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Philo of Alexandria’s Exposition of the Tenth Commandment
PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA’S EXPOSITION OF THE TENTH COMMANDMENT

Hans Svebakken

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Behold me daring, not only to read the sacred messages of Moses, but also in my love of knowledge to peer into each of them and unfold and reveal what is not known to the multitude.

Philo of Alexandria, *De specialibus legibus* 3.6
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This has been a long journey, and I consider its completion a great blessing. Unsure of how to express my deepest sense of gratitude, I’ll let Philo have the last word, in honor of our many hours together: “It is for God to give benefits and for mortals to give thanks, since they have nothing else to give in return” (Plant. 130).
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations of primary sources are those of *The SBL Handbook of Style* (ed. Patrick H. Alexander et al.; Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1999), with the following exceptions:

**Primary Sources**


**Mazz.** Claudio Mazzarelli, “Raccolta e interpretazione delle testimonianze e dei frammenti del medioplatonico Eudoro di
Alessandria: Parte prima: Testo e traduzione delle testimonianze e dei frammenti sicuri,” Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica 77 (1985): 197–209. Cited by fragment number and line (e.g., 1.10).


<table>
<thead>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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**Secondary Sources**

- AB Anchor Bible
- ACPQ *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*
- AJP *American Journal of Philology*
- ALGHJ Arbeiten zur Literatur und Geschichte des hellenistischen Judentums
- AMMTC Ancient Mediterranean and Medieval Texts and Contexts
- AMP Ancient and Medieval Philosophy
- AP *Ancient Philosophy*
- ARGU Arbeiten zur Religion und Geschichte des Urchristentums
- ASE Annali di storia dell’esegesi
- ASNSP Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa
- ASR Annali di scienze religiose
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BBB</td>
<td>Bonner biblische Beiträge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEATAJ</td>
<td>Beiträge zur Erforschung des Alten Testaments und des antiken Judentum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEHE</td>
<td>Bibliotheca de l’École des hautes études</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BICSSup</td>
<td>Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies: Supplements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BJS</td>
<td>Brown Judaic Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BThSt</td>
<td>Biblisch-Theologische Studien</td>
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<tr>
<td>BU</td>
<td>Biblische Untersuchungen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BZAW</td>
<td>Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die altestamentliche Wissenschaft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBQ</td>
<td>Catholic Biblical Quarterly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBQMS</td>
<td>Catholic Biblical Quarterly Monograph Series</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCWJCW</td>
<td>Cambridge Commentaries on Writings of the Jewish and Christian World 200 BC to AD 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEC</td>
<td>Collection d’études classiques</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJA</td>
<td>Christianity and Judaism in Antiquity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CQ</td>
<td>Classical Quarterly</td>
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<tr>
<td>CR</td>
<td>Classical Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRINT</td>
<td>Compendia Rerum Iudaicarum ad Novum Testamentum</td>
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<td>CS</td>
<td>Collected Studies</td>
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<td>CSCP</td>
<td>Cornell Studies in Classical Philology</td>
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<td>CSP</td>
<td>Cornell Studies in Philosophy</td>
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<td>CUAPS</td>
<td>Catholic University of America Patristic Studies</td>
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<td>CWS</td>
<td>Classics of Western Spirituality. New York, 1978—</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCLY</td>
<td>Deuterocanonical and Cognate Literature Yearbook</td>
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<tr>
<td>ELA</td>
<td>Études de littérature ancienne</td>
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<tr>
<td>EP</td>
<td>Études platoniciennes</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPM</td>
<td>Études de philosophie médiévale</td>
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<tr>
<td>ETL</td>
<td>Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses</td>
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<tr>
<td>ETR</td>
<td>Études théologiques et religieuses</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUSLR</td>
<td>Emory University Studies in Law and Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIOTL</td>
<td>Formation and Interpretation of Old Testament Literature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FJCD</td>
<td>Forschungen zum jüdisch-christlichen Dialog</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRBS</td>
<td>Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRRS</td>
<td>Greco-Roman Religion Series</td>
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<tr>
<td>HBS</td>
<td>Herders Biblische Studien</td>
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<tr>
<td>HPhQ</td>
<td>History of Philosophy Quarterly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSCP</td>
<td>Harvard Studies in Classical Philology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HTR</td>
<td>Harvard Theological Review</td>
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</table>
JACE    Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum, Ergänzungsband
JBL    Journal of Biblical Literature
JHS    Journal of Hellenic Studies
JJML    Journal of Jewish Music and Liturgy
JJS    Journal of Jewish Studies
JLAS    Journal of Jewish Law Association Studies
JSH    Journal of Sport History
JSHRZ    Jüdische Schriften aus hellenistisch-römischer Zeit
JSPSup    Journal for the Study of the Pseudepigrapha: Supplement Series
JTS    Journal of Theological Studies
LTE    Library of Theological Ethics
MCL    Martin Classical Lectures
MScRel    Mélanges de science religieuse
MdB    Le monde de la Bible
MP    Museum Patavinum
NAWG    Nachrichten von der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen
NovT    Novum Testamentum
NovTSup    Supplements to Novum Testamentum
NTOA    Novum Testamentum et Orbis Antiquus
OBO    Orbis biblicus et orientalis
OPM    Oxford Philosophical Monographs
OTM    Oxford Theological Monographs
PA    Philosophia Antiqua
PASSV    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume
PBACAP    Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy
Ph&PhenR    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
PhilSup    Philologus: Supplementband
PHR    Problèmes d’histoire des religions
REG    Revue des études grecques
REL    Revue des études latines
RKAM    Religion und Kultur der alten Mittelmeerwelt in Parallel forschungen
RM    Review of Metaphysics
RMCS    Routledge Monographs in Classical Studies
RSR    Recherches de science religieuse
RTL    Revue théologique de Louvain
SA    Studia Anselmiana
SAP    Studien zur antiken Philosophie
SBLTT    Society of Biblical Literature Texts and Translations
SBS  Stuttgarter Bibelstudien
ScEs  *Science et esprit*
SCHNT Studia ad corpus hellenisticum Novi Testamenti
ScrTh *Scripta Theologica*
SF    *Studi filosofici*
SJLA  Studies in Judaism in Late Antiquity
SPh   *Southern Journal of Philosophy*
SNTSMS Society for New Testament Studies Monograph Series
SO    *Symbolae Osloenses*
SPhA  *Studia Philonica Annual*
SPhA  Studies in Philo of Alexandria
SPhAMA Studies in Philo of Alexandria and Mediterranean Antiquity
SSEJC Studies in Scripture in Early Judaism and Christianity
STA   Studia et Testimonia Antiqua
SUNT  Studien zur Umwelt des Neuen Testaments
TSAJ  Texte und Studien zum antiken Judentum
TSHP  New Synthese Historical Library: Texts and Studies in the History of Philosophy
TSP   Trivium: Special Publications
TUGAL Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur
VC    *Vigiliae Christianae*
VC Sup Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae
VT Sup Supplements to Vetus Testamentum
WMANT Wissenschaftliche Monographien zum Alten und Neuen Testament
WS    *Wiener Studien: Zeitschrift für Klassische Philologie und Patristik*
WS    World Spirituality: An Encyclopedic History of the Religious Quest
WTS   Wijsgerige Teksten en Studies
WUNT  Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament
ZNW   *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche*
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The Septuagint version of Exodus 20:17, translated literally, reads as follows:

You shall not desire your neighbor’s wife. You shall not desire your neighbor’s house, nor his field, nor his male servant, nor his female servant, nor his ox, nor his beast of burden, nor any of his flock, nor anything that is your neighbor’s.¹

This is the last of the Ten Commandments,² and although Philo of Alexandria (ca. 20 B.C.E.–50 C.E.) must have known the full biblical version,³ he cites the Tenth Commandment simply as “You shall not desire” (οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις), indicating that in his view the principle concern of this Commandment is desire itself (ἐπιθυμία), not desire’s object.⁴


² The Ten Commandments appear first in Exod 20:1–17 (cf. Deut 5:1–21) spoken by God and so become known as the “ten words,” or in modern usage the “Decalogue” (N.B. LXX Deut 10:4: τοὺς δέκα λόγους). Philo often refers to them as οἱ δέκα λόγοι (e.g., Decal. 154, Spec. 1.1) or δέκα λόγια (e.g., Decal. 36, Spec. 3.7).


⁴ In Spec. 4.78, Philo cites the Tenth Commandment as an abbreviated, two-word prohibition: “Let us turn now to the last of the Ten Words (δέκα λόγιον) … ‘You shall not desire’ (οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις)” (my translation; unless otherwise noted, all translations of Philo’s writings are from PLCL.) In Decal. 142, he clearly has this abbreviated version in mind: “Finally, he places a prohibition on desiring (τελευταίον δ’ἐπιθυμεῖν ὑπαγορεύειν), knowing that desire (τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν) is crafty and treacherous (νεοτέρησιν καὶ ἐπιβουλον)” (my translation). ( Cf. Decal. 173: πέμπτον [of the second tablet] δὲ τὸ ἀνεύριον τὴν τῶν ἀδικημάτων πηγήν, ἐπιθυμίαν; Her. 173: ἡ δὲ ἐπέτερα πεντάς ἑστὶν ἀπαγόρευσις μοιχείας, ἀνδροφοβίας, κλοπῆς, ψευδομαρτυρίας, ἐπιθυμίας.) In his discussion of the Tenth Commandment (Decal. 142–153, 173–174; Spec. 4.78b–131), Philo mentions none
This monograph explains in detail Philo’s exposition of the Tenth Commandment. As an introduction, this chapter (1) situates Philo’s exposition within his larger corpus of works, (2) summarizes the nature and content of the exposition, (3) explains the value of the exposition, (4) reviews prior research, and (5) outlines the plan of the monograph.

Philo’s Commentary on Mosaic Legislation

Philo describes the contents of the Pentateuch as a sequence of three topics: creation, history, and legislation. In a series of works known collectively as the Exposition of the Law, he offers an exegesis of the Pentateuch using these topics as his basic outline. The Exposition begins with a treatise on the creation of the world (De opificio mundi), continues with a set of of the prohibited objects of desire listed in the LXX version (οἰκία, ἄγριος, παῖς, παιδίσκη, βοῦς, ψαρζύγων, κτήνος), with the exception of γονή, which appears once in a list that includes also “reputation” (δόξα) and categorically “anything else that produces pleasure” (τινὸς ἄλλου τῶν ἁδουν ὄπεργαζομένου) (Decal. 151). Similarly, πλησίον, an essential element of the LXX version (τοῦ πλησίον σου ... ὥσα τῷ πλησίον σου ἑστιν), appears only once (Spec. 4.93), and there it involves Platonic psychology: the θυμός, or spirited part of the soul, is a “neighbor” to the λόγος, or rational part. 

5 “The oracles delivered through the prophet Moses are of three kinds (τρεῖς ἱδέας). The first deals with the creation of the world (ἡν μὲν περί κοσμοσποιίας), the second with history (ἡν δὲ ἱστορικήν) and the third with legislation (ἡν δὲ τρίτην νομοθετικήν)” (Praem. 1). The same classification appears in Mos. 2.46–47, although Philo initially identifies only two parts: (1) the historical part (ἱστορικὸν μέρος), which he subdivides into two sections dealing respectively with the creation of the world (κόσμου γενέσεως) and genealogy (γενεαλογικόν), and (2) the part dealing with commands and prohibitions (περὶ προστάξεως καὶ ἄποροτοσεως). The part dealing with commands and prohibitions corresponds to the third topic in Praem. 1, while the subdivisions of the first part correspond to the first two topics in Praem. 1. (On the relation between γενεαλογικός and ἱστορικός, see F. H. Colson’s note on Mos. 2.47 in PLCL 6, 606; also PLCL 8, 313, n. a.) On the correlation of Praem. 1 and Mos. 2.46–47, see also Peder Borgen, “Philo of Alexandria,” in Jewish Writings of the Second Temple Period (ed. M. E. Stone; vol. 2 of The Literature of the Jewish People in the Period of the Second Temple and the Talmud; CRINT 2; Assen: Van Gorcum, 1984), 233–82, 234, n. 5; Richard Hecht, “Preliminary Issues in the Analysis of Philo’s De Specialibus Legibus,” SPh 5 (1978): 1–55, 3; Leopold Cohn, “Einteilung und Chronologie der Schriften Philos,” PhilSup 7 (1899): 387–143, 405–06.

treatises on the patriarchs (De Abraamo and De Josepho), and ends with a set of treatises on Mosaic legislation (De decalogo, De specialibus legibus 1–4, and De virtutibus). This last set dealing with legislation consists thematically of only two parts, despite its formal division into six treatises: the first comprises De decalogo and practically all of De specialibus legibus (1.1–4.132), the second comprises the remainder of De specialibus legibus (4.133–238) and De virtutibus. In both parts, Philo cites then analyzes laws, noting mostly their literal bearing on practical and ethical matters. But the real

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7 See Cristina Termini, “The Historical Part of the Pentateuch According to Philo of Alexandria: Biography, Genealogy, and the Philosophical Meaning of the Patriarchal Lives,” in History and Identity: How Israel’s Later Authors Viewed Its Earlier History (ed. Núria Calduch-Benages and Jan Liesen; DCLY 2006; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2006), 265–95. Originally, the set included treatises also on Isaac and Jacob (see Ios. 1), which are now lost. Most assign these treatises to the “history” portion of the creation-history-legislation triad of Praem. 1 (e.g., Borgen, “Philo,” 237–38). Some, however, assign them to the legislative portion, based on Philo’s claim that the patriarchs themselves represent unwritten counterparts to the written laws he begins to consider in De decalogo (see Abr. 3–4). The historical portion, in this configuration, consists of Philo’s Allegorical Commentary, a separate series of treatises covering most of Genesis (on which see Borgen, “Philo,” 243–44; Morris, “Philo,” 830–40). Valentin Nikiprowetzky, for example, holds this view: see PAPM 23, 13, and Commentaire, 234–35, n. 217. But if the correlation of Praem. 1 and Mos. 2.46–47 is correct, the legislative portion mentioned in Praem. 1 corresponds explicitly to “commands and prohibitions” in Mos. 2.46 and cannot reasonably include the lives of the patriarchs. For other problems with this view, see Cohn, “Einteilung und Chronologie,” 406, n. 23; cf. Morris, “Philo,” 845–46, n. 134.

8 Another treatise, De praemiis et poenis, immediately follows De virtutibus and concludes the Exposition. In Praem. 2–3, Philo states that he has fully discussed (i.e., finished) the legislative section in the preceding treatises and is moving on to a new topic: “the rewards and punishments which the good and the bad have respectively to expect.” De praemiis et poenis thus forms a fitting conclusion to the Exposition, insofar as the stipulated rewards and punishments are contingent on observance of the laws. But it does not form part of the legislative section proper, because it does not deal with the laws themselves. Philo’s treatise on Moses, De vita Mosis 1–2, is closely connected with, but not part of, the Exposition (see Erwin R. Goodenough, “Philo’s Exposition of the Law and His De Vita Mosis,” HTR 26 [1933]: 109–25).

9 Philo makes an explicit transition from one major topic to another in Spec. 4.132–34. For division of the same material into the same two parts, see points B and C on Peder Borgen’s outline of the Exposition (“Philosopher or Editor,” 118).

10 In Decal. 1 Philo announces that his investigation of the written laws will not neglect allegorical interpretations, when they are warranted, and indeed it does not (e.g., Spec. 2.29–31). Nevertheless, Philo’s legal commentary tends to avoid allegory, in some instances offering only a literal treatment of laws read allegorically in the Allegorical Commentary (see Colson, PLCL 7, xiii, n. c, and Isaak Heinemann, PCH 2, 4, n. 1, for examples, such as Ebr. 14–95 vs. Spec. 2.232 on Deut 21:18–21). Samuel Sandmel (“Philo Judaeus: An Introduction to the Man, His Writings, and His Significance,” ANRW 21.1:3–46, 10) thus goes too far in saying: “The treatises in [the ‘Exposition of the Law’] are no less allegorical than those in the ‘Allegory of the Law.’”
commentary on Mosaic legislation in Philo’s Exposition is the first part (Decal. 1–Spec. 4.132), which he frames as a unified, systematic, and comprehensive exposition of Mosaic commands and prohibitions, using an organizational scheme based on the Ten Commandments.\footnote{Praem. 2 suggests that part one (Decal. 1–Spec. 4.132) represents, from Philo’s perspective, the Pentateuch’s “legislative part” proper (thus Borgen, “Philosopher or Editor,” 132–33; cf. Borgen, “Philo,” 239–40). Part two (Spec. 4.133–238 and Virt.) has a different organizational scheme (categorization by virtues, not Commandments [see Spec. 4.133–35]) and is secondary to part one in terms of both length and design. Part one is roughly three times as large (ca. 277 vs. ca. 95 pages in PCW); but, more importantly, part one represents Philo’s principal effort to organize all Mosaic precepts into a single logical system (on which see esp. Yehoshua Amir, “The Decalogue According to Philo,” in The Ten Commandments in History and Tradition [ed. B.-L. Segal and G. Levi; Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1990], 121–60, 128–30; idem, “Philon und die jüdische Wirklichkeit seiner Zeit,” in Die hellenistische Gestalt des Judentums bei Philon von Alexandria [FJCD 5; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1983], 3–51, esp. 42–44 [=“Das System der Gebote”]). In this respect, part two serves as a catchall, accommodating laws that do not fit neatly into Philo’s primary scheme (see Amir, “Decalogue,” 127; Morris, “Philo,” 851).}


I will proceed to describe the laws (τοὺς νόμους) themselves in order, with this necessary statement by way of introduction, that some of them (οὓς μὲν) God judged fit to deliver in His own person alone without employing any other, and some (οὓς δὲ) through His prophet Moses whom He chose as of all men the best suited to be the revealer of verities. Now we find that those
which He gave in His own person and by His own mouth alone are\textsuperscript{13} (συμβέβηκε) both laws and heads summarizing the particular laws (καὶ νόμους ... καὶ νόμων τῶν ἐν μέρει κεφάλαια), but those in which He spoke through the prophet all belong to the former class. (Decal. 18–19)

Two key traits set the Ten Commandments apart. First, God delivered them personally to the Israelites without a human mediator.\textsuperscript{14} Second, each of the Ten Commandments has a unique dual significance: like any law, it stands on its own as a distinct ethical imperative, but it also functions as the “head” (κεφάλαιον) or “summary” of an entire category of particular laws (νόμων τῶν ἐν μέρει).\textsuperscript{15}

In Philo’s view, God delivered each of the Ten Commandments “in the form of a summary,”\textsuperscript{16} stating succinctly what Moses spells out at length by means of additional laws found elsewhere in the Pentateuch.\textsuperscript{17} These other laws form a distinct set of subsidiary precepts, which—despite their

\textsuperscript{13} Substituting “are” (συμβέβηκε) for Colson’s “include,” which does not properly emphasize the dual nature of each Commandment. Cf. Nikiprowetzky, PAPM 23 (“sont non seulement des lois, mais aussi les principes qui commandent le détail des lois particulières”); Treitel, PCH 1 (“sind zugleich Gesetze und Grundprinzipien”); Francesca Calabi, Filone di Alessandria, De Decalogo (Philosophica 24; Pisa: ETS, 2005) (“sono leggi e principi delle leggi particolari”).

\textsuperscript{14} E.g., Spec. 2.189. Philo rejects an anthropomorphic concept of God speaking to the Israelites, developing instead the notion of a miraculous “divine voice” created especially for the occasion (Decal. 32–35; for analysis see Amir, “Decalogue,” 135–48; also Reinhard Weber, Das “Gesetz” bei Philon von Alexandrien und Flavius Josephus: Studien zum Verständnis und zur Funktion der Thora bei den beiden Hauptzeugen des hellenistischen Judentums (ARGU 11; Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2001), 68–77.

\textsuperscript{15} E.g., Decal. 154: “[W]e must not forget that the Ten Words (οἱ δέκα λόγοι) are summaries of the special laws (κεφάλαια νόμων εἰς τῶν ἐν εἰδetu which are recorded in the Sacred Books and run through the whole of the legislation” (substituting “Words” [λόγοι] for Colson’s “Covenants”). Thus the title of De decalogo: περὶ τῶν δέκα λόγων, οἷον κεφάλαια νόμων εἰς τὸν κεφάλαιον, see Termini, “Taxonomy,” 5–6.

\textsuperscript{16} κεφαλαίωδες τύπῳ (Spec. 4.78; also Decal. 168); cf. Gaius 178–79: “We determined to give Gaius a document, presenting in a summarized form (κεφαλαίωδη τύπων) the story of our sufferings and our claims. This document was practically an epitome (ἐπιτομή) of a longer supplication which we had sent to him a short time before through the hands of King Agrippa.”

\textsuperscript{17} E.g., Decal. 175: “For it was in accordance with His nature that the pronouncements in which the special laws were summed up (κεφάλαια μὲν τῶν ἐν εἰδεῖ νόμων) should be given by Him in His own person, but the particular laws (νόμους δὲ τοὺς ἐν τῷ μέρει) by the mouth of the most perfect of the prophets whom He selected for his merits and having filled him with the divine spirit, chose him to be the interpreter of His sacred utterances.” Cf. Congr. 120, where these ten are “general heads (γενικὰ κεφάλαια), embracing the vast multitude of particular laws (τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἄρχουσι νόμων), the roots (ῥίζαι), the sources (ἀρχαί), the perennial fountains of ordinances (πηγαῖ ἀέναι διατηρητῶν) containing commandments positive and prohibitive (προσταξίως καὶ ἀπαγορεύσεις περιεχόντων) for the profit of those who follow them.”
individual variety—all express in some way the moral essence of their respective summary Commandment. Philo characterizes this unique relationship of particular law(s) to summary Commandment in a variety of ways. In terms of status, the particular laws are all subordinate to their respective “heads,” as Philo’s use of ὑπό (“under”) and related compounds clearly indicates. In terms of function, they all “refer to” (ἀναφέρεσθαι; ἀναφορὰν λαμβάνειν) a single summary command, serving or promoting its moral purpose in some way. But in abstract terms, Philo envisions the relationship between summary Commandment and particular law(s) as that of genus to species.

The treatises De decalogo and De specialibus legibus represent, at least in part, Philo’s painstaking and systematic attempt to illustrate this genus-species relationship. His treatise on the Ten Commandments deals with the ten genera, expounding each of the Commandments in sequence (Decal. 50–153) and introducing the idea of their summary function (Decal. 154–75). His treatise on the particular laws (De specialibus legibus) again expounds the ten genera, in even greater depth, but goes on to identify and comment on their respective species. The Pentateuch itself never uses a genus-species taxonomy to organize precepts systematically, so Philo must

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18 For the particular laws as simply “under” (ὑπό) their respective heads, see Decal. 170; as “arranged under” (ὑποτάσσομαι), see Decal. 168, 171; as “falling under” (ὑποπίπτειν), see Decal. 174 (cf. ὑποστέλλειν in Decal. 157, Spec. 4.1, and Spec. 4.132).

19 E.g., Spec. 2.223: “I have now completed the discussion of the number seven [i.e., the fourth “head” (cf. Spec. 2.39)] and of matters connected with days and months and years that have reference to that number (τῶν εἰς αὐτήν ἀναφερομένων).” Spec. 2.242: “I have gone through the five heads of laws (κεφάλαια νόμων) that belong to the first table, along with whatever particular laws have reference to each of them (ὅσα τῶν κατὰ μέρος εἰς ἠκοστὸν ἐλάμβανε τὴν ἀναφορὰν)” (my translation). Cf. Leg. 2.102: “This is practically the summation (τὸ κεφάλαιον) of the whole Song [of Moses], to which every other part refers (ἐφ’ ὧν ἀλλα πάντα ἀναφέρεται)” (my translation). In Hist. eccl. 2.18.5, Eusebius refers to De specialibus legibus as Περὶ τῶν ἀναφερομένων ἐν εἰδεῖ νόμων εἰς τὸ συντείνοντα κεφάλαια τῶν δέκα λόγων α’ β’ γ’ δ’.

20 The δέκα λόγοι are τά … γένη τῶν ἐν εἰδεὶ νόμων (Spec. 1.1; Spec. 3.125: τὰ γένη τῶν ἐν εἰδεὶ νόμων) and thus “generic” (Congr. 120: γενικά κεφάλαια; Her. 167: τῶν γενικῶν δέκα νόμων; Her. 173: γενικοὶ … κανόνες). On this as a legal taxonomy in Philo, see esp. Jastram, “Generic Virtue,” 30–35. Jastram’s remarks situate the legal taxonomy in the context of Philo’s broader application(s) of the genus-species concept (see his chapter one, “Theory of Genus, Species, and Particular,” 10–72). Termini, “Taxonomy,” argues that Philo’s application of a genus-species taxonomy to Mosaic legislation is radically innovative, although his interest in the systematic organization of legal materials reflects contemporary trends in Roman jurisprudence.

21 Philo first treats introductory questions such as why God delivered the Ten Commandments in the desert (§§2–17), why there were ten (§§20–31), what voice announced the Commandments (§§32–35), and why the form of address was second-person singular (§§36–43).
construct the system himself. In other words, Philo must match species with genera, indicating which laws belong with which of the Ten Commandments. When his work is finished, he leaves no doubt as to his purpose:

For if we are right in describing the main heads delivered by the voice of God as generic laws (κεφάλαια γένη νόμων), and all particular laws of which Moses was the spokesman as dependent species (εἰδη), for accurate apprehension free from confusion scientific study was needed, with the aid of which I have assigned and attached to each of the genera what was appropriate to them throughout the whole legislation (ἐκάστῳ τῶν γενών εξ ἀπάσῃς τῆς νομοθεσίας τὰ οίκεία προσένεμα καὶ προσέφυσα). (Spec. 4.132)

The scope of Philo’s project is immense: considering each of the generic summaries in turn, he has scoured the Pentateuch in search of corresponding specific precepts. In this respect, De specialibus legibus complements De decalogo by presenting for each Commandment subsidiary laws that reflect its moral essence.

22 Despite disagreement over the originality of Philo’s use of the Decalogue as a comprehensive taxonomic framework, consensus holds that Philo at least did the work of matching species with genera, justifying the study of Philo’s view of the Tenth Commandment. In other words, it seems that Philo decided which laws logically pertain to the Tenth Commandment, according to his understanding of that Commandment. For a minimalist position, which concedes the originality of Philo’s genus-species matching but otherwise attributes his basic taxonomy to traditional (rabbinic) Judaism, see Naomi Cohen, Philo Judaeus: His Universe of Discourse (BEATAJ 24; Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1995), 72–85, esp. 84–85. (On Philo’s understanding of the Decalogue in relation to rabbinic tradition, see esp. Hecht, “Preliminary Issues,” 3–17.) For a more generous position, which sees Philo as an innovator not only in his assignment of species to genus but also in his granting of a special inclusive status to the Decalogue, see Termini, “Taxonomy.” Borgen, “Philosopher or Editor,” 126, has an intermediate position, which nevertheless approximates Cohen’s: “Philo seems to develop in a more systematic fashion a notion also found in Palestinian tradition, that the Decalogue contained in nuce all the commandments of the Mosaic laws. Thus, Philo has a Jewish concept as organizing principle, but he has developed it into a broader systematic rewriting than found elsewhere in the contemporary Jewish sources.”

23 Substituting “genera” (γενῶν) for Colson’s “heads.” On this passage, see also Termini, “Taxonomy,” 8. Cf. Spec. 3.7: “Since out of the ten oracles which God gave forth Himself without a spokesman or interpreter, we have spoken of five, namely those graven on the first table, and also of all the particular laws which had reference to these, and our present duty is to couple them with those of the second table as well as we can, I will again endeavour to fit the special laws into each of the genera (πειρόσματα πάλιν καθέκαστον τῶν γενῶν ἑφαρμόζεν τοὺς ἐν εἰδεῖ νόμων)” (substituting “genera” [γενῶν] for Colson’s “heads”).

24 Cf. Morris on De specialibus legibus (“Philo,” 847–48): “In this work Philo makes an extremely interesting attempt to bring the Mosaic special laws into a systematic arrangement according to the ten rubrics of the Decalogue.”
For the most part, Philo follows a rigid ten-point outline in both *De decalogo* and *De specialibus legibus*, introducing each Commandment, saying what he wants to say, then moving on to the next.\(^{25}\) As a result, both treatises contain a series of self-contained text units, each devoted essentially to one of the Ten Commandments. So Philo’s commentary on a particular Commandment consists of the material from two complementary text units—one in *De decalogo* and a corresponding unit in *De specialibus legibus*—dealing with both the Commandment itself (the genus) and the subordinate laws (the species).\(^{26}\)

Philo’s Exposition of the Tenth Commandment

*Decal.* 142–53 and *Spec.* 4.78b–131 contain Philo’s commentary on the Tenth Commandment, which he reads as a two-word prohibition, οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις.\(^{27}\) Philo abbreviates the Septuagint version, which lists various objects of desire: a neighbor’s wife, house, field, etc.\(^{28}\) Although he never explains or justifies this abbreviation, it makes good sense in light of his overall treatment of the Ten Commandments, especially his view of the last five as a pentad of basic prohibitions governing human affairs.\(^{29}\) Superficially, the abbreviation accomplishes a stylistic leveling, bringing the Tenth Commandment into line with the four other basic prohibitions: οὐ μοιχεύσεις, οὐ κλέψεις, οὐ φονεύσεις, and οὐ ψευδομαρτυρήσεις—the last of which is itself an abbreviation of the Ninth Commandment.\(^{30}\)

\(^{25}\) Structural outlines of the treatises reveal Philo’s straightforward sequential movement through the list of Ten Commandments. For an outline of *De decalogo*, see Borgen, “Philosopher or Editor,” 124–25. For an outline of the four books of *De specialibus legibus*, see Heinemann, PCH 2, 8–13 (although, as Heinemann’s outline indicates, Philo in effect treats the First and Second Commandments as a single unit).

\(^{26}\) For a schematic correlation of material from *De decalogo* and *De specialibus legibus*, see the outline of the Sixth through Tenth Commandments in André Mosès, PAPM 25, 15–16.

\(^{27}\) On οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις as Philo’s version of the Tenth Commandment, see above, n. 4.

\(^{28}\) LXX Exod 20:17 [=LXX Deut 5:21], on which see above, n. 1.

\(^{29}\) E.g., *Decal.* 121: ἀπαγορεύσεις τῶν πρὸς ἀνθρώπους. In Philo’s view, these five prohibitions are comprehensive: “These are general rules forbidding practically all sins (οὕτως γενικοὶ σχέδην πάντων ἁμαρτημάτων εἰς κανόνες), and to them the specific sins may in each case be referred (ἐφ’οὖς ἐκαστον ἀναφέρεσθαι τῶν ἐν εἴδει συμβέβηκεν)” (*Her* 173). For the division of the Ten Commandments into pentads, see esp. *Decal.* 50–51 (also *Her.* 168).

\(^{30}\) N.B. Philo’s citation of οὐ ψευδομαρτυρήσεις (*Spec.* 4.41; cf. *Decal* 172: τέταρτον δὲ [κεφάλαιον] τὸ περὶ τού ὑψίτου ψευδομαρτυρεῖν) compared with Exod 20:16 [=Deut 5:20]: οὐ ψευδομαρτυρήσεις κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος σου μαρτυρίαν ψευδῆ. For the other prohibitions, whose simple two-word expressions Philo adopts verbatim, see Exod 20:13–15 [=Deut
importantly, however, a specific formulation of the Tenth Commandment would contradict Philo’s claim that the Commandments are comprehensive, generic summaries—or, as with οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις, generic prohibitions. In his system of thought, limiting the scope of the Tenth Commandment to specific objects would blur the distinction between genus and species. Rather than a summary, the Commandment would read more like a short list of “particular laws.”

31 Philo does consider various objects of desire, but only as concrete illustrations of the nature and function of desire itself, not restrictions on the Commandment’s proscriptive range of objects.

The first unit of commentary, Decal. 142–53, is the last installment in his initial survey of the Ten Commandments (Decal. 50–153). Focusing on what the prohibition entails, this unit contains a sketch of the nature, mechanics, and potentially disastrous effects of desire, framed initially (§§142–46) as a review of the four cardinal πάθη: pleasure (ἡδονή), grief (λύπη), fear (φόβος), and desire (ἐπιθυμία).33 (Decal. 173–74 briefly restates the ill effects


31 Although the LXX version does include a general prohibition of ὅσα τῷ πλησίον σοῦ ἐστιν, it never loses the fundamental specification τοῦ πλησίον σου. In its full LXX formulation, the Commandment does not proscribe, for example, the desire for a house per se, only the desire for a specific type of house—viz., the house of a neighbor.

32 For example, in Spec. 4.86–91 Philo wants to illustrate how desire “produces a change for the worse in all which it attacks” (§86) by listing various aims of desire and the respective vices associated with those aims. The aims are all quite general: “money” (χρήματα), “reputation” (δόξα), “power” (ἀρχή), “physical beauty” (σώματος κάλλος), “the tongue” (γλῶττα) (i.e., desire to speak or keep silent), “the belly” (γαστήρ) (i.e., desire for food and drink).

of desire, then previews *De specialibus legibus* by noting the existence of “many ordinances which come under this head,” without identifying any of those ordinances.) The second unit of commentary, *Spec. 4.78b–131*, represents the exposition proper, since it contains Philo’s comprehensive treatment of both οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις and the corresponding subordinate laws.  

Again he covers the nature, mechanics, and effects of desire, as in the first unit, but in much greater depth (*Spec. 4.78b–94*). Then, in keeping with his overarching program for *De decalogo* and *De specialibus legibus*, Philo cites and expounds the Mosaic dietary laws, which he considers the “particular laws” belonging under the rubric οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις (*Spec. 4.95–131*). The two units of commentary together amount to 351 lines of Greek text in PCW, with the exposition proper (*Spec. 4.78b–131*) amounting to 298 lines, all devoted to Philo’s understanding of the Tenth Commandment. In sheer quantity, Philo’s exposition of οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις stands on a par with some of

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Because it amounts to a self-contained treatise, the unit *Spec. 4.79–135* receives its own title “De concupiscencia” in some MSS (see PCW 5, xiv, xxvi), and, as Colson notes (PLCL 8, 56, n. 1), Cohn “here begins a fresh numbering of chapters.” Older studies sometimes refer to *Spec. 4.79–135* using the Latin title and Cohn’s fresh numeration (e.g., Emile Bréhier, *Les idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d’Alexandrie* [EPM 8; 3d ed.; Paris: J. Vrin, 1950], 253).
his independent treatises—for example, De gigantibus (320 lines in PCW). The importance of this exposition, however, lies in the material itself, first in its own right but also in its relation to other first-century treatments of the Tenth Commandment and key topics in Philo’s ethical theory.

The Value of Philo’s Exposition

As a substantive, detailed analysis of the Tenth Commandment from arguably the best representative of Hellenistic Judaism in antiquity, Philo’s exposition of οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις deserves a complete study in and of itself. In his exposition, he considers in depth both the Tenth Commandment and the dietary laws that for him reflect its moral essence, so a careful reading should answer two fundamental questions:

1. In Philo’s view, what does the Tenth Commandment prohibit? (All desire? A certain type? What type?)

2. In Philo’s view, how is the Tenth Commandment observed? (What are the mechanics of its observance? What role do the dietary laws play in its observance?)

Answering these specific questions helps to illuminate general aspects of Philo’s fusion of Judaism and Hellenism. For example, how does a first-century Jew, who is also an accomplished student of Greek philosophy, make sense of the Decalogue’s prohibition of desire (ἐπιθυμία), an emotion that Greek philosophers studied at length? And how does an obscure set of dietary regulations, which often placed observant Jews at odds with the broader culture, become the centerpiece of Moses’ philosophically astute training program for managing desire?  

35 Philo’s exposition speaks to these and other issues.

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But Philo’s work also bears importance for the comparative assessment of a broader first-century interest in the Tenth Commandment attested elsewhere by two of Philo’s contemporaries, Paul and the author of 4 Maccabees. All three authors cite abbreviated Greek versions of the Tenth Commandment and consider its moral significance. Such an interest in о́кё̂ ἐπιθυμήσεως makes sense in light of a number of ancient perspectives on ἐπιθυμία: for example, Judeo-Christian speculations regarding ἐπιθυμία as the root of all sin. But it also makes sense in light of...
Greco-Roman philosophical speculations regarding the function and malfunction of ἐπιθυμία, one of the four cardinal πάθη, whose ill effects are counteracted by ἐγκράτεια.39 In any case, a full comparative assessment of these three treatments of the Tenth Commandment and their relation to broader trends in biblical exegesis and ethical reflection requires a proper understanding of Philo’s treatment—which is by far the most elaborate of the three.

Finally, a comprehensive investigation of Philo’s exposition of the Tenth Commandment promises a better understanding of key topics in Philo’s ethical theory, which can in turn illuminate broader trends in Middle-Platonic ethical theory.40 For example, Philo grounds his exposition in


theoretical overviews of the πάθη, using a variety of technical terms and concepts. He clearly intends to establish first a working model of ἐπιθυμία as πάθος and then use it to inform his discussion of the prohibition οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις. Because Philo is a Middle Platonist, his exposition offers valuable insight into the elements of a Middle-Platonic theory of the “passions,” insofar as it deals with passionate desire. The concept of self-control (ἐγκράτεια) also bears directly on Philo’s understanding of the Tenth Commandment. When he begins his survey of the “particular laws,” species of the genus οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις, Philo cites the law of first fruits (Exod 23:19; Deut 18:4), which in his view exists “for the practice of self-control” (πρὸς ἀσκησιν ... ἐγκρατεῖας). This phrase suggests not only the importance of

112–140, 125): “he does not belong to the school, but has a philosophical stance which is fundamentally Platonist and might well make him welcome in such circles.”

14. See esp. Decal. 142–46; Spec. 4.79.

42 Simply put, Philo’s exposition reflects a Middle-Platonic theory of the passions, insofar as it combines a fundamentally Platonic psychology (esp. Spec. 4.92–94) with Stoic technical definitions of passion(s) (esp. Spec. 4.79; cf. Decal. 142)—a combination evident in other Middle-Platonic texts (e.g., Didask. 32.1 [185.26]: κίνησις ἁλογος ψυχής [cf. DL 7.110]). Middle Platonists rework these Stoic definitions, enabling them to describe psychological phenomena whose existence “orthodox” (i.e., Chrysippean) Stoicism would deny (e.g., non-rational parts of the soul in conflict with a rational part). Evidence in Philo’s exposition for this sort of reinvention exists but has not been properly assessed. For example, Philo in Spec. 4.79 adds to the Stoic definition of passion as “excessive impulse” (πλεονάζοντα ὁμήροι; e.g., DL 7.110 [=SVF I 50, 23]; ESE 10 [=SVF III 92, 11]; PHP IV 2.8 [=SVF III 113, 15]) the qualifier “unmeasured” (ἀμετρως), which is unattested in the Stoic sources and indicates a failure to limit the quantitative force of a non-rational impulse—a notion incompatible with the Stoic understanding of impulse as a form of rational assent (on which see Brad Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism [Oxford: Clarendon, 1985], esp. chs. 3 and 5, N.B. 167–68 on “excessive impulse”: “no aspect of the theory [Stoic psychology] ... admits of the sort of variation of degree which would be needed for a more familiar quantitative sense of ‘excessive’.”).


44 Spec. 4.99. Philo twice lists ἐγκράτεια as one of many different kinds of ἀσκησις (Leg. 3.18; Her. 253). Pierre Hadot uses Philo’s two lists as a basis for his discussion of different “spiritual” exercises in antiquity, by which he means exercises of Greco-Roman philosophers pertaining to the soul, not exercises practiced in a religious setting (Pierre Hadot, “Spiritual Exercises,” in Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault [ed., intro. Arnold I. Davidson; trans. Michael Case; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1995], 81–125, 84).
Introduction

...but also the relevance of another ethical concept, ἀσκησις—specifically, how Mosaic laws regarding food and drink function as practice in the cultivation of self-control. Understanding Philo’s exposition involves the clarification of these and other topics.

Even an introductory survey of the nature and content of Philo’s exposition of the Tenth Commandment commends it to further study, and Philo facilitates such study by neatly packaging his material: the structural layout of his broader Exposition of the Law makes his exposition of ὥς ἐπιθυμήσεις a complete text in and of itself. Earlier studies of Philo have touched on this text in a variety of ways, from a variety of perspectives, with a variety of results.

History of Research

Had Philo chosen to publish his exposition of the Tenth Commandment as an independent work, it surely by now would have received more attention. But to date no comprehensive study of this important treatise exists, one that deals exclusively with Philo’s view of the Tenth Commandment in light of his agenda, his interests, his organization of the material, and his understanding of the relevant topics—one that clearly and adequately answers the two fundamental questions of what ὥς ἐπιθυμήσεις actually prohibits and how to observe the injunction. Translators of the relevant units (Decal. 142–53, 173–74 and Spec. 4.78b–131) offer general remarks on Philo’s interpretation of the Tenth Commandment, along with commentary on specific passages, but the scope of their work is too broad and too sketchy to treat those units—especially the exposition proper (Spec. 4.78b–131)—in sufficient depth. Similarly, a number of works whose aims

45 In regard to Philo’s usage, the term ἀσκησις has little to do with modern terms such as “ascetic” or “asceticism,” whose connotations derive mostly from Christian monasticism. The Greek term has no intrinsic association with religious practice (see Hermigild Dressler, The Usage of Ἀσκησις and Its Cognates in Greek Documents to 100 A.D. [CUAPS 78; Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1947]). For Philo, ἀσκησις pertains mainly to moral philosophy, as one of three ways to acquire virtue: nature, instruction, and practice (e.g., Abr. 52); see Ellen Birnbaum, “Exegetical Building Blocks in Philo’s Interpretation of the Patriarchs,” in From Judaism to Christianity: Tradition and Transition: A Festschrift for Thomas H. Tobin, S.J., on the Occasion of His Sixty-fifth Birthday (ed. Patricia Walters; NovTSup 136; Leiden: Brill, 2010), 69–92.

46 For translations of the De decalogo units (§§142–53, §§173–74), see Leopold Treitel, PCH 1 (1909); F. H. Colson, PLCL 7 (1937); Valentín Nikiprowetzky, PAPM 23 (1965); Francesca Calabi, Filone, Decalogo (2005); cf. Ronald Williamson, Jews in the Hellenistic World: Philo (CCWJCW 1.2; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 255–78. For the exposition proper (Spec. 4.78b–131), see Isaak Heinemann, PCH 2 (1910); F. H. Colson, PLCL 8 (1939); and André Mosès, PAPM 25 (1970).
lie elsewhere offer incidental, often helpful, remarks on Philo’s view of the Tenth Commandment, but never in an effort to explain it in full. In fact, only two works offer sustained treatments of the Tenth Commandment in Philo, and neither satisfies the need for a comprehensive study.

Harry A. Wolfson

In an extensive work on Philo, Harry Wolfson devotes part of a chapter on ethics to a study of the Tenth Commandment. The title of his brief analysis, “The Virtue of the Control of Desire,” reflects a broader aim on Wolfson’s part to explore the relationship between law and virtue, especially where and how Philo’s understanding of Mosaic law incorporates terms and concepts derived from Greek ethical theory. He does not intend to provide a comprehensive analysis of the contents of Philo’s


exposition. Instead, as part of a sweeping effort to reconstruct Philo’s system of thought, he considers the significance within that system of a moral imperative aimed not at action(s) but at “pure emotion.” Although limited, Wolfson’s treatment nevertheless includes substantive claims about Philo’s interpretation of ὀρκ. 

Wolfson’s most valuable contribution comes at the end of his analysis, where he recognizes the central importance of ἔγκρατεσια in Philo’s overall understanding of the Tenth Commandment. In particular, he recognizes that “[t]he negative tenth commandment is ... a command to control one’s desire.” In other words, the negative prohibition implies a positive command to cultivate the virtue of ἔγκρατεσια, which—as Wolfson notes—is “the positive term ... by which the control of excessive desire is to be described.” But because his interests lie elsewhere, he only considers that this is true, not how this is true. He never answers the basic question of how someone observes the Tenth Commandment or how it in fact promotes ἔγκρατεσια. Wolfson also realizes that, for Philo, other Mosaic laws work along with the Tenth Commandment to promote ἔγκρατεσια. But he never mentions the dietary laws, let alone explains how—in Philo’s view—they pertain to ὀρκ. ἐπιθυμήσεις. In this respect Wolfson’s treatment, even where it does correctly characterize Philo’s view of the Tenth Commandment, remains sketchy.

Although valuable for its emphasis on ἔγκρατεσια, Wolfson’s study misconstrues Philo’s view of what the Commandment prohibits. He makes the unfounded assumption that Philo, with the Septuagint version in mind, understands the Tenth Commandment to be a prohibition only of desire for what belongs to another person. Wolfson does not acknowledge the generalizing effect of Philo’s abbreviated ὀρκ. ἐπιθυμήσεις, choosing instead to retain the Septuagint version’s specification “of your neighbor” (τοῦ πλησίον σου). He admits that this specification does not appear in Philo’s commentary but assumes it nevertheless:

50 Wolfson, Philo, 2:225.
51 Stowers (e.g., “Paul and Self-Mastery,” 532) similarly notes the importance of ἔγκρατεσια for Philo’s understanding of the Tenth Commandment.
52 Wolfson, Philo, 2:235.
53 Wolfson, Philo, 2:235. Wolfson refers to the concept of ἔγκρατεσια found in Eth. eud. 1223 b 11–14 (e.g., ἔγκρατεσια δόταιν πράττει παρά τήν ἐπιθυμίαν κατά τὸν λογισμὸν).
54 “It is the virtue of ‘continence’ ... that is taught by the tenth commandment as well as by all those special laws of which the purpose, as seen by [Philo], is to teach the control of desire” (Wolfson, Philo, 2:236).
56 Wolfson takes this in its most general sense of ὃσα τῷ πλησίον σοῦ ἔστιν, as the LXX version stipulates. He cites and disagrees with Colson, whose assessment is correct:
Though Philo speaks of desire in general, that is, of a desire for what we have not, and not of a desire for that which belongs to somebody else, still his discussion, in so far as it is a commentary upon the commandment, implies that the desire of which he speaks is that desire which the commandment explicitly describes as a desire for that which belongs to another person. (Wolfson, *Philo*, 2:228)\(^{57}\)

The only evidence Wolfson offers in support of this view involves Philo’s first example of an object of desire, money (χρήματα).\(^{58}\) He argues that, although Philo does not specify the money’s source:

> the subsequent statement that a desire for money leads to robbery and purse-cutting and house-breaking makes it quite evident that the desire for money spoken of was not a desire for money in general but rather for the money in the pocket or the purse or the house of one particular person. (Wolfson, *Philo*, 2:228)

But Wolfson fails to cite the entire passage, which goes on to associate the desire for money also with, for example, receiving bribes (δοροφόρια), which clearly involves greed per se and not desire for the money “of one particular person.” Moreover, the other objects of desire on Philo’s list, none of which Wolfson mentions, hardly make sense when construed strictly as belonging to another person. This is especially true in the case of desires for food and drink, which are, for Philo, governed by the Tenth Commandment’s particular laws.\(^{59}\)

Wolfson’s study suffers also from an outdated conception of Philo’s relationship to Greek philosophy. As he investigates select details of Philo’s “homily on the evils of desire,” Wolfson considers Philo an eclectic who adopts any number of different philosophical positions ad hoc. Wolfson suggests that in most of his analysis of ἔπιθυμια Philo chooses a Stoic

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\(^{57}\) Also 2:229: “It is exactly the latter kind of desire, the desire for that which belongs to somebody else, that the tenth commandment as a law, and not a mere moral maxim, legally prohibits, according to Philo ....” Ibid.: “In his discussion of the legal prohibition not to desire that which belongs to one’s neighbor, a prohibition, as we have said, of a mere desire for that which belongs to one’s neighbor.”

\(^{58}\) *Spec.* 4.87: “If the desire is directed to money it makes men thieves and cut-purses, footpads, burglars, guilty of defaulting to their creditors, repudiating deposits, receiving bribes, robbing temples and of all similar actions.”

\(^{59}\) On Philo’s association of the Tenth Commandment with dietary laws, Amir notes: “This association of ideas is possible only if the Commandment is shorn of its concluding words, ‘anything that is your neighbor’s.’ For after all, kashrut has nothing to do with issues of ownership, of ‘mine and thine.’ An animal is not forbidden as food because it is stolen goods” (“Decalogue,” 159).
position, but “[w]henever forced by certain native Jewish presuppositions, he departs from the Stoics and follows some other philosopher or presents a new view of his own.”

Wolfson is correct, generally speaking, when he matches various terms and concepts in Philo’s commentary with the same terms and concepts in sources known to be, for example, Stoic. But he gives the misleading impression that Philo freely vacillates from one philosophical opinion to another with no underlying commitment to one philosophical orientation over another. Philo’s “eclectic” philosophical mix is instead best understood as a reflection of his Middle Platonism—without this insight, Wolfson’s study cannot provide an adequate understanding of Philo’s philosophical perspective.

In sum, Wolfson offers a substantial discussion of the Tenth Commandment in Philo, but one whose breadth and depth are severely limited due to the relatively minor role it plays within a much larger and more broadly oriented work. His answer to the question of what, in Philo’s view, the Tenth Commandment prohibits is incorrect, since he limits the scope of ἐπιθυμία to only desire for what belongs to another person. Nor does he answer the question of how someone observes the Tenth Commandment, although he provides the proper context for an answer—namely, the acquisition, development, and exercise of ἐγκράτεια. Finally, his comments on the nature and function of ἐπιθυμία, although helpful at times, do not represent Philo’s relationship with Greek philosophy properly.

60 Wolfson, Philo, 2:231. Wolfson initially emphasizes Stoic provenance: e.g., 2:230: “It is the Stoics … whom Philo follows here in the external formulation of his views.” Ibid.: “He similarly follows the Stoics ….”

61 E.g., Wolfson cites SVF for definitions of emotion comparable to Spec. 4.79, but he fails to note the significance of the non-Stoic ἡμέτρος in Philo’s definition (see above, n. 42).

62 Cf. Dillon, Middle Platonists, 182: “My chief thesis (as against such an authority as H. A. Wolfson, for example) is that Philo was not so much constructing for himself an eclectic synthesis of all Greek philosophy, from the Presocratics to Posidonius, as essentially adapting contemporary Alexandrian Platonism, which was itself heavily influenced by Stoicism and Pythagoreanism, to his own exegetical purposes.” For a fuller, yet still concise, statement of this position, in which Dillon rejects the misconceptions of (1) Philo as an “eclectic” who (2) merely uses philosophical language to serve exegetical aims, see his preface to Philo of Alexandria: The Contemplative Life, The Giants, and Selections (trans. and intro. David Winston; CWS; Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist, 1981), xii–xiii. See also David Winston’s introduction (idem, 1–37), in which he accepts Philo’s views as “Middle Platonist, that is, a highly Stoicized form of Platonism, streaked with Neopythagorean concerns” (3). In general, see John M. Dillon and A. A. Long, eds., The Question of “Eclecticism”: Studies in Later Greek Philosophy (HCS 3; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
In *The Making of Fornication*, Kathy Gaca includes a chapter on Philo that deals in part with his understanding of the abbreviated Tenth Commandment. While the broad scope of her work precludes an exhaustive treatment of Philo’s exposition, Gaca nevertheless presents a sustained and virtually self-contained study of Philo’s interpretation of ὀνκ ἐπιθυμήσεις, offering summary conclusions and a bold thesis about Philo’s notion of forbidden desire. Taking all three of the relevant text units into account (*Decal.* 142–53, 173–74; *Spec.* 4.78b–131), she addresses not only the question of what, in Philo’s view, the Commandment prohibits, but also how someone observes the Commandment, including an explanation of how the dietary laws promote its observance. In one important general respect Gaca’s work breaks new ground and sets a worthy standard: in her consideration of Philo’s view of ὀνκ ἐπιθυμήσεις, she takes seriously the idea that he is a Middle Platonist, consistently bearing in mind his debt to Plato and his acceptance of Platonic doctrines pertinent to an analysis of ἐπιθυμία. But in her analysis of Philo’s view, Gaca misconstrues the

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64 See esp. her section titled “Philo’s Revolutionary Conception of Forbidden Desire” (Gaca, *Making of Fornication*, 194–204). The aim of her book is “to resolve an important philosophical and historical problem about the making of sexual morality in Western culture: Do the patristic sexual rules of second-century Christianity differ notably from the Greek philosophical sexual principles that the patristic writers used to help formulate their own? Alternatively, are these Christian rules in unison with the Greek philosophical basis that they claim to have” (1). Her interest in Philo lies mainly in his contribution to the sexual ethics of “Christian Platonism” (see 193–94, along with her study of Clement of Alexandria in 247–72).

65 Gaca does not quote Philo at length, but she does refer to passages from all three units of his exposition, indicating her awareness of the extent of his treatment. Her references take into account esp. *Decal.* 142, 173–174 and *Spec.* 4.78, 85, 87–96, 100–118.

66 On Gaca’s concept of Philo as a “Jewish Middle Platonist,” see *Making of Fornication*, 191, n. 2. Although her conclusions are problematic, Gaca’s approach is commendable in several respects. For example, she brings a Platonic psychological model to bear on the textual data of Philo’s exposition, relating his discussion of ἐπιθυμία to Plato’s theory that there is in the soul a distinct, non-rational source of ἐπιθυμία—i.e., [τὸ] ἀλόγιστον τε καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν [εἴδος] (*Resp.* 439 D; N.B. *Spec.* 4.92–94 [cf. *Tim.* 70 D–E]). Moreover, she notes key implications of Plato’s theory, such as the moral agent’s inability to remove appetitive ἐπιθυμία entirely and the consequent importance of moderation (e.g., *Making of Fornication*, 197). Gaca also understands that Philo’s Middle Platonism involves the reinvention of Stoic terms and definitions: “The Stoic definitions of the passions that Philo uses are thus like a label that at first glance looks Stoic,
textual data, misreading a number of passages and failing to mention others that would readily disprove her claims. For this reason, and because her study proposes a definitive—but incorrect—account of how Philo understands the Tenth Commandment, it deserves a detailed review.

Stated in its broadest terms, Gaca’s thesis is that Philo’s explanation of the abbreviated Tenth Commandment combines two elements into one innovative “Jewish Middle Platonist notion of forbidden desire”—namely, (1) “the Hellenistic Jewish concern about the desire (ἐπιθυμία) to disobey God’s laws” and (2) “the Middle Platonist problem of excessive physical appetites (ἐπιθυμία) for the pleasures of food, drink, and especially sexual activity, contrary to reason’s judicious sense of moderation.” What this means is that Philo follows a broader exegetical trend within Hellenistic Judaism to treat the Tenth Commandment as an abbreviated, two-word prohibition (οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις), but he does not follow the standard line of interpretation, which takes the prohibition to mean “that it is wrong or sinful even to desire to act contrary to God’s will.” Instead, Philo follows

but the contents have changed” (201). Gaca’s understanding of exactly how Philo changes the contents is problematic, but this statement as such is correct.

67 Cf. David Runia’s review of The Making of Fornication in SPhA 17 (2005): 237–43, esp. 241–43. Runia’s summary assessment of Gaca’s study includes a caveat: “[B]ecause its method of analyzing and interpreting texts is flawed, it is to be used with caution” (243).

68 See Gaca, Making of Fornication, 194–95. Stated differently: “He reinterprets Platonic appetite—and sexual desire foremost—in light of the Hellenistic Jewish prohibition against the desire (ἐπιθυμία) to disobey God’s will” (197). Gaca frames her thesis as a matter of sexual ethics: “Philo’s sexual principles are part of an innovative agenda for social order that borrows from Plato and the Pentateuch, makes sense only in relation to both, and yet represents neither without noteworthy transformation. This is especially true for Philo’s reinterpretation of the problems Plato sees with sexual desire, which Philo presents in his take on the aphoristic version of the Tenth Commandment: ‘You will not desire’ (οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις). In Philo’s synthesis, forbidden desire (ἐπιθυμία) in the Hellenistic Jewish sense, which signifies any inclination to defy God’s will, becomes primarily sexual in light of Plato’s conviction that uncontrolled desire (ἐπιθυμία) for sexual pleasure is the single biggest source of individual and social corruption” (Gaca, Making of Fornication, 193).

69 Gaca, Making of Fornication, 153. See 153–54 for Gaca’s idea of a “Hellenistic Jewish variant on the Septuagint Tenth Commandment.” In her discussion of Philo, Gaca speaks of “the Hellenistic Jewish Tenth Commandment in its two more traditional forms,” by which she means (a) the LXX version itself (Exod 20:17 [=Deut 5:21]) and (b) the abbreviated version οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις, which omits the list of direct objects (198). She believes that Paul and Philo’s citations of οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις serve as evidence for a hypothetical tertium quid—namely, an exegetical tradition that influenced these two authors. Her supposition involves first the claim that prior to Philo, who in fact offers the earliest extant citation of οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις (see above, n. 36), one or more unidentified Hellenistic Jewish exegetes chose to make an abbreviated Tenth Commandment
Plato’s conviction that uncontrolled appetitive desire, especially sexual desire, corrupts individuals and societies, and for this reason he interprets ὧκ ἐπιθυμήσεις as a divine injunction to control appetitive, especially sexual, desire.

This last idea, that Philo’s Tenth Commandment deals especially with sexual desire, deserves careful attention, since it in effect answers the question of what the Commandment prohibits. Ultimately, this idea derives from a reasonable but false assumption on Gaca’s part that Philo imports without modification a certain concept of desire found in Plato’s writings—a concept she outlines in an earlier chapter of her study.70 Taken for granted, this assumption drives an almost syllogistic logic that informs much of what Gaca has to say about Philo’s view of the Tenth Commandment: (a) when Plato thinks of ἐπιθυμία and its dangerous propensity for excess, he has in mind physical appetites, especially the sexual appetite; (b) when Philo thinks of the Commandment ὧκ ἐπιθυμήσεις, he has in mind Plato’s concept of ἐπιθυμία and its dangerous propensity for excess, therefore (c) Philo has in mind physical appetites, especially the sexual appetite. A number of sweeping claims ensue:

Philo reinterprets this commandment in a Platonic spirit that is very much in keeping with “nothing in excess,” as though ὧκ ἐπιθυμήσεις meant “you will restrain your physical appetites from becoming excessive,” the sexual

their object of inquiry. This is of course plausible, but the alternate supposition that Philo himself was the first to cite and interpret ὧκ ἐπιθυμήσεις is equally plausible and less speculative. After all, his is the most extensive extant commentary on the abbreviated version and—contingent on unknown facts regarding the publication of his Exposition of the Law—is as likely as any to have been the seminal work. Be that as it may, Gaca goes on to attribute a standard line of interpretation to this already hypothetical exegetical tradition. ὧκ ἐπιθυμήσεις, the “newer prohibition” offered by the tradition, means “that it is wrong or sinful even to desire to act contrary to God’s will” (153). Gaca’s view problematically requires Philo to creatively modify a tradition for which no evidence exists, at least in terms of an extant text that cites ὧκ ἐπιθυμήσεις, then explicitly offers the interpretive conclusion “that it is wrong or sinful even to desire to act contrary to God’s will.” (On 152 Gaca cites “a broader Hellenistic Jewish and early Christian trend that stresses the danger of rebellious impulses verystringently”; but this broader trend—even if it did exist—does not constitute evidence for the exegetical trend that Gaca posits.)

70 See Gaca, Making of Fornication, 26–41, esp. 32–33. The accuracy of Gaca’s reading of Plato on this point bears less importance than the question of what Philo has to say about desire in his exposition of the Tenth Commandment. Even if she has correctly understood Plato’s concept of appetitive desire, this concept must not serve automatically as the interpretive lens for Philo’s understanding of ὧκ ἐπιθυμήσεις, without proof that Philo too is employing the same concept. This is especially true if Philo, as Gaca admits, is a Middle Platonist, which implies that he would have employed “Platonic” concepts that had been modified in significant respects in light of philosophical developments postdating Plato.
introduction

appetite especially. By οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις in this sense, God too teaches the Platonic doctrine that depravity is grounded primarily in the unrestrained sexual appetite and its progeny of vices. (Gaca, Making of Fornication, 196)

Or similarly:

In God’s social order these iniquities would become a thing of the past, so long as the people heed the commandment οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις by getting their appetitive urges under control, especially sexual desire. (Ibid.)

Gaca frames these statements carefully, avoiding the claim that οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις deals exclusively with sexual desire. She does, after all, understand that the basic operation of the Platonic ἐπιθυμητικόν involves desires also for food and drink. But in some instances there is no clear acknowledgement of the relevance of non-sexual desire(s) within the Commandment’s purview: “Philo’s Tenth Commandment is innovative as a Decalogue rule because it valorizes sexual desire as the main source of all wickedness.” In other instances, particularly in concluding summaries of her argument, there is no indication that anything but sexual desire lies within the proscriptive range of οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις:

Though Philo supports Plato’s argument that uncontrolled sexual desire is the primary and most incorrigible source of all vices, he identifies the Hellenistic Jewish notion of desiring to disobey God (ἐπιθυμία) with the Platonic sexual appetite (ἐπιθυμία). (Gaca, Making of Fornication, 297; emphasis added)

71 The “iniquities” Gaca has in mind appear in Republic 575 B. In her view, Philo cites this passage in Spec. 4.87 (certainly an allusion, but Philo’s χρεωκοτίας τε καὶ παρακτικοθέτηκαν ἀρνήσεις has no parallel in the Republic passage) to illustrate “proliferating vices that he attributes to breaking his version of the Tenth Commandment” (196). But in Spec. 4.87, Philo explicitly considers desire directed at “money” (χρήματα), not sexual or even appetitive desire per se. Plato does consider χρήματα an object of appetitive desire (see Resp. 439 A–E; cf. 437 D: “‘[S]hall we say that the desires (ἐπιθυμίων) constitute a class and that the most conspicuous members of that class are what we call thirst and hunger?’ ‘We shall,’ said he” [trans. Paul Shorey; unless otherwise noted, all translations of Plato’s writings are from LCL]).

72 E.g., Plato cites thirst to illustrate the distinction between rational and appetitive elements within the soul (see Resp. 439 A–E; cf. 437 D: “[S]hall we say that the desires (ἐπιθυμίων) constitute a class and that the most conspicuous members of that class are what we call thirst and hunger?” ‘We shall,’ said he” [trans. Paul Shorey; unless otherwise noted, all translations of Plato’s writings are from LCL]).

73 Gaca, Making of Fornication, 198. Also: “Philo’s version of οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις, however, prohibits unrestrained sexual desire as the primary religious defiance and corruption in the city of God” (ibid.).

74 Cf. idem, 216, where Philo is said to identify “the Platonic notion of sexual desire (ἐπιθυμία) with the Hellenistic Jewish concern about the inherently wrongful impulse (ἐπιθυμία) to transgress God’s laws. He makes this identification most notably through his Jewish Middle Platonist explanation of the commandment against forbidden desire (οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις)” (emphasis added). Also idem, 23: “[Plato] would have needed an
Gaca clearly has an answer to the question of what Philo’s Tenth Commandment prohibits. Although she ostensibly points to “excessive appetitive desire,” she in fact has sexual desire in mind.75

But the idea that Philo’s concept of desire in his exposition is exclusively—or even primarily—sexual is incorrect, since Philo associates ὀὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις with a generic desire involving any number of different objects, none of which figures more prominently than another in the Commandment’s theoretically limitless proscriptive range.76 In fact, the idea that ὀὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις deals with a specific desire of any type undermines Philo’s concept of the Ten Commandments as generic summaries.77 Philo’s commentary consistently reflects his underlying belief in a prohibition of desire able to subsume any and all specific types. For example, in Spec. 4.80 Philo identifies this most troublesome passion simply as “desire of what we have not” (ἐπιθυμία τῶν ἀπόντων).78 When Philo goes on to

75 This exclusive focus is confirmed by Gaca’s construal of the Mosaic dietary laws, which in her view do not ultimately regulate appetitive desires for food and drink, but instead target the Tenth Commandment’s real concern—sexual desire: “Philo regards Moses’ dietary laws as the one sure regimen that reduces sexual desire and thereby subdues its offspring of vices” (Making of Fornication, 196).

76 On this point commentators generally agree, with the exception of Gaca. For example, Colson (PLCL 7, 76, n. c): “Philo extends the meaning of the word from covetousness of what is another’s to desire in general”; Mosè (PAPM 25, 17, n.1): Philo’s version of the Tenth Commandment “n’admet pas de contenu veritable, puisque le désir est lui-même coupe de tout objet précis”; Williamson (Philo, 267): “Philo … extends the meaning of a desire to include its most general sense.” Even Wolfson (Phila, 2:228), who needlessly specifies “desire for that which belongs to another person,” nevertheless acknowledges that “Philo speaks of desire in general, that is, of a desire for what we have not.” On the concept of generic desire, note esp. Migr. 155: “It is this mixed multitude which takes delight not in a few species of desire only (μὴ μόνον ὁλίγος εἶδεν ἐπιθυμίας), but claims to leave out nothing at all, that it may follow after desire’s entire genus (ὁλὸν δι’όλαν τὸ γένος), including all its species” (substituting “desire” [ἐπιθυμία] and “desire’s” [ἐπιθυμίας] for Colson’s “lusting” and “lust’s”).

77 N.B. Spec. 4.78b: “Let us move on to the last of the Ten Words (δεκά λογίων), delivered like each of the others in the form of a summary (κεφαλαίωσε τύπῳ καθάπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκαστον): ‘You shall not desire’ (οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις)” (my translation). Note also the following descriptions of the Ten Commandments: Her. 167: τῶν γενικῶν δέκα νόμων; Her. 173: γενικοὶ … κανόνες; Congr. 120: γενικά κεφάλαια.

78 Philo’s immediate specification of “things which seem good, though they are not truly good” (ὅσα τῷ δοκεῖν ἄγαθον, πρὸς ἀλλήλων μὲ ὁντων) mitigates the generic sense of ἐπιθυμία somewhat but still allows for most any particular ostensible “good” (cf. Decal. 146: ἔννοιαν ἄγαθον μὴ παρόντος). When Philo turns to the Tenth Commandment’s particular laws (dietary laws) he singles out the desire for food and drink, but in a paradigmatic (not absolute) sense (see Spec. 4.96).
associate this desire with specific aims, he is merely illustrating its trouble-
some nature, noting that it creates a savage hunger and thirst in people,
“but not for something to fill the void in their bellies—they hunger for
money, fame, power, shapely bodies, or any of the countless other things
that seem to them enviable and worth a struggle” (*Spec.* 4.82; my transla-
tion). As this list indicates, sexual desire is not foremost in Philo’s mind,
nor even appetite desire per se. At most, sexual desire forms a part, but
only a small part, of Philo’s overall concept of desire with respect to the
Tenth Commandment. Not only do Philo’s words fail to support the
claim that οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις targets sexual desire—they positively refute it.

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80 In fact, Gaca’s proposal that *ἐπιθυμία* in Philo’s exposition refers specifically to
Platonic appetitive desire (a function of τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν) collapses with the mention in
*Spec.* 4.82 of δόξα (cf. §88) and ἰγμονία (cf. ἀρχή in §89)—which Plato identifies as
ambitions as the spirited part of the soul, τὸ θυμοειδὲς; e.g., *Resp.* 581 A–B: “[D]o we not
say that [τὸ θυμοειδὲς] is wholly set on predominance (τὸ κράτειν) and victory (νικῶν)
and good repute (εὐδοκιμεῖν)?” Yes indeed. “And might we not appropriately desig-
nate it as the ambitious part (φιλόνικον) and that which is covetous of honour
(φιλόστιμον)?” Most appropriately.” (On τὸ θυμοειδὲς see John M. Cooper, “Plato’s
Theory of Human Motivation,” in *Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology
and Ethical Theory* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999], 118–37, esp. 130–36;
repr. from *HPhQ* 1 [1984].) On Philo’s concept of desire, Schmidt, *Anthropologie*, 92–93,
notes: “Als Gegenstand des Begehrens werden fast durchweg die Strebungen, die Platon
von dem zweiten und dritten Sellenteil aussagt, zusammengefaßt.” This conflation of τὸ
ἐπιθυμητικὸν and τὸ θυμοειδὲς makes sense in light of Middle-Platonic moral psychol-
ogy, which was influenced by Aristotle’s concept of ἐπιθυμία and θυμός as two types of
ἀρέτης, both belonging to a single faculty of the soul, the ὀρεκτικόν (see P. A. Vander
Waerdt: “The Peripatetic Interpretation of Plato’s Tripartite Psychology,” *GRBS* 26
[1985]: 283–302 and “Peripatetic Soul-Division, Posidonius, and Middle Platonic Moral
81 The passage in Philo’s exposition that pertains to sexual desire appears in *Spec.*
4.89: “If the object [of desire] is bodily beauty they are seducers (φθορεῖς), adulterers
(μοιχοῦσι), pederasts (παιδεραστῶν), cultivators of incontinence and lewdness (ἀκολο-
χίας καὶ λαγνείας), as though these worst of evils were the best of blessings.” In *Decal.*
168–69, Philo has in mind the very same types of immoral sexual behavior, but he is
commenting on a different Commandment, the κεφάλαιον τὸ κατὰ μοιχῶν, “under
which come many enactments against seducers (φθορέων) and pederasty (παιδε-
ραστῶν), against dissolute living (τῶν λαργίστερον βιώστων) and indulgence in lawless
and licentious forms of intercourse (ὀμμίλας τέ καὶ μίξεσιν ἐκνύμως καὶ ἀκολάστος).”
The lack of commentary on sexual matters in Philo’s exposition of the Tenth Commandment is best explained by his having already dealt with such matters in his
exposition of the Sixth Commandment, which governs the obviously sexual transgres-
sion of adultery. The preeminence of the Sixth Commandment, not the Tenth, in
Philo’s consideration of sexual ethics is correctly noted by Baudouin Decharneux,
“Interdits sexuels dans l’œuvre de Philon d’Alexandrie dit ‘Le Juif,’” *Religion et tabou
So where and how does Gaca find textual support for her idea that the desire proscribed by Philo’s Tenth Commandment is primarily sexual? She asserts that “Philo accepts Plato’s theory of the irrational physical appetites as well as his position that the sexual appetite is the most domineering and recalcitrant of the lot” (emphasis added), citing *Spec.* 4.92–94 to support her claim:

Finally, they determined that desire must reside in the area around the navel known as the “diaphragm” (ἐπιθυμία δὲ ἀπένεμαν τὸν περὶ τὸν ὀμφαλὸν καὶ τὸ καλοῦμενον διάφραγμα χῶρον). Since desire has the least to do with reason (λογισμὸν), it clearly must reside as far as possible from reason’s royal domain—practically at the outskirts. Naturally, the pasture of this most insatiable and licentious of beasts (ἀπληστότατον καὶ ἀκόλαστότατον ... θρεμάτων) is the area of the body associated with primal drives for food and sex (τρωφαί τε καὶ ὠχέιαι). (*Spec.* 4.93–94)\(^{83}\)

Philo clearly marks in this passage the Platonic ἐπιθυμητικόν as the seat of primal drives for food and sex, but this is ultimately nothing more than an endorsement of Plato’s tripartite psychology.\(^{84}\) By itself, this passage does not prove that Philo saw ὁμός ἐπιθυμήσεις primarily as a restriction of sexual desire. In fact, not one of the passages Gaca cites reflects a special emphasis on sexual appetite in Philo’s exposition. She claims that “Philo fully agrees with Plato” that:

The combined sexual appetite and reproductive urge, when fattened and left to their own devices, are the main root of depraved minds and social mores because they stimulate a proliferation of other passions. (Gaca, *Making of Fornication*, 195)

To support this claim, she cites *Spec.* 4.85 as follows: “Sexual eros is ‘the passion at the origin of wrongdoing’ (ὀρχέκακον πάθος) (*Spec* 4.85).\(^{85}\) But a fuller citation shows that Gaca misreads Philo’s statement:

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82 See Gaca, *Making of Fornication*, 195. Presumably, *Spec.* 4.92–94 is the textual evidence Gaca has in mind, since it is the only passage she cites in the paragraph other than *Decal* 173–74, which proves only that “appetites are an unavoidable part of our human and animal nature.”


84 N.B. λόγος, θυμός, and ἐπιθυμία in *Spec.* 4.92. Gaca rightly suggests Philo’s endorsement here of “Plato’s theory of the irrational physical appetites” (Gaca, *Making of Fornication*, 195), but Philo says nothing about “[Plato’s] position that the sexual appetite is the most domineering and recalcitrant of the lot.” Gaca assumes that a reference to the Platonic ἐπιθυμητικόν and its characteristic appetites proves ipso facto that Philo holds a highly sexualized concept of ἐπιθυμία throughout his exposition.

For the passion to which the name of originator of evil can truly be given is
desire (τὸ ... ἀρχέκακον πάθος ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία), of which one and that the
smallest fruit the passion of love (Ἦς ἐν τῷ βραχύτατον ἐγγονον, ἔρως) has not
only once but often in the past filled the whole world with countless calamities (ἀμυθήτων ... συμφορῶν) .... (Spec. 4.85)

The ἀρχέκακον πάθος in this passage is clearly ἐπιθυμία (desire involving
any object), not “sexual eros” as Gaca states. Philo does identify ἔρως as an
“offspring” (ἐγγονον) of ἐπιθυμία, but nothing in the passage requires even this word to have a sexual connotation. Gaca also misconstrues the phrase ἀπάντων πηγῆ τῶν κακῶν (Spec. 4.84), which she cites four times. Here Philo does indeed identify ἐπιθυμία as “the fountain of all evils,” but in light of Spec. 4.82 (esp. ἀλλὰ ἀμυθήτων) it must be understood as desire involving any number of possible objects—not sexual desire, or even appetitive desire per se. Gaca first misunderstands the sense when she states that “physical appetite in general” (ἐπιθυμία) is “the origin of all wrong-doing,” then she provides in each subsequent reference to Spec. 4.84 a different rendering of ἐπιθυμία:

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86 Cf. Méasson, Char ailé, 154: “Philon analyse d’abord le désir en lui-même et, sans référence à aucun objet, le définit: ἀρχέκακον πάθος, «la passion qui est le principe du mal» (§ 85)” (emphasis added).
87 Spec. 4.85 in its entirety shows that the “calamities” (συμφορῶν) Philo has in mind mainly involve warfare, which of course can result from sexual ἔρως (e.g., the Trojan war, noted by Colson in regard to Spec. 4.85 [PLCL 8, 61, n. b]), but obviously need not. Decal. 152–53 also mentions “calamities” (συμφορῶν) involving warfare and attributes all wars (πόλεμοι πάντες) to desire (ἐπιθυμία): for money (χρημάτων), glory (δόξης), or pleasure (ἡδονῆς) (cf. esp. Phaed. 66 C). In general, Gaca fails to note that ἔρως in Philo’s exposition is not inherently sexual (e.g., Decal. 151: χρημάτων ἔρως). Gaca seems to limit the scope of ἔρως, by definition, to sexual desire alone: “Uncontrolled sexual desire, or eros, is especially problematic for Philo and his predecessor Plato” (Gaca, Making of Fornication, 195). This is surprising, since Gaca in an earlier chapter on Platonic desire emphatically notes the difference between “sexual appetite” and “Platonic eros” (see Making of Fornication, 36–39). On ἔρως in Plato, including its orientation in theory toward any object, see David M. Halperin, “Platonic ἔρως and What Men Call Love,” AP 5 (1985): 161–204. Gaca faults Halperin’s study for “diminish[ing] the opposition” between eros and sexual desire (Making of Fornication, 38, n. 53), when in fact he clearly and carefully notes the difference (Halperin, “Platonic ἔρως,” 170–76). Her citation of Halperin, intended to prove his conflation of eros and sexual appetite for sexual pleasure, fails to take into account his explicit distinction between the terms “appetite” and “desire” (see Halperin, “Platonic ἔρως,” 170). For the generic Platonic notion of ἔρως, see esp. Symp. 205 D, which defines ἔρως as πᾶσα ἡ τῶν ἄγαθῶν ἐπιθυμία.
88 Gaca, Making of Fornication, 198.
• “sexual and other appetite” (ἐπιθυμία) is “the origin of all wrongdoing”
• “innate sexual desire” (ἐπιθυμία) is “the origin of wrongdoing”
• “eros” (ἐπιθυμία) is “the origin of wrongdoing”

The same word, from the same passage, receives a progressively more sexual connotation in the course of Gaca’s study, without justification or explanation. Gaca cannot produce no clear evidence for an especially sexual connotation of ἐπιθυμία in Philo’s exposition because no such evidence exists. Moreover, the principal evidence she cites (three times) from elsewhere in Philo’s writings, Opif. 151–52, is inconclusive. Although this passage does deal with sexual attraction, it has little to say about the kind of ἐπιθυμία Philo envisions when commenting on the Tenth Commandment. In fact, this passage does not even contain the word ἐπιθυμία, contrary to Gaca’s original citation:

“The irrational appetite” (ἐπιθυμία), and the sexual appetite in particular, “is the beginning of wrongs and violations of the Law” (Opif 151–2).

The relevant section reads in full:

And this desire begat likewise bodily pleasure (ὁ δὲ πόθος οὗτος καὶ τὴν τῶν σωμάτων ἡδονήν ἐγέννησεν), that pleasure which is the beginning of wrongs and violation[s] of law (ητὶς ἐστὶν ἀδικημάτων καὶ παρανομημάτων ἀρχή) .... (Opif. 152)

Clearly, the passage states that “bodily pleasure” (τὴν τῶν σωμάτων ἡδονήν), and not “irrational appetite” (ἐπιθυμία), is ἀδικημάτων καὶ παρανομημάτων

89 Gaca, Making of Fornication, 198: “Philo, however, differs dramatically from Plato by insisting that sexual and other appetite is a ‘great and excessive wickedness, truly the origin of all wrongdoing’” (Spec 4.84).
90 Gaca, Making of Fornication, 200: “For Philo, however, the ‘origin of wrongdoing’ and ‘of violation of the Law’ (Spec 4.84, Opif 151–2) is innate sexual desire and its tendency to excessive pleasure ....”
91 Gaca, Making of Fornication, 216: “In support of Plato’s political theory, Philo formulates a distinctively Jewish Platonist position that sexual desire is the primary root of rebellion against God. As he phrases this idea, eros is the ‘origin of wrongdoing’ and ‘of violation of the Law’” (Spec 4.84, Opif 151–2).
92 See Gaca, Making of Fornication, 198, 200, and 216.
93 As part of his commentary on Genesis 1–3, Philo considers the nature and consequences of sexual ἔρως between Adam and Eve.
94 Gaca, Making of Fornication, 198.
95 The “desire” mentioned here is πόθος, which—like ἔρως, also in Opif. 152—need not have a sexual connotation, although it clearly does in this case (cf. Opif. 5: ἔρωτι καὶ πόθῳ σοφίας; Ebr. 21: πόθος ἀρέτῆς; Fug. 164: πόθον ἐπιστήμης; Decal. 148: πόθῳ τοῦ τρανοῳθήναι ταῖς ἀκοαῖς τὸν Ἡχον).
The pleasure (ἡδονή) mentioned here arguably involves sexual ἐπιθυμία, but the word ἐπιθυμία simply does not appear, and applying this passage to Philo’s commentary on the Tenth Commandment is unwarranted. Gaca is unable, with this or any other passage, to demonstrate that Philo sees ὅν ἐπιθυμήσεις mainly as a proscription of sexual desire, or that he anywhere in his exposition singles out sexual desire as especially problematic over against any other type.

Because her study misidentifies what the Commandment prohibits, its explanation of how someone observes the Commandment, particularly the role played by the dietary laws, is also incorrect. According to Gaca, and in keeping with her overall emphasis, the dietary laws for Philo ultimately target sexual desire. Since a dangerous causal link exists between unrestrained eating and unrestrained sexual desire (which in turn causes a proliferation of other vices), dietary laws that restrict food intake restrict also sexual desire and thus limit the vice associated with sexual excess. But nowhere in Philo’s discussion of the dietary laws (Spec. 4.96–131) is sexual desire mentioned, much less cited as the ultimate concern. This again calls into question Gaca’s treatment of Philo’s text—what does she claim to find?


97 “Restricting diet is an important part of taming sexual desire for both Philo and Plato. Philo regards Moses’ dietary laws as the one sure regimen that reduces sexual desire and thereby subdues its offspring of vices” (Gaca, Making of Fornication, 196).

98 Gaca elsewhere makes the connection between food and sexual desire without explicitly mentioning dietary laws: “Human beings must keep their appetites under rational guard by curbing their wild sexual desire through restricting the intake of food and drink” (Making of Fornication, 195). Also: “Sexual eros on Plato’s view comes into its own as a raging tyrant once surplus nutriment fuels its voracity. The combined sexual appetite and reproductive urge, when fattened and left to their own devices, are the main root of depraved minds and social mores because they stimulate a proliferation of other passions. Philo fully agrees with Plato on this matter” (ibid.).
and where. She refers to *Spec.* 4.96, where Philo states the rationale of the dietary laws from Moses’ perspective, but she misinterprets his statement:

Moses thus “began to train and chastise the appetite centered on the belly” (*Spec.* 4.96), because he knew God’s people needed to put their “love-mad” sexual behavior on the right kind of diet (*Spec* 3.9–10).

According to Philo, the reason Moses focused on training the desire “whose field of activity is the belly” (τὴν περὶ γαστερὰ πραγματευομένην ἐπιθυμίαν) is so that “the other forms (τὰς ἀλλὰς) will cease to run riot as before and will be restrained by having learnt that their senior and as it were the leader of their company (τὴν πρεσβυτάτην καὶ ὁς ἡγεμονίδα) is obedient to the laws of temperance” (*Spec.* 4.96). The desire for food and drink is preeminent and serves as a “paradigmatic instruction” (παραδειγματικὴ διδασκαλία in *Spec.* 4.96), whose training applies to *any other form of desire*, including—but certainly neither limited nor especially pertinent to—sexual desire. Gaca omits the second half of Philo’s sentence in *Spec.* 4.96, which contains his understanding of the rationale for training dietary desires, and substitutes a different rationale based on a passage from a different treatise, which has no direct application to Philo’s discussion of the Tenth Commandment. As for prohibited animals, Gaca understands Philo to say that Moses “knew that the prohibited types of animal flesh, such as pork, are particularly laced with an aphrodisiac surplus (*Spec.* 4.100–18).” But Philo says nothing of the sort in *Spec.* 4.100–18. He does say that Moses prohibited animals “whose flesh is the finest and fattest, thus titillating and exciting the malignant foe pleasure (τὴν ἐπιβουλὴν ἡδονήν) ... knowing that they set a trap for the most slavish of the senses, the taste (γεύσιν), and produce gluttony, an evil very dangerous both to soul and body” (*Spec.* 4.100). Without exploring here the full import of this statement for Philo’s understanding of the dietary laws, it is enough to note that the sensory pleasure involved is gustatory, not sexual. Gaca notes also Philo’s

100 Philo’s comments in *Spec.* 3.9–10 pertain, as he explicitly states, to the Sixth Commandment (not the Tenth), the first in the second table (see *Spec.* 3.7–8).
102 Presumably, this is the passage Gaca has in mind, since Philo immediately gives the example of pork in *Spec.* 4.101 and Gaca mentions pork explicitly when citing this passage.
103 In any case, the context suggests that Philo’s interest is in Moses’ proscriptive cultivation of self-control (N.B. *Spec.* 4.101: πρὸς ... ἐπιτάσσειν), not the avoidance of “aphrodisiac surplus.” Isaak Heinemann, commenting on this passage, correctly notes
summary statement concerning Moses’ prohibition of various animals, that “by this as by the withdrawal of fuel from a fire he creates an extinguisher to desire (σβέσν της ἐπιθυμίας)” (Spec. 4.118). But this has no explicit bearing on sexual desire, unless the term ἐπιθυμία is presumed to have an especially sexual connotation in Spec. 4.96–131, which it does not. In fact, due to an overemphasis on sexual desire, Gaca overlooks the fundamental role of the dietary laws from Philo’s perspective, which is to promote self-control (ἐγράτεια)—initially with respect to desire(s) for food and drink, but ultimately with respect to desires of any type.

Despite their respective contributions, the studies of Wolfson and Gaca, along with other shorter, incidental treatments of οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις, fail to answer with sufficient depth or accuracy the fundamental questions surrounding Philo’s exposition of the Tenth Commandment. As a result, this important element of Philo’s thought remains obscure.

Plan of the Monograph

Chapters two and three of this monograph do not deal directly with Philo’s exposition of the Tenth Commandment. Instead, they offer an introductory survey of terms and concepts that Philo uses in that exposition, situating his moral psychology within the philosophical context of Middle Platonism. Chapter two treats Philo’s concept of desire (ἐπιθυμία), including explanations of its source, nature, function, and problematic malfunction. Chapter three treats Philo’s concept of self-

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104 Gaca, Making of Fornication, 196.
106 Without assuming or suggesting that Philo intends to write as a systematic philosopher, chapters two and three nevertheless demonstrate the existence of coherent strands of thought running throughout his works. Multiple attestation confirms the reliability of these strands as accurate representations of Philo’s Middle-Platonic convictions regarding ἐπιθυμία and other concepts.
control (ἐγκράτεια), including explanations of its nature, its acquisition through ἄσκησις, and its role in the proper management of desire. With this conceptual backdrop in place, Philo’s exposition of οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις emerges more clearly as a coherent, representative statement of his ethical theory.

Chapter four focuses on Spec. 4.78b–131, Philo’s exposition of the Tenth Commandment (although Decal. 142–53 and Decal. 173–74 receive consideration in connection with relevant sections of the exposition proper). Along with introductory matters, an outline of Philo’s exposition, a fresh translation of the PCW text, and notes on select passages, chapter four comments on each distinct unit of text. This commentary, however, does not treat all aspects of the text equally and so does not serve as a commentary in the traditional sense. Instead, it is focused and thematic, explaining how Philo uses the conceptual nexus of ἐπιθυμία, ἐγκράτεια, and ἄσκησις as an overarching expository agenda for his work.

Chapter five summarizes the results of the monograph by providing direct, concise answers to the basic questions regarding Philo’s exposition:

1. In Philo’s view, what does the Tenth Commandment prohibit? (All desire? A certain type? What type?)

2. In Philo’s view, how is the Tenth Commandment observed? (What are the mechanics of its observance? What role do the dietary laws play in its observance?)

Chapter five also suggests lines of further research based on the results of this study.