

TRANSGENDER, INTERSEX, AND
BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION

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TRANSGENDER, INTERSEX, AND
BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION

by

Teresa J. Hornsby and Deryn Guest

SBL Press



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ABBREVIATIONS

AB	Anchor Bible
ABD	<i>Anchor Bible Dictionary</i> . Edited by David Noel Freedman. 6 vols. New York: Doubleday, 1992.
AOAT	Alter Orient und Altes Testament
AOTC	Abingdon Old Testament Commentaries
AUSS	<i>Andrews University Seminary Studies</i>
BAR	<i>Biblical Archaeology Review</i>
Berit Olam	Berit Olam: Studies in Hebrew Narrative and Poetry
<i>BibInt</i>	<i>Biblical Interpretation</i>
BibInt	Biblical Interpretation Series
BibOr	Biblica et Orientalia
BJS	Brown Judaic Studies
BMW	Bible in the Modern World
CBC	<i>Children's Bible in Colour</i>
GNB	Good News Bible
GCT	Gender, Culture, Theory
GLQ	<i>GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies</i>
HSM	Harvard Semitic Monographs
IDB	<i>Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible</i> . Edited by George A. Buttrick. 4 vols. New York: Abingdon, 1962.
JBL	<i>Journal of Biblical Literature</i>
JNES	<i>Journal of Near Eastern Studies</i>
JQR	<i>Jewish Quarterly Review</i>
JSNTSup	Journal for the Study of the New Testament Supplement Series
JSOTSup	Journal for the Study of the Old Testament Supplement Series
JSS	<i>Journal of Semitic Studies</i>
JTS	<i>Journal of Theological Studies</i>
KJV	King James Version

KTU	<i>Die keilalphabetischen Texte aus Ugarit</i> . Edited by Manfred Dietrich, Oswald Loretz, and Joaquín Sanmartín. 3rd ed. Münster: Ugarit-Verlag, 2013.
LHBOTS	Library of Hebrew Bible/Old Testament Studies
Mx.	Mixer
NCBC	New Century Bible Commentary
<i>Neot</i>	<i>Neotestamentica</i>
NIBCOT	New International Biblical Commentary on the Old Testament
NICOT	New International Commentary on the Old Testament
<i>NIDB</i>	<i>New Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible</i> . Edited by Katharine Doob Sakenfeld. 5 vols. Nashville: Abindgon, 2006–2009.
<i>NovT</i>	<i>Novum Testamentum</i>
NovTSup	Novum Testamentum Supplements
NRSV	New Revised Standard Version
OBT	Overtures to Biblical Theology
OTL	Old Testament Library
SemeiaSt	Semeia Studies
SHBC	Smyth and Helwys Bible Commentary
<i>Signs</i>	<i>Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society</i>
<i>TDOT</i>	<i>Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament</i> . Edited by G. Johannes Botterweck and Helmer Ringgren. Translated by John T. Willis et al. 15 vols. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974–2006.
UCOP	University of Cambridge Oriental Publications
VC	<i>Vigilae Christianae</i>
VT	<i>Vetus Testamentum</i>
WBC	Word Biblical Commentary
ZNW	<i>Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft</i>

INTRODUCTION: THE BODY AS DECOY

Teresa J. Hornsby

We are Internet-dependent here in the first world. It is where we get the morning news and updates on the personal and professional goings-on of friends and colleagues around the world; we learn about beer making, new music, and real estate deals; we watch films and listen to music; we read film reviews, book reviews, and stay connected with recent scholarship in all the varied academic arenas in which we work. It is disparate and chaotic, unstructured, without boundaries, and, simply put, a hot mess—and we like that. Our brains move seamlessly from fermentation processes to musings on life, the universe, and everything.

It was on Facebook that I came across the video clip from Katie Couric's 2014 interview with Carmen Carrera and Laverne Cox (Rude 2014). After asking Carrera pointed, invasive, and personal questions concerning her trans surgical¹ procedures, in order to “educate those who are not familiar with transgender” (and by the way, if someone wants to be “educated” about the surgical procedures or any of the hormonal regimens, Google it—it is all there), Couric turned to Cox with the same line of questions. Cox began by telling Couric about the lived experiences of trans people: that discrimination and violence occur disproportionately in the trans community when compared to other demographics. For example,

1. Throughout this volume, there is a deliberate space between “trans” and other terms, such as “surgical,” “people,” and “man.” The decision to do so is informed by Julia Serano (2007, 29), who argues that merging such terms reinforces that there is an unmarked “man” (or person, community, etc.) of which “transman” is a variant, “without ever bringing into question ... assumptions and beliefs about maleness and femaleness.” If trans studies are to problematize and call into question such assumptions, then our grammatical terminology needs to facilitate that. Having said that, we make two exceptions throughout: we use the terms “transgender” and “transsexual” primarily because we are following the designations of our sources.

in the United States, one in twelve of all trans persons will be physically assaulted (one in eight if you are a trans person of color) (Dunbar 2006). According to the National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs' 2012 report (NCAVP), this rate is one and a half times larger than nontrans lesbian/gay/bisexual (hereafter LGB) persons (cited in Rude 2014). In addition to the constant threat of physical violence, the attacks on transsexual persons are, predictably, economic. According to key findings of the 2009 report of the National Center for Transgender Equality and the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, in the United States, transgendered people have double the rate of unemployment than the population as a whole, 97 percent of the 6,450 respondents reported harassment on their jobs, and 15 percent exist below the poverty level, at an income of less than \$10,000 per year (cited in Rude 2014).

After reciting some of these statistics to Couric, Cox then shared the story of the murder of Islan Nettles, a trans woman of color who was beaten to death on August 17, 2013, and whose killer was set free. Cox told Couric (and us) that the public's preoccupation with genitalia and the physical aspects of transition "objectifies trans women and distracts from the real issues." She goes on to say, so eloquently and directly, that trans people are looking for justice, and "by focusing on bodies we don't focus on the lived realities of that oppression and that discrimination" (Rude 2014). This is a critical point: Is she saying that by focusing on physical bodies, we cannot attend to how those bodies are treated in the real world? Is she saying that by focusing on *specific* parts of the body (genitalia, eyes, hands, etc.) we are not doing justice to the whole body? Is she saying that specific body parts become a diversion that pulls the public's attention from the social constructedness and the social reception of the whole body? We do not mean to speak for Ms. Cox, but we would answer yes to all of these questions.

The bottom line is this: the complexity of bodies and their social destinies are all entangled within (and produced by) heteronormativity: the dominant belief system that relies on fixed and binary genders and the certainty that heterosexuality is the norm that occurs naturally, that is, apart from cultural influences. All other sexual relationships are deemed culturally produced (unnatural), are regulated and defined in relation to heterosexuality, and are thus devalued. In this system, females and males (whose bodies are produced *naturally*) are assumed to be the only appropriate sexual partners. Heterosexism, then, is a systematic social bias that stems from heteronormativity in which society rewards heterosexuals (in the form of economic benefits and civil rights) and punishes all other sexualities.

Closely related to heteronormativity, heterosexism would be the way that a heteronormative worldview is manifested within social contexts. If one assumes that heterosexuality is the norm, that it occurs naturally or that it is divinely blessed or sanctioned, then one also assumes that those persons who identify as heterosexual would receive more benefits, rights, and rewards and would be looked upon favorably in general. Everyone, then, who does not claim to be heterosexual is perceived and treated as a second-class citizen and is discriminated against in every level of social encounter (legal, medical, religious, psychiatric, etc.).

At the institutional level, heterosexism is evident. Even though the Supreme Court decision *Obergefell v. Hodges* in June 2015 legalized same-sex marriage across the United States, the full legal ramifications of the decision are yet to be worked out. Key issues such as adoption, custodial rights, hospital spousal rights (if hospitals give power of attorney or decision-making power to closest relatives, the same-sex partner can be excluded from visitation or critical health-care decisions), inheritance, and rights of survivorship to shared property are still uncertain. This uncertainty is particularly pronounced in areas where federal rights intersect with religious institutions (a same-sex couple may be able to adopt from the state, but can they adopt from Catholic Charities?). Even as marriage equity has won its day in court, sexual orientation is not a protected class, and therefore it remains perfectly legal to discriminate against LGB people in housing and employment in most cities and states.

Like sexism, racism, or classism, heterosexism depends upon the assumption that there is a “normal” (thus superior) way of being (divinely ordained and/or “natural”). Those who view themselves to be in the “better” of any of the previously mentioned binaries usually do not see the privilege society grants them—they may assume that those in the lesser binary do not deserve the same rights and privileges (this seems to be most evident in racism and in heterosexism), or they are ignorant (or in denial) of their own privilege.

Though at first glance it may seem that “heteronormativity” and its subsequent heterosexism are not explicitly bound to trans issues, on the contrary, heteronormativity with its dependence upon an artificial framework of only two, naturally occurring sexes (as determined by genitalia) is the lynchpin that holds together all of the justifications of the violence and discrimination that is placed upon trans bodies.

The intense amounts of violence and economic punishment are “logical” extensions of a belief that the trans person’s gender is “fake,” because

it does not occur “naturally” and is not connected to the sex that the trans person was born with (Serano 2007, 13). Thus, according to a dominant heterosexist/cissexist ideology, transsexuality is unnatural, deviant, and against God’s order, which therefore removes divine blessing and, in some instances, sanctions violence against it. Julia Serano points out that this belief that a gender is inauthentic if it cannot be connected to one’s sex is naïve. She writes, “We make assumptions every day about other people’s genders without ever seeing their birth certificates, their chromosomes, their genitals, their reproductive systems, their childhood socialization, or their legal sex. There is no such thing as a ‘real’ gender—there is only the gender we experience ourselves as and the gender we perceive others to be” (2007, 13).

If the power of heteronormativity resides in its unquestioned status of “normal” and its unchallenged place at the foundation of a sexuality that is “good” and “blessed,” the buttress of the whole façade is Bible translation and interpretation. Only in recent times (the last few decades) have scholars initiated a critique of the heterosexism that permeates all Bible reception at least since the nineteenth century. The burgeoning field of queer biblical studies has produced compelling scholarship, which seeks to show the heteronormative biases that punctuate biblical interpretation. For example, as one reads Genesis, apart from the example of Rebekah and Isaac, where does one actually find one man married to one woman? Apart from the purity codes of Leviticus, where does one find a clear condemnation of homoeroticism in the Hebrew Bible? How should one understand the place of Ebed-melech (Jer 38:7), an Ethiopian eunuch (intersex perhaps) who rescues Jeremiah and is blessed by God? Or, as we explore here, what can one make of Jezebel’s masculinity? Can we read Gen 1 in such a way that “the monstrous other” is indeed part of, not apart from, the Creator?

A prominent (and dominant) reading of the relationship of God to Israel (and later, Christ to the church) is one of husband and wife, the groom and the bride. Yet, ironically, as queer readers point out, the “people” of Israel and the “church” refer to “men” (as are God and Jesus). Thus, if one holds on to that metaphor of marriage, both examples are *same-sex* marriages. As postmodern readers of the Bible suggest, the reader makes meaning. Heteronormativity is not *in* the text, waiting to be discovered; the interpreter or reader brings the assumption of heteronormativity to the text and uses the text to justify heteronormativity.

Like the air we breathe, heteronormativity, heterosexism, and cissexism are pervasive yet invisible; it is an assumed and unquestioned notion

that there are only two naturally occurring and opposite sexes and that each is, naturally, attracted to the other. This heterosexual desire is created and blessed by a deity. These assumptions then dictate that there are only two genders. Hence, any and every expression of gender that does not “match” one’s assigned physical sex is rendered deviant; any sexual desire not directed to one’s opposite sex is aberrant. This aberrance is interpreted as sin or as unnatural, which justifies punishment and violence against sexual and gender “queers.”

Heteronormativity is a culturally produced ideology, justified and maintained institutionally through religious beliefs, economic and political systems, medical classifications, psychiatric diagnoses, and judicial processes. The dominant premise of heteronormativity permeates every detail of someone’s life: love, marriage, aging, death, reproduction, property ownership, leisure time, and every single other thing. Only in recent times has the “natural” occurrence of heteronormativity been challenged, and with this recognition has come a chipping away of the mighty fortresses of heterosexism. Through academic studies of heterosexuality and through the visibility and increased activism of those considered nonnormative by the dominant ideology, more and more are questioning the presumed natural, divinely blessed, and normal status of heterosexuality.

But as some of the sexual and gender queers move toward the center (finding some social acceptance through heteronormativity), the trans person is “the Other’s Other.” Those who live a gender that is different from their birth genitalia or those who change their physical sex to match their lived gender can find few allies. To some queer theorists, the idea that one is “born” a particular sex (regardless of genitals) and that one’s existing physical body must be altered to “match” the internal chemistry of one sex or the other flies in the face of the counteressentialist notions of gender upon which queer theory rests; gender is a socially constructed entity with no “essential” tie to physicality. Here it is necessary for gender theorists to recall Jay Prosser’s (1998, 84) reminder of the importance of the materiality of the body. Though the lived gender may be more or less aligned with one’s physicality, the performed masculinity or femininity lives out a subversion that maintains queerness; it is masculinity or femininity with a difference. A transsexual (one who opts for surgery) can do it in a quieter way (than posttranssexual activists such as Sandy Stone or Kate Bornstein, for example) that acknowledges the comfort gained from body/gender alignment while also acknowledging a trans history.

To a general Christian laity, the body is as God made it, and sex and gender are inextricably bound. In this mind-set, to alter one's God-given genitalia is "unnatural" and, in lay terms, sinful. Thus the trans person has no advocate here. What we offer in this volume are alternative readings of foundational Bible texts that refuse to pit order and chaos against one another (ch. 2) and show that any sexed body can perform any gender (ch. 1).

Additionally, there is no haven, particularly for the male-to-female (MTF) trans person, within radical feminism. We see an emerging and continuing transphobia, particularly as it is presented in the work of Sheila Jeffreys, Julie Bindel, and Janice Raymond. Jeffreys (2005, 53–58) understands MTF surgery as a reiteration and tragic reproduction of impossible, misogynist, and oppressive standards of beauty for women. In *Transsexual Empire: The Making of the She-Male*, Raymond (1979) describes transsexual surgery as an invention of the medical industry for profit. Bindel (2004) claims that transsexualism reinforces the notion of gender essentialism. She writes, "I don't have a problem with men disposing of their genitals, but it does not make them women, in the same way that shoving a bit of vacuum hose down your 501s does not make you a man." In the same vein, Elinor Burkett (2015), writing in response to a media frenzy caused by Caitlyn (née Bruce) Jenner's public statement that her brain is more female than male and that femininity is expressed primarily through fashion and "feminine" emotions, states that

[MTFs'] truth is not my truth. Their female identities are not my female identity. They haven't traveled through the world as women and been shaped by all that this entails. They haven't suffered through business meetings with men talking to their breasts or woken up after sex terrified they'd forgotten to take their birth control pills the day before. They haven't had to cope with the onset of their periods in the middle of a crowded subway, the humiliation of discovering that their male work partners' checks were far larger than theirs, or the fear of being too weak to ward off rapists.

From that critical perspective, Jeffreys, Bindel, Raymond, and Burkett do have a point: there are experiences that women-born-women have endured throughout their lives that are part of a shared identity. Yet does this reduce the category of "woman" to one of victimhood? Perhaps that reduction is, in light of historical realities, appropriate. Does this then require that we claim that "the oppressed" is a feminine category?

Again, this does seem to be another historical reality. This line of feminist ideology reflects the productions of power that Michel Foucault (1978) describes: sex is invented to produce and keep power in place. Moreover, as Judith Butler (1990) asserts, “sex” is produced by an imaginary gender binary. If “feminine” is reiterated as “oppressed” and “weak” in feminist discourse, it is an example of the production of the category “woman” that seeks to thwart a dissolution of gender boundaries (which are, ultimately, the foundation of all power). In other words, all misogyny rests upon the (usually well-intentioned) impulse to define “woman.”

In that reiteration of the gender binary, where does that leave the autonomy and personhood of one who chooses to physically transition? That oppression then becomes attached to her new body. Radical feminism here misses the point: in its defense of women-born-women (another category of “woman”), radical feminists overlook the source of villainy—misogyny—which is maintained by the two-gendered system. If such a system were not in place, if the categories of “male” and “female” were allowed to dissolve, the “protection” of the category “woman” would not be necessary. By defending the category “woman” at the expense of those who are in fact dissolving the binary, we are defining (confining) women; the two-gendered system is reinforced. The phobia that radical feminism places upon the bodies of trans women is simply misogyny in different clothing. As Deryn Guest writes later in this volume,

the road to transsexuality *does* subvert supposed coherence between sex and gender. It disturbs, it unhinges expectations, and it prompts violence. But once the chosen gender is inhabited, do we lose that subversion because the person occupying it is pressured to demonstrate that their sex and gender are congruent? No. The lived femininity (or masculinity) is a different femininity. (ch. 3)

As gay and lesbian cissexuals are enjoying more social acceptance (as witnessed in recent same-sex marriage legislation in the first world), it has come at a cost of creating (or, rather, solidifying) the transgendered person as “other.” The “acceptable gays,” those who have become models for human rights issues (such as marriage, adoption, and nondiscriminatory practices in employment and housing) tend to be men and women whose lifestyle mirrors heterosexual monogamy. As gays and lesbians find a place in the church, the church’s message tends to be, “We accept you because you are ‘good’ like us,” rather than, “We accept you just as you

are because you are a child of God.” The trans person is excluded. We are reminded of a punk anthem, “Domesticated Queer”:

There is no fucking diversity
 No victory over hate
 No tolerance or acceptance
 We just assimilate
 Thought we had it all
 But lets be sincere
 All that we’ve become
 Domesticated Queers!
 You know they’re gonna love you
 Cause you’re just like them!
 You know they’re gonna love you
 Cause you’re just like them!
 You know they’re gonna love you
 Cause you’re just like them!
 You know they’ll fuck you over
 Cause you’re just like them.
 Say we pick our battles
 So we can win the war
 Someone please remind me
 What the hell we’re fighting for?
 Go tell that little faggot
 No high heels at the polls
 Too queer to be here
 We just want your vote²

The lyrics reflect the quasi-acceptance of the trans person as a means to a political end but not much acceptance beyond that. Trans people become an unwanted other at many LGB “family friendly” events.

The trans person becomes the lightning rod, because he or she makes a private struggle public. On a fundamental level, the trans person’s battle is about personal autonomy. Neither queer theory, nor fundamentalist Christianity, nor radical feminism gives the individual the power to choose a sex and/or gender for oneself. Queer theory posits that culture determines gender, which usually remains a binary; Christian fundamentalists posit that God determines the sex, which therefore determines the

2. “Domesticated Queer.” Words and music by Rebecca I. Doss, 2014. See <http://www.c-rex.com/#!about/guq4k>.

gender; and radical feminism sees the production of gender as an extension of power, that those who hold fast to gender stereotypes are collaborators in the oppression of women. It seems to us that Bible scholarship has a unique role to play here—one that empowers the individual to live fully in his or her chosen (or rejected) gender and/or sex.

So, to revisit Cox's assertion that attention to the trans body diverts us from the real issues, I would say this: attention to the trans body is *good* if it is indeed the *whole* body. Rather, what we witness, as far as trans bodies are concerned (and indeed, the bodies of all *others*), is a hyperfocus on body parts (usually the genitals); those parts then are allowed to represent the entire person. If the social body is intellectually dissected, with hyperattention paid to the genitalia, we cannot be surprised that the public is unable and unwilling to accept the full humanity of the trans person. As we note in chapter 3, that body becomes "monstrous." More, the rhetorical violence upon the body desensitizes the public to the material and real violence that follows.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

Already in this short introduction, we have used words that may not be familiar to many readers. For example, *cissexuals* are simply those who present and live a gender that is the same as the one with which they were assigned at birth. Serano (2007, 12) defines the corresponding term *cissexism* as "the belief that transsexuals' identified genders are inferior to, or less authentic than, those of cissexuals (i.e., people who are not transsexual and who have only ever experienced their subconscious and physical sexes as being aligned)." Thus cissexuals experience some social privilege that trans people may not. As with heterosexism (and racism, classism, and sexism), privilege is invisible to the dominant group, and basic privileges are denied to the "lesser" group—in this case, noncissexuals (transsexual/transgender persons). Since Western social arrangements depend upon *heteronormativity* (there being two, and only two, sexes that occur naturally), cissexuals' privilege tends to occur on a more personal level (in addition to institutional biases).³ To some this may seem to be a trivial matter, but, for example, transgendered persons are often denied equal access to public restrooms or department store fitting rooms. However, this ostensibly slight discrimination is critical for this reason: all of

3. For a discussion of "heteronormativity" and "heterosexism," see page 84.

Western culture stands upon a two-sex system. The one way this system is concretized (made “real”) is through the separation of the physical, naked body in public space (restrooms and dressing rooms). If there is any intrusion into the fantasy of a “two sexes and two genders” system, the center cannot hold. It is no coincidence, then, that violence against trans persons is extraordinarily high, which appears to be connected to the very high occasion of suicide attempts. Cox’s (and our additional) statistics above attest to all the ways that a culture, whose existence depends upon heteronormativity, will punish those who fail to do their gender right.

You may have noticed that we are not using words such as *transsexual*, *transgendered*, *queer*, or *genderqueer* in reference to a trans person. We are not opposed to these terms in general, but we are choosing to use the descriptor *trans* simply for its inclusivity *and* its specificity. We find that with the addition of *sexual* or *gender* to *trans*, people assume that we are making a distinction between those who physically alter their bodies and those who have not. Furthermore, many of us have worn the clothes of our nonbirth gender since we could choose for ourselves. So at what point does one consider oneself to be “transgendered”? Is it only at the point that one senses a social aversion directed at her or him or *them* (a pronoun that is often preferred in order to eliminate the binary)? Regardless of what may or may not be concealed under one’s clothes, trans people still experience the same social attitudes.⁴

We are also not using the term *queer* to describe trans people. Though an inclusive concept that serves as an umbrella for persons who do not fit neatly into a category (which is, of course, everyone), “queer” is too broad. While all trans persons could be included in the grouping “queer,” not all queers are trans persons. Trans persons receive disproportionately greater incidence of discrimination and violence. There must be a more specific descriptor for this distinct group toward which so much social hatred is directed. There is a much more nuanced discussion of these terms in chapter 3.

CISSEXUALS WRITING ABOUT TRANS PEOPLE?

We, the authors of this volume, are white, and we receive all of the privilege that society bestows upon our race. We are academics, which sug-

4. For a discussion of how and why Guest specifically models a trans gaze and not a transsexual gaze, see ch. 2.

gests that we enjoy a certain amount of class privilege as well. Some of this privilege is lessened because we are women, and a portion of that privilege is also reduced by being visibly *queer* women. Yet even in our queer female bodies, we do not experience the same terror that our trans friends are likely to encounter each time they enter a strange place or walk down an unfamiliar street or attempt to use a public restroom. We (mostly) do not fear being fired from our jobs or being refused housing. We are fairly certain that if we are violently attacked, the assailant will be prosecuted and sentenced. Despite the clear privilege that we enjoy in our presumed cissexuality and the corresponding lack of empathetic understanding for pressing trans issues that we may have as a result, we choose to write what we hope to be something that moves us toward social justice and civil rights for trans persons; movement, in a good world, would lead to acceptance, love, and celebration.

This volume, *Transgender, Intersex, and Biblical Interpretation*, is itself a bit queer in that it is a collection of essays by two authors, yet it should be read as an integral unit. While each chapter can be a stand-alone essay, our claim is that biblical narratives have been read and continue to be read through a gender-binary lens with heteronormative bias. In each chapter, we offer an example of how paradigmatic narratives are radically transformed when we read without the assumptions that go along with that binary and acknowledge the presence of ambiguously gendered subjectivities. Deryn Guest “troubles” the binary in chapters 2 and 3 by rereading Gen 1 and the Jezebel-Jehu encounter in 2 Kgs 9–10, respectively; Teresa Hornsby reassesses King David’s dance in 2 Sam 5–6 and the Christian Apocalypse in chapters 4 and 5, respectively. In a concise description of what we are doing in this volume, Guest writes in chapter 3 that “applying the trans gaze to biblical texts is a vital new hermeneutical lens that can offset the heteronormative ends to which biblical texts are often put and provide a counterdiscourse to those who use the Bible to denounce transgender or transsexual persons.” In short, we are trying to undo the heteronormative way in which biblical texts have been read and used; we are both using the lens of trans theory to interpret texts in new and illuminating ways; we are both committed to the ethical imperative to do this given the way Scriptures can be mobilized for transphobic purposes; and we are both working toward more inclusive curricula for the field of biblical studies. These are the perspectives and goals that unify the constituent chapters and hold the book together.