

# THE CHREIA AND ANCIENT RHETORIC



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Number 31

THE CHREIA AND ANCIENT RHETORIC  
Commentaries on Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata*

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Craig A. Gibson

# The Chreia and Ancient Rhetoric

## Commentaries on Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata*

Translated with an Introduction and Notes by

Ronald F. Hock

Society of Biblical Literature  
Atlanta

# THE CHREIA AND ANCIENT RHETORIC

Commentaries on Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata*

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In memory of Edward N. O'Neil

συνεργοῦ καὶ φίλου



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# Abbreviations

## PRIMARY RESOURCES

Ambros. gr.	Codex Ambrosianus graecus
Anon. Schol.	Anonymous scholia
<i>Anon. Seg.</i>	<i>Anonymous Seguerianus</i>
<i>AP</i>	Anthologia Palatina
<i>Ars gramm.</i>	Dionysius Thrax, <i>Ars grammatica</i>
Barrocc.	Codex Bodleianus Baroccianus graecus
<i>Bis acc.</i>	Lucian, <i>Bis accusatus</i>
Brit. Mus. addit.	British Museum additional manuscript
<i>Cat.</i>	Lucian, <i>Cataplus</i>
Coisl. gr.	Codex Coislinianus graecus
<i>Comm. in Aphth.</i>	<i>Commentarium in Aphthonii Progymnasmata</i>
<i>De an.</i>	Aristotle, <i>De anima</i>
<i>Dem. enc.</i>	Pseudo-Lucian, <i>Demosthenis encomium</i>
<i>Demetr.</i>	Plutarch, <i>Demetrius</i>
<i>Demosth.</i>	Plutarch, <i>Demosthenes</i>
<i>Eleg.</i>	Theognis, <i>Elegiae</i>
<i>Fab.</i>	<i>Fabulae</i> (Aesop, Aphthonius)
<i>Frag.</i>	Epicharmus, <i>Fragmenta</i>
<i>Hec.</i>	Euripides, <i>Hecuba</i>
<i>Hell.</i>	Xenophon, <i>Hellenica</i>
<i>Hes.</i>	Lucian, <i>Hesiodus</i>
<i>Hom.</i>	Basil, <i>Homiliae</i>
<i>Il.</i>	Homer, <i>The Iliad</i>
<i>Intr.</i>	Porphyry, <i>Introduction</i>
Laur.	Codex Laurentianus graecus
Laur. S. Marc.	Codex Laurentianus San Marco
Marc. gr.	Codex Marcianus graecus
<i>Men.</i>	Lucian, <i>Menippus</i>
<i>Merc. cond.</i>	Lucian, <i>De Mercede conductis</i>
<i>Mon.</i>	Menander, <i>Monostichoi</i>
<i>Mor.</i>	Plutarch, <i>Moralia</i>
<i>Nub.</i>	Aristophanes, <i>Nubes</i>
O.Claud.	Mons Claudianus. Ostraca Graeca et Latina

<i>Od.</i>	Homer, <i>The Odyssey</i>
<i>Orat.</i>	<i>Orationes</i> (Demosthenes, Dio Chrysostom, Isocrates, Julian)
Oxon. misc	Codex Oxiensis miscellaneus graecus
Paris. gr.	Codex Parisinus graecus
P.Berol.	Papyrus Berolensis
<i>Pelop.</i>	Plutarch, <i>Pelopidas</i>
<i>Phoc.</i>	Plutarch, <i>Phocion</i>
<i>Progymn.</i>	<i>Progymnasmata</i> (Aphthonius, Georgius, Libanius, Nicepheros, Nicolaus, pseudo-Nicolaus, Theon)
<i>Progymn. Frag.</i>	Sopatros, <i>Progymnasmatum Fragmenta</i>
<i>Rhet.</i>	Aristotle, <i>Rhetorica</i>
<i>Rhet. ad Alex.</i>	<i>Rhetorica ad Alexandrum</i>
<i>Rhet. ad Her.</i>	<i>Rhetorica ad Herennium</i>
Riccard. gr.	Codex Riccardianus graecus
Taurien. gr.	Codex Tauriensis graecus
UB Salamanca	Universitas Bibliotheca Salamanca
<i>V. Apoll.</i>	Philostratus, <i>Vita Apollonii</i>
Vat. gr.	Codex Vaticanus graecus
<i>V.H.</i>	Aelian, <i>Varia historia</i>
Vindo. phil. gr.	Codex Vindobonensis philosophicus graecus
<i>Vit. dec. orat.</i>	Pseudo-Plutarch, <i>Vitae decem oratorum</i>
<i>WD</i>	Hesiod, <i>Works and Days</i>

## SECONDARY RESOURCES

ABla	Analecta Blatadon
ArchExSard	Archaeological Explorations of Sardis
<i>AttiSocLSL</i>	<i>Atti Società linguistica Scienze e Letteratura</i>
<i>BNĴ</i>	<i>Byzantinisch-neugriechische Jahrbücher</i>
<i>BS</i>	<i>Byzantinoslavica</i>
ByzA	Byzantinische Archiv
<i>ByzZ</i>	<i>Byzantinische Zeitschrift</i>
CAG	Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca
CHellSt	Center for Hellenic Studies
<i>Chreia</i> 1	R. F. Hock and E. N. O'Neil, eds., <i>The Chreia in Ancient Rhetoric. Vol. 1: The Progymnasmata</i> . Society of Biblical Literature Texts

	and Translations 27. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986.
<i>Chreia</i> 2	R. F. Hock and E. N. O'Neil, eds., <i>The Chreia and Ancient Rhetoric. Vol. 2: Classroom Exercises</i> . Society of Biblical Literature Writings from the Greco-Roman World 2. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2002.
<i>CJ</i>	<i>Classical Journal</i>
<i>CQ</i>	<i>Classical Quarterly</i>
<i>CR</i>	<i>Classical Review</i>
CSCT	Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition
<i>ÉchO</i>	<i>Échos d'Orient</i>
<i>GRBS</i>	<i>Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies</i>
HAW	Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft
H/ON	R. F. Hock and E. N. O'Neil, eds., <i>The Chreia in Ancient Rhetoric. Vol. 1: The Progymnasmata</i> . Society of Biblical Literature Texts and Translations 27. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986.
<i>ICS</i>	<i>Illinois Classical Studies</i>
<i>JHS</i>	<i>Journal of Hellenic Studies</i>
<i>JÖB</i>	<i>Jahrbuch der Österreichische Byzantinistik</i>
LSJ	H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, and H. S. Jones, <i>A Greek-English Lexicon</i> . 9th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
<i>MH</i>	<i>Museum helveticum</i>
MMed	The Medieval Mediterranean
<i>ODB</i>	A. P. Kazhdan et al., eds. <i>Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium</i> . 3 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.
PG	Patrologia graeca. Edited by Jacques-Paul Migne. 162 vols. Paris: Migne: 1857–1886.
<i>PGL</i>	G. W. H. Lampe, ed., <i>A Patristic Greek Lexicon</i> . Oxford: Clarendon, 1968.
PhilAnt	Philosophia Antiqua
<i>PhW</i>	<i>Philologische Wochenschrift</i>
<i>PRSt</i>	<i>Perspectives in Religious Studies</i>
<i>PS</i>	Hugo Rabe, ed., <i>Prolegomenon Sylloge. Rhetores Graeci</i> 14. Leipzig: Teubner, 1931.

PSI	<i>Papiri greci e latini</i> (Pubblicazione della Società Italiana)
PW	<i>Paulys Real-Encyklopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft</i> . New edition by Georg Wissowa and Wilhelm Kroll. 50 vols. in 84 parts. Stuttgart: Metzler and Druckenmüller, 1894–1980.
<i>REA</i>	<i>Revue des études anciennes</i>
<i>REG</i>	<i>Revue des études grecques</i>
<i>RhM</i>	<i>Rheinisches Museum für Philologie</i>
<i>RHT</i>	<i>Revue d'histoire des textes</i>
SBL	Society of Biblical Literature
SBLWGRW	Society of Biblical Literature Writings from the Greco-Roman World
SBLTT	Society of Biblical Literature Texts and Translations
<i>SicGymn</i>	<i>Siculorum Gymnasium</i>
SPByzS	Society for the Promotion of Byzantine Studies
Suda	Adler, Ada, ed., <i>Suidae Lexicon</i> . 5 vols. Leipzig: Teubner, 1928–1938.
Teubner	Bibliotheca scriptorum graecorum et romanorum teubneriana
TLing	Trends in Linguistics
TSHCyp	Texts and Studies of the History of Cyprus
<i>VC</i>	<i>Vigiliae christianae</i>
WByzSt	Wiener Byzantinische Studien
<i>ZPE</i>	<i>Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik</i>

# Introduction

This is the third and final volume of the Chreia in Ancient Education and Literature Project sponsored by the Institute for Antiquity and Christianity at the Claremont Graduate University in Claremont, California. The first volume, *The Chreia in Ancient Rhetoric: The Progymnasmata*,<sup>1</sup> appeared in 1986 and introduced and translated the chreia chapters from all the extant *Progymnasmata* as well as some related texts. The second volume, *The Chreia and Ancient Rhetoric: Classroom Exercises*,<sup>2</sup> was published in 2002; it introduced and translated the various classroom exercises that used the chreia during the primary and secondary stages of the curriculum but especially during the third, or rhetorical, stage, where elaborating a chreia became the principal exercise for students to undertake.

The years since the publication of these volumes have witnessed a renewed scholarly interest in these texts, and this interest has advanced their study in significant ways. For example, regarding the *Progymnasmata* Michel Patillon and Giancarlo Bolognesi have edited and translated the complete text of Theon's *Progymnasmata*,<sup>3</sup> and George Kennedy has provided an easily accessible English translation of all the *Progymnasmata*.<sup>4</sup> Advances in the analysis of the *Progymnasmata* proceed in various directions. For example, Ruth Webb, Malcolm Heath, and Manfred Kraus have

<sup>1</sup> Ronald F. Hock and Edward N. O'Neil, eds., *The Progymnasmata* (vol. 1 of *The Chreia in Ancient Rhetoric*; SBLTT 27; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986).

<sup>2</sup> Ronald F. Hock and Edward N. O'Neil, eds., *Classroom Exercises* (vol. 2 of *The Chreia and Ancient Rhetoric*; WGRW 2; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2002).

<sup>3</sup> Michel Patillon and Giancarlo Bolognesi, eds., *Aelius Theon, Progymnasmata* (2nd ed.; Paris: Belles Lettres, 2002).

<sup>4</sup> George A. Kennedy, trans., *Progymnasmata: Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric* (WGRW 10; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003).

written updated surveys of the *Progymnasmata*,<sup>5</sup> whereas others have focused on issues regarding individual *Progymnasmata*. Thus, Craig Gibson has refined and clarified the translation of two terms in the *Progymnasmata* of pseudo-Hermogenes and Aphthonius;<sup>6</sup> Heath has proposed a later dating for Theon's *Progymnasmata*<sup>7</sup> and conjectured Minucianus as the author of pseudo-Hermogenes's *Progymnasmata*;<sup>8</sup> and Gibson has found textual evidence in Nicolaus's *Progymnasmata* for the long-held assumption that its author was a Christian.<sup>9</sup>

Scholarship on the classroom exercises that accompanied the theoretical sections of Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata* has also begun to appear.<sup>10</sup> Eugenio Amato has published a new edition of the sample narratives (διηγήματα) and speeches-in-character (ῥητορικαί) of one of Libanius's students, Severus of Alexandria,<sup>11</sup> but especially notable in this regard is the work of Gibson, who has translated the voluminous sample exercises either by or attributed to Libanius of Antioch.<sup>12</sup> Gibson has also examined the

<sup>5</sup> Ruth Webb, "The Progymnasmata as Practice," in *Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity* (ed. Y. L. Too; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2001), 289–316; Malcolm Heath, "Theon and the History of the Progymnasmata," *GRBS* 43 (2003): 129–60; Manfred Kraus, "Aphthonius and the Progymnasmata in Rhetorical Theory and Practice," in *Sizing Up Rhetoric* (ed. David Zarefsky and Elizabeth Benacka; Long Grove, Ill.: Waveland, 2008), 52–67.

<sup>6</sup> Craig A. Gibson, "Two Technical Terms in Greek Progymnasmata Treatises," *RhM* 152 (2009): 141–49.

<sup>7</sup> Heath, "History of the Progymnasmata," 141–58.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 132, 158–60.

<sup>9</sup> Craig A. Gibson, "Was Nicolaus the Sophist a Christian?" *VC* 64 (2010): 496–500.

<sup>10</sup> New classroom texts that have chreiai include one attributed to Dio- genes on O.Claud. 413, published in Jean Bingen et al., eds., *Mons Claudianus: Ostraca Graeca et Latina* (Paris: Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale, 1997), 263–65, and a restored chreia attributed to Olympias, the mother of Alexander, in P.Berol. inv. 21258v, published by Nikos Litinas, "A Chreia of Olympias?" *ZPE* 172 (2010): 197–98.

<sup>11</sup> Eugenio Amato, ed., *Severus Sophista Alexandrinus: Progymnasmata quae exstant omnia* (Teubner 2002; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2009), 3–30.

<sup>12</sup> Craig A. Gibson, trans., *Libanius' Progymnasmata: Model Exercises in Greek Prose Composition and Rhetoric* (WGRW 27; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2008).

anonymous sample exercises included in the commentary on Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata* by John Doxapatres<sup>13</sup> and has used a sample description (ἐκφρασις) of the Alexandrian temple of Tyche by pseudo-Nicolaus to date more securely this author to the late fourth or early fifth century.<sup>14</sup>

But when it comes to the extensive commentary tradition on Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata* scholarship is still sparse, due in part to a reputation that these commentaries are "a dreary waste of pedantry and triviality."<sup>15</sup> This opinion has, of course, some truth in it, given the repetition of earlier materials by later commentators and the beginner level of the material contained in these prrhetorical exercises. But that is hardly the entire story. Apart from the pedantry and triviality, there is much in these commentaries that deserves our attention, if we are to appreciate their role in late-antique and Byzantine education. Herbert Hunger has provided a useful summary and a starting point for work on them, and Kennedy's translation of the *Progymnasmata* also includes a partial translation of at least John of Sardis's commentary.<sup>16</sup> But much work on the commentaries remains to be done, and it is the intention of this third volume to begin that work, the preliminary work, by providing full introductions to the six texts collected here as well as facing translations of the chapters on the chreia along with explanatory notes. It is hoped that others will go on to provide much-needed critical editions of these texts as well as more insightful and contextual analyses of them.

At any rate, each text in this volume will be based on the standard edition, usually Christian Walz's. Several changes, however, have been made to these texts, largely to aid the reader. Page

<sup>13</sup> Craig A. Gibson, "The Anonymous Progymnasmata in John Doxapatres' *Homiliae in Aphthonium*," *ByzZ* 102 (2009): 83–94.

<sup>14</sup> Craig A. Gibson, "The Alexandrian Tychaion and the Date of Ps.-Nicolaus' *Progymnasmata*," *CQ* 59 (2009): 608–23.

<sup>15</sup> Such is the opinion of J. D. Denniston in his review of the introductory chapters of these commentaries (see his review of Hugo Rabe, ed., *Prolegomenon Sylloge*, *CR* 46 [1932]: 86).

<sup>16</sup> Herbert Hunger, *Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner* (2 vols.; HAW 12.5.1–2; Munich: Beck, 1978), 1:78–79, and Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, 173–228. Unfortunately, the following book came to my attention too late to be considered (see *ByzZ* 103 [2010]: 259): K. Alpers, *Untersuchungen zu Johannes Sardonios und seinem Kommentar zu den Progymnasmata des Aphthonios* (Braunschweig: Cramer, 2009).

numbers from the standard editions have been inserted in parentheses at the appropriate places. Quotations from Aphthonius's chapter on the chreia are printed in bold and further identified by the line number(s) from Hock/O'Neil, *Chreia* 1 (= H/ON; "Aphthonius" is abbreviated as "Aphth") in parentheses, along with the page and line numbers from Rabe's standard edition<sup>17</sup> (= Rabe) in square brackets. The structure of the commentaries has been made explicit by providing a number and title in bold and in pointed brackets for each section of the commentary. In addition, "verse" numbers have been added within each section for easier referencing.

The earliest known commentary on the progymnasmata is that by Menander of Lycian Laodicea in the early third century. According to the Suda, he wrote a commentary on Minucianus's *Progymnasmata* as well as on the Hermogenean corpus.<sup>18</sup> This commentary has not survived, and in fact the whole of the extant commentary tradition is entirely Byzantine and devoted to explaining not Minucianus's but Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata*. By the sixth century Aphthonius's had become the standard set of progymnasmata and so was included in the Corpus Hermogenianum, the five-part rhetorical canon that was made up of Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata* along with four writings attributed to Hermogenes of Tarsus—Περὶ Στάσεων (*On Issues*), Περὶ εὐρέσεως (*On Invention*), Περὶ ἰδεῶν (*On Types of Style*), and Περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος (*On Method*).<sup>19</sup>

The earliest commentary on Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata* is by John of Sardis, who belongs to the mid-ninth century. His chapter on the chreia is thus the first text in this volume, and the subsequent five texts range from the turn of the millenium to the

<sup>17</sup> Hugo Rabe, ed., *Aphthonii Progymnasmata* (Rhetores Graeci 10; Leipzig: Teubner, 1926).

<sup>18</sup> See Suda 3:361: Μένανδρος Λαοδικεύς τῆς παρὰ τῷ Λύκῳ τῷ ποταμῷ σοφιστῆς. ἔγραψεν ὑπόμνημα εἰς τὴν Ἑρμογένους τέχνην καὶ Μινουκιανοῦ προγυμνάσματα; and Malcolm Heath, *Menander: A Rhetor in Context* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 34, 51, 69, 93.

<sup>19</sup> For the texts of these Hermogenean treatises, see Hugo Rabe, ed., *Hermogenis Opera* (Rhetores Graeci 6; Leipzig: Teubner, 1913). Only two of the treatises are now considered authentic, *On Issues* and *On Types of Style*, but since the commentators assumed all to be by Hermogenes, they will be so treated here. For a summary of the content of these treatises, see Hunger, *Literatur*, 1:76–77.



late fifteenth century. They include the P-scholia from around the year 1000, Doxapatres's commentary from the late eleventh century, the *Rhetorica Marciana* from the late twelfth, Maximus Planudes's commentary from the late thirteenth, and Matthew Camariotes's epitome from some decades after the fall of Constantinople in 1453. The range in size of these commentaries is equally broad, as John Doxapatres's is the longest at 483 pages, whereas Matthew Camariotes's comes in at a meager six.

What scholarship there is on these commentaries tends to focus, as will become clear in the introductions to the individual commentaries, on dating and sources and on making only the most general of statements about their contents. Close analysis of the contents of the commentaries themselves is largely missing, so it is to that task that the introductions to the individual commentaries are devoted. At this point, however, only some preliminary observations need be made.

The commentaries on Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata* have a number of functions, but most of them can be subsumed under the need to expand on Aphthonius's rather spare treatment of the progymnasmata. For example, the *Suda* correctly sensed that Aphthonius wrote his *Progymnasmata* as preparation for the technical treatises of Hermogenes.<sup>20</sup> But nowhere in his *Progymnasmata* does Aphthonius indicate how his lessons actually prepare students for the compositional and argumentative skills they will need for the more advanced task of composing speeches. The commentaries do, stressing how useful (χρήσιμον) each progymnasma is for teaching the basics of the three kinds of public speech and the four parts of a speech. Aphthonius gave no rationale for the order (τάξις) of the fourteen progymnasmata, but the commentaries provide elaborate justifications of his order, particularly with respect to the chreia. Aphthonius provided only the simplest division (διαίρεσις) of the subforms of any progymnasma, but the commentaries, especially in the chreia chapter, provide a subdivision (ὑποδιαίρεσις) and an alternate division (ἐπιδιαίρεσις). Aphthonius simply listed the virtues (ἀρεταί) of a good narrative, but the commentaries go on to provide detailed instructions

<sup>20</sup> See *Suda* 1:432: Ἀφθόνιος, σοφιστής, ἔγραψεν εἰς τὴν Ἑρμογένους τέχνην Προγυμνάσματα.

on how to achieve them. Aphthonius simply listed the headings (κεφάλαια) that are to be used in elaborating a chreia, but the commentaries explain their specific functions, suggest ways of composing them, and even justify their order. Aphthonius simply listed the stylistic features required of a speech-in-character, but the commentaries provide instruction on how to attain them. In short, the expansive nature of the commentaries would have made Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata* that much easier to use as a textbook for teaching basic compositional skills and especially the methods of argumentation.

In addition, the commentaries identify what subjects are essential to each progymnasma, debate competing interpretations of what Aphthonius really said, incorporate Christian quotations and orators, clarify various words and phrases with synonyms, comment on grammatical features, point out Aphthonius's effective rhetorical figures and strategies in the model exercises, add further examples of model progymnasmata, and even point out variant readings in the manuscripts.

All these features, and still others, will be dealt with in detail in the following chapters, but for now it should be clear that the commentaries provide extensive, useful, and at times sophisticated expansions of Aphthonius's spare treatment. And perhaps it should also now be clear that, far from offering "a dreary waste of pedantry and triviality," these commentaries helped teachers take students through the sequence of progymnasmata or, as Doxapatres put it, "the flight of stairs" (ἀναβαθμοί) that would provide them with the skills necessary eventually to study rhetoric,<sup>21</sup> which was the ultimate goal of the educational curriculum.

It remains my pleasant duty to record the debts incurred in doing this volume. First, those of us who work on the rhetorical texts of Late Antiquity and Byzantium cannot be anything but profoundly indebted to the indefatigable work that Christian Walz and Hugo Rabe put into collecting and editing the rhetorical manuscripts on which we are still dependent.<sup>22</sup> My debt to them will become apparent on almost every page of this volume. Thanks are also due to the Institute for Antiquity and Christianity

<sup>21</sup> See Doxapatres 2:138,16 (Walz) (= *PS* 147,18 [Rabe]).

<sup>22</sup> Hunger (*Literatur*, 1:78) lists others, such as Stephan Glöckner and Otmar Schissel, whose work also forms the basis of much contemporary scholarship on Byzantine rhetoric.

and its director Dennis R. MacDonald for their continuing support and encouragement of the Chreia Project. Specific thanks go to members of the Chreia Project who helped in the initial draft translations of the texts in this volume, with special thanks to Professor David Lull of Warburg Theological Seminary for his further work on the introductions and texts of Maximus Planudes and Matthew Camariotes. In addition, I am very grateful indeed to Professor Craig Gibson of the University of Iowa for his help on a number of difficult passages, but also for his meticulous reading of the entire manuscript and his numerous suggestions for its improvement. Thanks also to the Interlibrary Loan staff of Doheny Library at the University of Southern California for their assistance in securing a number of articles that were difficult to find and to Dani Byrd, Dean of Faculty of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences at USC, for granting me a sabbatical during the 2009–10 school year, during which substantial work on the volume was done. Thanks are also due to John T. Fitzgerald, the general editor of the Writings from the Greco-Roman World series, for accepting this volume, and to Craig Gibson, the editor of this volume, for his careful and meticulous reading of it, which saved me from numerous infelicities and mistakes. Thanks also to Editorial Director Bob Buller and his staff at the Society of Biblical Literature for seeing this volume through the press.

Finally, even though the late codirector of the Chreia Project, Professor Edward N. O’Neil of the Classics Department at USC, died in 2001 while the second volume was in press, his assistance has continued up to the present, thanks to his “infamous yellow pages,” as they have become known, which provide not only his draft translations of most of the texts in this volume but also his thinking on the grammar and vocabulary of various difficult sentences. Because of his continuing help in this indirect way I have dedicated this volume to his memory.

Ronald F. Hock  
Professor of Religion  
University of Southern California  
January 2011



# Text 1. John of Sardis

## Commentary on Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata*

Chapter 3: On the Chreia  
(34,1–55,15 Rabe)

### INTRODUCTION

#### *Life and Writings*

The debt that students of Byzantine school rhetoric owe to Hugo Rabe is especially evident in the case of the earliest extant commentator on Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata*: John of Sardis. This debt becomes clear once we realize how little was known about this commentator before Rabe's contributions. For example, in the Pauly-Wissowa article on Aphthonius, published in 1894, J. Brzoska duly noted the existence of an Aphthonian commentator who is known from five citations by the late eleventh-century commentator John Doxapatres, and who is called there simply "the Sardian" (ὁ τῶν Σάρδεων). Brzoska did not know the name of "the Sardian," much less the century to which to assign him.<sup>1</sup> Consequently, for Brzoska "the Sardian" remained a shadowy figure indeed.

This situation changed dramatically with the work of Rabe in the early decades of the twentieth century. His investigations of rhetorical manuscripts led to discoveries of decisive importance for moving John of Sardis out of the shadows. The most important was his discovery of a fifteenth-century manuscript, Vat. gr. 1408 (= V), which contains in fol. 11r–135r a virtually complete text of John's commentary on Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata*. In two articles, both published in 1908, Rabe made passing reference

<sup>1</sup> See J. Brzoska, "Aphthonios (1)," PW 1:2797–800, esp. 2799.

to this manuscript,<sup>2</sup> but it was not until 1928 that he published an edition of the commentary.<sup>3</sup>

Rabe unfortunately is silent about the circumstances of his discovery of Vat. gr. 1408, but it seems to have occurred sometime after he wrote an article, published in 1907,<sup>4</sup> addressing the sources of John Doxapatres's commentary on Aphthonius. In that article he discusses the tenth-century manuscript Coisl. gr. 387 (= C) without any hint that this manuscript also contains a portion of John of Sardis's commentary—a fact that would have been immediately obvious had he already known about Vat. gr. 1408. In any case, the significance of Vat. gr. 1408 is not only that it contains the text of the commentary, but also that it has a superscription that includes the author's full name as well as the title of the work: Ἰωάννου τοῦ Σάρδεων ἐξηγησις εἰς τὰ Ἀφθονίου Προγυμνάσματα.<sup>5</sup>

With the discovery of the text of John's commentary in Vat. gr. 1408, Rabe was able to compare this text with other manuscripts and to identify which, if any, of them also contain the commentary, or at least portions of it. Rabe found two such manuscripts. One manuscript, as already mentioned, is Coisl. gr. 387, which contains, besides John's introductory chapter, the complete commentary on the first chapter (the fable) and roughly two-thirds of the commentary on the second (the narrative), before breaking off well short of the third, or chreia, chapter (fol. 121r-134r).<sup>6</sup> The other manuscript is the thirteenth-/fourteenth-century manuscript Vindo. phil. gr. 130 (= W). This manuscript gathers together three sets of scholia on Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata*: one set from John Doxapatres; another from John of Sardis, though here he is simply called "the other

<sup>2</sup> Hugo Rabe, "Aus Rhetoren-Handschriften: 5. Des Diakonen und Logotheten Johannes Kommentar zu Hermogenes' Περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος," *RhM* 63 (1908): 127–51, esp. 128–30; and "Aus Rhetoren-Handschriften: 6. Weitere Textquelle für Johannes Diakonos," *RhM* 63 (1908): 512–30, esp. 517, 524–25. See also Rabe's review of Stephan Glöckner, *Über den Kommentar des Johannes Doxapatres zu den Staseis des Hermogenes*, *PhW* 29 (1909): 1017–22, esp. 1018.

<sup>3</sup> Hugo Rabe, ed., *Ioannis Sardiani Commentarium in Aphthonii Progymnasmata* (Rhetores Graeci 15; Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1928).

<sup>4</sup> Hugo Rabe, "Aus Rhetoren-Handschriften: 3. Die Quellen des Doxapatres in den Homilien zu Aphthonios," *RhM* 62 (1907): 559–86, esp. 578–80.

<sup>5</sup> John of Sardis, *Comm. in Aphth.*, praef. (1, 1–3 Rabe).

<sup>6</sup> John of Sardis, *Comm. in Aphth.*, praef.-2 (1, 4–27, 14 Rabe).

commentator" (ἕτερος ἐξηγητής); and a third from an unknown commentator (fol. 8r-83v).<sup>7</sup> These three manuscripts, as well as the five passages that Doxapatres attributed to "the Sardinian,"<sup>8</sup> not to mention the many tacit ones in his commentary, thus form the basis of Rabe's text of John of Sardis's commentary on Aphthonius.

If the discovery of Vat. gr. 1408 led to the recovery of all extant texts of John of Sardis's commentary, then Rabe's second discovery, the fourteenth-century manuscript Vat. gr. 2228, provided some biographical information about John of Sardis that allowed Rabe to assign him to his proper century. This manuscript contains Doxapatres's commentary on Hermogenes's *On Invention*, and at the very beginning of it he refers to a similar commentary by John of Sardis and adds that John held two important ecclesiastical offices: ὁ σύγκελλος, or private secretary to the patriarch, and ὁ ἀρχιερατικὸς τῆς τῶν Σάρδεων μητροπόλεως θρόνος, or metropolitan of Sardis (fol. 194r).<sup>9</sup> This biographical information is especially helpful for dating John because, as Rabe points out, two bishops of Sardis named John are known, one from the ninth century and the other from the twelfth. Since Coisl. gr. 387 is a tenth-century manuscript, the later John is thereby eliminated, leaving the earlier one as the author of the commentaries on Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata* and Hermogenes's *On Invention*.<sup>10</sup>

The ninth-century bishop of Sardis is known from his receipt of a letter from Theodore Studites (d. 826).<sup>11</sup> This letter securely places him in the ninth century and indeed among the defenders of icons at the Synod of 815, which reestablished iconoclasm and consequently led to John's exile and imprisonment.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>7</sup> On these three manuscripts, see further Rabe, *Commentarium*, *praef.* iii-xi.

<sup>8</sup> To be sure, only four of Doxapatres's citations actually appear in John of Sardis's commentary (see 2:422,14; 512,29; 521,8; and 543,8 Walz); the citation at 554,16 (Walz) does not (cf. Rabe, *Commentarium*, *praef.* xi).

<sup>9</sup> See Rabe, *Commentarium*, *praef.* xix (later published in *PS* 361,12-13 [Rabe]).

<sup>10</sup> See Rabe, *Commentarium*, *praef.* xvi.

<sup>11</sup> For the letter, see PG 99:1368C-1369A.

<sup>12</sup> See Rabe, *Commentarium*, *praef.* xvii. On John's activities in the iconoclastic controversy, see J. Pargoire, "Saint Euthyme et Jean de Sardes," *ÉCHO* 5 (1901): 157-61.

Accordingly, Brzoska's perplexity about where to assign "the Sardinian" has been cleared up. For, thanks to Rabe, John of Sardis can now be assigned to the mid-ninth century.<sup>13</sup>

Rabe's conclusions regarding the identity and date of John of Sardis have received widespread support,<sup>14</sup> although Clive Foss, a historian of Byzantine Sardis, is inclined to posit a John different from the correspondent of Theodore Studites and so places him somewhat later—in the middle to late ninth century. His reasoning is simply that John was too popular a name to make the identification automatic.<sup>15</sup> Nevertheless, George Kennedy, aware of Foss's hesitation, still considers Rabe's identification probable.<sup>16</sup> And rightly so, for until further evidence emerges for another John at roughly this time, it is better to keep the identification.

Beyond dating, the only other relevant question about John's life that scholars have raised is whether he wrote his commentaries while teaching in Constantinople or later in Sardis when he was bishop. Foss prefers the latter option, noting that bishops had responsibility for education and that provincial cities sometimes organized schools on the model of the patriarchal school in the capital. Accordingly, John's commentaries would have been used in such a school and would in fact "illustrate the continuity or revival of basic learning among the higher clergy and in the provinces."<sup>17</sup>

But the former cannot be ruled out. And Foss himself provides the evidence. On the one hand, Sardis, ever since its

<sup>13</sup> Alexander Kazhdan's claim ("John of Sardis," *ODB* 2:1067) that Rabe dated John to the mid-tenth century comes from a misreading of Rabe's *praefatio*, where he initially posits a mid-tenth-century date (*praef.* xvi) but then rejects it in favor of the mid-ninth (*praef.* xvii).

<sup>14</sup> See, e.g., Otmar Schissel, review of Hugo Rabe, ed., *Ioannis Sardiani Commentarium in Aphthonii Progymnasmata*, *ByzZ* 31 (1929): 75–82, esp. 75–76, and Georg Ammon, review of Hugo Rabe, ed., *Ioannis Sardiani Commentarium in Aphthonii Progymnasmata*, *PhW* 49 (1929): 1009–18, esp. 1011–12. More recently, see Herbert Hunger, *Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner* (HAW 12.5.1–2; Munich: C. H. Beck, 1978), 1:78.

<sup>15</sup> Clive Foss, *Byzantine and Turkish Sardis* (ArchExSard 4; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 64–66.

<sup>16</sup> George Kennedy, *Greek Rhetoric under Christian Emperors* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 275–77.

<sup>17</sup> Foss, *Sardis*, 66.



destruction in 616 by the Persians, suffered so many setbacks—Arab attacks, bubonic plague, loss of provincial capital status to Ephesus, iconoclastic persecution, and the revolt of Thomas the Slav<sup>18</sup>—that it is difficult to imagine the kind of educational program presupposed by John's commentaries. Accordingly, it is somewhat more likely that John wrote his commentaries in Constantinople and surely as part of a teaching career that, in the light of his high ecclesiastical office, may well have been centered in the οἰκουμενικὸν διδασκαλεῖον.<sup>19</sup>

In any case, the writings of John of Sardis are considerable, although they are still largely unpublished or lost. Thus, besides the commentary on Aphthonius, there is the commentary on Hermogenes's *On Invention*, of which only the introduction has survived and been edited.<sup>20</sup> In addition, it is likely that John, having written commentaries on the first and third books of the Corpus Hermogenianum, also wrote a commentary on the second, on Hermogenes's *On Issues*. Indeed, Rabe claims that portions of John's commentary on this book are preserved in the fourteenth-century manuscript Vat. gr. 1022, again under the designation ἕτερος ἐξηγητής.<sup>21</sup> In addition, Rabe and others propose that John wrote commentaries on the remaining books of the Corpus as well, that is, Hermogenes's *On Types of Style* and *On Method*.<sup>22</sup>

Besides these rhetorical writings, there are two ecclesiastical works ascribed to John. Both are hagiographical, one a paraphrase of the martyr Nicephorus and the other an account of the martyrdoms of the fourth-century saints Barbara and Juliana.<sup>23</sup> Neither, however, has as yet been edited.

<sup>18</sup> See Foss, *Sardis*, 53–62.

<sup>19</sup> See Schissel, review of Rabe, 76 (though he does not rule out John's teaching later at Sardis).

<sup>20</sup> For the introduction, see *PS* 351,8–360,5 (Rabe).

<sup>21</sup> For the identification, see Hugo Rabe, ed., *Prolegomenon Sylloge* (Rhetores Graeci 14; Leipzig: Teubner, 1931), *praef.* lxxxix. For the remains, see *PS* 318,9–328,11 (Rabe).

<sup>22</sup> So Rabe, *Prolegomenon Sylloge*, *praef.* xc. See also Schissel, review of Rabe, 76, and Hunger, *Literatur*, 1:83.

<sup>23</sup> See Rabe, *Commentarium*, *praef.* xx. Cf. also Hans-Georg Beck, *Kirche und theologische Literatur im byzantinischen Reich* (HAW 12.2.1; Munich: Beck, 1959), 510.

*John of Sardis's Commentary on Aphthonius's Progymnasmata*

John's commentary on Aphthonius is massive, second only to that of Doxapatres in length. More specifically, Rabe's edition of Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata* fills only 51 Teubner pages, but his edition of John's commentary runs to 267 pages, which means that, on average, each of John's chapters is over five times longer than Aphthonius's. Clearly, John supplied his readers with much that clarifies or supplements Aphthonius's spare presentation.

John's chapters, however, are not equally longer than their Aphthonian counterpart. The three progymnasmata that receive the longest treatment by John are narrative, speaking-in-character, and encomium, being respectively thirteen times, eight and a half times, and eight times longer than their Aphthonian counterparts. The lengthy treatment of the latter two is easily explained, given their importance outside the classroom as popular literary forms.<sup>24</sup> But the reason for the length of the commentary on narrative is less obvious. A perusal of the commentary, however, suggests the answer. Much of the chapter is taken up with expanding on topics that Aphthonius merely listed. Thus, John expands considerably on the six *περιστατικά* ("circumstantial elements") of a narrative. Aphthonius lists them in three lines,<sup>25</sup> but John's informative discussion of them takes up forty-two lines.<sup>26</sup> More expansive yet are John's clarifying comments on the four virtues of a narrative: clarity, conciseness, plausibility, and good Greek. Aphthonius merely lists them in two lines,<sup>27</sup> but John's explanations take up an astounding 148 lines.<sup>28</sup> Once again, the thoroughness of John would have been helpful to teachers trying to explain what these compositional virtues entailed and how they could be achieved.

<sup>24</sup> See George L. Kustas, "The Function and Evolution of Byzantine Rhetoric," *Viator* 1 (1970): 55–73, esp. 60–61.

<sup>25</sup> Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 2 (2,23–3,2 Rabe): the individual who acted, the action that was done, the time when it occurred, the place where it occurred, the manner how it occurred, and the reason why it occurred.

<sup>26</sup> John of Sardis, *Comm. in Aphth.* 2 (18,4–19,24 Rabe).

<sup>27</sup> Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 2 (3,3–4 Rabe).

<sup>28</sup> John of Sardis, *Comm. in Aphth.* 2 (19,25–30,13 Rabe).

Turning from the considerable bulk of John's commentary, we look next at his brief introductory chapter.<sup>29</sup> Aphthonius supplied no introduction—defining the term “progymnasma,” for example, or the purpose of his textbook—so that John, strictly speaking, is not commenting here. Instead, he steps back, as it were, and reflects on the progymnasmata as a whole, particularly in the context of rhetoric. John thought (and Rabe lists no sources for these reflections) that it was unnecessary to begin with a definition (ῥορος) of rhetoric or with identifying the three types (εἶδη) of speeches, even though Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata* was the opening textbook of the five-part rhetorical Corpus Hermogenianum and even though the progymnasmata bore, he says, traces (ἵχνη) of the three types of speeches—advisory, judicial, and celebrative. The reason for not doing this, he adds, is because of the beginner status of those who would be learning the progymnasmata. Mixing in rhetorical categories with progymnasmatic ones at this stage of their education would not be appropriate, because it would terrify (ταράττειν) these beginners with the magnitude of what the rhetorical discipline entails.<sup>30</sup> Put differently, John's reluctance to define rhetoric and its types, as well as his view of rhetoric as terrifying and difficult, suggests that he understood the progymnasmata much as Malcolm Heath does in an interpretation of a passage of Quintilian: they “are preliminary *to* rhetoric rather than a preliminary part *of* it.”<sup>31</sup>

Having dispensed with what he is not going to discuss, John says that he is obligated to treat two other subjects: the σκοπός (“aim”) of Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata* and the τάξις (“order”) in which they are to be read. These subjects, as Rabe has shown, are typical of introductions to specific books, whether grammatical, philosophical, or rhetorical.<sup>32</sup> John begins the first subject by

<sup>29</sup> John of Sardis, *Comm. in Aphth., praef.* (1,8–4,4 Rabe). On this introduction, see also the incisive analysis by Schissel (review of Rabe, 79–82).

<sup>30</sup> See John of Sardis, *Comm. in Aphth., praef.* (1,8–2,8 Rabe).

<sup>31</sup> Malcolm Heath, *Menander: A Rhetor in Context* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 219 (discussing Quintilian 2.10.1) (emphasis original).

<sup>32</sup> Hugo Rabe, “Aus Rhetoren-Handschriften: 10. Einleitungen,” *RhM* 64 (1909): 539–78, esp. 539, 542, 546, and 564. Cf. also Denis van Berchem, “Poètes et grammairiens: Recherche sur la tradition scolaire d'explication des auteurs,” *MH* 9 (1952): 79–87, esp. 80–81.

speaking of the nature (φύσις) of the progymnasmata.<sup>33</sup> And central to their nature, he says, is their being ἀτελής (“incomplete”), because they could not be presented by themselves in a court or an assembly. Those settings require a complete speech (τελεία ὑπόθεσις) with its four parts (μέρη): introduction, statement of the case, proof, and conclusion. None of the progymnasmata has all parts, although some bear a likeness (εἰκλών) to these parts—for example, the narrative bears a likeness to the statement of the case, the refutation and the confirmation to the proof, and the common place to the conclusion.<sup>34</sup> Therefore, given the incomplete nature of progymnasmata, their aim (σκοπός)—and I use Schissel’s change of Rabe’s text at this point—is “not distinctive” (<οὐκ ἴδιος>),<sup>35</sup> because those who are trained writers make use of maxims at one time in their speeches, chreiai at another, and common places at still another. As Schissel explains, these progymnasmata are thus subordinated to the speeches in which they appear and so have no particular aim, apart from contributing to the distinctive aim of, say, a judicial speech, which is justice.<sup>36</sup>

The second subject John discusses has to do with the appropriate τάξις of reading the progymnasmata.<sup>37</sup> John now defines progymnasmata as a miniature rhetoric (μικρὰ ῥητορικὴ), and since rhetoric is a discipline (τέχνη), the τάξις of progymnasmata must follow that of all τέχναι. He says: “Just as in the case of the manual arts [ἐπὶ τῶν βαναύσων τέχνων] something precedes the whole art—in the case of smiths lighting the charcoal and working the bellows or in the case of shoemaking preparing the leather—so also in the case of the liberal arts [τέχνων τούτων]<sup>38</sup> one must begin [ἀρχτέον] first with the simpler ones, the simplest being the fable.”<sup>39</sup> John then gives his reasons for the fable being the leadoff

<sup>33</sup> John of Sardis, *Comm. in Aphth., praef.* (2,9–10 Rabe).

<sup>34</sup> John of Sardis, *Comm. in Aphth., praef.* (2,10–3,1 Rabe).

<sup>35</sup> Schissel, review of Rabe, 79–80. Rabe proposed <πολυσχιδής ἐστι> (3,2).

<sup>36</sup> Schissel, review of Rabe, 80.

<sup>37</sup> John of Sardis, *Comm. in Aphth., praef.* (3,6–4,4 Rabe). On the proper order of reading, see further Jaap Mansfeld, *Prolegomena: Questions to Be Settled before the Study of an Author, or a Text* (PhilAnt 61; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994), 22–57.

<sup>38</sup> I follow Schissel (review of Rabe, 81) in keeping the reading of C, V, and W and not Rabe’s emendation to προγυμνασμάτων (3,11).

<sup>39</sup> John of Sardis, *Comm. in Aphth., praef.* (3,8–12 Rabe).

progymnasma: beginning students would be familiar with the fable not only from their secondary curriculum<sup>40</sup> but also from their nurses and paedagogi, and since the fable contains advice, it would go first, because the advisory speech is the first one studied.<sup>41</sup>

The subject of the proper *τάξις* of progymnasmata continued beyond the introduction. In fact, this introductory subject dominates the opening sections throughout the commentary, appearing in every chapter except two, confirmation and invective. These omissions, however, are only apparent. The *τάξις* of both is discussed in the preceding chapters of their respective pair, refutation and encomium, each of which precedes its pair in the Aphthonian sequence.<sup>42</sup> The principle of simple to more complex appears in some of the discussions: for example, the twelfth progymnasma, description, follows speaking-in-character because it requires more skill and so is more difficult (*ἐργωδεστέρα*).<sup>43</sup> In other discussions, however, other justifications are offered. For example, the maxim is paired with the chreia because it has the same eight *κεφάλαια* (“headings”) for its confirmation, and it follows the chreia because crafts proceed from the lesser to the greater, which means in this case from the specific to the general, from sayings made in response to a situation (chreiai) to those of universal import (maxims).<sup>44</sup> Moreover, refutation and confirmation are grouped with the chreia and maxim because they, too, teach argumentation; refutation and confirmation follow chreia and maxim because refutation and confirmation deal with more than a single saying or action.<sup>45</sup> Finally, thesis and introduction of a law are last in the sequence because these are the first to make use of *ἀντίθεσις* (“objection”) and *λύσις* (“rebuttal”), that is, arguments used in complete speeches. In short, John of Sardis takes

<sup>40</sup> Schissel notes (review of Rabe, 81) that as students were ending their secondary studies they were engaged in versifying fables. See further Raffaella Cribiore, *Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 202–3, and esp. 139 n. 36, which cites school papyri with versified fables.

<sup>41</sup> John of Sardis, *Comm. in Aphth.*, *praef.* (3, 13–4, 4 Rabe).

<sup>42</sup> John of Sardis, *Comm. in Aphth.* 5 (67, 22–68, 2 Rabe) and 8 (116, 7–11).

<sup>43</sup> John of Sardis, *Comm. in Aphth.* 11 (195, 21–22 Rabe).

<sup>44</sup> John of Sardis, *Comm. in Aphth.* 4 (55, 17–56, 6 Rabe).

<sup>45</sup> John of Sardis, *Comm. in Aphth.* 5 (67, 22–68, 2 Rabe).

seriously the proper *τάξις* for reading or studying the progymnasmata and in the process carefully defends the Aphthonian order.

The subject of *τάξις*, while a consistent feature of John's opening remarks for individual progymnasmata, is not the only one. On occasion the question of etymology is asked, as happens in the cases of maxim, common place, and description. For example, John traces the word *γνώμη* back to *γῶσις* ("knowledge"), since a *γνώμη* contains knowledge of what is essential to a matter.<sup>46</sup> Another subject raised on occasion is the relation of a progymnasma to the parts of a complete speech, as is the case with common place and speaking-in-character. For example, John uses the common place chapter as an appropriate location to line up various progymnasmata with the parts of a speech, such as the fable with the introduction; the narrative with the statement of the case; the chreia, maxim, refutation, and confirmation with the proof; and the common place with the epilogue.<sup>47</sup>

Once these opening subjects are dealt with for each progymnasma, John turns to the actual text of Aphthonius and works very carefully—sometimes word by word—through Aphthonius's theoretical section (*μέθοδος*) and more sporadically and briefly through the sample exercise (*παράδειγμα*), but always defining, clarifying, illustrating, and expanding on what Aphthonius said. Many of John's comments are taken from earlier sources, especially previous *Progymnasmata*, such as those by Theon, Sopater, and Nicolaus, but also, to a lesser extent, from treatises on rhetoric, such as those of Rufus of Perinthus and the Anonymous Seguerianus, not to mention the many illustrations that John took from *ὁ ῥήτωρ*, that is, Demosthenes. These and other sources are all duly discussed in Rabe's *praefatio*<sup>48</sup> and noted specifically in the apparatus to the text. John's commentary thus becomes in large part a collection of earlier materials, which is indicated already by the subtitle to the commentary: "A collection of commentaries [*συναγωγὴ ἐξηγήσεων*] regarding the *Progymnasmata* of Aphthonius, which were gathered together [*συλλεγεῖσθαι*] with much toil and zeal by me the author, John, and connected

<sup>46</sup> John of Sardis, *Comm. in Aphth.* 3 (56,7–8 Rabe).

<sup>47</sup> John of Sardis, *Comm. in Aphth.* 7 (89,15–90,3 Rabe).

<sup>48</sup> See Rabe, *Commentarium, praef.* xx–xxxiv. For a summary of the sources, see also Ammon, review of Rabe, 1012–14.

[συναρμοσθεισῶν] to the appropriate passages of Aphthonius.”<sup>49</sup> And yet, despite what the subtitle says (and, admittedly, it may not be original), Rabe removes John’s toil and zeal and ascribes them to an otherwise unknown sixth-century rhetor, whom John simply took over virtually word for word.<sup>50</sup> But this claim, due perhaps to Rabe’s being a *Quellenforscher*, has convinced few. Schissel, for example, regards the sixth-century rhetor as “mythical” and gives more credit to John on the assumption that most of the sources he used were still available at his time.<sup>51</sup> In any case, John of Sardis has preserved an immense amount of material, much of it now lost, that was in turn used by subsequent commentators.

*John of Sardis’s Commentary on Aphthonius’s Chreia Chapter*

After his initial discussion of the placement of the chreia within the progymnasmatic sequence, John turns to each of the topics in Aphthonius’s treatment of the chreia—definition, etymology, division into classes, headings of an elaboration, and model elaboration. They will be treated here in the same sequence.

John of Sardis begins his comments on Aphthonius’s chreia chapter with the subject of τὰς ζῆς (“sequence”) (I.1–19). This subject, as we have seen, is a standard one for John, but his discussion here is by no means typical, for the discussion of the τὰς ζῆς of the chreia is by far the longest in the commentary, occupying eighty-nine lines of Rabe’s text. The next longest is the three-part discussion of the fable, which add up to sixty-nine lines,<sup>52</sup> followed by that of the speaking-in-character at twenty-five.<sup>53</sup> Indeed, when the chreia discussion is left out of consideration, John spends an average of eleven lines when discussing the τὰς ζῆς of a progymnasma. Conversely, the chreia discussion alone represents 41 percent of all the space John devoted to τὰς ζῆς throughout

<sup>49</sup> John of Sardis, *Comm. in Aphth., praef.* (1,4–8 Rabe).

<sup>50</sup> See Rabe, *Commentarium, praef.* xviii, esp. the sentence “*Hausit (sc. Ioannis) enim aperte ex fonte pervetusto, cuius verbis vix unum addidit.*”

<sup>51</sup> Schissel, review of Rabe, 76–77. Cf. also Georges Mathieu, review of Hugo Rabe, ed., *Ioannis Sardiani Commentarium in Aphthonii Progymnasmata*, *REA* 31 (1929): 89–91, esp. 90. Still supporting Rabe is Kennedy, who says: “John himself seems to have no independent ideas” (*Greek Rhetoric*, 276).

<sup>52</sup> John of Sardis, *Comm. in Aphth., praef.* (3,7–4,4 Rabe), 1 (11,4–20), and 3 (34,2–35,18).

<sup>53</sup> John of Sardis, *Comm. in Aphth.* 11 (194,2–195,26 Rabe).

the commentary. Clearly this imbalance needs an explanation.

One reason for the exceptional length of the *τάξις* discussion in the chreia chapter is that John not only discusses the *τάξις* of the chreia but deals again with the *τάξις* of the first two progymnasmata, the fable and narrative. The entire discussion is carefully organized, as is clear from the words *πρῶτον* ("first") (1.1), *δεύτερον* ("second") (1.9), and *τρίτον* ("third") (1.14) leading off the discussions of these three progymnasmata. The discussions are also relatively balanced—twenty-four, thirty-four, and thirty-one lines, respectively.

The *τάξις* of the fable is justified first by saying that the fable exhibits a likeness (*εἰκλῶν*) and function (*δύναμις*) to the whole discipline of rhetoric. This claim does not so much argue for the leadoff position of the fable as it points to its appropriateness for beginning an education in rhetoric. In other words, the fable, at least implicitly, bears a likeness to rhetoric, in that a fable can praise what is good (celebratory rhetoric), prosecute evils (judicial rhetoric), and persuade or dissuade (advisory rhetoric) (1.1). John made this claim earlier, in the fable chapter,<sup>54</sup> and presumably at that point had taken it from Nicolaus of Myra.<sup>55</sup> The fable also exhibits the function of rhetoric, in that it provides instruction in achieving plausibility (*τὸ πιθανόν*), again something that John mentioned earlier<sup>56</sup> and something that he found again in Nicolaus.<sup>57</sup> In any case, plausibility is required when students depict the characters in fables, making the lion regal, the fox crafty, and so on (1.2–4). In other words, the fable is eminently appropriate to lead off the sequence. It comprises all three types of rhetorical speech, and it teaches what is the aim of the rhetorical discipline, plausibility.

John, however, is not finished with the fable. For some people—exactly who is not clear—have raised a problem: how can a fable, which is admittedly false, also be plausible (1.5)? This problem seemingly arose from varying definitions of the *μῦθος*—Aphthonius's stresses its being a false story (*λόγος ψευδής*),<sup>58</sup> but Sopater's and Nicolaus's also emphasize its being plausibly

<sup>54</sup> John of Sardis, *Comm. in Aphth.* 1 (11, 14–18 Rabe).

<sup>55</sup> See Nicolaus, *Progymn.* 1 (8, 12–9, 11 Felten).

<sup>56</sup> John of Sardis, *Comm. in Aphth.* 1 (6, 7–18 Rabe).

<sup>57</sup> See Nicolaus, *Progymn.* 1 (6, 9 Felten).

<sup>58</sup> Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 1 (1, 6 Rabe).



(πιθανῶς) composed.<sup>59</sup> How can both be true? John responds by comparing the fable to τὸ καθ' ὑπόθεσιν <διήγημα>, which stipulates something as false by common consent and then proceeds on that basis; so also with the fable, which stipulates, say, that irrational creatures can talk and then proceeds to match this fiction with creatures who speak and act in plausible ways (1.6–8).<sup>60</sup> In sum, given its simplicity of style and conciseness of exposition (1.8), the fable is the simplest of the progymnasmata, and its likeness to rhetorical speeches and its focus on plausibility make it most appropriate for the leadoff position as well.

John's discussion of the narrative as occupying second position is much shorter. He justifies its position by noting that whereas the fable is by nature false, and the narrative can be both true (ἱστορικὸν διήγημα) and false (δραματικὸν διήγημα),<sup>61</sup> and since the progymnasmata progress little by little to the better, the διήγημα reasonably comes second (1.12–13).

The chreia comes third, John says, but it is not the chreia itself, which is typically only one sentence, or even the κλίσις, or the declension of a chreia through its cases and numbers (1.19),<sup>62</sup> that demands this position. Rather, it is the chreia elaboration that requires the chreia to have third position. A chreia elaboration is an eight-paragraph essay that attempts to confirm the saying or action in the chreia, as we will discuss below. Such a lengthy essay is clearly more complex than the fable and narrative (1.17). In addition, an elaboration of a chreia demands advocacy (συνηγορία) and confirmation (κατασκευή), both skills that are more advanced than the simple recounting of a fable or a narrative (1.17–18). Finally, John points out that third position is also justified by comparing the elaboration to the public speech. Just as the proof, made up of arguments, is the third part of the public speech, so the elaboration, in which five of the eight headings are argumentative

<sup>59</sup> Nicolaus, *Progymn.* 1 (6,9–10 Felten), and Sopater, *Progymn. Frag.* 1 (in Hugo Rabe, ed., *Aphthonii Progymnasmata* [Rhetores Graeci 10; Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1926], 59,2), quoted by John of Sardis, *Comm. in Aphth.* 1 (6,5–8 Rabe).

<sup>60</sup> See also the briefer discussion in John of Sardis, *Comm. in Aphth.* 2 (14,20–15,8 Rabe).

<sup>61</sup> For the distinction, see Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 2 (2,19–21 Rabe).

<sup>62</sup> The role of κλίσις in placing the chreia earlier in the sequence is addressed in greater detail by Nicolaus 12–44 H/ON (= 18,1–19,6 Felten).

in function, should come third in the progymnasmatic sequence (1.18–19). This sort of argument, as has been noted, is presented more fully (and clearly) later in the chapter on the common place. The common place is seventh, because this exercise completes the exercises needed to train students in the four parts of the public speech: the fable provided training in introductions; the narrative in statements of the case; the chreia, maxim, refutation, and confirmation in proofs; and, now, the common place trains students in composing epilogues.<sup>63</sup> The chreia is thus placed third in the *τάξεις* of the Aphthonian sequence not only because it is more complex than the preceding fable and narrative, less general than the maxim (which follows it), less complex than the next exercises (the refutation and confirmation), but also because it is rhetorically useful in a *τάξεις* that conforms to a sequence of learning how to compose the parts of a public speech.

Having secured the *τάξεις* of the chreia on various grounds, John of Sardis now turns to the text itself and begins with Aphthonius's definition of the chreia, which he quotes in full: "A chreia is a concise reminiscence aptly attributed to some individual" (Aphth 2–3 H/ON [= 3,21–22 Rabe]). John then explains each word or phrase in it (2.1–5), a method that was used earlier by Nicolaus, though on a different definition of the chreia.<sup>64</sup> John's giving attention to each word or phrase does not mean that each is equally important. Indeed, the key word for John is *ἀπομνημόνευμα* ("reminiscence"), which he understands to be a literary form that contains an action or saying that is useful for life but is not concise (2.1). Thus the chreia is a kind of reminiscence, a simpler kind in the sense of a remembered saying. This simpler form is indicated by Aphthonius's modifier *σύντομον* ("concise"), which John glosses as *μὴ διεξοδικόν* ("not detailed") (2.2).

Still, the definition of one literary form in terms of another is somewhat confusing, and John goes on to differentiate the two forms more fully by quoting the two *διαφοραί* ("differentiations") identified by Theon, in particular the one in which the chreia is always concise whereas the reminiscence is sometimes (*ἔσθ' ὅτε*) expanded (2.2).<sup>65</sup> This differentiation, however, is not sharp, or

<sup>63</sup> John of Sardis, *Comm. in Aphth.* 4 (55, 17–56, 6 Rabe).

<sup>64</sup> See Nicolaus 45–58 H/ON (= 19, 7–18 Felten).

<sup>65</sup> See Theon 19–24 H/ON (= 19 Patillon).

is at least circular, in that a chreia and a concise reminiscence are one and the same, and an expanded chreia (not mentioned by Aphthonius) becomes a reminiscence, as John illustrates with Theon's concise and expanded chreia attributed to the Theban general Epaminondas (2.5–8). This illustration, however, is provided by Theon not in his differentiation between a chreia and reminiscence but later in his chapter as one of several manipulations of the chreia.<sup>66</sup> Try as he might, John has not clarified the definition of a chreia, since now the term “concise” has been effectively removed from it.

John is more successful when differentiating the chreia from the maxim. He sees the phrase ἐπὶ τι πρόσωπον ἀναφέρουσα<sup>67</sup> (“attributed to some individual”) as being added by Aphthonius in order to distinguish these two related forms (2.4). The word πρόσωπον (“individual”) is key. It reminds John of the six περιστατικά (“circumstantial elements”), which, as Aphthonius lists them in the narrative chapter, include the individual who acts, as well as the action, the time when it occurred, the place where it occurred, the manner of how it occurred, and the cause of the action.<sup>68</sup> Hence the attribution to an individual means that the chreia has its origin in a circumstantial element (ἀπὸ περιστατικοῦ τινος), whereas the maxim is unattributed and hence universal, since it is completely unrelated to the circumstantial elements.

Aphthonius's next topic is the etymology of the word “chreia”: “Since it is useful, it is called ‘chreia’” (Aphth 4 H/ON [= 4,1 Rabe]). John of Sardis quotes the line in full and expands on it by citing three ways that the chreia's usefulness might be understood. The first was quite popular, John says, with earlier writers of *Progymnasmata*—that the chreia deserves its name because it is exceptionally useful (κατ' ἐξοχὴν διὰ τὸ χρησίμον) (3.2).<sup>69</sup> John, however, rejects this explanation and offers two others without explicitly accepting or rejecting either one, although the length

<sup>66</sup> See Theon 313–33 H/ON (= 27–28 Patillon).

<sup>67</sup> Note that John quoted Aphthonius's definition exactly at the start of this section, but here he writes ἐπὶ τι for Aphthonius's εἰς τι.

<sup>68</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 2 (2,23–3,2 Rabe). John discusses these circumstantial elements in great detail in his commentary on this Aphthonian passage (see *Comm. in Aphth.* 2 [18,4–19,24 Rabe]).

<sup>69</sup> See Theon 25–28 H/ON (= 19 Patillon) and Nicolaus 60–62 H/ON (= 20,1–5 Felten).

of the first is an implicit endorsement. This explanation takes the word *χρεία* in the sense of “need,” so that there is a need for the individual in a chreia to say what he said. John gives two chreiai as illustrations, the first of which has Alexander seeing Diogenes asleep and then quoting a line of Homer: “To sleep all night ill-suits a counselor.”<sup>70</sup> John explains: “Alexander had a need [*χρεία*] to make this saying, because Diogenes was sleeping. Consequently, if Diogenes had not been sleeping, Alexander would have had no need for this line. . . . Therefore, the chreia is given this name because of the need [*χρεία*] for the saying to be spoken or the act to be done” (3.2–3).

The other explanation is presented quite briefly and appears almost as an afterthought. In any case, this explanation claims that the chreia is useful because of the explicit (*γυμνή*) counsel in a chreia, in contrast to the veiled (*ἐπικεκαλυμένη*) advice of fables. This brevity leads to some obscurity until John’s language in earlier discussions is recalled. In the commentary on the fable chapter John comments on Aphthonius’s reference to the *προμύθιον* and *ἐπιμύθιον*, which are statements of the moral of the fable that come either before or after the fable itself,<sup>71</sup> and he says: “After setting forth the fable we necessarily and concisely unveil [*ἀποκαλύπτουμεν*] its meaning. . . . And this is called an *ἐπιμύθιον*.”<sup>72</sup> In other words, the utility of the chreia now derives from its clarity.

John of Sardis turns next to Aphthonius’s division of chreiai and expands on it to a considerable degree by supplementing it primarily from Theon’s much more elaborate division. After quoting Aphthonius: “Of the chreia there is the saying class, the action class, and the mixed class” (Aphth 5–6 H/ON [= 4,2–3 Rabe]), John follows up with Theon’s very similarly worded division: “The principal subclasses of the chreia, he says, are three: saying chreiai, action chreiai, and mixed chreiai” (4.1).<sup>73</sup> Theon’s statement has one word—*εἶδη* (“classes”)—that may have prompted John’s inclusion of it, for it indicates what Aphthonius was doing, namely, giving a *διαίρεσις* (“division”) of the chreia,

<sup>70</sup> *Il.* 2.24. On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:314–15.

<sup>71</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 1 (1,15–2,2 Rabe).

<sup>72</sup> John of Sardis, *Comm. in Aphth.* 1 (9,10–11 Rabe).

<sup>73</sup> Theon 29–31 H/ON (= 19 Patillon).

specifically a διαίρεσις ἀπὸ γένους εἰς εἶδη, a division of the general literary form “chreia” into its classes.

When John turns to the saying class, he repeats Aphthonius’s definition of it (cf. Aphth 6–7 H/ON [= 4,3–4 Rabe]) and follows it with Theon’s (4.2), but with no appreciable advancement except perhaps for confirmation.<sup>74</sup> In any case, instead of going on simply to cite Aphthonius’s example of a saying chreia (cf. Aphth 8–9 H/ON [= 4,4–5 Rabe]), John supplements him by reciting eight other chreiai, five of which are unique to this commentary (4.2–6). John further supplements Aphthonius by retrieving Theon’s distinction between simple saying chreiai (i.e., those with a saying attributed to one πρόσωπον) and double chreiai (i.e., those with sayings attributed to two πρόσωπα), complete with his examples (4.8).<sup>75</sup>

John further supplements Aphthonius’s classification of saying chreiai by bringing in another of Theon’s distinctions. John, however, simplifies the distinction and in doing so gets confused (4.9–12). Theon distinguished statement (ἀποφαντικόν) and responsive (ἀποκριτικόν) chreiai and then further subdivided the ἀποφαντικόν into unprompted (καθ’ ἐκούσιον) and circumstantial (κατὰ περίστασιν) chreiai,<sup>76</sup> leaving the ἀποκριτικόν until later (with its four subclasses).<sup>77</sup> John, however, thinks of only one ἀποφαντικόν subclass, what Theon terms κατὰ περίστασιν. He explains it as follows: “A statement [ἀποφαντικόν] chreia occurs whenever someone, on seeing [ἰδών] something, makes a statement” (4.10). Such a chreia would be ἀποφαντικὸν κατὰ περίστασιν, whose formal marker is a participle of seeing, like ἰδών, in the dependent clause. But the example John gives is ἀποφαντικὸν καθ’ ἐκούσιον: “Isocrates said that gifted students are the children of gods.” There is no participial clause in this chreia, and John’s explanation that Isocrates must first have seen gifted students before speaking (4.11) requires an implicit dependent clause, something like: Ἰσοκράτης ἰδὼν τοὺς τῶν μαθητῶν εὐφυεῖς ἔφη ὅτι οὗτοι θεῶν παῖδες εἰσιν. In other words, John’s simplification of Theon eliminates the καθ’ ἐκούσιον subclass of saying chreiai altogether.

<sup>74</sup> See Theon 31–32 H/ON (= 19 Patillon).

<sup>75</sup> See Theon 84–95 H/ON (= 20–21 Patillon).

<sup>76</sup> See Theon 36–45 H/ON (= 19 Patillon).

<sup>77</sup> See Theon 46–83 H/ON (= 19–20 Patillon).

After quoting Aphthonius's brief definition of action chreiai—"The action class is the one that depicts an action [πρᾶξις]" (cf. Aphth 9–10 H/ON [= 4,5–6 Rabe])—John expands on it with a definition of unknown origin, although it includes the familiar example of Diogenes striking the paedagogus, in which the blow is identified as the action (πρᾶξις) (4.13). He then merely alludes to Aphthonius's own example of an action chreia, that attributed to Pythagoras (cf. Aphth 10–12 H/ON [= 4,6–8 Rabe]) (4.14), and then adds Theon's definition: "Action chreiai are those that hint at some thought without using speech."<sup>78</sup>

John goes on to add Theon's distinction between action chreiai in which the πρῶτον acts (ἐνεργητικαί) and those in which he is acted upon (παθητικαί), complete with Theon's examples—the chreiai in which Diogenes strikes the paedagogus and Didymon is hanged by his namesake (4.15).<sup>79</sup>

Regarding mixed chreiai, John again quotes again Aphthonius's definition—"The mixed class is the one that is composed of both a saying and an action" (cf. Aphth 13–14 H/ON [= 4,8–9 Rabe])—but he skips his example about Pythagoras (cf. Aphth 14–16 H/ON [= 4,9–11 Rabe]) and adds two others—one, the Laconian and his spear, taken from Nicolaus<sup>80</sup> and the other, Alexander and his friends as treasures,<sup>81</sup> which is perhaps from Theon, although this chreia comes from another section of Theon (4.16).<sup>82</sup> In any case, John follows up with an explicit, if partial, quotation from Theon, namely, his very different definition of mixed chreiai, and includes one of Theon's examples, the chreia attributed to Pythagoras, which was Aphthonius's example of an action chreia (4.17).<sup>83</sup> In other words, John seems unaware of the

<sup>78</sup> See Theon 96–104 H/ON (= 21 Patillon).

<sup>79</sup> On these chreiai, see further *Chreia* 1:316 and 312–13, respectively.

<sup>80</sup> See Nicolaus 76–79 H/ON (= 20,15–17 Felten). For the chreia, see *Chreia* 1:302.

<sup>81</sup> See Theon 158–61 H/ON (= 23 Patillon). For the chreia, see *Chreia* 1:302.

<sup>82</sup> Theon recites this chreia as part of his further classification (ἐπιδιαίρεσις) of saying chreiai; in this case the chreia attributed to Alexander is a mixed chreia, to be sure, but in Theon it is an example of a symbolic chreia.

<sup>83</sup> See Theon 105–13 H/ON (= 21 Patillon). Put simply, Aphthonius's definition of a mixed chreia requires the πρῶτον to both speak and act, whereas Theon considers a chreia mixed if the πρῶτον acts in response to a question: Pythagoras, on being asked how long human life is, went up to his

difference and has tacked on the quotation without any reflection simply to preserve Theon's discussion.

Although John has now finished with the three principal classes of chreiai, he appends an independent discussion of certain sayings chreiai that contain only wit (4.18–22), although this subject was dealt with, if differently, by both Theon and Nicolaus. Theon identified witty chreiai as part of an ἐπιδιάρσεις, which is an additional way of dividing chreiai—by content rather than by form.<sup>84</sup> Witty chreiai are thus one of twelve types of content in sayings chreiai in this scheme, as exemplified as follows: Olympias, on hearing that her son Alexander was proclaiming himself to be the offspring of Zeus, said, “Won’t this fellow stop slandering me to Hera?”<sup>85</sup> Nicolaus likewise identified witty chreiai, but he paired them with those that are told for their utility and also cited the witty chreia attributed to Olympias but added another attributed to the crippled Damon, whose shoes were stolen.<sup>86</sup> John, however, uses neither example but adds two of his own, one attributed to Theocritus and another to Demosthenes (4.18–20).<sup>87</sup>

Theon is unconcerned about witty chreiai, which are only one of twelve sayings identified by content, and Nicolaus is not either as he ends up blurring the distinction by arguing that witty chreiai contain not only wit but also good advice. For example, Olympias’s remark—“Won’t this fellow stop slandering me to Hera?”—is witty, to be sure, but it also dissuades her son Alexander from calling himself a son of Zeus, making the chreia useful as well.<sup>88</sup> John, however, is so troubled by witty chreiai that he argues they are chreiai only by a misuse of language, since by their etymology they must be useful. In addition, he says that witty chreiai will not be the subject of elaborations (4.21–22).

bedroom and peeked in for a short time, showing thereby life’s brevity. Here Pythagoras only acts.

<sup>84</sup> Theon 115–89 H/ON (= 22–24 Patillon).

<sup>85</sup> See Theon 134–37 H/ON (= 22 Patillon). On the chreia, see further *Chreia* 1:330–31.

<sup>86</sup> Nicolaus 80–101 H/ON (= 21, 1–18 Felten). On the chreia, see further *Chreia* 1:310.

<sup>87</sup> On these chreiai, see *Chreia* 1:341 and 312.

<sup>88</sup> See Nicolaus 97–100 H/ON (= 21, 13–16 Felten).

In sum, it seems obvious that John found Aphthonius's διαίρεσις of chreiai into the three εἶδη to be too brief and so supplemented it with material from other, more complex, διαιρέσεις, largely from Theon's ὑποδιαίρεσις and ἐπιδιαίρεσις, with a few nods toward Nicolaus as well. Some supplements were included seemingly mechanically and led to confusion, as in John's using Theon's different definition of a mixed chreia without realizing the difference, but other supplements show some independent analysis, as in John's rejection of witty chreiai altogether, which is a clear break with his sources.

John now turns to Aphthonius's second διαίρεσις, this time ἡ διαίρεσις ἀπὸ ὅλου εἰς μέρη, or "the division of the whole into its parts," the whole being the chreia elaboration, the parts its eight κεφάλαια ("headings"). After quoting the opening sentence—"You can elaborate [ἐργάσαι] [a chreia] by means of the following headings" (Aphth 16–18 H/ON [= 4, 12–13 Rabe])—John tries to clarify what an ἐργασία ("elaboration") is by supplying two synonyms, κατασκευή ("confirmation") and βεβαίωσις ("corroboration") (5.1). The latter word plays no further role, but the word κατασκευή prompts a lengthy defense of Aphthonius's exercise with a chreia (5.2–11). To be sure, Aphthonius does not use the word in this sense, but John knows of some who have applied it to a chreia elaboration and have raised two objections to it that John has had to confront and dispel. Κατασκευή is the name of the sixth progymnasma,<sup>89</sup> which led some to claim that a κατασκευή of a chreia became redundant and so unnecessary, a claim that applies equally to the maxim, which is also elaborated (5.7). John responds to this objection by saying that a κατασκευή of a chreia (or maxim) and a narrative (the subject matter of the sixth progymnasma) are not at all the same and hence are not redundant (5.8). John explains the difference by noting that while a chreia elaboration deals with one saying or action, a narrative is made up of many sayings and actions (5.9–10).

The second objection derives not directly from the word κατασκευή but from its pair, ἀνασκευή ("refutation"). When seen as one exercise of a pair, κατασκευή of a chreia suggests a refutation of it, a suggestion made all the more likely since rhetoric itself

<sup>89</sup> On this exercise, see Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 6 (13, 19–16, 16 Rabe).



teaches how to argue on both sides of an issue (5.2), and Theon actually made refutation one of his manipulations of a chreia.<sup>90</sup> John, however, rejects any refutation of a chreia and mounts several arguments in defense of his position. Refutation is inappropriate due to the youth of the students who might not be able to handle refuting what appears to be correctly spoken or nobly done, not to mention teachers who should be concerned not only with proper speaking but also with good character (5.2). In addition, refutation is already an exercise, making it foolish to practice it on what is properly said or done in a chreia (5.3); refutation of a chreia goes against the nature of chreiai that are useful (5.4); and refutation of a narrative does not involve recommending what is said in it, whereas in a chreia elaboration it does (5.11).

Having rejected any possibility of refuting a chreia, John now turns to the individual *κεφάλαια*, which are merely listed by Aphthonius (cf. Aphth 19–22 H/ON [= 4,13–15 Rabe]). John treats them individually although not equally (5.12–31). The first three are treated rather perfunctorily, advising brevity in the ἐγκωμιαστικόν (“encomiastic heading”) (5.12);<sup>91</sup> emphasizing the role of the παραφραστικόν (“paraphrastic heading”) in providing instruction in learning how to put in different words what has been said by others (5.13); and identifying the αἰτία (“rationale”) as the place to express the point to be proved (5.14).

The next five *κεφάλαια* receive fuller treatment. This fuller treatment is due in large part to John’s illustrating these headings by quoting from a chreia elaboration composed by Sopater (5.15, 18, 23, 24, 31). The chreia that Sopater elaborated is: Alexander, on seeing Diogenes asleep, said: “To sleep all night ill-suits a counselor.”<sup>92</sup> For example, to illustrate the fourth heading, ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου (“from the opposite”), whose persuasive power comes from showing that not only is the saying in the chreia noble, as shown in the rationale, but its opposite is base (5.16), John cites

<sup>90</sup> Theon 334–83 H/ON (= 28–30 Patillon).

<sup>91</sup> The need for brevity goes back to Hermogenes (Hermogenes 32–33 H/ON [= 7,11–12 Rabe]) and Nicolaus. The latter explained the brevity of this section by saying that it should not make use of the many encomiastic topics, which would be learned later, in the progymnasma encomium (see Nicolaus 162–65 H/ON [= 24,4–7 Felten]).

<sup>92</sup> *Il.* 3.24. On this partial chreia elaboration, see further *Chreia* 2:98–112, esp. 110–12.

Sopater as saying: “The one who stays awake thinks about what is likely to happen; he always has his mind on affairs; he distinguishes what one ought and ought not to do and is a good judge of what is advantageous” (5.16).

John treats the fifth and sixth headings, the *παραβολή* (“analogy”) and the *παράδειγμα* (“example”), individually (5.17–18, 19–23) as usual, but he also discusses them in tandem since it is necessary to make some distinctions between them. John lists three: (1) the *παραβολή* uses unnamed characters, the *παράδειγμα* named ones; (2) the *παραβολή* also uses inanimate things and irrational creatures, the *παράδειγμα* only humans and deities; and (3) the *παραβολή* is made up of events that occur frequently (*ἀπὸ τῶν γινομένων πολλάκις λαμβάνεται*), the *παράδειγμα* of those that have happened once in the past (*ἀπὸ τῶν <ἅπαξ> γεγονότων*) (5.20–22).

This third distinction requires further comment, for it presumes a correction of John’s text, one noted by Rabe but not corrected.<sup>93</sup> Essentially, the correction involves switching the aorist and present participles *γεγονότων* and *γινομένων* in Rabe’s text and inserting *ἅπαξ*. To use Sopater’s illustrations of these sections, the *παραβολή* uses irrational creatures, and their behavior is recurrent (hence the present participle *γινομένων*): “For just as drowsy creatures are susceptible, and so fall prey, to many evils, whereas those that are constantly alert more readily keep themselves safe...” (5.18). Likewise, the *παράδειγμα* uses named characters and describes one-time events (hence the aorist participle *γεγονότων* and *ἅπαξ*): “Just as Themistocles, because he was alert, explained the oracle and saved Hellas, so also Demosthenes, because he was not accustomed to much sleep and practiced his rhetorical skills at night, became an orator who is famous down to the present time...” (5.24). This textual emendation not only is logical but also receives textual support from John Doxapatres’s similar discussion of *παραβολή* and *παράδειγμα*. He writes (using Aphthonius’s elaboration as illustrations): “An analogy [*παραβολή*] uses events that are daily occurrences [*ἀπὸ τῶν καθ’ ἑκάστην γινομένων*], as in this analogy: ‘For just as those who till the land...’ (Aphth 59 H/ON [= 6,3 Rabe]).... An example [*παράδειγμα*] uses events that have occurred once [*ἀπὸ τῶν ἅπαξ*]

<sup>93</sup> In the apparatus Rabe does note that John was “rectius” elsewhere regarding the tenses of *γίνεσθαι* (see *Comm. in Aphth.* 4 [= 62, 11–13 Rabe]).

γεγονότων], as in this example: ‘Consider, if you will, the life of Demosthenes. . .’ (Aphth 64 H/ON [= 6,7 Rabe]).”<sup>94</sup> Both John and Doxapatres are making use of a long tradition of correctly expressing this distinction between παραβολή and παράδειγμα,<sup>95</sup> making this correction of John’s text certain.

The seventh heading, μαρτυρία παλαιῶν (“testimony of the ancients”), provides persuasive force, John says, when other people agree with the saying in the chreia, as in Sopater’s elaboration where the μαρτυρία of Pythagoras—“Sleep sparingly”—is cited in support of Alexander’s use of the Homeric line<sup>96</sup> (5.24–25). But, someone might ask, what about an action chreia? Can such a chreia have a μαρτυρία? Yes, John says, because it is possible to show that what was done in an action chreia is noble by citing someone else whose words express the same intent as the action. He refers to the action chreia attributed to Diogenes’s striking the boy’s paedagogus and cites the supporting μαρτυρίαι by Thucydides and Demosthenes. Thus, to cite only the μαρτυρία of Thucydides: “Thucydides also agrees with what was done, <when he said>: ‘For the one who is able to stop something but allows it to occur does it in a truer sense’” (5.26).<sup>97</sup>

For the last heading, the ἐπίλογος βραχύς (“brief epilogue”), John provides a definition and etymology. This heading, like the ἐπίλογος of a public speech, is designed to recapitulate (ἀνακεφαλαιοῦσθαι) the arguments of the previous sections, so that the hearer comes to agree with the saying in the chreia (5.27).<sup>98</sup> He then follows up with an etymology of the ἐπίλογος as the part of a speech that is spoken (λεγόμενος) “after” (ἐπί) the other parts.

John sums up his discussion of the eight κεφάλαια by saying that Aphthonius has provided students with preliminary training (προεγυμνάσατο) in composing a rhetorical speech, since these

<sup>94</sup> See below, Doxapatres 6.50.

<sup>95</sup> See, e.g., Rufus of Perinthus 31–32 (1.2:405, 15–27 Spengel-Hammer); Apsines 6.2 (168, 5–6 Kennedy-Dilts); P-scholia 2:596, 1–4 (Walz); and an anonymous scholion on Hermogenes’s *On Issues* (7:25, 20–23 Walz).

<sup>96</sup> *Il.* 2.24.

<sup>97</sup> Thucydides 1.69.1.

<sup>98</sup> On the role of recapitulation in the epilogue of a public speech, see, e.g., *Rhet. ad Alex.* 20 (1433 b 29–40), *Rhet. ad Her.* 2.30, *Anon. Seg.* 203 (56 Dilts-Kennedy), Apsines 10.2 (192 Dilts-Kennedy), and esp. Rufus of Perinthus 41 (1.2:407, 12–15 Spengel-Hammer).

κεφάλαια can be aligned with the four parts of a public speech—introduction, statement of the case, proof, and epilogue. Thus the ἐγκωμιαστικόν is similar to the introduction, and the παραφραστικόν to the statement of the case. The next five κεφάλαια belong to the proof. Since proofs are classified as invented or uninvented, John identifies the αἰτία, ἐναντίον, παραβολή, and παράδειγμα as invented proofs and the μαρτυρία παλαιῶν as uninvented. Finally, the ἐπίλογος βραχύς is like the conclusion (5.29–31).

The last portion of John's commentary treats Aphthonius's model elaboration of a saying chreia: "Isocrates said that the root of education is bitter, but its fruits are sweet" (Aphth 23–25 H/ON [= 4.16–17 Rabe]). But before taking up this elaboration John, presumably because Aphthonius has written "a saying chreia" before the recitation itself, quickly distinguishes a chreia from a γνώμη (which has no πρόσωπον) and an ἀπομνημόνευμα (which is expanded at length, like Xenophon's *Memorabilia*) (6.1; cf. 2.1–4). Then he distinguishes a witty chreia (like the one attributed to Damon) from true chreiai, which are not witty but must be useful (cf. 4.18–22), as is Isocrates's saying, whose utility resides in its stress on the need to endure difficulties for the sake of the pleasures that come after them (6.2).

With Aphthonius's elaboration of this chreia, John does not follow the text as closely as he has previously. Now he picks and chooses a word, phrase, or clause that he thinks requires some comment. These words and phrases are quoted as lemmata to which he appends his comments. These comments can be grammatical, lexical, stylistic, literary, or explanatory. The first lemma is the opening sentence of the ἐγκωμιαστικόν—"It is right to admire Isocrates for his discipline" (Aphth 26 H/ON [= 4.18 Rabe])—and prompts John to explain the use of the genitive (τῆς τέχνης) with the verb θαυμάσαι ("to admire") and to note that this use is Attic (6.3–4). A few more grammatical comments follow on the next clauses (6.5–8), and then John's analysis becomes more substantive. He admires Aphthonius's style when he inverted the thought that rhetoric had not exalted Isocrates but rather he the discipline (6.10). Moreover, he approves Aphthonius's praise of Isocrates here because it is based on his special characteristics, an individualized praise that is appropriate in an ἐγκωμιαστικόν and appropriate to Isocrates (6.11). John winds up his comments on the ἐγκωμιαστικόν section with an explanatory note on this phrase:

“How often, moreover, either as a lawgiver to kings or as adviser to individuals” (Aphth 29–31 H/ON [= 5,1–2 Rabe]). The generalized references to kings and individuals makes use of the figure of speech “pretended omission” (6.12), and then John shows the truth of Isocrates’s versatility by noting that he wrote *Nicocles* for a king and *To Demonicus* for an individual (6.13).

John cites the opening words of the παραφραστικόν heading (Aphth 34–35 H/ON [= 5,5 Rabe]) but does not comment on them specifically. Rather, he quotes a passage from Isocrates’s *To Demonicus* that could very well have served as a paraphrase of the chreia: “In all things we do not so much remember the beginning of our tasks as we derive our perception of them after their completion” (6.15).<sup>99</sup>

John devotes the most space to commenting on the αἰτία (“rationale”). There are six lemmata from this section. The first one is the opening clause—“For lovers of education are reckoned among [συνεξετάζονται] the leaders of education” (Aphth 38–39 H/ON [= 5,8–9 Rabe]). John glosses the verb συνεξετάζονται as equivalent to “being trained for virtue” (πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐγυμνάζονται) (6.16) and then reflects more broadly on what the αἰτία should accomplish, namely, an investigation of the content of the saying, which in this case involves two parts, the difficult and the noble, and how the latter is a consequence of the former (6.17). In the remaining lemmata John confines himself largely to lexical and grammatical comments—μέλλουσι (Aphth 42 H/ON [= 5,11 Rabe]) he interprets as “they loiter, procrastinate, hesitate, put off” (6.19); the middle/passive αἰκιζόμενοι (Aphth 43 H/ON [= 5,12 Rabe]) he notes is used as an active, “inflicting punishment” (6.20); μετέρχονται (Aphth 46 H/ON [= 5,15 Rabe]) he glosses as “[they] punish, examine, monitor, and evaluate” (6.22); and οἰκεῖα (Aphth 46–47 H/ON [= 5,15 Rabe]) he says should be preceded by ὥς, that is, “as expected” (6.23).

In the heading ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου John quotes the opening line—“But if anyone in fear of these hardships avoids [φύγη] his teachers...” (Aphth 53–54 H/ON [= 5,21–22 Rabe])—but not enough of it, for his comment involves not only φύγη but also ἀποδράσει (“he runs away”) and ἀποστραφεῖ (“he turns away”).

<sup>99</sup> Isocrates 1.47.

Each, John says, has essentially the same meaning, and Aphthonius's piling up of synonyms John identifies as the figure *χορηγία* ("repetition"), a figure that Demosthenes used in his second speech *Against Aristogeiton*, where he speaks of "despising and disobeying"<sup>100</sup> the laws (6.24–26). Regarding the next lemma—"And in ridding himself of his apprehension he also rids himself of their guidance" (Aphth 56–57 H/ON [= 5,23–24 Rabe])—John does little more than offer a paraphrase (6.27).

For the three lemmata of the *παραβολή* heading John again says little, merely identifying the opening words—"For just as those who till the land. . ." (Aphth 59 H/ON [= 6,3 Rabe])—as signaling the *παραβολή* (6.27). Otherwise, he sticks to lexical matters, interpreting *καταβάλλουσι* (cf. Aphth 59–60 H/ON [= 6,3–4 Rabe]) as "they provide" (6.29) and *ἀντιποιούμενοι* (cf. Aphth 62 H/ON [= 6,5–6 Rabe]) as "cultivating" (6.30).

In the *πράδειγμα* heading, however, John does more than identify the words—"Consider, if you will, the life of Demosthenes" (Aphth 64 H/ON [= 6,7 Rabe])—as introducing this heading (6.31). He goes on to note its role as adding further credibility to the enthymemic sections that preceded it (6.32). The next two lemmata discuss the example itself, Demosthenes's zeal for excelling in rhetoric (cf. Aphth 66–68 H/ON [= 6,9–10 Rabe]) (6.34) and his willingness to spend his wealth on it, whether for books or for oil (cf. Aphth 69–70 H/ON [= 6,11–12 Rabe]) (6.35).

The *μαρτυρία παλαιῶν* is taken from Hesiod—the road to virtue is rough, its summit smooth (cf. Aphth 71–72 H/ON [= 6,13–14 Rabe]), and John identifies the lines as coming from *Works and Days*<sup>101</sup> and then explains Aphthonius's choice of Hesiod as based on students' having already become familiar with this poet (6.36).<sup>102</sup>

Finally, John says that the *ἐπίλογος βραχύς* concludes the elaboration by restating the intent of Isocrates's saying (6.37).

<sup>100</sup> See Demosthenes, 26.25.

<sup>101</sup> See Hesiod, *WD* 287–91.

<sup>102</sup> On students' familiarity with Hesiod, see Cribiore, *Gymnastics of the Mind*, 197–98.

### Conclusion

Now that we have worked through portions of John of Sardis's commentary, the chreia chapter in particular, it should be clear that students and teachers who used it would have benefitted from it in a variety of ways. They would have better understood the role of progymnasmata in the rhetorical curriculum when John termed them a μικρὰ ῥητορική, as each progymnasma had as its aim to introduce the conceptual tools and compositional skills that would be required to compose the three types of speech and the four parts of a speech. They would have had the sequence of progymnasmata fully defended and Aphthonius's spare treatment clarified and supplemented.

In terms of the chreia chapter John of Sardis provided the fullest defense of its third place in the sequence and worked methodically through Aphthonius's definition, etymology, division, and headings. Especially noteworthy are John of Sardis's expansion of Aphthonius's simple division, largely from the discussions of Theon and Nicolaus, and his clarification of the nature, purpose, and compositional requirements of the headings of an elaboration.

### Text and Translation

The text of John's commentary used here is, of course, Rabe's Teubner *editio princeps*.<sup>103</sup> This text, as noted above, is based on three manuscripts—Coisl. gr. 387 (= C), Vind. phil. graec. 130 (= W), and Vat. gr. 1408 (= V). C, however, breaks off in the narrative chapter and thus plays no part in Rabe's text of the chreia chapter, and neither W nor V, Rabe says, reproduces John's text but both, especially W, often abridge, correct, and modify the text.<sup>104</sup> Rabe has therefore made countless improvements in the text by looking in particular at the many passages of "the Sardian" in Doxapatres's commentary, a practice that, as Schissel warns, must be done with a clear sense of Doxapatres's own redactional concerns.<sup>105</sup>

<sup>103</sup> See Rabe, *Commentarium*.

<sup>104</sup> See Rabe, *Commentarium*, *praef.* vi-viii.

<sup>105</sup> See Schissel's careful analysis of Rabe's text of John's *praefatio* (review of Rabe, 79–82). For proposals for five changes in Rabe's text outside the *praefatio*, see Georg Ammon, "Zum Aphthonioskommentar des Johannes von Sardes," *PhW* 49 (1929): 1566–68.

Accordingly, in a few passages I have departed from Rabe's text, all of them clearly noted in the apparatus.

As indicated already in the introduction to this volume, there are several formatting changes in the way the text is presented here. First, page numbers from Rabe's text are inserted in parentheses at the appropriate places. Second, here and throughout this volume, quotations from Aphthonius's text are printed in bold and identified by their respective line number(s) plus the letters "H/ON" from *Chreia* 1<sup>106</sup> in parentheses and by page and line number(s) plus Rabe's name in square brackets from his edition of the text.<sup>107</sup> Third, titles to indicate the sections of the commentary have been inserted along with "verses" within the sections to aid in clarifying the organization of the chapter and for easier referencing. References elsewhere in John's commentary in the notes will continue to be cited by page and line number(s) of Rabe's edition.

George Kennedy's translation of John's commentary<sup>108</sup> is complete only for the first two chapters and only sporadic for the remaining ones. In fact, only 20 percent of the chreia chapter has been translated by Kennedy. Otherwise, this is the first translation of this chapter.

<sup>106</sup> See *Chreia* 1:224–29.

<sup>107</sup> See Rabe, *Aphthonii Progymnasmata*, 3–6.

<sup>108</sup> See George A. Kennedy, *Progymnasmata: Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric* (WGRW 10; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003), 175–228.





# Text I. Ioannis Sardiani Commentarium in Aphthonii Progymnasmata

Cap. III. Περὶ Χρείας  
(34,1–55,15 Rabe)

## <§ I. ΤΑΞΙΣ>

1. Πρῶτον μὲν τὸν μῦθον προέταξεν, ὅτι τῆς ῥητορικῆς ἀπάσης εἰκόνα φέρει καὶ δύναμιν· εἰκὼν μὲν γὰρ τῆς τέχνης ἐστὶ, δι' ὧν τὰ τρία εἶδη τῆς ῥητορικῆς ἐν ἑαυτῷ φέρει καὶ δείκνυσι· καὶ γὰρ ἐπαινοῦμεν δι' αὐτοῦ τὰ καλὰ καὶ κατηγοροῦμεν τῶν κακῶν καὶ προτρέπομεν ἢ ἀποτρέπομεν, ὡς ἀπὸ τούτων ἔχνος καταλαμβάνειν τὸν νέον τῶν <τριῶν> τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰδῶν.

2. Περιέχει δὲ καὶ τὴν τῆς ῥητορικῆς ὅλην δύναμιν τῷ διδάσκειν ἡμᾶς τὴν τοῦ πιθανοῦ μεταχείρισιν. 3. Ἰσμεν γάρ, ὡς τὸ πιθανὸν τοῖς νέοις τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ τοὺς λόγους οἰκείους ποιεῖσθαι μανθάνειν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις προσώποις· τῷ μὲν γὰρ λέοντι βασιλεῖ τυγχάνοντι βασιλικὸν <δεῖ> περιτιθέναι καὶ φρόνημα, τῇ δὲ ἀλώπεκι πανούργῳ τυγχανούσῃ τὴν φύσιν κακουργίας ποιεῖν μεστὴν τὴν διάνοιαν, καὶ τὴν ἔλαφον ἀνόητον οὔσαν εὐήθη φρονεῖν ποιήσομεν· δῆλον γὰρ ὡς, ἐάν τὴν τοιαύτην ἀμείψωμεν τῶν ζώων ποιότητα, ἀπίθανον τὸν μῦθον ποιήσομεν. 4. οὐκοῦν δῆλον, ὡς ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς εἰσαγωγῆς οἱ νέοι καὶ τοῖς ζητήμασι πρὸς τὴν τῶν προσώπων ποιότητα τὰ ἦθη τηρήσαντες πιθανὸν τὸν λόγον ἐργάσσονται.

# Text I. John of Sardis

## Commentary on Aphthonius's

### *Progymnasmata*

#### Chapter 3: On the Chreia (34,1–55,15 Rabe)

##### <§ I. SEQUENCE>

1. Aphthonius placed the fable chapter first in the sequence because a fable exhibits a likeness to and the power of the whole discipline of rhetoric. A fable exhibits a likeness to this discipline in that it contains and displays all by itself the three types of rhetorical speech—for by means of a fable we praise what is good, prosecute what is evil, and persuade or dissuade<sup>1</sup>—so that from these activities the young man gains a glimmer of the <three> types of rhetorical speech.

2. The fable also involves the principal power of the rhetorical discipline, in that it teaches us how to achieve plausibility. 3. For we know that for young men plausibility is this: to learn how to fashion speech that is appropriate to the assigned characters in a fable—for example, <one must> bestow regal thoughts on the lion since it is a regal creature; but with the fox, since it is crafty by nature, one must fill his mind with wickedness; and we will make the deer, which is foolish, think simple thoughts. 4. For it is clear that, if we should change the essential character of these animals, we will render the fable implausible. Accordingly, it is clear that young men, once they have preserved the characters of the animals in this introductory exercise, will also produce a speech that is plausible in their later assignments.

<sup>1</sup> These three clauses correspond to the purposes of the three types of rhetorical speeches: celebratory, judicial, and advisory, respectively.

5. Ἐνθεν καὶ τινες ἠπόρησαν λέγοντες ὅτι «εἰ τὸ ὁμολογούμενον ψεῦδος ἐναντίον ἐστὶ τῷ πιθανῷ—πιθανὸν γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ πείσαι δυνάμενον· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ πιθανὸν παρὰ τὸ πείσαι εἴρηται τὸν ἐναντίον—, τὸ ἐν τῷ  
 [35] μύθῳ κατὰ φύσιν ψεῦδος συμβαίνει τῷ πιθανῷ ἐναντίον γίνεσθαι· | τίνα γὰρ πείσει ἀληθὲς εἶναι, ὃ μὴ κατὰ φύσιν ἀληθὲς ὑφέστηκεν, οἷον λογικὸν εἶναι τὸν ἵππον καὶ τὴν χελώνην ἢ ἐπιθυμῆσαι τὸνλέοντα γάμου ἢ τὸν ὄνον τοῦλέοντα εἶναι δοκεῖν, ψευδοῦς ὄντος κατὰ φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος;» 6. ἐροῦμεν οὖν ὅτι, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς καθ' ὑπόθεσιν τὴν πρότασιν κατὰ συγχώρησιν δίδομεν οὕσαν φύσει ψευδῇ, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς μύθοις ὥσπερ ἐν λήμματι κατὰ συγχώρησιν δίδομεν τὸ τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα πράττειν ἢ λέγειν τινά· ὥς, ἐὰν μὴ τοῦτο δοθῇ, τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδὲ μῦθος γίνεται. 7. τούτου δὲ συγχωρουμένου, ὥς ἐν μύθῳ ἐν λήμματι τοῦ λογικά εἶναι τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα <ἢ λέγει> ἢ πράττει τι, τὸ λοιπὸν ζητοῦμεν τὸ πιθανόν, εἰ τῇ ποιότητι τῶν προσώπων ἢ πλάσις συμβέβηκε καὶ εἰ τὰ τῆς περι-

5 post εἴρηται scripsit τὸν Rabe || τὸ V || om. W || 7 post μύθῳ scripsit ἐν Rabe || καὶ V W || 7 ἢ λέγει addidit Rabe

5. Now, some people have raised a question,<sup>2</sup> saying: “If that which is widely agreed upon to be false<sup>3</sup> is the opposite of what is plausible—for what is able to persuade is plausible; thus it is called ‘plausible’ because it persuades the opponent—then the falsehood that naturally occurs in a fable turns out to be the opposite of what is plausible. For who will be persuaded that something is true that by nature is not true—for example, that a horse and a tortoise are capable of speaking,<sup>4</sup> a lion is desirous of marriage,<sup>5</sup> or an ass thinks he is a lion<sup>6</sup>—since such subject matter is, by the nature of the case, false?” 6. We, then, will reply: Just as in a suppositional example<sup>7</sup> where we admit by common consent a hypothetical situation even though it is by nature false, so also in fables, just as in a premise, we permit irrational creatures to say and do certain things, because, if this were not allowed, there would be no fable at all. 7. But once this is granted in a fable—irrational creatures, as in a premise, are capable of <either speaking> or doing something—then we investigate plausibility: whether the fiction corresponds to the stereotypes of the characters and whether the particulars of

<sup>2</sup> Who “some people” are is not known, but presumably they are some previous commentators.

<sup>3</sup> John is alluding to the definition of a fable, in particular its being a λόγος ψευδῆς, or false story (see Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 1 [1,6 Rabe]). For John’s discussion of Aphthonius’s definition of a fable, see *Comm. in Aphth.* 1 (5,1–7,10 Rabe).

<sup>4</sup> John has already referred to the fable of the horse and the tortoise (see *Comm. in Aphth.* 1 [10,18 Rabe]). For the fable itself, see Libanius, *Progymn.* 2 (8:25,10–26,14 Foerster [= 2–5 Gibson]). Cf. also the similar and more familiar fable of the tortoise and the hare (see Aesop, *Fab.* 420 [203 Halm]).

<sup>5</sup> John has also previously referred to the fable of the lion who fell in love with a young woman (see *Comm. in Aphth.* 1 [7,2–3 Rabe]). For the fable itself, see Aesop, *Fab.* 249 (122 Halm); within the rhetorical tradition, see Aphthonius, *Fab.* 7 (1.2:136 Hausrath-Hunger), and Georgius, *Progymn.* 1 (1:551,12–552,9 Walz).

<sup>6</sup> John referred previously to the fable of the ass dressed in a lion skin (see *Comm. in Aphth.* 1 [7,9–10 Rabe]). For the fable, see Aesop, *Fab.* 336 (165–66 Halm); within the rhetorical tradition, see Aphthonius, *Fab.* 10 (1.2:137 Hausrath-Hunger); ps.-Nicolaus, *Progymn.* 1 (1:266,12–18 Walz); and Nicephorus, *Progymn.* 1 (1:426,1–427,8 Walz). Cf. also Doxapatres 2:162,13–14 and 172,25–173,2 (Walz).

<sup>7</sup> On this understanding of ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς καθ’ ὑπόθεσιν, see Rufus of Perinthus 30 (1.2:405,8–14 Spengel-Hammer).

στάσεως τοῖς προσώποις συνήρμωσται· ἐν γὰρ τούτῳ μόνῳ τὸ πιθανὸν θεωρεῖται. 8. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν διὰ ταῦτα προετάγη ὁ μῦθος, καὶ ὅτι ἐστὶ πρὸς ψυχαγωγίαν ὁ μῦθος πρόχειρος καὶ τῇ πλάσει καὶ τῇ ἀφελείᾳ τῆς λέξεως καὶ τῇ συντομίᾳ τῆς ἐκθέσεως τὸν νέον ἐπαγόμενος.

9. Δεύτερον δὲ τὸ διήγημα· πενταμεροῦς γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ λόγου, τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ἐν προοιμίῳ, τὸ δὲ ἐν διηγῆσει, τὸ δὲ ἐν ἀντιθέσει, τὸ δὲ ἐν λύσει, τὸ δὲ ἐν ἐπιλόγει. 10. ὁ μῦθος τοίνυν εἰ καὶ συμβάλλεται πρὸς πίστιν ἐνίοτε, ὅμως προοιμίων καθάπερ εἶπεῖν τάξιν ἐπέχων, δι' ὧν [36] καὶ συνίστησιν τινὰ καὶ διαβάλλει—τοῦτο δὲ προοιμίων ἔργον | ἐστίν—, εἰκότως δευτέραν ἀπαιτεῖ τὴν διήγησιν.

11. Ἐτι ὁ μῦθος φύσει ψευδής, τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος ἀνυπόστατον· τὸ δὲ διήγημα ἔχει τι καὶ ἀληθές, ὅπερ ὑφέστηκεν· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος τὸ ὄν γίνεται· εἰκότως οὖν καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο προτέτακται, τὸ δὲ διήγημα δευτέραν ἔχει τάξιν.

12. Ἐτι ὁ μῦθος ὁμολογουμένως ἐστὶ καὶ μόνος ψευδής, τὸ δὲ διήγημα πῇ μὲν ψευδές, πῇ δὲ ἀληθές· οὐκοῦν τῶν προγυμνασμάτων ἐπὶ τὸ κρεῖττον κατ' ὀλίγον προκοπτόντων, εἰκότως ἐπὶ τὸ διήγημα δεύτερον ἐρχόμεθα ὥς ἔχον τι ἀληθές μᾶλλον ἢ περ ὁ μῦθος.

13. Τρίτον προγύμνασμα τὴν χρεῖαν ἐτάξαμεν· τῇ γὰρ τάξει τῶν μερῶν τοῦ λόγου καὶ τὰ προγυμνάσματα δικαίως ἀκολουθεῖ. 14. ὥσπερ οὖν ἐν ἐκείνοις τρίτον τὸ ἀγωνιστικὸν μέρος τυγχάνει τοῦ λόγου, οὕτω κἀνταῦθα μετὰ τὸ διήγημα τρίτον τὸ ἀγωνιστικὸν μέρος τυγχάνει καὶ

the situation are appropriate to the characters.<sup>8</sup> For in this aspect alone is plausibility considered. 8. So, then, this is why the fable chapter has been placed first, but also because the fable is readily suited to win young men over since it entices them through its fiction, simple style, and concise exposition.

9. The narrative chapter is second. For since a speech contains five parts—introduction, statement of the case, objection, rebuttal, and epilogue<sup>9</sup>—10. the fable, accordingly, even though it occasionally contributes to the proof,<sup>10</sup> nevertheless occupies, so to speak, the position of an introduction, by means of which one recommends or slanders someone—and this is the task of the introduction—then the fable reasonably requires that the narrative chapter be second.

11. In addition, the fable is false by nature, but the falsehood is imaginative. The narrative, however, contains something that is true and indeed is realistic. And that which is real proceeds from that which is not. And so in accordance with this principle the fable chapter is again reasonably placed first, while the narrative chapter occupies second place.

12. In addition, the fable is also, by general consent, solely false, whereas the narrative is sometimes false and sometimes true. Thus, since progymnasmata progress little by little toward the more advanced, we reasonably come to the narrative chapter second, as it contains, more than the fable does, something that is true.

13. We have placed the chreia as the third progymnasma. For the progymnasmata also rightly follow the sequence of the parts of a speech. 14. Thus, just as in speeches the argumentative part of the speech is third, so here, too, after the narrative the argumentative part, though on a partial and small scale, is third. For

<sup>8</sup> This last clause can be clarified by what John has said earlier about how plausibility is achieved (*Comm. in Aphth.* 1 [5,15–19 Rabe]): “One should consider how plausibility originates—from locales where the characters typically spend their time, from the language that naturally fits each character, and from situations that do not go beyond the essential nature of each character.”

<sup>9</sup> The five-part public speech goes back to Nicolaus (see, e.g., *Progymn., praef.* [4,6–5,10 Felten]).

<sup>10</sup> The mention of proof comes from the standard four-part division of a speech—introduction, statement of the case, proof, and epilogue. Here proof refers to the third and fourth parts, i.e., objection and rebuttal.

τοῦ ἐκ μέρους καὶ πρὸς ὀλίγον· κατασκευάζομεν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς χρεαίαις, εἰ ἀληθῆς ὁ λόγος, εἰ καλῶς ἢ πρᾶξις γεγένηται· πᾶσα δὲ κατασκευὴ τῶν ἀγώνων ἐστίν.

15. Ἔτι πᾶσα τέχνη ἀπὸ τῶν ἀπλουστέρων ἀρχομένη ἐπὶ τὰ τελεώτερα προκόπτειν εἶωθεν. 16. οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖς προγυμνάσμασι παρετηρήσαμεν τοῦτο γινόμενον· ἀπλούστερον μὲν γὰρ ὁ μῦθος καὶ τὸ διήγημα, τελειότερον δὲ τὸ ἀγωνίζεσθαι κατασκευάζειν ἕτερον, εἰ καὶ [37] τοῦτο τυγχάνει σφόδρα μικρόν· λόγον γὰρ, ὡς ἔφην, | ἓνα ἢ πρᾶξιν κατασκευάζομεν μίαν καὶ σύντομον.

17. Ἔτι τὸ συνηγορεῖν ἑτέρῳ δύναμιν ἔχει ῥητορικὴν· συνηγοροῦμεν οὖν ἐν τῇ χρείᾳ τοῖς εἰποῦσί τι ἢ πράξασιν ὡς καλῶς εἰποῦσιν ἢ πράξασι· τοῦτο δὲ δυσχερέστερον τοῦ ἐκτίθεσθαι μῦθον ἢ διήγημα· ἀπλούστερα γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ ἀβίαστον ἔχει τὸν λόγον.

18. Ἔτι ὁ μὲν μῦθος ἀφελέστερος ὢν καὶ τέρπει τῇ πλάσει καὶ εἰς μεγάλα συμβάλλεται, ἡ χρεία δέ, εἰ <καὶ> ταῦτόν τῳ μύθῳ ὠφελεῖ τοὺς ἀκούοντας, ἀλλ' ἀγωνιστικώτερον ἔχει, καὶ <γὰρ> ἔχει τὴν κατασκευὴν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἐστὶ χρεία ἀλλὰ καὶ χρείας κατασκευή. 19. τὸ δ' ἐπαγωνίσασθαι τινα τελεωτέρας δεῖται ἕξσεως· εἰ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὰς πτώσεις καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ὡς παρὰ τοῖς γραμματικοῖς τὴν γυμνασίαν ἐλάμβανε, συνέβαινε χρεῖαν εἶναι μόνον ὡς ἀληθῶς, εἰ δ' ἐξ ἐπιχειρημάτων καὶ παραδειγμάτων λαμβάνει τὴν σύστασιν, ὅπερ ἐν τῇ κατασκευῇ τῆς χρείας ποιοῦμεν, μετὰ τὸ προοίμιον καὶ τὴν ἔκθεσιν ἐπὶ τὴν σύστασιν αὐτῆς ἐρχόμενοι, οὐκέτι χρεία ἀλλὰ χρείας ἐστὶ κατασκευή.

18 καὶ addidit Rabe || 18 καὶ γὰρ ἔχει posuit Rabe || καὶ ἔχει V W  
|| 19 αὐτῆς scripsit Rabe || οὕτως V



in chreia elaborations we confirm whether the saying is true or the action has been nobly done. And every confirmation is characterized by arguments.

15. In addition, every skill begins with simpler tasks and regularly progresses to more advanced ones. 16. Accordingly, we have observed this progression occurring in the progymnasmata, too. For the fable and narrative are simpler forms, whereas using arguments to confirm a saying or action is more advanced, even if this is a rather short exercise. For, as I said, we are confirming only one concise saying or one brief act.

17. In addition, being an advocate for another is a function of rhetoric. Thus, in a chreia elaboration we are advocates for those who have said or done something as having spoken or acted rightly. And this elaboration is more difficult than recounting a fable or a narrative. For these forms are simpler and have no persuasive language.

18. In addition, a fable, since it is quite simple, both delights with its fiction and contributes to important issues,<sup>11</sup> whereas a chreia elaboration, although it benefits its audience in the same way as a fable does, nevertheless has a more argumentative aspect, <for> it also provides confirmation. For a chreia elaboration not only has a chreia but also a confirmation of the chreia, 19. and to argue on behalf of something requires a more advanced skill. For if Aphthonius's chreia exercise had provided training in the cases and numbers, as occurs among grammarians,<sup>12</sup> then it follows that this exercise would truly be dealing with the chreia alone, but if it gives proof from arguments and examples—and this is precisely what we do in a confirmation of a chreia when, after the introduction and exposition, we come to the proof of it—then the exercise no longer entails (the declension of) a chreia but the confirmation of it.

<sup>11</sup> Presumably, John is thinking of the delight of the fable itself and then of its contribution to some important issue by means of the ἐπιμύθιον, or lesson of the fable.

<sup>12</sup> On this exercise with the chreia, called κλίσις ("declension"), see *Chreia* 2:51–77.

## §2. ΟΡΟΣ ΧΡΕΙΑΣ

**Χρεία ἐστὶν ἀπομνημόνευμα σύντομον εὐστόχως ἐπὶ τι πρόσωπον ἀναφέρουσα** (Aphth 2–3 H/ON [= 3,21–22 Rabe]). 1. Ἀπομνημόνευμα, φησὶν, ἐστὶν ἡ χρεία—δηλονότι πράξεως ἢ λόγου—σύντομον· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀπομνημόνευμα κυρίως μὲν πρᾶξις ἐστὶν ἢ λόγος βιωφελής, οὐ μὴν σύντομος πάντως· ἐνταῦθα δὲ ἀπλούστερον εἶπεν ἀπομνημόνευμα, ἀντὶ τοῦ μνήμη καὶ λόγος περιφερόμενος. 2. σύντομον δὲ τὸ μὴ <δι>εξοδικόν· τοῦτο δὲ εἶπε διὰ τὰ ἀπομνημονεύματα· δυσὶ | γὰρ τοῖσδε κεχώρισται τῆς χρείας τὸ ἀπομνημόνευμα· ἡ μὲν γὰρ σύντομος, τὸ δὲ ἀπομνημόνευμα ἔσθ' ὅτε ἐπεκτείνεται, καὶ ἡ μὲν ἀναφέρεται εἰς τινα πρόσωπα, τὸ δὲ ἀπομνημόνευμα καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸ μνημονεύεται. 3. πρόσκειται δὲ τὸ «εὐστόχως» οἷονεὶ ἀρμοζόντως, ἐπειδὴ ἐν τούτῳ ἐστὶν ἡ ἰσχὺς τῆς χρείας ἐν τῷ μὴ ἀστόχως εἰρῆσθαι. 4. πρόσκειται δὲ τὸ «εἰς τι πρόσωπον ἀναφέρουσα» πρὸς ἀντιδιαστολὴν τῶν μὴ ἔχουσῶν πρόσωπα γνωμῶν. 5. «εἰς τι,» φησί, «πρόσωπον ἀναφέρουσα,» τουτέστιν ἀπὸ περιστατικοῦ τινος ἔχουσα τὴν ἀρχήν.

6. Ἰστέον δέ, ὅτι οὐ πάντοτε ἡ χρεία σύντομον ἔχει τὸ ἀπομνημόνευμα· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ διὰ μακροτέρων. 7. σύντομος μὲν οὖν χρεία ἔσται οὕτως· Ἐπαμεινώνδας ἄτεκνος ἀποθνήσκων ἔλεγε τοῖς φίλοις «δύο θυγατέρας ἀπέλιπον, τὴν γε περὶ Λεῦκτρα νίκην καὶ τὴν περὶ Μαντίνειαν.» 8. διὰ μακροτέρων δὲ οὕτως· Ἐπαμεινώνδας ὁ τῶν Θηβαίων στρατηγὸς ἦν μὲν ἄρα καὶ περὶ τὴν εἰρήνην ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, συστάντος δὲ τῇ πατρίδι πολέμου πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους πολλὰ καὶ λαμπρὰ τῆς μεγαλοψυχίας ἔργα ἐπεδείξατο· Βοιωταρχῶν μὲν περὶ Λεῦκτρα ἐνίκα τοὺς πολεμίους, στρατευόμενος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος καὶ ἀγωνιζόμενος ἀπέθανεν ἐν Μαντίνειᾳ. 9. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τρωθεὶς ἐτελεύτα τὸν βίον, ὀλοφυρομένων τῶν φίλων τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ διότι ἄτεκνος ἀποθνήσκει, μειδιάσας «παύσασθε,» ἔφη,

## §2. DEFINITION OF A CHREIA

**A chreia is a concise reminiscence aptly attributed to some individual** (Aphth 2–3 H/ON [= 3,21–22 Rabe]). 1. The chreia, Aphthonius is saying, is a reminiscence—obviously of an action or saying—that is concisely expressed. Now the literary form reminiscence is, strictly speaking, an action or saying that is useful for life but not always concisely expressed. But here he meant a simpler reminiscence, in the sense of a recollection of a well-known saying. 2. “Concise”: not expressed in detail. Aphthonius used this word on account of the form reminiscences. For the reminiscence is distinguished from the chreia in these two ways—(a) a chreia is concise, but a reminiscence is sometimes expanded; and (b) the chreia is attributed to various individuals, whereas the reminiscence is recollected for itself by itself. 3. The word “aptly,” that is, suitably, is added since the power of the chreia is in this: in not being told inaptly. 4. The phrase “attributed to some individual” is added for the purpose of distinguishing the chreia from maxims, which have no attribution. 5. He says “attributed to some individual”; that is, a chreia has its origin in a circumstantial element.<sup>13</sup>

6. One should realize, however, that a chreia does not always contain a concise reminiscence. For it is also told in longer form.<sup>14</sup> 7. Accordingly, a chreia that is concise will be as follows: Epaminondas, as he was dying childless, said to his friends, “I have left behind two daughters, the victory at Leuctra and the one at Mantinea.”<sup>15</sup> 8. In longer form, however, it goes like this: Epaminondas, the Theban general, was, of course, a good man in times of peace, but when war against the Lacedaemonians came to his homeland, he displayed many outstanding deeds of great courage. As a Boeotarch at Leuctra he triumphed over the enemy, and while campaigning and fighting for his homeland he died at Mantinea. 9. While he was dying of his wounds and his friends were lamenting, among other things, that he was dying childless,

<sup>13</sup> John is thinking of the six *περιστατικά*, one of which is the *πρόσωπον*.

<sup>14</sup> John is referring to what Theon regards as an expanded chreia, one of the manipulations of the chreia that Theon allows, using the same example as that which follows here (see Theon 309–33 H/ON [= 27–28 Patillon] and *Chreia* 1:70–71).

<sup>15</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:322.

« ὦ φίλοι κλαίοντες· ἐγὼ γὰρ ὑμῖν ἀθανάτους δύο καταλέλοιπα θυγατέρας, δύο νίκας τῆς πατρίδος κατὰ Λακεδαιμονίων, τὴν μὲν ἐν Λεύκτροις, τὴν πρεσβυτέραν, νεωτέραν δὲ τὴν ἄρτι μοι γεγεννημένην ἐν Μαντινείᾳ. »

### <§3. ΕΤΥΜΟΛΟΓΙΑ>

- [39] | **Χρειώδης δὲ οὕσα προσαγορεύεται χρεία** (Aphth 4 H/ON [= 4,1 Rabe]). 1. Οὐ κατ' ἐξοχὴν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, ὥς τινές φασιν, εἴρηται χρεία, ἀλλ' ὅτι φερωνύμως διὰ τινὰ χρεῖαν ἢ ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ πρᾶξις γίνεται· ὥσπερ γὰρ λέγομεν χρεῖαν εἶναι τοῦδε τοῦ σκεύους διὰ τήνδε τὴν πρόφασιν, οὕτω κἀνταῦθα χρεία γίνεται τοῦ λόγου τῷ λέγοντι ἢ τῆς πράξεως τῷ πράττοντι διὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην περίστασιν, οἷον Διογένους καθεύδοντος ἐπιστάς Ἀλέξανδρος εἶπεν·

οὐ χρὴ παννύχιον εὔδειν βουληφόρον ἄνδρα.

2. χρεία γὰρ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ γέγονε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον εἰπεῖν διὰ τὸν Διογένην καθεύδειν· ὥς, εἰ μὴ Διογένης ἐκάθευδεν, οὐδ' ἂν τοῦ ἔπους χρεῖαν ἔσχεν Ἀλέξανδρος. 3. καὶ πάλιν Διογένης ὁρῶν μειράκιον ἀκοσμοῦν τὸν παιδαγωγὸν τῇ βακτηρίᾳ ἐτύπτησεν, ὥς δῆλον εἶναι, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν τὸν παιδαγωγὸν ἐτύπτησεν, εἰ μὴ ὁ νέος ἀκοσμῶν ἐφαίνετο· χρεία οὖν πεποίηκε τὴν πληγὴν. 4. κυρίως οὖν ἡ χρεία φερωνύμως διὰ τὴν χρεῖαν τοῦ λεγομένου λόγου ἢ τῆς γινομένης πράξεως κατωνόμασται· καὶ ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν προγυμνασμάτων, ἐὰν οὕτως ἐπιτηρῇς, κυρίαν καὶ ἀκριβῶς κειμένην τὴν προσηγορίαν ἐδέξατο, καθάπερ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ προγύμνασμα.

he smiled and said, “Stop weeping, my friends, for I have left you two immortal daughters—the two victories of our homeland over the Lacedaemonians, the one at Leuctra, the elder daughter, and the younger, which is being born right now in Mantinea.”<sup>16</sup>

### <§3. ETYMOLOGY>

**Since it is useful, it is called “chreia”** (Apth 4 H/ON [= 4,1 Rabe]). 1. Not because a chreia is useful [χρήσιμος] beyond all other forms, as some say,<sup>17</sup> is it called a “chreia”; rather, the saying or action is well named because of some need [χρεία]. For just as we say that there is a need of some particular utensil for a specific purpose, so also here the speaker has a need to speak—or the actor to act—because of a given circumstance. For example, while Diogenes was sleeping, Alexander stood over him and said: <sup>18</sup>

To sleep all night ill-suits a counselor.

2. Alexander had a need to make this saying, because Diogenes was sleeping. Consequently, if Diogenes had not been sleeping, Alexander would have had no need for this line. 3. And again: Diogenes, on seeing a youth misbehaving, struck the paedagogus with his staff. Therefore, it is clear that he would not have struck the paedagogus unless the young man had clearly been misbehaving. Thus, a need caused the blow. 4. Strictly speaking, therefore, the chreia is given this name because of the need for the saying to be spoken or the act to be done. Indeed, each of the progymnasmata, if you investigate them in this way, has received a name that is proper and accurately assigned, just as this progymnasma has been.

<sup>16</sup> Epaminondas’s victories ended the long military domination of the Spartans—on the battle at Leuktra in 371, see Xenophon, *Hell.* 6.4.4–15; Diodorus Siculus 15.55–56; and Plutarch, *Pelop.* 23; on the battle at Mantinea in 361, see Xenophon, *Hell.* 7.5.18–27, and Diodorus Siculus 15.84–88.

<sup>17</sup> See Theon 25–28 H/ON (= 19 Patillon); cf. Hermogenes 4 H/ON (= 6,5–6 Rabe), and Nicolaus 80–86 (= 21,1–6 Felten).

<sup>18</sup> *Il.* 2.24. On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:314–15.

5. Ἄλλοι δέ φασιν, ὅτι, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐπικεκαλυμένην ἔχει τὴν παραινέσιν, ὥσπερ ὁ μῦθος, ἀλλὰ γυμνήν τὴν συμβουλήν, εἰκότως χρεία ὠνόμασται κατ' ἐξοχὴν· ἐναργεστέρα γὰρ ἢ ἀπ' αὐτῆς ὠφέλειά ἐστιν οἷον χρειώδης καὶ ἀναγκαία καὶ χρῆσιν ἔχουσα μετὰ ὠφελείας.

<§4. Η ΔΙΑΙΡΕΣΙΣ ΑΠΟ ΓΕΝΟΥΣ ΕΙΣ ΓΕΝΗ>

[40] | Καὶ τῆς χρείας τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ λογικόν, τὸ δὲ πρακτικόν, τὸ δὲ μικτόν (Aphth 5–6 H/ON [= 4,2–3 Rabe]). 1. Τὰ ἀνωτάτω, φησὶν, εἶδη τῆς χρείας τρία εἰσὶν· αἱ μὲν γὰρ εἰσι λογικαί, αἱ δὲ πρακτικά, αἱ δὲ μικταί.

Καὶ λογικὸν μὲν τὸ τῷ λόγῳ δηλοῦν τὴν ὠφέλειαν (Aphth 6–7 H/ON [= 4,3–4 Rabe]). 2. Λογικαὶ χρεῖαί εἰσι, φησὶν, αἱ χωρὶς πράξεως διὰ λόγων ἔχουσαι τὸ κῦρος, οἷον Ἀλέξανδρος ἐρωτηθεὶς, πόθεν ἐκτήσατο τοσαύτην δυναστείαν, ἔφη «μηδὲν εἰς αὔριον ἀναβαλλόμενος,» καὶ Ἰσοκράτης τοὺς εὐφυεῖς τῶν μαθητῶν θεῶν παῖδας ἔφασκε, καὶ Διογένης ἰδὼν μειράκιον καλλωπιζόμενον ἔφη «εἰ μὲν πρὸς ἄνδρας, ἀτυχεῖς, εἰ δὲ πρὸς γυναῖκας, ἀδικεῖς,» καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ τινος, πῶς ἂν ἔνδοξος γένοιτο, ἀπεκρίνατο ὅτι «ἥκιστα δόξης φροντίζων,» καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἰδὼν τινα αἰσχυρῶς βιοῦντα, εἶτ' ἄλλω τινὶ ταῦτὸ τοῦτο ὀνειδίσαντα «ἔοικας,» φησί, «τέφραν φυσᾶν ἀνέμου κατεναντίον.» 3. ἄλλος δὲ φησι

5. But others say<sup>19</sup>: “Since a chreia does not contain veiled advice, as does a fable, but contains explicit counsel, it is reasonably named “chreia” because of this quality. For the benefit that derives from it is clearer because of its necessary utility and having utility along with the benefit.”

<§4. DIVISION OF CLASS INTO SUBCLASSES>

**Of the chreia there is the saying class, the action class, and the mixed class** (Aphth 5–6 H/ON [= 4,2–3 Rabe]). 1. The principal subclasses of the chreia, he says, are three: saying chreiai, action chreiai, and mixed chreiai.

**The saying class is the one that demonstrates its utility by a saying** (Aphth 6–7 H/ON [= 4,3–4 Rabe]). 2. Saying chreiai, he says, are those that make their point through words, without action.<sup>20</sup> For example: Alexander, on being asked how he had acquired such great power, said, “By not putting anything off until tomorrow.”<sup>21</sup> Isocrates said that gifted students are the children of gods.<sup>22</sup> Diogenes, on seeing a youth dressed foppishly, said, “If you are doing this for husbands, you are accursed; but if for wives, you are unjust.”<sup>23</sup> The same one, on being asked by someone how he could become famous, answered, “By worrying as little as possible about fame.”<sup>24</sup> The same one, on seeing someone living shamelessly and then rebuking someone else for the very same thing, said, “You’re like a man who blows ash against the wind.”

<sup>19</sup> Who these others are is not known, since what is said here does not appear in any of the extant *Progymnasmata*, and while Doxapatres copies this passage from John (see Doxapatres 4.6), he too retains the ἔλλοι.

<sup>20</sup> John clarifies Aphthonius’s definition by quoting Theon’s (see Theon 31–32 H/ON [= 19 Patillon]).

<sup>21</sup> This chreia appears for the first time here, so far as I know, and again much later in Nicephorus Callistos (10,105–7 Glettner). For related chreiai, see *Chreia* 1:303.

<sup>22</sup> This chreia is a favorite of Theon’s, which he recites six times (e.g., 39–40 H/ON [= 19 Patillon]). Theon is presumably John’s source since the chreia does not appear in any other extant *Progymnasmata*. See further *Chreia* 1:324.

<sup>23</sup> Again, John has seemingly taken this chreia from Theon (139–41 H/ON [= 22 Patillon]). See further *Chreia* 1:317.

<sup>24</sup> Another chreia taken from Theon (33–35 H/ON [= 19 Patillon]), on which see further *Chreia* 1:313, and for its ἄλσις, or declension, by Doxapatres, see *Chreia* 2:74–77.

«τί κόνιν φυσῶς; εἰς τὸ σὸν ἀναστρέφεται πρόσωπον.» 4. καὶ Λάκων τις κατὰ πόλεμον αἰχμάλωτος γενόμενος καὶ πωλούμενος ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ τινος, τί δύναται, ἔφη, «ἐλεύθερος εἶναι.» 5. καὶ Θαλῆς ὁ Μιλήσιος ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ τινος, τί ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, εἶπεν, «ἡ γλῶττα.» 6. καὶ Δημοσθένης ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ τινος, τί ῥητορικὴ περιποιεῖ τοῖς μανθάνουσιν, εἶπεν,

Ἄνδρ' ἐπαμύνασθαι, ὅτε τις πρότερος χαλεπήνη.

[41] | 7. αὗται γὰρ ἅπασαι διὰ λόγου τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἔχουσι.

8. Τούτων δὲ τῶν λογικῶν χρειῶν εἶδη τυγχάνει δύο· αἱ μὲν γὰρ εἰσιν ἀπλαῖ, αἱ δὲ διπλαῖ, ἀπλαῖ μὲν αἱ λόγον ἕνα παρ' ἑνὸς ἔχουσαι προσώπου, οἷον Ἀλέξανδρος ἰδὼν Διογένην καθεύδοντα εἶπεν·

οὐ χρή παννύχιον εὔδειν βουληφόρον ἄνδρα·

διπλαῖ δὲ αἱ πρὸς τὸν ῥηθέντα λόγον ἄλλον ἀντικείμενον ἔχουσαι, οἷον Ἀλέξανδρος ἐπιστάς Διογένηι καθεύδοντι εἶπεν

οὐ χρή παννύχιον εὔδειν βουληφόρον ἄνδρα,

καὶ Διογένης ἀναστὰς εἶπε πρὸς αὐτὸν

ᾧ λαοί τ' ἐπιτετράφαται καὶ τόσσα μέμηλε·

δύο γὰρ χρειᾶι ἐνταῦθα τυγχάνουσι, μία μὲν παρ' Ἀλεξάνδρου, ἑτέρα δὲ παρὰ Διογένηος· διπλῇ γὰρ ἐστὶ χρεία ἡ δύο προσώπων ἀποφάνσεις ἔχουσα, ὣν καὶ ἡ ἑτέρα μεθ' ἑνὸς προσώπου χρεῖαν ποιεῖ.

9. Πάλιν τῶν ἀπλῶν λογικῶν χρειῶν εἶδη τυγχάνει δύο, τό τε ἀποφαντικὸν καὶ τὸ ἀποκριτικόν. 10. καὶ ἀποφαντικὸν μὲν ἐστίν, ὅταν



3. But another man said, "Why are you blowing dust? It is being carried back into your face."<sup>25</sup> 4. A Laconian who had become a captive and was being sold, on being asked by someone what he could do, said, "Be free." 5. Thales of Miletus, on being asked by someone what is both good and bad, said, "The tongue." 6. Demosthenes the orator, on being asked by someone what advantage rhetoric gives to those who are learning it, said:<sup>26</sup>

To defend myself against a man when he's angry at me first.

7. For all these chreiai make their point by means of a saying.

8. Now, there are two subtypes of sayings chreiai: simple and double.<sup>27</sup> Simple chreiai are those that have one saying made by one individual. For example, Alexander, on seeing Diogenes asleep, said:<sup>28</sup>

To sleep all night ill-suits a counselor.

Double chreiai are those that have another saying made in response to the one that has already been spoken. For example, Alexander stood over a sleeping Diogenes and said:<sup>29</sup>

To sleep all night ill-suits a counselor.

And so Diogenes stood up and said to him:<sup>30</sup>

On whom the folk rely, whose cares are many.

For there are two chreiai here, one by Alexander and a second by Diogenes. For a double chreia is one that has sayings of two individuals. The second saying forms a chreia with one individual, as well.

9. Again, there are two subclasses of simple saying chreiai—statement and response.<sup>31</sup> 10. A statement chreia occurs whenever

<sup>25</sup> This and the following three chreiai appear for the first time in the progymnastic tradition and only here. On these chreiai, see further *Chreia* 1:321–22, 329–30, 340, and 311–12.

<sup>26</sup> *Il.* 24.369; cf. *Od.* 16.72; 21.133.

<sup>27</sup> John has taken this distinction and its exemplars from Theon (see Theon 84–95 H/ON [= 20–21 Patillon]).

<sup>28</sup> *Il.* 2.24.

<sup>29</sup> *Il.* 2.24

<sup>30</sup> *Il.* 2.25.

<sup>31</sup> The distinction between statement and response chreiai also derives, if rather loosely, from Theon's longer, more complex, and complete discussion (see Theon 36–95 H/ON [= 19–21 Patillon]). But John's simplification leads him to a confused presentation. Theon distinguishes between two subclasses of

τις ιδών τι ἀποφαίνηται· ἰσοδυναμεῖ δὲ ἐν τούτοις ἡ θέα ταῖς ἐρωτήσε-  
 σιν· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐρωτώμενος ἀποκρίνεται, οὕτω καὶ ὁρῶν ἀποφαίνεται,  
 ὥς, εἴ γε μὴ εἶδεν, οὐδ' ἂν ἀπεφώνηατο. 11. ἐν δὲ ταύταις ταῖς χρεῖαις  
 ἡ ἀπόφασις οὐκ ἔστι καθόλου ἀλλὰ μερική· οἴκοθεν γὰρ κινήθει ἀπὸ  
 τῆς θεᾶς πρὸς τὸ πρόσωπον τὸ παρὸν ἀποφαίνεται, οἷον Ἰσοκράτης τοὺς  
 εὐφυεῖς τῶν μαθητῶν θεῶν παῖδας ἔφασκεν εἶναι· ὁρῶν γὰρ τοὺς εὐφυεῖς  
 [42] οὕτως πρὸς μερικὸν πρόσωπον ἀποφαίνεται· | μέρος γὰρ οἱ εὐφυεῖς τῶν  
 μαθητῶν. 12. ἀποκριτικὸν δέ ἐστιν, ὅταν ὑποκειμένης ἐρωτήσεως ἀπο-  
 κρίνηται τις, ὥς ἤδη προείπομεν.

**Πρακτικὸν δὲ τὸ πρᾶξιν σημαῖνον** (Aphth 9–10 H/ON [= 4,5–6 Rabe]). 13. Πρακτικαὶ χρεῖαί εἰσιν, ἐν αἷς πρᾶξις τις πρὸς τὴν ὑποκει-  
 μένην χρεῖαν συνίσταται, οἷον Διογένης μειράκιον ὁρῶν ἀκοσμοῦν τὸν  
 παιδαγωγὸν τῇ βακτηρίᾳ τετύπτηκε· πρᾶξις γὰρ ἡ πληγὴ. 14. καὶ τὸ  
 παρὰ τῷ Ἀφθονίῳ τεθέν, τὸ τοῦ Πυθαγόρου· πρακτικαὶ γάρ εἰσιν, αἱ  
 χωρὶς λόγου ἐμφαίνουσί τινα νοῦν.

15. Τούτων δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσιν ἐνεργητικαί, αἱ δὲ πα-  
 θητικαί· ἐνεργητικαὶ μὲν, ὅσαι δηλοῦσί τινα ἐνέργειαν, οἷον Διογένης  
 ιδὼν ὀψοφάγον παιδίον τὸν παιδαγωγὸν τῇ βακτηρίᾳ ἔπαισε· παθητικαὶ

someone, on seeing something, makes a statement. In this category sight has the same function as questions in responsive chreiai. For just as one, on being asked, responds, so also one, on seeing, speaks since, if he had not seen anything, he would not have spoken. 11. In these chreiai the statement is not universal but responds to a particular circumstance. For one is moved, to begin with, by some sight and then makes a statement to an individual who is present. For example, Isocrates said that gifted students are the children of gods.<sup>32</sup> For on seeing gifted students he thus made this statement to a certain individual. For the gifted are only a portion of students. 12. A responsive chreia occurs whenever someone answers a specific question, as I have already said above.

**The action class is the one that depicts an action** (Aphth 9–10 H/ON [= 4,5–6 Rabe]). 13. Action chreiai are those in which some action is involved in the chreia being considered—for example, Diogenes, on seeing a youth misbehaving, struck the paedagogus with his staff.<sup>33</sup> For the blow is an action. 14. There is also the chreia used by Aphthonius, the one about Pythagoras.<sup>34</sup> For action chreiai are those that hint at some thought without using speech.

15. Some action chreiai, however, are active, and others passive.<sup>35</sup> Active are all those that disclose some aggressive act. For example, Diogenes, on seeing a boy who was a gourmand, struck

statement chreiai, those whose statements are unprompted (*καθ' ἐκούσιον*) and those that are a visual response to some situation (*κατὰ περίστασιν*). In other words, the former takes the form “So and so said something,” whereas the latter takes the form “So and so, on seeing something, said something.” Responsive chreiai take the form “So and so, on being asked something, said something.” John cites examples of only the statement subclass, none that is responsive, although he correctly associates this subclass with responses to questions.

<sup>32</sup> This chreia, as recited, is not *κατὰ περίστασιν* but *καθ' ἐκούσιον*, for Isocrates does not “see” anything before making his statement, John’s next sentence notwithstanding. Hence, Isocrates’s statement is universal. That Isocrates saw any gifted students is John’s unsubstantiated assumption.

<sup>33</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:316.

<sup>34</sup> See Aphthonius 10–12 H/ON (= 4,5–8 Rabe): “Pythagoras, on being asked how long human life can be, was visible for a short time and disappeared, making his brief appearance the measure of life.”

<sup>35</sup> The distinction between active and passive chreiai, complete with the following examples, derives almost word for word from Theon 97–104 H/ON (= 21 Patillon).

δὲ αἱ πάθος τι σημαίνουσαι, οἷον Διδύμων ὁ αὐλητῆς ἀλούς ἐπὶ μοιχείᾳ ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐκρεμάσθη.

**Μικτὸν δὲ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων, λόγου καὶ πράξεως** (Aphth 13–14 H/ON [= 4,8–9 Rabe]). 16. Μικταὶ χρεῖαι εἰσιν αἱ ἀπὸ λόγου καὶ πράξεως, οἷον Λάκων ἐρωτηθεὶς, ποῦ τῆς Σπάρτης οἱ ὄροι, ἀνατείνας τὴν δεξιὰν καὶ δείξας τὸ δόρυ εἶπεν «ἐνταῦθα,» καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ἐρωτηθεὶς, ποῦ ἔχει τοὺς θησαυρούς, τοὺς φίλους δείξας εἶπεν «ἐν τούτοις.»

[43] 17. Θέων δὲ «μικταί,» φησί, «χρεῖαι εἰσιν ἐκεῖναι, ὅσαι τοῦ μὲν λογικοῦ καὶ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ κοινωνοῦσιν, ἐν δὲ τῷ πρακτικῷ τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσιν, οἷον | Πυθαγόρας ὁ φιλόσοφος ἐρωτηθεὶς, πόσος ἐστὶν ὁ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίος, ἀναβὰς ἐπὶ τὸ δωμάτιον παρέκυψεν ὀλίγον, δηλῶν διὰ τούτου τὴν βραχύτητα· καὶ ἔτι Λάκων ἐρομένου τινὸς αὐτόν, ποῦ τοὺς ὄρους ἔχουσι τῆς γῆς οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἔδειξε τὸ δόρυ.»

18. Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν Ἀφθόνιος εἶπεν εἶδη τῆς χρείας. 19. ἀλλ' εἰσὶ τινες χρεῖαι καὶ χαριεντισμὸν ἔχουσαι μόνον, αἱ λογικαὶ κατὰ γένος εἰσίν, οἷον Θεόκριτον ἐξιόντα ἐκ τῆς Ἀντιγόνου οἰκίας οὐδὲν παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως δεξάμενον ἤρετό τις, τί ποιεῖ ὁ βασιλεύς· ὃ δὲ εἶπε «πτωχεύει,»

the paedagogus with his staff.<sup>36</sup> Passive, however, are those that portray something being experienced. For example, Didymon the flute player, on being convicted of adultery, was hanged by his namesake.<sup>37</sup>

**The mixed class is the one that is composed of both a saying and an action** (Aphth 13–14 H/ON [= 4,8–9 Rabe]).

16. Mixed chreiai are those that are made up of a saying and an action. For example, a Laconian, on being asked where the boundaries of Sparta were, raised his right hand, brandished his spear, and said, “Here.”<sup>38</sup> And: Alexander, on being asked where he kept his treasures, pointed to his friends and said, “In these.”<sup>39</sup>

17. Theon, however, says: “Mixed chreiai are those that share elements of the saying and action classes, although the point is contained in the action element. For example, Pythagoras the philosopher, on being asked how long human life is, went up to his room and peeked in for a moment, thereby disclosing life’s shortness. Moreover, a Laconian, when someone asked him where the Lacedaemonians had the boundaries of their land, brandished his spear.”<sup>40</sup>

18. And so, these, according to Aphthonius, are the classes of chreiai. 19. But there are also some chreiai that contain only wit, though they are saying chreiai according to class. For example, when Theocritus was leaving Antigonus’s household without having received anything from the king and someone asked him

<sup>36</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:315–16.

<sup>37</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:312–13.

<sup>38</sup> This chreia appears in both Theon and Nicolaus, but John seems to be using Nicolaus here, because while both recite it in the context of mixed chreiai, only Nicolaus’s recitation is, as here, actually a mixed chreia (Nicolaus 77–79 H/ON [= 20,15–17 Felten]; see further *Chreia* 1:328–29).

<sup>39</sup> John has taken this chreia from Theon, but it is not used there in the context of mixed chreiai (see Theon 158–61 H/ON [= 23 Patillon]; see further *Chreia* 1:302).

<sup>40</sup> Now John has actually quoted Theon’s discussion (105–13 H/ON [= 21 Patillon]) of mixed chreiai but without making clear the differences between his discussion and that of Aphthonius. For Aphthonius the *πρόσωπον* makes the saying and does the action—for example, the Laconian brandishes his spear and says, “Here.” In Theon, however, the *πρόσωπον* merely is credited with an action—Pythagoras’s peeking in for a moment—whereas the interlocutor speaks, i.e., by asking a question.

καὶ Δημοσθένης ὁ ῥήτωρ ἰδὼν πεδήτην ἐπὶ πολλὸν χρόνον λουόμενον εἶπε «θάρσει· οὐ μὴ ἐκλυθῆς.» 20. τό τε γὰρ πτωχὸν εἰπεῖν διὰ τὸ μηδὲν λαβεῖν ἔχει τι χάριεν καὶ εὖστοχον καὶ τὸ «οὐ μὴ ἐκλυθῆς» διὰ τὸν δεσμὸν ῥηθὲν εὐθίκτως ἀλλὰ καὶ πολιτικῶς παρὰ τοῦ ῥήτορος εἴρηται.

21. Ἰστέον δέ, ὅτι αἱ ἐπὶ συμφέροντι τοῦ βίου λεγόμεναι κυρίως χρεῖαι καλοῦνται ἔχουσαι τὸ νουθετεῖν δι' ἐμφάσεως, αἱ δὲ εἰς σκῶμμα εὐκαιρον ἢ γέλωτα συγκείμεναι τὸ σχῆμα μὲν ἔχουσι χρεῶν, οὐ μὴν εἰσι χρεῖαι, εἰ μὴ τις ἐθέλει μιμεῖσθαι τὴν εὐχαριν ἐν αὐταῖς ὀξύτητα· ζηλωτὸν γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐ τὸ κατὰ νοῦν εὐχρηστον ἀλλὰ τὸ κατὰ λέξιν εὐθικτον, καὶ λέγοντο ἂν αὗται χρεῖαι καταχρηστικῶς. 22. ταῖς γοῦν τοιαύταις χρεῖαις οὐ γυμνασόμεθα διὰ τὸ γέλωτα φέρειν τοῦ λόγου τὴν ἔκβασιν.

<§5. Η ΔΙΑΙΡΕΣΙΣ ΑΠΟ ΟΛΟΥ ΕΙΣ ΜΕΡΗ>

[44] Ἡ μὲν οὖν διαίρεσις αὕτη τῆς χρείας. ἐργάσαιο δ' ἂν αὐτὴν τοῖσδε τοῖς κεφαλαίοις (Aphth 16–18 H/ON [= 4,12–13 Rabe]). 1. Ἐργασία ἐστὶν ἡ κατασκευὴ καὶ [ἡ] βεβαίωσις. 2. εἰ δέ τις λέγει ὅτι, εἰ κατασκευάζειν | τὴν χρεῖαν ἔστι τὸ προγύμνασμα, καὶ ἀνασκευάσομεν δηλονότι τὴν χρεῖαν, ῥητορικῆς γὰρ ἴδιον ἐπιχειρεῖν εἰς ἐκάτερα, λέξει μὲν καλῶς—τοῦτο γὰρ τῆς τέχνης ἐπάγγελμα—, οὐ μὴν ἀκόλουθον τοῦτο διὰ τὴν ἕξιν τῶν νέων ποιεῖν· οὔτε γὰρ ὥς ἐν εἰσαγωγῇ κρατύνειν αὐτοὺς τὴν φύσιν <τῶν> ἐπιχειρημάτων ἐάσομεν οὐδ' εἰς ἓνα προσέχειν σκοπὸν, καὶ ἄτοπον ὥς πρὸς νέους ἀνατρέπειν τὸ <ὀρθῶς> εἰρησθαι δοκοῦν ἢ πεπραῆχθαι καλῶς· ὁμοῦ γὰρ καὶ ἥθους γίγνεται διδασκαλία καὶ

21 εὐκαιρον scripsit Rabe || ἄκαιρον V W || §5.1 ἡ delevit Rabe ||  
2 τῶν addidit Rabe; cf. Doxapatres 6.5 || 2 ὀρθῶς addidit Rabe; cf. Doxapatres 6.5

how the king was faring, he replied, “He’s faring poorly.”<sup>41</sup> And Demosthenes the orator, on seeing a chained prisoner washing for a long time, said, “Don’t worry. You won’t be set free.”<sup>42</sup> 20. For to say “Antigonus is poor” because Theocritus received nothing has something witty and apt about it, and the response “You won’t be set free,” which was mentioned on account of the chain, is said cleverly and civilly by the orator.

21. One should realize, however, that chreiai that are told for their usefulness in life are properly called “chreiai” since they have admonishment as their purpose, but those that are composed for the purpose of a timely joke or laugh possess the form of chreiai but are not really chreiai unless someone wishes to imitate the sharp wit contained in them. What is enviable in them is not the utility of their sentiment but the cleverness of their expression, and so these would be called “chreiai” only by a misuse of language. 22. At any rate, we will not practice with such chreiai since the consequence of their sayings provokes only laughter.

#### <§5. DIVISION OF THE WHOLE INTO ITS PARTS>

**This, then, has been the classification of the chreia. But you can elaborate it by means of the following headings** (Aphth 16–18 H/ON [= 4, 12–13 Rabe]). 1. Elaboration is confirmation and corroboration. 2. But if someone says that since this progymnasma consists of confirming a chreia, then we will clearly also have to refute it, for the defining characteristic of rhetoric is to argue on both sides,<sup>43</sup> that person will speak correctly, for this is indeed the avowed purpose of the discipline, but to refute it is inappropriate on account of the temperament of young men. For while they are in an introductory stage we will allow them neither to strengthen the nature of such arguments nor to focus their attention on this one point of view, and it is ridiculous in view of the young men to overturn what appears to have been <correctly> spoken or nobly performed. For teaching is concerned with both character and

<sup>41</sup> Only John cites this chreia, on which see further *Chreia* 1:341.

<sup>42</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:312.

<sup>43</sup> Refutation of a chreia is discussed at length by Theon, who identifies nine ways to do so, including in terms of obscurity, pleonasm, ellipsis, and so on (see Theon 334–83 H/ON [= 28–30 Patillon]).

τοῦ λέγειν καλῶς, καὶ ὅπερ ἐστὶ κυριώτατον, κατὰ μέρος κρατύνειν τὸν εἰσαγόμενον τὴν γυμνασίαν παρασκευάσομεν.

3. Ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις, εἰ μὲν μὴ δυνατὸν ἦν ἐν ἄλλοις τοὺς τῆς ἀνασκευῆς τρόπους μαθεῖν, καλῶς εἶχεν ἡμᾶς εἰς τοῦναντίον ἐνταῦθα γυμνάσασθαι· εἰ δ' ἔστιν ἀνασκευὴ πάλιν ἄλλο προγύμνασμα, τῶν ἀτοπωτάτων ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν καλὸν εἶναι ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μάχην.

4. Ἔτι καὶ πολλοὶ βιωφελῆ τὴν χρεῖαν ὥρισαντο· οὐκοῦν ἐναντία τῷ ὄρω ποιήσομεν τὸ παρὰ ταύτης ἀνασκευάζοντες χρήσιμον.

5. Ἔτι κατ' ὀλίγον ἐπαύξειν δεῖ τὰ μαθήματα· πρῶτον οὖν γυμναζόμεθα τῇ κατασκευῇ τῆς χρείας καὶ <τῆς> γνώμης, εἴτα τοῦτο τὸ μέρος κρατύναντες διὰ τῆς ἀνασκευῆς καὶ κατασκευῆς ὥς [ἐπὶ] τι μεῖζον τὴν εἰς ἑκάτερα παρεχόμεθα ἐργασίαν. 6. ὅτι δὲ μεῖζόν ἐστι τῆς χρείας ἐκεῖνο τὸ μάθημα, ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἔξεστι συνιδεῖν· ἐν <μὲν γάρ> | ταῖς χρεαῖαις λόγος ἐστὶν ἢ πρᾶξις σύντομος, ἐν δὲ τῇ τῶν διηγημάτων ἀνασκευῇ ὁλοκλήρου πράγματος τυγχάνει παράστασις.

7. Πάλιν ζητοῦσιν· εἰ κατασκευὴ ἐστὶ χρείας τὸ προγύμνασμα, γυμναζόμεθα δὲ καὶ διηγημάτων κατασκευήν, περιττὴ ἢ διδασκαλία τῆς χρείας, περιττὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ γυμνασμία τῆς γνώμης τυγχάνει. 8. ἄλλ' ἕτερον λόγου ποιεῖσθαι κατασκευήν, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ χρεῖα καὶ τῇ γνώμη, ἕτερον δὲ ὁλοκλήρου πράγματος, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ κατασκευῇ τοῦ διηγήματος.

9. Διὰ τοῦτο δὲ μετὰ τὸ διήγημα ἐπὶ τὴν χρεῖαν ἐρχόμεθα, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς τοῦ λόγου μέρεσι μετὰ τὴν διήγησιν ἐπὶ τὴν πίστιν ἐρχόμεθα,



speaking properly; and what is most important: we will accustom the student who is just beginning this exercise to grow strong gradually in both.

3. There is still another reason: if it were impossible to learn the methods of refutation in other progymnasmata, it would be proper to practice on the opposite side here. But since refutation is already a separate progymnasma, it is only the very foolish who do battle against what seems to be good.

4. Furthermore, many have defined the chreia as useful for living.<sup>44</sup> Accordingly, we will be acting contrary to the definition if we refute the usefulness in it.

5. Then, too, lessons must advance little by little. So we first exercise ourselves with the confirmation of a chreia and maxim; then, when we have mastered this part of rhetoric, we provide something more advanced in the exercises that take both sides of an issue, refutation and confirmation.<sup>45</sup> 6. And it is possible to see from the exercises themselves that the teaching there is more advanced than the chreia elaboration. For the saying or action in chreiai is concise, whereas in the refutation of narratives there is the presentation of an entire incident.

7. Again, people think: "If this progymnasma involves the confirmation of a chreia, and if we also practice confirmation with narratives, then the instruction regarding the chreia becomes unnecessary, as is confirmation of a maxim." 8. But it is one thing to confirm a saying, as is the case with the elaboration of a chreia or maxim, but quite another to do so for an entire incident, as is the case with the confirmation of a narrative.

9. This is why we come to the chreia after the narrative, because in terms of the parts of a speech we come to the proof after

<sup>44</sup> For utility in the definition of the chreia, see Hermogenes 2–4 H/ON (= 6,4–6 Rabe); see also Nicolaus 80–81 H/ON [= 21,1–2 Felten]. The utility of the chreia also appears in Aphthonius's etymology of the word itself: *χρειώδης* (see Aphthonius 4 H/ON [= 4,1 Rabe]).

<sup>45</sup> The maxim (*γνώμη*) follows the chreia and likewise has elaboration as its manipulation (see Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 4 [= 7,1–10,7 Rabe]). Refutation (*ἀνασκευή*) and confirmation (*κατασκευή*) follow as the fifth and sixth progymnasmata in the Aphthonian sequence. What is refuted or confirmed in these exercises, however, are narratives, usually mythological ones (see Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 5 and 6 [10,8–13,18 and 13,19–16,16 Rabe]).

λόγος δὲ καὶ πράξεις, ἐν οἷς ἡ χρεία, μέρη τοῦ διηγήματος. 10. καὶ πρὸς τούτοις μὴ δυναμένου τοῦ νέου ἀθρόον νῦν τὴν κατασκευὴν πολλῶν ἐργάσασθαι (πολλοὶ γὰρ λόγοι καὶ πολλαὶ πράξεις ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ διηγήματι), ἐπὶ τὰ συντομώτερα τὸν γυμναζόμενον ἄγομεν καὶ τῶν μικρῶν πρῶτον περιγεγόμενος ἱκανὸς καὶ τῶν πλειόνων γενήσεται.

11. Ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἡ χρεία διήγησις εἶναι σύντομος ἔχουσα ἐν ἑαυτῇ πρόσωπα καὶ πράγματα καὶ λόγους· ἀλλὰ διενήνοχε τοῦ διηγήματος καὶ ἄλλοις μὲν πολλοῖς, μάλιστα δὲ τούτῳ τῷ τὸ μὲν ἔκθεσιν ἔχειν ψιλὴν πράγματος, τὴν δὲ χρείαν ἐνέργειαν καὶ προσώπων ἐρώτησιν καὶ ἀποκρισιν καὶ τῷ τοῖς ἐν τῷ διηγήματι μὲν ἡμᾶς μὴ συνίστασθαι, ἐν δὲ τῇ χρείᾳ τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἢ πεπραγμένοις συναγωνίζεσθαι.

[46] | Ἐγκωμιαστικῷ (Aphth 19 H/ON [= 4,13 Rabe]). 12. Τὸ ἐγκωμιαστικὸν βραχὺ ἔσται, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰς μῆκος ἐκτεινόμενον τῷ μὴ μεῖζον γενέσθαι τῆς ὑποθέσεως τὸ προοίμιον.

**Παραφραστικῷ** (Aphth 19 H/ON [= 4,13 Rabe]). 13. Τὸ παραφραστικὸν πρὸς τὰς μεῖζονας βουλάς γυμνάζει τοὺς νέους, ἵνα μὴ <μόνον> τοῖς οὖσιν ἐτοίμως χρῶνται, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρ' ἑαυτῶν <ἄλλα> ἐξευρίσκωσι.

**Τῷ τῆς αἰτίας** (Aphth 19–20 H/ON [= 4,14 Rabe]). 14. Αἰτία λέγεται, διότι τὴν πρόφασιν τῆς χρείας ἀποδείκνυσι. 15. τὸ τῆς αἰτίας μέντοι καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου ἕτεροι εἰκὸς εἶπον καὶ ἀληθές.

**Ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου** (Aphth 20 H/ON [= 4,14 Rabe]). 16. Τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν, ὅταν ζητήσης, τί τῷ προκειμένῳ λόγῳ ἐστὶν

10 γὰρ scripsit Rabe; cf. Doxapatres 6.12 || δὲ V W ||  
 10 περιγεγόμενος ἱκανὸς ... γενήσεται scripsi; cf. Doxapatres 6.12 || πε-  
 ριγεγόμενοι ἱκανοὶ ... ἐσόμεθα V W unde Rabe || 11 πράγματος W ||  
 παραγμάτων V unde Rabe || 12 ὑποθέσεως scripsit Rabe; cf. Nicolaus 166  
 H/ON (= 24,7 Felten) || διηγήσεως V W || 13 μόνον addidit Rabe |  
 13 ἄλλα addidit Rabe

the narrative. Now, a saying and an action, which a chreia consists of, are also parts of a narrative. 10. In addition to these, if the young man is unable at this point to compose a confirmation of many sayings and actions all at once—for there are many sayings and actions in a complete narrative—we guide the student to the simpler exercises, and so by his first becoming proficient with the shorter exercises he will be ready for the more advanced ones.

11. A chreia also resembles a concise narrative since it contains individuals, actions, and sayings. Nevertheless, it differs from the narrative in many respects as well but especially in this: a narrative contains an unadorned exposition of an event, whereas a chreia contains activity as well as the question and answer of individuals; and in this respect: we are not involved in what is said in a narrative, whereas in a chreia elaboration we argue on behalf of what has been said or done.

**The encomiastic heading** (Aphth 19 H/ON [= 4,13 Rabe]).

12. The encomiastic heading is to be brief and not expanded at length to the extent that the introduction of a speech becomes longer than the remainder of the speech.

**The paraphrastic heading** (Aphth 19 H/ON [= 4,13 Rabe]).

13. The paraphrastic heading trains young men in more lofty sentiments,<sup>46</sup> so that they not <only> might readily use the words already there but also invent <an alternative wording> on their own.

**By means of the rationale** (Aphth 19–20 H/ON [= 4,14 Rabe]). 14. This heading is called “rationale” because it proves the point of the chreia. 15. Other commentators say that the rationale and opposite are the probable and the true.<sup>47</sup>

**From the opposite** (Aphth 20 H/ON [= 4,14 Rabe]). 16. The heading from the opposite occurs whenever you investigate what

<sup>46</sup> The word βουλάς, rendered here as “sentiments,” is odd. We expect something like facility in alternative wording of others’ writings. Discussions of paraphrase are relatively rare and brief, but perhaps the translation “sentiments” gets some support from Quintilian 10.5.9, which uses *sententiae* as the object of paraphrase. I thank Craig Gibson for his help on this passage.

<sup>47</sup> Nicolaus had used these terms, the Probable and the True (see Nicolaus 169 H/ON [= 24,10 Felten]).

ἐναντίον, ὥς τῷ καθεύδειν τὸ ἀγρυπνεῖν· ἐρεῖς οὖν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου «ὁ δὲ ἀγρυπνῶν φροντίζει τὰ εἰκότα, αἰεὶ τὸν νοῦν ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἔχει, διορᾷ, τί μὴ δέον ποιεῖν καὶ τί δέον, καὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ἐστὶ κριτής» καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. 17. δεῖ οὖν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου κατασκευάζειν τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἵνα μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ καλὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀποδεικνύωμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον φαῦλον· αὕτη γὰρ μεγίστη τοῦ πράγματος σύστασις, ὅταν τὸ ἐναντίον φαῦλον δοκῇ εἶναι· πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν πραγμάτων καλὰ μὲν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἔχει φαῦλον, οἷον τὸ νόμους θεῖναι καλόν, τὸ δὲ μὴ θεῖναι οὐ κακόν.

- [47] | **Παραβολή** (Aphth 20 H/ON [= 4,14 Rabe]). 18. Παραβολή ἐστὶν ἐξομοίωσις νοητοῦ πρὸς αἰσθητόν, οἷον «ὥς θαλάσσης κύματα, οὕτω νοδὸς διανοήματα.» 19. κατασκευάσεις δὲ ἐκ παραβολῆς, ὅταν ἐξ ἀλόγων ζώων λάβῃς ὥσπερ εἰκόνα τινὰ ἀκόλουθον τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις,

the opposite point of view is to that of the saying under consideration, as staying awake is the opposite of sleeping.<sup>48</sup> Therefore, you will say on the basis of the opposite: “The one who stays awake thinks about what is likely to happen; he always has his mind on affairs; he distinguishes what one ought and ought not to do and is a good judge of what is advantageous,” and so forth.<sup>49</sup> 17. Therefore, it is necessary to confirm the subject from the opposite point of view in order that we demonstrate not only that the subject itself is noble but also that its opposite is base. For this is the most effective support of a subject: whenever the opposite seems to be base. For many subjects are noble but have no opposite that is base. For example, to propose laws is noble, but not to propose them is not bad.

**Analogy** (Aphth 20 H/ON [= 4,14 Rabe]). 18. An analogy is the comparison of the mental to the perceptible—for example, “like the waves of the sea,”<sup>50</sup> so the thoughts of the mind.<sup>51</sup> 19. You will confirm by means of an analogy whenever you take

<sup>48</sup> That John illustrates the opposite in this way is because he already has in mind the *chreia* that was elaborated by Sopatros, namely: “Alexander, on seeing Diogenes asleep, said: ‘To sleep all night ill-suits a counselor’” (*Il.* 2.24).

<sup>49</sup> At this point John begins to quote from Sopatros’s elaboration of a *chreia* attributed to Alexander. After this quotation from Sopatros’s argument from the opposite, John will go on to include quotations from the remaining four *κεφάλαια* of Sopatros’s elaboration. For the identification of Sopatros’s elaboration embedded in John’s commentary and its reconstruction, see *Chreia* 2:106–12.

<sup>50</sup> This phrase comes from *Il.* 2.144–45, which reads in full: *κινήθη δ’ ἀγορὴ ὡς κύματα μακρὰ θαλάσσης, πόντου Ἰκαρίου* (“The assembly was moved like the huge waves of the Icarian sea”). Incidentally, this same passage, cited in full, illustrates the definition of a *παράβολή* in Tryphon, *On Tropes* 5 (8:750,9–13 Walz).

<sup>51</sup> This phrase seems to come from Aristophanes, *Nub.* 703–5: *ταχὺς δ’, ὅταν εἰς ἄπορον πέσης, ἐπ’ ἄλλο πῆδα νόημα φρενός* (“Quickly, whenever you fall into a difficulty, jump to another thought”). In any case, the former phrase illustrates the perceptible, the latter the mental. A similar definition of an analogy appears in George Choïroboskos, *On Figures* 21 (8:816,15–19 Walz): *Παράβολή ἐστι φράσις δι’ ὁμοίων καὶ γινωσκομένων ἐπ’ ὅψιν ἄγουσα τὸ νοούμενον, ὡς ἔχει ἡ τοῦ Κυρίου περὶ τοῦ ἀσώτου παράβολή, ἐν ᾗ δείκνυσι τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ φιλανθρωπίαν καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ πατρὸς ἀγαθότητα, καὶ πῶς προσίεται τοὺς μετανουῶντας* (“An analogy expresses what is thought and brings it before the eyes by means of what is similar and known, as the parable of the Lord does concerning the prodigal, in which he shows the *philanthropia* of God and the goodness of the prodigal’s father, and how he accepts those who repent”).

οἷον «ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ ὑπνώττοντα τῶν ζώων εὐάλωτα ὄντα πολλοῖς περιπίπτει κακοῖς, τὰ δὲ συνεχῶς ἐγρηγορότα διασώζει θᾶττον αὐτά, οὕτω καὶ οἱ πολλῶ κεχρημένοι τῷ ὕπνῳ μηδὲν τῶν δεόντων φροντίζοντες πολλοῖς κακοῖς περιπίπτουσι.»

**Παραδείγματι** (Aphth 21 H/ON [= 4,14 Rabe]). 20. Παράδειγμά ἐστι πρᾶγμα ὅμοιον ὡς ὁμοίῳ προσώπῳ [ἐμψύχῳ] παρατιθέμενον, ὡς ἀγνοουμένῳ γνώριμον, οἷον «βούλει τὰ τῆς ῥητορικῆς ἰδεῖν καλὰ; ὅρα πρὸς Δημοσθένην.»

21. Παραβολὴ δὲ παραδείγματος τούτοις διαφέρει, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐξ ἀορίστων λαμβάνεται, τὸ δὲ ἐξ ὠρισμένων· καὶ ἡ μὲν ἀπὸ ἀψύχων καὶ ἀπὸ ἀλόγων, οἷον «ὥσπερ γὰρ οἰκίας οἶμαι καὶ πλοίου. . .» καὶ

ὡς δ' ὅτε τις στατὸς ἵππος ἀκοστήσας ἐπὶ φάτνῃ,  
καὶ

one of the irrational creatures as an image that mirrors the subject under discussion. For example: “For just as drowsy creatures are susceptible, and so fall prey, to many evils, whereas those that are constantly alert more readily keep themselves safe, so also men who are accustomed to much sleep and do not worry about their responsibilities encounter many evils.”<sup>52</sup>

**Example** (Aphth 21 H/ON [= 4,14 Rabe]). 20. An example is a similar subject that is set alongside an individual, as a known to an unknown, as in: “Do you want to see the benefits of rhetoric? Look at Demosthenes.”<sup>53</sup>

21. An analogy differs from an example in these respects: (a) An analogy is made up of unnamed individuals, whereas an example uses named ones.<sup>54</sup> (b) An analogy deals with inanimate things or irrational creatures—for example, “For just as a house, I think, and a boat. . . .”<sup>55</sup>

Also:

As when a stalled horse, well fed at the manger,<sup>56</sup>

and

<sup>52</sup> This analogy comes from Sopatros’s elaboration (see *Chreia* 2:110–11).

<sup>53</sup> This example does not come from Sopatros’s elaboration. It may come from an otherwise unknown elaboration. In any case, this example sets a *πρῶσιμα* (“the benefits of rhetoric”) alongside a *πρόσωπον* (Demosthenes).

<sup>54</sup> The distinction here is that in an analogy the *πρόσωπα* (the implicit noun with *ἀορίστων*) are identified by their social role—e.g., farmers—whereas an example identifies its *πρόσωπα* with proper names—e.g., Demosthenes. See further Ronald F. Hock, “Romancing the Parables of Jesus,” *PRSt* 29 (2002): 11–37, esp. 12–15.

<sup>55</sup> Demosthenes 2.10. This differentiation appears much earlier in rhetorical treatises, most closely in Apsines 6.1 (166–69 Dिल्s-Kennedy), whose definition is almost identical and uses the same quotation from Demosthenes to illustrate an analogy from inanimate things and one of the same Homeric lines that follow (*Il.* 6.506). Rufus of Perinthus has a different definition but still includes the quotation from Demosthenes, though quoted in full (Rufus of Perinthus 32 [1.2:405,24–27 Spengel-Hammer]), and Minucianus likewise has the same quotation from Demosthenes (see Minucianus, *On Arguments* 2 [9:603,20–604,4 Walz]). Minucianus’s way of distinguishing an analogy from an example, while different, makes the distinction clearer. He says that examples are taken from history, whereas analogies are taken not from history but from events that continue to happen, whose individuals are not named.

<sup>56</sup> *Il.* 6.506. This line is thus an analogy taken from irrational creatures.

ὡς δ' ὅτ' ὄνος παρ' ἄρουραν ἰὼν ἐβιήσατο παῖδας νωθήs,

- [48] | 22. τὸ δὲ παραδείγμα ἀπὸ ἀνθρώπων μόνων ἢ θεῶν· καὶ ἡ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν γινομένων πολλάκις λαμβάνεται, τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν <ἄπαξ> γεγονότων. 23. παραδείγμα γάρ ἐστιν <ἀπόδειξις> διὰ τινος διηγήσεως ὁμοίας καὶ γνωρίμου τῷ ἀμφισβητουμένῳ καὶ ἀγνοουμένῳ πράγματι.

24. Μετὰ τὴν παραβολὴν δὲ τὸ παραδείγμα ἔταξεν· ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτὰ λοιπὸν ἤξεις τὰ παραδείγματα, οἷον «οὔτω Θεμιστοκλῆς ἀγρυπνῶν καὶ τὸν χρησμὸν ἐπελύσατο καὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα διέσωσεν, οὔτω καὶ Δημοσθένης ὕπνῳ μὴ κεχρημένος πολλῷ καὶ νυκτὸς τῆς τέχνης ἐπιμελόμενος ῥήτωρ γεγένηται ὁ μέχρι τοῦ παρόντος ἀοίδιμος» καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα.

**Μαρτυρίᾳ παλαιῶν** (Aphth 21 H/ON [= 4,15 Rabe]). 25. Μετὰ τὰ παραδείγματα λαμβάνεις ἐπιχείρημα ἄλλο τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων κρίσεως, ὡς ὅταν λέγῃς ὅτι «καὶ οὐ μόνον Ἀλέξανδρος τοῦτο ἐπὶ Διογένους ἔκρινεν»—εἰ τύχοι χρεῖαν τὴν «οὐ χρὴ παννύχιον εὔδειν βουληφόρον ἄνδρα» μελετᾶν—«ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν παλαιῶν, ὡς Πυθαγόρας ὁ Σάμιος ὕπνου φείδεσθαι συνεβούλευεν.» ἀξιοπιστοτέρα γὰρ ἔσται ἡ χρεῖα, ὅταν πολλοὶ εἰς τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ τοὺς λόγους συμφέρωνται, οἷον ὅτι καὶ ὁ δεῖνα ταῦτα τῇ χρεῖᾳ φησὶν.

26. Ἄλλ' ἴσως εἴποι τις ἂν «ταῖς πρακτικαῖς πῶς ἐπενεχθεῖν ἢ χρῆσις; λόγων γὰρ οὐκ ὄντων πῶς τοὺς ταῦτὸν εἰρηκότας παρὰ-

21 *Il.* 11.558–59 || 22 γινομένων scripsi; cf. John of Sardis, *Comm. in Aphth.* 4 (62,10–13 Rabe) || γεγονότων V W unde Rabe | 22 ἄπαξ addidi | 22 γεγονότων scripsi || γινομένων V W unde Rabe || 23 ἀπόδειξις addidit Rabe



As when an ass, on passing by a grain field,  
O'ercomes the boys, dull as he is.<sup>57</sup>

22. An example, however, deals with humans or deities only. (c) And an analogy uses events that occur frequently, whereas an example uses those that have occurred <once>. 23. For an example is a <proof> of an ambiguous or unknown event by means of a narrative about a similar but well-known event.

24. Aphthonius has placed his example heading after the analogy. For from there you will then come to the examples themselves. Thus: "Just as Themistocles, because he was alert, explained the oracle and saved Hellas, so also Demosthenes, because he was not accustomed to much sleep and practiced his rhetorical skills at night, became an orator who is famous down to the present time"<sup>58</sup> and so forth.

**Testimony of the ancients** (Aphth 21 H/ON [= 4, 15 Rabe]). 25. After the examples you use another argument, that of the opinion of others,<sup>59</sup> such as whenever you say: "And not only did Alexander make this judgment about Diogenes"—if perchance you should use this chreia as an exercise that (says):<sup>60</sup>

To sleep all night ill-suits a counselor

—"but so have many other ancient authorities, such as Pythagoras of Samos, who used to counsel, 'Sleep sparingly.'"<sup>61</sup> For a chreia will be more convincing whenever many people concur in their words on the same subject—for example, So and so makes the same point as does the chreia.

26. Now perhaps someone might say: "How can the opinion heading be applied to action chreiai? For, since there are no sayings in them, how can we cite those who have said the same thing?"

<sup>57</sup> *Il.* 11.558–59. These lines are likewise an analogy taken from irrational creatures.

<sup>58</sup> This example comes from Sopatros's elaboration of a chreia (see *Chreia* 2:110–11).

<sup>59</sup> John will use ἡ ἀφ' ἐτέρων κρίσις for Aphthonius's μαρτυρία παλαιῶν later in this chapter (see below, 5.29 and 6.35) and then again in the parallel section of his commentary on the maxim chapter (see *Comm. in Aphth.* 4 [62, 19–20 Rabe]). John seems to have preferred this phrase to Aphthonius's and may have taken it from Nicolaus (see Nicolaus 170–71 H/ON [= 24, 11 Felten]).

<sup>60</sup> *Il.* 2.24.

<sup>61</sup> This opinion comes from Sopatros's elaboration of a chreia (see *Chreia* 2:112 and n. 149).

[49] σχοιμεν;» | ἔστιν οὖν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς <χρεαίαις ἢ> χρῆ-  
σις ἀκολουθεῖ· δεῖ γὰρ ἐπιδεικνύναι, ὅτι καλὸν τὸ γεγενημένον καὶ ὅτι  
τὸν σκοπὸν τῆς πράξεως ἐγνωμολόγησεν ἕτερος, ὥς ἐπὶ τοῦ Διογέ-  
νους τοῦ τυπτήσαντος τὸν παιδαγωγὸν ἐροῦμεν, ὅτι καὶ Θουκυδίδης τοῖς  
πραχθεῖσιν ὁμολογεῖ <λέγων> «ὁ γὰρ δυνάμενος παῦσαι, περιορῶν δὲ  
ἀληθέστερον αὐτὸ δρᾶ» ἢ τὸ τοῦ Δημοσθένους «ὁ γὰρ τὸ σπέρμα πα-  
ρασχῶν οὗτος τῶν φύντων κακῶν αἴτιος,» καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ τοῦ Λάκωνος  
τοῦ δεῖξαντος τὸ δόρυ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ὥς ἐν τῷ δ' τῶν Φιλιππικῶν <Δη-  
μοσθένης λέγει «φύσει» δὲ ὑπάρχει τοῖς παροῦσι τὰ τῶν ἀπόντων καὶ  
τοῖς ἐθέλουσι πονεῖν καὶ κινδυνεύειν τὰ τῶν ἀμελούντων.»

Ἐπιλόγῃ βραχεῖ (Apth 21–22 H/ON [= 4,15 Rabe]). 27. Ἐπί-  
λογός ἐστι τὸ τελευταῖον τοῦ λόγου μέρος, ἐν ᾧ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐν τοῖς  
ἀγῶσιν ἔστι τοῖς βουλομένοις ἀνακεφαλαιοῦσθαι τὰ καίρια, ὥς ἂν ὁ  
ἀκροατῆς μεμνημένος αὐτῶν τὴν περὶ τοῦ πράγματος θεῖη καθὰ βουλό-  
μεθα ψῆφον. 28. ἐντεῦθεν ἐπίλογος ἀγορεύεται ὥς ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις  
λεγόμενος τοῦ λόγου μέρος.

29. Καλῶς δὲ πρὸς τὴν τῶν τελείων λόγων ἐργασίαν ἡμᾶς προεγυ-  
μνάσατο Ἀφθόνιος τὰ ἐκείνων μέρη ἐν τῇ χρείᾳ σκιαγραφήσας. 30. τῶν  
γὰρ τελείων λόγων μέρη ἐστι δ', προοίμιον, διήγησις, πίστις, ἐπίλο-  
γος. 31. τὴν μὲν οὖν τοῦ προοιμίου τάξιν ἐνταῦθα τὸ ἐγκώμιον ἐπέχει,  
ἀντὶ δὲ τῆς διηγήσεως ἢ τῆς χρείας ἐστὶ παράφρασις, ἢ δὲ πίστις ἐν  
[50] τοῖς λοιποῖς κεφαλαίοις θεωρεῖται· τῆς γὰρ πίστεως διπλῆς | οὔσης, τῆς  
μὲν ἐντέχνου, τῆς δὲ ἀτέχνου, τῆς μὲν ἐντέχνου δι' ἐνθυμημάτων καὶ  
συλλογισμῶν οὔσης, τῆς δὲ ἀτέχνου τυγχανούσης, ἥτις διὰ μαρτυριῶν  
συνέστηκεν, ἀμφοῖν τούτοις μετέχει τὰ κεφάλαια τῆς χρείας· ἢ μὲν γὰρ

26 χρεαίαις ἢ addidit Rabe; cf. Doxapates 7.43 || 26 λέγων addidit  
Rabe; cf. Doxapates 7.44 | 26 Thucydides 1.69.1 || 26 Demosthenes  
18.159 || 26 Δημοσθένης λέγει φύσει addidit Rabe || 26 Demosthenes 4.5

Well, it is possible to say that <the> opinion heading is also appropriate for action <chreiai>. For it is necessary to show that what was done is noble and that someone else has expressed the intent of the action in words. For example, in the case of Diogenes, who struck the paedagogus,<sup>62</sup> we will say: Thucydides also agrees with what was done, <when he said>: “For the one who is able to stop something but allows it to occur does it in a truer sense.”<sup>63</sup> Or the saying of Demosthenes: “For the one who provides the seed is the cause of the crop of evil.”<sup>64</sup> Again, in the case of the Laconian who brandished his spear<sup>65</sup> it is possible to say: In the fourth of his speeches against Philip, <Demosthenes says: “By nature> the property of those who are absent belongs to those who are present, and the property of those who are negligent belongs to those who are willing to toil and take risks.”<sup>66</sup>

**Short epilogue** (Aphth 21–22 H/ON [= 4, 15 Rabe]). 27. The epilogue is the last part of a speech, where it is possible, for those who wish, to recapitulate the main points of what was said in the argumentative headings, so that the hearer, by remembering them, can cast his vote on the issue as we want him to. 28. Hence it is called the “epilogue” because it is spoken after [ἐπὶ] all the other parts of a speech [λόγος].

29. And so Aphthonius has prepared us well for the composition of complete speeches by foreshadowing their parts in the chreia elaboration. 30. For the parts of complete speeches are four: introduction, statement of the case, proof, and epilogue. 31. Accordingly, the encomium here occupies the position of the introduction; instead of the statement of the case there is the paraphrase of the chreia; and the proof is seen in the remaining headings. Indeed, since the proof is twofold—the invented and the uninvented, the former being made up of enthymemes and syllogisms and the latter being put together from testimonies—the headings of the elaboration contain both kinds of proof. For the

<sup>62</sup> John is referring to this chreia: Diogenes, on seeing a youth misbehaving, struck his paedagogus; see further *Chreia* 1:315–16.

<sup>63</sup> Thucydides 1.69.1.

<sup>64</sup> Demosthenes 18.159.

<sup>65</sup> John is referring to this chreia: when someone asked a Laconian where the Lacedaimonians consider the boundaries of their land to be, brandished his spear; see further *Chreia* 1:328–29.

<sup>66</sup> Demosthenes 4.5.

αἰτία καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον καὶ <ἡ παραβολὴ καὶ> τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς ἐντέχνου πίστεώς ἐστι μέρη, ἡ δὲ κρίσις ἡγουν ἡ τῶν παλαιῶν μαρτυρία τῆς ἀτέχνου· τύπον γὰρ ἐπέχει μαρτυρίας ἡ ἀφ' ἐτέρων κρίσις. 32. ἡ μέντοι παράκλησις ὥσπερ ἐπίλογός ἐστιν, ὅς ὥσπερ τι συμπέρασμα τῆς κατασκευῆς ἐπάγεται ἀνατρέχων πρὸς τὸν ὅλον αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου σκοπόν, οἷον «καλῶς ἄρα τὸ ἔπος ἡ τόνδε τὸν λόγον Ἀλέξανδρος πρὸς Διογένην ἐφθέγγετο.»

33. Ταῦτα δὲ τὰ μέρη τοῦ πολιτικοῦ λόγου φασὶν εὐρέσθαι τὸν Κόρακα, ὧν ἡ γνώσις ὕστερον προσηγορεύθη ῥητορική· χρῆζομεν γὰρ ἐν τῷ πολιτικῷ <λόγῳ> προοιμίων μὲν πρὸς τὸ προσεχέστερους ποῦν-σαι τοὺς ἀκροατάς, διηγῆσεων δὲ πρὸς τὸ διδάξαι τὸ πρᾶγμα, τῶν δὲ πίστεων πρὸς τὸ κατασκευάσαι ἢ ἀνασκευάσαι τὸ προκείμενον, τῶν δὲ ἐπιλόγων πρὸς τὸ ἐπιρρῶσαι τὸν ἀκούοντα.

#### <§6. ΠΑΡΑΔΕΙΓΜΑ>

**Χρεία λογική· Ἰσοκράτης τῆς παιδείας τὴν μὲν ρίζαν ἔφη πικράν, τοὺς δὲ καρποὺς γλυκεῖς** (Aphth 23–25 H/ON [= 4,16–17 Rabe]).

- [51] 1. Τῇ χρεῖᾳ παράκειται γνώμη καὶ ἀπομνημόνευμα· μὴ ἔχουσα γὰρ ἡ λογικὴ χρεία τὸ πρόσωπον γνώμην ποιεῖ, μηχανομένη δὲ καὶ μακρότερον ἔχουσα λόγον ἀπομνημόνευμα γίνεται, ὡς τὰ Ξενοφώντος «Ἀπομνημονεύματα.» 2. τῶν δὲ | χρεῶν τῶν μὲν χρησίμου ἕνεκα παραλαμβανομένων, τῶν δὲ χαριεντισμοῦ, ὡς τὸ Δάμων ὁ παιδοτρίβης στρεβλοὺς ἔχων τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰ ὑποδήματα ἐν τῷ βαλανείῳ ἀπολέσας

rationale, opposite, <analogy,> and example are invented proofs, whereas the opinion, or the testimony of the ancients, is an un-invented proof, for the judgment of others amounts to a type of testimony. 32. Of course, the exhortation<sup>67</sup> is like an epilogue that is introduced as a summary of the confirmation and refers back to the full intent of the saying itself. For example: “Properly, therefore, has Alexander quoted this verse or saying to Diogenes.”<sup>68</sup>

33. Corax, it is said, invented the parts of the public speech, and the knowledge of them was later given the name “rhetoric.”<sup>69</sup> For in the public <speech> we need introductions to render the audience more attentive, statements of the case to explain the case, proofs to confirm or refute the matter at hand, and epilogues to strengthen the resolve of the audience.

#### <§6. MODEL EXERCISE>

**A sayings chreia: Isocrates said that the root of education is bitter, but its fruits are sweet** (Aphth 23–25 H/ON [= 4,16–17 Rabe]).<sup>70</sup> 1. The maxim and reminiscence are related to the chreia. For, a saying chreia, when it has no attribution, turns into a maxim, and it becomes a reminiscence when it is lengthened and contains a longer saying, as in the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon.<sup>71</sup> 2. Since some chreiai are handed on because of their usefulness and others because of their wit, as: Damon the gym teacher who was crippled in his feet and who had lost his sandals in the bath

<sup>67</sup> Once again John prefers other terminology to Aphthonius’s by using Hermogenes’s term for the last heading of an elaboration, *παράκλησις* (see Hermogenes 60 H/ON [= 8,12 Rabe]).

<sup>68</sup> This exhortation comes from Sopatros’s elaboration (see *Chreia* 2:111–12).

<sup>69</sup> Corax of Syracuse is the traditional founder of the art of rhetoric in the fifth century B.C., on which see *PS* 25,11–26,8 [Rabe]); George Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 58–61; and Thomas Cole, “Who Was Corax?” *ICS* 16 (1991): 65–84.

<sup>70</sup> On this chreia, see further *Chreia* 1:325–26.

<sup>71</sup> Before turning to the chreia and its elaboration, John has slipped in a brief discussion of *διαφορά*, or the difference between the chreia and related forms, the maxim and reminiscence. John will discuss the *διαφορά*, at least for the chreia and maxim, more fully later, when Aphthonius himself did, i.e., in the chapter on the maxim (see Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 4 [8,7–10 Rabe] and John of Sardis, *Comm. in Aphth.* 4 [62,23–63,16 Rabe]).

ἤρχετο ταῦτα τοῖς ποσὶ τοῦ κλέψαντος ἀρμόσαι, ἢ προκειμένη χρεία τοῦ χρησίμου ἔνεκα παρελήφθη· συμβάλλεται γὰρ πρὸς τὸ δεῖν καρτερεῖν τὰ δυσχερῆ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὴν μετὰ ταῦτα.

**Θαυμάσαι δίκαιον Ἰσοκράτην τῆς τέχνης** (Aphth 26 H/ON [= 4,18 Rabe]). 3. Ἀντὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἢ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἔνεκα τῆς τέχνης. 4. ἔστι δὲ ἡ σύνταξις Ἀττική.

**Ὅς ὄνομα αὐτῇ** (Aphth 27 H/ON [= 4,18 Rabe]). 5. Ἀντὶ τοῦ αὐτῆς, τῆς τέχνης· Ἀττικὸν καὶ τοῦτο. 6. ἢ ἐν αὐτῇ, τῇ τέχνῃ.

**Καὶ ὅση τις ἦν, ἀσκῶν ἐπεδείξατο** (Aphth 27–28 H/ON [= 4,19–20 Rabe]). 7. Ὅση κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος· ἢ ἀντὶ τοῦ οἴα, πηλικότης ἀντὶ ποιότητος. 8. ἀσκῶν δὲ σπουδάζων.

**Καὶ κηρύττει τὴν τέχνην, οὐκ αὐτὸς ἐκ ταύτης κεκήρυκται** (Aphth 28–29 H/ON [= 4,20–5,1 Rabe]). 9. Κηρύττει· μεγαλύνει, δοξάζει. 10. θαυμασιῶς δὲ ἀντέστρεψεν, ὥς οὐχ ἡ τέχνη τοῦτον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον αὐτὸς τὴν τέχνην ἐσέμνυνε. 11. τὸν ἔπαινον δὲ τοῦ Ἰσοκράτους ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἐποίησατο τῆς τοῦ προσώπου ποιότητος· ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐν τάξει προοιμίου λαμβάνεται [καὶ παραδέδοται] τὸ ἐγκώμιον καὶ δεῖ τοῖς προοιμίοις ἰδιάζοντα ἐνθυμήματα προτίθεσθαι τὰ μόνῃ τῇ παρούσῃ ὑποθέσει ἀρμόζοντα, καὶ οὗτος τῷ προσήκοντι ἐπαίνῳ ἐχρήσατο, τῇ ποιότητι τοῦ περὶ τὴν προκειμένην χρείαν προσώπου ἀρμόζον ἐνθύμημα παραλαβών.

[52] | **Ὅσα μὲν τοίνυν ἢ βασιλεῦσι νομοθετῶν ἢ παραινῶν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον** (Aphth 29–31 H/ON [= 5,1–2 Rabe]). 12. Σκῆμα τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ κατὰ παράλειψιν. 13. παραινετικούς δὲ ἔγραψεν Ἰσοκράτης «Πρὸς Δημόνικον» καὶ «Νικοκλέα.»

**Ὁ παιδείας ἐρῶν πόνων μὲν ἄρχεται, πόνων δὲ ὅμως** (Aphth 34–35 H/ON [= 5,5–6 Rabe]). 14. Ἀπὸ τοῦ καθόλου ἐπαίνου ἐπὶ τὴν

prayed that they might fit the feet of the thief,<sup>72</sup> the chreia cited above has clearly been handed on because of its usefulness, for it stresses the need to endure difficulties for the sake of the pleasures that come after them.

**It is right to admire Isocrates for his discipline** (Aphth 26 H/ON [= 4,18 Rabe]). 3. ("Discipline" in the genitive [τέχνης] is used) in the sense of "regarding his discipline" or in the sense of "because of his discipline." 4. The syntax, however, is Attic.

**Who (appeared) as its (most illustrious) name** (Aphth 27 H/ON [= 4,18 Rabe]). 5. ("Its" in the dative [αὐτῇ] is used) either in the sense of (the genitive [αὐτῆς]) "its," that is, the discipline's, and this too is Attic. 6. Or in the sense of "through it," that is, through the discipline.

**And how great his name was he showed by his practice** (Aphth 27–28 H/ON [= 4,19–20 Rabe]). 7. "How great" in magnitude; or in the sense of "what sort," magnitude in the sense of quality. 8. "By his practice": by his earnest pursuit.

**And so he is a herald for the art of rhetoric; he himself has not been heralded by it** (Aphth 28–29 H/ON [= 4,20–5,1 Rabe]). 9. "He is a herald": He magnifies it, he glorifies it. 10. Aphthonius has marvelously inverted the thought, so that it was not the discipline of rhetoric that was exalting him, but rather he the discipline. 11. Aphthonius has created this praise of Isocrates on the basis of the qualities of this individual. For since this encomium is used in the place of an introduction, and since it is necessary in introductions to set forth individualized enthymemes that fit only the present subject, Aphthonius has made use of the appropriate praise by taking up an enthymeme that fits the quality of the individual in the chreia under consideration.

**How often, moreover, either as a lawgiver to kings or as adviser to individuals** (Aphth 29–31 H/ON [= 5,1–2 Rabe]). 12. The figure of speech used here is "pretended omission." 13. Isocrates wrote advisory treatises *To Demonicus* and *Nicocles*.<sup>73</sup>

**The lover of education begins with toil but toil that nevertheless...** (Aphth 34–35 H/ON [= 5,5–6 Rabe]). 14. From this

<sup>72</sup> On this chreia, see further *Chreia* 1:310.

<sup>73</sup> These treatises presumably are selected so that *To Demonicus* represents advice for an individual and *Nicocles* advice for a king.

προκειμένην ἤλθε χρεῖαν παραφράσει εὐθὺς χρησάμενος, ἵνα δόξη κατ' ἀκολουθίαν εἰσάγεσθαι ἢ παράφρασις καὶ πανταχόθεν βεβαιῶται τὸ οἰκεῖον εἶναι τὸν ἔπαινον τῆς παρούσης ὑποθέσεως. 15. ὁμοίαν δὲ ταύτης εἶπε τῆς χρεῖας καὶ ἑτέραν ὁ αὐτὸς Ἰσοκράτης «ἐν ἅπασιν δὲ τοῖς πράγμασιν οὐχ οὕτω τῆς ἀρχῆς τῶν ἔργων μνημονεύομεν ὥς τῆς τελευτῆς τὴν αἴσθησιν λαμβάνομεν.»

**Οἱ γὰρ παιδείας ἐρῶντες τοῖς τῆς παιδείας ἡγεμόσι συνεξετάζονται** (Aphth 38–39 H/ON [= 5,8–9 Rabe]). 16. Ἀντὶ τοῦ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐγγυμνάζονται· δι' αὐτῶν γὰρ εἰς διόρθωσιν καὶ διάγνωσιν ἔρχονται.

17. Ἐκ τῆς αἰτίας ἢ κατασκευῇ, τοῦτο δὲ τὸ κεφάλαιον ἐξετάζεται ἔκ τε τῶν καθόλου καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τῷ πράγματι, ἐφ' ᾧ ἡ χρεῖα. 18. εἰκὸς δὲ τοῦτο ὠνόμασαν ἕτεροι, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸ διὰ τῶν ἐνθυμηματικῶν ἀποδείξεων τῶν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος λαμβάνεται· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ταῖς ἐνθυμηματικαῖς ἀποδείξεσι χρώμενον τὴν δι' αὐτῶν τῶν συμβαινόντων περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ δυσχερῶν καὶ καλῶν ἐξέτασιν ποιήσασθαι καὶ εἰπεῖν, πόσα μὲν ἂν εἴη τὰ λυποῦντα περὶ τὴν ἄσκησιν, πόσα δὲ τὰ ἐκβαίνοντα μετὰ ταῦτα ἀγαθά.

[53] | **Καὶ παροῦσι καὶ μέλλουσι** (Aphth 42 H/ON [= 5,11 Rabe]).

19. Τὸ μέλλουσιν ἀντὶ τοῦ βραδύνουσιν ἢ ἀναβάλλουσιν ἢ ἀναδυόμενοις, ὑπερτιθεμένοις.

**Αἰκίζόμενοι δέ** (Aphth 43 H/ON [= 5,12 Rabe]). 20. Ἀντὶ τοῦ αἰκίζοντες, παθητικὸν ἀντὶ ἐνεργητικοῦ.

**Φθάνει τὴν πείραν τὸ δέος** (Aphth 44 H/ON [= 5,13 Rabe]).

21. Ὁ φόβος, φησί, τὴν κόλασιν προλαμβάνει.

**Μετέρχονται** (Aphth 46 H/ON [= 5,15 Rabe]). 22. Ἀντὶ τοῦ τιμωροῦσι, διεξετάζουσιν, ἐρευνῶσι καὶ κρίνουσιν οἱ παιδαγωγοί.

**Οἰκεῖα δὲ τὰ κατορθώματα** (Aphth 46–47 H/ON [= 5,15 Rabe]). 23. Λεῖπει τὸ ὥς, ἔν' ἢ ὥς οἰκεῖα.

Ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου· εἰ δέ τις ταῦτα φοβούμενος φύγη μὲν τοὺς διδασκάλους (Aphth 53–54 H/ON [= 5,21–22 Rabe]). 24. Τὸ φύγη καὶ

15 Isocrates, *Orat.* 1.47 || 15 πράγμασιν V W unde Rabe || ἔργοις Isocrates || 15 τῶν ἔργων V W unde Rabe || deest Isocrates || 18 ἂν εἴη scripsit Rabe || ἀνάγκη V || ἀναγκαῖον W



general praise (of Isocrates), Aphthonius comes to the chreia under consideration by turning immediately to the paraphrase, in order that the paraphrase might seem to be introduced in its correct sequence and that the praise of the present subject might be confirmed as proper in every respect. 15. Isocrates has uttered another chreia that is similar to this one: "In all things we do not so much remember the beginning of our tasks as we derive our perception of them after their completion."<sup>74</sup>

**For lovers of education are reckoned among the leaders of education** (Aphth 38–39 H/ON [= 5,8–9 Rabe]). 16. In the sense of "they are being trained for virtue." For through their leaders they attain upright behavior and discernment.

17. Confirmation by means of a rationale. This heading is investigated on the basis of both general considerations and those pertaining to the subject of the chreia. 18. Others have named this heading "the probable," since it, too, uses enthymemic proofs that derive from the subject itself. It is necessary for one using enthymemic proofs to investigate the subject in terms of the circumstances themselves, both those that are difficult and those that are noble, and to say how great the pains in the training would be and how great the blessings would be that come after them.

**Both when they are present (at school) and when they hesitate (to go there)** (Aphth 42 H/ON [= 5,11 Rabe]). 19. (The verb μέλλουσι is used) in the sense of "they loiter, procrastinate, hesitate, put off."

**Inflicting punishment** (Aphth 43 H/ON [= 5,12 Rabe]). 20. In the sense of "inflicting punishment," the middle/passive is used as the active.

**Apprehension precedes the endeavor** (Aphth 44 H/ON [= 5,13 Rabe]). 21. Fear, he is saying, comes before the punishment.

**They assail** (Aphth 46 H/ON [= 5,15 Rabe]). 22. In the sense of "the paedagogi punish, examine, monitor, and evaluate."

**Achievements to be expected** (Aphth 46–47 H/ON [= 5,15 Rabe]). 23. He leaves out the word "as," so that it should read "as expected."

From the opposite: **But if anyone in fear of these hardships avoids his teachers ...** (Aphth 53–54 H/ON [= 5,21–22 Rabe]).

<sup>74</sup> Isocrates, *Orat.* 1.47.

ἀποδράσει καὶ ἀποστραφείη ταῦτόν ἐστι, διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ταυτολογῆσαι ἐχρήσατο τῷ τῆς χορηγίας σχήματι.

25. Ἡ δὲ κατασκευὴ αὕτη ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου. 26. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ θεώρημα καὶ Δημοσθένης ἐν τῷ Κατὰ Ἀριστογείτονος δευτέρῳ ἐπισημαίνεται λέγων «οὕτω δ' ἂν ἄριστα συνθεωρήσετε τὸ τοῖς κειμένοις πείθεσθαι ἡλίκον ἀγαθόν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ καταφρονεῖν καὶ μὴ πειθαρχεῖν αὐτοῖς ἡλίκον κακόν, εἰ τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἀγαθὰ χωρὶς καὶ τὰ διὰ τῆς παρανομίας συμβαίνοντα πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ποιησάμενοι θεωρήσετε.»

**Καὶ μετὰ τοῦ δέους τὸν λόγον ἀφήρηται** (Aphth 56–57 H/ON [= 5,23–24 Rabe]). 27. Ἀφαιρούμενος γὰρ τοῦ φόβου ἀφαιρεῖται καὶ τοῦ λόγου.

[54] | **Ὡς γὰρ οἱ τὴν γῆν ἐργαζόμενοι** (Aphth 59 H/ON [= 6,3 Rabe]). 28. Ἐκ παραβολῆς ἡ ἐργασία· δεῖ γὰρ προστιθέναι ταῖς ἐνθυμηματικαῖς ἀποδείξεσιν ὡς μέρος ὃν τοῦ εἰκότος καὶ τὸ ἐκ παραβολῆς κεφάλαιον ὀνομαζόμενον.

**Πόνῳ μὲν τῇ γῇ τὰ σπέρματα καταβάλλουσι** (Aphth 59–60 H/ON [= 6,3–4 Rabe]). 29. Τὸ καταβάλλουσιν ἀντὶ τοῦ παρέχουσι.

**Ἀντιποιοῦμενοι** (Aphth 62 H/ON [= 6,5–6 Rabe]). 30. Ἐπιμελούμενοι.

**Τὸν Δημοσθένους ὄρα μοι βίον** (Aphth 64 H/ON [= 6,7 Rabe]). 31. Συνῆψε τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ παραδείγματος ἐπιχείρημα. 32. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ ῥητορικὸς λόγος πιστοῦται καὶ κατασκευάζεται ἐξ ἐνθυμήματος καὶ παραδείγματος, ἰστέον ὡς ἐνθυμήματα μὲν εἰσιν οἱ λογισμοὶ ἥτοι τὰ ἐπιχειρήματα, παραδείγματα δὲ τὰ παρατιθέμενα ὅμοια πράγματα πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ προκειμένου. 33. εἰκότως οὖν καὶ ἐν τῇ τῆς χρείας κατασκευῇ ἐχόντων ἡμῶν ἀποδεῖξαι, ὡς ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ ῥηθὲν ἢ καλῶς γέγονε τὸ πραχθέν, ἐκ τῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων καὶ τῶν παραδειγμάτων τὸ προκείμενον ἀποδείκνυμεν.

26 Demosthenes 26.25 || 28 τοῦ εἰκότος scripsit Rabe; cf. Nicolaus 174 H/ON (= 24,14 Felten) || τῶν εἰρημένων V W || 32 post ἐπειδὴ scripsit δὲ Rabe || γὰρ V W

24. The verbs “he avoids,” “he runs away,” and “he turns away”<sup>75</sup> have the same meaning, but because he did not want to repeat what he was saying, Aphthonius used the figure variation.<sup>76</sup>

25. This is confirmation from the opposite. 26. Demosthenes also observes this rule in his second speech *Against Aristogeiton*, when he says: “Thus you would best observe how great is the blessing of obeying the established <laws> and how great is the evil of despising and disobeying them, if you will hold before your very eyes and examine separately the blessings that come from the laws and the consequences that come through their transgression.”<sup>77</sup>

**And in ridding himself of his apprehension he also rids himself of their guidance** (Aphth 56–57 H/ON [= 5,23–24 Rabe]). 27. For, although the apprehension (toward paedagogi) has been removed, he has also denied himself of their guidance.

**For just as those who till the land . . .** (Aphth 59 H/ON [= 6,3 Rabe]). 28. Elaboration by means of an analogy. For one must add an analogy to the enthymemic proofs since it is part of the probable and the heading is called “from analogy.”

**They sow the seed in the land with toil** (Aphth 59–60 H/ON [= 6,3–4 Rabe]). 29. “They sow” in the sense of “they provide.”

**Pursuing** (Aphth 62 H/ON [= 6,5–6 Rabe]). 30. Cultivating.

**Consider, if you will, the life of Demosthenes** (Aphth 64 H/ON [= 6,7 Rabe]). 31. Aphthonius has attached an argument using an example. 32. Since rhetorical speech is credible and is confirmed by means of enthymeme and example, one should realize that enthymemes are reasons or arguments, whereas examples are events that are similar and that are used to prove the matter at hand. 33. Therefore, since in the confirmation of the chreia we are able to prove that what was said is true or what was done is noble, we reasonably prove the subject at hand by means of arguments and examples.

<sup>75</sup> Aphth 55 (= 5,23–24 Rabe). The latter two verbs are not included in the lemma but are in the next two clauses of this sentence and are required for John’s comment to make sense (see Aphthonius 53–55 H/ON [= 5,22–24 Rabe]).

<sup>76</sup> For this figure, see Hermogenes, *On Method* 4 (416,21–417,4 Rabe), a text that Doxapatres will later cite for this very passage (see Doxapatres 7.34).

<sup>77</sup> Demosthenes 26.25.

**Καὶ τοσοῦτον αὐτῷ τῆς σπουδῆς περιῆν, ὥς καὶ τὸν κόσμον πε-**  
**ραιοῖσθαι τῆς κεφαλῆς** (Aphth 66–68 H/ON [= 6,9–10 Rabe]).

34. [Ἐκ] τῆς ἀπάντων, φησί, σπουδῆς τοσοῦτον αὐτῷ περιῆν ἢ σπουδῇ, ὥς καὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ παρέχειν πράγματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τε τὸν αὐτῆς κόσμον ἢ παραλογίζεσθαι καὶ εἰς οὐδὲν ἡγεῖσθαι.

[55] | **Καὶ πόνοις ἠνάλωσεν, ἃ καὶ πρὸς ἡδονὰς ἀναλίσκουσιν ἕτεροι**  
(Aphth 69–70 H/ON [= 6,11–12 Rabe]). 35. Ἡ τὸν πλοῦτον αὐτοῦ λέγει, ὃν εἰς τὰ βιβλία ἐκένωσεν, ἢ τὸ ἐκδαπανώμενον ἔλαιον περὶ τὰ λυχνία.

**Διὸ θαυμάσαι τὸν Ἡσίοδον δεῖ τραχεῖαν εἰπόντα τῆς ἀρετῆς**  
**τὴν ὁδόν** (Aphth 71–72 H/ON [= 6,13–14 Rabe]). 36. Μετὰ τὸ πα-  
ράδειγμα ἐπιχείρημα ἔλαβεν ἄλλο τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ἐτέρων κρίσεως, ἀπὸ  
τοῦ ποιητοῦ δὲ τοῦ γνωριμωτέρου τοῖς νέοις παρέθηκε τὴν μαρτυρίαν·  
Ἡσιόδου γὰρ ἐν Ἑργοῖς καὶ Ἡμέραις ταῦτα τὰ ἔπη.

**Πρὸς ἃ δεῖ βλέποντας Ἰσοκράτην θαυμάζειν** (Aphth 77–78  
H/ON [= 6,18 Rabe]). 37. Ὅπερ εἶπεν ἐν τῇ διαιρέσει, ὅτι ἐπὶ τε-

**Indeed, his life so excelled in zeal that he even removed the adornment from his head** (Aphth 66–68 H/ON [= 6,9–10 Rabe]). 34. Aphthonius is saying that Demosthenes’s zeal so excelled everybody else’s that he took it out on his head and removed its adornment<sup>78</sup> or that he ignored<sup>79</sup> this adornment and counted it as nothing.

**And so he spent on toil what others spend on pleasures** (Aphth 69–70 H/ON [= 6,11–12 Rabe]). 35. Aphthonius means either the wealth that Demosthenes spent on books or the oil that was consumed by his lamps.<sup>80</sup>

**Therefore, one must admire Hesiod for saying that the road to virtue is rough** (Aphth 71–72 H/ON [= 6,13–14 Rabe]). 36. After the example, Aphthonius has used another argument, that from the opinion of others.<sup>81</sup> He has provided a testimony from a poet who is quite familiar to young men. For these lines are from Hesiod’s *Works and Days*.<sup>82</sup>

**When these points are considered, we must admire Isocrates** (Aphth 77–78 H/ON [= 6,18 Rabe]). 37. What Aphthonius

<sup>78</sup> Removing his adornment refers to Demosthenes’s practice of shaving his head before entering an underground chamber in order to prepare a speech, the time needed to prepare it being the time needed to regrow his hair (see Plutarch, *Demosth.* 849B–C; cf. also Quintilian 10.3.25; ps.-Plutarch, *Vit. dec. orat.* 844D; and ps.-Lucian, *Dem. enc.* 14).

<sup>79</sup> The verb *παρὰλογίζεσθαι*, rendered here as “ignored,” is troublesome. Its basic meaning is “reason falsely,” which would be a surprising criticism of “the orator,” but the meaning, taking the prepositional prefix *παρά* as “to the side,” to “leave out of reckoning” and hence “ignore” is found in late Greek (see Lampe s.v. *παρὰλογίζομαι*). I am thankful to Craig Gibson for his advice on the syntax of this sentence and for the reference to Lampe’s treatment of *παρὰλογίζομαι*.

<sup>80</sup> A chreia attributed to Demosthenes favors the latter option: Demosthenes, on being asked how he had become an orator, said: “By spending more on oil than on wine” (see Stobaeus 3.29.90 [655 Hense]; cf. ps.-Plutarch, *Vit. dec. orat.* 848C; Aelian, *V.H.* 7.7b; ps.-Lucian, *Dem. enc.* 15; and *Chreia* 1:311).

<sup>81</sup> John earlier glossed Aphthonius’s *μαρτυρία παλαιῶν* as *ἡ ἀφ’ ἐτέρων κρίσις* (see 5.23).

<sup>82</sup> See *WD* 287–91. On young men’s familiarity with Hesiod from their schooling, see, e.g., Lucian, *Men.* 3; *Hes.* 1; and, more generally, Raffaella Cribiore, *Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 197–98.

λευτῇ βραχεῖ τινι ἐπιλόγῳ δεῖ χρῆσθαι συμπληροῦντι τὸν λόγον, τοῦτο ἐποίησε νῦν, ὥσπερ τι συμπέρασμα τῆς κατασκευῆς ἐπαγαγὼν τὸν λόγον συντελοῦντα πρὸς τὸν ὅλον αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου σκοπόν.

had said in his division<sup>83</sup>—that at the end one must use a short epilogue, which finishes the essay—this he has done now by bringing in a statement that, like a conclusion to the confirmation, contributes to the overall aim of Isocrates's saying.

<sup>83</sup> John is referring back to Aphthonius's list of the eight headings that comprise an elaboration and specifically to the last item in the list (see Aphthonius 21–22 H/ON [= 6,18 Rabe]). He did not use the word *διάρσεις* there, but John uses it for him here in the sense of the division of the whole into its parts.





# Text 2. The P-Scholia

## Commentary on Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata*

Chapter 3: On the Chreia  
(2:585,3–591,31 Walz)

### Introduction

#### PREVIOUS SCHOLARSHIP

Christian Walz's second volume of his *Rhetores Graeci*, published in 1835, contains commentaries on Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata*. One anonymous commentary, preserved in several, mostly late, manuscripts, bears the title Σχόλια εἰς τὰ τοῦ Ἀφθονίου Προγυμνάσματα, or *Scholia on the Progymnasmata of Aphthonius*.<sup>1</sup> Not long after the publication of the scholia, Eberhard Finckh saw their significance for recovering the fifth-century Nicolaus of Myra's *Progymnasmata*, which is mentioned by the Suda.<sup>2</sup> Finckh made the discovery with a perceptive observation involving John Doxapatres's discussion of the differences between a διήγημα and a διήγησις: a διήγησις is the narration of events that have actually happened, whereas a διήγημα narrates events that could have happened.<sup>3</sup> As sources for this διαφορά, or difference, between these terms Doxapatres cites Nicolaus as well as an unnamed commentator on Aphthonius.<sup>4</sup> Finckh noted that what was attributed to

<sup>1</sup> Christian Walz, ed., *Rhetores Graeci* (9 vols.; Tübingen: Cottae, 1832–1836), 2:1–68 and 565–684.

<sup>2</sup> See Suda 3:469, which says in part Νικόλαος ... ἔγραψε προγυμνάσματα, and Finckh's *praefatio* in Leonard Spengel, ed., *Rhetores Graeci* (3 vols.; Teubner, 1853–1856), 3.xxv.

<sup>3</sup> See Doxapatres 2:198,17–199,3 (Walz).

<sup>4</sup> Doxapatres 2:199,1–3 (Walz).

Nicolaus was precisely what was said in the anonymous scholia.<sup>5</sup> Finckh found other places in Doxapatres's commentary that mention Nicolaus as his source and match the scholia,<sup>6</sup> and he came to realize that embedded in the anonymous scholia was the whole of Nicolaus's otherwise lost *Progymnasmata*. Finckh then used the scholia to reconstruct the whole of Nicolaus's *Progymnasmata* and, in 1856, published his results in the third volume of Leonard Spengel's *Rhetores Graeci*.<sup>7</sup>

Further progress in reconstructing Nicolaus's *Progymnasmata* came at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth. In 1895 Heinrich Graeven reported the discovery of a fifteenth-century manuscript in the British Museum, Brit. Mus. addit. 11889, which contains the text of the *Progymnasmata* itself, or at least much of it,<sup>8</sup> copied there as commentary on Aphthonius's standard *Progymnasmata*.<sup>9</sup> This manuscript confirmed Finckh's use of the anonymous scholia in reconstructing Nicolaus's text, but it also made the scholia themselves less important, since Joseph Felten used the British Museum manuscript as the basis of his critical text of Nicolaus, published in 1913, in the Teubner *Rhetores Graeci* series.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Doxapatres 2:198,30–199,1 (Walz) = Anon. Schol. 2:578,15–17 (Walz).

<sup>6</sup> See, e.g., Doxapatres 2:539,14–18 (Walz), which cites Nicolaus and gives his definition of a thesis, a definition that matches that of the anonymous scholia (2:657,22–24 Walz), and Doxapatres 2:548,14–17 (Walz), which differentiates a celebratory thesis from an encomium, and again mentions Nicolaus and follows with analysis that matches that in the anonymous scholia (2:658,12–15 Walz).

<sup>7</sup> Spengel, ed., *Rhetores Graeci*, 3:449–98.

<sup>8</sup> The manuscript breaks off toward the end of the chapter on encomium and invective.

<sup>9</sup> Heinrich Graeven, "Die Progymnasmata des Nicolaus," *Hermes* 30 (1895): 471–73. Graeven (472) describes this manuscript as subordinating Nicolaus's *Progymnasmata* to Aphthonius's. Except for Nicolaus's introductory chapter (for which Aphthonius has no equivalent), the copyist placed Aphthonius's text in large letters in inner columns and wrote Nicolaus's in smaller letters on the outside or wherever they could fit, a practice Graeven had noted in other commentaries (see "Ein Fragment des Lachares," *Hermes* 30 [1895]: 289–313, esp. 290).

<sup>10</sup> Joseph Felten, ed., *Nicolai Progymnasmata* (*Rhetores Graeci* 11; Leipzig: Teubner, 1913). Hugo Rabe had already edited and published the introductory chapter from this manuscript (see "Aus Rhetoren-Handschriften. 10. Einleitungen," *RhM* 64 [1909]: 539–78, esp. 558–61).

As the anonymous scholia were losing their importance as a source of Nicolaus's *Progymnasmata*, Hugo Rabe drew attention to them for another reason. In two *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* articles, one appearing in 1907 and the other in 1912,<sup>11</sup> Rabe analyzed the anonymous scholia in and for themselves and especially in their role as a carefully constructed rhetorical corpus, not merely a collection of rhetorical treatises.<sup>12</sup> Central to this corpus are the five treatises that made up the standard rhetorical curriculum—Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata* and the four rhetorical writings of Hermogenes.<sup>13</sup>

This corpus is represented best by two eleventh-century Parisian manuscripts, Paris. gr. 1893 and 2977.<sup>14</sup> The location of these manuscripts prompted Rabe to designate the corpus with the letter P (and hence the designation of the anonymous scholia as the P-scholia).<sup>15</sup> P “was planned,” Rabe says, “from the outset as a large corpus of scholia; the compiler wanted to collect for the five writings of Aphthonius and Hermogenes what had been produced for understanding them in terms of rhetoric generally and specifically through introductions to each writing and detailed commentary on the writings themselves.”<sup>16</sup> As a result, in addition to the various introductions to these texts, the compiler, perhaps around the year 1000, arranged the texts of Aphthonius and Hermogenes so that only a few lines of the author appear on

<sup>11</sup> Hugo Rabe, “Aus Rhetoren-Handschriften. 3. Die Quellen des Doxapatres in den Homilien zu Aphthonius,” *RhM* 62 (1907): 559–86; and “Rhetoren-Corpora,” *RhM* 67 (1912): 321–57, esp. 323–32.

<sup>12</sup> Rabe, “Quellen des Doxapatres,” 560, and “Rhetoren-Corpora,” 321.

<sup>13</sup> For the contents of P, comprising thirty-one treatises, of which only six are not concerned with the Aphthonian-Hermogenean writings, see Rabe, “Rhetoren-Corpora,” 325–26.

<sup>14</sup> On these manuscripts, see also Germaine Aujac, “Recherches sur la tradition de περὶ συνθέσεως ὀνομάτων de Denys d’Halicarnasse,” *RHT* 4 (1974): 1–44, esp. 32–34.

<sup>15</sup> Rabe (“Quellen des Doxapatres,” 559 n. 1) assigns two other manuscripts to P—the thirteenth-century manuscript Paris. gr. 2916, at least from fol. 39 on, and the fifteenth-century manuscript Oxon. misc. 268. For other P manuscripts, see further Rabe, “Rhetoren-Corpora,” 324–325.

<sup>16</sup> Rabe, “Rhetoren-Corpora,” 324 (my translation).

each page of the manuscript, with the remainder of the page filled with scholia on those lines.<sup>17</sup>

Yet despite Rabe's painstaking work on the manuscripts and initial insights about the unified conception of P, and despite his eventual editing of some of the introductions in 1931,<sup>18</sup> little, if anything, has come of his work, in part because Rabe died a year later<sup>19</sup> and in part because, at least for the Aphthonian portions of the corpus, the discovery of the commentary by John of Sardis—by Rabe himself no less<sup>20</sup>—made the P-scholia once again of less significance.<sup>21</sup> But, even if eclipsed, the P-scholia on Aphthonius deserve more analysis than Rabe's preliminary work provided, and to that analysis we now turn.

#### THE P-SCHOLIA ON APHTHONIUS'S *PROGYMNASMATA*

We begin with Rabe's revision of Walz's presentation of the P-scholia on Aphthonius in the second volume of his *Rhetores Graeci*. As already stated, Walz had divided the scholia in the manuscripts he had and printed them in two sections, a decision that followed the Aldine edition before him.<sup>22</sup> Rabe reunited the sections—pages 1 to 68 and 565 to 684—but, because Walz used manuscripts that were later than or unrelated to Paris. gr. 1983 and 2977, his edition had some material that had been added in the course of centuries. Thus Rabe eliminated pages 9 (beginning at line 21)

<sup>17</sup> See further Rabe, "Rhetoren-Corpora," 324, and the photographs of pages from Paris. gr. 1893 and 2977 that Rabe included as Tabula I at the back of his *Hermogenis Opera* (*Rhetores Graeci* 6; Leipzig: Teubner, 1913). On the tentative dating, see Rabe, "Rhetoren-Corpora," 329–32.

<sup>18</sup> See PS 44–58, 183–217, 238–55, 255–58, and 388–90 (Rabe).

<sup>19</sup> On the loss to the discipline from Rabe's "viel zu früher Tod," see Georg Lehnert, review of Hugo Rabe, ed., *Prolegomenon Sylloge*, *PhW* 54 (1934): 65–74, esp. 65. On Rabe's unfinished work, see Ursula Peters, "Übersicht über den Nachlass Hugo Rabes zu den *Rhetores Graeci*," in *Miscellanea Critica. Teil 1. Aus Anlass des 150 jährigen Bestehens der Verlagsgesellschaft und des Graphischen Betriebes B. G. Teubner, Leipzig* (ed. Johannes Irmscher et al.; Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1964), 172–75.

<sup>20</sup> See Hugo Rabe, ed., *Ioannis Sardiani Commentarium in Aphthonii Progygmnasmata* (*Rhetores Graeci* 15; Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1928).

<sup>21</sup> For this assessment, see Herbert Hunger, *Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner* (HAW 12.5.1–2; Munich: C. H. Beck, 1978), 1:78.

<sup>22</sup> See Rabe, "Quellen des Doxapatres," 559.

to 68 because they are missing in his principal manuscripts.<sup>23</sup> But he also eliminated pages 1 to 4 because of their content. These pages ask and answer a series of questions more appropriate to an introduction to rhetoric, not progymnasmata—What is an orator? (1,5); What are the tasks of rhetoric? (1,7); What is rhetoric? (2,1); How many kinds of speech are there? (2,3); What is rhetoric useful for? (2,9); and so forth.<sup>24</sup> Thus in P the introduction to Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata* should include only pages 5 to 9 (through line 20) and 565–567 (through line 29).

Accordingly, in Rabe's reconstruction the introduction to Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata* begins, appropriately enough, with definitions of the word "progymnasma," both in a general sense and in a specifically rhetorical one. Generally speaking, a progymnasma is training in moderate tasks with a view to facility in greater ones. With regard to rhetoric, a progymnasma is introductory practice with the parts of a speech and the kinds of rhetorical speeches and thereby is practice in something useful (5,2–5). Then there follows the caveat that no one progymnasma is useful for all parts of a speech or for all kinds of public speeches. Rather, some progymnasmata are useful training, say, for judicial speeches, such as refutation, confirmation, and common place, whereas others are useful with regard to advisory speeches, such as fable and maxim. Fuller, but still elementary, definitions and aims of the three kinds of public speech and the five parts of a judicial speech are given to clarify what students of progymnasmata would eventually have to tackle (5,5–7,17). Rhetoric, too, is defined and its possible etymologies provided (5,18–8,13). Especially noteworthy is the justification for the progymnasmata, which deserves to be quoted in full:

We begin with the progymnasmata because rhetoric, while naturally always present in society, was difficult to grasp and so did not easily prove its utility. Therefore, it was not evident to all. Each person, then, grasped a certain part of this discipline and handed it on to those after him, and so little by little the discipline developed divisions [διαίρεσεις] and theories [μέθοδοι]. Now that these developments were being used, the value of rhetoric was

<sup>23</sup> Rabe ("Quellen des Doxapatres," 559) says that these pages are missing in the two best manuscripts, which have pages 565–684 immediately after 1–9,20.

<sup>24</sup> Rabe, "Quellen des Doxapatres," 559–60.

much clearer. Still, for youths the discipline seemed difficult to master, since it is not easy for those trying to grasp it to comprehend every aspect of the discipline all at once. Therefore, the need for progymnasmata arose. For we get training in the progymnasmata not to grasp the whole of rhetoric but merely to learn each of its parts separately. (9,8–20)

The introduction then takes up Aphthonius's name, his title, and the relation of his *Progymnasmata* to Hermogenes's four rhetorical treatises. The name "Aphthonius" is both a proper name and a derived one (παράγωγον).<sup>25</sup> It is in fact especially fitting, in that Aphthonius poured forth the streams of speech ἀφθόνως, that is, abundantly or richly, and pumped forth springs of instruction without emotion, that is, envy (φθόνου), for those who were being taught (565,5–9). The title used of Aphthonius in the commentary is σοφιστής ("sophist"),<sup>26</sup> and this word is given two meanings—either "deceiver, imposter" or, as used of Aphthonius, "teacher" (565,10–566,7). Finally, the progymnasmata (προγυμνάσματα) are preliminary exercises to the rhetorical exercises (γυμνάσματα) of the books of Hermogenes, those *On Issues*, *On Invention*, *On Types of Style*, and *On Method* (566,18–19). "Accordingly, the *Progymnasmata* of Aphthonius is an introduction to the books of Hermogenes and is, as it were, a brief and continuing disclosure that anoints and arouses youths to the close examination of them" (566,23–26).<sup>27</sup>

The introduction ends with a catechetical section that asks and answers basic questions about the progymnasmata. The first

<sup>25</sup> Παράγωγον is a technical term in grammar, with which students would have become familiar during their secondary curriculum. Dionysius Thrax pairs it with πρωτότυπον ("primary") to identify the two principal classes of a noun (*Ars gramm.* 12 [25,3–5 Uhlig]): "There are two classes: primary and derived. A primary noun is one that was assigned at first to a thing, such as earth [γῆ], whereas a derived noun has its origin from another noun, such as earthly [γαϊήιος]." The P-scholias goes on to derive Aphthonius's name from ἀφθόνως and φθόνος.

<sup>26</sup> See P-scholia 566,6; 604,16; 633,30; 636,26; 647,20.

<sup>27</sup> Much like John of Sardis, however, the scholiast seldom indicates how the progymnasmata prepared for or anticipated what students would learn from the Hermogenean treatises. Indeed, at only a few places are there specific and clarifying references to τὰ τοῦ Ἑρμογένους βιβλία (2:566,21 Walz). The scholiast refers only twice to *On Issues* (671,1 and 674,25) and three times to *On Types of Style* (646,31; 647,8; and 671,20).

question—Why were the progymnasmata thought necessary?—has been answered before (cf. 9,16–20) and the answer here is similar (566,27–567,6). How many progymnasmata are there? Fourteen (567,7), and they are listed in the Aphthonian sequence (567,7–10) and lined up with the appropriate kind of public speech they provide training for, such as the fable, chreia, and maxim for the advisory speech, and so on (567,10–17). Similarly, it is asked for what part of the public speech does each progymnasma provide training, and the answer is that the fable, narrative, and description provide training for the statement of the case and the rebuttal; the confirmation for the introduction and resolution; and the common place for the epilogue (567,18–25). The final question—Why does the progymnastic sequence begin with the fable?—is answered by saying that the fable is simpler than the others and also akin to poetry, the latter point being that students were coming from the study of poetry under a grammarian and probably had composed familiar fables in verse;<sup>28</sup> in other words, they began with something simple and familiar (567,26–29).

The commentary proper on Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata* begins at 567,30 with Aphthonius's chapter on the fable and continues through the remaining thirteen chapters, ending at 682,30, which is short of Walz's conclusion at 684,5: Τέλος τῶν εἰς τὴν ῥητορικὴν προγυμνασμάτων. Rabe would put these words after 682,30. The intervening thirty-four lines (682,31–684,4) belong, he says, to an introduction to rhetoric and specifically to the first of Hermogenes's books, *On Issues*, because, again, their contents are more appropriate to rhetoric, such as the short history of the origins and development of the discipline (683,17–684,4).<sup>29</sup>

Before turning to the commentary on the chreia it is helpful to make some generalizations about the commentary as a whole in order to put the chapter on the chreia in its context. First, while we have talked about the P-scholia as being a commentary on Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata*, it must be recalled that the core of the commentary, as Finckh realized, is simply Nicolaus's *Progymnasmata*, fitted on each page more to supplement than to comment

<sup>28</sup> On this practice, see Raffaella Cribiore, *Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 202–3 and esp. 139 n. 36, which cites school papyri with versified fables.

<sup>29</sup> See Rabe, "Quellen des Doxapatres," 561–62.

on the few lines from Aphthonius. But this core material is seldom simply copied from Nicolaus but more often paraphrased and rearranged. Two examples will illustrate the scholiast's method. In the chapter on the narrative, for example, all of Nicolaus is taken over, although considerably paraphrased. Moreover, the Nicolaus material, if divided into four sections, has been rearranged by the scholiast in the order 1, 4, 3, 2. Finally, material that was not taken from Nicolaus is placed at the beginning (578,2–6), interspersed in the Nicolaus material (579,31–580,17 and 581,11–583,1), and added again at the end (584,5–585,2). This non-Nicolaus material comprises roughly 45 percent of the whole chapter, and it is in this material that we actually have commentary on Aphthonius's text.

The arrangement of material in the maxim chapter is somewhat similar. The core of the chapter is, of course, from Nicolaus (592,21–593,9 and 593,14–595,5), the former section having been simply copied, the latter somewhat condensed. There is, however, no rearrangement of the Nicolaus material. But, once again, the non-Nicolaus material comes at the beginning (592,2–20) and end (595,5–596,4), with a few lines (593,9–14) inserted between the two sections from Nicolaus. This material amounts to 52 percent of the total. We will see similarities to these arrangements of material when we analyze the chreia chapter.

While this non-Nicolaus material is often simply commentary on what Aphthonius says, there is one non-Aphthonian feature that appears throughout the commentary. This feature, typically placed at, or near, the beginning of each chapter, might be called the *παρεπόμενα*-section since it is signaled by the verb *παρέπεται* followed by the particular progymnasma in the dative and a number, as in the fable chapter: *Παρέπεται τῷ μύθῳ πέντε* (575,17), or "Essential to the fable are five subjects," which are then listed: origin (*γένεσις*), definition (*ὅρος*), etymology (*κλήσις*), division (*εἶδος*), and differentiation (*διαφορά*) (575,17–18). Then each word is defined or explained (575,18–25). To take the last as an example: *διαφορά* refers to the moral (of the fable), which is called a *προμύθιον*, if it precedes the fable, or an *ἐπιμύθιον*, if it follows (575,23–25).

This format appears in each chapter with only minor variations—in the narrative chapter we have *ἴδια* substituted for *παρέπεται*: *Πόσα ἴδια τοῦ διηγήματος*; (580,3–4); and in the maxim



chapter we have *παρέπεται* but used in a question: *Πόσα παρέπεται τῇ γνώμῃ*; (592,2). Still, we always have the number, the subjects, and the brief treatments. The number of subjects varies—from as few as two (description) to as many as eight (common place). More typical are three (chreia, maxim, refutation, confirmation, and introduction of a law) and five (fable, narrative, encomium, speaking-in-character, and thesis). Since the *παρεπόμενα*-sections appear at or near the beginning of each chapter (fable and narrative being the only exceptions) and generally follow the subjects treated in Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata*, their function is probably that of orienting the teacher and students to what will be covered in that particular chapter, a kind of heads-up before plunging into the details of Aphthonius's presentation. Thus, while the *παρεπόμενα*-sections would be quite helpful for reading Aphthonius, we will see that it is less so as far as the P-scholia go, for the commentary is based on Nicolaus.

#### THE P-SCHOLIA ON APHTHONIUS'S CHREIA CHAPTER

With these general comments on format and distinctive content in mind, we can proceed to the chapter on the chreia. This chapter can be divided into eight distinct sections. The core of the chreia chapter derives from Nicolaus (§§2–7.4); the non-Nicolaus material begins (§1) and ends (§§7.5–8; and 8) the chapter, accounting for roughly 45 percent of the whole.

The first section contains τὰ *παρεπόμενα*, which in the case of the chreia are three: *ὁρος* (“definition”), *εἶδος* (“division”), and *ἐργασία* (“elaboration”) (1.1–2). These three subjects are Aphthonian, as becomes clear from the briefly expanded discussion of each of the *παρεπόμενα*. The definition of the chreia, while incomplete (saying only “a concise reminiscence”), is Aphthonian, since he, not Nicolaus, uses the word *ἀπομνημόνευμα* (“reminiscence”) in the definition. In addition, this word probably implies the rest of Aphthonius's definition: “aptly attributed to some individual” (1.1).<sup>30</sup> The division of the chreia is common to all—saying, action, and mixed—but the use of the neuter singular (*λογικόν*, *πρακτικόν*, *μικτόν*) points again to Aphthonius,<sup>31</sup> since the others

<sup>30</sup> Aphthonius 2–3 H/ON (= 3,21–22 Rabe).

<sup>31</sup> See Aphthonius 5–6 H/ON (= 4,2–3 Rabe).

use the feminine plural (1.2). Finally, the elaboration into eight headings is again Aphthonian, since the number and names of the headings match those of Aphthonius<sup>32</sup> (and not Nicolaus or even Hermogenes) (1.3). And yet, despite the Aphthonian character of these *παρεπόμενα*, it should be added that one *παρεπόμενον*, the etymology of the chreia, is missing, clearly a subject of interest to Aphthonius, who relates the word *χρεία* (“chreia”) to *χρηώδης* (“useful”).<sup>33</sup>

The section ends untypically, with a question—What is a chreia?—then gives the answer: “An instructive, concise saying of someone” (1.2). The switch to a catechetical style is not used elsewhere in the *παρεπόμενα*-sections, and the definition is otherwise unattested, particularly in the use of the word *ἀπόφθεγμα* (“saying”). Finally, the *παρεπόμενα*-section—while it shows how Aphthonius’s chreia chapter would be approached, the scholiast does not proceed through these three subjects but turns instead to Nicolaus’s treatment.

The Nicolaus material begins in the second section with the discussion of *τάξις* (“sequence”) and explains why the chreia occupies third place in the progymnasmatic sequence.<sup>34</sup> The reasoning that Nicolaus gave has been condensed, and in the process the scholiast has made two changes. First, Nicolaus argued against those who placed the chreia chapter in first position, that is, before both the fable chapter and the narrative chapter,<sup>35</sup> but the scholiast only argues against placing the chreia chapter second, that is, after the fable chapter (2.1). Second, Nicolaus argued against two groups that had placed it first—one group argued on the similarity of function (both the fable and the chreia persuade young men to virtue and dissuade them from vice) and the other on instructional grounds (preferring the simpler exercise of *κλίσις*, or declension, of the chreia to the more difficult elaboration of it).<sup>36</sup> The scholiast collapses both groups into one and rejects the earlier order

<sup>32</sup> See Aphthonius 19–22 H/ON (= 4, 13–15 Rabe).

<sup>33</sup> See Aphthonius 4 H/ON (= 4, 1 Rabe).

<sup>34</sup> See Nicolaus 2–44 H/ON (= 17, 15–19, 6 Felten).

<sup>35</sup> See Nicolaus 4 H/ON (= 17, 16–17 Felten): *καὶ πρὸ τοῦ μύθου καὶ πρὸ τοῦ διηγήματος*.

<sup>36</sup> Nicolaus’s *κλίσις*, at least through the five cases in the singular (Nicolaus 18–35 H/ON [= 18, 7–22 Felten]), has been drastically condensed by the scholiast, retaining only those portions of a chreia that would change from case

for the chreia on the grounds that a more complex exercise with the chreia, the “present-day division,” or elaboration, has become standard and would be too hard if the chreia chapter were placed earlier in the sequence (2.2, 4).<sup>37</sup>

The scholiast now takes up the third subject, ὅρος (“definition”), and uses Nicolaus’s ὅρος with very little change in wording (3.1).<sup>38</sup> But Nicolaus’s definition, while different, seems to be used here to clarify Aphthonius’s since Nicolaus used the same or similar language—εὐστοχος, σύντομος, and εἰς τι πρόσωπον ἔχουσα τὴν ἀναφοράν. The clarification occurs when each part of Nicolaus’s definition is expounded on (3.2–3).<sup>39</sup> For example, Aphthonius simply spoke of the chreia as being σύντομος and ἐπὶ τι πρόσωπον ἀναφέρουσα (cf. Aphth 2–3 H/ON [= 3,21–22 Rabe]), but in Nicolaus’s expansion of his own definition he says that σύντομος is necessary to distinguish a chreia from a reminiscence, and the word ἀναφορά distinguishes it from a maxim (which has no attribution). Further differences between the chreia and maxim are promised in the maxim chapter (3.2).<sup>40</sup>

In this way, the scholiast’s use of Nicolaus ends up clarifying Aphthonius’s definition as well. Indeed, the one significant change from Nicolaus is that the scholiast omitted the word ὁρισμένον, which modifies πρόσωπον, that is, a specific individual. The omission, both in the definition and in the expansion of that part of the definition, suggests that it was deliberate, probably in order to make the definition conform more to Aphthonius’s definition, which does not have ὁρισμένον. So it becomes clear how

to case and even omitting, perhaps inadvertently, two cases altogether, the genitive and vocative (2.2–3).

<sup>37</sup> See Nicolaus 39–44 H/ON (= 19,1–6 Felten).

<sup>38</sup> See Nicolaus 45–48 H/ON (= 19,7–9 Felten): “A chreia is a saying or action that is apt [εὐστοχος] and concise [σύντομος], attributed to some specified individual [εἰς τι πρόσωπον ὁρισμένον ἔχουσα τὴν ἀναφοράν] and employed for the purpose of correcting some aspect of life.”

<sup>39</sup> See Nicolaus 48–58 H/ON (= 19,10–17 Felten).

<sup>40</sup> For the discussion of the differences between the chreia and maxim, see Nicolaus 185–213 H/ON (= 25,2–26,7 Felten). Aphthonius also postponed this discussion to the maxim chapter (see Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 4 [8,7–10 Rabe]). Aphthonius’s discussion does appear later in the non-Nicolaus material (590,22–25), although the two differences are reversed by the scholiast. This material has been inserted here (as 3.4) since it is out of place in the non-Nicolaus material.

Nicolaus's definition of a chreia can now function as commentary on Aphthonius's.

The fourth section treats the etymology of the word "chreia," which, while omitted in the *παρεπόμενα*-section, is appropriate here because this subject does follow on the definition in Aphthonius. At any rate, Nicolaus's discussion<sup>41</sup> is sharply condensed in Walz's text, so much so that it makes little sense. Whether the scholiast or Walz is responsible, the sense becomes clear once some omitted words in Nicolaus's discussion are restored (4.1).<sup>42</sup> A second section on etymology, which occurs elsewhere in the non-Nicolaus material, has also been inserted here to round out the discussion (4.2).

In the fifth section the scholiast moves on to Nicolaus's next subject, the classes and subclasses of chreiai.<sup>43</sup> It is the longest section (5.1–13) and significantly supplements Aphthonius's simple division into saying, action, and mixed chreiai.<sup>44</sup> The scholiast follows Nicolaus rather closely throughout, though often paraphrasing. Thus we have, besides the three principal classes of chreiai (5.1–5), chreiai classified into those that are told for utility or for humor (5.6–9), chreiai that address the way things are and the way things ought to be (5.10–12), and chreiai that have only a statement and those that have a statement in response to a question or a situation (5.13). Throughout these subdivisions the scholiast uses Nicolaus's illustrative chreiai, except for the action chreia, where he substitutes a chreia attributed to Alexander (5.4) for Nicolaus's that is attributed to Diogenes.<sup>45</sup>

The sixth section on parts and on parts and wholes is unique to Nicolaus. He distinguished progymnasmata into two groups: those that can be a part of a speech and those that can be either a part or a whole speech.<sup>46</sup> In the case of the chreia, we have only a part of a speech, not a whole one (6.1). But while not a

<sup>41</sup> See Nicolaus 59–64 H/ON (= 20,1–5 Felten).

<sup>42</sup> See Nicolaus 60–61 H/ON (= 20,2–3 Felten) and the relevant portion of P-scholia 4.1, as now restored: < ὅτι ἡ τῶν κοινῶν ὀνόματι > κατ' ἐξοχὴν < ὡς ἰδίῳ τετίμηται >.

<sup>43</sup> See Nicolaus 65–137 H/ON (= 20,6–23,5 Felten).

<sup>44</sup> See Aphthonius 5–17 H/ON (= 4,2–11 Rabe).

<sup>45</sup> See Nicolaus 74–77 H/ON (= 20,13–15 Felten).

<sup>46</sup> This distinction was introduced in the chapter on the narrative (Nicolaus, *Progymn.* 2 [= 17,4–14 Felten]).

complete speech, the chreia—or better, the chreia elaboration—is nevertheless useful for preparing students to compose public speeches, since a chreia elaboration provides training in how to compose all three rhetorical speeches and all four parts of a speech (6.2–3). The scholiast has paraphrased Nicolaus, to be sure, but he also has made one significant, if subtle, change. Nicolaus spoke of five parts to a public speech already in the introductory chapter<sup>47</sup> and here as well<sup>48</sup> and went on to say that the chreia elaboration provides practice in all of them.<sup>49</sup> He said this even though he later admitted that an elaboration does not have a counter-argument and rebuttal, simply an argument to confirm what was said or done<sup>50</sup>—in other words, it has only four parts. The scholiast has dropped the word “five” (6.3) and then has gone on to show how the elaboration provides training in the four parts of a public speech (6.3). Finally, this section, even though it has no peg in Aphthonius to hang on, probably served the purpose of introducing Aphthonius’s elaboration by pointing out its utility, at the beginning, as a prerhetorical exercise.

The seventh section turns directly to Nicolaus’s division of the whole into its parts and tries to connect it to Aphthonius’s through the shared word *κεφάλαια* (“headings”) (7.1). Nicolaus wrote: “The chreia is divided [*διήρηται*] into these *κεφάλαια*.”<sup>51</sup> But the scholiast connects this portion of Nicolaus to Aphthonius by inserting the word “eight” (*ὀκτώ*): “The chreia elaboration is divided [*τέμνεται*] into eight *κεφάλαια*” (7.1).<sup>52</sup> In addition, the scholiast has an eye on Aphthonius’s terminology when he changes Nicolaus’s word *ἔπαινος* (“praise”)<sup>53</sup> for the first *κεφάλαιον* to a word that is closer to Aphthonius’s wording—*ἐγκώμιον* (7.1),

<sup>47</sup> Nicolaus, *Progymn. praef.* (4,6–5,10 Felten).

<sup>48</sup> See Nicolaus 152–54 H/ON (= 23,18–19 Felten): *ἔτι πέντε μερῶν τοῦ πολιτικοῦ λόγου, τουτέστι προοιμίου, διηγήσεως, ἀντιθέσεως, λύσεως καὶ ἐπιλόγου.*

<sup>49</sup> See Nicolaus 154–55 H/ON (= 23,20 Felten).

<sup>50</sup> See Nicolaus 158–60 H/ON (= 23,23–24,2 Felten).

<sup>51</sup> Nicolaus 162 H/ON (= 24,4 Felten).

<sup>52</sup> It should be noted that the scholiast has also exchanged the standard verb for dividing, *διαίρειν*, for another with the same meaning, *τέμνειν*, and makes the same change at the end of this section. Nicolaus used the noun *διαίρεσις* (see Nicolaus 184 H/ON [= 24,22 Felten]), which the scholiast has changed again to *τέμνεται* (7.2).

<sup>53</sup> See Nicolaus 162 H/ON (= 24,4 Felten).

Aphthonius's term being ἐγκωμιαστικόν.<sup>54</sup> Furthermore, the scholiast equates Nicolaus's terms, τὸ εἰκός and τὸ ἀληθές,<sup>55</sup> with Aphthonius's αἰτία and ἐναντίον, respectively (7.1). Finally, he adds ὁκτώ again at the end of this discussion (7.2). In short, the scholiast has deliberately tried to match Nicolaus's κεφάλαια with those of Aphthonius. The addition of "eight," however, creates problems, because Nicolaus's presentation of the elaboration did not mention eight κεφάλαια, only seven, and, moreover, Nicolaus used different names for some of Aphthonius's κεφάλαια.

Still, the connections are not as successful as the scholiast thinks. He has counted τὸ εἰκός and τὸ ἀληθές as two of the eight κεφάλαια. But he also says that τὸ ἀληθές is used when the chreia being elaborated discloses the way things are, and τὸ εἰκός when the chreia depicts the way things ought to be (cf. 5.2). Thus, the scholiast still ends up with only seven κεφάλαια. The basic problem is that Nicolaus's terminology and number of κεφάλαια were eclipsed by Aphthonius's, which, by the time of the scholiast, had defined "the present-day division [διαίρεσις]" (see 2.2). The result is some confusion and would have hardly helped teacher or student to understand this "present-day division." And the final comments on enthymemic proofs (for the analogy) and paradigmatic ones (for the example), while clarifying two other κεφάλαια, do not resolve the confusion (7.3–4).

With this confused discussion of the κεφάλαια as they relate to Aphthonius's elaboration, the Nicolaus material comes to an end (7.4). The scholiast now turns to other material, again on the κεφάλαια, but now less on definition and more on the proper content (ὕλη) for achieving their functions (7.5–8). The opening claim to delve deeper into the content of the κεφάλαια (7.5) comes up short since only the first κεφάλαιον, the ἐγκωμιαστικόν ("encomiastic heading") is treated in any detail. And in this one case the scholiast has clearly and usefully supplemented Aphthonius's mere listing of this κεφάλαιον. The purpose of the encomiastic heading, which is similar to that of the introduction to a speech, is to praise the one who spoke or acted. This praise should not be too general or applicable to many others but focused on the content of the saying

<sup>54</sup> See Aphthonius 19 H/ON (= 4, 13 Rabe).

<sup>55</sup> See Nicolaus 169 H/ON (= 24, 10 Felten).

or action (7.6). The praise should also be brief so that other accomplishments of the individual should be merely alluded to by means of the figure “pretended omission” (κατὰ παράλειψιν) (7.7). If little is known of the individual himself, then a more general characteristic can be used. For example, identifying the individual as a Spartan immediately connotes his praiseworthy Spartan, or rigorous, style of life (7.7). Such practical ideas on the content of an encomiastic heading, if only on that heading, would have helped students to understand how to proceed with composing an ἐγκωμιαστικόν.

The final, or eighth, section of the commentary is the only one that directly comments on what Aphthonius said. It treats Aphthonius’s model elaboration of the chreia attributed to Isocrates: “The root of education is bitter, but its fruits are sweet” (Aphth 24–78 H/ON [= 4,16–6,19 Rabe]). But before turning to the comments it is necessary to emphasize that this section is a jumble. Some comments on Aphthonius’s elaboration are out of place and others, as we have noted, fit better in other sections of the commentary and so have been reassigned (as shown below) to their logical location. But, for clarity’s sake, here is a chart comparing Walz’s text (identified by page and line numbers) to the text in this volume (identified by section number and “verse”) (transposed sections are indicated by < >):

Walz	P-Scholia
589,33–590,3	8.1
590,3–14	8.4–5
<590,14–16>	8.2
590,16–21	8.6
<590,22–25>	3.4
<590,25–26>	2.5
<590,26–29>	4.2
590,29–591,29	8.7–12
<591,29–31>	8.3

When the portions of the text that make up this section are rearranged into the order of Aphthonius’s κεφάλαια, the P-scholia comment on all but one of them and examine how Aphthonius achieved the purpose of each. A sampling of comments will illustrate what a teacher or student would have gained from reading

them: The scholiast shows how Aphthonius's encomiastic heading meets the need for brevity without sacrificing mention of Isocrates's other achievements by using the figure "pretended omission" (κατὰ παράλειψιν) in the words "How often, either as law-giver to kings or adviser to individuals he has benefitted the life of mankind. . ." (Aphth 29–31 H/ON [= 5,1–3 Rabe]) (8.4). The scholiast also notes how Aphthonius used the argument "from the admirable" to highlight Isocrates's praiseworthy contribution to education by using the word οἷα ("What. . .!") (Aphth 32 H/ON [= 5,3 Rabe]), which, he says, is used to express admiration (8.5). The scholiast, however, cautions against using the figure "pretended omission" (κατὰ παράλειψιν) too often, since a simple "enumeration" (ἀπαρίθμησις) can accomplish the same purpose (8.6).

The scholiast's comments on the other κεφάλαια are briefer. The paraphrastic heading is designed to teach students how to say the same thing as the saying but in different words (8.7). The rationale teaches probability, supporting the saying by addressing either the subject itself or what is related to it (8.8). The opposite heading is explicitly identified, and its purpose stated: to make the saying clearer by juxtaposing what is opposite to it (8.9). The analogy is identified as a probable argument, as is the example, but it is also distinguished from it since an analogy is expressed through an action (διὰ πράξεως), an example through individuals (διὰ προσώπων) (8.11). The testimony supports the saying by citing authoritative sayings and considered judgments of the ancients. Then comes this advice: should no testimony be at hand, the student is instructed to use the figure "pretended omission" (κατὰ παράλειψιν), saying something like: "It is possible to adduce many sayings of the ancients that advocate what is being said, and I doubt there is much to say that disagrees with the present argument" (8.12). There is no comment on the last heading, the epilogue.

And so again, as in the discussion of the ὕλη of the encomiastic heading, so now through all but one of the κεφάλαια the scholiast has provided helpful, if brief, information, strategies, and illustrative material for composing an elaboration, something Aphthonius did, but only implicitly through his model elaboration.



## CONCLUSION

What has emerged in this review of the P-scholia's chapter on the chreia is how the scholiast was able, with some success, to use material largely from Nicolaus to work as a commentary on Aphthonius's chapter on the chreia. To be sure, the *παρεπόμενα*-section identified the essentials of Aphthonius's chapter (§1), but it did not function as an outline for the following commentary. Instead, apart from the subject of *τάξις* (§2), a subject Aphthonius did not address anywhere in his *Progymnasmata*, the P-scholia clearly adhere to Aphthonius's order of subjects, beginning with *ῥος* (§3) and then proceeding through *ἐτυμολογία* (§4), *εἶδος* (§5), *κεφάλαια* (§7), and *ἐργασία* (§8). Only the Nicolaus material on *μέρη, καὶ μέρη καὶ ὅλη* (§6), has no equivalent in Aphthonius and seems out of place here. Still, the scholiast's comments have throughout provided clarification and substantial supplementary material, especially on *εἶδος* (§5), to Aphthonius's spare treatment. The few missteps and confusions that appear at various points, however, do not detract from his overall achievement. Aphthonius would surely have been better understood, by teacher and students alike, with the P-scholia to consult.

## TEXT AND TRANSLATION

The text of the P-scholia used here is based on Walz's edition,<sup>56</sup> though not without a constant eye on Finckh's and Felten's editions of Nicolaus,<sup>57</sup> which have corrected many of the deficiencies in Walz's text.<sup>58</sup> Page numbers from Walz's edition have been inserted to make for easier comparison with his text. These page numbers are especially helpful for this text because the P-scholia, as already noted, seem to have undergone significant displacements. Rearrangements of these displaced scholia are all indicated by references to Walz's page and line numbers in pointed brackets < > where his text resumes. The sections of the commentary have

<sup>56</sup> Walz, *Rhetores Graeci*, 2:585–91.

<sup>57</sup> Eberhard Finckh's text was published in Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci*, 3:458–63. For Felten's text, see Felten, *Nicolai Progymnasmata*, 17–24.

<sup>58</sup> See esp. Finckh's *praefatio* in Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci*, 3:xxv–xxx.

also been identified by numbers and titles in bold and in pointed brackets, and “verses” within the sections have been added to aid in referencing.

George Kennedy’s translation of Nicolaus’s *Progymnasmata* has been consulted for those portions deriving from that source,<sup>59</sup> but the entire translation is my own.

<sup>59</sup> George Kennedy, *Progymnasmata: Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric* (SBLWGRW 10; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003), 139–42.



# Text 2. P-Scholia

## Commentarium in Aphthonii

### Progymnasmata

Cap. III. Περὶ Χρείας  
(2:585,3–591,31 Walz)

#### <§1. ΤΑ ΠΑΡΕΠΟΜΕΝΑ>

1. Παρέπεται τῇ χρείᾳ τρία· ὅρος, εἶδος, ἐργασία· ὅρος μὲν χρείας ἐστὶν ἀπομνημόνευμα σύντομον. 2. εἶδος· εἶδη δὲ αὐτῆς τρία· λογικόν, πρακτικόν, μικτόν. 3. ἐργασία· κεφάλαια δὲ τῆς ἐργασίας ὀκτώ, οἷς ἐργάζεται ἡ χρεία, ἐγκωμιαστικόν, παραφραστικόν, τὸ τῆς αἰτίας, ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου, παραβολή, παράδειγμα, μαρτυρία παλαιῶν, ἐπίλογος βραχύς.
4. Τί ἐστι χρεία; διδασκαλία καὶ ἀπόφθεγμα τινος σύντομον.

#### <§2. ΤΑΞΙΣ>

1. Χρεία μετὰ τὸ διήγημα τέτακται, ὥς ποικιλωτέραν ἐπιδεχομένη τοῦ διηγήματος τὴν διαίρεσιν. 2. ὅσοι γὰρ πρὸ τοῦ διηγήματος αὐτὴν ἔταξαν, τῷ ὥσπερ τὸν μῦθον καὶ αὐτὴν προτρέπουν καὶ ἀποτρέπουν τοὺς νέους ἐπὶ αἰρετὰ καὶ μή, οὗτοι ὅσον κατὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔξω σκοποῦ ἔβαλον, ἐπεὶ

# Text 2. P-Scholia

## Commentary on Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata*

### Chapter 3: On the Chreia (2:585,3–591,31 Walz)

#### <§1. THE ESSENTIAL SUBJECTS>

1. Three subjects are essential to the chreia chapter: definition, division, and elaboration. The definition of a chreia is a concise reminiscence. Division: There are three classes—saying, action, and mixed. Elaboration: The headings of the exercise by which the chreia is elaborated are eight: encomiastic, paraphrastic, rationale, opposite, analogy, example, testimony of the ancients, and brief epilogue.

2. What is a chreia? An instructive, concise saying of someone.

#### <§2. SEQUENCE>

1. The chreia chapter has been placed after the narrative chapter since it admits of a more complex division than the narrative does.

2. For all those who have placed it before the narrative—on the grounds that, like the fable, the chreia also persuades young men toward what is to be chosen and dissuades them from what is not—these people have not thereby missed the mark, since they did not

μηδὲ κατὰ τὴν νῦν διαίρεσιν αὐτὴν ἡβούλοντο διαιρεῖν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πάσας μόνον ὁμοῦ τὰς πτώσεις.

Κατ' εὐθεῖαν μὲν, οἷον Πιττακὸς ὁ Μιτυληναῖος, ἐρωτηθεὶς εἰ λανθάνει τις τοὺς θεοὺς φαῦλα ποιῶν, ἀπεκρίνατο, «ἀλλ' οὐδὲ διανοοῦμενος.»

<Κατὰ γενικὴν Πιττακοῦ, ἐρωτηθέντος . . . λόγος ἀπομνημονεύεται, «ἀλλ' οὐδὲ διανοοῦμενος.»>

Κατὰ δοτικὴν Πιττακῶ, ἐρωτηθέντι . . . ἐπὶ ἦλθεν εἰπεῖν, «ἀλλ' οὐδὲ διανοοῦμενος.»

Κατὰ αἰτιατικὴν Πιττακόν, ἐρωτηθέντα . . . φασὶν εἰπεῖν, «ἀλλ' οὐδὲ διανοοῦμενος.»

<Κατὰ κλητικὴν Σύ, ὃ Πιττακέ, ἐρωτηθεὶς . . . εἶπας, «ἀλλ' οὐδὲ διανοοῦμενος.»>

Καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐξῆς ἀριθμῶν οὕτως.

[586] 3. Τοῦτο δὲ ἐποιοῦν οἰόμενοι τοῖς νέοις ἄρτι ποιητικῶν ἀφισταμένοις καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἰοῦσιν ἀρκεῖν αὐτὴν οὕτως πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πολιτικοῦ λόγου μελέτην. 4. ὅσοι μὲν οὖν διὰ ταῦτα τοῦ διηγήματος | προὔταξαν, οὐκ ἔξω πεποιθήκασιν λόγου, ἥ καὶ προεῖρηται, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ νῦν πλείονος τετύχηκε διαιρέσεως καὶ ποικιλωτέρας τοῦ μύθου καὶ διηγήματος, διὰ ταῦτα καὶ μετ' ἐκεῖνο τάττεσθαι καλῶς ἔδοξεν.

2 post primus διανοοῦμενος inseruit κατὰ γενικὴν . . . λόγος ἀπομνημονεύεται . . . διανοοῦμενος addidi || κατὰ γενικὴν . . . λόγος φέρεται . . . διανοοῦμενος Finckh || 2 post quartus διανοοῦμενος addidit κατὰ κλητικὴν . . . διανοοῦμενος Finckh || 3 ποιητικῶν scripsi; cf. Doxapatres 2:193,5 (Walz) || ποιητικῆς Walz || 3 τὴν ῥητορικὴν scripsi; cf. Doxapatres 2:193,6 (Walz) || τὰ ῥητορικὰ Walz || 4 λόγου Finckh || λόγον Walz || 4 τετύχηκε Finckh || τε τύχη Walz || 4 ποικιλωτέρας Finckh || ποικιλωτέρου Walz || 4 ἐκεῖνο Finckh || ἐκεῖνον Walz

want to divide the chreia according to its present-day division,<sup>1</sup> but merely to decline<sup>2</sup> it according to all its cases.

In the nominative, for example: Pittacus of Mitylene, on being asked if anyone escapes the notice of the gods in committing sinful acts, replied, “Why, not even when contemplating them.”

<In the genitive: The statement of Pittacus, on being asked. . . , is remembered when he said, “Why, not even when contemplating them.”>

In the dative: To Pittacus, on being asked. . . , it occurred to say, “Why, not even when contemplating them.”

In the accusative: They say that Pittacus, on being asked. . . , said, “Why, not even when contemplating them.”

<In the vocative: You, O Pittacus, on being asked. . . , said, “Why, not even when contemplating them.”>

And likewise in the following numbers.<sup>3</sup>

3. They did this exercise in the belief that for young men who were just leaving the study of poets and moving on to rhetoric this manipulation was thus sufficient for training in public speaking. 4. So, all those who for these reasons placed the chreia in front of the narrative have not done so without reason, as has been said above.<sup>4</sup> But since the chreia has now acquired a division that is fuller and more complex<sup>5</sup> than the fable and narrative, it has seemed proper to place it after the narrative.

<sup>1</sup> By διαίρεῖν the scholiast means a specific form of division, that is, ἡ διαίρεσις ἀπὸ ὅλου εἰς μέρη, or the eight-part elaboration of a chreia.

<sup>2</sup> The Greek text does not have a verb meaning “to decline,” that is, κλίνειν, but such a verb is necessary since the implicit verb for this clause, “to divide” (which is to be supplied from the previous clause), is not apt since declension of a chreia is not a form of division.

<sup>3</sup> For a declension of a chreia through the dual and plural as well, see Brit. Mus. addit. MS 37516 in Frederic G. Kenyon, “Two Greek School Texts,” *JHS* 29 (1909): 29–40, esp. 29–30 (reproduced and discussed in *Chreia* 2:62–66).

<sup>4</sup> See above 2.2.

<sup>5</sup> By “division” (διαίρεσις) the scholiast means ἡ διαίρεσις ἀπὸ ὅλου εἰς μέρη, or the division of an elaboration into eight headings, as indicated in 1.1. Such a lengthy essay is clearly more complex than the one-paragraph fable and narrative.

5. <Τέτακται δὲ ἡ χρεία μετὰ τὸ διήγημα, διότι ἡ χρεία εἰς πρόσωπον ἔχει τὴν ἀναφοράν.>

<§3. ΟΡΟΣ>

- [586,4] | 1. 'Ορίζονται δὲ αὐτὴν οὕτως· χρεία ἔστιν λόγος ἢ πρᾶξις εὐστοχος καὶ σύντομος εἷς τι πρόσωπον ἔχουσα τὴν ἀναφοράν, πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσίν τινος τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ παραλαμβανομένη. 2. πρόσκειται («λόγος ἢ πρᾶξις» [εὐστοχος καὶ σύντομος, εἷς τι πρόσωπον ἔχουσα τὴν ἀναφοράν, πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσίν τινος τῶν ἐν βίῳ παραλαμβανομένη· πρόσκειται λόγος ἢ πρᾶξις] ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἐν λόγοις εὐρίσκεται καὶ ἐν πράξεσιν· «εὐστοχος» δέ, ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῷ εὐστόχως εἰρῆσθαι ἢ τῆς χρείας ἰσχύς· «σύντομος» δὲ διὰ τὰ ἀπομνημονεύματα, καὶ ἐν συντόμῳ ἂν γένοιτο· αἱ δὲ χρεῖαι διὰ βραχυτέρων αἰεὶ· «εἷς τι δὲ πρόσωπον ἔχουσα τὴν ἀναφοράν» διὰ τὴν γνώμην πρόσκειται· ἐκείνη γὰρ οὐ πάντως εἰς ὠρισμένον ἀναφέρεται πρόσωπον· καὶ καθ' ἃ ἄλλα γνώμη καὶ χρεία διαφέρουσιν, ἐν τῷ περὶ γνώμων εἰρήσεται. 3. <διαφέρει χρεία γνώμης τῷ τὴν μὲν χρεῖαν μετὰ προσώπων ἐκφέρεισθαι, τὴν δὲ γνώμην χωρὶς, καὶ τῷ τὴν μὲν χρεῖαν ἐνίοτε καὶ πρακτικὴν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ γνώμην αἰεὶ λογικὴν.> | 4. τὸ δὲ «πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσίν τινος τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ <παραλαμβανομένη>» διὰ τὸ
- [586,18]

5 Τέτακται ... ἀναφοράν transposui ex 590,25-26 (Walz) ||  
 §3.1 πρόσωπον Finckh; cf. 586,9 et 15 (Walz) || προσώπων Walz ||  
 2 εὐστοχος ... πρᾶξις omittit Finckh || 2 γνώμων correxit Finckh ||  
 χρεῖων Walz | 3 διαφέρει ... λογικὴν transposui ex 590,22-25 (Walz) ||  
 4 παραλαμβανομένη addidi



5. <The chreia chapter is placed after the narrative chapter because the chreia has an attribution to an individual.><sup>6</sup>

### <§3. DEFINITION>

1. The chreia is defined in this way: A chreia is a saying or action that is apt and concise, attributed to some individual, and employed for the purpose of correcting some aspect of life.<sup>7</sup> 2. The words “saying or action” are added to the definition since the chreia is found with both sayings and actions. “Apt” is added since the force of a chreia consists in its being spoken aptly. “Concise” is added on account of the related form reminiscences.<sup>8</sup> The latter, to be sure, can be expressed concisely, but chreiai are always expressed in a briefer form. “Having an attribution to some individual” is added on account of the related form maxim. For the maxim is certainly not attributed to a specific individual. In what other ways the maxim and chreia differ will be discussed in the chapter “On maxims.”<sup>9</sup> 3. <The chreia differs from the maxim, in that the chreia is attributed to individuals, whereas the maxim is without attribution; and the chreia sometimes contains an action, whereas the maxim is always a saying.> 4. “<Employed> for

<sup>6</sup> This sentence, which has been transposed from 590,25–26, is placed here since it is concerned with the *τάξις* of the chreia chapter in the progymnastic sequence. Still, the sentence makes little sense, as attribution is usually discussed as a distinguishing feature of the chreia over against the maxim, which is not attributed to anyone, and not in relation to a narrative, as is the case below at 3.2–3.

<sup>7</sup> This definition is not that of Aphthonius but of Nicolaus, which is quoted exactly except for its omission of the word *ὠρισμένον* (“specific”) after the word *πρόσωπον* (see Nicolaus 45–48 H/ON [= 19,7–9 Felten]). The commentary-like explanation of each word or phrase—saying or action, apt, and so forth—that follows also draws on Nicolaus but with numerous departures from him.

<sup>8</sup> Elsewhere the scholiast mentions the most famous example of reminiscences, Xenophon’s *Ἀπομνημονεύματα* (see 2:593,20 Walz), but, somewhat surprisingly, he does not mention it here.

<sup>9</sup> Both Aphthonius and Nicolaus delay discussing the differences between chreia and maxim until the maxim chapter (see Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 4 [8,7–10 Rabe] and Nicolaus, *Progymn.* 5 [25,2–26,7 Felten]; cf. P-scholia 2:592,18–593,9 [Walz]).

ὥς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἀγαθὴν τινα παραίνεσιν τῇ χρεῖα ἔπεσθαι πρόσκειται.

#### <§4. ΕΤΥΜΟΛΟΓΙΑ>

[586,23]

1. Χρεῖα δὲ εἴρηται, οὐχ ὅτι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα προγυμνάσματα οὐ πληροῖ τινα χρεῖαν, ἀλλ' <ὅτι ἡ τῷ κοινῷ ὀνόματι> κατ' ἐξοχὴν <ὥς ἰδίῳ τετίμηται>, | ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον ποιητὴν φαμεν εἶναι, ἡ ὅτι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκ περιστάσεώς τινος καὶ χρεῖας αὐτῇ τις ἐχρήσατο. 2. <καὶ πάντα τὰ προγυμνάσματα χρεῖωδη, ἡ δὲ χρεῖα μόνη τούτῳ κέκληται τῷ ὀνόματι, ὅτι τοῖς καθολικοῖς ὀνόμασι τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν πραγμάτων καλλωπίζειν εἰώθαμεν.>

#### <§5. Η ΔΙΑΙΡΕΣΙΣ ΑΠΟ ΓΕΝΟΥΣ ΕΙΣ ΕΙΔΗ>

[586,25]

| 1. Τρεῖς αἱ ἀνώταται τῆς χρεῖας διαφοραί· αἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν εἰσι λογικαὶ καὶ μόνον, αἱ δὲ πρακτικαί, αἱ δὲ μικταί. 2. πρόσκειται τὸ «ἀνώταται,» ἐπειδὴ αὗται πολλὰς διαφορὰς ἔχουσιν, ἃς δεῖ μανθάνειν ἐκ παρασκευῆς τῆς περὶ τὴν τέχνην ἡ ὕλην πλείονος. 3. λογικαὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσιν αἱ διὰ λόγων μόνων δηλοῦσαι τὴν ὠφέλειαν· οἷον Ἰσοκράτης ἔφη τῆς παιδείας τὴν μὲν ῥίζαν εἶναι πικράν, γλυκεῖς δὲ τοὺς καρπούς. 4. πρακτικαὶ δὲ αἱ δι' ἔργων, οἷον Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Μακεδών, ἐρωτηθεὶς ποῦ οἱ θησαυροὶ | τῶν χρημάτων, οἷς τὰ ἐν χερσὶ κατορθοῖ, τοὺς φίλους ἔδειξε. 5. μικταὶ

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4 πλεῖστον Finckh; cf. Hermogenes 4 H/ON (= 6,6 Rabe) || πᾶσαν Walz || §4.1 ὅτι ἡ τῷ κοινῷ ὀνόματι et ὥς ἰδίῳ τετίμηται addidi; cf. Nicolaus 60–61 H/ON (= 20,2–3 Felten) || 2 καὶ πάντα . . . εἰώθαμεν transposui ex 590,26–29 (Walz) || §5.2 ὕλην Finckh; cf. Doxapates 2:421,27 (Walz) || ὕλης Walz

the purpose of correcting some aspect of life" is added to the definition on account of the sound advice that usually results from a chreia.

#### <§4. ETYMOLOGY>

1. It is called "chreia," not because the other progymnasmata do not satisfy some need, but <either because it has been honored with the generic name> par excellence <as though it were peculiar to it>, just as we say that Homer is "the poet,"<sup>10</sup> or because someone used it at first because of some circumstantial need.
2. <Moreover, while all the progymnasmata are useful, the chreia alone is named for this quality, because we are accustomed to adorn the best examples of a thing with generic names.>

#### <§5. DIVISION OF THE CLASSES INTO SUBCLASSES>

1. The principal classes of the chreia are three. Some chreiai have only sayings, others only actions, and some are mixed.
2. The word "principal" is added since these classes themselves have many subclasses, which one must learn from more extended experience with their forms and subjects.
3. Saying chreiai, then, are those that disclose their benefit through words alone. For example: Isocrates used to say that the root of education is bitter, but its fruits are sweet.<sup>11</sup>
4. Action chreiai are those that do so through deeds. For example: Alexander the Macedonian, on being asked where the treasures for his money were by which he had accomplished the tasks at hand, pointed to his friends.<sup>12</sup>
5. Mixed chreiai

<sup>10</sup> The scholiast quotes Homer sixteen times but, despite this convention, refers to him as *ὁ ποιητής* only once (2:636,23 Walz). On this convention of calling Homer "the poet," which arose in the Hellenistic period but declined with the rise of Atticism, see A. M. Harmon, "The Poet KAT' ΕΞΟΧΗΝ," *CJ* 18 (1923): 35-47. Harmon, however, did not survey the rhetorical tradition.

<sup>11</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:325-26.

<sup>12</sup> The recitation of this popular chreia (for other citations, see *Chreia* 1:302-3) is hardly concise, as the question is most typically "on being asked where he kept his treasures."

δὲ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων· οἶον Λάκων, ἐρωτηθεὶς ποῦ τὰ τεῖχη τῆς Σπάρτης, «ἐνταῦθα,» ἔφη, τὸ δόρυ ἀνατείνας.

6. Ἔτι τῶν χρειῶν αἱ μὲν χρησίμου τινὸς ἔνεκα παραλαμβάνονται, οἶον Ἰσοκράτης τῆς παιδείας τὴν μὲν ρίζαν ἔφη πικράν, γλυκεῖς δὲ τοὺς καρπούς· συμβάλλεται γὰρ πρὸς τὸ δεῖν καρτερεῖν τὰ δυσχερῆ διὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, τὴν μετὰ ταῦτα· αἱ δὲ χαριεντισμοῦ· οἶον Ὀλυμπίας, φησίν, ἡ μήτηρ Ἀλεξάνδρου, ἀκούουσα, ὅτι ὁ παῖς αὐτῆς Διὸς ἑαυτὸν εἶναι λέγει, «οὐ πάύεται,» ἔφη, «τὸ μειράκιον διαβάλλον με πρὸς τὴν Ἥραν.» δοκεῖ γὰρ χαριεντισμὸν ἔχειν· 7. καὶ πάλιν, Δάμων ὁ παιδοτρίβης, φησί, στρεβλοὺς ἔχων τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰ ὑποδήματα ἀπολέσας ἠύχετο ταῦτα τοῖς ποσὶ τοῦ κλέψαντος ἀρμόσαι· δοκεῖ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο χαριεντισμὸν ἔχειν <μόνον· ἐμοὶ δὲ μετὰ τοῦ χαριεντισμοῦ φαίνονται καὶ ἀγαθὴν παραινέσιν ἔχουσαι> | ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀποτρέπει τὸν παιῖδα τοῦ ἑαυτὸν Διὸς εἶναι λέγειν, ὁ δὲ τὴν κλοπὴν ψέγει ὥς ἀτοπώτατον.

8. Διὸ οὐδὲ ὑπαικτέον τοῖς ἀνασκευάζουσι τὰς χρειάς· εἰσὶ γάρ τινες, οἳ καὶ αὐτὰς καὶ τοὺς μύθους ἀνασκευάζειν πειρῶνται· πρὸς οὓς λεκτέον, ὅτι δεῖ μήτε τὰ ὁμολογούμενα ἀγαθὰ ἀνασκευάζειν, διὰ τὸ μηδένα ἔχειν τὸν πειθόμενον, μήτε τὰ ὁμολογούμενα ψευδῆ, διὰ τὸ πρόδηλον εἶναι τὸ ψεῦδος. 9. ὅτι δὲ ὁ μῦθος ψευδῶς πέπλασταί, καὶ ὅτι πρὸς τι

[587,15]

6 Ὀλυμπίας scripsi || Ὀλυμπία Walz et Finckh || 6 παύεται Walz; cf. Doxapatres 1.1 || παύσεται Finckh; cf. Theon 136 H/ON (= 22 Patillon) || 7 μόνον· ἐμοὶ . . . ἔχουσαι addidi; cf. Finckh, *praef.* xxvii et Nicolaus 97–99 H/ON (= 21,14–15 Felten) || 7 ψέγει Finckh || φεύγειν Walz || 8 διὸ οὐδὲ ὑπαικτέον Finckh || δι' οὗ ὑπακτέον Walz || 8 primus μήτε Finckh || μηδὲ Walz

are a combination of both. For example: A Laconian, on being asked where the walls of Sparta were, said, "Here," while brandishing his spear.<sup>13</sup>

6. In addition, some chreiai are used for the sake of something useful. For example: Isocrates used to say that the root of education is bitter, but its fruits are sweet. It refers metaphorically to the need to endure difficulties for the sake of the pleasure that comes after them. But other chreiai are told for the sake of wit. For example: Olympias, he says,<sup>14</sup> the mother of Alexander, on hearing that her son was saying that he was an offspring of Zeus, said, "The young man does not stop slandering me to Hera."<sup>15</sup> For it seems to contain wit. 7. Again he says: Damon the gymnastic teacher, who had crippled feet and had lost his sandals, prayed that they would fit the feet of the thief.<sup>16</sup> For this chreia also appears to contain <only> wit. <But in my opinion these chreiai also appear to contain sound advice along with their wit.> For Olympias is trying to dissuade her son from saying that he is a son of Zeus. And Damon is denouncing thievery as most wicked.

8. For this reason one must not yield to those who refute chreiai, for there are in fact some who try to refute both chreiai and fables.<sup>17</sup> To them one should reply: One must not refute what is commonly accepted to be good, because no one would be persuaded, nor (should one refute) commonly accepted fabrications, because the fabrication is patent.<sup>18</sup> 9. And no one with any sense

<sup>13</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:328–29.

<sup>14</sup> The word φησὶν ("he says") typically means Aphthonius in the commentaries, but here it must refer to Nicolaus, as the word is missing in the corresponding part of his discussion (see Nicolaus 88 [= 21,7 Felten]). See also 5.7.

<sup>15</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:330–31.

<sup>16</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:310.

<sup>17</sup> Theon provides instruction on refuting fables and chreiai. For the former, see Theon, *Progymn.* (35–36,3 Patillon), for the latter, see Theon 334–83 H/ON (= 28–30 Patillon). But refutation eventually became the preserve of a special progymnasma called "refutation" (see Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 6 (10,8–13,18 Rabe)).

<sup>18</sup> Note that the argument here to deny refutation of chreiai draws on language used in the chapter on refutation. There refutation is denied for the same reason, i.e., the elimination of the extremes (see Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 5 [10,11–12 Rabe]).

βιωφελές καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ χρεία προῆκται, οὐδεὶς ἂν ἀμφιβάλλοι τῶν νοῦν ἔχόντων.

10. Ὅτι τῶν χρεῶν αἱ μὲν δηλοῦσιν, ὅποιά εἰσι τὰ πράγματα, ὥς ἐκεῖνο· Αἴσωπος ὁ λογοποιὸς ἐρωτηθεὶς τί ἰσχυρότατον τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις, «ὁ λόγος,» ἀπεκρίνατο· τοῦτο δὲ ἰσχυρότατόν ἐστιν. 11. αἱ δὲ δηλοῦσιν, ὅποια δεῖ εἶναι, ὥς ἐκεῖνο· Ἀριστείδης ἐρωτηθεὶς τί ἐστὶ τὸ δίκαιον, «τὸ μὴ ἐπιθυμεῖν,» εἶπε, «τῶν ἀλλοτρίων.» τοῦτο δὲ δεῖ εἶναι. 12. τοῦτο δὲ συμβάλλεται ἡμῖν πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὴν διαίρεσιν· ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ ἡ <ἡ> χρεία δηλοῦσα, ὅποιά εἰσι τὰ πράγματα, μετὰ τὸ προοίμιον καὶ τὴν παράφρασιν | ἐπαινέσομεν αὐτήν, ὥς ἀληθῶς ἔχουσιν, ἐὰν δὲ ὅποια δεῖ εἶναι, ὥς εἰκότως ἔχουσιν.

13. Ὅτι τῶν χρεῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσὶν ἀπλαῖ, αἱ δὲ πρὸς τι· ἀπλαῖ μὲν, οἷον Ἰσοκράτης ἔφη τῆς παιδείας τὴν μὲν ῥίζαν πικράν, <γλυκεῖς δὲ τοὺς καρπούς> πρὸς τι δέ, οἷον Πλάτων, ἐρωτηθεὶς ποῦ οἰκοῦσιν αἱ Μοῦσαι, «ἐν ταῖς τῶν πεπαιδευμένων,» ἔφη, «ψυχαῖς.»

#### <§6. TA MEN MERH, TA ΔΕ ΟΛΑ ΚΑΙ ΜΕΡΗ>

1. Τῶν δὲ προγυμνασμάτων <τῶν μὲν ὄντων μέρων καὶ τῶν δὲ μέρων καὶ ὄλων> ἡ χρεία τῶν μερῶν ἂν εἴη· αὐτὴ γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς οὐκ ἂν πληροῖ μόνη ὑπόθεσιν. 2. Ὅτι τριῶν ὄντων τῶν εἰδῶν, ὥς ἤδη δεδήλωται, τῆς ῥητορικῆς, ἡ χρεία προδήλως μὲν τῷ συμβουλευτικῷ χρησιμεύει· πάντως γὰρ ἡ ἐπὶ τι προτρέπει χρηστόν, ἢ πονηροῦ τινος ἀπειργεῖ· συντελέσει δ' ἂν καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα· <τῷ μὲν πανηγυρικῷ> διὰ τοῦ ἐν τῷ προοιμίῳ τοῦ φήσαντος ἐπαινοῦ, τῷ δικανικῷ δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἀπὸ παραδειγμάτων εἰκότος. 3. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ πολιτικοῦ λόγου συντελέσει, τῷ μὲν προοιμίῳ

10 πράγματα Finckh; cf. 594,7 (Walz) || πραγματικά Walz ||  
 10 ἰσχυρότατον Finckh || ἰσχυρότερον Walz || 12 πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὴν διαίρεσιν Felten || εἰδέναι πρὸς τὴν δ. Walz || εἰδέναι omittit Finckh || 12 ἡ addidi; cf. Nicolaus 126 H/ON (= 22,17 Felten) || 13 γλυκεῖς δὲ τοὺς καρπούς addidi; cf. Nicolaus 133–34 H/ON (= 23,2 Felten) || §6.1 τῶν μὲν ὄντων . . . καὶ ὄλων scripsi; cf. Nicolaus 138–39 H/ON (= 23,7 Felten) || καὶ μέρων ὄντων καὶ ὄλων Walz et Finckh || 2 post γὰρ addidit ἡ Finckh; cf. Doxapatres 2.2 || 2 post ἄλλα addidit τῷ μὲν πανηγυρικῷ Finckh; cf. *praef.* xxvii et Doxapatres 2.2

would dispute the fact that the fable is intentionally fabricated<sup>19</sup> and that the chreia itself is a guide to something useful.

10. In addition, some chreiai disclose the way things are, as in this chreia: Aesop, the composer of fables, on being asked what the most potent thing is among men's possessions, answered, "Speech."<sup>20</sup> Indeed, speech is the most potent thing. 11. Other chreiai, however, disclose the way things ought to be, as in this chreia: Aristides, on being asked what justice is, said, "Not desiring the possessions of others."<sup>21</sup> And this is what ought to be. 12. This distinction helps us in understanding the elaboration. For if the chreia reveals the way things are, we will, after the encomium and paraphrase, praise it as being true; but if it reveals the way things ought to be, we will praise it as being probable.

13. In addition, some chreiai are simple, whereas others are in response to something. A simple chreia, for example: Isocrates used to say that the root of education is bitter, <but its fruits are sweet>. A chreia in response to something, for example: Plato, on being asked where the Muses dwell, said, "In the souls of the educated."<sup>22</sup>

#### <§6. PARTS, AND PARTS AND WHOLES>

1. Since some progymnasmata are <partial and others partial and whole>, the chreia should belong to the partial ones, for it cannot comprise all by itself a whole speech. 2. In addition, since there are three classes of rhetoric, as has already been shown,<sup>23</sup> the chreia elaboration is clearly useful for the advisory speech; for it always <either> directs us toward something good or deters us from something evil. It can also contribute to the other classes: <to the celebratory speech> by its praise of the speaker in the introduction, and to the judicial speech by means of a probable argument from examples. 3. Furthermore, the chreia elaboration

<sup>19</sup> A fable is defined as a fabricated story (λόγος ψευδής) (Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 1 [1,6 Rabe]).

<sup>20</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:301.

<sup>21</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:305.

<sup>22</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:333–34.

<sup>23</sup> See the P-introduction to Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata*, specifically 2:5,9–11 (Walz).

διὰ τοῦ ἐν τῷ ἐπαίνῳ τοῦ εἰρηκότος ἐγκωμίου· τῇ δὲ διηγῆσει διὰ τῆς παραφράσεως, τοῖς δὲ ἀγῶσι καὶ μὴ ἀντιτιθῶμεν, διὰ τοῦ κατασκευάζειν τὸ καλῶς εἰρησθαι, τοῖς δὲ ἐπιλόγοις διὰ τῆς παραινέσεως, ἐν οἷς ζηλοῦν ταῦτα προτρέπομεν.

<§7. Η ΔΙΑΙΡΕΣΙΣ ΑΠΟ ΟΛΟΥ ΕΙΣ ΜΕΡΗ>

1. Ἡ δὲ χρεία τοῖς μὲν ὁκτώ τούτοις τέμνεται κεφαλαίως, οἷον ἐγκωμίῳ τοῦ εἰρηκότος βραχεῖ καὶ οὐκ εἰς μῆκος ἐκτεινομένῳ· οὐ γὰρ καὶ διὰ πάντων πρόεισι τῶν ἐγκωμιαστικῶν κεφαλαίων, ἵνα μὴ μεῖζον ἢ τὸ προοίμιον τῆς ὑποθέσεως· ἔπειτα μετ' αὐτὸ τῇ παραφράσει, εἴτα τῷ εἰκότι καὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ, ἃ ἐκ τῆς αἰτίας καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου Ἀφθόνιος εἶπεν, εἴτα τῷ ἀπὸ παραδειγμάτων, ὃ πάλιν διττόν, ἐκ πράξεως καὶ προσώπου, ὧν τὸ μὲν παράδειγμα τὸ ἀπὸ προσώπου, ἡ δὲ παραβολὴ τὸ ἀπὸ πράξεως λέγεται· καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τῇ ἀφ' ἑτέρων κρίσει, μεθ' ἣν, ἂν δέη, καὶ ἐπὶ βραχεῖάν τινα παράκλησιν ἐρχόμεθα. 2. καὶ τούτοις μὲν τέμνεται τοῖς ὁκτώ.

[589] 3. Ἰστέον δέ, ὅτι τινὲς μετὰ τὸ εἰκὸς τὸ ἀπὸ παραβολῆς τάττουσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ μέρος τοῦ εἰκότος, ἐμπίπτον | ἐν αὐτοῖς ὡς ἐνθύμημα· τῶν γὰρ ἀποδείξεων ἀπασῶν τῶν μὲν οὐσῶν ἐνθυμηματικῶν, τῶν δὲ παραδειγματικῶν, ἐν μὲν τῷ εἰκότι ταῖς ἐνθυμηματικαῖς χρῆσόμεθα, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀπὸ παραδειγμάτων ταῖς παραδειγματικαῖς. 4. ὥς μὲν οὖν ἐν βραχεῖ προγυμνάσματι, οὕτως· πῶς δὲ δεῖ κεχρῆσθαι ταῖς ἀποδείξεσιν ἐν τελειοτέραις ὑποθέσεσι, μαθησόμεθα.



contributes to the parts of a public speech as well: to the introduction through the encomium in the praise of the speaker; to the narrative through the heading paraphrase; to the proofs, even if we do not counter-argue, through confirming what has been said well;<sup>24</sup> and to the epilogue, through the heading exhortation, where we persuade (the reader) to show zeal for these sentiments.

<§7. DIVISION OF THE WHOLE INTO ITS PARTS>

1. The chreia elaboration is divided into eight headings: (first) an encomium of the speaker, which is brief and not expanded at length. For it should not proceed through all the encomiastic headings in order that the introduction not be longer than the remainder of the speech.<sup>25</sup> Then, after it, comes (second) the paraphrase, then the probable and the true, which Aphthonius calls “the rationale” and “from the opposite.” Then the examples, which again are twofold: action and person. Of these (fifth) the example is based on an individual, (sixth) the analogy on an action. And in addition to all these, there is (seventh) the opinion of others, after which, should it be necessary, we come (eighth) to a brief exhortation. 2. And so the elaboration of a chreia is divided into these eight sections.

3. One should realize that some people place the argument from analogy after the probable since an analogy is part of the probable since it is subsumed under it as an enthymeme. Since some proofs are enthymemic and some are paradigmatic, we will use in the probable enthymemic proofs but in the argument from examples we will use paradigmatic ones. 4. So much, then, for this topic in a short progymnasma, but we will learn how one must use proofs in the more advanced compositions.

<sup>24</sup> The scholiast has not named the specific headings used in confirmation. They are: rationale, opposite, analogy, example, and testimony of the ancients (see above 1.1).

<sup>25</sup> Hermogenes, for example, lists the encomiastic topics for a person: ethnicity, polis, tribe; birth, nurture, training; virtues of soul and body—thirteen in all (see *Progymn.* 7 [= 15,17–17,4 Rabe]), which, if used, would make the encomium far longer than the remainder of the elaboration.

5. Προμηθῶς δ' ἂν ἔξει, καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ὕλης ἐπιδείξασθαι τὴν διαίρεσιν. 6. ἴσμεν, ὅτι τὰ προοίμια δεῖ οἰκεῖα εἶναι τῶν ὑποκειμένων προσώπων καὶ ὑποθέσεων, ὥστε μὴ κοινὰ φαίνεσθαι, μηδὲ πολλοῖς τὰ αὐτὰ δύνασθαι ἀρμόζειν, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν ταῖς χρεῖαις, ὅτι δεῖ ἐν τῷ προοίμῳ εἶναι τὸν ἔπαινον τοῦ εἰπόντος ἢ πράξαντος· πῶς οὖν οἷον τ' ἐστὶν εἶναι μὴ μόνης τῆς προκειμένης χρεῖας τὸ οἶονεῖ προοίμιον;

7. Δεῖ οὖν τὸν ἔπαινον τὸν κατασκευαζόμενον διὰ βραχέων εἶναι, ἵνα μὴ, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, μεῖζον τοῦ δέοντος ἢ τὸ πάρεργον· καὶ μὲν ἢ τινὰ αὐτῷ ἕτερα πεπραγμένα ἢ δι' ἔργων ἢ διὰ λόγων, ἐν παραιτήσεως ἤτοι ἀποσιωπήσεως ἢ παραλείψεως σχήματι, ὡς ἐνι μάλιστα διὰ βραχέων αὐξήσαντες τὸν ἔπαινον, οὕτως ἐπὶ τὸ προκείμενον ἤζομεν, ὑπερτιθέντες αὐτὸ πάντων ἐκείνων· ἂν δὲ μὴ ἔχωμεν τοιοῦτον, ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκειᾶς αὐτῷ ποιότητος αὐξήσομεν τὸν ἔπαινον· οἷον Ἀθηναῖος φέρε ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῶν Σόλωνος νόμων ὡς ἀξίως τούτων τέθραπται· εἰ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιος, ὁμοίως ἀπὸ τε τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῶν Λυκούργου νόμων καὶ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος, καὶ δεῖ σπεύδειν ἀρμόττειν τῷ προκειμένῳ λόγῳ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ποιότητος ἀναφαινόμενα ἐξαίρετα.

8. Ἐσθ' ὅτε δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν καθολικωτέρων βεβαιωτέον τὸν ἔπαινον, οἷον ποιητὴν ἢ λογογράφον ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων, ὡς ἐστὶ λέγειν οὕτως, οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ λογογράφοι πολλοὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἄξιοι πεφήνασι, πολλῶ μᾶλλον οὗτος· ὁμοίως καὶ στρατιώτην ἢ ῥήτορα ἢ φιλόσοφον ἢ στρατηγὸν ἢ βασιλέα.

5. It may be a good idea, too, to illustrate this division with the content itself. 6. We know that introductions should be tailored to the individuals and subjects being treated, so that they not seem too generic nor the same introduction be capable of fitting many individuals, and especially so in chreia elaborations, because in the introduction there must be praise of the one who has spoken or acted. How, then, is it possible for the introduction, as it were, not to be unique to the chreia being elaborated?

7. The praise that is being composed must be brief, in order that, as was said above,<sup>26</sup> a subordinate heading not be longer than the essential ones. And should there be other accomplishments, either in deeds or in words, we will, after amplifying the praise as briefly as possible by means of the figures “deprecation,” “falling silent,” or “pretended omission,” come to the subject under consideration, emphasizing it above all those other accomplishments. But should we not have such an individual, we will amplify the praise on the basis of the quality that is appropriate to him. For example, take an (unnamed) Athenian. We will amplify the praise of him on the basis of his city and the laws of Solon,<sup>27</sup> to the effect that he has been raised in keeping with them. But if the (unnamed) individual is a Laconian, we will likewise amplify the praise of him on the basis of his city, the laws of Lycurgus, and its traditional way of life.<sup>28</sup> One should also be careful that these special traits that are being emphasized on the basis of quality fit the saying under consideration.

8. Sometimes, however, one must substantiate the praise on the basis of more general topics—for example, a poet or prose writer on the basis of their similarities, so that it is possible to speak thus: “Many poets and prose writers have seemed worthy to men, but much more so is this individual.” It is possible to speak similarly of a soldier, orator, philosopher, general, or king.

<sup>26</sup> See above 7.1.

<sup>27</sup> On Solon as the lawgiver of Athens, see Plutarch’s *Life of Solon*.

<sup>28</sup> On Lycurgus and his similar role for Sparta, see Plutarch’s *Life of Lycurgus*.

## &lt;§8. ΠΑΡΑΔΕΙΓΜΑ&gt;

- [590] 1. Ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη αὕτη· σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ | ἐπὶ τοῦ προκειμένου τὰ ἐμπίπτοντα χρή· οἰκεῖον μὲν Ἴσοκράτους τὸ προοίμιον· οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ ὄνομα προφαίνειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα. 2. <τοῦτο θαυμασίως ἀντέστρεψεν, ὥς οὐχὶ τέχνη τοῦτον, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς τὴν τέχνην ἐσέμνυνεν.> 3. <τοῦτο ὑπερβολικόν, εἰ μὴ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὑπὸ ταύτης ἐκηρύχθη, οὔτ' αὐτὴν οὐκ ἂν ἐκήρυξεν.>
- [590,3] | 4. Οὕτω δὲ βραχύ τι καὶ σύντομον, ὥστε τὰ αὐτῷ πεπονημένα εἰς αὕξησιν ἐπαίνου ἢ παραλειφθῆναι ὀφείλοντα τῷ κατὰ παράλειψιν σχήματι <ἡ> διὰ τὴν συντομίαν παρελήφθαι. 5. εἴτα μετὰ ταῦτα εἰσβολὴ τοῦ προκειμένου τῆς χρείας λόγου καὶ μεταχείρισις μετὰ τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ θαυμασμοῦ αὐξήσεως, καὶ τῆς τῶν προλεχθέντων ἁρμογῆς· εἰ γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸν τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὖ πεποίηκε βίον αὐτοῦ πόνοις, πάντως καὶ ἡ παιδεία ἐν τοῦ κατὰ ἀνθρώπους ὑπάρχουσα βίου εὖ τετύχηκε καὶ Ἴσοκράτους τοιοῦτου ἀξιωθεῖσα ἐπαίνου, ἠύξητο δὲ ὅμως πλέον τῶν ἄλλων, ὥς καὶ προεῖρηται, τῷ θαυμασμῷ· τὸ γὰρ «οἷα» (cf. Aphth 32 H/ON [= 5,3 Rabe]) θαυμαστικόν ἐστι. | 6. ἰστέον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, ὥς οὐ πάντοτε τῷ κατὰ παράλειψιν χρηστέον, ἐφ' ὧν καὶ ἄλλοις τισὶν εὐπορον κατορθώμασι τὸν ἔπαινον αὕξειν τοῦ τὴν χρεῖαν προενεγκόντος· ἔσθ' ὅτε γὰρ καὶ ψιλὴ ἀπαρίθμησις τοῦτο δύναται ἀπεργάσασθαι ἄνευ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἀριθμούμενα τριβῆς.
- [590,16]

§8.2 τοῦτο . . . ἐσέμνυνεν transposui ex 590,14–16 (Walz) || 3 τοῦτο . . . ἐκήρυξεν transposui ex 591,29–31 (Walz) || 4 post σχήματι addidi ἡ || 5 οἷα scripsi || οἷον Walz et Finckh || 6 τῷ scripsi || τὸ Walz || 6 κατορθώμασι scripsi || κατορθώματι Walz

## &lt;§8. MODEL EXERCISE&gt;

1. So much for the theory. One should, however, look as well at the data available in the elaboration being treated.<sup>29</sup> Its introduction<sup>30</sup> is suitable to Isocrates—by pointing out not only his name but also his discipline. 2. <This point Aphthonius has admirably inverted: his discipline did not bring distinction to him, but rather he to his discipline.><sup>31</sup> 3. <This figure is called “hyperbole,” for if he had not been heralded by his discipline, he could not have heralded it.>

4. Aphthonius’s encomiastic heading is brief and concise, so that the (other) things he composed for amplifying the praise either ought to be passed over altogether <or> are included in the figure “pretended omission” for the sake of conciseness.<sup>32</sup> 5. Then after these words comes the introduction of the saying being treated in the chreia elaboration and the handling of it by means of amplification through the argument from the admirable as well as through its connection with his previous statements. For if he had benefitted human life with his other efforts, surely education, being one aspect of human life, has also benefitted and makes Isocrates be deemed worthy of such praise. Still, it was amplified more than the others, as was said above,<sup>33</sup> by means of an expression of admiration, for the word “what” is an exclamation of admiration.<sup>34</sup> 6. One should realize this as well: One should not always make use of the figure “pretended omission,” since it is profitable to amplify the praise of the speaker in the chreia with certain other of his accomplishments. For sometimes a simple enumeration is able to achieve this purpose without spending time on the items being enumerated.

<sup>29</sup> Since we are in the non-Nicolaus material, the elaboration being treated is that of Aphthonius, as will become clear.

<sup>30</sup> See Aphthonius 26–33 H/ON (= 4, 18–5, 4 Rabe).

<sup>31</sup> See Aphthonius 28–29 H/ON (= 4, 20–5, 1 Rabe).

<sup>32</sup> The scholiast is commenting on Aphthonius 29–32 H/ON (= 5, 1–3 Rabe): “How often, moreover, either as lawgiver to kings or as adviser to individuals he has benefitted the life of mankind would be a long story to set forth in detail.”

<sup>33</sup> Cf. 8.2.

<sup>34</sup> The scholiast is commenting on Aphthonius 32–33 H/ON (= 5, 3–4 Rabe): “But what a philosophy of education he had!”

[590,29]

| 7. Ἡ παράφρασις γυμνάζει εἰς τὸ τὰ αὐτὰ διαφόρως δύνασθαι ἀπαγγέλλειν τῇ ἑρμηνείᾳ. 8. τοιαύτη δέ τις ὀφείλει εἶναι, οἷον μήτε ἀφισταμένη τοῦ προκειμένου, μήτε ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν λέξεων ἀκριβῶς μένουσα.

[591]

9. Ἡ αἰτία τὰ εἰκότα διδάσκει, | τουτέστι τὰ ἐκ τοῦ πράγματος ἀναφαινόμενα, εὖ τι καὶ ὡς ἑτέρως ἔχοντα· ταύτην δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐνθυμηματικαῖς ἀποδείξεσι βεβαιώσομεν· ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν πρότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τῷ πράγματι, τὰ δὲ ἐνθυμήματα ἀπὸ τῶν περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα· ἐνταῦθα δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς παρουσίας μελέτης τὸ εἶκος ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τῷ πράγματι εἴργεται· τουτέστιν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, καὶ οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνθυμηματικῶν ἀποδείξεων.

**Εἰ δέ τις ταῦτα φοβούμενος καὶ <ταῦτα>** (Aphth 53–58 H/ON [= 5,21–6,2 Rabe]). 10. ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου τὴν πίστιν τῶν λεγομένων ἐργάζεται, ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ μέρος τοῦ εἰκότος, ἵνα μᾶλλον αὐξήσῃ καὶ φανεράν τὴν ὠφέλειαν τοῦ λεγομένου καταστάσῃ, πέφυκε γὰρ τὰ πράγματα τῇ παραθέσει τῶν ἐναντίων διαδηλότερα φαίνεσθαι· οὕτω φῶς τῇ τοῦ σκότους παραβολῇ, καὶ λευκὸν τῇ τοῦ μέλανος παρουσίᾳ τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀρετὴν ἐπεδείξαντο.

**Ὡσπερ οἱ γῆν ἐργαζόμενοι καὶ ταῦτα** (Aphth 59–63 H/ON [= 6,3–6 Rabe]). 11. ἡ παραβολή φημι τό τε παράδειγμα μέρη τοῦ εἰκότος προαποδέδεικται· διαφέρει δὲ τούτοις ἀλλήλων ταῦτα, καθὼς ἡ μὲν παραβολή διὰ πράξεως, τὸ δὲ παράδειγμα διὰ προσώπων εἰσφέρεται.

**Διὸ θαυμάσαι <καὶ ταῦτα>** (Aphth 71–76 H/ON [= 6,13–17 Rabe]). 12. ἡ μαρτυρία βούλεται τῇ ἀφ' ἑτέρων κρίσει βεβαιοῦν τὸ ἀποδεικνύμενον, ὥς ἂν μὴ μόνον πραγματικῇ, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ λόγων σοφῶν καὶ γνώμης ἀνδρῶν παλαιῶν τὸ κράτος ἔχοι· εἰ δ' ἄρα ποτὲ καὶ ἀποροίημεν οὕτως ἐναργοῦς μαρτυρίας τῶν παλαιῶν, τῷ κατὰ παράλειψεν σχήματι χρησόμεθα, λέγοντες οὕτω· «πολλοὺς ἔνι καὶ παλαιῶν λόγους παραθεῖναι συνηγοροῦντας τοῖς προκειμένοις· εἰ μὴ τῆς παρουσίας ὑποθέ-

10 εἰ δέ τις ταῦτα correxī; cf. Aphthonius 53 H/ON (= 5,21 Rabe) || οὐδέ τις ταῦτα Walz | 10 post φοβούμενος καὶ addidi ταῦτα; cf. 519,15 (Walz) || 12 θαυμάσαι correxī || θαυμασίως Walz | 12 post θαυμάσαι inserui καὶ ταῦτα || 12 ἔνι correxī || ἔτι Walz

7. The paraphrase provides training in the ability to recite the same subject in a different style. 8. And it ought to be such a recitation that it neither departs from the subject being treated nor keeps exactly to the words themselves.

9. The rationale teaches probabilities, that is, what is probable from within the subject, whether it is complimentary or otherwise. And we will confirm the rationale with enthymemic proofs as well. Now the former are made from what is inherent in the affair, and the enthymemes come from what is external to the affair. But here in the present model elaboration the probable is worked from what is internal to the affair, that is, from the affair itself, and not from enthymemic proofs.

**But if someone in fear of these things** and so forth (cf. Aphth 53–58 H/ON [= 5,21–6,2 Rabe]). 10. He is also working out the proof of what is being said by means of the opposite, which is also part of the probable, in order that he might augment as well as establish clearly the benefit of what has been said as apparent. For subjects naturally seem clearer when juxtaposed with their opposite, just as light shows forth its character when juxtaposed with darkness and as the color white does in the presence of black.

**Just as those who till the soil** and so forth (cf. Aphth 59–63 H/ON [= 6,3–6 Rabe]). 11. The analogy, I mean, and the example have been shown before to be parts of the probable.<sup>35</sup> These sections, however, differ from one another in these respects, in that an analogy is expressed through action, but an example through an individual.

**Therefore, (one must) admire** <and so forth> (cf. Aphth 71–76 H/ON [= 6,13–17 Rabe]). 12. The testimony is intended to confirm what is being proved through the opinion of others, so that the persuasive power of the saying might be not only through analysis of the chreia<sup>36</sup> but also through the wise sayings and judgment of the ancients. But if we are at any time at a loss for a clear testimony of the ancients, we will make use of the figure “pretended omission,” speaking as follows: “It is possible to adduce many sayings of the ancients that advocate what is being said, and

<sup>35</sup> Cf. 7.1.

<sup>36</sup> The phrase “analysis of the chreia” is a rendering of the slippery term *πραγματική*. The contrast seems to be the switch from analyzing the *πρᾶγμα*, or situation, of the chreia in the previous headings to citing an independent voice from the past that also confirms the saying in the chreia.

σεως τὸ πολλὰ λέγειν ἡπιστάμην ἀλλότριον·» ἢ οὕτως, «εἰ μὴ τὸ πολλὰ  
λέγειν οὐ κατὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ὑπόθεσιν.»



I doubt there is much to say that disagrees with the present argument.” Or in this way: “. . . except that saying anything more is not in keeping with the present argument.”



# Text 3. John Doxapatres

## Commentary on Aphthonius's

### *Progymnasmata*

Chapter 3: On the Chreia  
(2:247,12–282,11 Walz)

#### Introduction

#### LIFE AND WRITINGS

Biographical information about John Doxapatres is meager, and scholarly confusion and neglect regarding this important commentator have only exacerbated the situation. His name, his relationship to John Siceliotes, and his dates have confused scholars, and more information about him would surely surface if all his writings were published or if those that have been were read with this purpose in mind.

Confusion about the correct spelling of John's name goes back to his editor, Christian Walz, who introduced Δοξόπατρος (Doxopater).<sup>1</sup> At the end of the nineteenth century Karl Krumbacher sorted out the possibilities in the manuscripts, regarded Δοξαπατρῆς and Δοξοπατρῆς as the most likely options, and preferred the former, Δοξαπατρῆς (with an α, not an ο, after the ξ).<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Christian Walz, ed., *Rhetores Graeci* (9 vols.; Tübingen: Cotta, 1832–1836), 2:iii.

<sup>2</sup> Karl Krumbacher, *Geschichte der byzantinischen Literatur von Justinian bis zum Ende des Öströmischen Reiches (527–1453)* (2nd ed.; HAW 9.1; Munich: Beck, 1897), 462–63.

Hugo Rabe corroborated this spelling—and indeed made it virtually certain—when he reexamined the manuscripts and determined that Walz had misread his manuscript.<sup>3</sup> Consequently, Doxapatres is the correct spelling, and scholars have generally followed suit ever since,<sup>4</sup> although the form Doxopater occasionally appears as well.<sup>5</sup>

Confusion has likewise arisen over the relationship between this John and another John, John Siceliotes, who was also a commentator on Hermogenes.<sup>6</sup> Krumbacher and Ludwig Radermacher merely followed tradition when they identified the two, but they also drew the following conclusions: that Doxapatres thereby originated from Sicily and that he was a poor monk who found his poverty oppressive. The former conclusion obviously derives from the name “Siceliotes,” but the latter seemingly comes from some comments Siceliotes made in his commentary on Hermogenes’s *On Types of Style*.<sup>7</sup> In any case, Rabe rejected this identification on the grounds that Doxapatres himself cites Siceliotes in his introduction to Hermogenes’s *On Types of Style*<sup>8</sup> and

<sup>3</sup> See Hugo Rabe, “Aus Rhetoren-Handschriften: 6. Weitere Textquellen für Johannes Diakonos,” *RhM* 63 (1908): 512–30, esp. 512 n. 3.

<sup>4</sup> See, e.g., George L. Kustas, *Studies in Byzantine Rhetoric* (ABla 17; Thessaloniki: Patriarchal Institute for Patristic Studies, 1973), 25 n. 2; George A. Kennedy, *Greek Rhetoric under Christian Emperors* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 66; and C. N. Constantinides, “Teachers and Students of Rhetoric in the Late Byzantine Period,” in *Rhetoric in Byzantium* (ed. Elizabeth Jeffreys; SPByzS 11; Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2003), 39–53, esp. 47.

<sup>5</sup> See, e.g., Alexander Kazhdan, “Doxapatres, John,” *ODB* 1:660.

<sup>6</sup> For his commentary on Hermogenes’s *On Types of Style*, see John Siceliotes 6:54–506 (Walz), the introduction of which is also in *PS* 393–426 (Rabe). On John Siceliotes and John Doxapatres, see further Jean Irigoín, “La tradition des rhéteurs grecs dans l’Italie byzantine,” *SicGymn* 39 (1986): 73–82, esp. 79–81.

<sup>7</sup> See Krumbacher, *Geschichte*, 462, and Ludwig Radermacher, “Doxapatres,” *PW* 5.2:1611–13, esp. 1612. Neither cites a passage mentioning Siceliotes’s poverty, but apparently they are thinking of 6:444,31–445,3 (Walz), where in summarizing his life he says that he barely lived even with respect to the necessities.

<sup>8</sup> Doxapatres as cited in *PS* 422,8 and 423,2 (Rabe).

that the two are elsewhere distinguished,<sup>9</sup> a view that has also prevailed ever since.<sup>10</sup>

Accordingly, John Siceliotes and John Doxapatres are two distinct individuals. Siceliotes, probably an exile from Sicily, was active in Constantinople, to judge from a reference to a speech (now lost) that he gave to Emperor Basil II (976–1025),<sup>11</sup> and hence belongs to the early eleventh century. Doxapatres's origin, however, remains unknown, even though he, too, was probably active in Constantinople (since the capital exercised a near monopoly on rhetorical education<sup>12</sup>). He is thus later than Siceliotes and, so far as we know, did not complain about the oppressiveness of poverty, even if perhaps he, too, to judge from his "doxalogical" name, was a monk.<sup>13</sup>

Finally, confusion has also surrounded the discussion of Doxapatres's dates. For example, Karl Fuhr identified Doxapatres's reference to a commentator on Hermogenes by the name of Eustathius<sup>14</sup> as none other than the famous twelfth-century Homer commentator Eustathius of Thessalonica.<sup>15</sup> He then coupled this identification with derogatory references to Doxapatres by another twelfth-century writer, John Tzetzes,<sup>16</sup> and concluded

<sup>9</sup> For the unpublished manuscript evidence, see Hugo Rabe, "Aus Rhetoren-Handschriften: 3. Die Quellen des Doxapatres in den Homilien zu Aphthonius," *RhM* 62 (1907): 559–86, esp. 581 n. 1; see also Hugo Rabe, ed., *Prolegomenon Sylloge* (Rhetores Graeci 14; Leipzig: Teubner, 1931), lii.

<sup>10</sup> See, e.g., Wilhelm Schmid and Otto Stählin, *Wilhelm von Christs Geschichte der griechischen Literatur* (6th ed.; HAW 7.1.1–2; Munich: Beck, 1912–1924), 996; Kustas, *Studies*, 25 n. 2; Herbert Hunger, *Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner* (HAW 12.5.1–2; Munich: Beck, 1978), 1:82; Kennedy, *Greek Rhetoric*, 309; and Alexander Kazhdan, "John Sikeliotes," *ODB* 2:1068.

<sup>11</sup> John Siceliotes 6:447,24–26 (Walz).

<sup>12</sup> See Kennedy, *Greek Rhetoric*, 273, 312.

<sup>13</sup> For the suggestion that the name "Doxapatres" points to him being a monk, see Kustas, *Studies*, 25 n. 2.

<sup>14</sup> See Doxapatres 2:545,13 (Walz).

<sup>15</sup> On this Eustathius, see Alexander Kazhdan, "Eustathios of Thessalonike," *ODB* 2:754.

<sup>16</sup> See John Tzetzes 3:670–86, esp. 673,11 and 679,31 (Walz). See further Hunger, *Literatur*, 1:87, and Alexander Kazhdan, "Tzetzes, John," *ODB* 3:2136.

that Doxapatres was a contemporary of both.<sup>17</sup> But the identification with Eustathius proved wrong, as even Fuhr soon admitted,<sup>18</sup> since the Eustathius referred to by Doxapatres is doubtless another Eustathius, known from other sources, who lived before the sixth century and probably in the fourth or fifth centuries.<sup>19</sup> This reference thus drops out as evidence of Doxapatres's dates.

But the critical remarks about Doxapatres by Tzetzes, who died shortly after 1180, remain relevant, as they form the *terminus ante quem*. And Doxapatres's own references to Siceliotes, already noted, provide the other *terminus*. Herbert Hunger places Doxapatres closer to the latter and specifically in the generation after him—in other words, in the second half of the eleventh century.<sup>20</sup> Confirmation of this dating comes from two passages in Doxapatres's commentary on Aphthonius. The first passage, which appears in a discussion of the meter in the lines from Theognis<sup>21</sup> (which Aphthonius had used for his model elaboration of a maxim<sup>22</sup>), is an epigram that was written in the apse of the great church in Constantinople and mentions one Romanos.<sup>23</sup> Again, some confusion arose, as Rabe identified him initially as Emperor Romanos I Lakapenos (920–944)<sup>24</sup> but later, without further comment, as Romanos III Argyros (1028–1034).<sup>25</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Karl Fuhr, "Zwei Hermogenescommentaren," *RhM* 51 (1896): 45–51, esp. 45.

<sup>18</sup> Karl Fuhr, "Nachtrag zu oben p. 48f.," *RhM* 51 (1896): 164; cf. Radermacher, "Doxapatres," 1612.

<sup>19</sup> On this earlier Eustathius, see further J. Brzoska, "Eustathius (17)," *PW* 6.1:1451–52; Hunger, *Literatur*, 1:81; and Malcolm Heath, *Menander: A Rhetor in Context* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 71 and n. 42.

<sup>20</sup> Hunger, *Literatur*, 1:83, following Rabe, *Prolegomenon*, li–lii. Others settling on the eleventh century include Krumbacher, *Geschichte*, 462, who prefers the early eleventh century because he identified him with Siceliotes; Kustas, *Studies*, 25, and Kennedy, *Greek Rhetoric*, 312, place him in the mid-eleventh century.

<sup>21</sup> See Theognis, *Eleg.* 1.175–76 (12 Young).

<sup>22</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 4 (8,12–13 Rabe).

<sup>23</sup> Doxapatres 2:309,19–25 (Walz).

<sup>24</sup> See Rabe, "Quellen des Doxapatres," 572. On this emperor, see Alexander Kazhdan, "Romanos I Lakapenos," *ODB* 3:1806.

<sup>25</sup> See Rabe, *Prolegomenon*, li, followed by Hunger, *Literatur*, 1:83, and Kennedy, *Greek Rhetoric*, 312. On this emperor, see Charles M. Brand and Anthony Cutler, "Romanos III Argyros," *ODB* 3:1807.

The other passage from Doxapatres's commentary is a sample speaking-in-character, which begins as follows: What words Michael might say when he was driven from the palace.<sup>26</sup> Walz<sup>27</sup> and later Rabe identified this Michael as Michael V Kalaphates (1041–1042),<sup>28</sup> but Rabe, noting that the speaking-in-character does not appear in the II-scholia, one of Doxapatres's sources, attributed it to Doxapatres himself.<sup>29</sup> Doxapatres, however, is not the author of this or any of the other sample progymnasmata included in his commentary.<sup>30</sup> But this sample speaking-in-character does at least confirm the latter half of the eleventh century for the dates of Doxapatres.

To sum up: the meager biographical information about Doxapatres, once the confusions are cleared up, points to an individual of unknown origin, though probably not from Sicily; an individual whose name was spelled Doxapatres; an individual who, because of the etymology of his name, was probably a monk, although there is no evidence that he resented the consequent poverty; and, finally, an individual who was active most likely in Constantinople, the center of rhetorical education, and most likely during the second half of the eleventh century. More information might be available in his commentaries on Hermogenes, which are still largely unpublished, but a closer reading of his commentary on Aphthonius, as will be shown below, can be of help, at least in filling out his interests and achievements as a commentator.

The only word for Doxapatres's writings is "voluminous." His commentary on Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata* is by far the longest of any in this volume—483 pages in Walz's edition.<sup>31</sup> In

<sup>26</sup> Doxapatres 2:508, 18–509, 3 (Walz).

<sup>27</sup> Walz, *Rhetores Graeci*, 2:iv and note.

<sup>28</sup> On this Michael and his banishment, see Charles M. Brand, "Michael V Kalaphates," *ODB* 2:1366.

<sup>29</sup> Rabe, "Quellen des Doxapatres," 580–81, and 559–62 for the close, yet distinguishable, relationship between the II-scholia and the P-Scholia treated in chapter 2. Further confusion is added by Kennedy (*Greek Rhetoric*, 312), who, seemingly summarizing Rabe, nevertheless still identifies this Michael as Michael IV (1034–1041).

<sup>30</sup> See further *Chreia* 2:234–37, and esp. Craig A. Gibson, "The Anonymous Progymnasmata in John Doxapatres' *Homiliae in Aphthonium*," *ByzZ* 102 (2009): 83–94, esp. 83–86.

<sup>31</sup> Doxapatres 2:81–564 (Walz).

addition, he wrote commentaries on at least three of the four Hermogenean treatises that make up the rest of the *Corpus Hermogenianum*: *On Issues*, *On Invention*, and *On Types of Style*. Since only the introductions to these commentaries are fully available,<sup>32</sup> it is difficult to get any sense of their size, but if they are in any way as comprehensive as his commentary on Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata*, the notion "voluminous squared" comes to mind.<sup>33</sup> Our focus, of course, is on Doxapatres's commentary on Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata*. Some general remarks on this commentary are in order before turning in greater detail to the chapter on the chreia.

DOXAPATRES'S COMMENTARY ON APHTHONIUS'S  
*PROGYMNASMATA*

Previous work on Doxapatres's commentary has been thin and sporadic. The most intensive work took place in the early twentieth century and primarily by Hugo Rabe.<sup>34</sup> He used his intimate knowledge of the commentary, however, only on the text and the sources used by Doxapatres. His textual efforts resulted in a

<sup>32</sup> See *PS* 304–18, 360–74, and 420–26 (Rabe). In addition to the introductions, note also the excerpts—twenty in all from Barocc. 175—of Doxapatres's commentary on Hermogenes's *On Invention* that have been included by J. A. Cramer in his *Anecdota graeca e codd. manuscriptis bibliothecarum oxoniensium* [4 vols.; Oxford: e Typographeo academico, 1835–1837], 4:155–69.

<sup>33</sup> Krumbacher (*Geschichte*, 462) lists some other works, based on Walz (see *Rhetores Graeci*, 6:vii–ix). But some of those listed, now that John Doxapatres and John Siceliotes are distinguished, must be dropped (so 6:56–504 Walz); others, mistakenly attributed to Doxapatres (see, e.g., 6:1–32 Walz) but now considered anonymous (see *PS* 18–43 [Rabe]; and Georg Lehnert, review of Hugo Rabe, ed., *Prolegomenon Sylloge*, *PhW* 54 (1934): 65–74, esp. 68), must be dropped; and still others, mentioned by Walz (see *Rhetores Graeci*, 6:viii), one of which is likely a model refutation (*ἀνασχευή τοῦ τοῦ Προμηθέως μύθου*), are no longer extant.

<sup>34</sup> Besides the scholarship of Rabe, to be cited below, see more recently Kustas, *Studies*, 25–26, 89, 111 n. 2, 124 n. 2; and Gibson, "Anonymous Progymnasmata," 83–94. Other studies of education at the time of Doxapatres ignore him altogether; see, e.g., Panagiotis A. Agapitos, "Teachers, Pupils and Imperial Power in Eleventh-Century Byzantium," in *Pedagogy and Power: Rhetorics of Classical Learning* (ed. Yun Lee Too and Niall Livingstone; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 170–91.



new edition of Doxapatres's lengthy introductory chapter, which appears in his *Prolegomenon Sylloge*.<sup>35</sup> As for sources, Rabe recognized that Doxapatres named numerous sources and some of them quite often. For example, Doxapatres quotes John Geometres's now lost commentary on Aphthonius over ninety times.<sup>36</sup> Doxapatres obviously admired this late tenth-century commentator, calling him at one point ὁ σοφώτατος Γεωμέτρης.<sup>37</sup> But Rabe argues that a comparison of the II-scholia with Doxapatres at a number of passages shows that Doxapatres did not draw directly from this near contemporary, much less from any of his much earlier sources, whether it is Menander Rhetor, Aristides, Porphyry, Simplicius, or Diodorus Siculus. Rather, the scholiast and Doxapatres both drew on an earlier *Vorlage*.<sup>38</sup> Even in Geometres's case, where Doxapatres frequently juxtaposes him with earlier commentators<sup>39</sup> he still got him via this *Vorlage*.<sup>40</sup> Rabe does allow that Doxapatres has not copied from any source when he

<sup>35</sup> PS 80–155 (Rabe).

<sup>36</sup> See Rabe, "Quellen des Doxapatres," 573; but Doxapatres quotes John Geometres only three times in the chreia chapter (see 3.10; 6.9 and 28).

<sup>37</sup> See Doxapatres 2:554,33 (Walz). Doxapatres's admiration is well justified. Besides the commentary on Aphthonius, Geometres wrote sample progymnasmata in prose and verse. On the prose progymnasmata, four encomia and two descriptions, see Anthony R. Littlewood, ed., *The Progymnasmata of Ioannes Geometres* (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1972). For an analysis of the first, an encomium of the oak, see Littlewood, "A Byzantine Oak and Its Classical Acorn: The Literary Artistry of Geometres, Progymnasmata 1," *JÖB* 29 (1980): 133–44. For verse examples of speaking-in-character, description, and encomia see Emilie Marlène van Opstall, ed., *Jean Géomètre: Poèmes en hexamètres et en distiques élégiaques* (MMed 75; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 139, 286, 358, 542, 546. Littlewood and van Opstall analyze Geometres's progymnasmata in terms of Hermogenes and Aphthonius, but further insights might accrue if quotations from the relevant chapters from Geometres's commentary on Aphthonius were used in the analysis. In any case, on what we know of Geometres's life (ca. 940–1000), see Alexander Kazhdan, "John Geometres," *ODB* 2:1059; Marc D. Lauxtermann, "John Geometres—Poet and Soldier," *Byzantion* 68 (1998): 356–80; and van Opstall, *Géomètre*, 3–17.

<sup>38</sup> Rabe characterizes this *Vorlage* as a rich collection of scholia that was nameless and, due to the use of Geometres and the mention of Romanos, is to be dated about 1000 (see Rabe, "Quellen des Doxapatres," 573, 585).

<sup>39</sup> See, e.g., Doxapatres 2:206,18–19; 228,12; 229,9; 430,7–8 (Walz).

<sup>40</sup> Rabe, "Quellen des Doxapatres," 565–74; accepted by Hunger, *Literatur*, 1:79.

voices his own view on a matter, and so we learn more about Doxapatres, at least about his intentions, interests, and blind spots as a commentator. For example, Rabe notes that Doxapatres placed the progymnasmata more firmly in a rhetorical context, stressed the meaning of specific words and phrases over general content, and minimized (in contrast to the  $\Pi$ -scholia) historical and mythological explanations.<sup>41</sup>

It is not surprising that Doxapatres did not cite directly all his named sources, given the penchant of commentators to build on one another. Nor is it surprising that such dependence can lead to occasional mistakes. Thus, George Kustas, for example, notes that Doxapatres attributed a definition of rhetoric to Dionysius Thrax when in fact it was that of Dionysius of Halicarnassus.<sup>42</sup> But elsewhere quotations from Dionysius Thrax are accurate,<sup>43</sup> and even Rabe has to admit that Doxapatres's responsible use of his many sources makes him, since his principal *Vorlage* is no longer extant, a valuable source of earlier material for scholars of Byzantine rhetoric.<sup>44</sup>

The value of Doxapatres's numerous sources, even if largely indirect, transcends Rabe's concern for *Quellenforschung*. These sources function primarily to explain Aphthonius's text, but they also function to place the *Progymnasmata* of Aphthonius—on whom Doxapatres often confers the honorary title  $\delta$  σοφιστής<sup>45</sup>—within the entire educational curriculum. For example, Doxapatres uses these sources to remind students of what they learned at the secondary level and to show their relevance for beginning tertiary training, as becomes evident from his use, as mentioned

<sup>41</sup> Rabe, "Quellen des Doxapatres," 585.

<sup>42</sup> Kustas, *Studies*, 167 n. 5; see Doxapatres 2:104,7–9 (Walz) (= *PS* 106,21–23 [Rabe]).

<sup>43</sup> See Doxapatres 2:197,7–8 (Walz) (= Dionysius Thrax, *Ars gramm.* 2 [6,5 Uhlig]), 200,1 (= *Ars gramm.* 1 [5,2–3]), and 416,27–417,1 (= *Ars gramm.* 12 [24,3–4]).

<sup>44</sup> Rabe, *Prolegomenon*, liii. Rabe is typical in seeing Doxapatres's value only in the previous sources that he preserved (see also Krumbacher, *Geschichte*, 462; Radermacher, "Doxapatres," 1312; and Hunger, *Literatur*, 1:83).

<sup>45</sup> See esp. Doxapatres 2:127,20–21 and 128,8–13 (Walz) (= *PS* 136,2–3 and 14–19 [Rabe]). Doxapatres often uses this title alone when referring to Aphthonius (see, e.g., 207,7 and 21; 212,14; 240,11; 242,20; 312,9 and 11; 323,20; 340,15 and 24—twenty-nine times in all).

above, of Dionysius Thrax's standard grammatical textbook,<sup>46</sup> not to mention Doxapatres's forty plus quotations from ὁ ποιητής, whose *Iliad* and *Odyssey* were the students' basic literary texts.<sup>47</sup> Doxapatres also cites frequently from other *Progymnasmata* to supplement Aphthonius's spare treatments, as is indicated by numerous quotations; he cites especially from Hermogenes's *Progymnasmata*,<sup>48</sup> but also from at least the definitions of a lost *Progymnasmata*, that by Sopatros,<sup>49</sup> and a few times from Nicolaus's (that, as we have seen, allowed his *Progymnasmata* to be rediscovered).<sup>50</sup> In addition, Doxapatres gives special emphasis to the ways that the progymnasmata anticipated various aspects of the rhetorical curriculum proper, as is shown by his forty-two explicit references to, or quotations from, at least three of Hermogenes's rhetorical treatises—*On Issues*, *On Invention*, and *On Types of Style*.<sup>51</sup> This use of Hermogenes is especially noteworthy since earlier commentators like John of Sardis and the P-scholia make only limited use of Hermogenes. John of Sardis cites Hermogenes only seven times, six of which occur in the later

<sup>46</sup> See Doxapatres 2:197,7–8; 200,1; 310,15–20; 416,27 (Walz).

<sup>47</sup> See, e.g., Doxapatres 2:165,31; 182,12; 206,9; 210,29; 219,27; 224,26; 229,1; 230,18 (Walz).

<sup>48</sup> See, e.g., Doxapatres 2:147,9; 156,20; 154,7; 175,31; 176,21; 197,7 (Walz).

<sup>49</sup> See Doxapatres 2:156,23; 161,17; 288,10; 371,12; 534 (Walz). The fragments and other references are collected at the back of Rabe's edition of Aphthonius (see Hugo Rabe, ed., *Aphthonii Progymnasmata* [Rhetores Graeci 10; Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1926], 57–70).

<sup>50</sup> See Doxapatres 2:198,17–199,3; 539,14–18; 548,14–17 (Walz); *Chreia* 1:238–39; and *Chreia* 2:200–201.

<sup>51</sup> The role of Hermogenes's rhetorical treatises in Doxapatres's explanation of Aphthonius deserves a special study. For some references to his *On Issues*, see, e.g., Doxapatres 2:101,7; 140,28; 169,3; 211,8; 189,25 (Walz); for his *On Invention*, see, e.g., Doxapatres 2:126,18; 207,26; 212,19; 214,27 (Walz); for his *On Types of Style*, see, e.g., Doxapatres 2:216,27; 219,1; 227,15; 236,16; 237,4 and 16 (Walz). On Doxapatres's attempt to relate Aphthonius to Hermogenes, see also Hugo Rabe, "Aus Rhetoren-Handschriften: 10. Einleitungen," *RhM* 64 (1909): 539–78, esp. 539: "für Dox. gehörten Aphthonios' *Progymnasmata* schon unlöslich zum Hermogenes-Corpora und damit zum rhetorischen Kursus." Note that Doxapatres could also refer back to Aphthonius when commenting on Hermogenes, as he does in his commentary on *On Invention* where he refers back to Aphthonius's encomium of Thucydides (see 4:166,15–17 Cramer).

progymnasmata,<sup>52</sup> and there are only eight references in all of the P-scholia.<sup>53</sup> The later progymnasmata—the fifth, common place; the eleventh, speech-in-character; and the fourteenth, introduction of a law—are all closer to the rhetorical speeches that the students would soon be learning, so that looking ahead to Hermogenes makes sense. In other words, if Malcolm Heath's contention, namely, that the progymnasmata were "preliminary to rhetoric rather than a preliminary part of it,"<sup>54</sup> is true of John of Sardis and the P-scholia, it no longer is for Doxapatres. He incorporates Hermogenes throughout his commentary, beginning in the chapter on the fable.<sup>55</sup> This incorporation of rhetoric is also suggested by his forty-five quotes from the speeches of ὁ ῥήτωρ,<sup>56</sup> Demosthenes.<sup>57</sup>

Doxapatres's citations even point to an attempt to incorporate philosophy into the study of progymnasmata, as indicated by fourteen references to Porphyry's influential introduction to philosophy, the *Introduction*,<sup>58</sup> as well as by references to and quo-

<sup>52</sup> John of Sardis, *Comm. in Aphth.* 2 (20,2 Rabe) (alluding tacitly and loosely to *On Types of Style* 1.2 [226,14 Rabe]); 5 (95,3) (alluding tacitly and loosely to *On Method* 27 [444,14–16]); 5 (108,3) (alluding tacitly but rather closely to *On Issues* 3 [53,1–3]); 5 (108,13–20) (citing explicitly and quoting at length from *On Invention* 4.2 [173,2–9]); 5 (114,5) (alluding tacitly and briefly to *On Issues* 3 [52,16–17]); 13 (242,23) (alluding tacitly and loosely to *On Issues* 7 [78,1–3]); and 14 (263,14) (alluding tacitly but clearly to *On Issues* 2 [38,3–5]).

<sup>53</sup> The P-scholia refer explicitly to Hermogenes eight times, twice generally (see 2:566,21 [introduction] and 674,21 Walz [introduction of a law]) and six times to specific books. For *On Issues* see 2:671,1 and 674,25 (both introduction of a law); for *On Types of Style*, see 2:646,31; 647,8; 647,25 (all speech-in-character); and 671,20 (introduction of a law).

<sup>54</sup> Heath, *Menander*, 219.

<sup>55</sup> See Doxapatres 2:169,3–6 (Walz), referring to Hermogenes, *On Issues* 1 (38,16–39,19 Rabe), when discussing Aphthonius's division of fables.

<sup>56</sup> For this title, see Doxapatres 2:169,27; 332,18; 379,6; 558,20 (Walz).

<sup>57</sup> See, e.g., Doxapatres 2:87,24; 110,17; 128,15; 134,18; 169,27; 192,8 and 10; 203,11; 217,4–6 (Walz).

<sup>58</sup> See, e.g., Doxapatres 2:93,24; 95,6; 106,5; 157,4; 168,29; 169,21; 211,5; 374,29 (Walz).

tations of ὁ φιλόσοφος,<sup>59</sup> Plato,<sup>60</sup> not to mention Aristotle as well (mostly in the introductory chapter).<sup>61</sup>

Finally, Doxapatres cast the net even more broadly by relating the progymnasmata and rhetoric as a whole to Christianity. There are various ways that he Christianized the progymnasmatic tradition. Scattered throughout his commentary are brief quotations from ἡ θεία γραφή (“the divine scripture”). For example, Doxapatres uses Genesis to show that God used all three kinds (εἴδη) of public speech. He classifies Gen 1:26—“Let us make man in our image and likeness”—as an example of advisory (συμβουλευτικόν) speech. He refers to God’s accusations and judgment of Adam and Eve (Gen 3:11–20) as an example of judicial (δικανικόν) speech, and he quotes Gen 1:31—“God saw everything that he made, and behold it was very good”—as an example of celebratory (πανηγυρικόν) speech.<sup>62</sup> In addition, there are quotations of and references to the New Testament: there is a brief quotation from Acts 1:1, which, Doxapatres adds, was written by ὁ μέγας Λούκας (“the great Luke”);<sup>63</sup> he quotes 1 Cor 12:28, attributed ὁ ἀπόστολος (i.e., Paul), as an example of ἀπαρίθμησις (“enumeration”);<sup>64</sup> and he gives a snippet from Christian doctrine: ἐκ παρθένου ἄγνης (“from the holy virgin”).<sup>65</sup> The last of

<sup>59</sup> See Doxapatres 2:115,8 (Walz).

<sup>60</sup> In addition to a lengthy quotation from the *Gorgias* (463A–465C) in Doxapatres 2:112,19–115,6 (Walz), see also Doxapatres 2:89,22; 94,7 and 22; 95,11; 96,9; 112,11 and 16; 154,27 and 29; 230,7; 437,28 (Walz).

<sup>61</sup> See Doxapatres 2:93,23; 94,23; 95,10 and 17; 102,8; 104,5; 106,4; 319,24 (Walz). Note also that commentators on Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* occasionally cite Aphthonius. An anonymous commentator refers to Aphthonius’s model comparison of Achilles and Hector (Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 10 [32,3–33,25 Rabe]) (see Hugo Rabe, ed., *Anonymi et Stephani in Artem Rhetoricam Commentaria* [2 vols.; CAG 21.1–2; Berlin: Reimer, 1896], 2:57,3–4), and Stephanus cites Aphthonius four times. Calling him ὁ ῥήτωρ, Stephanus refers to features of Aphthonius’s treatment of encomium, common place, and maxim (see Rabe, *Anonymi et Stephani*, 2:281,30; 282,8–11 and 14–15; 299,38).

<sup>62</sup> Doxapatres 2:92,25–93,4 (Walz). Doxapatres follows the LXX except for its τὰ πάντα; he has only πάντα.

<sup>63</sup> Doxapatres 2:526,11 (Walz).

<sup>64</sup> Doxapatres 2:218,27 (Walz).

<sup>65</sup> Doxapatres 2:148,12–13 (Walz). This use of Christian material continues in Doxapatres’s commentaries on Hermogenes, as seen in the commentary on *On Issues*, where he analyzes Matt 6:25–30 in terms of its rhetorical argumentation, which makes use of ἐνθυμήματα, ἐργασίαι ἀπὸ παραβολῆς, and

these quotations is used to explain one of the meanings of the word προῆλθε in the opening line of the chapter on the fable as equivalent to ἐγεννήθη (“was born”).<sup>66</sup> More numerous are citations from church fathers, in particular John Chrysostom<sup>67</sup> and the Cappadocians Basil<sup>68</sup> and especially ὁ θεόλογος, Gregory Nazianzus, whom Doxapatres quotes ten times.<sup>69</sup> These men, precisely at this time, were becoming Christian models of rhetorical style,<sup>70</sup> and toward the end of the century they were commemorated by a feast that was to recognize contributions to education and the cultivation of rhetoric.<sup>71</sup> This Christianization of rhetoric leads Doxapatres, as Kustas has observed, to regard rhetoric as a sacred act—indeed, to call rhetoric at the very beginning of his introductory chapter a μέγα μυστήριον (“a great mystery”).<sup>72</sup>

Besides Doxapatres’s attempts to integrate the progymnasmata into the grammatical, rhetorical, philosophical, and even Christian traditions, his real purpose was to comment on Aphthonius’s *Progymnasmata*. In the introductory chapter he discusses a number of subjects, but central is his orienting discussion of Aphthonius’s textbook in terms of a standard—as shown by ὧς φασι—series of eight topics that prepares the reader to turn to the textbook itself.<sup>73</sup> These topics are the aim (σκοπός) of the textbook,

ἐπιχειρήματα (see 4:163,26–164,5 Cramer).

<sup>66</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 1 (1,4 Rabe).

<sup>67</sup> Doxapatres 2:132,14; 379,19 (Walz).

<sup>68</sup> See, e.g., Doxapatres 2:188,7–16, which is a rather lengthy quotation from Basil’s protreptic sermon on baptism, though with some textual variants from Migne’s edition (see Basil, *Hom.* 13.7 [PG 31:437C–440A]).

<sup>69</sup> See, e.g., Doxapatres 2:132,12; 227,24; 291,7; 405,15; 422,29; 425,24; 428,24; 450,11; 480,14; 526,14 (Walz).

<sup>70</sup> See, e.g., Doxapatres 2:450,11 (Walz), where he speaks of Gregory of Nazianzus as ὁ καθ’ ἡμᾶς λαμπρότατος ἐν λόγοις Γρηγόριος (“Gregory, our own most brilliant orator”).

<sup>71</sup> On the rise of the three, known as the Three Hierarchs, see Agapitos, “Teachers, Pupils and Imperial Power,” 187–91, and, esp. for Gregory Nazianzus, Thomas M. Conley, “Demosthenes Dethroned: Gregory Nazianzus in Sikeliotes’ Scholia on Hermogenes’ Περὶ ἰδεῶν,” *ICS* 27–28 (2002–2003): 145–52.

<sup>72</sup> Kustas, *Studies*, 119–26; see Doxapatres 2:81,6–7 (Walz) (= *PS* 80,12–13 [Rabe]).

<sup>73</sup> While the series of topics that precede reading a book include more than rhetorical texts (see Denis van Berchem, “Poetes et grammairiens:

how it is useful (χρήσιμον), whether it is genuine (γνήσιον), the order (τάξις) of reading it, the reason (αἰτία) for the textbook's title, its division (διάρσεις) into parts, its method (τρόπος) of teaching, and, substituting for a topic used in philosophy, why it is the preferred textbook.<sup>74</sup>

Here we will confine ourselves to the σκοπός. "Aphthonius's σκοπός for the *Progymnasmata* is to provide preliminary training in, and to become accustomed to, the kinds [εἶδη] and parts [μέρη] of rhetoric as well as the parts of a public speech."<sup>75</sup> Rhetoric has three εἶδη: advisory, judicial, and celebratory. The progymnasmata provide preliminary training in these εἶδη as follows: "Of the progymnasmata," Doxapatres says, "some have characteristics of the advisory εἶδος, such as the fable, thesis, chreia, and maxim; others of a judicial speech, such as the refutation, confirmation, and common place; and still others of a celebratory speech, such as the encomium, invective, and comparison."<sup>76</sup>

Doxapatres speaks of the μέρη of rhetoric in two senses, one familiar, one less so. Familiar is the division of each εἶδος into two μέρη: the advisory into persuasion and dissuasion, the judicial into prosecution and defense, and the celebratory into praise and blame.<sup>77</sup> The second sense of μέρη is a little confused because Doxapatres is really talking about the εἶδη of rhetoric, but the change of terminology does not negate his point and in fact is explained by the use of μέρη, which is regularly used to speak of the "parts" of the soul. He says:

Recherche sur la tradition scolaire d'explication des auteurs," *MH* 9 [1952]: 79–87), the earliest such discussion in the rhetorical commentaries seems to be in an anonymous prolegomenon from perhaps the sixth century, available now in *PS* 73, 11–17 (Rabe). Closer to Doxapatres himself is the use of this series by John Siceliotes in his introduction to *On Types of Style* (see Siceliotes 2:64, 2–9 [Walz] [= *PS* 401, 27–402, 4 (Rabe)]). See also Jaap Mansfeld, *Prolegomena: Questions to Be Settled before the Study of an Author, or a Text* (PhilAnt 61; Leiden: Brill, 1994).

<sup>74</sup> Doxapatres 2:120, 10–19 (Walz) (= *PS* 127, 22–128, 3 [Rabe]). Doxapatres introduced his other commentaries on the Corpus Hermogenianum with the same series of topics (see *PS* 304, 9–13 [Rabe] [*On Issues*]; *PS* 360, 13–16 [*On Invention*]; and *PS* 420, 13–421, 1 [*On Types of Style*]).

<sup>75</sup> Doxapatres 2:121, 1–4 (Walz) (= *PS* 128, 4–8 [Rabe]).

<sup>76</sup> Doxapatres 2:125, 5–10 (Walz) (= *PS* 133, 7–12 [Rabe]).

<sup>77</sup> Doxapatres 2:122, 5–9 (Walz) (= *PS* 129, 17–21 [Rabe]).

It was necessary for rhetoric to be joined to the human soul and to be divided in ways that are analogous to the parts [τοιζ μέρεσι] of the soul. Now the parts [μέρη] of the soul are the rational [λογικόν], the emotional [θυμικόν], and the appetitive [ἐπιθυμητικόν]. Therefore, advisory speech is analogous to the rational part [λογικῶ] of the soul, for just as our reason steers us to what is good, so also advisory speech dissuades us from what is not good, and pushes us to what is good. Judicial speech is analogous to the emotional part [θυμικῶ], for they say that emotion is a seething of blood about the heart that yearns for retaliation.<sup>78</sup> Similarly, a judicial speech is “to defend oneself whenever someone was previously angry at you.”<sup>79</sup> Celebratory speech is analogous to appetite [ἐπιθυμία], for desire has as its goal what is noble (and so also does a celebratory speech have what is noble as its goal).<sup>80</sup>

In other words, what students learned on first taking up preliminary training in rhetoric was not only that their training as a public speaker would provide them with a valuable set of skills but that the skills needed to deliver the three kinds of public speech would also develop all three parts of their souls and so enable them to become fully human.

The progymnasmata also provide preliminary training, as indicated above, in composing the parts (μέρη) of a public speech—the introduction, statement of the case, proof, and epilogue. As Doxapatres explains:

Of the progymnasmata some are analogous to the introduction, such as the fable. For just as the task of the introduction is to make the audience attentive to what will be said in the statement of the case, so also a task of a fable is to prepare the audience for accepting the moral of the fable. . . . Others are analogous to the

<sup>78</sup> These words seem to draw on a passage from Aristotle. In *De an.* 403a31 there is a discussion of what anger (ὀργή) is. Natural philosophers (φυσικοί) say that it is seething of blood and heat around the heart (ζέειν τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν αἵματος), whereas dialecticians (διαλεκτικοί) say it is a yearning for retaliation (ὀρεξιν ἀντιλυπῆσεως). These two definitions have been combined here.

<sup>79</sup> Cf. *Od.* 16.72; 21.133; etc.

<sup>80</sup> Doxapatres 2:121,22–122,5 (Walz) (= *PS* 129,4–17 [Rabe]). The final words in parentheses are not in Doxapatres but are supplied to complete the thought. The words come from a nearly identical statement of this analogy between rhetoric and the soul in another prolegomenon (see *PS* 170,21 [Rabe]).



statement of the case, such as the narrative and the description. It is clear, then, that the one who has composed such exercises would not be flustered in composing this part. Refutation and confirmation are analogous to the argumentative part of a speech, and the common place to the epilogue.<sup>81</sup>

In these ways, then, the progymnasmata would prepare students for the more rigorous training in rhetoric and its instruction in the εἶδη and μέρη of rhetoric.

Finally, when Doxapatres turns to comment on Aphthonius's textbook itself, he provides both specific comments on nearly every word and some more general analytical guidance about what this textbook contains and often why it does so. Doxapatres makes the rather obvious observation that each progymnasma has two parts, a theoretical part, which he terms the μέθοδος, and a fully worked-out illustration, which he calls the παράδειγμα.<sup>82</sup> Aphthonius provided παραδείγματα, Doxapatres says, to ensure clarity, "for παραδείγματα illuminate what is being taught, and so by means of them all things become clear."<sup>83</sup>

While the παραδείγματα have the same function throughout, the μέθοδοι are much more complex and varied. In the chapter on the narrative Doxapatres provides an overview of the subjects, which he terms παρατηρήματα, that appear in the μέθοδος sections of the various progymnasmata. Aphthonius treats the various progymnasmata under the following παρατηρήματα: definition (ὅρος), division into classes (διαίρεσις εἰς εἶδη), headings (κεφάλαια), differentiation (διαφορά) from related progymnasmata, reason for the name (αἰτία τῆς ὀνομασίας), and three παρατηρήματα that appear in only one progymnasma. Specifically, Doxapatres notes that only the ὅρος appears in every progymnasma. The διαίρεσις εἰς εἶδη appears in all progymnasmata except refutation, confirmation, and common place. The αἰτία τῆς ὀνομασίας appears only in the chreia, common place, and encomium. And some παρατηρήματα appear only in one progymnasma—origin (γένεσις) and naming (κλήσεις) in the fable, and virtues (ἄρεται) in the narrative.<sup>84</sup> With the two-part structure of the chapters of Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata*

<sup>81</sup> Doxapatres 2:125,14–126,3 (Walz) (= PS 133,16–124,6 [Rabe]).

<sup>82</sup> See esp. Doxapatres 2:177,26–31 (Walz). See also 2:241,16 and 18 (Walz).

<sup>83</sup> Doxapatres 2:177,31–33 (Walz).

<sup>84</sup> See Doxapatres 2:193,22–194,26 (Walz).

identified and the possible subjects in the μέθοδος of each chapter revealed, we can now turn from Doxapatres's overall analysis to his specific analysis of Aphthonius's chreia chapter.

DOXAPATRES'S COMMENTARY  
ON APHTHONIUS'S CHREIA CHAPTER

Before Doxapatres comments directly on the text of Aphthonius's chreia chapter, he takes up two, by now traditional, subjects—sequence and utility—which, as we have seen, are part of the series of topics that must precede reading a book or, in this case, a chapter.<sup>85</sup> Regarding the chreia's third place in the progymnasmatic sequence (τάξις) (1.1–3), Doxapatres cites three reasons why Aphthonius was correct in placing the chreia third in the sequence, that is, after the chapters on the fable and narrative. The first reason is new. Doxapatres says that the chreia belongs with the fable and narrative because some chreiai, that is, those told for the sake of wit (αἱ χαριεντισμοῦ ἐνεκεν), are recited merely to delight, a function that is true also for fables and narratives, at least for fictional ones (1.1). The second and third reasons have precedents in John of Sardis and the P-scholia, although direct use seems most unlikely. The second reason for the sequence fable-narrative-chreia is that these three progymnasmata follow the sequence of the parts of a public speech. Thus the fable can be compared to the introduction, the narrative to the statement of the case, and the chreia elaboration to the argument (1.2).<sup>86</sup> Doxapatres's third reason seems an afterthought, since he says that some (ἐνιοι) commentators argue in terms of increasing complexity—the narrative being more complex than the fable and the chreia more complex than both (1.3). Doxapatres's source here could be John of Sardis or the P-scholia but hardly directly.<sup>87</sup> In other words, Doxapatres has made this discussion of τάξις his own.

<sup>85</sup> The other topics—genuineness, reason for the title, teaching method, and why Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata* prevailed—could be treated satisfactorily in the introductory chapter (see Doxapatres 2:127,4–131,26 [Walz] [= *PS* 135,7–140,24 (Rabe)]).

<sup>86</sup> Cf. John of Sardis 1.9, 13.

<sup>87</sup> Cf. John of Sardis 1.15; P-scholia 2.4.

As for the chreia being useful (*χρήσιμον*), the second preliminary subject, Doxapatres argues that the chreia—better, the chreia elaboration—is useful for introducing students to the functions and skills involved in composing the three kinds (*εἶδη*) of public speech (2.1–2) and the four parts (*μέρη*) of a public speech (2.3). This claim of double utility derives, as we have seen, from the P-scholia, although Doxapatres has taken this material from later in the P-scholia, namely, in a discussion of parts and parts and wholes, which is a characteristic topic of Nicolaus’s analysis of the *progymnasmata*.<sup>88</sup> Doxapatres drops the parts and parts and wholes terminology and instead speaks of utility, but he generally follows his source, changing only some terms in order to conform to Aphthonius’s—such as changing *ἐγκώμιον* and *παράφρασις*<sup>89</sup> to *ἐγκωμιαστικόν* and *παράφραστικόν* (2.3).

Having dispensed with *τάξεις* and *χρῆσις*, Doxapatres turns to Aphthonius’s commentary itself and follows him topic by topic; as we have seen, he calls these topics *παρατηρήματα*,<sup>90</sup> which for the chreia include four: definition (*ὅρος*), etymology (*ἐτυμολογία*), division (*διαίρεσις*), and headings (*κεφάλαια*) (3.1–2). Aphthonius defined a chreia as “a concise reminiscence aptly attributed to some individual” (Aphth 2–3 H/ON [= 3,21–22 Rabe]). This two-line definition takes Doxapatres 128 lines (in Walz’s edition) to treat fully—much, much longer than it took John of Sardis (35 lines in Rabe’s edition) and the P-scholia (only 13 lines in Walz’s). These comparisons should give us an indication of how comprehensive Doxapatres’s commentary on the chreia is.

Doxapatres begins his discussion of the definition by first explaining why this *παρατήρημα* precedes the others and indeed does so throughout the *Progymnasmata*. The reason is that by learning the nature of a *progymnasma* the student is better able to follow what else he says about it (3.3). Doxapatres then turns to the definition itself and compares Aphthonius’s with those of Hermogenes and Nicolaus (via the P-scholia), though Nicolaus is not identified specifically. Neither definition, however, is without fault, for Hermogenes’s definition uses a disjunctive conjunction

<sup>88</sup> See P-scholia 6.2–3; cf. Nicolaus 138–61 H/ON (= 23,6–24,3 Felten).

<sup>89</sup> See P-scholia 6.3.

<sup>90</sup> See Doxapatres 2:193,22 (Walz).

and Nicolaus's leaves out mixed chreiai (3.4–5). Thus Doxapatres is left with Aphthonius's, and he very thoroughly treats each word of the definition: "reminiscence," "aptly," "attributed," and "individual."

Doxapatres treats the word "reminiscence" (ἀπομνημόνευμα) somewhat similarly to the way John of Sardis did. Both see reminiscence as a general literary category that can take either of two forms—one concise, which is a chreia, and one expanded, which is also called "reminiscence" (3.6).<sup>91</sup> And both cite an example of an expanded saying, although each uses a different example. John of Sardis used a saying of Epaminondas and recited it concisely as a chreia<sup>92</sup> and then at length as a reminiscence,<sup>93</sup> but Doxapatres recites only the expanded version of a saying attributed to Demetrius (3.7). Doxapatres moves even further away from John of Sardis when he concludes his treatment of the word "reminiscence" by identifying the role of this word in the definition. He says that "reminiscence" functions as the generic term (γένος), whereas the remaining terms of the definition—"aptly" and "attributed to some individual"—become the distinguishing terms (διαφοραί) (3.8).

Doxapatres says that the word "aptly" (εὐστόχως) can be understood in three ways: (1) if the attribution of the chreia is correctly attributed, (2) if the occasion when the chreia is recited is timely, and (3) if the content of the chreia espouses some value (3.8–10). John of Sardis said nothing in this regard, the P-scholia mentioned only the first interpretation,<sup>94</sup> and Doxapatres cites John Geometres as the source for the third (3.10).

Doxapatres focuses next on the word "individual" (πρόσωπον) and goes beyond anything said by previous commentators. He begins by asking whether a chreia can be attributed to a πρόσωπον who is or is not capable of being investigated (3.11). Although he does not say so, he is dependent on an eightfold division of πρόσωπα that appears in Hermogenes's *On Issues*. This dependence is clear in the distinction between πρόσωπα that are or are not capable of investigation, and Doxapatres includes three of the

<sup>91</sup> Cf. John of Sardis 2.2.

<sup>92</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 2:322.

<sup>93</sup> Cf. John of Sardis 2.7–9.

<sup>94</sup> See P-scholia 3.2.

seven πρόσωπα that are. Only a πρόσωπον identified merely by τις (“someone”) is incapable of investigation, and Doxapatres excludes only τις as a possible πρόσωπον of a chreia; the other seven can all be πρόσωπα of a chreia, and he lists the first three of Hermogenes’s categories of πρόσωπα: τὰ ὠρισμένα καὶ κύρια, or definite individuals with proper names (Pericles or Demosthenes, to use Hermogenes’s examples); τὰ πρὸς τι, or those that are identified by a relationship (father and son, slave and master); and τὰ διαβεβλημένα, or those that are considered disreputable (prodigals, adulterers, and flatterers) (3.11).<sup>95</sup>

The last term of the definition, “attributed” (ἀναφέρουσα), likewise receives a new analysis from Doxapatres. His analysis now draws on grammatical material. He notices that the active participle is used here in a passive sense (3.12) and that it thereby modifies the more distant feminine noun χρεία, not the neuter ἀπομνημόνευμα. Doxapatres tries to explain the choice of a feminine participle by pointing to a rule that stipulates that a feminine noun trumps a neuter noun and a masculine one trumps both. But having thus explained the participle in this way, Doxapatres then seemingly changes his analytical stance and considers whether a participle in a definition should modify the word being defined or one of the terms in the predicate. Seen thus, Aphthonius becomes inconsistent, for the participle modifies the term being defined in the definition of the chreia, but it modifies a term in the predicate in the definition of the maxim.<sup>96</sup> A similar inconsistency, Doxapatres points out, is also evident in Hermogenes (3.13–14).<sup>97</sup>

Aphthonius’s next topic is the etymology (ἐτυμολογία) of the word “chreia”: “Since it is useful, it is called ‘chreia’” (Aphth 4 H/ON [= 4,1 Rabe]). Here Doxapatres remains on rather familiar

<sup>95</sup> See Hermogenes, *On Issues* 1 (29,12–30,9 Rabe). The other four are individuals identified by status (farmers), those with combined features (rich young man), those combining an individual and situation (a foppish young man avoiding sexual immorality), and those known by a common name (general or orator).

<sup>96</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 4 (7,2–3 Rabe): “A maxim [fem.] is a general saying [masc.] in statement form which urges [masc. part.] us toward something.”

<sup>97</sup> Doxapatres cites definitions from Hermogenes, *On Invention* 4.4 (183,13–14 Rabe) and 4.9 (196,11–12).

ground. To be sure, his discussion is longer than that of his predecessors, but much of the greater length is due to elaboration. The term “chreia” (χρεία) can be understood etymologically as suggesting either utility (χρησις) or need (χρεία). Hence commentators refer to both etymologies. The first raises the question of whether the other progymnasmata also possess utility. The answer is yes, but the chreia is eminently so, receiving the generic name “chreia” in the same way as Homer has become known as “the poet.”<sup>98</sup> Doxapatres adds that the utility refers specifically to utility in preliminary training in rhetoric (4.1), and he adds other examples of such generic names—Demosthenes as “the orator,” Thucydides as “the historian,” and Plato as “the philosopher” (4.1).<sup>99</sup> Doxapatres also answers the hypothetical question of whether the chreia is more useful than the maxim. His answer is yes because the attribution to a renowned πρόσωπον makes the saying or action more compelling. As an example Doxapatres cites as a maxim “Hard work begets glory, hardship procures crowns” and then turns it into a chreia by (correctly) attributing it to Basil the Great, the first time in the chreia chapter that Doxapatres cites Christian material (4.2–3).<sup>100</sup> Attribution to one of the great Cappadocians would have made the saying more compelling to his students, given the rise in status at this time, as we have seen, of Basil (and Gregory Nazianzus and John Chrysostom) for their contributions to education and the cultivation of rhetoric.<sup>101</sup>

As for the etymology of the word “chreia” as “need,” Doxapatres uses familiar material.<sup>102</sup> A circumstance produced a need (χρεία) that was met by the saying or action preserved in the chreia. A sleeping Diogenes was the circumstance, it is said, that prompted Alexander to see the need to respond with a line from Homer—“To sleep all night ill-suits a counselor”<sup>103</sup> (4.4). Doxapatres, however, adds a criticism of this etymology. It is not true

<sup>98</sup> Cf. P-scholia 4.1.

<sup>99</sup> We have already noted other instances of this anaphoric use of the definite article, such as Paul as ὁ ἀπόστολος (2:218,27 Walz) and Gregory of Nazianzus as ὁ θεόλογος (2:132,12; 425,24 Walz).

<sup>100</sup> The saying comes from Basil, *Hom.* 13.9 (PG 31:440B). On Basil, see Barry Baldwin et al., “Basil the Great,” *ODB* 1:269–70.

<sup>101</sup> So Agapitos, “Teachers, Pupils and Imperial Power,” 189.

<sup>102</sup> Cf. John of Sardis 3.1–4; P-scholia 4.1.

<sup>103</sup> *Il.* 2.24.

of some chreiai—statement chreiai made voluntarily (ἀποφαντικὸν καθ' ἐκούσιον) (4.5–6), a subclass of the division of chreiai that he has not yet introduced (cf. 5.7).

Finally, Doxapatres comments briefly on Aphthonius's choice of προσαγορεύεται (“it is called”) since other words—ὀνομάζεται (“it is named”), καλεῖται (“it is designated”), and λέγεται (“it is termed”)—were also available. He explains the choice by relating the verb προσαγορεύεται to its adjectival form προσηγορικόν, which is a technical grammatical term, according to Dionysius Thrax, for one of many types of nouns: προσηγορικὸν ὄνομα, or common noun, such as man, horse, orator, and so on.<sup>104</sup> Chreia, too, is a common noun (4.7), and so προσαγορεύεται is the appropriate verb.

Aphthonius's next topic is the division of the chreia into its main types (διαίρεσις ἀπὸ γένους εἰς εἶδη) (Aphth 5–17 H/ON [= 4,2–11 Rabe]). Before treating the division, however, Doxapatres again steps back and reflects on the order of topics. He repeats his earlier claim that definitions go first because they reveal the nature of the progymnasma (cf. 3.3), but he adds that since his students have come from the study of grammar, which includes the investigation of etymology,<sup>105</sup> Aphthonius reasonably put etymology second. Only then did Aphthonius turn to dividing the chreia (5.1–4).

Aphthonius's division of the chreia is simple, distinguishing saying, action, and mixed chreiai (cf. Aphth 5–6 H/ON [= 4,2–3 Rabe]). Previous commentators expand on this simple division, largely through inclusion of material from Theon and Nicolaus. For example, not only did John of Sardis add numerous examples of saying chreiai,<sup>106</sup> but he also identified subclasses of chreiai—simple and double chreiai, statement and responsive chreiai, and active and passive action chreiai.<sup>107</sup> And the P-scholia add Nicolaus's distinction between chreiai that speak of the way things are and those that speak of the way things ought to be.<sup>108</sup>

<sup>104</sup> See Dionysius Thrax, *Ars gramm.* 12 (34,1–2 Uhlig).

<sup>105</sup> On etymology as part of the grammatical curriculum, see Stanley F. Bonner, *Education in Ancient Rome: From the Elder Cato to the Younger Pliny* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 208–9.

<sup>106</sup> See John of Sardis 4.2–7.

<sup>107</sup> See John of Sardis 4.8–15.

<sup>108</sup> See P-scholia 6.10–11.

Doxapatres expands on Aphthonius's simple division, too, but he also expands and refines his predecessors. He provides some technical terms for these more complex divisions. He calls a "subdivision" (ὑποδιαίρεσις) Theon's two forms of saying chreiai, namely, statement and responsive chreiai (5.6–14). He calls an "alternative division" (ἐπιδιαίρεσις) Theon's list of chreiai identified by the content of the saying (5.15–24).<sup>109</sup> Once he has worked through these divisions, Doxapatres tries to explain why Aphthonius has omitted them. He says that Aphthonius omitted more complex divisions of narratives as well, and that such divisions are complicated and tedious, presumably especially so for young students (5.15–26).

Perhaps to make this complexity less intimidating, Doxapatres takes the three chreiai that Aphthonius provided for each of the three classes of chreiai—saying, action, and mixed—and analyzes them in terms of the categories belonging to the ὑποδιαίρεσις and ἐπιδιαίρεσις of chreiai (5.28–31). To illustrate, here is Aphthonius's example of a mixed chreia: Diogenes, on seeing a youth misbehaving, struck the paedagogus and said, "Why are you teaching such behavior?" (Aphth 14–16 H/ON [= 4,9–11 Rabe]). Doxapatres analyzes as follows:

This is a mixed [μικτή] chreia; it is active [ἐνεργητική] because of the action, responsive [ἀποκριτική] because of the remark, and both the action and the response are made on the basis of a circumstance [ἐκ περιστάσεως], and furthermore it is combined [συνεζυγμένη]. And so, it is mixed insofar as it contains both an action and a remark. And it is active because of the action since Diogenes is depicted as doing something in it. It is responsive because of the remark insofar as it simply contains a retort to some action. And both the action and response are made on the basis of a circumstance since Diogenes both performed the action and made the remark because he saw the youth misbehaving. And it is combined because all these features come together in it. (5.31)

If students practiced in this fashion, they obviously would have seen the utility of the division system and would have themselves become more adept at using it or at least less intimidated by it.

<sup>109</sup> For fuller discussion of these complex divisions, see *Chreia* 1:27–35.



Aphthonius's next sentence—"This, then, is the division [διαίρεσις] of the chreia" (Aphth 16–17 H/ON [= 4, 12 Rabe])—raised some eyebrows, as it has been asked why he used the word διαίρεσις since what follows also involves dividing (διαίρων) the chreia, by which he meant the elaboration of a chreia, which is divided into eight headings (6.1). Doxapatres answers the question by saying that there are various types of διαίρεσεις, and the one that describes a chreia elaboration is the διαίρεσις ἀπὸ ὅλου εἰς μέρη ("division of the whole into its parts"), and specifically the διαίρεσις ἀπὸ ὅλου εἰς μέρη ἀνομοιομερῆ ("division of the whole into its dissimilar parts") (6–2–3). Earlier in the commentary, in the chapter on the fable, Doxapatres discussed two subtypes of the διαίρεσις ἀπὸ ὅλου εἰς μέρη, one into like parts (εἰς ὁμοιομερῆ) and another into dissimilar parts (εἰς ἀνομοιομερῆ). The former, Doxapatres says, would be a rock that has been broken up into pieces; the latter would be Socrates divided into head, hands, and feet. Having clarified the matter, Doxapatres then goes on to keep διαίρεσις for the previous διαίρεσις ἀπὸ γένη εἰς εἶδη and proposes ἐπιδιαίρεσις for Aphthonius's διαίρεσις ἀπὸ ὅλου εἰς ἀνομοιομερῆ (6.4).<sup>110</sup> Neither John of Sardis nor the P-scholia showed even an inkling of such reflection on the uses of the word διαίρεσις.

Doxapatres then turns to Aphthonius's next sentence—"You can elaborate [ἐργάσαιο] a chreia by means of the following headings [κεφαλαίους]" (Aphth 18 H/ON [= 4, 12–13 Rabe]) and subjects it to an extensive and varied analysis (6.5–28). He treats the word ἐργάσαιο in three ways. First, following John of Sardis, Doxapatres notes that a synonym for this verb is κατασκεύεις ("you will confirm"), a word that immediately suggests its partner, ἀνασκεύεις ("you will refute"). Some conclude, Doxapatres says, that chreiai should therefore be both confirmed and refuted since it is characteristic of rhetoric to argue both sides of an issue. But like John of Sardis, Doxapatres disagrees with this conclusion on the basis that refuting a chreia is inappropriate, because of the immaturity of the students (6.5).<sup>111</sup> Doxapatres buttresses his view by adding the arguments of other commentators, identified only as being πολλοί ("many") (6.7). In any case, Doxapatres

<sup>110</sup> For a fuller discussion of the various διαίρεσεις, see further Doxapatres 2:166,8–169,31 and 193,21–194,26 (Walz).

<sup>111</sup> See John of Sardis 5.2.

notes that refutation would be taught anyway, though later in the progymnasmatic sequence, namely, in the fifth progymnasmata, refutation. Also, refuting a chreia that is by nature useful would be absurd, as it would appear to be fighting against what is good and would break the progymnasmatic principle of advancing only little by little in difficulty (6.6–8). He even rejects Geometres's compromise of allowing refutation of chreiai in the same way that narratives are confirmed and refuted—not those chreiai that are completely without fault nor very fallacious but only those in between (6.9).<sup>112</sup> But such treatment would be a different exercise, involving a different set of headings, those of refutation and confirmation. In short, chreiai are not to be refuted (6.10–11).

Doxapatres's next two comments on the word ἐργάσαιο deal with two other ways that one can understand the word, which basically means “working” with a chreia. One way to work with a chreia is to decline it, reciting a chreia through all the cases and numbers. Doxapatres provides examples of declined chreiai, if only through the nominative, genitive, dative, and accusative cases in the singular (6.13–19). The P-scholia provided a similar κλίσις but in the context of explaining why the chreia occupies third place in the progymnasmatic sequence.<sup>113</sup> A second way of working with a chreia is to expand or condense it, and Doxapatres illustrates with concise and expanded recitations of a chreia attributed to Socrates (6.20–22).<sup>114</sup>

Besides the word ἐργάσαιο, Doxapatres also discusses the word κεφάλαια (“headings”) in this sentence (6.24–28). He says that Aphthonius used this word in the sense of a μέρος (“part”) of a speech, but this usage, he adds, is not precise. Doxapatres defined κεφάλαιον earlier in the commentary, where he said it is composed of ideas and arguments (νοήματα καὶ ἐπιχειρήματα),<sup>115</sup> but the κεφάλαια of a chreia elaboration are only analogous to arguments and elaborations (ἐπιχειρήματα καὶ ἐργασίαι) (6.24–25). Doxapatres then identifies the heading rationale (αἰτία) as an ἐπιχείρημα and the opposite (ἐναντίον), analogy (παραβολή), example (παράδειγμα), and testimony (μαρτυρία) as ἐργασίαι (6.26; cf. 6.28). Doxapatres

<sup>112</sup> Geometres's language here reflects that found in the chapter on refutation (see Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 5 [10, 11–12 Rabe]).

<sup>113</sup> Cf. P-scholia 2.1–2.

<sup>114</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:337.

<sup>115</sup> See Doxapatres 2:102, 29–31 (Walz) (= *PS* 104, 12–14 [Rabe]).

tries to explain Aphthonius's imprecision by saying that either he used *κεφάλαια* with deliberate imprecision or that he used *κεφάλαια* in the same way that Hermogenes did in *On Issues* (6.27).<sup>116</sup> And he adds that Geometres also tried to explain Aphthonius's usage by analyzing his model elaboration in terms of τὰ τελικὰ κεφάλαια, specifically the headings "the difficult" and "the glorious," with the latter providing a counter-presentation (ἀντιπαράστασις) to the former (6.28).<sup>117</sup> Doxapatres thus comes to no particular decision, but he has carefully presented the possibilities.

After the word *κεφάλαια* Aphthonius listed those headings that belong to a chreia elaboration: encomiastic, paraphrastic, rationale, from the opposite, analogy, example, testimony of the ancients, and short epilogue (Aphth 19–22 H/ON [= 4,13–15 Rabe]). Previous commentators had found the simple listing inadequate and tried to expand on what was involved in each heading and, in the case of John of Sardis, provided illustrations for some of them.<sup>118</sup> Doxapatres followed suit, but, as usual, at much greater length—218 lines (in Walz's edition) to John of Sardis's 103 lines (in Rabe's edition) and the P-scholia's 47 lines (in Walz's).

Doxapatres discusses the first *κεφάλαιον*, the ἐγκωμιαστικόν, in two ways. He deals first with the relation of this heading to the parts of a speech, saying that it is comparable to the introduction in that it should also instill goodwill toward the πρόσωπον and should be brief. The latter was emphasized by John of Sardis and the P-scholia.<sup>119</sup> Brevity is avoided by not following the headings of an encomium,<sup>120</sup> a danger, Doxapatres adds, that comes from the similarity between the word for this heading (ἐγκωμιαστικόν) and "encomium" (ἐγκώμιον). Consequently, he prefers the term ἔπαινος ("praise"), Hermogenes's word for this heading,<sup>121</sup> but comes short of replacing it since he regards ἐγκωμιαστικόν as a

<sup>116</sup> See Hermogenes, *On Issues* 3 (43,16–59,9 Rabe).

<sup>117</sup> The use of ἀντιπαράστασις shows that Geometres also used Hermogenes to interpret Aphthonius (see Hermogenes, *On Issues* 3 [48,17–18 Rabe]).

<sup>118</sup> See John of Sardis 5.12–32; P-scholia 7.1–8.

<sup>119</sup> Cf. John of Sardis 5.12; P-scholia 7.1.

<sup>120</sup> Cf. P-scholia 7.1. Aphthonius identifies the headings that make up an encomium in the chapter on the encomium (see Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 8 [21,20–22,11 Rabe]).

<sup>121</sup> See Hermogenes 38 H/ON (= 7,15 Rabe).

diminutive (ὀποχορισμός)<sup>122</sup> and so implying brevity (6.29–30).

Doxapatres turns next to instructions on how to compose this heading while achieving brevity at the same time. He follows the P-scholia, though expanded, in emphasizing that, with named πρόσωπα, only the most important and distinctive deeds should be mentioned, while others can simply be alluded to by the figure “pretended omission” (κατὰ παράλειψιν). With πρόσωπα identified only by group, such as Laconian, only the distinctive traits and ways of life of that group need be cited, in this case a Laconian’s courage—the P-scholia add his city, the laws of Lycurgus, and its traditional way of life (6.31–33).<sup>123</sup>

With the second heading, the παραφραστικόν, Doxapatres not only follows tradition in defining this heading as training in using different words to say the same thing (6.35)<sup>124</sup> but also distinguishes various words based on φράσις: παράφρασις, μετάφρασις, ἑκφρασις, ἀντίφρασις, and περίφρασις. Such a concern is new among commentators, as Doxapatres seems rather to have drawn on grammatical material, not, as he usually does, from Dionysius Thrax, but probably from material preserved in a treatise like that attributed to George Choiroboskos (6.34–35).<sup>125</sup> Finally, the word παραφραστικόν, not παράφρασις, is used by Aphthonius, since παραφραστικόν can be seen as a diminutive, since only one saying is paraphrased in a chreia elaboration (6.36).

Doxapatres’s comments on the third heading, the αἰτία (“rationale”), form the heart of his analysis of a chreia elaboration (6.37–45). The comments on this heading are the longest, because they incorporate the next four headings and because they break new ground, particularly in drawing on material from Hermogenes. To be sure, he repeats earlier comments on the purpose of this heading—to prove the meaning of the saying (or action) (6.45).<sup>126</sup> But that purpose is almost an afterthought, coming at the end of his discussion of this heading. What really interested Doxapatres goes before (6.37–44).

Doxapatres begins with comparing a chreia elaboration to a public speech. He says that after the ἐγκωμιστικόν, which is

<sup>122</sup> See further Dionysius Thrax, *Ars. gramm.* 12 (28,6–7 Uhlig).

<sup>123</sup> Cf. P-scholia 7.5–8.

<sup>124</sup> Cf. John of Sardis 5.13; P-scholia 7.7.

<sup>125</sup> See George Choiroboskos 8:812, 15–813, 14 (Walz).

<sup>126</sup> Cf. John of Sardis 5.14; P-scholia 7.9.

comparable to the introduction, and the *παραφραστικόν*, which is comparable to the statement of the case, Aphthonius places the argumentative headings, which are comparable to the argument. By argumentative headings he means not only the rationale but also the opposite, analogy, example, and testimony of the ancients. Doxapatres clarifies the relation of the rationale to these others and explains their sequence. Strictly speaking, the rationale is an argument (*ἐπιχέρισμα*); the others, citing Hermogenes, are elaborations (*ἐργασίαι*).<sup>127</sup> Since *ἐργασίαι* buttress the former, the *αἰτία* must come before them (6.37). Regarding these *ἐργασίαι*, Doxapatres argues that Aphthonius rightly put the opposite next since it too is demonstrative. The analogy precedes the example either because the general precedes the more specific or because an example confirms an analogy. And the testimony comes last not because it is less persuasive but because it is more so, since uninvented proofs are more persuasive than invented ones; the testimony thus ratifies the previous headings (6.38–40). In other words, Doxapatres has taken the standard concern for the *τάξις* of the various *progymnasmata* and applied it now to the *τάξις* of the headings of the argumentative part of a *chreia* elaboration by defending the Aphthonian sequence rhetorically.

With the sequence of the argumentative headings settled, Doxapatres turns to the *αἰτία* itself. He identifies the *αἰτία* as one of the *περιστατικά* (“circumstantial elements”), which Aphthonius named in the chapter on the narrative: the individual who acted, the act that was done, the time it was done, the place it was done, the manner in which it was done, and the reason (*αἰτία*) it was done.<sup>128</sup> Doxapatres also says that the *αἰτία* is superior to all the others, in that it is necessary for conjectural cases to be adjudicated. With no *αἰτία*, there is no basis for decision. Doxapatres cites several examples, but one will suffice here, one taken from Hermogenes: A man disinherits his son for no reason. Hermogenes calls such a case *ἀπερίστατον* (“uncircumstantial”), not because it has no circumstantial elements—indeed, it has an individual who acted and an act that was done—but because it does

<sup>127</sup> These headings are included in a list of elaborations (*ἐργασίαι*) by Hermogenes (see *On Invention* 3.7 [148,21–149,1 Rabe]).

<sup>128</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 2 (2,23–3,2 Rabe).

not have the most important element, the αἰτία.<sup>129</sup> Hence Aphthonius was right when choosing only one περιστατικόν to have chosen the αἰτία (6.41–44).

The next four headings—ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου, παραβολή, παράδειγμα, and μαρτυρία παλαιῶν—are treated, comparatively speaking, rather briefly. He says that the heading ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου states the position opposite to the αἰτία, as did previous commentators,<sup>130</sup> but he adds illustrations taken from Aphthonius's model elaborations of a chreia and a maxim (6.46–49). The παραβολή and παράδειγμα are distinguished, the former speaking of events that occur daily, the latter only once, a distinction already made by others.<sup>131</sup> Again, he includes illustrations from the same model elaborations (6.50). The μαρτυρία παλαιῶν is, as mentioned above, an uninvented proof, and Doxapatres gives examples of what qualifies as one (6.51–52), but he is more interested, as were the P-scholia, in what to do when a relevant quotation from an ancient author did not come to mind, namely, to use “pretended omission” (κατὰ παράλειψιν) by saying, for example: “It would have been possible to cite many sayings of ancient authors. . . , but I know that being loquacious is contrary to the present subject” (6.53).<sup>132</sup>

The final and eighth heading, the ἐπίλογος βραχύς, which is comparable to the epilogue of a public speech (6.55), should be brief and composed either in terms of the encomiastic heading, as seen in the repetition of the verb θαυμάζειν (“to admire”) in Aphthonius's ἐπίλογος βραχύς (Aphth 26 H/ON [= 4, 18 Rabe]), a verb that was used in the encomiastic heading (Aphth 77 H/ON [= 6, 18 Rabe]). Or the epilogue could also be in terms of one of the other headings, although Doxapatres's own example—“Therefore, the saying has been nobly expressed by Isocrates (or Theognis)”—seems related only to the paraphrastic in the model maxim elaboration (6.56–57).<sup>133</sup>

In sum, after working through Doxapatres's comments students would have vastly increased their grasp of the terminology,

<sup>129</sup> See Hermogenes, *On Issues* 1 (33, 14–15 Rabe).

<sup>130</sup> Cf. John of Sardis 5.16; P-scholia 7.10.

<sup>131</sup> Cf. John of Sardis 5.22.

<sup>132</sup> Cf. P-scholia 7.12.

<sup>133</sup> The word “nobly” (καλῶς) picks up what Aphthonius said in the paraphrastic heading: “This then is what he thought about poverty, but it is possible to see how nobly [καλῶς] he thought” (*Progymn.* 4 [9, 1–2 Rabe]).

sequence, and function of the headings of a chreia elaboration that had been merely listed by Aphthonius. In addition, the role of the elaboration in preparing students to compose a speech would also have been clarified.

Doxapatres is no less detailed in his comments on Aphthonius's model chreia elaboration (Aphth 23–78 H/ON [= 4,16–6,19 Rabe]). And, as usual, he also has a number of preliminary comments before turning to the elaboration itself (7.1–5). For example, he applies his complex division to the chreia that Aphthonius is elaborating, namely, the chreia attributed to Isocrates, who said that the root of education is bitter, but its fruits are sweet (Aphth 24–25 H/ON [= 4,16–17 Rabe]). In terms of his *διαίρεσις*, this chreia is a saying chreia (*λογική*); in terms of his *ὑποδιαίρεσις*, it is a statement made voluntarily (*καθ' ἐκούσιον ἀποφαντική*); in terms of his *ἐπιδιαίρεσις*, it is figurative (*τροπική*) (7.2). This analysis would have allowed students to review once again and to apply the complex division that had been presented earlier (cf. 5.6–26).

Doxapatres then addresses an objection made by commentators about this chreia, to the effect that it breaks the pattern established in the model fable and narrative, namely, that they were chosen because they were enjoyable. On that basis the chreia should be one told for the sake of wit (*κατὰ χαριεντισμόν*). Doxapatres counters by asking: Why practice on a chreia that is recited solely to raise a laugh (7.3)? Finally, he addresses the question of why Aphthonius chose to elaborate a saying chreia and not an action or mixed one. Doxapatres's reply includes four possible reasons: (1) for those training for a livelihood involving speech, the word has priority over action; (2) composing the headings of an elaboration is easier for a saying chreia; (3) this particular chreia suits Aphthonius's aim of encouraging students to work hard to acquire rhetorical skills; (4) Aphthonius simply filled out the skeletal elaboration of this chreia by Hermogenes, which Doxapatres quotes to prove that that is what Aphthonius has done (7.4–12).<sup>134</sup>

Having justified Aphthonius's choice of chreia to elaborate, Doxapatres now turns to commenting on the elaboration itself (7.13–44). His comments greatly exceed those by John of Sardis and the P-scholia, although even Doxapatres comments more

<sup>134</sup> See Hermogenes 31–62 H/ON (= 7,11–8,14 Rabe).

fully on the first four headings—ἐγκωμιαστικόν, παραφραστικόν, τῷ τῆς αἰτίας, and ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου (7.13–39). Of the remaining four he has no comments on two—παραβολή and ἐπίλογος βραχύς—and only brief comments on the other two—παράδειγμα and μαρτυρία παλαιῶν (7.40–44). Dependence on John of Sardis is apparent in a number of these comments, as will be indicated on occasion below.

What characterizes Doxapatres's comments, like those of John of Sardis, is variety, and a sampling of them will illustrate this variety. For example, Doxapatres is interested in highlighting features of Aphthonius's style. For instance, when commenting on the sentence "it is right to admire Isocrates for his discipline" (Aphth 26 H/ON [= 4,18 Rabe]), Doxapatres notes Aphthonius's use of the stylistic device ἐπίκρισις ("added judgment") in the word δίκαιον ("right"), adding that it is a feature of σεμνότης ("solemnity"), which is one of the ways to produce μέγεθος ("grandeur") (7.13–14). Doxapatres clearly, if tacitly, derived this analysis from Hermogenes's *On Types of Style*.<sup>135</sup>

At times Doxapatres's comments are informational. Aphthonius's high praise of Isocrates in the encomiastic heading, such as saying that he was rhetoric's "most illustrious name" (Aphth 27 H/ON [= 4,19 Rabe]), seemingly raised eyebrows, in that Demosthenes was regularly called "the orator," as Doxapatres said earlier (cf. 4.1). Doxapatres defends Aphthonius, saying that Isocrates excelled in all three types of public speech, whereas Demosthenes fell short in celebratory speeches (7.17).

Another comment clarifies usage. Doxapatres identifies the function of the adverb οἷα ("what") in the sentence "But what a philosophy of education he had!" (Aphth 32–33 H/ON [= 5,3–4 Rabe]) as expressing admiration. Elsewhere, however, Doxapatres adds that Aphthonius used this word to express indignation, as in the model refutation (7.20).<sup>136</sup>

Yet another comment notes but does not explain a contradiction. Aphthonius's paraphrase of the chreia—"The lover of education begins with toils, but toils that nonetheless end in profit" (Aphth 34–35 H/ON [= 5,5–6 Rabe])—is much briefer than the encomiastic heading, even though Doxapatres, following others, has stated earlier that the encomiastic heading should be

<sup>135</sup> See Hermogenes, *On Types of Style* 1.6 (250,6–11 Rabe).

<sup>136</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 5 (11,5–6 Rabe).



shorter than the paraphrastic (cf. 6.29). Now he simply acknowledges that in this case Aphthonius did not follow this rule (7.22).

Doxapatres identifies yet another stylistic device that Aphthonius used in the sentence “And so what he taught is this, but in the following headings we will learn about it” (Aphth 36–37 H/ON [= 5,6–7 Rabe])—this time συμπλήρωσις (“completion”). Συμπλήρωσις is a device to achieve clarity by bringing to a close what has been said and preparing for what will be said (7.23). For his knowledge of this device, Doxapatres turned once again to Hermogenes.<sup>137</sup> Doxapatres goes on to claim that Aphthonius used συμπλήρωσις again in the model exercises of the maxim, refutation, and confirmation chapters (though he seems to be incorrect in the case of the model confirmation) (7.23).<sup>138</sup>

A number of comments clarify words with synonymous ones, and Doxapatres does so using the prepositional phrase ἀντὶ τοῦ (“in the sense of”). These comments often derive from John of Sardis. For example, the participle μέλλουσι in the phrase “both when they are (at school) and when they are about [μέλλουσι] (to go)” (Aphth 42 H/ON [= 5,11 Rabe]) seemingly caused some confusion. John of Sardis supplied four synonyms.<sup>139</sup> Doxapatres has kept two of them, reflecting one of the word’s basic meanings: “to be about to.” Thus, like John of Sardis, he says that the participle μέλλουσι is used ἀντὶ τοῦ (“in the sense of”) βραδύνουσι (“delaying”) and ἀναδυσόμενοι (“shrinking back” [from going to school]) (7.28).<sup>140</sup>

The ἀντὶ τοῦ formula is also used to point out grammatical features. For example, Doxapatres says that the participle αἰκίζόμενοι (“inflicting”) in the phrase “and inflicting punishment more severely” (Aphth 43–44 H/ON [= 5,12–13 Rabe]), while middle in form, is used “in the sense of” the active (7.30).<sup>141</sup> Doxapatres, but not John of Sardis, goes on to add that passive forms can also be used in the sense of the active and actives in the sense of passives, and he buttresses these grammatical remarks by citing an active used passively in Porphyry’s *Introduction*.<sup>142</sup>

<sup>137</sup> See Hermogenes, *On Types of Style* 1.4 (237,8–10 Rabe).

<sup>138</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 4 (8,19–20 Rabe), 5 (11,14–15 Rabe).

<sup>139</sup> Cf. John of Sardis 7.19.

<sup>140</sup> Cf. John of Sardis 7.19.

<sup>141</sup> Cf. John of Sardis 7.20.

<sup>142</sup> See Porphyry, *Introduction* (2,6 Busse).

Doxapatres follows John of Sardis again when he explains why Aphthonius chose Hesiod as the authority in the heading *μαρτυρία παλαιῶν*. Both say the choice was based on the fact that young students already knew this poet (7.42).<sup>143</sup>

Finally, Doxapatres closes off his comments on Aphthonius's model chreia elaboration with an issue raised by John of Sardis: since Aphthonius's model elaboration dealt with a saying chreia, how does a *μαρτυρία παλαιῶν* fit in with an action or mixed one? He answers, as did John of Sardis, by saying that one should argue that what was nobly done can be correlated with someone who expressed the same point in words. Sardis cited two examples—one involving Diogenes, who struck the paedagogus, and another involving the Laconian who brandished his spear<sup>144</sup>—and he quoted passages from Thucydides and Demosthenes as appropriate *μαρτυρίαι*.<sup>145</sup> Doxapatres has kept the Diogenes example but not that regarding the Laconian (7.43–44). Instead, Doxapatres decided to include three more fully worked-out elaborations, featuring in turn a saying, an action, and a mixed chreia—texts that have already been included in the second volume of *The Chreia and Ancient Rhetoric*.<sup>146</sup> Perhaps Doxapatres's decision to include these three elaborations at just this point (i.e., during his comments on Aphthonius's *μαρτυρία παλαιῶν*) might explain why there are no comments on Aphthonius's last heading, the *ἐπίλογος βραχύς*.

Before ending it should be noted that Doxapatres's references to and comments on Aphthonius's chreia chapter are not limited to this chapter. In the maxim chapter, for example, Aphthonius treated the *διαφοραί* between the chreia and the maxim.<sup>147</sup> Accordingly, Doxapatres also reserves his treatment of the differences between a chreia and a maxim for that chapter and expands Aphthonius's two *διαφοραί* to seven.<sup>148</sup> Doxapatres also gives another *κλίσις* of a chreia in the narrative chapter (as part of a

<sup>143</sup> Cf. John of Sardis 7.36.

<sup>144</sup> On these chreiai, see *Chreia* 1:315–16 and 328–29.

<sup>145</sup> Cf. John of Sardis 5.26, who quotes Thucydides 1.69.1 and Demosthenes 18.159.

<sup>146</sup> See *Chreia* 2:244–53.

<sup>147</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 4 (8,7–10 Rabe).

<sup>148</sup> Doxapatres 2:305,1–306,10 (Walz).

longer discussion of τᾶξις, or why the narrative chapter should precede the chreia chapter),<sup>149</sup> and individual chreiai are scattered throughout the commentary, especially the chreia that Aphthonius elaborated: Isocrates said that the root of education is bitter, but the fruits are sweet.<sup>150</sup> Further, Doxapatres continues to reflect on Aphthonius's chreia elaboration later in his commentary. Thus he answers "why in the case of the chreia elaboration did Aphthonius take his παραδείγμα from a saying of Isocrates and in the case of his maxim elaboration he used Theognis, even though he was able to take both from Homer, who was well known to those beginning the study of rhetoric?" Doxapatres responds: "Aphthonius did not unreasonably take his παραδείγματα from these men—from Isocrates because he was an orator, and his saying is conducive to learning rhetoric; from Theognis because, though unknown to most, he might make students polymaths by forcing them to know many poets."<sup>151</sup>

In sum, Doxapatres's lengthy, thorough, informative, and thoughtful commentary on Aphthonius's chreia chapter would have answered virtually any question teachers and students might have had when working through this chapter. Clarifications, justifications, and expansions of what Aphthonius said abound, making his commentary an accomplishment that had not been, and would not be, equaled. And Doxapatres's commentary was of considerable influence as it contributed, according Otmar Schissel, to a new flowering of progymnasmatic literature in the twelfth century.<sup>152</sup>

#### TEXT AND TRANSLATION

The standard edition of Doxapatres's commentary on Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata* is that by Walz.<sup>153</sup> To be sure, Hunger has judged this edition to be clearly deficient,<sup>154</sup> but Rabe has

<sup>149</sup> Doxapatres 2:192,14–193,8 (Walz); see also *Chreia* 2:74–77.

<sup>150</sup> See, e.g., Doxapatres 2:312,16–17; 534,2–4; 540,28–29 (Walz).

<sup>151</sup> Doxapatres 2:307,2–13 (Walz).

<sup>152</sup> Otmar Schissel, "Rhetorische Progymnasmatik der Byzantiner," *BNJ* 11 (1934–1935): 1–11, esp. 3–4.

<sup>153</sup> Walz, *Rhetores Graeci*, 2:81–564.

<sup>154</sup> See Hunger, *Literatur*, 1:79.

said that Walz at least based his edition on Vat. gr. 15, which is descended from the best manuscript, the thirteenth/fourteenth-century Laur. 55.7.<sup>155</sup> The latter manuscript Rabe has used in re-editing Doxapatres's lengthy introduction.<sup>156</sup>

The following text of the chreia chapter must still depend on Walz's text. Numerous changes, however, have been made in his text,<sup>157</sup> all of which are noted in the apparatus. Page numbers from Walz's edition are inserted in parentheses to aid in comparison of the texts. Once again, section numbers and titles in bold and in pointed brackets are inserted, as well as "verses," to bring out more clearly the structure and flow of topics in Doxapatres's presentation.

The translation is, as far as I know, the first.

<sup>155</sup> See Rabe, *Prolegomenon*, xlviii.

<sup>156</sup> See *PS* 80,8–155,32 (Rabe).

<sup>157</sup> Walz has made numerous corrections of his text of Doxapatres (see *Rhetores Graeci*, 9:732–33) but only one in the chreia chapter (see the apparatus at 6.18).



# Text 3. Ioannis Doxapatris Commentarium in Aphthonii Progymnasmata

Cap. III. Περὶ Χρείας  
(2:247,12–282,11 Walz)

## <§ I. ΤΑΞΙΣ>

1. Μετὰ τὸν μῦθον καὶ τὸ διήγημα ἔταξε τὴν χρείαν· εἰκότως, ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸν μῦθον διὰ τοῦτο πρῶτον ἔταξε διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἡδὺν τῇ πλάσει κα-  
θάπαξ, καὶ καταγλυκαίνειν τῶν ἀκροατῶν τὴν διάνοιαν, καὶ τὸ διήγημα  
δεύτερον, διὰ τὸ καὶ τὰ δραματικὰ διηγήματα τοιαῦτα εἶναι ἡδέα, οὖ-  
τω καὶ τὴν χρείαν εὐθέως μετὰ ταῦτα τέθεικε, διὰ τὸ εἶναι τινας χρείας  
τέρψιν ποιούσας ψιλὴν, οἷαί εἰσιν αἱ χαριεντισμοῦ ἔνεκεν παραλαμβανό-  
μεναι, οἷον Ὀλυμπιάς ἢ μήτηρ Ἀλεξάνδρου, ἀκούσασα, ὅτι ὁ παῖς αὐτῆς  
Διὸς ἑαυτὸν λέγει εἶναι, «οὐ παύεται,» ἔφη, «τὸ μειράκιον διαβάλλον  
με πρὸς τὴν Ἥραν.» 2. ἢ ὅτι ὥσπερ ὁ μῦθος ἐτάχθη πρῶτος διὰ τὸ  
πρώτῳ μέρει τοῦ λόγου, δηλονότι τῷ προοιμίῳ, ἀναλογεῖν, τὸ δὲ διή-  
γημα δεύτερον, διὰ τὸ διηγῆσαι εἶναι ἀνάλογον, ἥτις δευτέρα ἐστὶ τοῦ  
πολιτικοῦ λόγου, οὕτω καὶ ἡ χρεία ἐτάχθη τρίτη διὰ τὸ τῷ τρίτῳ μέ-  
ρει τοῦ λόγου τῷ ἀγωνιστικῷ δηλονότι ἀναλογεῖν· ἀναλογεῖ δὲ τῷ ἀγω-

# Text 3. John Doxapatres Commentary on Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata*

## Chapter 3: On the Chreia (2:247,12–282,11 Walz)

### <§1. SEQUENCE>

1. Aphthonius placed the chreia chapter after the fable and narrative chapters. And with good reason, for just as he had placed the fable chapter first because the fable is uniquely enjoyable due to its fanciful content and because it sweetens the disposition of the audience, and just as he placed the narrative chapter second because fictional narratives<sup>1</sup> are also enjoyable, so also did he place the chreia chapter immediately after them because some chreiai produce only delight, such as those that are told for the sake of wit—for example, Olympias, the mother of Alexander, having heard that her son was saying that he was a son of Zeus, said, “That boy won’t stop slandering me to Hera.”<sup>2</sup> 2. Or he put it in third place, for just as the fable chapter was placed first since it is comparable to the first part of a speech, that is, the introduction, and the narrative chapter was placed second because it is comparable to the statement of the case, which is the second part of a public speech, so also the chreia chapter was placed third since a chreia elaboration is comparable to the third part of a speech, that is, the proof. It is comparable to the proof insofar as in an elaboration we confirm whether the saying is true or whether the action

<sup>1</sup> Fictional narratives are one of three types of narrative and are defined as sheer fabrications, much like a fable. These narratives contrast with historical narratives and those narratives used in public speeches (see Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 2 [2,19–22 Rabe]).

<sup>2</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:330–31.

[248] νιστικῶ, καθὸ κατασκευάζομεν ἐν | αὐτῶ, εἰ ἀληθὴς ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος, εἰ καλῶς ἢ πρᾶξις γεγένηται· πᾶσα δὲ κατασκευὴ τῶν ἀγώνων ἐστίν.

3. Ἐνιοὶ δὲ φασιν, ὅτι ὥσπερ ὁ μῦθος ἐτάχθη πρῶτος διὰ τὸ εἶναι πάντων ἀπλούστερος, καὶ τὸ διήγημα δεύτερον διὰ τὸ εἶναι τοῦ μὲν μύθου ποικιλώτερον, τῶν δ' ἐξῆς ἀπλούστερον, οὕτω καὶ τὴν χρεῖαν ἔδει ταχθῆναι τρίτην, διὰ τὸ τοῦ μὲν μύθου καὶ τοῦ διηγήματος τελεωτέραν αὐτὴν εἶναι, τῶν δ' ἐφεξῆς ἀτελεστέραν, καὶ αἱ μὲν αἰτίαι, δι' ἃς ταύτην ἡ χρεῖα τὴν τάξιν εἴληφεν, αὗται.

### <§2. ΧΡΗΣΙΣ>

1. Ἰδῶμεν δέ, εἰ δοκεῖ, καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ χρήσιμον, καὶ πρὸς ποῖον μὲν τῶν τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰδῶν καὶ αὐτῇ, πρὸς ποῖον δὲ τῶν τοῦ πολιτικοῦ λόγου μερῶν χρησιμεύει, εἰπώμεν. 2. Ἰστέον δέ, ὅτι κατὰ τὰ εἶδη κοινῶς μὲν τῶ συμβουλευτικῶ συμβάλλεται λόγῳ, πάντως γὰρ ἢ ἐπὶ τι χρηστὸν προτρέπει ἢ χρεῖα, ἢ πονηροῦ τινος εἶργει· κατὰ δεύτερον δὲ λόγον καὶ τῶ δικανικῶ καὶ τῶ πανηγυρικῶ· τῶ μὲν δικανικῶ, δι' ὧν ἀγωνίζεται παραδείγμασί τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις κεφαλαίοις συστῆσαι τὸ ῥηθὲν ἢ πραχθέν· τῶ δὲ πανηγυρικῶ διὰ τοῦ εἰς τὸν φήσαντα ἐπαίνου ἢ καὶ τὸν πράξαντα.

3. Κατὰ δὲ τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου συμβάλλεται μὲν [οὐ] τοῖς προοιμίοις, καθὸ καὶ προοιμίου τάξιν πληροῦσα ἔσθ' ὅτε εὐρίσκεται· ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὅτι τὸ ἐγκωμιαστικὸν κεφάλαιον προοιμίῳ ἀναλογεῖ· συμβάλλεται δὲ τῇ διηγῆσει καὶ τοῖς ἀγῶσι καὶ τοῖς ἐπιλόγοις· τῇ μὲν διηγῆσει διὰ τοῦ παραφραστικοῦ κεφαλαίου· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀφήγησίς τίς ἐστι, τοῖς δὲ ἀγῶσι διὰ τε τοῦ τῆς αἰτίας κεφαλαίου καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου καὶ τῆς παραβολῆς καὶ



is nobly done. And every confirmation is made up of arguments.

3. Some commentators, however, say: Just as the fable chapter was placed first because it is simpler than all the other progymnasmata, and the narrative chapter second because it is more complex than the fable but simpler than the following progymnasmata, so also it was necessary for the chreia chapter to be placed third because a chreia elaboration is more advanced than the fable and narrative but less advanced than those that follow. These, then, are the reasons why the chreia chapter has received this position.

## <§2. UTILITY>

1. But let us also look, if you like, at the utility of the chreia elaboration, and let us do so by explaining its utility with regard to the types of rhetoric and the parts of a public speech. 2. One should realize that in terms of the types of rhetoric the chreia elaboration is commonly compared with the advisory speech, for a chreia always encourages us to do something good or counsels us against doing something evil. Furthermore, the chreia elaboration can be compared with the judicial and the celebrative types of speech: with the judicial, in the way it argues by means of examples and the other headings<sup>3</sup> to support what was said or done; and with the celebrative, through its praise of the one who spoke or acted.<sup>4</sup>

3. Now, regarding the parts of a speech, the chreia elaboration is comparable to an introduction, insofar as it is sometimes found filling the position of an introduction, but more because the encomiastic heading is analogous to an introduction. It is also comparable to the statement of the case, the proof, and the epilogue—to the statement of the case through the paraphrastic heading, for this heading contains an exposition; to the proof through the rationale heading as well as through the opposite,

<sup>3</sup> By “headings” is meant the third through the seventh headings, or *κεφάλαια*, of an elaboration, as enumerated by Aphthonius 18–22 H/ON (= 4, 12–15 Rabe). But why Doxapatres mentions the sixth *κεφάλαιον*, and not the third and the others, is not clear.

<sup>4</sup> Praise is taken up in the first *κεφάλαιον*, the *ἐγκωμιαστικόν* (see Aphthonius 19 H/ON [= 4, 13 Rabe]).

τοῦ παραδείγματος καὶ τῆς τῶν παλαιῶν μαρτυρίας· τοῖς δὲ ἐπιλόγοις διὰ τῆς ἐν τῷ τέλει βραχείας παρακλήσεως.

<§3. ΟΡΟΣ>

**Χρεία ἐστὶν ἀπομνημόνευμα σύντομον** (Aphth 2 H/ON [= 3,21 Ra-be]). 1. Ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς διδασκαλίας τοῦ διηγήματος πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ὠρίσατο τὸ διήγημα, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς χρείας ποιεῖ. 2. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὀρίζεται αὐτήν, εἴθ' οὕτως | λέγει τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ὀνομασίας, εἴτα διαιρεῖ καὶ τὰ κατασκευαστικά αὐτῆς κεφάλαια παραδίδωσιν. 3. ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν τῷ μύθῳ διατί τοῦτον πρῶτον ὀρίζεται, εἴθ' ὕστερον διαιρεῖ, ἐζητήσαμεν· νῦν δὲ διαιρήσομεν, διατί πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων οὐχὶ μόνης τῆς διαιρέσεως ὀρίζεται· φαίη δ' ἂν τις πρὸς τοῦτο, ὅτι οἱ ὀρισμοὶ φῶς εἰσι τῶν ὀριστῶν· δέον οὖν πρῶτον διδάξαι ἡμᾶς διὰ τοῦ ὀρισμοῦ τὸ καθ-

analogy, example, and testimony of the ancients; and to the epilogue through the brief exhortation at the end.

<§3. DEFINITION>

**A chreia is a concise reminiscence** (Aphth 2 H/ON [= 3,21 Rabe]). 1. Just as in the instructions for the narrative chapter where he defined the narrative before all other matters, so also he proceeds in the chreia chapter. 2. For he first defines the chreia, then he discusses the reason for its name, then he divides it and gives the confirmatory headings of a chreia elaboration.<sup>5</sup> 3. We have already investigated in the fable chapter why he defines this progymnasma first and only later divides it.<sup>6</sup> Now, however, we will determine why he defines the chreia before all other matters and not simply before the division.<sup>7</sup> And in this regard one could say: Definitions are the illumination of what is being defined.<sup>8</sup> We

<sup>5</sup> Doxapatres has just outlined the theoretical part of Aphthonius's chapter: definition (Aphthonius 2-3 H/ON [= 3,21-22 Rabe]), etymology (4 [= 4,1]), division (5-15 [= 4,2-11]), and elaboration headings (16-22 [= 4,12-15]).

<sup>6</sup> See Doxapatres 2:153,5-156,17 (Walz). This discussion arises from an earlier one in his introductory chapter, in which he presented a series of standard questions to ask of a work like that of Aphthonius (see 2:120,10-132,6 Walz). The seventh of these questions involves asking which of the four instructional methods (διδασκαλικοί τρόποι)—διααιρετικός, δριστικός, ἀποδεικτικός, ἀναλυτικός—an author used (2:130,19-22 Walz). Apparently, many regarded the order of the list—which is the same elsewhere (see *PS* 78,17-18 and 169,20-21 [Rabe])—to require that the methods be applied in that order. But as early as the fable chapter and consistently thereafter Aphthonius applies the first two methods in reverse order—defining before dividing—and hence needs to be defended, which Doxapatres does in the case of the fable (again, see 2:153,5-156,17 Walz).

<sup>7</sup> Doxapatres is aware that in the fable chapter, even before the definition, Aphthonius spoke of the fable's origin (see Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 1 [1,3-4 Rabe]).

<sup>8</sup> This is a difficult sentence, as it borders on the tautological, but perhaps it makes sense if we keep in mind Doxapatres's earlier definition of ὀρίσμοι. In his introduction he has a long discussion of definitions, leading up to his definition of rhetoric. At one point he says that the question "What is rhetoric?" can be answered in two ways—with a word (ὄνομα) or with a definition (ὀρίσμος). The former simply means providing its generic term, in this case τέχνη. The latter, however, adds the distinguishing terms that identify rhetoric from other τέχναι (2:93,6-13 Walz [= 93,16-23 Rabe]). Doxapatres says: "Α ὀρίσμος is a

έκαστον γύμνασμα, εἴθ' οὕτω τᾶλλα τὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι, ὥς ἂν μαθόντες πρῶτον τὴν φύσιν τοῦ προκειμένου διὰ τοῦ ὀρισμοῦ μᾶλλον παρακολουθῶμεν τοῖς λεγομένοις περὶ αὐτοῦ.

**Χρεία ἐστὶν ἀπομνημόνευμα σύντομον** (Aphth 2 H/ON [= 3,21 Rabe]). 4. Ὁ μὲν Ἀφθόνιος λέγει τὴν χρεῖαν εἶναι ἀπομνημόνευμα εὐστόχως ἐπὶ <τι> πρόσωπον ἀναφέρουσιν, ὁ δὲ Ἑρμογένης ἀπομνημόνευμα λόγου τινὸς ἢ πράξεως, ἢ συναμφοτέρου σύντομον ἔχον δῆλωσιν, ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον χρησίμου τινὸς ἕνεκα· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνεπίληπτος ὁ παρὰ τοῦ Ἑρμογένους ἀποδοθεὶς τῇ χρεῖα λόγος, διὰ τοὺς διαζευκτικούς συνδέσμους, οὓς οὐ δέον ἐν ὀρισμοῖς τίθεσθαι, ὥς καὶ προλαβόντες εἰρήκαμεν· ἕτεροι δὲ πάλιν οὕτως αὐτὴν ὥρισαντο, χρεία ἐστὶ λόγος ἢ πρᾶξις τις εὐστοχος καὶ σύντομος, εἷς τι πρόσωπον ὠρισμένον ἔχουσα τὴν ἀναφοράν, ἐπανόρθωσιν τινος τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ παραλαμβανομένη· ἔστι μὲν οὖν καὶ οὗτος ὁ λόγος τῆς χρεῖας ἐπιλήψιμος διὰ τὰ αὐτά, δι' ἃ καὶ ὁ Ἑρμογενικός, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲ πάσας τὰς χρεῖας δηλοῖ. 5. τὰς τε γὰρ μικτὰς καὶ τὰς χαριεντισμοῦ ἕνεκα λαμβανομένας παρίησιν· ὁ μέντοι Ἑρμογένης φαίνεται καὶ ταύτας παραλαμβάνων, φημὶ τὰς χαριεντισμοῦ ἕνεκα, διὰ τὸ εἰπεῖν τὸ ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον, ἀλλὰ φέρε τοὺς ἄλλους ἀφέντες τὸν τοῦ Ἀφθονίου σκοπήσωμεν.

[250] **Ἀπομνημόνευμα** (Aphth 2 H/ON [= 3,21 Rabe]). 6. Τὸ ἀπομνημόνευμα εἶναι βούλονται μνήμην καὶ λόγον περιφερόμενος· παρείληπται | οὖν τὸ μὲν ἀπομνημόνευμα ἀντὶ γένους, παρόσον καὶ τὸ ἀπομνημόνευμα διαιρεῖται εἷς τε τὸ σύντομον, ὥς αἱ χρεῖαι, καὶ εἷς τὸ ἐκτεταμένον, ὥς τὰ οὕτως ὀνομαζόμενα ἀπομνημονεύματα, μακρὰ ὄντα καὶ ἐξηπλωμένα, ὥς ἔχει ἐκεῖνο·

§3.4 post ἐπὶ addidi τι; cf. Aphthonius 3 H/ON (= 21–22 Rabe) || 4 ἢ συναμφοτέρου scripsi; cf. Hermogenes 3 H/ON (= 6,5 Rabe) || ἢ τὸ συναμφοτέρων Walz || 6 περιφερόμενος scripsi; cf. John of Sardis 2.1 || περιφερομένως Walz

ought, therefore, to treat each exercise first through its definition, then investigate the other matters regarding it, so that, by learning at the beginning the nature of the exercise under consideration through its definition, we might better follow what other things are said about it.

**A chreia is a concise reminiscence** (Aphth 2 H/ON [= 3,21 Rabe]). 4. Now Aphthonius says: “A chreia is a concise reminiscence aptly attributed to <an> individual.” But Hermogenes says: “A chreia is a reminiscence of some saying or action or combination of both, its point concisely stated and generally for the purpose of something useful.”<sup>9</sup> The definition assigned by Hermogenes to the chreia, however, is not unassailable, because of its disjunctive conjunctions,<sup>10</sup> which are not to be put in definitions, as I have said before.<sup>11</sup> Others, though, have defined it as follows: “A chreia is a saying or an action that is apt and concise, attributed to some specified individual, and employed for the purpose of correcting some aspect of life.”<sup>12</sup> This definition is also inadequate for the same reasons as the Hermogenean one, as well as for the fact that it does not include all chreiai. 5. For it leaves out mixed chreiai as well as those told for the sake of wit. Hermogenes, however, clearly includes even these—I mean, those told for the sake of wit—because he says “generally.” And yet, come, let’s put these other definitions aside and consider that of Aphthonius.

**A reminiscence** (Aphth 2 H/ON [= 3,21 Rabe]). 6. By “reminiscence” people mean the recollection of a well-known saying. The word “reminiscence” is used, therefore, in the sense of a general category insofar as the reminiscence is also divided into one that is concise, such as chreiai, and another that is extended, such as the like-named reminiscences, which are longer and expanded, as in this famous example:

concise sentence that discloses the nature [φύσις] of the subject under consideration” (2:94,7–9 Walz [= 94,16–17 Rabe]). In other words, illumination comes from learning the full nature of the subject being defined. Elsewhere, Doxapatres speaks of examples (παράδειγματα) as a source of illumination: “Examples are the illumination [φῶς] of what is being said, and by means of them everything becomes clear” (2:177,32–33 Walz).

<sup>9</sup> Hermogenes 2–4 H/ON (= 6,4–6 Rabe).

<sup>10</sup> Doxapatres means the use of the conjunction ἢ (“or”) in Hermogenes’s definition.

<sup>11</sup> See Doxapatres 2:195,10–196,5 (Walz).

<sup>12</sup> So, e.g., Nicolaus 45–48 H/ON (= 19,7–9 Felten).

7. Μιθριδάτης, <ὁ> Ἀριοβαρζάνου παῖς, ἑταῖρος ἦν Δημητρίου τοῦ Πολιορκητοῦ, καὶ καθ' ἡλικίαν συνήθης· ἐθεράπευε δὲ τὸν πατέρα Δημητρίου Ἀντίγονον οὔτε ὦν οὔτε δοκῶν πονηρός· ἐκ δ' ἐνυπνίου τινὸς ὑποψίαν Ἀντιγόνῳ παρέσχε· ἐδόκει γὰρ μέγα καὶ καλὸν πεδῖον ἐπιὼν ὁ Ἀντίγονος ψήγματα χρυσίου κατασπείρειν· ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ πρῶτον μὲν ὑποφύεσθαι χρυσοῦν θέρος, ὀλίγῳ δ' ὕστερον ἐπελθὼν ἰδεῖν οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ἢ τετμημένην καλάμην· λυπούμενος δὲ καὶ περιπαθὼν ἀκοῦσαί τινων λεγόντων, ὡς ἄρα Μιθριδάτης εἰς Πόντον Εὐξείνιον οἴχεται, τὸ χρυσοῦν θέρος ἐξαμνησάμενος· ἐκ τούτου ταραχθεὶς καὶ τὸν υἱὸν ὀρκώσας σιωπήσειν ἔφρασε τὴν ὥσιν αὐτῷ, καὶ ὅτι πάντως τὸν ἄνθρωπον διαφθείρειν ἔγνωκεν· ἀκούσας δὲ ὁ Δημήτριος ἠχθέσθη σφόδρα καὶ τοῦ νεανίσκου, καθάπερ εἶωθε, γενομένου παρ' αὐτῷ καὶ συνιόντος ἐπὶ σχολῆς, φθέγγασθαι μὲν οὐκ ἐτόλμησεν, οὐδὲ τῇ φωνῇ κατεπιπεῖν διὰ τὸν ὄρκον, ὑπαγαγὼν δὲ μικρὸν ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων, ὡς ἐγεγόνεισαν μόνοι καθ' αὐτούς, τῷ στύρακι τῆς λόγχης κατέγραψεν εἰς τὴν γῆν ὀρῶντος αὐτοῦ· «φεῦγε, Μιθριδάτα·» συνεὶς δὲ ἐκεῖνος ἀπέδρα νυκτὸς εἰς Καππαδοκίαν.

[251] 8. Ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐλέγομεν, τὸ μὲν ἀπομνημονευμά ἐστιν ἀντὶ γένους· τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ ἀντὶ διαφορῶν, τό τε σύντομον καὶ τὸ εὐστόχως ἐπὶ τι πρόσωπον ἀναφέρουσα, χωρίζοντα τὴν χρεῖαν, τὸ μὲν σύντομον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀπομνημονευμάτων· ἐκεῖνα γὰρ οὐκ εἰσὶ σύντομα, ὡς ἐδείκνυμεν· | τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τι πρόσωπον ἀναφέρουσα διὰ τοῦ ὀρισμοῦ διδάσκει ἡμᾶς στοχαζομένους πρῶτον, τίς ἐστιν ὁ εἰρηκῶς οὕτω τὴν χρεῖαν εἰς αὐτὸν ἀναφέρειν, καὶ μὴ τυχόν, εἰ Πλάτων εἶπε, λέγειν, ὅτι Ἰσοκράτης ἢ τις ἕτερος εἴρηκεν· αὐτίκα γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς μελετηθείσης τῷ Ἀφθονίῳ χρεῖας χρησαμένου τοῦ διδασκάλου τῷ ῥητῷ τοῦ Ἡσιόδου, τῷ·

Τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἰδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθιγαν.

7 Plutarch, *Demetr.* 4.1-3 || 7 ὁ addidi || 8 post primum ἐπὶ scripsi τι || τὸ Walz || 8 post secundum ἐπὶ τι scripsi; cf. Aphthonius 3 H/ON (= 3,21-22 Rabe) || εἷς τι Walz || 8 post αὐτίκα γὰρ scripsi ἐπὶ || ἐπεὶ Walz Hesiod, *WD* 289

7. Mithridates, <the> son of Ariobarzanes, was a companion of Demetrius Poliorcetes and a friend of like age. He was serving the father of Demetrius, Antigonos, and neither was nor seemed to be evil. But on the basis of a dream he became an object of suspicion to Antigonos. For Antigonos dreamed that he came upon a large and beautiful plain and sowed gold dust; from it he saw at first a golden crop growing, but on returning a little later he saw nothing except the cut stubble. Grieved and upset, he heard people saying that Mithridates had harvested the golden crop and gone off to the Euxine Sea. Being terrified because of this dream, Antigonos swore his son to silence and then described the dream to him and decided to destroy the man for sure. But Demetrius, on hearing this, became very upset. And so when the young man came to him and shared his leisure time, as he was accustomed to do, Demetrius did not dare to speak or say anything with his voice on account of his oath. But leading him aside a little from their friends, so that they might be alone by themselves, he wrote on the ground with the point of his spear as the other looked on: "Flee, Mithridates!" The other understood and during the night ran away to Cappadocia.<sup>13</sup>

8. But, as I was saying, the word "reminiscence" is used in the sense of a general category, whereas the other words in the definition are used as distinguishing terms, since both the word "aptly" and the phrase "aptly attributed to some individual" define the chreia. Now the word "concise" distinguishes it from reminiscences, for those are not concise, as I have shown. And the phrase "attributed to some individual" teaches us by means of this limitation to consider first the one who spoke thus and to attribute the chreia to him, and not to say, if Plato had said it, that perhaps Isocrates or someone else had—for example, in the case of the chreia elaborated by Aphthonius when the teacher used the line of Hesiod, namely:

In front of virtue have the gods ordained sweat.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>13</sup> See Plutarch, *Demetr.* 4.1–3.

<sup>14</sup> Hesiod, *WD* 289. Doxapatres is confused here, for it is Hermogenes, not Aphthonius, who quotes this line from Hesiod (see Hermogenes 56–57 H/ON [= 8,9 Rabe]). Aphthonius does refer, rather allusively, to Hesiod in his model chreia elaboration, rather generally to lines 287–91 (see Aphthonius 71–72 H/ON [= 6,13–16 Rabe]).

9. εἰ καὶ γὰρ μέλλων χρήσασθαι τῷ ῥητῷ, ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰπεῖν, ὥς ποὺ φησιν Ἡσίοδος, εἶπω ὥς ποὺ φησιν ὁ Ἀφθόνιος, εἰρήκαμεν τι πλὴν οὐκ εὐστόχως· τινὲς δὲ οὕτως εἶπον, ἀρμόδιος ὀφείλει εἶναι ἡ χρεία τῇ προκειμένη ὑποθέσει· εἰ γὰρ φέρε εἰπεῖν ὁρῶμέν τινα σπεύδοντα κατὰ πάντα κερδαίνειν, τότε εὐστόχως ἂν εἴποιμι πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸ Μενάνδρειον·

Βέλτιστε, μὴ τὸ κέρδος ἐν πᾶσι σκόπει·

εἰ δὲ πρὸς ἀνειμένον καὶ ῥάθυμον τοῦτο εἵπομεν, οὐκ εὐστοχος ἔσται ὁ λόγος.

10. Ὁ μέντοι Γεωμέτρης οὕτως ἐρμηνεύει τὴν λέξιν· τὸ εὐστόχως πρόσκειται, διότι μὴ πᾶσα πρᾶξις ἢ λόγος ἤδη καὶ χρεία, ἀλλὰ μόνος ὁ εὐστόχως λεγόμενος ἢ πραττόμενος· εὐστόχως δὲ λέγεται ὁ τις ἐν βραχεῖ ἢ ἔργῳ ἢ ῥήματι πολλὴν τὴν διάνοιαν περιέχει καὶ ὀξύτητα, ἢ εὐβουλίαν ἢ ἐμπειρίαν ἢ τινα ἄλλην ἀρετὴν κατηγορεῖ τοῦ λέγοντος· τῶν γὰρ χρεῶν οὕτω πάσας εὐρίσκομεν, τὰς μὲν τοῦ λογικοῦ μέρους ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὴν τινα δεικνυούσας, τὰς δὲ τοῦ ἀλόγου, εἴτ' οὖν παθητικὰς, τοῦ θυμοῦ λέγω καὶ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας· οὕτω γοῦν τὸ μὲν Πυθαγόρας ἐρωτηθεὶς πόσος ἂν εἴη ὁ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίος, καὶ βραχὺ τι φανεῖς ἀπεκρύψατο, σοφίαν ἐλέγχει, τὸ δὲ Λάκων ἐρωτηθεὶς, ποῦ τῆς Σπάρτης | οἱ ὄροι, καὶ ἀνατείνας τὸ δόρυ καὶ δείξας εἶπεν, «ἐνταῦθα,» ἀνδρεῖαν ἢ τινα ἄλλην τῶν ἀρετῶν.

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Ἐπὶ τι πρόσωπον ἀναφέρουσα (Aphth 3 H/ON [= 3,21–22 Ra-be]). 11. Ζητεῖται περὶ τῶν προσώπων, εἰς ἃ χρεῖαι ἀναφέρονται, ποίας ὀφείλουσιν εἶναι τάξεως, τῆς τῶν ἀνεξετάστων, ἢ τῆς τῶν ἐξεταζομέ-



9. Now if I, too, am going to use this line and instead of saying “as Hesiod says somewhere” I should say “as Aphthonius says somewhere,” I have said something, but not aptly. Some, however, have spoken as follows: The chreia ought to fit the occasion in question. For if, let us say, we see someone eager for gain by any means, then I could aptly cite the line of Menander to him:

Friend, look not for gain in everything.<sup>15</sup>

But if we should cite this line to someone who is relaxed and lazy, the saying will not be apt.

10. Geometres, though, interprets the word as follows: The word “aptly” is added to the definition because not every action or saying is actually a chreia, but only one that has been said or done aptly. The word “aptly” is said of whoever captures much insight in a brief action or saying and displays the cleverness, advice, experience, or some other virtue of the speaker. For we find all chreiai to be thus: some pointing to a virtue of the rational part of our soul, and others to a virtue of the irrational part, and others especially to the emotions, I mean anger and desire. At any rate, the following chreia—Pythagoras, on being asked how long the life of man is, was present for a brief time and disappeared<sup>16</sup>—exposes wisdom; whereas this one—A Laconian, on being asked where the boundaries of Sparta were, raised and brandished his spear and said, “Here!”<sup>17</sup>—exposes courage or some other of the virtues.

**Attributed to some individual** (Aphth 3 H/ON [= 3,21–22 Rabe]). 11. Regarding the individuals that chreiai are attributed to, it is asked: To what category do they belong—to the category of individuals who are not capable of investigation or to that of those

<sup>15</sup> Menander, *Mon.* 98 (38 Jaekel). Doxapatres cites this line four more times in his discussion of maxims (see 2:294,19; 295,12, 18, and 30 Walz) and in fact knows that it appears ἐν μονοστίχοις Μενάνδρου (2:294,15 Walz).

<sup>16</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:334–35.

<sup>17</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:328–29.

νων, καὶ εἰ ταύτης, τῆς τῶν ὠρισμένων καὶ κυρίων μόνης, ἢ καὶ τινος ἄλλης, οἷον τῆς τῶν πρὸς τι, τῆς τῶν διαβεβλημένων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ λέγουσιν, ὅτι ὥσπερ ὁ μῦθος μιᾶς μόνης ποιότητος προσώπου ἀπέχετο, τῆς τῶν ὠρισμένων, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἀπάντων μετεῖχεν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ χρεία ἐνὸς μόνον προσώπου ἀπέχεται, τοῦ φύσει ἀνεξετάστου, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἀπάντων ἔχεται.

**Ἀναφέρουσα** (Aphth 3 H/ON [= 3,21 Rabe]). 12. Τὸ ἀναφέρουσα ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀναφερομένη· σκόπει δέ, πῶς ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰπεῖν ἀναφερόμενον πρὸς τὸ ἀπομνημόνευμα, ἀναφερομένη εἶρηκε πρὸς τὴν χρείαν· τοῦτο δὲ ἐποίησεν, ἢ ὅτι τιμιώτερόν ἐστι τὸ θηλυκὸν γένος τοῦ οὐδετέρου, ὥσπερ τὸ ἀρσενικὸν τοῦ θηλυκοῦ, καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ οὐδετέρου, διὸ καὶ προτιμᾷ-

who are?<sup>18</sup> And if the latter, to the category of named individuals only or to any of the others—for example, to the category of individuals who are related to one another, to the category of disreputable characters, or to the remaining ones? And they say that just as the fable excludes only one sort of individual, namely, those with a proper name, but admits all others,<sup>19</sup> so also the chreia excludes only one individual, namely, the one who, by nature, is incapable of investigation but lays claim to all others.

**Attributed** (Aphth 3 H/ON [= 3,21 Rabe]). 12. (The active participle) “attributing” is used in the sense of (the passive) “being attributed.” Note also how Aphthonius, instead of using the (neuter) participle “being attributed” with reference to the (neuter) word “reminiscence,” has written the (feminine) participle “attributed” with reference to the (feminine) word “chreia.” He did this, on the one hand, because the feminine gender takes priority over the neuter, just as the masculine takes priority over both—over the neuter, as in this example: “Tauros [masc.],

<sup>18</sup> Doxapatres is referring, if allusively, to a standard division of *πρόσωπα* (“individuals”) in public speeches. He has already identified this division in his discussion of the *πρόσωπα* that appear in a fable (see 2:189,23–190,4 Walz; see also 2:495,30–496,2), where he also cites his source, Hermogenes. He distinguishes between *πρόσωπα* who can be investigated and those who cannot. To the latter category belongs only *τις* (“someone”), whereas the former has seven subcategories: (1) individuals who are named individuals, such as Pericles or Demosthenes; (2) individuals in some relation, such as father and son, slave and master; (3) individuals who are disreputable, such as prodigals, adulterers, and flatterers; (4) individuals identified by role, such as farmers; (5) individuals with combined features, such as a rich young man; (6) individuals combining a person with a situation, such as a foppish young man avoiding sexual immorality; and (7) individuals known by a common name, such as a general or an orator (see Hermogenes, *On Issues* 1.2–3 [29,12–30,9 Rabe]). In what follows, Doxapatres mentions three of the individuals who can be investigated—named individuals, characters in relation, and disreputable characters—but allows any of the seven to be used in a chreia. Only the character incapable of investigation, i.e., *τις*, is excluded.

<sup>19</sup> On this feature of fables, see Doxapatres 2:189,30–190,4 (Walz).

ται τῶν δύο, τοῦ μὲν οὐδετέρου ὡς ἐν ἐκείνῳ, ὁ Ταῦρος τὸ ὅρος μέχρις Ἰβηρίας διήκων· τοῦ δὲ θηλυκοῦ, ὡς παρ' Ὀμήρῳ·

Ἦλθε δ' ἐπὶ ψυχῇ Θηβαίου Τειρεσίαο,  
Χρύσειον σκῆπτρον ἔχων.

13. ἢ οὖν κατὰ τούτων ἀναφέρουσα καὶ οὐκ ἀναφερόμενον εἴρηκεν, ἢ ὅτι ἀδιάφορον ἡγεῖται ποτὲ μὲν πρὸς τὸ ὀριστικὸν ποιεῖν τὴν ἀπόδοσιν, ποτὲ δὲ πρὸς τι τῶν συμπληρούντων τὸν ὅρον· πρὸς μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὀριστικὸν ποιεῖ τὴν ἀπόδοσιν ὡς ἐνταῦθα· ἢ γὰρ χρεῖα ὀριστὸν ἐστὶν ἐνταῦθα, παρόσον καὶ αὐτῆς ἐστὶν ὁ προκείμενος ὀρισμός, πρὸς τι δὲ τῶν ὀριζομένων, ὡς ἐν ἐκείνῳ· γνώμη ἐστὶ λόγος ἐν ἀποφάνσεσι κεφαλαιώδης ἐπὶ τι προτρέπων· καὶ παρ' αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ Ἑρμογένει ἀδιαφόρως ἐστὶν εὑρεῖν τὸ | τοιοῦτον γινόμενον· πῇ μὲν γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς πρὸς τὸ ὀριστὸν ποιούμενος φαίνεται τὴν ἀπόδοσιν, ὡς ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ λόγῳ τοῦ Περὶ εὐρέσεως βιβλίου· λέγει γὰρ ἐκεῖ οὕτως· « Πνεῦμά ἐστι σύνθεσις λόγου διάνοιαν ἀπαρτίζον ἐν κώλοις καὶ κόμμασιν. » 14. ἀντὶ γὰρ τοῦ εἰπεῖν ἀπαρτίζουσα, ἀπαρτίζον εἶπε, πρὸς τὸ ὀριστὸν τὸν λόγον ἀποδιδούς· πῇ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τι τῶν συμπληρωτικῶν τοῦ ὅρου τὸν ὀρισμὸν ἀποδίδωσιν, ὡς ἐν
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the mountain [neut.] that extends [masc. participle] as far as Iberia,"<sup>20</sup> and over the feminine, as in Homer:<sup>21</sup>

And up came the spirit [fem.] of Theban Teiresias [masc.]  
Holding [masc. participle] a golden staff.

13. So, then, either in respect of these rules he has written (the feminine participle) of "attributed," and not (the neuter) "attributed." On the other hand, he considered it a matter of indifference to formulate the definition on one occasion in agreement with the term being defined and on another in agreement with the predicate. The *chreia* is defined in terms of the word being defined insofar as this definition is controlled by the word "*chreia*." But elsewhere in terms of one of the words in the predicate, as in: "A maxim [fem.] is a general saying [masc.] in statement form that urges [masc. participle] us toward something. . . ." <sup>22</sup> It is also possible to find such a situation occurring indiscriminately in Hermogenes himself. For even he in one case seems to make a definition in agreement with the word being defined, as in the fourth book of *On Invention*. For he speaks there as follows: "A statement-in-a-single-breath [neut. noun] is the formulation of a sentence that completes [neut. participle] its thought by means of periods and clausulae. . . ." <sup>23</sup> 14. For instead of using the feminine form of the participle <sup>24</sup> he has used the neuter, making the word agree with the term being defined. <sup>25</sup> But in another case he renders the definition in agreement with one of the terms in the predicate of the definition, as he does in the section "On an additional comment." He speaks as follows: "An additional comment

<sup>20</sup> I have not been able to track down this quotation, although the key terms also appear in Procopius, *De bellis* 1.15.20, which says in part: . . . ἐν δεξιᾷ μὲν ὁ Ταῦρός ἐστίν, ἐς τε Ἰβηρίαν καὶ τὰ ἐκείνη ἔθνη διήκων. I thank Craig Gibson for this reference.

<sup>21</sup> *Od.* 11.90–91.

<sup>22</sup> Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 4 (7,2–3 Rabe). Doxapatres does not cite the entire definition, which goes on to say: "or dissuades us from something."

<sup>23</sup> Hermogenes, *On Invention* 4.4 (183,13–14 Rabe).

<sup>24</sup> That is, to agree with the feminine noun σύνθεσις ("formulation").

<sup>25</sup> That is, the neuter noun πνεῦμα, lit. "breath," but rendered here as "statement-in-a-single-breath."

τῷ Περὶ ἐπιφωνήματος λόγῳ ποιεῖ· φησὶ γὰρ οὕτως· «ἐπιφώνημά ἐστι λόγος ἔξωθεν ἐπὶ τῷ πράγματι παρ' ἡμῶν λεγόμενος.»

#### <§4. ΕΤΥΜΟΛΟΓΙΑ>

**Χρειώδης δὲ οὖσα προσαγορεύεται χρεία** (Aphth 4 H/ON [= 4,1 Rabe]). 1. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τᾶλλα προγυμνάσματα χρειώδη εἰσί, προασκοῦσι γὰρ ἡμᾶς τὴν ῥητορικὴν· ἔτι δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐν γραφαῖς ἀσχολούμενοι πῇ μὲν κέχρηται γνώμῃς, πῇ δὲ ἡθοποιίαις, πῇ δὲ κοινοῖς τόποις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις· δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων, ὅτι καὶ ταῦτα χρειώδη εἰσί· πῶς οὖν ἡ χρεία μόνη παρὰ τὸ εἶναι χρειώδης εἴρηται; ἔστιν οὖν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ὥσπερ πλειόνων ὄντων λόγων, οἷς τὸ μυθεῖσθαι, τουτέστι λέγεσθαι, συμβέβηκε, μόνος ὁ ψευδὴς ὢν καὶ εἰκονίζων ἀλήθειαν παρὰ τοῦτο εἴρηται, οὕτω καὶ πλειόνων χρεωδῶν ὑπαρχόντων προγυμνασμάτων οὐδὲν ἀπεικὸς τὴν χρεῖαν μόνην παρὰ τοῦτο εἰρησθαι, ἥ ὅτι χρεωδεστέρα τῷ λόγῳ τῶν ἄλλων προγυμνασμάτων ἐστὶν ἡ χρεία, διὰ τοῦτο οὕτως εἴρηται κατ' ἐξοχὴν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν Δημοσθένην ῥήτορα λέγομεν, καίτοι καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν ὄντων ῥητόρων, καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον ποιητὴν, καὶ τὸν Θουκυδίδην συγγραφέα, καὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα φιλόσοφον.

2. «Τί οὖν,» ἂν ἴσως εἴποι τις, «καὶ τῆς γνώμης ἡ χρεία χρεωδεστέρα ἐστί;» 3. καὶ φαμεν, ὅτι ναί, εἴγε πιστικωτέρα ἡ χρεία, διὰ τὸ τοῦ εἰρηκότος ἢ πράξαντος ἔνδοξον· οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτον πεισθεῖν ἂν ὁ ἀκροατὴς τῷ, πόνοι γεννῶσι δόξαν, κάματοι δὲ προξενοῦσι στεφάνους, ὅπερ [254] ἐστὶ γνώμης, ὅσον εἰ καὶ τὸ εἰρηκὸς προστεθείη πρόσωπον, | ἵνα γένηται <χρεία>, οἷον ὅτι ὁ μέγας Βασίλειος εἶπε, «πόνοι γεννῶσι δόξαν, κάματοι δὲ προξενοῦσι στεφάνους.»

[neut.] is a remark [masc.] that is said [masc. participle] by us about the matter at hand.”<sup>26</sup>

#### <§4. ETYMOLOGY>

**Since it is useful, it is called “chreia”** (Aphth 4 H/ON [= 4,1 Rabe]). 1. The other progymnasmata are obviously useful, too, for they provide us with preliminary training in rhetoric. In addition, those engaged in writing have made use of maxims, speaking-in-character, common places, and other progymnasmata. It is clear, therefore, from these writers that these progymnasmata are also useful. How, then, is the chreia alone paradoxically said to be “useful”? It is, therefore, possible to say that just as, although there are many words that are equivalent to the verb “to tell a fable,” that is, “to tell a story,” only that story which is false and yet embodies a truth<sup>27</sup> is called by this term, so also, although there are many progymnasmata that are useful, it is not unreasonable that the chreia alone is called by this term. Or it is because the chreia through its saying is more useful than the other progymnasmata, and this is why it is called “useful,” on account of its preeminent utility, just as we also speak of Demosthenes as “the orator,” although there are many orators, and we speak of Homer as “the poet,” Thucydides as “the historian,” and Plato as “the philosopher.”

2. “What, then?” perhaps someone might ask; “Is the chreia more useful than even the maxim?” 3. And we say in reply: Yes, if the chreia really is more compelling because of the renown of its speaker or actor. For the listener may not be as persuaded by the saying “Hard work begets glory, hardship procures crowns,” which is in the form of a maxim, as he would be if the individual who said it were also added, so that it becomes <a chreia>—for example, Basil the Great said, “Hard work begets glory, hardship procures crowns.”<sup>28</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Hermogenes, *On Invention* 4.9 (196,11–12 Rabe). Now the participle λεγόμενος (masc.) (“said”) agrees not with ἐπιφώνημα (neut.) (“additional comment”) but with λόγος (masc.) (“remark”).

<sup>27</sup> Doxapatres is referring to the definition of a fable (see Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 1 [1,6 Rabe]).

<sup>28</sup> Basil, *Hom.* 13.9 (= PG 31:440B).

4. Τινὲς δὲ φασὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰρησθαι χρεῖαν, διότι οἱ παλαιοὶ ἐν χρεΐᾳ γενόμενοι αὐτῶν διὰ τινὰ περίστασιν ἐξέφερον αὐτάς, οἷον Διογένης ἐπιστάς Ἀλέξανδρος καθεύδοντι εἶπεν,

Οὐ χρὴ παννύχιον εὕδειν βουληφόρον ἄνδρα.

5. ἐν χρεΐᾳ γὰρ τοῦ εἰπεῖν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐγένετο, διὰ τὸ τὸν Διογένην καθεύδειν· φαμέν οὖν ἡμεῖς πρὸς τοῦτον, ὅτι ἄλλ' οὐ πᾶσαι τοιαῦταί εἰσιν αἱ χρεῖαι, αὐτίκα τῶν λογικῶν χρεῖαι καθ' ἐκούσιον ἀποφαντικά, οὐ διὰ τινὰ φανεράν περίστασιν ἐν χρεΐᾳ τοῖς εἰρηκόσιν ἐγένετο, ὡς ἔχει καὶ αὕτη· Ὁ Πλάτων τοὺς τῆς ἀρετῆς κλῶνας ἰδρῶσι καὶ πόνοις ἔλεγε φύεσθαι, κἀκεῖνη· Ἰσοκράτης τῆς παιδείας τὴν μὲν ῥίζαν ἔφη πικράν, γλυκεῖς δὲ τοὺς καρπούς.

6. Εἰ δὲ τις ἐρεῖ, ὅτι καὶ αὐταὶ διὰ τινὰ αἰτίας περίστασιν ἐρῶθησαν, οἷον ὅτι στοχαζόμενος καὶ σκοπῶν ὁ Πλάτων τὴν ἀρετὴν ἰδρῶσι φυομένην καὶ πόνοις ταῦτα εἴρηκε, καὶ ὅτι πάντας τοὺς ἀρετῆς ἐρῶντας διδάξαι θέλων ὁ Ἰσοκράτης ὡς ἰδρῶσι καὶ πόνοις φύεται ἀρετὴ ἔνεκα τούτου οὕτως εἴρηκε, σκοπεῖτω, ὅτι κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ αἱ γινῶμαι πᾶσαι χρεῖαι ὀφείλον λέγεσθαι· ἄλλοι δὲ φασιν, ὅτι ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐπικεκαλυμμένην ἔχει τὴν παραινέσιν, ὥσπερ ὁ μῦθος, ἀλλὰ γυμνὴν τὴν συμβουλήν, εἰκότως χρεῖα ὠνόμασται κατ' ἐξοχὴν· ἐναργεστέρα γὰρ ἢ ἀπ' αὐτῆς ὠφέλεια, οἷον χρειώδης καὶ ἀναγκαῖα.

**Προσαγορεύεται χρεῖα** (Aphth 4 H/ON [= 4,1 Rabe]). 7. Ζητεῖται διὰ τί οὐκ εἶπεν, ὀνομάζεται, ἢ καλεῖται ἢ λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τὸ προσαγορεύεται ἀντὶ τούτων λαλεῖ, ἢ ὅτι ἐπειδὴ τὰ προσηγορικὰ ὀνόματα τὰ κοινὰ λέγονται, οἷον τὸ ἄνθρωπος, ἵππος, ῥήτωρ, στρατηγός, πατήρ, υἱός, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς χρεΐας ὄνομα τοιοῦτον,



4. Some, however, say that it is called “chreia” for this reason: because the ancients were in need [χρεία] of them because of some circumstance, they came up with chreiai—for example, Alexander stood over a sleeping Diogenes and said:

“To sleep all night ill-suits a counselor.”<sup>29</sup>

5. For Alexander was in need of reciting this line, because Diogenes was sleeping. We, therefore, say to this claim: Not all chreiai are like this one; for example, some saying chreiai are unprompted statements, for the speakers were not in need of some specific circumstance, as both this chreia has it—Plato said that the offshoots of virtue grow by sweat and toil<sup>30</sup>—and this one also—Isocrates said that the root of education is bitter, but its fruits are sweet.<sup>31</sup>

6. Now if someone says that even these chreiai were spoken on account of some causal circumstance—for example, that Plato, on speculating and considering that virtue grows with sweat and toil, said this, and that Isocrates, in his desire to teach all who love virtue that virtue grows with sweat and toil,<sup>32</sup> spoke thus on behalf of this subject—let him consider that according to this logic all maxims ought also to be called “chreiai.” Now others say that since the chreia has no concealed advice, as does the fable, but provides its counsel explicitly, it is reasonably named “chreia” on account of its excellence, for the benefit that derives from it is more obvious, that is, it is useful and necessary.

**It is called “chreia”** (Aphth 4 H/ON [= 4,1 Rabe]). 7. It is asked: Why did he not say, “it is named,” “it is designated,” or “it is termed,” but, instead of these words, he says, “it is called”? It is either<sup>33</sup> because, since appellative nouns are said to be common ones—for example, man, horse, orator, general, father, son, and the like<sup>34</sup>—and since the name “chreia” is such a word, for it too

<sup>29</sup> *Il.* 2.24. On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:314.

<sup>30</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:333.

<sup>31</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:325–26.

<sup>32</sup> Doxapatres seems confused here, as he uses words more appropriate to the chreia attributed to Plato than to that attributed to Isocrates, which is concerned with education (παιδεία), not virtue (ἀρετή).

<sup>33</sup> Whatever the reason, there is no follow up with an “or.”

<sup>34</sup> Doxapatres has interpreted Aphthonius’s choice of verb—that is, προσαγορεύεται—by reference to its adjectival form—that is, προσηγορικόν, which is a technical term for a class of nouns. Doxapatres is probably using

[255] | κοινὸν γάρ ἐστι καὶ αὐτό, διὰ τοῦτο εἶπε, προσαγορεύεται· τουτέστι προσηγορικὸν καὶ κοινὸν ἔχει τὸ χρεῖα, ἐδύνατο δέ, εἴπερ ἐβούλετο, ἀντὶ τοῦ προσαγορεύεται ὀνομάζεται εἰπεῖν· παρόσον ἐστὶ προσηγορία, τοῦτο καὶ ὀνομά ἐστι· τὸ γὰρ ὄνομα ὡς γένος διαιρεῖται εἰς εἶδη, εἷς τε τὸ κύριον καὶ τὸ προσηγορικὸν καὶ τὰ λοιπά.

<§5. Η ΔΙΑΙΡΕΣΙΣ ΑΠΟ ΓΕΝΟΥΣ ΕΙΣ ΕΙΔΗ>

**Τῆς δὲ χρεῖας τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ λογικόν** (Aphth 5 H/ON [= 4,2 Ra-be]). 1. Μετὰ τὴν ἐτυμολογίαν τῆς χρεῖας, καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν διαίρεσιν αὐτῆς ἔρχεται. 2. Ζητεῖται διατί τεσσάρων τρόπων διδασκαλικῶν ὄντων, διαιρετικοῦ, ὀριστικοῦ, ἀποδεικτικοῦ, καὶ ἀναλυτικοῦ, χρώμενος ὁ σοφιστὴς τοῖς δυσὶ τούτοις ἐν τῷ παρόντι, τῷ διαιρετικῷ καὶ τῷ ὀριστικῷ, οὐ συνέταξεν ἀλλήλοις αὐτούς, ἀλλὰ διέστησε τὸν διαιρετικὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀριστικοῦ, διὰ μέσης τῆς ἐτυμολογίας τοῦ ὀνόματος τῆς χρεῖας;

3. Καί φαμεν, ὅτι τὸν ὀρισμὸν ἀναγκαίως προέταξεν, ὡς καὶ ἀνωτέρω δέδεικται, διότι αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ διδάσκων ἡμᾶς τὴν φύσιν τῆς χρεῖας, διὰ τοῦ ὀρισμοῦ δὲ οὔτε τῇ ἐτυμολογίᾳ τῆς χρεῖας, οὔτε τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐδυνήθη μὲν ἂν παρακολουθῆσαι· 4. μετὰ δὲ τὸν ὀρισμὸν ἐπειδὴ ἐγίνωσκεν ἡμᾶς ἅτε τῇ γραμματικῇ ἐνησκημένους καὶ ἐτυμολογεῖν εἰθισμένους τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ὀνομασίας ζητήσοντας, καὶ περὶ ταύτης διαφορήσοντας, διὰ τοῦτο ταύτην εὐθὺς παρέδωκε, τὴν δὲ διαίρεσιν μετὰ ταῦτα ἔθηκεν, ἵν'

is a common one, for this reason he said, “it is called.” That is, the word “chreia” has an appellative and common meaning. And it was possible for him, if he wanted to, to say “it is named” instead of “it is called.” Insofar as chreia is an appellation, it is also a noun. A noun, as a class, is divided into types—the proper, the appellative, and so forth.<sup>35</sup>

<§5. DIVISION OF THE CLASS INTO ITS SUBCLASSES>

**Of the chreia there is the saying class** (Aphth 5 H/ON [= 4,2 Rabe]). 1. After the etymology of the chreia Aphthonius turns to its division. 2. It is asked: “Although there are four pedagogical modes—divisional, definitional, demonstrative, and analytical<sup>36</sup>—why does the sophist use only these two in the present book, the divisional and the definitional; and why has he not arranged them next to one another but rather has separated the divisional from the definitional by means of the intervening etymology of the word ‘chreia’?”

3. And we say in reply: Aphthonius necessarily put the definition first, as previously shown, because this mode is what teaches us the nature of the chreia by means of a definition. 4. And so he could not allow it to follow either the etymology of the word “chreia” or the other subjects of the chapter. But after the definition, since he knew that we have been trained in grammar and have become accustomed to doing etymologies in order to investigate the origin of a word and to raise questions about it,<sup>37</sup> this is why he immediately provided the etymology and placed the division

Dionysius Thrax, whose standard *Ars grammatica* identifies the προηγούμενον ὄνομα (“appellative noun”) as one of many types of nouns and even illustrates the appellative noun with two of the same illustrations of such a common noun—man and horse (see Dionysius Thrax, *Ars gramm.* 12 [34,1–2 Uhlig]).

<sup>35</sup> Doxapatres is again referring to the division of nouns by Dionysius Thrax into twenty-four different types, a division that begins with these very two types, the proper noun and the appellative noun (see *Ars gramm.* 12 [33,6–45,2 Uhlig]).

<sup>36</sup> As already noted, Doxapatres discusses these four pedagogical modes as one of eight standard ways to analyze a book such as Aphthonius’s *Progymnasmata* (see 2:120,10–132,6 Walz [= *PS* 127,21–140,24 (Rabe)]).

<sup>37</sup> Doing etymologies was one of six tasks—indeed, the fourth of six—of grammatical analysis, as given by Dionysius Thrax (see *Ars gramm.* 2 [5,3–6,3 Uhlig]).

εὐθὺς ἀπὸ τῆς διαιρέσεως ὡς τὴν ἀπαρίθμησην τῶν κεφαλαίων τῶν κατασκευαζόντων τὰ διαιρεθέντα εἶδη χωρήσῃ. 5. καὶ τοῦτο ἐν πᾶσι σχεδὸν εἴωθε τηρεῖν τοῖς γυμνάσμασι· φημὶ δὴ τὸ μετὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν ἐπὶ τὰ κατασκευαστικὰ τοῦ γυμνάσματος εὐθὺς μεταβαίνειν κεφάλαια, οὕτω γὰρ ἐν τῷ διηγήματι πρῶτον ὀρισάμενος τὸ διήγημα, εἴτα τὴν διαφορὰν τοῦ διηγήματος καὶ τῆς διηγήσεως παραδούς, καὶ διελὼν τὸ διήγημα, εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν ἐπὶ τὰ ὥσανεὶ κεφάλαια τοῦ διηγήματος | τὰ περιστατικὰ δηλαδὴ μετεχώρησε, καὶ τῷ ἐγκωμίῳ δὲ καὶ τῷ ψόγῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῦτο ποιεῖ.

**Τῆς δὲ χρείας τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ λογικόν** (Aphth 5 H/ON [= 4,2 Rabe]). 6. Ἰστέον, ὅτι ἡ χρεία οὐ μόνον διαίρεσιν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑποδιαίρεσιν καὶ ἐπιδιαίρεσιν· 7. καὶ διαίρεσις μὲν αὐτῆς ἐστὶν ἡ εἰς τὰ τρία ταῦτα τομὴ, ὑποδιαίρεσις δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ λογικοῦ εἶδους τῆς χρείας εἷς τε τὸ ἀποφαντικὸν καὶ εἰς τὸ ἀποκριτικὸν τομὴ, ὣν ἑκάτερα πάλιν ὑποδιαίρεται, οἷον τὸ μὲν ἀποφαντικὸν εἷς τε τὸ καθ' ἐκούσιον ἀποφαντικόν, καὶ εἰς τὸ κατὰ περίστασιν· καὶ καθ' ἐκούσιον μὲν ἀποφαντικόν ἐστίν, οἷον Ἰσοκράτης τοὺς εὐφυεῖς τῶν μαθητῶν θεῶν παῖδας ἔφασκεν εἶναι,

after them, in order that he might go immediately from the division to the enumeration of the headings that confirm the classes of chreiai once they have been divided. 5. And he is accustomed to observe this order in almost all the exercises—I mean proceeding immediately after the division to the compositional headings of the exercise. For it is like this in the narrative chapter: after first defining the narrative, then providing the distinction between narrative and narration and dividing the narrative, he moved immediately after this division to the headings, as it were, of the narrative, that is, to its circumstantial elements.<sup>38</sup> And he does this in the encomium chapter,<sup>39</sup> in the censure chapter,<sup>40</sup> and in the others.

**Of the chreia there is the saying class** (Aphth 5 H/ON [= 4,2 Rabe]). 6. One should realize that the chreia not only has a division but also a subdivision and a further division.<sup>41</sup> 7. Its division is the one into three classes, whereas the subdivision divides the saying class into the statement and the responsive subclasses, both of which are further divided. For example, the statement subclass is divided into: a statement made voluntarily and one made on the basis of a circumstance. And so, an example of a statement made voluntarily: Isocrates said that gifted students are

<sup>38</sup> For the definition of the narrative, see Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 2 (2,14–15 Rabe), which is followed by the differentiation (2,16–18), the division (2,19–22), and the circumstantial elements (2,23–3,2). Doxapatres's use of the word κεφάλαια ("headings") is not precise, and he is aware of it, as shown by the word ὡσανεί ("as it were"). The precise term is στοιχεῖα, or "elements," which are treated by Doxapatres (see 2:214,23–215,8 Walz), so that, strictly speaking, he is referring to τὰ περιστατικὰ στοιχεῖα, or the six essential elements of a narrative, as listed by Aphthonius: the person who acts, the act that was done, the time it happened, the place it happened, the manner by which it was done, and the reason why it happened (2,23–3,2 Rabe). Still, Doxapatres is trying to indicate a certain similarity between the κεφάλαια of a chreia elaboration and the στοιχεῖα of the narrative in order to establish a pattern to Aphthonius's chapters.

<sup>39</sup> Aphthonius's organization of the encomium chapter (*Progymn.* 8) is as follows: definition (21,5 Rabe), etymology (21,6–7), differentiation (21,8–11), division (21,12–19), and headings (21,20–22,11).

<sup>40</sup> Aphthonius's organization of the censure chapter (*Progymn.* 9) is as follows: definition (27,13 Rabe), differentiation (27,14–16), division (27,17–28,3), and headings (28,3–6).

<sup>41</sup> The subdivision and further division of chreiai that Doxapatres goes into here come from Theon (36–189 H/ON [= 19–24 Patillon]), although the terms ὑποδιαίρεσις and ἐπιδιαίρεσις come from Doxapatres himself.

ἢ Πλάτων τοὺς τῆς ἀρετῆς κλώνας ἰδρῶτι καὶ πόνοις ἔλεγε φύεσθαι· κατὰ περίστασιν δὲ ἀποφαντικὸν ἐστίν, ἐν ᾧ ἕκ τινος περιστάσεως ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον κεκίνηται ὁ τὸν λόγον εἰπὼν ἐν τῇ λεγομένῃ παρ' ἡμῶν χρεῖα, οἷον Διογένης ἰδὼν πλούσιον ἀπαίδευτον εἶπεν, «οὗτός ἐστιν ἵππος περιγυρωμένος.»

8. Τὸ δὲ ἀποκριτικὸν πάλιν διαιρεῖται ἕς τε τὸ κατ' ἐρώτησιν καὶ τὸ κατὰ πύσμα, καὶ τὸ κατ' ἐρώτησιν αἰτιῶδες καὶ τὸ ὁμωνύμως τῷ γένει καλούμενον ἀποκριτικόν. 9. διαφέρει δὲ πύσμα τῆς ἐρωτήσεως τῷ ἐκείνην μὲν ἄρνησιν ἔχειν μόνην ἢ συγκατάθεσιν τὸ ναὶ ἢ οὐ· πολλάκις δὲ καὶ διὰ σχήματος μόνην ἀνάνευσιν ἢ κατάνευσιν· τοῦτο δὲ μακροτέραν ἀπαιτεῖν τὴν ἀπόκρισιν· 10. καὶ κατ' ἐρώτησιν μὲν ἐστίν, οἷον Πιτταχὸς ὁ Μιτυληναῖος ἐρωτηθεὶς, εἰ λανθάνει τις τοὺς θεοὺς κακὰ πράττων, ἔφη, ὅτι μὴδὲ διανοούμενος, <περιττὸν γὰρ ἐνταῦθα τὸ μὴδὲ διανοούμενος> ἀρκούσης καὶ μόνης τῆς ἀποφάσεως.

[257] 11. Κατὰ πύσμα δέ, οἷον Θεανὼ ἡ Πυθαγορικὴ φιλόσοφος ἐρωτηθεῖσα, ποσταία ἀπὸ ἀνδρὸς γυνὴ καθαρά τοῖς Θεσμοφορίοις κάτεισιν, εἶπεν, «ὥς μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τοῦ | ἰδίου παραχρῆμα, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου οὐδέποτε.»

12. Τὸ δὲ κατ' ἐρώτησιν αἰτιῶδες τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν, ὅταν μὴ μόνον ἀποκρινώμεθα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀποδιδῶμεν τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, οἷον εἰ λέγομεν, ὅτι Σωκράτης ἐρωτηθεὶς, εἰ εὐδαίμων αὐτῷ δοκεῖ ὁ Περσῶν βασιλεὺς, ἔφησε μὴ εἰδέναι, μὴδὲ γὰρ εἰδέναι πῶς ἔχει παιδείας· πρὸς γὰρ τῇ ἀποκρίσει καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀποδέδωκε ταύτης τῆς ἀποφάσεως.

13. Ἔστι καὶ τὸ ἀποκριτικὸν τέταρτον ὃν, ὃ μῆτε ἐρώτησιν ἔχει μῆτε ἀπόκρισιν, πρὸς δὲ τινὰ λόγον ἀπλῶς ἀντίρρησιν, οἷον Διογένους

children of the gods,<sup>42</sup> or Plato said that the offshoots of virtue grow by sweat and toil.<sup>43</sup> A statement made on the basis of a circumstance is one in which the individual making the saying in the chreia said by us is moved to this saying by some circumstance. For example, Diogenes, on seeing a rich man who was uneducated, said, "This fellow is a silver-plated horse."<sup>44</sup>

8. Now the responsive subclass is likewise divided into these: a response to a simple question, a response to an inquiry, a response to a simple question but one requiring an explanation, and that called "responsive," just like the subclass. 9. Now an inquiry differs from a simple question in that the latter contains only a denial or an assent, a yes or no, and often merely a denial or an assent by means of a gesture, whereas the former requires an answer that is longer. 10. An example of a response to a simple question: Pittacus of Mitylene, on being asked if anyone escapes the notice of the gods when doing evil, said, "Not even when contemplating them."<sup>45</sup> <Indeed, the response "Not even when contemplating them" is superfluous,> since the implicit denial alone is sufficient.

11. An example of a response to an inquiry: Theano the Pythagorean philosopher, on being asked how long after intercourse with a man does a woman go in purity to the Thesmophoria, said, "If with your own man, immediately; but if with another's, never."<sup>46</sup>

12. A chreia with an explanation to a simple question is one in which we not only answer the question but also provide a reason for our answer—for example, if we say: Socrates, on being asked if he thought the king of the Persians was happy, said that he did not know, for he did not know how he stood on education.<sup>47</sup> For in addition to his answer, Socrates provided the reason for it.

13. There is also the "responsive" chreia, which is the fourth species, which contains neither a question nor an answer but simply a retort to some remark. For example: Once when Diogenes

<sup>42</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:324.

<sup>43</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:333.

<sup>44</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:313–14.

<sup>45</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:331–32.

<sup>46</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:340–41.

<sup>47</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:336–37.

ἀριστῶντός ποτε καὶ Πλάτωνα παριόντα πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον προσκαλέσαντος, ὁ Πλάτων, «ὥς χάριεν ἦν ἄν σου, Διόγενες, τὸ ἄπλαστον,» ἔφη, «εἰ μὴ πλαστὸν ἦν.» 14. ἥτις οὖν τοῦ λογικοῦ εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα τομὴ ὑποδιαίρεσίς ἐστι τῆς χρείας καὶ ἡ τῆς πρακτικῆς πάλιν εἰς ἐνεργητικὴν καὶ παθητικὴν· καὶ ἐνεργητικὴ μὲν ἐστίν, ἐν ᾗ ποιῶν τις ὑπόκειται, οἷον Πυθαγόρας ἐρωτηθεὶς, πόσος ἂν εἴη <ὁ> τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίος, βραχὺ τι φανείς ἀπεκρύψατο· ἡ Διογένης, ἰδὼν ἀδδηφάγον παῖδα, τὸν παιδαγωγὸν ἔπαισε· παθητικὴ δέ, ἐν ᾗ πάθος τι ὑποσημαίνεται, οἷον Διδύμων ὁ αὐλητῆς ἀλοὺς ἐπὶ τῇ μοιχείᾳ ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐκρεμάσθη.

15. Καὶ αὖται μὲν αἱ ὑποδιαίρεσεις τῆς χρείας· ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἐπιδιαίρεσιν, καθὸ ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς πάλιν ἡ χρεία διαιρεῖται εἰς τὰς γνωμολογικάς, εἰς τὰς κατ' ἐνθύμησιν, εἰς τὰς κατὰ παράδειγμα, εἰς τὰς συμβολικάς, εἰς τὰς τροπικάς, εἰς τὰς κατ' εὐχὴν, εἰς τὰς κατὰ ἀμφιβολίαν, εἰς τὰς κατὰ μετέληψιν, εἰς τὰς συνεζευγμένας.



was eating lunch<sup>48</sup> and invited Plato, as he was passing by, to join him, Plato said, "How charming your unpretentiousness would be, Diogenes, if it were not so pretentious."<sup>49</sup> 14. This division of the saying class into subclasses is thus a subdivision of the chreia, as is the division of the action class into active and passive chreiai. And so, an active action chreia is one in which someone is depicted as acting. For example: Pythagoras, on being asked how long human life is, appeared for a brief time and disappeared;<sup>50</sup> or: Diogenes, on seeing a boy who was a glutton, struck his paedagogus.<sup>51</sup> A passive action chreia, however, is one in which some passive experience is indicated. For example: Didymon the flute player, on being convicted for adultery, was hanged by his namesake.<sup>52</sup>

15. These are the subdivisions of the chreia, but it also has a further division insofar as the chreia is divided all over again into: those with a maxim, with an enthymeme, with an example, with a symbolic act or saying, with figurative language, with a wish, with an ambiguity, or with a change of subject, and those that are combined.<sup>53</sup>

<sup>48</sup> Doxapatres's recitation of this chreia omits a key word from Theon's. The latter had given the locale of Diogenes's invitation as the "marketplace" (ἀγορά) (see Theon 77 H/ON [= 20 Patillon]: ἐν ἀγορᾷ). Without this locale Diogenes's invitation does not "counterfeit the currency," in that eating outdoors broke with social conventions, as seen in another chreia: Diogenes, on being criticized because he ate in the marketplace, said: "But it was in the marketplace that I got hungry" (Diogenes Laertius 6.58).

<sup>49</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:332–33.

<sup>50</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:334–35.

<sup>51</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:316.

<sup>52</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:312–13.

<sup>53</sup> For this further classification Doxapatres, as noted above, draws on Theon but with considerable changes. Theon lists twelve types within this division (Theon 115–89 H/ON [= 22–24 Patillon]), not nine, as here. Missing are numbers 2–4 in Theon's list: chreiai with an explanation, with wit, or with a syllogism (116–17). Those from Theon's list that Doxapatres does have are listed in a different order (using Theon's numbers)—1, 5, 6, 8, 9, 7, 10, 11, and 12. Moreover, Doxapatres does not illustrate even these nine (omitting chreiai with an enthymeme and an example) and illustrates two that are not on his list (chreiai with an explanation and wit, numbers 2 and 3 on Theon's list). Nor are the chreiai that are illustrated done so in the same order as they appear in his list.

16. Καὶ γνωμολογικαὶ μὲν εἰσιν, ὅσαι περὶ τοῦ καθολικοῦ κοινὴν ἀπόφασιν ἔχουσιν, ἐν οἷς καὶ τὰ τῶν ἑπτὰ σοφῶν ἀποφθέγματα, ὥσπερ ὁ Βίας <ἔφη> τὴν φιλαργυρίαν μητρόπολιν εἶναι πάσης κακίας.

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17. Ἀποδεικτικαὶ | δέ, ὅσαι καὶ τῆς οἰκείας ἀποφάσεως τὴν ἀπόδειξεν κατευθὺς ἀπολαμβάνουσιν, ὥσπερ Ἰσοκράτης τοῖς γνωρίμοις παραινῶν τῶν γονέων τοὺς διδασκάλους προτιμᾶν ἀπεδείκνυνεν, ἐπιφύρων, οἱ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ζῆν, οἱ δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν γεγονάσιν αἵτιοι.

18. Κατὰ χαριεντισμὸν δέ, ὅσαι ἀστειότητά τινα ἐμφαίνουσιν, οἷον Φιλίππου πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους γράψαντος πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ, αὐτοὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀντέγραψαν· «Λακεδαιμόνιοι Φιλίππῳ· Διονύσιος ἐν Κορίνθῳ γράμματα·» διὰ γὰρ τοῦ παραδείγματος μετ' αὐτὸν ἐπιστρέφουσι, καὶ ὑπομιμνήσκουσι τῆς τυραννίδος ὅσον οὕτω καταλυθησομένης, καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ παραινούμενος παρὰ τῶν φίλων συλλέξαι χρήματα ἔφη, «οὐκ ὦνησαν οὐδὲ Κροῖσον.»

19. Κατ' εὐχὴν δέ, ὥσπερ ἱστορεῖται περὶ τοῦ παιδοτρίβου Δάμωνος· οὗτος γὰρ χολὸς ὢν καὶ τῶν ὑποδημάτων ἀφαιρεθεὶς, «εἶθε,» φησὶν, «ἐναρμόσειαν τοῖς τοῦ κλέπτου ποσί.»

16. Chreiai with a maxim are those that contain a well-known sentiment about a matter of universal application, among which are included the sayings of the seven wise men, as: Bias <said> that the love of money is the mother-city of every evil.<sup>54</sup>

17. Chreiai with an explanation<sup>55</sup> are those that immediately provide an explanation for the appropriate answer, as: Isocrates, when he advised his students to honor their teachers above their parents, provided an explanation by adding, “For the latter are the cause of their living, but the former of their living well.”<sup>56</sup>

18. Chreiai with wit<sup>57</sup> are those that display some urbanity. For example: When Philip had written many terrifying letters to the Lacedaemonians, they wrote back to him, “Lacedaemonians to Philip: Dionysius in Corinth, (teaching) the ABCs.”<sup>58</sup> For by means of this example they turn the tables on him and remind him that his tyranny is something that will shortly be brought down.<sup>59</sup> Also: When Alexander was being advised by his friends to amass money, he said, “It did not help even Croesus.”<sup>60</sup>

19. Chreiai with a wish, as is told of the physical trainer Damon: He was crippled, and when he had had his sandals stolen, he said, “Would that they fit the feet of the thief!”<sup>61</sup>

<sup>54</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:307.

<sup>55</sup> Explanatory chreiai are not listed above but are included second in Theon’s list (Theon 116 H/ON [= 22 Patillon] and illustrated with this very chreia (127–33 HO/N [= 22 Patillon]).

<sup>56</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:324.

<sup>57</sup> Chreiai with wit are not listed above, although they occupy third place in Theon’s list (Theon 116–17 H/ON [= 22 Patillon]) and the category uses a different illustrative chreia (134–37 H/ON [= 22 Patillon]).

<sup>58</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:326–28.

<sup>59</sup> This comment on the Lacedaemonians’ response to Philip says nothing about wit but instead points to Dionysius, the tyrant of Syracuse, as a warning example to Philip—a comment more appropriate for chreiai with examples than for those with wit. Given the generally confused state of Doxapatres’s overall discussion, we may suspect further confusion here. Doxapatres did not include chreiai with wit in his list but did include chreiai with an example. Accordingly, we may suspect that the type being illustrated here is that of chreiai with an example. Indeed, the next illustration—Alexander’s reference to the example of Croesus—is used by Theon to illustrate a chreia with an example (Theon 150–53 H/ON [= 22 Patillon]). In short, there seems to be misalignment between types.

<sup>60</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:302.

<sup>61</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:310.

20. Συμβολικαὶ δέ, ὅσαι διὰ συμβόλων τινῶν αἰνίττονται, ἅπερ βούλονται, οἷα καὶ ἡ τοῦ Διογένους, ὃς μειράκιον ἰδὼν ἐκ μοιχοῦ ποτε βάλλον εἰς τὸ πλήθος λίθον, «οὐ παύση,» ἔφη, «μειράκιον, μὴ ἀγνοοῦν παίσσης τὸν πατέρα;» συμβάλλεσθαι γὰρ ἡμῖν δέδωκεν, ὥς οὐκ ἐξ ὠρισμένου προσώπου τὸ μειράκιον ἦν.

21. Τροπικαὶ δέ, ὅσαι ταῖς λέξεσι μεταφορικαῖς χρῶνται, ὥσπερ ὁ Πλάτων τοὺς τῆς ἀρετῆς κλῶνας ἰδρῶσι καὶ πόνοις ἔλεγε φύεσθαι.

[259] 22. Κατὰ ἀμφιβολίαν δέ, ὅσαι κατὰ τινὰ τρόπον, καθ' ὅσους ἂν ἡ ἀμφιβολία γένηται, γίνονται, ὥς ἔχει τὸ Ἰσοκράτης τινὸς αὐτῶ συνιστῶντος παῖδα, καὶ ἐρομένου, τίνος αὐτῷ δεῖ, «γραφιδίου,» ἔφη, «καινοῦ καὶ πινακιδίου καινοῦ.» ἄδηλον γὰρ ἐνταῦθα, πότερον λέγει πινακίδος καινῆς καὶ γραφιδίου καινοῦ, ἢ πινακίδος τε | καὶ φρενός, καὶ πάλιν, γραφιδίου τε καὶ φρενός.

23. Αἱ δὲ κατὰ μετάληψιν τότε γίνονται, ὅταν ἄλλο μὲν τὸ ἐρωτώμενον, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἀποκρινόμενον, μεταλαμβάνοντων ἡμῶν ἀφ' ἐτέρων εἰς ἕτερον, οἷον καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ἐπαμινώνδου· οὗτος γὰρ ἀμφισβητούντων τινῶν παρὰ πότον, πότερος μᾶλλον αὐλητῆς κρείττων, Ἀντιγενίδης ἢ Σάτυρος, «ἐμοὶ μὲν,» ἔφη, «στρατηγὸς Πολυσπέρχων.»

24. Αἱ δὲ συνεζευγμέναι οὐκ ἄλλαι παρὰ ταύτας, ἀλλ' ἐκ τούτων συνίστανται, ὅταν δύο πολλάκις καὶ τρεῖς συνέλθωσι κατὰ ταύτόν· εἰ γοῦν τῇ παραδειγματικῇ ἐκείνῃ τῇ, Ἀλέξανδρος ἐρωτηθεὶς, ποῦ τοὺς θησαυροὺς ἔχει, ἔδειξε τοὺς φίλους, ἥνπερ καὶ συμβολικὴν εἶναι λέγομεν· εἰ ταύτῃ γοῦν προσθήσομεν ὥς ἐπεῖπεν ὢν καὶ Κροῖστος ἀμοιρῶν ἦν

20. Symbolic chreiai are those that hint at what they mean by means of symbolic action or words; such as the one about Diogenes, who, on once seeing a youth whose father was an adulterer throwing stones into a crowd, said, “Won’t you stop, young man, lest you unwittingly hit your father?”<sup>62</sup> He thus left it to us to infer that the young man was born of an unidentified father.

21. Figurative chreiai are those that make use of metaphorical speech, as: Plato used to say that the offshoots of virtue grow by sweat and toil.<sup>63</sup>

22. Chreiai with an ambiguity are those that are written in such a style that an ambiguity could occur, as the saying of Isocrates has it: When someone was enrolling his son with him and asked him what he needed, he said, A stylus KAINOY and a slate KAINOY.”<sup>64</sup> It is not clear here whether he is saying “A new slate and a new stylus,” or “A slate and a mind,” and likewise “A stylus and a mind.”<sup>65</sup>

23. Chreiai with a change of subject occur whenever the question is about one subject and the answer is about another, since we change the subject from one topic to another. For example, the saying of Epaminondas: While some were debating over wine whether Antigenides or Satyrus was the better flute player, he said, “In my opinion, Polysperchon was the better general.”<sup>66</sup>

24. Combined chreiai are no different from these forms. Rather, they are composed of them, whenever two, even three, forms are frequently united in the same saying. At any rate, if we add to the well-known chreia with an example, namely: Alexander, on being asked where he kept his treasures, pointed to his friends<sup>67</sup>—a chreia that we also call symbolic—if, then, we add to this same chreia that he added the words “Even Croesus was

<sup>62</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:317.

<sup>63</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:333.

<sup>64</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:325.

<sup>65</sup> Since Greek was written without spaces between words and in capitals, the letters KAINOY could be read in two ways, therefore ambiguously. The letters themselves form the word “new,” as in the first translation—“A new slate and a new stylus.” Or they could be divided into two words—KAI NOY, which means “and a mind.” Hence the second translation—“A slate and a mind, a stylus and a mind.”

<sup>66</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:334.

<sup>67</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:302.

κατὰ καιρὸν ἀτυχῶν· ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ μικτὴ εὐρίσκεται καὶ συνεζευγμένη· μικτὴ μὲν διὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν, ὡς τοὺς φίλους δείξαντος καὶ τὸν λόγον ὡς ἐπειπόντος· συνεζευγμένη δέ, ὡς διὰ τὸν Κροῖσον παραδειγματικὴ <καὶ> διὰ τὴν αἰτίαν [καὶ] ἀποδεικτικὴ.

25. Οὕτως οὖν τῆς χρείας, ὡς δέδεικται, καὶ διαιρέσεις καὶ ἐπιδιαιρέσεις καὶ ὑποδιαιρέσεις ἐχούσης, ζητεῖται διατί οὔτε περὶ τῶν ὑποδιαιρέσεων αὐτῆς οὔτε περὶ τῶν ἐπιδιαιρέσεων ὁ σοφιστὴς περιέλαβεν. 26. καὶ φαμεν, ὅτι ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ διηγήματος διαφερόντων τῶν διηγημάτων ἀλλήλων καὶ κατὰ τὰ πρόσωπα καὶ κατὰ τὰ πράγματα τὴν κατὰ τὰ πρόσωπα παρῆκεν ὡς ποικιλωτέρας δεομένην διδασκαλίας, οὕτω κἀνταῦθα τὰς ἐπιδιαιρέσεις καὶ τὰς ὑποδιαιρέσεις τῆς χρείας παραλιπὼν ὡς ποικίλας καὶ πραγματειώδεις, τὴν εἰς τὸ λογικὸν καὶ πρακτικὸν καὶ μικτὸν τομὴν μόνην ἡμῖν παραδέδωκε, πᾶσαν χρείαν ἐν τοῖς τρισὶ τούτοις περιλαβὼν· καὶ γὰρ τὰ εἰς ἃ ἡ διαίρεσις καὶ ἡ ἐπιδιαίρεσις καὶ αἱ | ὑποδιαιρέσεις γεγόνασιν, εἰς τὰ τρία ταῦτα ἀνάγονται.

**Τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ λογικόν** (Aphth 5 H/ON [= 4,2 Rabe]). 27. Ζητεῖται ἀπὸ ποίου λόγου λέγεται λογικὸν τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος τῆς χρείας, πότερον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνδιαθέτου, ὥσπερ καὶ λογικὸς μῦθος ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τούτου ἐλέγετο· καὶ γὰρ διὰ τὸ πλάττεσθαι ἀνθρώπους ἐν αὐτῷ τι ποιοῦντας, οἱ

unfortunate at the critical time because he had no friends,” this chreia<sup>68</sup> would be both mixed and combined. It is mixed on account of the action, because he pointed to his friends, and on account of the saying, because he also spoke. And it is combined, as it is exemplary on account of Croesus <and> explanatory on account of the reason.<sup>69</sup>

25. Therefore, although the chreia, as has been shown, has a division, a subdivision, and a further division, it is asked: “Why has the sophist not included anything about the subdivision and further division?” 26. And we say in reply: Just as in the case of the narrative, although they differ from one another according to individuals as well as subject matter, he has disregarded the division according to individuals since it requires a more complex exposition,<sup>70</sup> so also here he left out the further divisions and subdivisions of the chreia as being complicated and tedious and has provided only the division into saying, action, and mixed classes, thereby including every chreia in these three. Indeed, the forms into which the division, the further division, and the subdivision fall are taken up in these three classes.

**There is the saying class** (Aphth 5 H/ON [= 4,2 Rabe]). 27. It is asked: “From which meaning of the word “saying” [*logos*] does the saying class of the chreia get its name?” Either it is from *logos* in the sense of “being capable of reason,” just as a fable was also called “rational” [*logikon*] for this very reason. Indeed, because humans—who are endowed with reasoning ability—are depicted in this fable as doing something, this is why it has this

<sup>68</sup> Doxapatres—perhaps deliberately, perhaps inadvertently—has combined two separate chreiai (see, e.g., Theon 151–53 and 158–61 H/ON [= 23 Patillon]) to form this combined chreia (see also *Chreia* 1:302).

<sup>69</sup> Doxapatres’s claim that this chreia is explanatory goes against the illustration he gave of this very type, which has the particle γάρ (“for”) in the sentence that provides the explanation (see also Theon 127–33 H/ON [= 22 Patillon]).

<sup>70</sup> In addition to his fulsome discussion of Aphthonius’s classification of narratives according to subject matter—namely, fictional, historical, and political subjects (see 2:199,3–206,17 Walz; cf. *Progymn.* 2 [2,19–22 Rabe])—Doxapatres briefly notes the classification of narratives according to individuals: first-person narratives, third-person narratives, and mixed ones (see 206,30–207,7).

τῷ ἐνδιαθέτω λόγῳ κοσμοῦνται, διὰ τοῦτο λέγεται· ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ προφορικοῦ· διὰ γὰρ τὸ λόγους ἐν αὐτῷ τινων σοφῶν ἀπομνημονεύεσθαι, οὐ μὴν πράξεις λέγεται λογικόν.

**Οἶον ὁ Πλάτων τοὺς τῆς ἀρετῆς κλῶνας ἰδρῶσι καὶ πόνοις ἔλεγε φύεσθαι** (Aphth 7–9 H/ON [= 4,4–5 Rabe]). 28. Ἡ παροῦσα χρεῖα ἔστι μὲν λογικὴ, καθ’ ἐκούσιον δὲ ἔστιν ἀποφαντικὴ· ἔστι δὲ καὶ προπικὴ καὶ συνεζευγμένη· λογικὴ μὲν διὰ τὸ λόγῳ δηλοῦν τὴν ὠφέλειαν, καθ’ ἐκούσιον δὲ ἀποφαντικὴ, διότι οὐκ ἔκ τινος περιστάσεως ἐκινήθη ὁ Πλάτων πρὸς τὸ εἰπεῖν τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον· τροπικὴ δὲ διὰ τὸ μεταφορικᾶς ἔχειν τὰς λέξεις· συνεζευγμένη δὲ διὰ τὸ ἐπιπλακῆναι ἐν αὐτῇ τό τε καθ’ ἐκούσιον ἀποφαντικὸν καὶ τροπικόν.

**Οἶον Πυθαγόρας ἐρωτηθεὶς, πόσος ἂν εἴη ὁ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίος, βραχὺ τι φανείς, ἀπεκρύψατο** (Aphth 10–12 H/ON [= 4,6–8 Rabe]). 29. Ἡ τοιαύτη χρεῖα ἔστι μὲν πρακτικὴ καὶ ἐνεργητικὴ, ἔστι δὲ καὶ συμβολικὴ καὶ κατὰ περίστασιν καὶ συνεζευγμένη· πρακτικὴ μὲν, καθὸ σημαίνει πρᾶξιν, ἐνεργητικὴ δέ, καθὸ τι ποιῶν δείκνυται ἐν αὐτῇ ὁ Πυθαγόρας, εἰς ὃν αὐτὴ ἀναφέρεται· κατὰ περίστασιν δέ, καθὸ ἔκ τινος περιστάσεως ἐπὶ τὴν τοιαύτην ἐκινήθη πρᾶξιν ὁ Πυθαγόρας· συμβολικὴ δέ, καθὸ διὰ συμβόλου τινὸς ἀπέδειξεν ὁ Πυθαγόρας, ὅπερ ἐβούλετο·



name.<sup>71</sup> Or it is from *logos* in the sense of “reason that is expressed in speech” because sayings, not actions, of wise men are remembered in it, and it is thus called a “saying chreia.”<sup>72</sup>

**For example: Plato used to say that the offshoots of virtue grow by sweat and toil**<sup>73</sup> (Aphth 7–9 H/ON [= 4,4–5 Rabe]). 28. This chreia is a saying chreia, it contains a statement made voluntarily, and it is figurative and combined. It is a saying chreia because it discloses its benefit by means of a saying; a statement made voluntarily because Plato was not moved to express such a sentiment on the basis of some circumstance; figurative because it contains metaphorical speech, and combined because a voluntary statement and metaphor are interwoven in it.

**For example: Pythagoras, on being asked how long human life can be, was visible for a short time and disappeared**<sup>74</sup> (Aphth 10–12 H/ON [= 4,6–8 Rabe]). 29. This is an active chreia, and it is symbolic, made on the basis of a circumstance, and combined. It is an action chreia insofar as it depicts an action and an active action chreia insofar as Pythagoras, the one to whom the chreia is attributed, is shown doing something. It is made on the basis of a circumstance insofar as Pythagoras was moved to this action by a circumstance, symbolic insofar as Pythagoras showed what he meant by means of a symbolic action, and com-

<sup>71</sup> Doxapatres has referred to only one of Aphthonius’s three classes of fables—λογικόν, or rational fables, since rational creatures, i.e., humans, act in them; the others are: ἡθικόν, or character fables, since irrational creatures, i.e., animals with typical characters, act in them; and μικτόν, or mixed fables, since both humans and animals act in them (see *Progymn.* 1 [1,11–14 Rabe]).

<sup>72</sup> Doxapatres draws on a standard distinction between two senses of the word λόγος—ἐνδιάθετος λόγος and προφορικὸς λόγος—which he discusses at great length in his introductory chapter (see 2:116,6–117,25 Walz [= *PS* 122,4–124,9 (Rabe)]): “Logos is twofold: ἐνδιάθετος, according to which we think, and προφορικὸς, according to which we speak out loud” (116,6–8 [= 122,4–6]). There he uses the distinction when discussing rhetoric as a λογικὴ τέχνη and says that both senses apply: rhetoric belongs to ἐνδιάθετος λόγος in the process of inventing arguments and to προφορικὸς λόγος when speaking eloquently (cf. 117,15–21 [= 123,24–124,5]). For more on this distinction, see Adam Kamesar, “The *Logos Endiathetos* and the *Logos Prophorikos* in Allegorical Interpretation: Philo and the D-Scholia to the *Iliad*,” *GRBS* 44 (2004): 168–81.

<sup>73</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:333.

<sup>74</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:334–35.

συνεζευγμένη δὲ διὰ τὸ συνελθεῖν ἐν αὐτῇ ταῦτα πάντα, τό τε ἐνεργητικὸν καὶ τὸ κατὰ περίστασιν καὶ τὸ συμβολικόν.

[261] 30. Ζητεῖται δέ, διατί μὴ καὶ ἡ παροῦσα χρεία μικτὴ λέγεται· ἔχει γάρ καὶ λόγον καὶ πρᾶξιν, λόγον μὲν τὴν ἐρώτησιν, πρᾶξιν | δὲ τὸ βραχὺ φανέντα τὸν φιλόσοφον ἀποκρύψασθαι· καὶ λέγομεν, οὐχὶ τὰ τῆς ἐρωτήσεως ῥήματα δεῖ σκοποῦντα ἀπ' αὐτῶν λογικὴν τὴν χρείαν λέγειν, οὐ γὰρ ἐρώτησίς ἐστιν ἡ χρεία, ἀλλ' ἡ πρὸς τὴν ἐρώτησιν ἀπόκρισις ἢ πρᾶξις· αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν ἡ δηλοῦσα τὴν ὠφέλειαν, οὐχ ἡ ἐρώτησις· οὕτως οὖν τὸ μὲν Πυθαγόρας ἐρωτηθεὶς, πόσος ἂν εἴη ὁ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίος, βραχὺ τι φανείς ἀπεκρύψατο, πρακτικὴν ἐροῦμεν χρείαν, ἐπεὶ τὸ πρὸς τὴν ἐρώτησιν ἐπενεχθὲν πρᾶξις ἐστιν, οὐκ ἀπόκρισις· τὸ δὲ Λάκων ἐρωτηθεὶς, ποῦ τῆς Σπάρτης οἱ ὄροι, ἀνατείνας τὸ δόρυ καὶ δείξας εἶπεν, «ἐνταῦθα,» μικτήν, διότι πρὸς τὴν ἐρώτησιν καὶ πρᾶξις ἀπήντησε καὶ λόγος ὁμοῦ.

**Οἶον Διογένης μειράκιον ἐωρακὼς ἀτακτοῦν, τὸν παιδαγωγὸν ἔπαισεν εἰπὼν, τί γὰρ τοιαῦτα παιδεύεις** (Aphth 14–16 H/ON [= 4,9–11 Rabe]). 31. Ἡ παροῦσα χρεία ἔστι μὲν μικτή· ἔστι δὲ κατὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν ἐνεργητικὴ, κατὰ δὲ τὸν λόγον ἀποκριτικὴ, κατ' ἀμφοτέρα δὲ ἐκ περιστάσεως, ἔτι δὲ καὶ συνεζευγμένη· καὶ μικτὴ μὲν ἐστι, καθὸ καὶ πρᾶξιν ἅμα καὶ λόγον συνέχει· ἔστι δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὴν πρᾶξιν ἐνεργητικὴ, καθὸ ἐν αὐτῇ τι ποιήσας δείκνυται ὁ Διογένης, κατὰ δὲ τὸν λόγον ἀποκριτικὴ, καθὸ πρὸς τινὰ πρᾶξιν ἔχει ἀπλῶς ἀντίρρῃσιν· κατ' ἀμφοτέρα δὲ ἐστιν ἐκ περιστάσεως, καθὸ καὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν ἐνήργησε καὶ τὸν λόγον εἶπεν ὁ Διογένης διὰ τὸ ἰδεῖν τὸ μειράκιον ἀτακτοῦν· συνεζευγμένη δὲ ἐστι, διότι ταῦτα πάντα ἐν αὐτῇ συνῆλθον.

**Τῆς δὲ χρείας τὸ μὲν ἐστι λογικόν, τὸ δὲ πρακτικόν, τὸ δὲ μικτόν** (Aphth 5–6 H/ON [= 4,2–3 Rabe]). 32. Ἡ ἀδιαφόρως ταῦτα τέτακται διὰ τὴν τῶν εἰδῶν ὁμοτιμίαν, ἥ ὅτι ἐπειδὴ τὰ προκείμενα γυμνάσματα λογικῆς εἰσι πραγματείας εἰκότως καὶ τὴν διὰ λόγων χρείαν προτάττει τῆς πρακτικῆς, ἀμφοτέρα δέ, τὸ λογικόν φημι τῆς χρείας

31 post πάντα scripsi ἐν αὐτῇ || ἐν αὐτῷ Walz || 32 ἀδιαφόρως scripsi; cf. Doxapatres 2:170,2 (Walz) || διαφόρως Walz

bined because all these things come together in it, the active and circumstantial and the symbolic.

30. It is asked: "Why is the present chreia not also called 'mixed'? It has both speech and action—the question is speech and the philosopher's answer by means of a brief appearance and subsequent disappearance is an action." And we say: One must not see the words of the question and then say that the chreia is a saying chreia because of them, for a chreia is not made of a question alone, but of a saying or an action in response to a question. It is the saying or action that discloses the benefit, not the question. So, then, we will say that the chreia—Pythagoras, on being asked how long human life can be, was visible for a short time and disappeared—is an action chreia, since the response to the question is an action, not an answer. And yet, the chreia—A Laconian, on being asked where the boundaries of Sparta were, raised and pointed his spear and said, "Here!"<sup>75</sup>—is mixed because an action and a word together respond to the question.

**For example: Diogenes, on seeing a youth misbehaving, struck the paedagogus and said, "Why are you teaching such behavior?"** (Aphth 14–16 H/ON [= 4,9–11 Rabe]). 31. This is a mixed chreia; it is active because of the action, responsive because of the remark, and both the action and the response are made on the basis of a circumstance, and furthermore it is combined. And so, it is mixed insofar as it contains both an action and a remark. And it is active because of the action since Diogenes is depicted as doing something in it. It is responsive because of the remark insofar as it simply contains a retort to some action. And both the action and response are made on the basis of a circumstance since Diogenes both performed the action and made the remark because he saw the youth misbehaving. And it is combined because all these features come together in it.

**Of the chreia there is the saying, the action, and the mixed class** (Aphth 5–6 H/ON [= 4,2–3 Rabe]). 32. Either he has arranged these classes of chreiai without concern for order because of the equal status of the classes. Or because, since the previous exercises were verbal activities, he reasonably also ranked the chreia that is made through a saying before the action chreia, and both—I mean, the saying class and the action class—before the

<sup>75</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:328–29.

[262] | εἶδος καὶ τὸ πρακτικόν, προτάττει τοῦ μικτοῦ ὡς ἀπλούστερα, ὃν τρόπον  
| καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μύθου τὸ λογικὸν καὶ ἠθικὸν προέταξε τοῦ μικτοῦ.

<§6. Η ΔΙΑΙΡΕΣΙΣ ΑΠΟ ΟΛΟΥ ΕΙΣ ΜΕΡΗ ΑΝΟΜΟΙΟΜΕΡΗ>

Ἡ μὲν οὖν διαίρεσις αὕτη τῆς χρείας (Aphth 16–17 H/ON [= 4,12 Rabe]). 1. Ζητεῖται τίνος χάριν τοῦτο εἶρηκεν, ὡς καὶ τοῖς ἐξῆς μὴ διαιρῶν τὴν χρείαν. 2. καὶ μὴν διαιρεῖ αὐτὴν εἰς τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ κεφάλαια κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ ὅλου εἰς μέρη ἀνομοιομερῆ διαίρεσιν. 3. ἔστι δὲ μία τῶν διαιρέσεων καὶ αὕτη, δι' ἣν καὶ τὸ Περὶ τῶν στάσεων βιβλίον Περὶ διαιρέσεως ὀνομάζεται· καί φαμεν, ὅτι ἄλλ' ἢ κυρίως τῆς χρείας διαίρεσις αὕτη ἐστὶ· κατὰ ταύτην γὰρ ὡς γένος εἰς εἶδη διαιρεῖται· ἡ δὲ

mixed as they are simpler, in the same way as he ranked, in the case of the fable, the rational and the character fables ahead of the mixed.<sup>76</sup>

<§6. DIVISION OF THE WHOLE INTO ITS DISSIMILAR PARTS>

**This, then, is the division of the chreia** (Aphth 16–17 H/ON [= 4,12 Rabe]). 1. It is asked: “Why has he used the word ‘division,’ as if he were not also dividing the chreia in what follows?” 2. Indeed, he divides it into its headings in accordance with the division of the whole into its dissimilar parts.<sup>77</sup> 3. And this is one of the divisions on account of which the book *On Issues* is also called *On Division*.<sup>78</sup> We say in reply: But the division is, strictly speaking, the classification of the chreia. For according to this division the

<sup>76</sup> Doxapatres dealt with the same question regarding the sequence of the types of fables, and while some found a rationale behind the sequence—those with rational creatures, those with irrational ones, and those with both—Doxapatres himself concludes that this sequence is of no particular significance, for in a classification of a general term into its classes (διαίρεσις ἀπὸ γένους εἰς εἶδη) the εἶδη are of equal status (see 2:170,1–15 Walz). Incidentally, the reasoning for accepting the sequence of classes of chreiai as favoring the verbal and moving from simple to complex is cited for the fable but rejected there by Doxapatres (see esp. 2:170,11–15). Presumably, he would reject it here, too.

<sup>77</sup> Another sense of διαίρεσις is implicit in this sentence with the verbal form διαίρων (“dividing”), which points toward the elaboration with its eight headings. These two senses of διαίρεσις have already been identified in the narrative chapter where Doxapatres discusses the five παρατηρήματα, or usual observations, of Aphthonius’s presentation of the progymnasmata and lists them as the second and third, i.e., the διαίρεσις εἰς εἶδη and the διαίρεσις εἰς κεφάλαια (see Doxapatres 2:193,21–194,26 [Walz]). In addition, in the fable chapter he discusses the word ἀνομοιομερής (“dissimilar”), which points to an even more complex analysis of διαίρεσις in which the word can be used in seven senses, including the διαίρεσις ἀπὸ ὅλων εἰς μέρη, the division of the whole into its parts, which is itself divided into two subtypes, the διαίρεσις ἀπὸ ὅλων εἰς μέρη, ἥτοι ὁμοιομερῆ ἢ ἀνομοιομερῆ, the division of the whole into similar or dissimilar parts. Doxapatres illustrates the former with a large rock broken up into pieces and the latter with Socrates divided into head, hands, and feet (see 2:166,8–169,31, esp. 166,18–27). In other words, the whole of the elaboration of the chreia is understood to be a division into eight dissimilar parts.

<sup>78</sup> Doxapatres is referring to Hermogenes’s book *On Issues* (Περὶ στάσεων). He discusses at greater length this and its alternative title, *On Division* (Περὶ διαιρέσεων), in his prolegomenon to *On Issues* (see PS 314,18–315,19 [Rabe]).

ἐπιφερομένη οὐ κυρίως ἐστὶ διαίρεσις· τὴν δὲ αἰτίαν φθάσαντες εἵπομεν.  
4. ἢ οὐδὲ διαίρεσις ἢ ἐπιφερομένη ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἐπιδιαιρέσις μᾶλλον.

Ἐργάσαιο δ' αὐτὴν τοῖσδε τοῖς κεφαλαίοις (Aphth 18 H/ON [= 4,12–13 Rabe]). 5. Ἀντὶ τοῦ κατασκευάσεις, βεβαιώσεις· ἐνταῦθα δὲ γενόμενός τις τῶν ἐξηγητῶν ἀπορεῖ λέγων, ὅτι εἰ κατασκευάζειν τὴν χρεῖαν ἔστι τὸ προγύμνασμα, πῶς οὐχὶ καὶ ἀνασκευάσομεν αὐτήν· ῥητορικῆς γάρ ἐστιν ἴδιον ἐπιχειρεῖν εἰς ἑκάτερα, καὶ ἐπιλύει τὴν τοιαύτην ἀπορίαν ὁ αὐτὸς λέγων, μὴ ἀκόλουθον εἶναι τὴν ἀνασκευὴν τῆς χρεῖας διὰ τὴν ἕξιν τῶν νέων, οὔτε γάρ, φησὶν, ὥς ἐν εἰσαγωγῇ κρατύνειν αὐτοὺς τὴν φύσιν τῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων ἐάσομεν, οὐδ' εἰς ἓνα προσέχειν σκοπὸν, καὶ ἄτοπον, ὥς πρὸς νέον ἀνατρέπειν τὸ ὀρθῶς εἰρῇσθαι δοκοῦν ἢ πεπρᾶχθαι καλῶς· ὁμοῦ γὰρ καὶ ἡθους γίνεται διδασκαλία καὶ τοῦ λέγειν καλῶς, καὶ ὅπερ ἐστὶν κυριώτατον, κατὰ μέρος κρατύνειν τὸν εἰσαγόμενον τὴν γυμνασίαν παρασκευάσομεν.

6. Ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις, εἰ μὲν μὴ δυνατόν ἦν ἐν ἄλλοις τοὺς τῆς ἀνασκευῆς τρόπους μαθεῖν, καλῶς εἶχεν ἡμᾶς εἰς τοῦναντίον ἐνταῦθα γυμνάσασθαι· εἰ δ' ἔστιν ἀνασκευὴ πάλιν ἄλλο προγύμνασμα, τῶν ἀτοπωτάτων ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν εἶναι καλὸν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μάχην.

7. Ἔτι καὶ πολλοί, φησί, βιωφελῆ τὴν χρεῖαν εἰρήκασιν, οὐκοῦν ἐναντία τῷ ὄρω ποιήσομεν τὸ παρὰ ταύτης ἀνασκευάζοντες χρήσιμον.

chreia as a generic term is divided into its classes. The following division, however, is not, strictly speaking, a division, and we have already stated the reason. 4. The following division is not a division, but rather an additional division.

**You can elaborate a chreia by means of the following headings** (Aphth 18 H/ON [= 4,12–13 Rabe]). 5. “You can elaborate” is used in the sense of you will confirm, you will corroborate. At this point one of the commentators<sup>79</sup> raises a difficulty, saying: “If this progymnasma consists of confirming the chreia, why are we not also going to refute it? After all, it is the distinctive feature of rhetoric to argue both sides of an issue.” The same commentator resolves this difficulty by saying: “Refutation of the chreia is not appropriate, because of the temperament of young men. For,” he says, “while they are at an introductory level we will neither allow them to strengthen the nature of these arguments nor allow them to focus their attention on this one task, and it is ridiculous, in the presence of a young man, to overturn what appears to have been correctly spoken or nobly performed. For teaching is concerned with both character and with speaking properly, and this is precisely what is most important: we will accustom the student who is just beginning this exercise to grow strong gradually in both.”

6. There is still another reason: If it were impossible to learn the methods of refutation in other progymnasmata, it would be proper for us to practice the opposite side here. But since refutation is already a separate progymnasma,<sup>80</sup> it is only the very foolish who would do battle against what seems to be good.

7. Furthermore, many, he says, have said that the chreia is useful for living. Accordingly, we will be acting contrary to the definition if we refute what is useful in it.<sup>81</sup>

<sup>79</sup> The commentator is John of Sardis, whom Doxapatres copies rather closely (cf. John of Sardis 5.1–6).

<sup>80</sup> Refutation is the fifth progymnasma (see Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 5 [13,19–16,16 Rabe]).

<sup>81</sup> Being useful is not generally a part of definitions of the chreia, appearing only in Hermogenes’s definition (Hermogenes 1–2 H/ON [= 6,6 Rabe]): *χρησίμου τινὸς ἐνεκα*). Theon used the word *βιωφιλής* (“useful for living”) for a related form, the *ἀπομνημόνευμα* (“reminiscence”) (Theon 8 H/ON [= 18 Patillon]), and noted that chreiai are sometimes merely witty whereas another related form, the *γνώμη* (“maxim”), is always about matters useful in life (*περὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ χρησίμων*) (Theon 14–17 H/ON [= 18 Patillon]).

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8. Ἐτι κατ' ὀλίγον | ἐπαύξειν δεῖ τὰ μαθήματα· πρῶτον οὖν γυμνασόμεθα τῇ κατασκευῇ τῆς χρείας καὶ τῆς γνώμης, εἴτα τοῦτο τὸ μέρος κρατύναντες, διὰ τῆς ἀνασκευῆς καὶ κατασκευῆς ὥς [ἐπὶ] τι μεῖζον τὴν εἰς ἐκάτερα παρεχόμεθα γυμνασίαν· ὅτι δὲ μεῖζόν ἐστι τῆς χρείας ἐκεῖνο τὸ μάθημα, ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἐστι συνιδεῖν, ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς χρεαίαις λόγος ἐστὶν ἢ πρᾶξις σύντομος, ἐν δὲ τῇ τῶν διηγημάτων ἀνασκευῇ ὁλοκλήρου πράγματος τυγχάνει παράστασις.

9. Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν οἱ παλαιότεροι τῶν ἐξηγητῶν· ὁ δὲ Γεωμέτρης τάδε περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου φησὶν· ἀνασκευάζομεν δὲ καὶ κατασκευάζομεν τὰς χρείας οὐ πάσας, οὐδὲ αἰεὶ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς διηγήμασιν οὔτε τὰ λίαν σαφῇ οὔτε τὰ παντελῶς ἀδύνατα, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων οὔτε τὰς λίαν ἀμέμπτως ἐχούσας κατασκευάσομεν ἢ ἀνασκευάσομεν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ περιττόν, τὸ δὲ ἀδύνατον· οὔτε τὰς λίαν μοχθηρῶς καὶ ἐπισφαλῶς· αὐτόθεν γὰρ ἔχουσιν ὑποφαινομένην τὴν ἀτοπίαν· ἀλλ' ὅσαι μέσσην τὴν φύσιν ἔχουσι καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἐκάτερα δέχονται μεταχείρισιν, περὶ δὲ ἀνασκευῆς καὶ κατασκευῆς τῆς χρείας οὐ ταῦτά ἡμῖν τε καὶ τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν ἔδοξεν.

10. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ταύτην κατασκευάζουσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐγκωμιαστικοῦ καὶ παραφραστικοῦ κεφαλαίου καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν, ὧν ἐμνημόνευσε καὶ Ἀφθόνιος· ἀνασκευάζοντες δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἀσαφοῦς ταύτην ἀνασκευάζουσι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐλ-

8 ἐπὶ omissi || 8 σύντομος scripsi; cf. John of Sardis 5.6 || συντόμως Walz || 8 παράστασις scripsi; cf. John of Sardis 5.6 || περίστασις Walz || 9 ταῦτά correxi || ταυτά Walz



8. Then, too, lessons must advance little by little. So we first exercise ourselves with the confirmation of a chreia and maxim;<sup>82</sup> then, when we have mastered this aspect of rhetoric, we provide a more advanced exercise on both sides of an issue by means of refutation and confirmation.<sup>83</sup> That this lesson is more advanced than the chreia elaboration can be seen from the very subjects being treated. For the saying or action in chreiai is concise, whereas in the refutation of narratives there is the presentation of an entire incident.

9. Such, then, are the comments of older commentators. Geometres, however, has this to say about the subject: We refute and confirm chreiai—not all, nor always—but just as with narratives we do not confirm or refute those that are perfectly clear or utterly impossible,<sup>84</sup> so also in the case of chreiai we will not confirm or refute those that are completely without fault, for confirming would be superfluous, refuting impossible. Nor do we handle those that are very fallacious and misleading. For right from the start their absurdity is readily apparent. But we confirm and refute all those that have an intermediate nature<sup>85</sup> and that receive treatment from both directions. Now our predecessors and we do not think alike concerning the refutation and confirmation of the chreia. 10. For they confirm the chreia on the basis of the encomiastic and paraphrastic headings and the others that Aphthonius lists.<sup>86</sup> But when refuting it, they refute on the basis of its

<sup>82</sup> For the confirmation of a maxim, which uses the same eight sections as in the chreia chapter, see Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 4 (8,3–6 Rabe).

<sup>83</sup> For these progymnasmata, see Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 5–6 (10,8–16,16 Rabe).

<sup>84</sup> Geometres is applying to the chreia the language used by Aphthonius about refuting narratives; indeed, the language is virtually taken from Aphthonius (*Progymn.* 5 [10,11–12 Rabe]): τὰ μήτε σαφῆ μήτε ἀδύνατα παντελῶς.

<sup>85</sup> Once again, Geometres uses the language of the refutation chapter, as μέσην τὴν φύσιν recalls μέσην τὴν τάξιν (see Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 5 [10,12 Rabe]).

<sup>86</sup> Doxapatres names only the first two of eight κεφάλαια (see Aphthonius 19–22 H/ON [= 4,13–15 Rabe]).

λιποῦς καὶ πλεονάζοντος· ἡμεῖς δὲ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν φαμεν εἶναι τάς τε ἀνασκευὰς καὶ κατασκευὰς τῶν τόπων.

11. Ἀπορεῖται καὶ τοῦτο, εἰ κατασκευὴ ἐστὶ χρείας τὸ προγύμνασμα, γυμναζόμεθα δὲ καὶ διηγημάτων κατασκευήν, περιττὴ ἢ διδασκαλία τῆς χρείας, περιττὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ γυμνασία τῆς γνώμης τυγχάνει. 12. πρὸς δὲ [264] τοῦτό φαμεν, ὅτι ἕτερόν ἐστι λόγου ποιεῖσθαι κατασκευήν, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ χρείᾳ καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ, καὶ ἕτερον ὁλοκλήρου πράγματος, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ κατασκευῇ τοῦ διηγήματος· ἄλλως τε δὲ μὴ δυναμένου τοῦ νέου κατασκευήν πολλῶν ἐργάσασθαι ἀθρόον, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ κατασκευῇ, (πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ λόγοι καὶ πολλαὶ πράξεις ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ διηγήματι) ἐπὶ τὰ συντομώτερα τὸν γυμναζόμενον ἄγομεν, ὥς ἂν τῶν μικρῶν πρῶτον περιγενόμενος ἱκανὸς ἐπὶ τῶν πλειόνων γενήσεται.

**Ἐργάσιο δ' αὐτὴν τοῖσδε τοῖς κεφαλαίοις** (Aphth 18 H/ON [= 4,12–13 Rabe]). 13. Αὐτήν, φησί, τὴν χρείαν προθέντες δεῖ ἐργάσασθαι τοῖς ἐξῆς κεφαλαίοις. 14. προβαλοῦμεν δὲ τὴν χρείαν καὶ κατ' εὐθεΐαν πτώσιν καὶ κατὰ γενικὴν καὶ δοτικὴν καὶ αἰτιατικὴν.

being unclear, elliptical, or pleonastic.<sup>87</sup> We, however, say in reply: Refutations and confirmations have the very same categories.

11. This, too, is problematic: Since this exercise involves the confirmation of a chreia, and since we also train ourselves by confirming narratives, the teaching of the chreia elaboration is superfluous, as is the confirmation exercise with the maxim. 12. To this we say in reply: It is one thing to write a confirmation of a saying, which is what happens in the chreia and the maxim chapters, but it is quite another thing to write one of an entire incident, which is what happens in the confirmation of a narrative. Besides, since a young man is unable at the present stage to compose a confirmation of many things all at once, which is what happens in the confirmation exercise—for many sayings and actions occur in a complete narrative—we guide the young man being trained in rhetoric to the shorter exercise, so that, having first mastered the shorter exercise, he will be ready for the longer ones.

**You can elaborate a chreia by means of these headings** (Aphth 18 H/ON [= 4,12–13 Rabe]). 13. Aphthonius says that, having once quoted the chreia itself, we must elaborate it by means of the following headings. 14. Now we present the chreia in the nominative case as well as in the genitive, dative, and accusative cases.<sup>88</sup>

<sup>87</sup> Doxapatres assumes a different set of *κεφάλαια*, one for confirming a chreia, as listed in Aphthonius's chreia chapter (see Aphthonius 19–22 H/ON [= 4,13–15 Rabe]), another set of *κεφάλαια* for refuting a chreia, presumably those listed in the refutation chapter—unclearly, implausibility, impossibility, etc. (see Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 5 [10,15–17 Rabe]). A closer parallel, however, comes from Theon's discussion of refuting chreiai; he lists nine bases for refuting a chreia, the first three matching those of Doxapatres (though in a different order) (see Theon 334–83, esp. 334–35 H/ON [= 28–30 Patillon]).

<sup>88</sup> The vocative case is left out, not to mention the dual and plural. Doxapatres includes the vocative case in a *κλίσις* elsewhere (see 2:192,14–193,8 Walz) [= *Chreia* 2:74–77]). For a *κλίσις* with the dual and plural as well, see Brit. Mus. addit. 37533 (= *Chreia* 2:64–66). Elaborations normally have the chreia declined in the nominative, but Doxapatres includes one elaboration that presents the chreia in the genitive (see 2:282,12–283,21 Walz [= *Chreia* 2:244–47]). The source for what follows in 6.16–19 is Theon 223–75 H/ON (= 25–26 Patillon).

15. Κατὰ μὲν εὐθεϊάν, ὡς ἔχει τό· Ἰσοκράτης τῆς παιδείας τὴν μὲν ρίζαν ἔφη πικράν, γλυκεῖς δὲ τοὺς καρπούς, καὶ τό· ὁ Πλάτων τοὺς τῆς ἀρετῆς κλῶνας ἰδρῶσι καὶ πόνοις ἔλεγε φύεσθαι.

16. Κατὰ δὲ γενικὴν, εἰ μὲν λογικὴ εἴη ἡ χρεία, οἷον Πιττακοῦ τοῦ Μιτυληναίου ἐρωτηθέντος, εἰ λανθάνει τις τοὺς θεοὺς κακὰ πράττων, λόγος ἀπομνημονεύεται εἰπόντος, ὅτι μὴδὲ διανοούμενος· ἔτι δὲ καὶ οὕτως· Ἰσοκράτους τοὺς εὐφυεῖς τῶν μαθητῶν θεῶν παίδας εἰπόντος, τὸ ῥηθὲν μνήμης ἔτυχε· πλὴν κατὰ μὲν τὸ πρῶτον πάσας τὰς λογικὰς ἐξενεκτέον χρείας, κατὰ δὲ τὸ δεύτερον μόνας τὰς καθ' ἐκούσιον ἀποφαντικὰς.

17. οὕτω μὲν οὖν τὰς λογικὰς χρείας κατὰ γενικὴν προβαλοῦμεν, τῶν δὲ πρακτικῶν τὰς μὲν ἐνεργητικὰς, οἷον Πυθαγόρου ἐρωτηθέντος, πόσος ἂν εἴη ὁ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίος, καὶ βραχὺ τι φανέντος καὶ ἀποκρύψαντος, τὸ πραχθὲν μνήμης ἔτυχε· τὰς δὲ παθητικὰς, οἷον Διδύμωνος τοῦ αὐλητοῦ ἐπὶ μοιχείᾳ ἀλόντος, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος κρεμασθέντος, τὸ συμβᾶν μνήμης ἔτυχε.

[265] 18. Κατὰ δὲ δοτικὴν τὰς μὲν λογικὰς, οἷον Πιττακῷ τῷ Μιτυληναίῳ | ἐρωτηθέντι, εἰ λανθάνει τις τοὺς θεοὺς κακὰ πράττων, ἐπῆλθεν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὐδὲ διανοούμενος· ὁμοίως δὲ καί, εἰ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπῆλθεν εἰπεῖν, τὸ παρέστη εἰπεῖν, ἧ ἔδοξεν ἧ ἐφάνη ἐροῦμεν, κατὰ δοτικὴν τὴν χρείαν ἐκφέρομεν· τὰς δὲ πρακτικὰς, οἷον Πυθαγόρα ἐρωτηθέντι, πόσος ἂν εἴη ὁ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίος, ἔδοξε μικρόν τι φανῆναι καὶ ἀποκρύψασθαι.

19. Κατὰ δὲ αἰτιατικὴν, εἰ μὲν λογικὴ εἴη, οἷον Πιττακὸν Μιτυληναῖον ἐρωτηθέντα, εἰ λανθάνει τις τοὺς θεοὺς κακὰ πράττων, λέγεται εἰπεῖν, ὅτι μὴδὲ διανοούμενος· εἰ δὲ πρακτικὴ, οἷον Πυθαγόραν ἐρωτηθέντα, πόσος εἴη ὁ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίος, λέγεται μικρόν τι φανέντα ἀποκρύψασθαι.

17 ἀποκρύψαντος scripsi || ἀποκρυβέντος Walz || 18 παρέστη scripsi;  
cf. Theon 256 H/ON (= 26 Patillon) || παρίστη Walz || 18 ἔδοξεν scripsi; cf.  
Theon 255 H/ON (= 26 Patillon) || ἔδοξιν Walz

15. In the nominative, like this: Isocrates said that the root of education is bitter, but its fruits are sweet.<sup>89</sup> And this: Plato said that the offshoots of virtue grow by sweat and toil.<sup>90</sup>

16. In the genitive, and if it is a saying chreia—for example: When Pittacus of Mitylene was asked if anyone escapes the notice of the gods when doing wicked things, the saying is remembered when he said, “Not even when contemplating them.”<sup>91</sup> And like this: When Isocrates said that gifted students are children of gods, what was said by him is remembered.<sup>92</sup> Now one should present all saying chreiai with the first formula, but only those whose saying is unprompted with the second. 17. This is the way we set forth saying chreiai in the genitive case, but of the action chreiai some are active as follows: When Pythagoras was asked how long human life is and when he was present a short time and disappeared, the action is remembered.<sup>93</sup> And some are passive: For example: When Didymon the flute player was convicted for adultery and hanged by his namesake, what happened to him is remembered.<sup>94</sup>

18. In the dative—saying chreiai. For example: To Pittacus of Mitylene, on being asked if anyone escapes the notice of the gods when doing wicked things, it occurred to say, “Not even when contemplating them.” Similarly also, if, instead of “it occurred to say,” we can express a chreia in the dative with “it was agreeable to say,” “it seemed best to say,” or “it appeared good to say.” And action chreiai—for example: To Pythagoras, on being asked how long human life is, it seemed best to appear for a short time and disappear.

19. In the accusative case, and if it is a saying chreia—for example: It is said that Pittacus of Mitylene, on being asked if anyone escapes the notice of the gods when doing wicked things, said, “Not even when contemplating them.” But if it is an action chreia—for example: It is said that Pythagoras, on being asked how long human life is, appeared for a short time and disappeared.

<sup>89</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:325–26.

<sup>90</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:333.

<sup>91</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:331–32.

<sup>92</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:324.

<sup>93</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:334–35.

<sup>94</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:312–13.

20. Ἰστέον δέ, ὅτι τοῖς ἐξηγηταῖς δοκεῖ τοῖς τε ἄλλοις καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ Γεωμέτρῃ, ὥς ποτὲ μὲν ἐκτείνειν ἐφεῖται τὴν χρεῖαν, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ συστέλλειν· καὶ συστέλλεται μὲν, φησὶν, ἀπλῶς οὕτως ἀπαγγελλόντων ἡμῶν, οἷον Σωκράτης ποτὲ τὴν ἐπὶ θάνατον ἀγόμενος, καὶ Ἀπολλοδώρου τινὸς αὐτῷ τῶν γνωρίμων ἀκολουθοῦντος καὶ λέγοντος, «ἀδίκως σου θάνατον, ὦ Σώκρατες, Ἀθηναῖοι κατεψηφίσαντο,» γελάσας ἔφη· «σὺ δὲ ἐβούλου δικαίως;» ἅτε γὰρ ἐνθυμηματικῶς καὶ συνεσταλμένως ἐξηγέσθη.

[266] 21. Εἰ μέντοι ἐκτεῖναι ταύτην βουληθείημεν, οὕτως ἐροῦμεν. Σωκράτης ἀνὴρ σοφός τε καὶ ἀγαθός, καὶ τοὺς νέους ἐπὶ τὰ κρεῖττονα προτρέπων διὰ φθόνον Ἄνυτον καὶ Μέλιτον ἐπὶ τὴν κατηγορίαν ἐκίνησε· διὰ δὲ τὴν τοῦ ἥθους ἐπιείκειαν καὶ χρηστότητα μήτε πρὸς δικαστὰς ἀπολογησάμενος, μήτε μὴν διὰ τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν τῷ βουλευτηρίῳ προσδραμεῖν βουλευσάμενος, ἀλλὰ προθύμως ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ πρὸς τὸν θάνατον ἀπαγόμενος, ἄξιός γάρ ἦν οὐκ αὐτὸς ὀδυρμῶν, ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐδόκει πόλις τοιοῦτου χρήματος ἑαυτὴν ἀποστεροῦσα, κατηκολούθουν | δὲ καὶ τῶν γνωρίμων πολλοὶ καὶ πάντες οἰκεῖοι μετὰ τε τῆς γυναικὸς καὶ τῶν τέκνων, ἐν αὐτοῖς δὲ μάλιστα καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος, ὃς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πλείονα τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλίαν καὶ οἰκείωσιν ἔχων πολλὰ θρηνῶν καὶ ἀποκλαιόμενος καὶ συνεχῶς τοῦτον ἀνακαλούμενος, καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν δὲ παρ' αὐτοῦ τούτου διερωτώμενος, δι' ἣν οὕτω περιπαθῶς λίαν ἔχει καὶ ἀφορήτως, διότι σοῦ, φησὶν, «ἀδίκως Ἀθηναῖοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, θάνατον κατεψηφίσαντο.» 22. ἡδὺ γοῦν αὐτίκα πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁ Σωκράτης ἀπιδῶν τε καὶ μειδιάσας, «σὺ δέ,» ἔφη, “Ἀπολλόδωρε, δικαίως ἐβούλου με ἀποθνήσκειν;»

23. Καὶ οὕτω μὲν οἱ ἐξηγούμενοι καὶ ἐκτείνεσθαι τὰς χρεῖας φασὶ συστέλλεσθαι· ἡμῖν δὲ δοκεῖ σύντομον αἰεὶ δεῖν προτείνειν τὴν χρεῖαν, ἵνα μὴ λάθωμεν ἀπομνημόνευμα μᾶλλον, οὐ χρεῖαν εἰς μελέτην προβάλλοντες· ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἵνα μὴ παρὰ τὸ δοκοῦν τῷ σοφιστῇ ποιοῦντες φαινώμεθα

20. One should realize, however, that other commentators, including Geometres himself, think that it is permitted to expand a chreia at one time and to condense it at another. And it is condensed, Geometres says, when we recite it in a straightforward way like this. For example: At the time when Socrates was being led away to death and Apollodorus, one of his students, was following and remarked, "The Athenians, O Socrates, have condemned you to death unjustly," he laughed and said, "Did you wish that they were doing so justly?"<sup>95</sup> For inasmuch as it was expressed with an enthymeme, it was also expressed in condensed form.<sup>96</sup>

21. If, however, we should want to expand this chreia, we will speak like this: Socrates, a wise and virtuous man who encouraged youths to better things, prompted Anytus and Miletus out of jealousy to bring their accusation. But he did not defend himself before jurors, because of the reasonableness and goodness of his character, nor did he want to cooperate with the Council, because of his high-mindedness. Rather, he was led away to death readily and of his own accord, for he did not think it worth lamenting. But the city of the Athenians thought it best to rid itself of such a pest. Now following him out were many of his friends and entire household, including his wife and children, and among them was Apollodorus in particular, who, more than the others, had a friendship and affection for him and so lamented and wept much and constantly called to him. And so, when Socrates asked him why he was so very distraught and unable to bear up, he said, "Because the Athenians, O Socrates, have condemned you unjustly."

22. Well, then, Socrates immediately looked at him pleasantly and said with a smile, "Was it your wish, Apollodorus, that I die justly?"

23. In this fashion, then, the commentators say chreiai are to be expanded and condensed. It seems to me, however, that we should always put forward a chreia that is concise in order that we do not inadvertently present a reminiscence, instead of a chreia, for elaboration. And we should put forward a chreia in order that

<sup>95</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:337.

<sup>96</sup> That Geometres classifies this chreia as one expressed with an enthymeme shows his familiarity with Theon's *ἐπιδιαίρεσις*, which not only explains such a chreia but also illustrates it with this very chreia (see Theon 142–49 H/ON [= 22 Patillon]).

ὀριζομένῳ αὐτὴν ἀπομνημόνευμα σύντομον· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐκτείνειν αὐτὴν βουλόμεθα, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ καὶ ἐν τῇ οἶονεὶ προτάσει καὶ προβολῇ τῆς χρείας τοῦτο ποιήσομεν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ παραφραστικῷ κεφαλαίῳ, καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνῳ τὴν ἐρμηνείαν ἀλλοιοῦντες καὶ τὰ τοῦ μήκους ἐναλλάττειν δυνάμεθα.

**Ἔργασαιο δ'** αὐτὴν τοῖσδε τοῖς κεφαλαίοις (Aphth 18 H/ON [= 4,12–13 Rabe]). 24. Τὸ κεφάλαιον εἶναι βούλονται μέρος λόγου, ἀπόδειξιν ἔχον τοῦ προκειμένου πράγματος, ἐκ νοημάτων καὶ ἐπιχειρημάτων συγκείμενον. 25. Ἰστέον δέ, ὅτι τὰ τῆς χρείας κεφάλαια οὐκ εἰσὶ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ κεφάλαια, οὐ γὰρ ἐκ νοημάτων καὶ ἐπιχειρημάτων σύγκεινται, αὐτὰ δὲ μᾶλλον ἀναλογοῦσιν ἐπιχειρήμασι καὶ ἐργασίαις, ἐξ ὧν τὸ κεφάλαιον σύγκειται.

[267] 26. Ζητεῖται οὖν, πῶς τὴν αἰτίαν, ἣτις ἀναλογεῖ ἐπιχειρήματι, καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου καὶ τὴν παραβολὴν καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα ἐργασίαις ἀναλογοῦντα | κεφάλαια ὁ Ἀφθόνιος ὀνομάζει· φησὶ γάρ, ἐργάσαιο δ' αὐτὴν τοῖσδε τοῖς κεφαλαίοις, ὅπου δὲ πολὺ δῆπου διενηνόχασιν ἐργασία καὶ ἐπιχείρημα πρὸς κεφάλαιον, εἴγε τὰ μὲν μέρεσιν ἀναλογοῦσι, τὸ δὲ κεφάλαιον ὅλῳ, ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν συνίσταται, οὕτω καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον ἐκ τῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων καὶ ἐργασιῶν, ἔτι γε μὴν ἐνθυμημάτων καὶ ἐπενθυμημάτων.



we do not appear to be acting contrary to how the sophist thinks, for he has defined the *chreia* as “a concise reminiscence.”<sup>97</sup> But even if we want to expand the *chreia*, at least we will not do it in the initial presentation, as it were, of the *chreia*, but in the paraphrastic heading. For in this heading, where we vary the recitation, we are also able to change its length.<sup>98</sup>

**You can elaborate a *chreia* by means of these headings** (Aphth 18 H/ON [= 4,12–13 Rabe]). 24. By the word “heading” is meant a part of a speech that contains a proof of the matter under discussion and is composed of ideas and arguments.<sup>99</sup> 25. One should realize, however, that the headings of a *chreia* elaboration are not really headings, for they are not composed of ideas and arguments. Rather, they are analogous to arguments and elaborations<sup>100</sup> by which a heading is composed.

26. Therefore, it is asked: “Why does Aphthonius use the term ‘headings’ for the rationale, which is analogous to an argument, as well as for the opposite, analogy, and example, which are analogous to elaborations? For he says, ‘You can elaborate a *chreia* by means of these headings’” (Aphth 18 H/ON [= 4,12–13 Rabe]). On occasion, of course, elaboration and argument differ greatly from a heading, if indeed they are analogous to parts and the heading to the whole, for just as the whole is composed of parts, so also the heading is composed of arguments and elaborations as well as enthymemes and additional enthymemes.<sup>101</sup>

<sup>97</sup> See Aphthonius 2–3 H/ON (= 3,21 Rabe).

<sup>98</sup> An example of a concise *chreia* at the beginning of an elaboration, then expanded in the paraphrastic, is Libanius’s elaboration of a *chreia* attributed to Diogenes (see *Chreia* 2:156–57 [= 54–57 Gibson]).

<sup>99</sup> This definition is repeated from Doxapatres’s introduction to his commentary (see 2:102,29–31 Walz [= *PS* 104,12–14 (Rabe)]).

<sup>100</sup> *Ἐπιχειρήματα* (“arguments”) and *ἐργασίαι* (“elaborations”) are technical terms that Doxapatres has already defined in his introduction. Arguments are confirmatory reasoning that appeal to the *τὰ περιστατικά* (“circumstantial topics”) (2:103,4–5 Walz [= *PS* 104,18–20 (Rabe)]). Doxapatres identifies and discusses these *περιστατικά* in his chapter on the narrative; they are person, subject, time, place, manner, and reason (2:207,27–215,8 Walz). Elaborations are confirmatory reasoning that include analogy and example (2:103,12–14 Walz [= *PS* 105,1–4 (Rabe)]).

<sup>101</sup> Elsewhere Doxapatres again uses these terms, saying that we confirm arguments by means of elaborations, enthymemes, and additional enthymemes (2:331,11–13 Walz).

27. Φαμέν οὖν, ὅτι ἡ ἀδιαφόρως αὐτὰ ὀνομάζει κεφάλαια, ἢ ὅτι ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς λόγοις, οἷον ἐν τῷ στοχασμῷ κεφάλαια ὀνομάζονται τὰ τοῦ ἀγωνιστικοῦ μέρους, οἷον τὸ παραγραφικὸν καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐλέγχων ἀπαίτησις καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ὡς ἔκκριτα καὶ τιμιώτερα τῶν ἄλλων ἀπὸ μεταφορᾶς τῆς κεφαλῆς, οὕτω καὶ ταῦτα κεφάλαια ὀνομάζει ἐνταῦθα, διότι καὶ διὰ τούτων μόνων σκευάζεται τὸ προκείμενον.

28. Σημείωσαι δέ, ὅτι ὁ Γεωμέτρης δύο φησὶ κεφάλαια ταῦτα κατασκευάζεσθαι ἐν τῇ μελέτῃ τοῦ Ἀφθονίου, τό τε χαλεπὸν καὶ τὸ ἐνδοξόν, καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐτέρου λύεσθαι, οἷον τὸ χαλεπὸν παρὰ τοῦ ἐνδόξου, ὅπερ καὶ ἀντιπαραστάσεως ἔχει λόγον· δεχόμενοι γάρ, φησί, τὸ χαλεπὸν εἶναι τὴν παιδείαν, διὰ τοῦ ἐνδόξου πρὸς ταύτην διερεθίζομεν, ὡς εἰ καὶ χαλεπὸν, ὅμως δεῖ ἐπιχειρεῖν τῷ ἐπιτηδεύματι, καὶ ταῦτα μὲν φησιν εἶναι δύο κεφάλαια τὰ κατασκευαζόμενα, τὰ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὰ βλέποντα καὶ ταῦτα κατασκευάζοντα ἐπιχειρήματά φησιν εἶναι καὶ ἐργασίας, τὰς μὲν αἰτίας ἐπιχειρήματα, τὰς δὲ παραβολὰς καὶ τὰ παραδείγματα καὶ τὰς μαρτυρίας ἐργασίας.

Ἐγκωμιαστικῷ (Aphth 19 H/ON [= 4,13 Rabe]). 29. Ἰστέον, ὅτι τὸ ἐγκωμιαστικὸν ἀναλογεῖ προοιμίῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ προοίμιον

27. We, then, say in reply: Either because Aphthonius calls them “headings” without any special distinction. Or because, just as in public speeches—for example, in a conjectural case the argumentative parts, that is, the exception, the demand for evidence, and so on<sup>102</sup>—are called “headings” from the metaphor of the head, so also here they are called “headings” because they are special and more honored than the other parts of the speech.<sup>103</sup>

28. Take note, however, that Geometres says that in Aphthonius’s model elaboration these two headings are confirmed, the difficult and the glorious,<sup>104</sup> and that one is resolved by the other, that is, the difficult by the glorious, which also has the function of a counter-representation.<sup>105</sup> For, he says, by accepting the fact that education is difficult we motivate people toward it by means of the glorious because, even if education is difficult, we must nevertheless make the effort to pursue it. And so, he says, these are the two headings which are being confirmed, but those that consider them and confirm them are arguments and elaborations—the rationale being the argument, and the analogy, the example, and the testimony being the elaborations.

**The encomiastic heading** (Aphth 19 H/ON [= 4,13 Rabe]).

29. One should realize that the encomiastic heading is analogous to the introduction of a speech. Just as the introduction instills

<sup>102</sup> Doxapatres is referring to one of the issues dealt with in Hermogenes’s *On Issues*, specifically, the *στάσις* (“issue”) dealing with conjecture, or matters of fact, which has, besides exception and demand for evidence, eight more headings (see Hermogenes, *On Issues* 3 [43,16–59,9 Rabe]; and Donald A. Russell, *Greek Declamation* [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983], 44–51).

<sup>103</sup> In fact, as Russell (*Greek Declamation*, 45) points out, Hermogenes says nothing about the other parts of speech on a conjectural issue—introductions, statements of the case, or epilogues.

<sup>104</sup> Doxapatres is saying that Geometres found a way of understanding Aphthonius’s use of *κεφάλαια* that is precise, since arguing in terms of the difficult and the glorious reflects Aphthonius’s appeal to *τὰ τελικὰ κεφάλαια*, specifically to two of them, the *ἔνδοξον* (“the glorious”) and the *χαλεπόν* (“the difficult”), which is the opposite of another *κεφάλαιον*, the *ῥάδιον* (“the easy”). On *τὰ τελικὰ κεφάλαια*, see Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 13 (42,9–10 Rabe).

<sup>105</sup> Geometres also relies on Hermogenes for his use of *ἀντιπαράστασις* (“counter-representation”) (see Hermogenes, *On Issues* 3 [48,17–18 Rabe]). As seen in what follows, Geometres is saying that, while the difficulty of education cannot be denied, its glorious results can at least counter the difficulty to some extent.

[268] ἐμποιεῖ εὐνοίαν τοῖς ἀκροαταῖς πρὸς τὸν λέγοντα, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐγκωμιαστικόν· ἐμποιεῖ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸ εὐνοίαν τοῦ εἰρηκότος τὴν χρεῖαν· ἀξιοῦσιν οὖν αὐτὸ βραχὺ ὅτι μάλιστα εἶναι, καὶ μὴ τοῖς ἐγκωμιαστικοῖς τόποις πλατύνεσθαι, ἵνα μὴ μεῖζον τοῦ παραφραστικοῦ τοῦ ἀναλογοῦντος τῇ διηγήσει | γένηται· οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰκὸς τὸ προοίμιον μεῖζον εἶναι τῆς διηγήσεως· καὶ τινες πρὸς τοῦτο ἠπορήκασιν λέγοντες· εἰ τὸ μὲν ἐγκώμιον κατὰ τέχνην γίνεται καὶ τοῖς ἐγκωμιαστικοῖς πλατύνεται τόποις, ὥς ἐν τῷ περὶ ἐγκωμίου λόγῳ μαθητόμεν, ὁ δὲ ἔπαινος ἐν βραχεῖ, πάντως καὶ τὸ παρὸν κεφάλαιον, εἴγε δέοι αὐτὸ βραχὺ εἶναι καὶ μὴ τοῖς ἐγκωμιαστικοῖς ποικίλλεσθαι τόποις, οὐκ ἔδει τῷ τοῦ ἐγκωμίου ὀνομασθῆναι ὀνόματι, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοῦ ἐπαίνου. 30. λέγομεν οὖν, ὅτι ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο ἐγκωμιαστικὸν αὐτὸ καὶ οὐκ ἐγκώμιον ὠνομάσθη, ἵν' ἐκ τοῦ οἴονεῖ ὑποκορισμοῦ τὸ ἐνυπάρχον αὐτῷ ἐλάχιστον δηλωθῇ.

31. Ἰστέον δέ, ὅτι τοῦ ἐγκωμιαστικοῦ ὕλη ἐστίν, εἰ μὲν ὠρισμένα καὶ κύρια εἴη τὰ πρόσωπα, αἱ πράξεις καὶ τῶν πράξεων αἱ κυριώτεραι· τούτων δὲ ὅσαι μὲν εἰσιν ἰδιόζουσαι τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ προσώπῳ θετικῶς εἰσαχθήσονται, αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι κατὰ παράλειψιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς μελέτης τῆς μελετηθείσης τῷ Ἀφθονίῳ εὐρίσκομεν· ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ αὐτὸς

goodwill in the audience toward the speaker, so also does the encomiastic heading. For it, too, instills goodwill toward the one who spoke the saying. Therefore, they think that it should be as brief as possible and not expanded by means of the encomiastic topics, to keep it from becoming longer than the paraphrastic heading, which is analogous to the statement of the case. For it is unreasonable that an introduction be longer than the statement of the case. And so, some have objected to this terminology, saying: “If the introduction is done according to rhetorical rules and so is amplified by means of the encomiastic topics, as we learn in Aphthonius’s chapter ‘On the Encomium,’<sup>106</sup> whereas the praise is done briefly, then surely the present heading—if indeed it must be brief and not embellished with the encomiastic topics—should have been designated not by the term ‘encomium’ but rather by ‘praise.’”<sup>107</sup> 30. We, then, say in reply: Well, this heading has been named “encomiastic” and not “encomium” for this very reason: that the brevity inherent in this section is shown by the use, as it were, of the diminutive form of the word.<sup>108</sup>

31. One should realize that the content of the encomiastic heading, if the individuals are named, is their deeds and, of these, the more important ones.<sup>109</sup> All the deeds that are distinctive of the individual being treated will be introduced explicitly, but the others only in passing, just as we also find in the model elaboration that has been worked out by Aphthonius.<sup>110</sup> For here he takes his

<sup>106</sup> The encomiastic topics, according to Aphthonius, include: (1) race (γένος), specifically nationality, homeland, ancestors, and parents; (2) upbringing (ἀνατροφή), specifically adult pursuits, skills, and habits; (3) deeds (πράξεις) divided into those of the body and soul, the latter emphasizing the cardinal virtues; and (4) a comparison (σύγκρισις) (see Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 8 [22,2–10 Rabe]).

<sup>107</sup> Praise (ἔπαινος) is Hermogenes’s term for this heading (see Hermogenes 38 H/ON [= 7,15 Rabe]).

<sup>108</sup> Doxapatres’s term for diminutive, ὑποκορισμός, is not the one that had become standard, namely, ὑποκοριστικόν (see Dionysius Thrax, *Ars Gramm.* 12.5 [28,6–7 Uhlig]), but one of Dionysius’s examples mirrors Doxapatres’s, as ἀνθρωπισκός is the diminutive form of ἄνθρωπος.

<sup>109</sup> Doxapatres is alluding again to the encomiastic topics, the most important of which are πράξεις (“deeds”) (see Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 8 [22,5–6 Rabe]). In other words, when brevity is required in this heading, the most important topic is the one chosen when the individual is named.

<sup>110</sup> Doxapatres is alluding to Aphthonius’s encomiastic heading praising Isocrates (see Aphthonius 29–32 H/ON [= 4,18–5,4 Rabe]).

τὰς ἀφορμὰς τοῦ ἐγκωμιαστικοῦ ἀπὸ τῶν πράξεων λαμβάνων, πράξεις γὰρ εἰσι τοῦ Ἰσοκράτους τὰ πονηθέντα αὐτῷ συγγράμματα, τῷ τε κατὰ θέσιν καὶ τῷ κατὰ παράλειψιν χρῆται σχήματι· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ λέγειν, θαυμάσαι δίκαιον τὸν Ἰσοκράτην τῆς τέχνης, ὃς ὄνομα αὐτῇ κατεφάνη λαμπρότατον, καὶ ὅση τις ἦν, ἀσκῶν ἐπεδείξατο (Aphth 26–28 H/ON [= 4,18–20 Rabe]), τῷ κατὰ θέσιν χρῆται σχήματι, ἐν δὲ τῷ, ὅσα μὲν τοίνυν ἡ βασιλεῦσι νομοθετῶν ἡ παραινῶν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον τὸν τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὖ πεποίηκε βίον, μακρὸν ἂν εἴη διεξελθεῖν, τῷ κατὰ παράλειψιν, καὶ ἐν τῇ τῆς γνώμης μελέτῃ τὸ αὐτὸ πάλιν ποιεῖ.

[269] 32. Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν, εἰ ὠρισμένον εἴη τὸ πρόσωπον, εἰς δ' ἡ χρεῖα ἀναφέρεται· εἰ δέ τις τῶν ἄλλων τάξεων εἴη, ὕλη τῷ ἐγκωμιαστικῷ ἔσται τὰ φυσικὰ ἰδιώματα καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα, οἷον πατήρ ἢ υἱὸς ὅπως πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἔχουσιν· εἰ δὲ ῥήτωρ ἢ στρατηγός, ὅπως δυνάμεως πρὸς τὸ βλάπτειν ἡμᾶς ἢ ὠφελεῖν ἔχουσιν· εἰ καὶ κοινὸν καὶ ἐθνικὸν εἴη τὸ πρόσωπον, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθνους καὶ τῆς χώρας ἐπαινεσόμεθα, ὥσπερ τοὺς μὲν Λάκωνας ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνδρίας, τοὺς δὲ Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῆς σοφίας <καὶ . . . > καὶ ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις τῆς φιλανθρωπίας καὶ ἀρχαιότητος, ἅπερ ὡς ἐξαίρετα τῶν ἄλλων τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις δοκεῖ.

33. Δεῖ δὲ πειρᾶσθαι καὶ ἰδιάζοντα ἐπὶ τῶν χρεῶν τὰ προοίμια ἡγουν τὰ ἐγκωμιαστικά ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ κοινά, ὥστε ἐπὶ πάσης χρεῖας τὰ αὐτὰ ἀρμόζει· τοῦτο δ' ἂν γένοιτο, εἰ ἐπὶ τῶν κυρίων προσώπων καὶ ὠρισμένων τὰ κοινὰ παρορῶντες, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ Δημοσθένους τὸ Ἀθηναῖον

31 παραινῶν scripsi; cf. Aphthonius 30 H/ON (= 5,2 Rabe) || παρὼν Walz || 32 <καὶ . . . > lacunam suspecti

subjects for the encomiastic heading from deeds—for the deeds of Isocrates are the compositions labored over by him—and he uses the figures “explicit statement” and “pretended omission.” For when he says, “It is right to admire Isocrates for his discipline, for he gave it distinction by his illustrious name and by his practice shows how important it was” (cf. Aphth 26–28 H/ON [= 4, 18–20 Rabe]), he uses the figure “explicit statement,” but when he says, “How often, moreover, either as a lawgiver to kings or adviser to individuals, he has benefitted human life would be a long story to set forth in detail” (cf. Aphth 29–32 H/ON [= 5, 1–3 Rabe]), he uses the figure “pretended omission,” and he does the same thing again in the model elaboration of a maxim.<sup>111</sup>

32. And so, this is the content if the individual to whom the chreia is attributed is specified. But if the individual should belong to one of the other groups of individuals,<sup>112</sup> the content of the encomiastic section will be their peculiar traits and ways of life. For example, a father and son, how they relate to one another; but if the individual is an orator or general, how they are able to harm or benefit us.<sup>113</sup> And if the individual should be identified by a common name and nationality,<sup>114</sup> we will praise him on the basis of his nation and land, as we praise Laconians for their courage and Athenians for their wisdom <and . . . >, and, in addition to these, on their philanthropy and old-fashioned simplicity—what seems distinctive of Athenians in comparison with other nations.

33. One should, however, try to individualize introductions, that is, encomiastic headings, to the chreiai and not make them so general that the same contents apply to any chreia. This individualizing would happen if, in the case of named and specified individuals, we overlook generalities—for example, in the case of

<sup>111</sup> Doxapatres is alluding to Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 4 (8, 19–20 Rabe), where Aphthonius says in the encomiastic heading that Theognis can be praised for many things (= “pretended omission”) but especially for his advice about poverty (= “explicit statement”).

<sup>112</sup> Once again, Doxapatres is making use of the standard division of *πρόσωπα* (see further 3.11 and note).

<sup>113</sup> The father and son belong to the second group of *πρόσωπα*, those in relation to one another; the orator and general belong to the seventh group, those designated by a common name.

<sup>114</sup> While Hermogenes’s division of *πρόσωπα* includes those with common names, like general or orator, it does not mention nationality (*ἐθνικόν*), making a Laconian or Athenian a subtype of common *πρόσωπα*.

εἶναι, τὸ πρεσβευτήν, τὸ ῥήτορα, τᾶλλα οἷς καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς ἐπικοινωνοῦσι, τὸ ἰδιαίτατον αὐτοῦ μᾶλλον παραληψόμεθα τὴν δεινότητα, καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους δὲ τὴν τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων πυκνότητα, καὶ ἀφ' ὧν ὁμοίως ἕκαστος χαρακτηρίζεται, ὥσπερ καὶ Φωκίων μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς λιτότητος, Θεμιστοκλῆς δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς συνέσεως, καὶ ἄλλος ἀπὸ σωφροσύνης, ὥσπερ ὁ Πολέμων καὶ ἕτερος ἀπὸ δικαιοσύνης ὥσπερ Ἀριστείδης.

**Παραφραστικῶ** (Aphth 19 H/ON [= 4,13 Rabe]). 34. Τὸ παραφραστικὸν ἀναλογεῖν λέγεται τῇ διηγήσει, παρόσον ἐν αὐτῷ ἀφηγούμεθα τὸ πεπραγμένον ἢ λελεγμένον.



Demosthenes the facts that he was an Athenian, an ambassador, an orator, and whatever else other Athenians share with him—and instead seize upon what is his most distinguishing characteristic, his eloquence;<sup>115</sup> and in the case of Aristotle his frequent use of enthymemes; and so by such distinctive features each person is similarly characterized: Phocion by his simple way of life;<sup>116</sup> Themistocles by his intelligence;<sup>117</sup> and another man by his self-control, such as Polemo;<sup>118</sup> and still another by his justice, such as Aristeides.<sup>119</sup>

**The paraphrastic heading** (Aphth 19 H/ON [= 4, 13 Rabe]).

34. The paraphrastic heading is said to be analogous to the statement of the case since in it we set out what has been done or said.

<sup>115</sup> Demosthenes's δεινότης was widely recognized as his characteristic talent (see, e.g., Lucian, *Merc. cond.* 25), but Doxapatres may be thinking of Hermogenes's notion that δεινότης is not merely one type of style but the sum of all the types of style, best represented in Demosthenes's speeches (see Hermogenes, *On Types of Style* 1.1 [215, 22–24; 217, 21–218, 3 Rabe]; and Cecil Wooten, trans., *Hermogenes' On Types of Style* [Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987], xvi–xvii).

<sup>116</sup> On the simplicity of this fourth-century B.C.E. Athenian general and statesman, see, e.g., Plutarch, *Phoc.* 18.1–5, which tells of Alexander's gift of 100 talents, which Phocion refused even though Alexander's messenger who brought the gift visited Phocion's house and saw his great simplicity (πολλὴ εὐτέλεια), as evidenced by Phocion's drawing his own water to wash his feet and by his wife's kneading dough to make bread. Elsewhere it is said that Phocion's wife went out with only one slave-attendant, and when an Ionian woman visited with jewelry made of gold and precious stones, his wife said only that Phocion was her adornment, although he had been general for the twentieth year (19.1–3).

<sup>117</sup> Doxapatres refers again to Themistocles's wisdom (see 2:416, 14–15 Walz).

<sup>118</sup> Polemo's self-control was the result of his conversion to philosophy. According to Diogenes Laertius 4.16, Polemo had been living an extraordinarily undisciplined life when he happened to visit the Academy, where he heard the Platonist Xenocrates lecturing on self-control (σωφροσύνη) and was converted to a disciplined life and even became head of the Academy. This story is told or alluded to in various other sources (see, e.g., Lucian, *Bis acc.* 16–17; Epictetus 3.1.14; 4.11.30; Plutarch, *Mor.* 71e–f; and Julian, *Orat.* 8.241c).

<sup>119</sup> Aristeides and justice are always and everywhere combined (see, e.g., Dio Chrysostom, *Orat.* 64.27; Philostratus, *V. Apoll.* 6.21; and Athenaeus 13.555f), not to mention the appearance of this combination in the *Progymnasmata* (on which see *Chreia* 1:305) and Hermogenes's claim that an unjust Aristeides illustrates what is incredible (ἀπίθανον) (*On Issues* 1 [33, 8–9 Rabe]). Doxapatres refers again to the justice of Aristeides (see 2:416, 14 Walz).

35. δέον οὖν ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν, τί διαφέρει παράφρασις, μετάφρασις, ἔκφρασις, ἀντίφρασις καὶ περίφρασις. περίφρασιν οὖν ποιοῦμεν, ὅτε τι θέλοντες δηλῶσαι, ἐκ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο δεικνύομεν, οἷον ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰπεῖν Ἡρακλεῖς εἵπωμεν βίη Ἡρακλείη· ἡ δὲ μετάφρασις διττὴ ἐστίν, ἥ γὰρ τὰ ὑψηλὰ καὶ ἀνηγμένα μεταβάλλει εἰς ὑψηλότερα, ὡς αἱ τοῦ Λογοθέτου ἔχουσι Μεταφράσεις. . . , <ἡ . . . >. ἔκφρασις δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ λεπτομερὴς διήγησις· ἀντίφρασιν δὲ ποιοῦμεν, ὅταν τῷ τοῦ ἐναντίου ὀνόματι δηλώσωμεν τὸ προκείμενον. παράφρασις δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ τὰ εἰρημένα μεταβάλλειν εἰς ἕτερα

35. Now it is necessary to explain how paraphrase [παράφρασις], change of style [μετάφρασις], description [ἔκφρασις], substitution [ἀντίφρασις], and circumlocution [περίφρασις] differ from one another.<sup>120</sup> Thus we use circumlocution [περίφρασις] when we want to disclose something and point to this with what is associated with it. For example, instead of saying “Herakles,” we can say “Heraklean might.”<sup>121</sup> Change of style [μετάφρασις] is twofold: either exalted and lofty subjects are transformed into the more exalted, as the *Metaphrases* of the Logothete<sup>122</sup> do, <or . . . >. Description [ἔκφρασις] is a detailed account.<sup>123</sup> We make a substitution [ἀντίφρασις] whenever we discuss the subject at hand with a term having the opposite meaning.<sup>124</sup> Paraphrase [παράφρασις] is changing what has been said to something that is neither plainer nor loftier but is on a par with it, and it is also altering only the words

<sup>120</sup> Doxapatres’s list of words formed on the root φράσις is presumably derived from the grammatical tradition, and perhaps from the ninth-century grammatical commentator George Choiroboskos’s “On poetic figures” (on whom see Robert Browning, “Choiroboskos, George,” *ODB* 1:425). His treatment of terms based on φράσις is quite close to Doxapatres’s; indeed, Doxapatres includes six of Choiroboskos’s seven terms and changes only the placement of παράφρασις, which he puts first, not third, as in Choiroboskos’s list (see 8:812,15–813,14 Walz)—a change easily explained, given Doxapatres’s interest in clarifying the choice of terms leading up to the παραφραστικόν heading.

<sup>121</sup> A frequent Homeric phrase (see *Il.* 2.658, 666; 5.638; 11.690; 15.640) and likewise cited as the example of περίφρασις by Choiroboskos (8:812,23–23 Walz).

<sup>122</sup> Choiroboskos illustrates μετάφρασις, as does Doxapatres, by citing a Metaphrastes, but Doxapatres further identifies him with the title “Logothete,” which clearly refers to Symeon Metaphrastes, a logothete under the emperors Nicephorus II Phocas, John I Tzimiscus, and Basil II (i.e., A.D. 963–1025). The nickname “Metaphrastes” derives from his stylistic revisions (μεταφράσεις) of the lives of the saints (see PG 114–116; Hans-Georg Beck, *Kirche und theologische Literatur im byzantinischen Reich* [HAW 12.2.1; Munich: Beck, 1959], 571–75; and Alexander Kazhdan and Nancy P. Sevcenko, “Symeon Metaphrastes,” *ODB* 3:1983–84).

<sup>123</sup> Choiroboskos illustrates ἔκφρασις by referring to, but not explicitly naming, Aphthonius’s ἔκφρασις of the temple in Alexandria (8:813,9 Walz) (cf. Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 12 [38,3–41,11 Rabe]).

<sup>124</sup> Choiroboskos illustrates ἀντίφρασις with the phrase ἀργυροῦς Αἰθίοψ (“white Ethiopian”) (8:813,11 Walz).

[270] μήτε εὐτελέστερα, μήτε ὑψηλότερα, ἀλλ' ἴσα, καὶ τὰς μὲν λέξεις μόνας ἐξαλλάττειν, | καὶ ἀντ' αὐτῶν ἐτέρας ὁμοίας τιθέναι, τὸν δὲ νοῦν τὸν αὐτὸν φυλάττειν.

36. Παραφραστικὸν δὲ καὶ οὐ παράφρασιν τὸ παρὸν ὀνομάζει κεφάλαιον, διότι λόγον ἓνα μόνον, ἢ μίαν πρᾶξιν ἐν αὐτῷ μεταποιοῦμεν, τὴν δὲ παράφρασιν εἶναι βούλονται ἐρμηνείας ἀλλοίωσιν <τὴν αὐτὴν διάνοιαν φυλάττουσαν>.

**Τῷ τῆς αἰτίας** (Aphth 19–20 H/ON [= 4,14 Rabe]). 37. Μετὰ τὸ κεφάλαιον τὸ ἀναλογοῦν προοιμίῳ, δηλονότι τὸ ἐγκωμιστικόν, καὶ μετὰ τὸ παραφραστικὸν τὸ ἀναλογοῦν διηγῆσει τίθησιν τὰ ἀγωνιστικά· ἀναλογοεῖ τοίνυν τὸ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς αἰτίας κεφάλαιον ἐπιχειρήμασιν [ἀπὸ τῆς αἰτίας], τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου καὶ ἡ παραβολὴ καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα ἐργασίαις· αἱ γὰρ ἐργασίαι γίνονται ἀπὸ παραβολῆς, ἀπὸ παραδείγματος, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου, ὡς ἐν τῷ περὶ τῶν εὐρέσεων βιβλίῳ μανθάνομεν· ὥσπερ οὖν τὰ ἐπιχειρήματα προτάττονται τῶν ἐργασιῶν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον τὸ ἀναλογοῦν ἐπιχειρήματι ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο, τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς αἰτίας προτάττονται τῷ Ἀφθονίῳ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἀναλογούντων ἐργασίαις.

38. Αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων πάλιν τῶν ἀναλογούντων ἐργασίαις προτάττεται τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου, διότι αὐτὸ μὲν ἀποδεικτικόν ἔστι καὶ πολιτικῆς ἐργασίας δεόμενον, ἡ δὲ παραβολὴ καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα πανηγυρικά, ὡς ἐν τῷ προοιμίῳ τοῦ τετάρτου τόμου τῶν εὐρέσεων μανθάνομεν. δέον δὲ μετὰ τὰ πανηγυρικά τὰ πολιτικὰ τίθεσθαι, ὡς ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ τόμῳ τοῦ Περὶ εὐρέσεων βιβλίου ἐν τῷ περὶ τάξεως ἐπιχειρημάτων λόγῳ μανθάνομεν·

36 <τὴν αὐτὴν διάνοιαν φυλάττουσαν> addidi; cf. John of Sardis, *Comm. Aphth.* 4 (64,23–65,2 Rabe) || 37 cf. Hermogenes, *On Invention* 3.7 (148,21–149,1 Rabe) || 37 ἀπὸ τῆς αἰτίας omissi || 38 cf. Hermogenes, *On Invention* 4.1 (171,3–9 Rabe) | 38 cf. Hermogenes, *On Invention* 3.13 (162,18–164,9 Rabe)

and using in their place others that are similar while keeping the sense the same.<sup>125</sup>

36. Aphthonius calls the present heading “paraphrastic” and not “paraphrase” because in it we restate only one saying or action, whereas by paraphrase people mean a change of wording <while preserving the same meaning>.

**The rationale** (Aphth 19–20 H/ON [= 4,14 Rabe]). 37. After the heading that is comparable to the introduction, that is, the encomiastic heading, and after the paraphrastic heading, which is comparable to the statement of the case, Aphthonius places the argumentative headings. Accordingly, the heading rationale is comparable to the argumentative part of a speech,<sup>126</sup> whereas the headings from the opposite, analogy, and example are comparable to elaborations. For elaborations include those from analogy, example, and the opposite, as we learn in the book *On Invention*.<sup>127</sup> Therefore, just as arguments precede elaborations, so also does the heading that is comparable to an argument. That is to say, the heading from the rationale is placed by Aphthonius before the other headings that are comparable to elaborations.

38. Moreover, of those headings that are comparable to elaborations the heading from the opposite precedes because it is demonstrative and requires a political style, whereas the analogy and example are panegyric, as we learn in the introduction to the fourth chapter of *On Invention*.<sup>128</sup> Now political subjects must be placed after the panegyric, as we learn in the third chapter of *On Invention*, in the section “On the Order of Arguments.”<sup>129</sup>

<sup>125</sup> Choïroboskos illustrates *παράφρασις* by citing the opening words of the *Iliad* (Μῆνιν ἄειδε, θεά [“Sing, O goddess, of the wrath”]) and paraphrasing them as τὴν ὀργὴν εἰπὲ ὦ Μοῦσα (“Speak, O Muse, of the anger”) (8:813,5–6 Walz).

<sup>126</sup> Doxapatres is implicitly referring to a distinction of Hermogenes according to which arguments (*ἐπιχειρήματα*) come from the circumstantial elements (*τὰ περιστατικά*), one of which is the reason (*αἰτία*) (see, e.g., Hermogenes, *On Invention* 3.5 [140,15–16 Rabe]).

<sup>127</sup> See Hermogenes, *On Invention* 3.7 (148,21–149,1 Rabe), where these three are included in a list of *ἐργασίαι* that also includes those from the lesser, from the greater, and from the equal.

<sup>128</sup> On analogy and example as panegyric, see Hermogenes, *On Invention* 4.1 (171,3–9 Rabe).

<sup>129</sup> See Hermogenes, *On Invention* 3.13 (162,18–164,9 Rabe). Doxapatres seemingly is recalling Hermogenes by memory, because he says that

39. τὴν δὲ παραβολὴν προτάττει τοῦ παραδείγματος, ἡ ὡς καθολικώτερον μερικωτέρου, ἡ ὅτι καὶ ἐπιτήδειόν ἐστιν ἀπὸ τῆς παραβολῆς χωρεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ παράδειγμα, οὐ μὴν τὸ ἀνάπαλιν· κατασκευαστικὸν γὰρ ἐστὶν τῆς παραβολῆς τὸ παράδειγμα, οἷον, ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ γῆν ἐργαζόμενοι πόνῳ μὲν τῇ γῇ καταβάλλουσι τὰ σπέρματα, τοὺς δὲ καρποὺς ἡδονῇ συγκομίζονται μείζονι, τὸν αὐτὸν οἱ παιδείας ἀντιποιούμενοι τρόπον πόνῳ τὴν εἰς [271] ἔπειτα δόξαν | εἰλήφασιν. τῷ τοῦτο δῆλον; τὸν Δημοσθένους ὅρα μοι βίον, καὶ ἐξῆς τὸ παράδειγμα· 40. ἡ δὲ τῶν παλαιῶν μαρτυρία οὐχ ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶ κεφαλαίων ἀσθενεστέρα, τελευταία τέθεται, ἀλλ' ὅτι μᾶλλον ἰσχυροτέρα ἐστίν, ἅτε δὴ τῶν ἀτέχνων οὔσα πίστεων, ἰσχυροτέρων ἀεὶ τῶν ἀτέχνων πίστεων οὐσῶν τῶν ἐντέχνων, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τέθεται τὰς πίστεις ἐπισφραγίζουσα.

**Τῷ τῆς αἰτίας** (Aphth 19–20 H/ON [= 4,14 Rabe]). 41. Ἐκ πάντων τῶν περιστατικῶν τὴν αἰτίαν μόνην νενομοθέτηται εἰς κατασκευὴν τῆς χρείας παραλαμβάνεσθαι διὰ τὸ εἶναι τιμιωτέραν καὶ κρείττονα τῶν ἄλλων περιστατικῶν· διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν ζητημάτων, ὅσα μὴ ἔχει αἰτίαν, ἀσύστατά εἰσιν, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν στοχαστικῶν· νόμος τὰς ἱερείας παρθένους εἶναι· ἱερεῖά τις εὐρέθη φοροῦσα

39. Aphthonius places the analogy before the example either because the more general precedes the more specific or because it is proper to move from an analogy to an example and not the reverse, because an example confirms an analogy. For example: “For just as those who till the land sow the seeds in the land with toil and then gather the fruits with greater pleasure, in the same way those who pursue education with toil attain a subsequent reputation” (Aphth 59–63 H/ON [= 6,3–7 Rabe]). Who exemplifies this analogy? “Consider, if you will, the life of Demosthenes. . .” (Aphth 64 H/ON [= 6,8 Rabe]), and the rest of the example (cf. Aphth 64–70 H/ON [= 6,7–12 Rabe]). 40. The testimony of the ancients is placed last, not because it is a less persuasive heading than the others, but because it is much more so, inasmuch as it is made up of uninvented proofs, and they are always more persuasive than invented ones.<sup>130</sup> And so, this is why this heading is placed here: to put a seal of approval on the proofs.

**The rationale** (Aphth 19–20 H/ON [= 4,14 Rabe]). 41. Of all the circumstantial elements,<sup>131</sup> Aphthonius decided to use reason alone for the confirmation of the chreia because reason is more honored than, and superior to, the other elements.<sup>132</sup> This is why all public questions that have no reason are incapable of proof, as is the case in conjectural questions.<sup>133</sup> There is a law that priestesses

panegyric subjects must come after the political.

<sup>130</sup> Invented proofs include enthymemes and examples, whereas uninvented ones are those not devised by the speaker, such as decrees, contracts, and oracles (see, e.g., *Anon. Seg.* 145 [40, 42 Dilts-Kennedy]).

<sup>131</sup> The *περιστατικά* refer back to Aphthonius’s listing of the standard six elements of a narrative: the individual who acted, the act that was done, the time when it was done, the place where it was done, the way in which it was done, and the reason (*αἰτία*) why it was done (see *Progymn.* 2 [2,23–3,2 Rabe]). These *περιστατικά* receive lengthy treatment by Doxapatres in his commentary on Aphthonius’s narrative chapter (see 2:208,20–215,8 Walz). In this latter discussion Doxapatres also says that, though last in the sequence, reason nevertheless holds pride of place because it is more powerful than all the others (see 2:210,16–30).

<sup>132</sup> In Doxapatres’s detailed discussion of the circumstantial elements he notes that Aphthonius listed reason last and explains its placement as indicating its being more persuasive than the others (see 2:210,16–30 Walz).

<sup>133</sup> Doxapatres is relating the importance of the *αἰτία* in a chreia elaboration to Hermogenes’s discussion of various cases that are incapable of proof (*ἀσύστατα*) (see Hermogenes, *On Issues* 1.6–7 [32,8–33,16 Rabe]), the very word Doxapatres has just used. Hermogenes lists eight such cases, the eighth being

ἀτόκιον, καὶ φεύγει πορνείας· οὐκ ἔχει ἐνταῦθα εἰπεῖν ἢ ἰέρεια αἰτίαν εὐπρόσωπον, δι' ἣν φορεῖ τὸ ἀτόκιον, καὶ παρὰ τοῦτο ἀσύστατον μένει τὸ πρόβλημα· κεῖται δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον πρόβλημα ἀχρώματον.

42. Ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς τῶν νόμων εἰσφοραῖς εἰ μὲν διὰ τина προγεγεννημένην αἰτίαν συμβουλευόμεν ἢ τεθῆναι ἢ λυθῆναι τόνδε τὸν νόμον, συνίσταται τὸ πρόβλημα, καὶ ἔστιν ἢ στάσις πραγματική, οἷον ταριχεύειν νόμος τὰ σώματα, ἐμίχθη τις ταριχευομένῳ σώματι, καὶ γράφει τις τὸν τῆς ταριχείας λελῦσθαι νόμον· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ λυθῆναι νόμον κείμενον ἀξιούμεν, διὰ τина αἰτίαν συμβᾶσαν, καὶ ἔστι τὸ ζήτημα πραγματικῆς στάσεως. 43. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐὰν μὴ κείμενον νόμον ἀξιῶμεν τεθῆναι διὰ τина συμβᾶσαν αἰτίαν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ κεῖσθαι αὐτὸν τὸν νόμον, καὶ οὕτως πραγματικὴ ἔσται ἢ στάσις, οἷον μετακαλεσαμένων Ἀθηναίων Ἀλκιβιάδην ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν Σικελίᾳ στρατοπέδου καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τοῦ στρατοπέδου



are to be virgins. A certain priestess was discovered to be carrying a contraceptive drug and was prosecuted for sexual immorality. In this case the priestess is unable to come up with a plausible reason for having the drug, and consequently the case remains incapable of defense.<sup>134</sup> And such a case lies beyond any favorable slant.<sup>135</sup>

42. In addition, even in proposals of laws: If we, because of a pre-existing reason, advise that such and such a law be established or repealed, the case is capable of proof and the issue is practical.<sup>136</sup> For example, there is a law to embalm bodies. Someone had sex with an embalmed body, and someone else proposes that the law about embalming be repealed.<sup>137</sup> For in this case we deem the law on the books as worthy of repeal because of some contingent reason, and so the issue is practical. 43. Similarly, even if we request a law not on the books be established for some reason even though the law itself is not on the books, the issue will be practical. For example, when the Athenians summoned Alcibiades back from the army in Sicily, and when the whole army was in danger

one uncircumstantial (*ἀπερίστατον*), by which he means one that is without an *αἰτία* (1.7 [33,14–16]).

<sup>134</sup> Hermogenes's example is different: "A father disinherits his own son for no reason" (*ἐπ' οὐδενὴ αἰτίᾳ*) (see *On Issues* 1.7 [33,14–15 Rabe]). But Doxapatres is still drawing on Hermogenes's discussion, because his example does appear in Marcellinus's commentary on precisely this section of *On Issues* dealing with cases that are *ἀπερίστατα* (see Anon. Schol. 4:168,29–169,6 Walz).

<sup>135</sup> Lit. "without color." *Χρῶμα* ("color") is the slant or spin, as we say today, that an orator gives to his case to make it favorable to his side. See further T. P. Wiseman, *Clio's Cosmetics: Three Studies in Graeco-Roman Literature* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1979), 3–8.

<sup>136</sup> Hermogenes defines an issue that is practical (*πραγματική*) as a dispute concerning the future, whether something should occur or not, whether to allow something or not (see *On Issues* 2 [38,1–8 Rabe]).

<sup>137</sup> This example, which is taken from Hermogenes, *On Invention* 1.2 (103,21–23 Rabe), is used by Doxapatres elsewhere, and more naturally, specifically in his chapter on the introduction of a law, where the distinction (see below at 44) between an exercise (*γυμνασία*) as having no circumstance and a question (*ζήτημα*) as having a circumstance is more clearly made (see 2.553,21–30 Walz). This example also shows up in an anonymous commentary on Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1.14 (1375a2) (see Hugo Rabe, ed., *Anonymi et Stephani in Artem Rhetoricum Commentaria* [2 vols.; CAG 21.1–2; Berlin: Reimer, 1896], 2:78,21–26).

ἄπαντος κινδυνεύσαντος γράφει Ἀλκιβιάδης μηδένα στρατηγὸν ἐκ τοῦ στρατοπέδου ἀνακαλεῖσθαι.

[272] 44. Εἰ δὲ μὴ δι' αἰτίαν συμβᾶσαν ἀξιοῦμεν τεθῆναι ἢ λυθῆναι νόμον, οὐ γίνεται | τότε ζήτημα, ἀλλὰ γύμνασμα, οἷον ὡς ἐάν οὕτω μεταπλάσαντες εἴποιμεν, νόμος ταριχεύειν τὰ σώματα, καὶ γράφει τις τοῦτον λυθῆναι· τοῦτο γὰρ γυμνασία ἐστίν, οὐ ζήτημα· καὶ πάλιν, γράφει τις μηδένα στρατηγὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου μετακαλεῖσθαι· οὐδὲ τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ ζήτημα, καὶ ἀπλῶς τῶν προβλημάτων, ὅσα μὴ ἔχει αἰτίαν, ταῦτα ἀσύστατά εἰσιν, ὡς ἔχει καὶ τοῦτο, ἀποκηρύσσει τις τὸν υἱὸν ἐπ' οὐδεμιᾷ αἰτίᾳ· τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ἀπερίστατον ὀνομάζεται, οὐχ ὅτι οὐδὲν τῶν περιστατικῶν ἔχει· ἔχει γὰρ πάντως καὶ πρόσωπα τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱὸν καὶ πρᾶγμα τὴν ἀποκήρυξιν. ἀλλ' ὅτι αἰτίαν τὸ κύρος τῶν περιστατικῶν οὐκ ἔχει.

45. Ἰστέον δέ, ὅτι τὸ τῆς αἰτίας κεφάλαιον τὴν τῆς χρείας ἀποδείκνυσι πρόφασιν, οἷον Ἰσοκράτης τῆς παιδείας τὴν μὲν ρίζαν ἔφη πικράν, τοὺς δὲ καρποὺς γλυκεῖς. διότι οἱ παιδείας ἐρασταὶ παιδευόμενοι μὲν ὑφίστανται πόνους, εἰς δὲ τέλος τῆς παιδείας ἐλθόντες ἀρεταῖς κοσμοῦνται· πάλιν ὁ Θέογνις εἶπε, χρὴ τὴν πενίην φεύγοντα ῥιπτεῖν ἑαυτὸν καὶ κατὰ κρημνῶν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν, <ὁ γὰρ πενία συζῶν> παντοῖα δεινὰ ὑφίσταται.

Ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου (Aphth 20 H/ON [= 4,14 Rabe]). 46. Τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου κεφάλαιον τὸ ἐναντίον ἀποδείκνυσι τῇ προφάσει τῆς χρείας, ἥτις ἐν τῷ τῆς αἰτίας κεφαλαίῳ δείκνυται. 47. οἷον ὁ Ἰσοκράτης φησίν,

44 πρόσωπα scripsi || πρόσωπον Walz || 45 ὁ γὰρ πενία συζῶν addidi ex Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 4 (9,3 Rabe) || 45 ὑφίσταται cod. || ὑφιστάμενον Walz

besides, Alcibiades proposed that no general be recalled from his army.<sup>138</sup>

44. But if we do not request a law be established or repealed because of a contingent reason, then there is no question but an exercise. For example, if we should say, rephrasing as follows: There is a law to embalm bodies, and someone proposes its repeal. For this is an exercise, not a question. And again, someone proposes that no general be recalled from the army. For this, too, is no question. And put simply, all problems that have no reason are incapable of proof, as this example also shows: A man disinherits his son for no reason. This case is also called “uncircumstantial,”<sup>139</sup> not because it has none of the circumstantial elements (for it surely has individuals, father and son, as well as an action, disinheritance), but because it does not have the most important of the circumstantial elements, a reason.

45. One should realize that the rationale heading demonstrates the meaning of the chreia. For example: “Isocrates said that the root of education is bitter, but its fruits are sweet” (Aphth 24–25 H/ON [= 4,16–17 Rabe])—because lovers of education submit to toils while they are being educated, but on reaching the completion of their education are adorned with virtues (cf. Aphth 34–37 H/ON [= 5,5–6 Rabe]). Again, Theognis said: “The one who is trying to flee poverty must throw himself down a cliff and into the sea—<because the one who lives in poverty> submits to all sorts of dreadful things.”<sup>140</sup>

**From the opposite** (Aphth 20 H/ON [= 4,14 Rabe]). 46. The heading from the opposite takes a position that is opposite to the meaning of the chreia that has been shown in the rationale heading. 47. For example, Isocrates says: “The lover of education

<sup>138</sup> Doxapatres takes this example from Hermogenes, *On Invention* 2.3 (113,19–21 Rabe).

<sup>139</sup> Doxapatres draws on Hermogenes for the term uncircumstantial (ἀπερίστατον) and now takes up his example as well: A father disinherits his son for no reason (see Hermogenes, *On Issues* 1 [33,13–16 Rabe]). A little later Hermogenes will cite a similar example, but one with an αἰτία: A farmer disinherits his son for taking up philosophy (see *On Issues* 3 [38,15–16 Rabe]).

<sup>140</sup> Doxapatres is looking ahead to the elaboration of a maxim in the next chapter and citing, if not exactly, two lines of Theognis, *Eleg.* 1.175–76 (12 Young) and then paraphrasing the rationale (see Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 4 [8,12–13 and 9,3–7 Rabe]).

ὅτι ὁ παιδείας ἐρῶν πόνων μὲν ἄρχεται, πόνων δὲ ὅμως τελευτώντων εἰς ὄνησιν· τοῦτο τὸ παρὰ τοῦ Ἰσοκράτους ῥηθέν· εἴτα ἡ τούτου πρόφασις· καὶ γὰρ οἱ παιδείας ἐρῶντες τάδε καὶ τάδε κακοπαθοῦντες τέλος ἀνδρωθέντες ἀρεταῖς περιστέφονται. 48. εἴτα τὸ ἐναντίον· εἰ δὲ μὴ τάδε πονήσουσιν, οὐδὲ σπουδαῖοι γενήσονται. 49. καὶ πάλιν, φησὶν ὁ Θέογνις, [273] ὁ πενία συζῶν ἀγαπᾷ πενεῖν, ἢ τὸν | ἥλιον αἰσχύνης κτήσασθαι μάρτυρα, εἴτα ἡ τούτου πρόφασις· καὶ γὰρ ὁ πενία συζῶν τάδε ὑφίσταται δεινά, εἴτα τὸ ἐναντίον, ὁ δὲ πενίας ἀπηλλαγμένος οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον ὑφίσταται.

**Παραβολή, παραδείγματι** (Aphth 20–21 H/ON [= 4,14 Rabe]). 50. Διαφέρει ἡ παραβολή τοῦ παραδείγματος, καθὼς ἡ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν καθ' ἐκάστην γινομένων λαμβάνεται, ὡς ἔχει τό, ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ γῆν ἐργαζόμενοι, καὶ τό, ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ δεσμῷ κατειλημμένοι δεινῷ· τὸ δὲ παράδειγμα ἀπὸ τῶν ἅπαξ γεγονότων· ὡς ἔχει τό, τὸν Δημοσθένους ὄρα μοι βίον, καὶ τό, σκόπει τὸν Ἴρον, ὃς Ἰθακησίων μὲν εἷς ἐγεγένητο, ἢ καὶ τό, ἀλλ'

begins with toil but toil that nonetheless ends in profit.”<sup>141</sup> This is what was said by Isocrates. Then the meaning of this saying is: Indeed, lovers of education, though they suffer this and that, are finally crowned with virtues on reaching manhood.<sup>142</sup> 48. Then the opposite: But if they will not undergo these toils, they will not become virtuous men.<sup>143</sup> 49. And again, Theognis says: “The one who lives in poverty should <die since it is better to exit life early> than to have the sun as a witness of one’s shame.”<sup>144</sup> Then the point of this maxim: “Indeed, the one who lives in poverty submits to dreadful hardships.”<sup>145</sup> Then the opposite: “But the one who is delivered from poverty submits to no such thing.”<sup>146</sup>

**Analogy, example** (Aphth 20–21 H/ON [= 4,14 Rabe]). 50. An analogy differs from an example, in that an analogy uses events that are daily occurrences, as in this analogy: “For just as those who till the land. . .” (Aphth 59 H/ON [= 6,3 Rabe]);<sup>147</sup> and in this one: “Just as those who are bound with dreadful chains. . .”<sup>148</sup> An example uses events that have occurred once, as in this example: “Consider, if you will, the life of Demosthenes. . .” (Aphth 64 H/ON [= 6,7 Rabe]);<sup>149</sup> and in this one: “Look at Irus, who was one of the men of Ithaca . . .”;<sup>150</sup> or even this one: “But

<sup>141</sup> Strictly speaking, this is not Isocrates’s saying, but Aphthonius’s paraphrase of it in the paraphrastic heading, as indicated by the use *φρησίν*, which is a marker of the paraphrastic heading (see Aphthonius 34–35 H/ON [= 5,5–6 Rabe]).

<sup>142</sup> Doxapatres has merely paraphrased and summarized Aphthonius’s rationale heading (cf. Aphthonius 38–52 H/ON [= 5,8–20 Rabe]).

<sup>143</sup> Again, this is merely a paraphrase and summary of Aphthonius’s heading from the opposite (cf. Aphthonius 53–58 H/ON [= 5,21–6,2 Rabe]).

<sup>144</sup> Again, Doxapatres is quoting, if the emendation is correct, from Aphthonius’s paraphrastic heading of his elaboration of a maxim (see *Progymn.* 4 [8,21–9,1 Rabe]).

<sup>145</sup> Doxapatres simply summarizes Aphthonius’s rationale from his maxim elaboration (see *Progymn.* 4 [9,3–7 Rabe]).

<sup>146</sup> Again, a summary of Aphthonius’s section from the opposite (see *Progymn.* 4 [9,8–11 Rabe]).

<sup>147</sup> For the full analogy, see Aphthonius 59–64 H/ON (= 6,3–6 Rabe).

<sup>148</sup> Doxapatres once again looks ahead to Aphthonius’s elaboration of a maxim, specifically to its analogy (see *Progymn.* 4 [9,12–15 Rabe]).

<sup>149</sup> For the full example, see Aphthonius 64–70 H/ON (= 6,7–12 Rabe).

<sup>150</sup> Doxapatres cites the opening words of Aphthonius’s example from his maxim elaboration (see *Progymn.* 4 [9,16–21 Rabe]).

Ἵδυσσεὺς ὁ τῆς Ἰθάκης κρατῶν· ἔτι διαφέρειν λέγουσι παράδειγμα καὶ παραβολὴν τῷ τὸ μὲν παράδειγμα ἀπὸ τῶν λογικῶν ζώων λαμβάνεσθαι μόνων, τὴν δὲ παραβολὴν καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλόγων, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀψύχων ἔσθ' ὅτε.

**Μαρτυρία παλαιῶν** (Aphth 21 H/ON [= 4,15 Rabe]). 51. Ἡ μαρτυρία τῶν παλαιῶν τῶν ἀτέχνων οὕσα πίστεων ἀπῆται τῶν λοιπῶν προταχθῆναι κεφαλαίων· ἐκεῖνα γὰρ ἔντεχνοι πίστεις εἰσὶ· δέον δὲ προτάττεσθαι τὰς ἀτέχνους πίστεις τῶν ἐντέχνων, ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων φύσις ἐνῆλλαξε τὴν τάξιν, οὐ γὰρ ἐνεχώρει τὴν μαρτυρίαν τῶν παλαιῶν ἢ πρὸ τῆς αἰτίας ἢ μετ' αὐτήν, καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου ταχθῆναι, ἢ πρὸ τῆς παραβολῆς <καὶ> τοῦ παραδείγματος, καὶ τοῦτο σκοπήσας καθ' ἑαυτὸν συνίδοις· ἄτεχνοι δὲ πίστεις εἰσὶ μαρτυρίαι, ὅρκοι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. 52. μαρτυρία παλαιῶν οὐχ ὥς πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα τὴν χρεῖαν, ἀλλ' ὥς πρὸς σὲ τὸν μελετῶντα τὴν χρεῖαν.

[274] 53. Ἰστέον δέ, ὅτι περὶ τῆς μαρτυρίας τῶν παλαιῶν βούλονται οἱ πρὸ ἡμῶν, ἵνα ὅτε ἀπορῶμεν αὐτῆς, τῷ κατὰ παράλειψιν σχήματι χρώμεθα, λέγοντες οὕτως· πολλοὺς ἦν καὶ παλαιῶν παραθεῖναι λόγους, συνηγοροῦντας τῷ προκειμένῳ, εἰ μὴ τῆς παρούσης | ὑποθέσεως τὰ πολ-  
λὰ λέγειν ἥδειν ἀλλότριον. 54. τινὲς δὲ διαφέρειν ἔφασαν μαρτυρίαν καὶ ἐκμαρτυρίαν τῷ ἐγγράφῳ καὶ ἀγράφῳ· τὰ μὲν ἔγγραφα, φασί, λέγονται ἐκμαρτυρίαι, τὰ δὲ ἄγραφα μαρτυρίαι, καίτοι τὸ παρὸν κεφάλαιον δι' ἐγγράφων γενόμενον μαρτυρία καὶ οὐκ ἐκμαρτυρία ὠνόμασται.

**Ἐπιλόγῃ βραχεῖ** (Aphth 21–22 H/ON [= 4,15 Rabe]). 55. Ἐπί-  
λογος τὸ τελευταῖον μέρος τοῦ λόγου λέγεται, ὥς ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις μέρεσι τοῦ λόγου λεγόμενον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπιμύθιον λέγεται ἢ μετὰ τὸν μῦθον τε-

Odysseus, who rules Ithaca. . . .”<sup>151</sup> In addition, they say that an example and an analogy differ in that the example makes use of rational beings alone, whereas the analogy sometimes uses irrational creatures or inanimate things.<sup>152</sup>

**Testimony of the ancients** (Aphth 21 H/ON [= 4,15 Rabe]). 51. The heading “testimony of the ancients,” since it belongs to the uninvented proofs, requires that it be placed before the other headings, for they are invented proofs. Now it is necessary that uninvented proofs be placed before invented ones. But the nature of the subject has changed the order. For it is not possible that the testimony of the ancients be placed before the rationale or after it, or before the opposite, analogy, <and> example, and when you consider this on your own, you can understand it. Uninvented proofs are testimonies, oaths, and the like. 52. The testimony of the ancients does not testify for the speaker in the chreia but to you who are elaborating the chreia.

53. One should realize that, as far as the testimony of the ancients is concerned, our predecessors would have us use, when we are at a loss for a testimony, the figure “pretended omission,” speaking as follows: “It would have been possible to cite many sayings of ancient authors that support the saying under consideration, but I know that being loquacious is contrary to the present subject.”<sup>153</sup> 54. Some, however, have said that a testimony and a deposition differ in that one is written and one is not. What is put down in writing, they say, are called “depositions,” whereas what is not put down in writing are “testimonies,”<sup>154</sup> and yet the present section, which is made up of things that are in writing, has been called a “testimony” and not a “deposition.”

**Brief epilogue** (Aphth 21–22 H/ON [= 4,15 Rabe]). 55. The final part of the speech is called an “epilogue” because it is said after the other parts of the speech, just as the moral that is placed

<sup>151</sup> This example also comes from Aphthonius’s maxim elaboration (see *Progymn.* 4 [9,21–10,1 Rabe]).

<sup>152</sup> For fuller discussion of this distinction, see John of Sardis 5.21–22.

<sup>153</sup> John of Sardis makes much the same point, but he does so later, in his comments on the testimony heading of Aphthonius’s maxim elaboration (see John of Sardis, *Comm. in Aphth.* 4 [67,11–13 Rabe]).

<sup>154</sup> This distinction, as far as I know, is not attested elsewhere.

θειμένη παραίνεσις. 56. βραχὺν δὲ τοῦτον εἶναι βούλονται, καὶ μὴ μείζονα τῶν ἀγώνων, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ προοίμιον μεῖζον τῆς διηγήσεως. 57. ἰστέον δέ, ὅτι ὁ ἐπίλογος ἢ πρὸς τὸ ἐγκωμιαστικὸν κεφάλαιον γίνεται, ὡς ἔχει τό, πρὸς ᾧ δεῖ βλέποντας Ἰσοκράτην θαυμάζειν τῆς τέχνης κάλλιστα περὶ τῆς παιδείας φιλοσοφήσαντα, καὶ τό, ὥστε πῶς ἔνεστι κατ' ἄξιαν θαυμάζειν τὸν Θεόγνιν, κάλλιστα περὶ τῆς πενίας φιλοσοφήσαντα, ἢ πρὸς τὸ λοιπόν, οἷον ὡς ἴνα εἴπη τις, ὅτι καλῶς ἄρα τῷ Ἰσοκράτει ἢ τῷ Θεόγνιδι ὁ λόγος ἐγνωμολόγηται.

#### <§7. ΠΑΡΑΔΕΙΓΜΑ>

**Θαυμάσαι δίκαιον Ἰσοκράτην τῆς τέχνης** (Aphth 26 H/ON [= 4,18 Rabe]). 1. Λογικὴν χρεῖαν λαμβάνων ὁ τεχνικὸς διαιρεῖ τοῖς προεκτεθεῖσι κεφαλαίοις, διδάσκων ἡμᾶς, ἵνα καὶ αὐτὰ μελετῶντες χρεῖαν οὕτως αὐτὴν μεταχειριζώμεθα, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ παρόντι μεταχειρίζεται. 2. ἔστι δὲ ἡ παροῦσα χρεῖα λογικὴ, καθ' ἐκούσιον ἀποφαντικὴ, τροπικὴ.



after the fable is called an “epimythion.”<sup>155</sup> 56. They intend for this section to be brief and not longer than the arguments, just as the introduction is not to be longer than the statement of the case. 57. One should realize that the epilogue is made either in terms of the encomiastic section, as in this epilogue: “When these points are considered we must admire Isocrates for his art<sup>156</sup> since his philosophy of education is best” (Aphth 77–78 H/ON [= 6,18–19 Rabe]), and in this one: “Consequently, how is it possible to admire Theognis enough since his reflections on poverty are best?”<sup>157</sup> Or it is made in terms of the rest of the headings—for example, as someone might say: “Therefore, the saying has been nobly expressed by Isocrates (or Theognis).”<sup>158</sup>

<§7. EXAMPLE>

**It is right to admire Isocrates for his discipline** (Aphth 26 H/ON [= 4,18 Rabe]). 1. Aphthonius the theorist chooses a saying chreia and elaborates it according to the headings set out above (cf. Aphth 18–22 H/ON [= 4,12–15 Rabe]), teaching us, as we elaborate a chreia with these headings, how to treat it, just as he himself treats it in the present chapter. 2. The chreia being treated is a saying chreia that contains a statement made voluntarily<sup>159</sup> and is figurative.<sup>160</sup>

<sup>155</sup> Doxapatres is referring to a distinction in Aphthonius’s chapter on the fable between a *προμύθιον*, or the moral of a fable placed before its recitation, and an *ἐπιμύθιον*, or moral placed afterwards (see *Progymn.* 1 [2,1–2 Rabe]).

<sup>156</sup> The phrase “for his discipline” (τῆς τέχνης) is not in Aphthonius’s text of his epilogue, and Doxapatres inserts the phrase again later in the commentary (see 2:311,17 Walz). In any case, he brought this phrase forward from the encomiastic heading (see Aphthonius 26 H/ON [= 4,18 Rabe]: θαυμάσαι δίκαιον Ἰσοκράτης τῆς τέχνης).

<sup>157</sup> Doxapatres is citing the brief epilogue from Aphthonius’s elaboration of a maxim (see *Progymn.* 4 [10,6–7 Rabe]).

<sup>158</sup> This statement is too general to reflect any of the other headings, at least in the elaboration of the chreia. The word “nobly” (καλῶς), however, does appear in the paraphrastic heading of the elaboration of a maxim (see Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 4 [9,2 Rabe]) and may be what Doxapatres has in mind here—an epilogue in terms of another heading, i.e., the paraphrastic.

<sup>159</sup> On this subdivision of saying chreiai, see above 5.7.

<sup>160</sup> On this additional division of saying chreia, see above 5.21.

3. Ἀποροῦσι δέ τινες λέγοντες, ὅτι ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ μύθου τὸ μᾶλλον ἡδύτερον εἶδος εἰς μελέτην μετεχειρίσατο, τοῦτο δὲ ἦν τὸ ἠθικόν, καὶ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ διηγήματος δραματικὸν ἐμελέτησε διήγημα διὰ τὸ ἐνὸν ἡδὺ τοῖς δραματικοῖς διηγήμασιν, οὕτω πάντως καὶ χρεῖαν εἴπερ ἐβούλετο μελετῆσαι, τινὰ τῶν χαριεντισμῶν ἕνεκα παραλαμβανομένων ἀκόλουθον ἦν αὐτῷ | μελετῆσαι, ἀλλ' ἰστέον, ὅτι ταῖς κατὰ χαριεντισμὸν χρεαίαις οὐ δέον ἐστὶν ἐγγυμνάζεσθαι διὰ τὸ γέλωτα φέρειν τοῦ λόγου τὴν ἔκβασιν.

4. Ἔτι ζητεῖται, διατί λογικὴν χρεῖαν εἰς παράδειγμα τῆς διαιρέσεως παρέλαβε, καὶ οὐχὶ πρακτικὴν ἢ μικτήν; καὶ φαμέν, ὅτι λογικὴν χρεῖαν μελετᾷ ὁ διδάσκαλος ἔργῳ δεικνύς, ὅτι οἷς βίος ὁ λόγος, τούτοις καὶ τὰ λογικὰ τῶν πρακτικῶν τιμιώτερον, καὶ ἅμα καθαρωτέραν καὶ τελειοτέραν τὴν τῶν κεφαλαίων διαίρεσιν ἐν ταῖς λογικαῖς χρεαίαις γινώσκων ὑπάρχουσιν, ἥπερ ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς καὶ μικταῖς, ἢ ὅτι, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ μύθῳ σκοπὸν ἔχων προτρέψαι τοὺς νέους πρὸς ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ σπουδὴν τὴν περὶ τέχνην, ὃν εὔρισκε μῦθον συμβαλλόμενον τῷ σκοπῷ, τοῦτον ἐξέθετο ἀδιαφόρως, οὕτω ἀνταῦθα σκοπῶν προτρέψαι τοὺς νέους ἔχουσιν πόνων τῶν περὶ τὴν γνῶσιν, ἣν εὔρισκε χρεῖαν ἀρμόδιον τῷ σκοπῷ, ταύτην εἰς διαίρεσιν προὔθηκεν, ἢ ὅτι ἐπειδὴ ὁ Ἑρμογένης ἐν τοῖς φερομένοις αὐτοῦ γυμνάσμασιν ἐπὶ ταύτης τῆς χρείας ἐφαίνετο τὰ τοῦ παρόντος γυμνάσματος παραδειγματίζειν κεφάλαια, ἅπερ ἐκεῖνος διὰ βραχέων καὶ ἐν στενῷ ἔλεγε, ταῦτα οὗτος διὰ πλατέων ἐβουλήθη εἰπεῖν, ἅμα καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου διασαφῶν καὶ τὴν ὀφειλομένην μελέτην ἀποδιδούς· ἔχει δὲ τὰ Ἑρμογένους οὕτως·

5. Ἔργασία δὲ ἔστω τῆς χρείας τοιαύτη, πρῶτον ἐγκώμιον διὰ βραχέων τοῦ εἰπόντος ἢ πράξαντος· εἶτα αὐτῆς τῆς χρείας παράφρασις,

3. Some commentators raise an objection, saying: "Just as in the case of the fable where Aphthonius treated for practice the more enjoyable class, and this is the class that uses irrational creatures,<sup>161</sup> and just as in the case of the narrative where he practiced with a dramatic narrative because of the inherent enjoyment in dramatic narratives,<sup>162</sup> so also in the case of the chreia elaboration, if he wanted to practice with it, it would have been entirely consistent for him to practice with one of the chreiai that is told for the sake of wit." But one should realize that one ought not to practice on witty chreiai, because their purpose is merely to raise a laugh.

4. In addition, it is asked: "Why has Aphthonius selected a saying chreia to illustrate the elaboration and not an action or mixed one?" And we say in reply: The teacher has elaborated a saying chreia, showing by this decision that for those whose livelihood is speech, words have priority over actions, and at the same time he does it because he realizes that elaborating according to the headings is simpler and more complete with saying chreiai than it is with action and mixed ones; or that, just as in the fable, with its aim of encouraging youths toward the zealous pursuit of rhetoric, he deliberately offered that fable which he finds contributing to this aim, so also here he aims at encouraging youths to be zealous for the toils involved in acquiring knowledge, he has offered for elaboration that chreia which he finds to be consistent with this aim; or that, since Hermogenes in his published *Gymnasmata*<sup>163</sup> was exemplifying the present exercise of elaboration with this chreia but did so only briefly and in a limited way, Aphthonius wanted to present it more fully, clarifying what Hermogenes had said and at the same time offering a model exercise as it ought to be. Hermogenes's presentation is as follows:<sup>164</sup>

5. Let the elaboration of the chreia be like this: First, an encomium, in a few words, of the one who spoke or acted, then a

<sup>161</sup> The model fable is that of the cicadas and the ants (see Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 1 [2,3–12 Rabe]).

<sup>162</sup> The model narrative is about why roses are red (see Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 2 [3,5–19 Rabe]).

<sup>163</sup> Doxapatres apparently knows of Hermogenes's *Progymnasmata* with the title *Gymnasmata*. See further *Chreia* 1:11–15.

<sup>164</sup> Doxapatres now simply quotes Hermogenes 31–62 H/ON (= 7,11–8,14 Rabe).

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εἶτα αἰτία, οἷον Ἴσοκράτης ἔφη τῆς παιδείας τὴν μὲν ρίζαν εἶναι πικράν, τὸν δὲ καρπὸν γλυκύν. 6. ἔπαινος· Ἴσοκράτης σοφὸς ἦν, καὶ πλατυνεῖς ἡρέμα τὸ χωρίον· εἶτα καὶ ἡ χρεία, εἶπε τόδε· καὶ οὐ θήσεις αὐτὴν ψιλήν, ἀλλὰ πλατύνων τὴν ἑρμηνείαν. 7. εἶτα ἡ αἰτία· τὰ γὰρ μέγιστα τῶν πραγμάτων ἐκ πόνων φιλεῖ κατορθοῦσθαι· κατορθωθέντα δὲ | τὴν ἡδονὴν φέρει. 8. εἶτα κατὰ τὸ ἐναντίον· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τυχόντα τῶν πραγμάτων οὐ δεῖται πόνων καὶ τὸ τέλος ἀηδέστατον ἔχει, τὰ σπουδαῖα δὲ τοῦναντίον. 9. εἶτα ἐκ παραβολῆς· ὥσπερ γὰρ τοὺς γεωργοὺς δεῖ πονήσαντας περὶ τὴν γῆν κομίζεσθαι τοὺς καρπούς, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τοὺς λόγους. 10. εἶτα ἐκ παραδείγματος· Δημοσθένης καθεύρων ἐκείνους ἐν οἰκίᾳ καὶ πολλὰ μοχθήσας ὕστερον ἐκομίζετο τοὺς καρπούς, στεφάνους καὶ ἀναρρήσεις. 11. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐκ κρίσεως ἐπιχειρῆσαι, οἷον Ἡσίοδος μὲν γὰρ ἔφη·

Τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἰδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροισεν ἔθικαν.

12. ἐν δὲ τῷ τέλει παράκλησιν προσθήσεις, ὅτι χρὴ πείθεσθαι τῷ εἰρηκότι ἢ πεπονηκότι.

**Θαυμάσαι δίκαιον Ἴσοκράτην τῆς τέχνης** (Aphth 26 H/ON [= 4,18 Rabe]). 13. Διχῶς τοῦτο ἐρμηνεύουσιν, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀντὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην φασίν, οἱ δὲ ἀντὶ <τοῦ> ἕνεκα τῆς τέχνης Ἀττικῶς, ὡς εἶναι ὅμοιον τῷ, ὁ τὸ ῥόδον θαυμάζων τοῦ κάλλους. 14. ἔστι δὲ τὸ καλούμενον σχῆμα ἐπὶ κρισις ἴδιον ὃν τῆς σεμνότητος, μιᾶς οὔσης τῆς σεμνότητος τῶν ποιουσῶν τὸ μέγεθος ἰδεῶν· ἔστι δὲ ἐπὶ κρισις ἡ τῶν

5 αἰτία scripsi; cf. Hermogenes 34 H/ON (= 7,13 Rabe) || αἰτίαν Walz || 11 Hesiod, *WD* 289 || 12 παράκλησιν scripsi; cf. Hermogenes 60 H/ON (= 8,12 Rabe) || παρακλησίας Walz || 13 secundum τοῦ addidi || 14 cf. Hermogenes, *On Types of Style* 6 (250,6–11 Rabe)

paraphrase of the chreia itself, and then a rationale. For example: Isocrates said that the root of education is bitter, but its fruits are sweet. 6. Praise: “Isocrates was a wise man,” and you are to amplify the subject slightly. Then the chreia: “He said thus and so.” You are not to express it simply but rather by amplifying the wording. 7. Then the rationale: “For the most important affairs generally succeed because of toil, but, once they have succeeded, they bring pleasure.” 8. Then the opposite: “For matters that arise from fortune do not require toil and have an outcome that is entirely without pleasure, but serious matters have the opposite outcome.” 9. Then an analogy: “For just as it is the lot of farmers to reap their fruits after working the land, so also it is for those working with words.” 10. Then an example: “Demosthenes, after locking himself in a room and toiling for a long time, later reaped his fruits—wreaths and public acclamations.” 11. It is also possible to argue with a judgment of authority: For example, “Hesiod said:

In front of virtue have the gods ordained sweat.”<sup>165</sup>

12. At the end you are to add an exhortation to the effect that it is necessary to heed the one who has spoken or acted.

**It is right to admire Isocrates for his discipline** (Aphth 26 H/ON [= 4,18 Rabe]). 13. Commentators understand the word “discipline” [τέχνη in the genitive] in two ways: Some say that it is used in the sense of “regarding his discipline,” but others say that it is used, according to Attic usage, in the sense of “for his discipline,” so that it resembles the statement: “The one who admires the rose for its beauty. . . .”<sup>166</sup> 14. There is the so-called figure “added judgment,” which is a special feature of a solemn style, which is one of the styles that produces grandeur.<sup>167</sup> This figure

<sup>165</sup> Hesiod, *WD* 289. Doxapatres has omitted Hermogenes’s second quotation, a line from another poet, i.e., Epicharmus, *Frag.* 287 (Kaibel): “At the price of toil do the gods sell every good thing to us” (see Hermogenes 58–59 H/ON [= 8,9–10 Rabe]).

<sup>166</sup> Doxapatres is quoting the opening words of Aphthonius’s model narrative, where the genitive τοῦ κάλλους (“for its beauty”) (see Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 2 [3,6 Rabe]) is parallel to the genitive τῆς τέχνης here. In his comments on the phrase τοῦ κάλλους Doxapatres also identified this usage as Attic (see 2:246,4 Walz).

<sup>167</sup> Doxapatres is summarizing Hermogenes’s discussion of grandeur (μέγεθος), under which he includes solemnity (σεμνότης) and in turn added

ρήθέντων ἐπιβεβαίωσις, ὡς ἂν εἰ δημηγορῶν ἐρεῖς, καλῶς ἄρα τὴν ὑπόθεσιν διεξῆλθεν· ἐπικρίνεις γὰρ καὶ οἷον ἐπιλογίζῃ τοῖς μετὰ λογισμοῦ ρηθεῖσιν.

**Ὅς ὄνομα αὐτῇ κατεφάνη λαμπρότατον** (Aphth 27 H/ON [= 4,18-19 Rabe]). 15. Καὶ τοῦτο διχῶς ἐρμηνεύουσιν· ἡ γὰρ ἀντὶ τοῦ αὐτῆς τῆς τέχνης, ἡ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ τέχνῃ· τέχνην δὲ λέγουσι τὴν ρητορικὴν.

[277] 16. Ὅνομα δὲ εἶπε λαμπρότατον ἀναφανῆναι τὸν Ἴσοκράτην τῆς ρητορικῆς, ἡ δι' αὐτοῦ ἐπαρθείσης αὐτῆς εἰς μέγα καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὀνομασθείσης, ἡ ὅτι ἀπ' αὐτῆς παρονομαζόμενος καὶ ῥήτωρ ἀπὸ ταύτης λεγόμενος λαμπρότατος ἐπὶ τῷ ρητορεύειν Ἴσοκράτης ἐγένετο, ἡ διότι | Ἴσοκράτης ἐκλήθη ἡ ρητορικὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ τῶν ἴσων κρατεῖν· ἴσα δὲ λέγεται τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα καὶ δυνάμενα, γενέσθαι καὶ μὴ γενέσθαι.

**Θαυμάσαι δίκαιον . . .** (Aphth 26 H/ON [= 4,18 Rabe]). 17. Τὸ μὲν θαυμάσαι δίκαιον Ἴσοκράτην τῆς τέχνης πρότασίς ἐστι θετικὴ ἐξενηνεγμένη· τὸ δέ, ὅς ὄνομα αὐτῇ κατεφάνη λαμπρότατον καὶ τό, καὶ ὅση τις ἦν ἀσκῶν ἐπεδείξατο, τὸ ὅση τις ἦν ἀντὶ τοῦ ὁπόση τις ἦν κατὰ τὸ

provides further confirmation of what has been said, as if when addressing a crowd you will say: “Properly, then, has he given the details of the case.” For you add a judgment by providing, as it were, an additional comment<sup>168</sup> to what has been reasonably said.

**Who appeared as its most illustrious name** (Aphth 27 H/ON [= 4,18–19 Rabe]). 15. Commentators also understand the pronoun “its” in two ways: either in the sense of “its, the discipline’s” or in the sense of “by means of it, by means of the discipline”—and by “discipline” is meant rhetoric.

16. Aphthonius said that Isocrates emerged as the most illustrious name in rhetoric either because through him rhetoric was elevated to a position of importance and became famous among men; or because he was named after this discipline and called “the rhetor” from the discipline, Isocrates became most illustrious for his public speaking; or because the rhetorical discipline has been termed isocratic [=evenly balanced] from its rule for balanced clauses.<sup>169</sup> By “balanced” is meant such clauses as “acceptable and possible” and “to become and not to become.”

**It is right to admire** (Aphth 26 H/ON [= 4,18 Rabe]). 17. The statement “It is right to admire Isocrates for his discipline” (Aphth 26 H/ON [= 4,18 Rabe]) is a proposition expressed as a thesis, as are the clauses “who appeared as its most illustrious name” (Aphth 27 H/ON [= 4,18–19 Rabe]) and “he showed how much it was by his practice” (Aphth 27–28 H/ON [= 4,19–20 Rabe]). The expression “how much it was” is used in the sense of

judgment (ἐπιχρησις) (see *On Types of Style* 6 [250,6–11 Rabe]).

<sup>168</sup> The word “properly” is the added judgment, as becomes evident from an anonymous discussion of figures where the figure “added judgment” is illustrated from Demosthenes 24.24 (“All these laws have been established for a long time, gentlemen, and they have frequently been tested as being advantageous to you, and no one has ever said they were not good laws. And reasonably so.”) with the comment that the word “reasonably” is the added judgment (see Anonymous, *On Figures* [8:630,1–7 Walz]). Here the added judgment is δίκαιον (“It is right”).

<sup>169</sup> Doxapatres may be thinking of a passage from Hermogenes where balanced clauses are associated with Isocrates, especially in his paraenetic writings (see Hermogenes, *On Method* 13 [429,8–9 Rabe]). In any case, Nigel Wilson (*Scholars of Byzantium* [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983], 105) quotes a passage from Photius (codex 159) that criticizes Isocrates for “the boring regularity of his evenly balanced clauses,” an observation that Wilson says “hits the mark.”

μέγεθος· τοῦτο δὲ ὅσον εἶπε, τοὺς ἄλλους ῥήτορας αἰνιττόμενος· τριῶν γὰρ εἰδῶν ὄντων τῆς ῥητορικῆς, συμβουλευτικοῦ, δικανικοῦ, πανηγυρικοῦ, ὁ μὲν Ἴσοκράτης καὶ τοῖς τρισὶν ὁμοίως εὐδοκιμηκῶς φαίνεται, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἕκαστος καθ' ἓν μόνον ἢ δύο· αὐτίκα γοῦν ὁ Δημοσθένης τῷ πανηγυρικῷ πολλῶν λειπόμενος ἑαυτοῦ φαίνεται, καὶ τὸ ὅση τις ἦν ἀντὶ τοῦ οἷα τις ἦν τῷ Ἀφθονίῳ παρείληπται, ἵν' ἡ ποσότης ἀντὶ τῆς ποιότητος. 18. γράφεται δὲ καὶ ὡς ἦτις ἦν, τὸ δὲ ἀσκῶν ἀντὶ τοῦ σπουδάζων, ἐγγυμναζόμενος· τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ὄνομα κυρίως ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγώνων ἐστίν· καλῶς οὖν ἐνταῦθα τίθεται, παρόσον δι' ἀγῶνος καὶ σπουδῆς εἰς ἕξιν τῆς τέχνης ἐρχόμεθα.

**Καὶ κηρύττει τὴν τέχνην, οὐκ αὐτὸς ἐκ ταύτης κεκήρυκται** (Aphth 28–29 H/ON [= 4,20–5,1 Rabe]). 19. Ἐπειδὴ ἡ κοσμεῖ τις τὴν τέχνην, ὡς ὅτι πολὺ τὸ εὐδόκιμον κτήσεται ἐν αὐτῇ, τότε γὰρ βλέποντες αὐτὸν τοιοῦτον ὄντα θαυμάζομεν τὴν τέχνην ὡς τοιούτους δυναμένην ἀποτελεῖν ἡ κοσμεῖται ὑπὸ τῆς τέχνης, ὡς οἱ μέσως ἔχοντες καὶ τούτῳ αὐτῷ σεμνυνόμενοι, τῷ ῥήτορες τυχὸν ἢ γραμματικοὶ ὀνομάζεσθαι, τὸν Ἴσοκράτην τῆς πρώτης μοίρας ἀξιοῖ ὁ Ἀφθόνιος· φησὶ γὰρ αὐτὸν κοσμήσαι τὴν τέχνην μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπ' αὐτῆς κοσμηθῆναι· ἐνιοὶ δὲ φασιν, ὅτι τὸ τοιοῦτον ὑπερβολικόν ἐστιν, εἰ γὰρ μὴ αὐτός, φασίν, ὑπὸ τῆς τέχνης ἐκηρύχθη, οὐκ ἂν ἠδύνατο κηρύξαι αὐτήν.

[278] | **Ἄλλ' οἷα περὶ τῆς παιδείας ἐφιλοσόφησε** (Aphth 32–33 H/ON [= 5,3–4 Rabe]). 20. Τὸ οἷα θαυμαστικὸν κεῖται ἐνταῦθα, λαμβάνεται δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ σχετλιασμοῦ ἔσθ' ὅτε, ὡς ἐν τῇ ἀνασκευῇ. 21. ἔστι δὲ ἀμφοτέρων τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ καὶ ἐνδιαθέτου λόγου.

**Ὁ παιδείας ἐρῶν πόνων μὲν ἄρχεται, πόνων δὲ ὅμως τελευτώντων εἰς ὄνησιν** (Aphth 34–35 H/ON [= 5,5–6 Rabe]). 22. Εἰ καὶ δοκεῖ



how great it was, indicating extent. Aphthonius said “how much,” alluding to the other orators, for of the three classes of rhetoric—deliberative, judicial, and celebratory—Isocrates is clearly held in great honor for all three alike, but each of the other orators for only one or two. At any rate, Demosthenes is clearly less than his usual self in the case of celebratory speeches.<sup>170</sup> Also, the clause “how much it was” has been used by Aphthonius in the sense of “how it was,” so that it is an expression of quality instead of quantity. 18. And the expression is also written (in some manuscripts): “as what it was.” The expression “by practice” is used in the sense of “by earnest pursuit,” “by exercise.” And this expression is properly used in the case of competitions. Therefore, it is rightly placed here, insofar as we become skilled in the discipline of rhetoric through competition and zeal.

**And he is a herald for this discipline; he himself has not been heralded by it** (Aphth 28–29 H/ON [= 4,20–5,1 Rabe]). 19. There are two options: either someone enhances the discipline in that he will acquire a considerable reputation in it—for when we see him for the man he is, we admire his discipline for being able to produce such men—or someone is enhanced by his discipline, like those who have mediocre ability and put on airs for the very reason that they are styled orators perhaps or grammarians. Of these two options, Aphthonius deems Isocrates to be deserving of the former, for he says that Isocrates enhanced the discipline rather than that he was enhanced by it. Some commentators say, however, that Aphthonius’s language is hyperbolic, for if Isocrates, they claim,<sup>171</sup> had not been enhanced by his discipline, he would not have been able to herald it.

**But what a philosophy of education he had!** (Aphth 32–33 H/ON [= 5,3–4 Rabe]). 20. The word “what” is used here as an adverb expressing admiration, but it is sometimes used to express

<sup>170</sup> Doxapatres seems to be reflecting a discussion of Hermogenes, who identifies Demosthenes as the premier deliberative and judicial orator but singles out Plato as the best celebratory orator (see *On Types of Style* 2.10 [389,18–21 Rabe]).

<sup>171</sup> Doxapatres is drawing here on P-scholia 8.3.

τοῖς ἐξηγηταῖς δεῖν τὸ παραφραστικὸν μεῖζον τοῦ ἐγκωμιαστικοῦ γίνεσθαι, ὅμως ὁ Ἀφθόνιος ἐν τῇ παρούσῃ μελέτῃ τοῦτο συναιρεῖ.

**Καὶ ἃ μὲν ἐφιλοσόφησε τάδε, τοῖς δ' ἐφεξῆς μαθησόμεθα** (Aphth 36–37 H/ON [= 5,6–7 Rabe]). 23. Τοῦτό ἐστίν ἡ καλουμένη συμπλήρωσις, καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν καὶ κατὰ τὴν μέθοδον εὐκρινῇ ποιοῦσα τὸν λόγον, ἔργον δὲ αὐτῆς τὸ τὰ μὲν παρελθόντα ἀναπαύειν, τῶν δὲ ῥηθησομένων ἀρχὰς ἔχειν, οἷον «τοιαῦτα μὲν οἱ Κερκυραῖοι εἶπον, οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι μετ' αὐτοὺς τοιαῦτα.» χρῆται δὲ αὐτῷ Ἀφθόνιος οὐκ ἐνταῦθα μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῇ γνώμῃ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀνασκευῇ καὶ ἐν τῇ κατασκευῇ, διὰ τὸ σαφηνεῖαν ἐπιτηδεύειν, ἥς ἐργαστικὴ ἡ εὐκρίνεια, ἥς ἴδιον ἡ συμπλήρωσις.

**Τοῖς τῆς παιδείας ἡγεμόσι συνεξετάζονται** (Aphth 38–39 H/ON [= 5,8–9 Rabe]). 24. Παιδείας ἡγεμόνας τοὺς διδασκάλους λέγει· τὸ δὲ συνεξετάζονται οἱ μὲν ἀντὶ τοῦ συναμιλλῶνται, παρόσον καὶ ὁρῶντες

22 τάδε Walz || ταῦτα Aphthonius 36 H/ON (= 5,7 Rabe) |  
 22 μαθησόμεθα Walz || θαυμασόμεθα Aphthonius 37 H/ON (= 5,7 Rabe) ||  
 23 cf. Hermogenes, *On Types of Style* 1.4 (237,8–10 Rabe) | 23 Thucydides 1.36.4.

indignation, as in the chapter on refutation.<sup>172</sup> 21. Either meaning is consistent with the true and natural sense of the word.

**The lover of education begins with toils but toils that nonetheless end in profit** (Aphth 34–35 H/ON [= 5,5–6 Rabe]). 22. Even if commentators think that the paraphrastic heading should be longer than the encomiastic, Aphthonius nevertheless keeps this heading short in his model elaboration.

**And so what he taught is this, but in the following headings we will learn**<sup>173</sup> **about it** (Aphth 36–37 H/ON [= 5,6–7 Rabe]). 23. This sentence is an example of what is called “completion”; it makes the speech distinct in thought and method and has as its task to bring to a close what has transpired and to prepare for what will be said<sup>174</sup>—for example: “Such things the Corcyreans said, and after them the Corinthians said such things.”<sup>175</sup> Aphthonius used this stylistic device not only here but also in the model maxim elaboration,<sup>176</sup> as well as the model refutation<sup>177</sup> and confirmation,<sup>178</sup> because of his pursuit of clarity, which is produced by distinctness and which is a characteristic of completion.

**... are reckoned among the leaders of education** (Aphth 38–39 H/ON [= 5,8–9 Rabe]). 24. By “leaders of education” Aphthonius means teachers. The verb “they are reckoned among” is

<sup>172</sup> This word appears in Aphthonius’s model refutation; he shows his indignation at the poets who have reproached all the gods, but especially Apollo, the poets’ alleged leader! In this context Aphthonius says: “What (οἷα) things the poets have fabricated about Apollo’s Daphne!” (see *Progymn.* 5 [11,3–6 Rabe]).

<sup>173</sup> Doxapatres has made a couple of changes in Aphthonius’s text—one minor (τὰ δέ for ταῦτα) and one major (μαθησόμεθα for θαυμασόμεθα).

<sup>174</sup> Doxapatres’s definition of συμπλήρωσις reflects that of Hermogenes: “Completions make a speech distinct through thoughts and methods by bringing to a close what has transpired and by preparing for what will be said” (*On Types of Style* 1.4 [237,8–10 Rabe]).

<sup>175</sup> Thucydides 1.36.4.

<sup>176</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 4 (8,19–20 Rabe): “Such, then, is what he taught, but we will be amazed about it in what follows”; this sentence goes uncommented on by Doxapatres at that point in his commentary.

<sup>177</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 5 (11,14–15 Rabe): “Such, then, is what is said about the myth of Daphne, but it is possible to refute it on the basis of the following headings”; Doxapatres does identify it there as an example of completion (2:334,23–27 Walz).

<sup>178</sup> Aphthonius seems not to use this stylistic device in his model confirmation.

τὰ ἐκείνων τοιαῦτα καὶ αὐτοὶ ποιεῖν ἀναγκάζονται, οἱ δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ ὁμοῦ ἐγγυμνάζονται. 25. οἱ δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ σύνεισι καὶ ἐνδιατρίβουσι.

**Παρ' οἷς καὶ τὸ προσελθεῖν φοβερόν** (Aphth 39–40 H/ON [= 5,9 Rabe]). 26. Τινὲς ἀντίπτωσιν τοῦτο εἶπον, ἀντὶ τοῦ παρ' οὗς, οἱ δὲ τὸ προσελθεῖν ἀπόλυτον εἰρήκασι.

**Καὶ τὸ διαλιπεῖν ἀμαθέστατον** (Aphth 39–41 H/ON [= 5,9–10 Rabe]). 27. Ἀμαθίας πρόξενον.

**Καὶ παροῦσι καὶ μέλλουσι** (Aphth 42 H/ON [= 5,11 Rabe]).  
[279] 28. Τὸ μέλλουσι ἢ ἀντὶ τοῦ βραδύνουσι καὶ ἀναδυομένοις, ἢ | ἀντὶ τοῦ ὀφείλουσιν ἀπελθεῖν.

**Παιδαγωγοὶ** (Aphth 42–43 H/ON [= 5,11 Rabe]). 29. Τῶν παιδαγωγῶν οἱ πατέρες εἰσὶ χαλεπώτεροι, ἐπειδὴ οἱ παιδαγωγοὶ χαλεπώτεροι εἶναι τοῖς παισὶ τῶν διδασκάλων δοκοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ πατέρες καὶ ἀμφοτέρων· δεινὸν γὰρ καὶ κομιδῇ καὶ παγγάλεπον, τὸ παρ' ὧν δέον ἦν αὐτοὺς κατοικτεῖρεσθαι, παρὰ τούτων αὐτῶν ἐξετάζεσθαι· διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀσθενεστέρων ἀρξάμενος προβαίνει ἐπὶ τὸ ἀκμαιότερον, ὅπερ ἀρετὴ ἐστὶ λόγου.

**Αἰκίζόμενοι δὲ χαλεπώτερον** (Aphth 43–44 H/ON [= 5,12–13 Rabe]). 30. <Τὸ> αἰκίζόμενοι ἀντὶ τοῦ αἰκίζοντες· ἰστέον δέ, ὅτι τῶν ῥημάτων τῶν μὲν τὰ μὲν ἐνεργητικὰ οὐχ εὗρηνται ἐν χρήσει, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ πορεύομαι, τῶν δὲ τὰ παθητικὰ <οὐχ εὗρηνται> ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ζῶ, πλουτῶ, ὀδεύω, καὶ πάλιν ποτὲ μὲν τὰ παθητικὰ λαμβάνονται ἀντὶ <τοῦ> ἐνεργητικοῦ, ὡς τὸ λοιδορούμενος ἀντὶ τοῦ λοιδορῶν, καὶ αἰτιώμενος καὶ μεμφόμενος ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπιτιμῶν, ποτὲ δὲ πάλιν ἀντὶ τοῦ παθητικοῦ

29 secundum χαλεπώτεροι Walz || φοβώτεροι Aphthonius 44 H/ON (= 5,13 Rabe) || 30 τὸ addidi || 30 οὐχ εὗρηνται addidi || 30 τοῦ addidi

used, some say, in the sense of “they are in competition with,” insofar as students see their leaders’ activities and are themselves compelled to act, but others in the sense of “they are exercising together with.” 25. Still others in the sense of “they are associates of,” “they are colleagues of.”

**With whom it is both fearful to approach** (Aphth 39–41 H/ON [= 5,9–10 Rabe]). 26. Some commentators have called this expression [παρ’ οἷς] an example of change-of-case, used in the sense of παρὰ with the accusative (“at [whose school]”), and others have said that the infinitive “to approach” is used absolutely.

**From which it is the height of ignorance to stay away** (Aphth 39–41 H/ON [= 5,9–10 Rabe]). 27. Staying away causes ignorance.

**Both when they are (at school) and when they are about (to go)** (Aphth 42 H/ON [= 5,11 Rabe]). 28. The latter participle is used either in the sense of “when they delay and fail (to go)” or in the sense of “when they ought to leave (for school).”<sup>179</sup>

**Paedagogi** (Aphth 42–43 H/ON [= 5,11 Rabe]). 29. Fathers are harsher than paedagogi since paedagogi seem to the boys to be harsher than their teachers, and their parents seem more so than both. It was quite terrifying and very difficult for the boys to be examined by those from whom they must seek mercy. And this is why Aphthonius began with the lesser and goes on to the more important, and this is a virtue of his essay.

**And inflicting punishment more severely**<sup>180</sup> (Aphth 43–44 H/ON [= 5,12–13 Rabe]). 30. The participle “inflicting punishment” is a middle form used in the sense of the active. Now one should realize that the active forms of some verbs are not found in use, as is the case of the verb πορεύομαι, whereas the passive forms of other verbs <are not found>, as is the case with ζῶ, πλουτῶ, and ὀδεύω. And again, sometimes the passive forms are employed in the sense of the active, as the passive participle of the verb λοιδορούμενος is used in the sense of the active, and the passive

<sup>179</sup> The verb μέλλειν can mean “to be slow, to delay” (see LSJ, s.v. μέλλω III), but when μέλλουσι is paired with παροῦσι this verb must mean “to be about to. . .” (see LSJ, s.v. μέλλω II).

<sup>180</sup> Doxapatres departs from Aphthonius’s text here, having χαλεπώτερον instead of φοβώτεροι, perhaps because Doxapatres has just used χαλεπώτερον of paedagogi, teachers, and parents.

λαμβάνονται τὰ ἐνεργητικά, ὡς ἔχει ἐκεῖνο ἐν τῇ εἰσαγωγῇ Πορφυρίου· «Ἡρακλεῖδαι γὰρ λέγονται οἱ ἐκ γένους κατὰγοντες Ἡρακλέους·» ἔστι δὲ τῆς Ἀτθίδος τουτ' ἴδιον· αὐτοὶ γὰρ αἰ παθητικῶ ῥήματι ἀντὶ <τοῦ> ἐνεργητικοῦ χρῶνται, οἷον γράφομαι, ποιοῦμαι ἀντὶ τοῦ γράφω, ποιῶ, ποιείσθων, νοείσθων, λέγει ἀντὶ τοῦ ποιείτωσαν, νοείτωσαν.

**Φθάνει τὴν πείραν τὸ δέος καὶ διαδέχεται τὸ δέος ἢ κόλασις** (Aphth 44–45 H/ON [= 5,13–14 Rabe]). 31. Πρῶτον γὰρ φοβοῦνται τὰς κολάσεις, εἶτα κολάζονται. 32. τὸ οὖν φθάνει ἀντὶ τοῦ προλαμβάνει, οἷον προλαμβάνει τὴν πείραν τῶν βασάνων.

**Οἰκεῖα δὲ τὰ κατορθώματα κρίνουσι** (Aphth 46–47 H/ON [= 5,15–16 Rabe]). 33. Λεῖπει τὸ ὥς, ἔν' ἧ ὥς οἰκεῖα.

[280] **Φύγη μὲν τοὺς διδασκάλους** (Aphth 53–54 H/ON [= 5,21 Rabe]). 34. Δύο ταῦτα παράκεινται ἀλλήλοις, ταυτότης ὀνομάτων καὶ | ποιικιλία· καὶ τῇ μὲν ταυτότητι τότε προσήκόν ἐστι χρῆσθαι, ὡς τὸ Περι μεθόδου δεινότητος ἡμᾶς διδάσκει βιβλίον, «ὅταν τοῦ πράγματος ἐν ὀνομα ἧ τὸ ἐναργέστατον,» ὡς παρ' Ὀμήρω·

᾽Ως δὲ χιὼν κατατήκετ' ἐν ἀκροπόλοισιν ὄρεσσιν,

Ἦν τ' Εὐρος κατέτηξεν, ἐπὴν Ζέφυρος καταχεύῃ·

Τηκομένης δ' ἄρα τῆς ποταμοὶ πλήθουσι ῥέοντες,

᾽Ως τῆς τήκετο καλὰ παρήια δάκρυχεούσης.

35. ἐνταῦθα γὰρ ἐπειδὴ ἐν μόνον ὄνομα ἦν τὸ τὴν ἐνάργειαν ἔχον τοῦ πράγματος, καὶ οὐδὲν οὕτως ἀρμόζον ἦν οὔτε τὸ χεῖται οὔτε λύεται ὡς τὸ τήκεται, διὰ τοῦτο πολλάκις τῷ αὐτῷ ἐχρήσατο, καὶ τῇ μὲν ταυτότητι ἐν

30 Porphyry, *Intr.* (2,6 Busse) || 30 secundum τοῦ addidi ||  
34 ταυτότης scripsi || ταυτότης Walz || 34 ὅταν scripsi; cf. Hermogenes, *On Method* 4 (416,9–10 Rabe) || ὅτι Walz || 34 *Od.* 19.205–8 || 35 ταυτότητι scripsi || ταυτότητι Walz

forms *αἰτιώμενος* and *μεμφόμενος* are used in the sense of the active “censuring.” And again, sometimes active forms are used in the sense of the passive, as this passage from the *Introduction* of Porphyry has it: “Those who descend from the race of Herakles are called ‘Herakleidae.’”<sup>181</sup> This usage is peculiar to Attic Greek, for the Athenians are always using a passive form of a word in the sense of an active one—for example, the passive forms *γράφομαι* and *ποιῶμαι* have the active sense of “I write” and “I make,” the passive forms *ποιέσθων* and *νοέσθων* have the active sense of “Let them make” and “Let them think.”

**Apprehension precedes the endeavor, and punishment succeeds the apprehension** (Aphth 44–45 H/ON [= 5,13–14 Rabe]). 31. For they are first fearful of punishment, then they are punished. 32. Therefore, the verb “precedes” is used in the sense of “anticipates”—for example, he anticipates the sting of the blows.

**They judge the work students have done correctly only proper** (Aphth 46–47 H/ON [= 5,15–16 Rabe]). 33. Aphthorinus leaves out the word “as,” where the sense requires “as only proper.”

**Should a student flee from his teachers** (Aphth 53–54 H/ON [= 5,21 Rabe]). 34. Closely related to one another are these two compositional devices: repetition and variation of words. Occasionally, it is appropriate to use repetition, as the book *On the Method of Forcefulness* teaches us:<sup>182</sup> “whenever there is only one word for a subject that is clearest,” as in Homer:<sup>183</sup>

Just as snow melts on lofty mountains, snow  
That east wind melts, when west wind’s poured it down,  
And as it melts the streams run full; just so  
Her fair cheeks melted as she poured forth tears.

35. For in this instance, since there was only one word that clarifies the matter and since no other word was fitting—neither “pours” nor “is loosed”—as “melts,” this is why Homer

<sup>181</sup> See Porphyry, *Introduction* (2,6 Busse), where the active *κατάγοντες* has the passive meaning, “are descended,” although one MS has the middle-passive *καταγόμενοι* (see Busse’s apparatus).

<sup>182</sup> See Hermogenes, *On Method* 4 (416,8–417,5 Rabe), where both repetition and variation are similarly discussed and illustrated by the same Homeric passages.

<sup>183</sup> *Od.* 19.205–8.

τούτοις χρησόμεθα· τῇ δὲ ποικιλίᾳ πάλιν χρηστέον, ὅταν πολλὰ ὀνόματα ὑπάρχῃ ἰσότερα καὶ ὁμοίως ἔχοντα τὴν ἐνάργειαν, ὡς καὶ ὁ Ὅμηρος ποιεῖ λέγων·

‘Ὡς δ’ ὅτ’ ἂν ὠδίνουσιν ἔχῃ βέλος ὀξὺ γυναιῖκα,  
 Δριμύ, τό τε προιεῖσι μογαστόκοι Εἰλειθυῖαι,  
 Ὕρης θυγατέρες πικράς ὠδῖνας ἔχουσαι·

36. ἐνταῦθα γὰρ ποικιλίᾳ ὀνομάτων ἐχρήσατο, τὸ ὀξὺ καὶ τὸ δριμὺ καὶ τὸ πικρὸν παραλαβὼν· καὶ ὁ Ἀφθόνιος δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ποικιλίαν ὀνομάτων ἐν τῷ παρόντι τετήρηκεν. 37. ἔχει γὰρ τὸ φύγη, τὸ ἀποδράσει, τὸ ἀποστραφεῖν· πλὴν σημείωσαι, ὅτι κυριολεκτεῖν ἐπιμένονος, τῷ φύγῃ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ διδασκάλου, τῷ δὲ ἀποδράσει ἐπὶ τῶν πατέρων ἐχρήσατο· ἡ μὲν γὰρ φυγή καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων λέγεται, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ στρατιωτῶν φευγόντων, ἢ τινῶν ὑπευθύνων, ἡ δὲ ἀπόδρασις ἐπὶ μόνων τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἢ τύχην δεδουλωμένων, ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν παίδων, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν κατὰ τύχην, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν δούλων.

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**Καὶ μετὰ τοῦ δέους τῶν | λόγων ἀφήρηται** (Aphth 56–57 H/ON [= 5,23–24 Rabe]). 38. Τὸ ἀφήρηται ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐστέρηται τέθιται· ἔστι δ’ ὅτε καὶ αἰτιατικῇ συντάσσεται τὸ ἀφαιροῦμαι· ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ὅπερ εἶχον ἐκεῖνο ἀποβαλοῦμαι, αἰτιατικῇ συντάσσεται, ὡς ἔχει καὶ τό,

‘Ὡς ἔμ’ ἀφαιρεῖται Χρυσήϊδα καλλιπάρηρον.

39. ὅτε δὲ ὅπερ οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἰς ἐμὴν περιῆλθεν, ἐκεῖνου λέγομαι στερηθῆναι, γενικῇ <συντάσσεται>, ὡς <ἔχει καὶ τὸ . . . >

35 ἐνάργειαν scripsi; cf. Hermogenes, *On Method* 4 (416,22 Rabe) || ἐν-  
 έργειαν Walz || 35 *Il.* 11.269–71 || 37 τῶν λόγων Walz || τοὺς λόγους  
 Aphthonius 56 H/ON (= 5,24 Rabe) || 38 *Il.* 1.182 || 39 συντάσσεται  
 addidi | 39 ὡς <ἔχει καὶ τό . . . > lacunam suspecti



frequently used the same word, and so we will use repetition on these occasions. But again one must use variation whenever many words are equally appropriate and similarly clear, as Homer also does when he says:<sup>184</sup>

As when the keen dart strikes a woman in  
Travail, a piercing dart that goddesses  
Of childbirth send, the Eileithyiai, those  
Daughters of Hera who control sharp pangs.

36. For in this instance Homer has used a variation of words, employing the words “keen,” “piercing,” and “sharp.” Aphthonius himself has also observed variation of words in the present passage. 37. For he has the words “he flees,” “he runs away,” and “he avoids.” But note that with the aim of using words with precision he used “flees” in the case of the teacher, but “runs away” in the case of fathers. For the noun “flight” is also said of free men, as in the case of soldiers in flight or of certain officials subject to audit, whereas the noun “running away” is said only of those who are, by nature or fate, slaves—of those by nature, such as boys, and those by fate, such as slaves.

**And by ridding himself of his apprehension he also deprives himself of their guidance** (Aphth 56–57 H/ON [= 5,23–24 Rabe]). 38. The verb “he deprives himself” is used in the sense of “he loses.” The verb “I deprive myself” is sometimes constructed with an accusative, for when I throw away what I had, the verb is constructed with the accusative, as this line has it:<sup>185</sup>

Since he takes fair-cheeked Chryseis from me.

39. But when I am deprived of that which was not in my possession at the beginning, the verb <is constructed> with the genitive, <as this line has it . . . >.<sup>186</sup>

<sup>184</sup> *Il.* 11.269–71.

<sup>185</sup> *Il.* 1.182. Doxapatres quotes this line because ἀφαιρεῖται is used with the accusative (Χρυσήϊδα); still, the line is not quoted correctly. The adjective “fair-cheeked” appears not in this line but in 184, and the subject “he” is explicit, namely, Phoebus Apollo.

<sup>186</sup> There seems to be a sizeable lacuna here, for what follows does not complete the thought. In other words, we expect an example of ἀφαιρούμαι with the genitive. Instead, what we get is a clause from later in Aphthonius’s elaboration. Moreover, this clause does not have the verb ἀφαιρούμαι but another verb, and one with an accusative, not the genitive. Moreover, a lacuna explains why there are not comments on the intervening heading, analogy. Since the clause

**Ὡς καὶ τὸν κόσμον τῆς κεφαλῆς παραιρεῖσθαι** (Aphth 67–68 H/ON [= 6,9–10 Rabe]). 40. Ἦτοι γὰρ ἀπεκείρετο τὰς τρίχας τοῦ ἡμίσεος μέρους, ὥς φησι, τῆς κεφαλῆς, ὥς ἂν μὴ ἔξω τῆς οἰκείας προβαίνῃ, ἀλλ' ἐνδον τῆς οἰκείας καθήμενος ἀναγινώσκη, ἦτοι τὸ κοσμεῖν τὴν κεφαλὴν παρελογίζετο καὶ ὥς οὐδὲν ἡγεῖτο.

**Κόσμον ἄριστον τὸν ἐξ ἀρετῆς ἡγησάμενον** (Aphth 68–69 H/ON [= 6,10–11 Rabe]). 41. Τῆς συντάξεως τοῦ λόγου δοτικὴν ἀπαιτούσης πτώσιν, ἔν' ἣ κόσμον ἄριστον τὸν ἐξ ἀρετῆς ἡγησάμενον, λήθη τῶν ἀντιγράφων αἰτιατικὴ σχεδὸν ἀπάσαις ταῖς βίβλοις ἐντέθεται.

**Διὸ θανμάσαι τὸν Ἡσιόδον δεῖ** (Aphth 71 H/ON [= 6,13 Rabe]). 42. Ζητεῖται, διατὶ ἄφ' Ἡσιόδου καὶ οὐκ ἄφ' ἐτέρου τὴν μαρτυρίαν ἔλαβε· καὶ λέγουσιν, ὅτι ἐπεὶ γνωριμώτερος ἦν οὗτος ὁ ποιητὴς τοῖς νέοις, ἐν Ἑργοῖς δὲ καὶ Ἡμέραις ταῦτα λέγει.

43. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡ τῷ Ἀφθονίῳ τεθεῖσα εἰς παράδειγμα μελέτη τοῦ λογικοῦ ἐστὶν εἶδους τῆς χρείας, φαίνεται δὲ ζητήσεως ἄξιον, πῶς ἂν ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς χρείαις ἡ μαρτυρία τεθεῖη λόγων οὐκ ὄντων, φέρε ἀπὸ τῶν πρὸ ἡμῶν τὴν λύσιν τοῦ ἀπορήματος ἔχοντες εἴπωμεν· ἐστὶ γὰρ εἰπεῖν, φησὶν ὁ ἐξηγητὴς, καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς χρείαις χρῆσιν ἀκολουθεῖν· δεῖ γὰρ λέγειν ὅτι καλὸν τὸ γεγεννημένον, | καὶ ὅτι τὸν σκοπὸν τῆς πράξεως ἐγνωμολόγησεν ἕτερος. 44. ὥς ἐπὶ τοῦ Διογένηος τοῦ τυπτήσαντος τὸν παιδαγωγόν, ἐροῦμεν, ὅτι καὶ Θουκυδίδης τοῖς πραχθεῖσιν ὁμολογεῖ λέγων· «ὁ γὰρ δυνάμενος παῦσαι, περιορῶν δὲ ἀληθέστερον αὐτὸ δρᾷ,»

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39 παραιρεῖσθαι correxi; cf. Aphthonius 67 H/ON (= 6,10 Rabe) || παραιτεῖσθαι Walz || 40 secundum ἦτοι scripsi || ἢ ὅτι Walz || 40 post παρελογίζετο Walz scripsit καὶ || δέ codd. || 41 ἐντέθεται scripsi; cf. Rabe's apparatus || ἐκτέθεται Walz || 44 Thucydides 1.69.1.

**So that he even removed the adornment from his head** (Aphth 67–68 H/ON [= 6,9–10 Rabe]). 40. For either Demosthenes shaved the hair from half his head, as Aphthonius says, so that he would not venture out of his house, but would sit inside his house and practice his speech, or he ignored adorning his head and counted it as nothing.

**Regarding [ἡ γησάμενον] the best adornment to be that coming from virtue** (Aphth 68–69 H/ON [= 6,10–11 Rabe]). 41. Although the syntax of the sentence requires the dative case (for the participle)—so that the reading should be “(to him)<sup>187</sup> . . . who regarded [ἡ γησάμενον] the best adornment to be that coming from virtue”—the accusative participle is found in virtually all the manuscripts through an error of the copyists.

**Therefore, one must admire Hesiod** (Aphth 71 H/ON [= 6,13 Rabe]). 42. It is asked: “Why did Aphthonius take his testimony from Hesiod and not from some other poet?” And the commentators say that, since this poet was better known to young men, he refers to lines from the *Works and Days*.<sup>188</sup>

43. Now since the model elaboration provided by Aphthonius as an illustration is that of the saying class of chreia, it seems worth asking how a testimony can be provided in elaborations of action chreiai since they are without sayings. Now since we have the solution of this puzzle from our predecessors, come, let me explain: It is possible, says the commentator,<sup>189</sup> to say that a literary passage is consistent with action chreiai as well, for one must say “that what was done is noble and that someone else has expressed the intent of the action in words. 44. For example, in the case of Diogenes, who struck the paedagogus,<sup>190</sup> we will say: Thucydides also agrees with what was done, when he said: ‘For the one who is able to stop something but allows it to occur does it in a truer

comes some ten lines later in the elaboration, the lacuna is quite extensive.

<sup>187</sup> The participle should agree with the αὐτῷ in the previous clause (see Aphthonius 66 H/ON [= 6,9 Rabe]).

<sup>188</sup> Aphthonius does not quote from Hesiod but merely alludes to *WD* 287–89.

<sup>189</sup> The commentator is John of Sardis, and Doxapatres quotes him word for word (see John of Sardis 5.26).

<sup>190</sup> On this action chreia, see *Chreia* 1:315–16.

ἢ τὸ τοῦ Δημοσθένους· «ὁ γὰρ τὸ σπέρμα δούς, οὗτος τῶν φύντων καρπῶν αἴτιος.»

45. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὰ παραδείγματα φῶς εἰσι τῶν λεγομένων, φέρε τοῦ Ἀφθονίου λογικὴν μόνην χρεῖαν εἰς παράδειγμα μελετήσαντος, ἡμεῖς καὶ λογικῆς χρείας καὶ πρακτικῆς καὶ μικτῆς μελέτας, οὐχ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν μελετηθείσας εἰς παράδειγμα θήσομεν.

sense.’<sup>191</sup> Or the saying of Demosthenes: ‘For the one who provides the seed is the cause of the harvest.’”<sup>192</sup>

45. Since examples illumine what is being said, come, since Aphthonius practiced only on a saying chreia for his example, we will also set out as model exercises elaborations of a saying, action, and mixed chreia, elaborations composed not by me but by my predecessors.<sup>193</sup>

<sup>191</sup> Thucydides 1.69.1.

<sup>192</sup> Demosthenes 18.159, whose text does not have καρπῶν (“harvest”).

<sup>193</sup> For introduction, texts, and translations of these three chreia elaborations, see *Chreia* 2:234–57. For analysis of these three elaborations, along with six others (a refutation and confirmation, an encomium and invective, a comparison, and a speech-in-character) that Doxapatres has inserted elsewhere in his commentary, see Craig A. Gibson, “The Anonymous Progymnasmata in John Doxapatres’ *Homiliae in Aphthonium*,” *ByzZ* 102 (2009): 83–94.



# Text 4. Rhetorica Marciana

## Commentary on Aphthonius's

### *Progymnasmata*

On the Chreia  
(1:129,18–130,14 Walz)

#### Introduction

#### THE RHETORICA MARCIANA

Among the rhetorical manuscripts that Christian Walz edited for his nine-volume *Rhetores Graeci*, published in 1832–1836,<sup>1</sup> is a fourteenth-century Venetian manuscript, which he identified as Ven. 444.<sup>2</sup> Walz edited only small portions of this manuscript and scattered them about his various volumes. Hugo Rabe briefly dealt with this manuscript. He renamed it Marc. gr. 444 after the Venetian library of San Marco where it is located, combined it with other manuscripts—the thirteenth-century Marc. gr. 599 and the late fourteenth-century Vat. gr. 899—and regarded their contents as forming a coherent rhetorical corpus, formed in the late twelfth century, centered on the Corpus Hermogenianum, and he called it the “Rhetorica Marciana.”<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Christian Walz, ed., *Rhetores Graeci* (9 vols.; Tübingen: Cotta, 1832–1836).

<sup>2</sup> Walz, *Rhetores Graeci*, 1:127 n. 1, 597 n. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Hugo Rabe, ed., *Prolegomenon Sylloge* (*Rhetores Graeci* 14; Leipzig: Teubner, 1931), xix n. 1. On the notion of a rhetorical corpus, see also Hugo Rabe, “Rhetoren-Corpora,” *RhM* 67 (1912): 321–57, esp. 321. On the dating, see Rabe, *Prolegomenon*, xxiv; and *Chreia* 2:260–61.

The *Rhetorica Marciana* begins with two Aphthonian treatises, and these are the portions that Walz edited most fully.<sup>4</sup> One treatise, with the title *Περὶ τῶν τοῦ Ἀφθονίου Προγυμνασμάτων* (= fol. 1v-8), Walz placed toward the beginning of the first volume.<sup>5</sup> The other, with the title *Τὰ Προγυμνάσματα τῆς ῥητορικῆς* (= fol. 9-23r), he put at the very end of it.<sup>6</sup> The latter is a collection of sample progymnasmata that were treated in the second volume of the *Chreia and Ancient Rhetoric*, in particular the elaboration of a chreia.<sup>7</sup> The former treatise is our concern here.

RHETORICA MARCIANA'S COMMENTARY ON  
APHTHONIUS'S *PROGYMNASMATA*

Walz considered *Περὶ τῶν τοῦ Ἀφθονίου Προγυμνασμάτων* to be an epitome of Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata* and, after the title page, used *Ἀωνύμου Ἐπιτομή* as the header for the remainder of the treatise. At first glance this treatise could easily be seen as an epitome. But, as Vittorio DeFalco recognized,<sup>8</sup> this designation is arbitrary. To be sure, much of this treatise is simply taken from Aphthonius, and its length is considerably shorter. But the briefer extent of the treatise is largely due to the omission of all of Aphthonius's model exercises, so that it is only 30 percent as long as Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata*. But if much is simply copied from Aphthonius, there are also deletions and additions for each exercise that reflect a redactor. In addition, the commentary begins with an introduction, for which, of course, there is no parallel in Aphthonius. These changes to Aphthonius's text require further analysis if we are to see that this initial treatise in the *Rhetorica Marciana* is much more than an epitome but is indeed a commentary, obviously short, on Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata*.

<sup>4</sup> Unfortunately, Walz included only short excerpts from the Hermogean material (see 3:610-12 and 4:31 Walz); for longer excerpts but still less than half of the material (= fol. 25-91), see Vittorio DeFalco, "Trattato retorico bizantino (*Rhetorica Marciana*)," *AttiSocLSL* 9 (1930): 71-124, esp. 74-102.

<sup>5</sup> Walz, *Rhetores Graeci*, 1:127-36.

<sup>6</sup> Walz, *Rhetores Graeci*, 1:597-648.

<sup>7</sup> See further *Chreia* 2:258-69.

<sup>8</sup> DeFalco, "Trattato retorico," 73.



Like the other commentaries, this commentary begins with an introduction (127,1–128,5). It relates Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata* to the larger rhetorical curriculum by saying that progymnasmata are “a rhetoric writ small, but still incomplete [μικρὰ μὲν ἐστὶν [ὥσπερ]<sup>9</sup> ῥητορικῇ, ἀτελὴ δέ ἐῖσι] since none of them is brought into court or to an assembly or composed as a complete speech, that is, having an introduction, statement of the case, argument, and epilogue” (127,1–4). Rather, individual progymnasmata bear a resemblance to one of the parts of a speech—narrative to the statement of the case, refutation and confirmation to the arguments, and common place to the epilogue, whereas the prefatory thoughts of introductions are characteristic of all the progymnasmata (127,5–11).

The introduction sets the number of progymnasmata explicitly at fourteen and lists them in full and in the Aphthonian sequence (127,13–16). They are then related to the three types of speech—fable, chreia, and maxim to the advisory type; refutation, confirmation, common place, and introduction of a law to the judicial; and encomium, invective, comparison, and speech-in-character to the celebratory; whereas description and narrative belong to all, and the thesis takes its subject matter from the celebratory (127,16–128,5).

After this short introduction the commentary then turns to the individual progymnasmata, whose treatments have a number of similarities. Summarizing them, if only briefly, will help to put the treatment of the chreia in context. Given the brevity of this short commentary, it should not surprise us that much is missing that we have otherwise come to expect in a commentary. For example, after listing the progymnasmata in the Aphthonian sequence in the introduction (127,13–16) the commentary itself makes no further mention of *τάξις* (“sequence”) as an issue that needs discussion.

More surprising is the deletion of some *παρεπόμενα* (“essential subjects”) that the P-scholia included for each progymnasma.<sup>10</sup> In the fable chapter, for example, the commentary

<sup>9</sup> I have deleted *ὥσπερ* as this passage is clearly modeled on John of Sardis (cf. *Comm. in Aphth.*, *praef.* [2,9–10 and 3,7 Rabe]).

<sup>10</sup> See, e.g., P-scholia, 2:575,17–25; 580,3–5 (Walz).

deletes Aphthonius's sections on the γένεσις ("origin") of the fable, as well as the κλησις ("naming") of the fable.<sup>11</sup> In the maxim chapter the section on διαφοραί, or differences between a chreia and a maxim,<sup>12</sup> has been deleted. Even the ὅρος ("definition") of speaking-in-character has been deleted, which is hard to explain, given the fact that definition is the only παρεπόμενον that appears in every progymnasma.<sup>13</sup>

Other deletions in the commentary can be more easily explained, usually as being unnecessary or repetitious. For example, in five progymnasmata—chreia, maxim, encomium, speaking-in-character, and introduction of a law—Aphthonius transitioned from the division of forms to the compositional instructions with this sentence: "This, then, is the division [διαίρεσις] of. . ."<sup>14</sup> And in all five cases the commentary omits the sentence, presumably as being unnecessary. In addition, whereas Aphthonius listed eight κεφάλαια ("headings") for elaborating a chreia and repeats them for elaborating a maxim,<sup>15</sup> the commentary lists them only for the chreia (129,29–31), presumably doing so because such a second listing in the maxim chapter would be repetitious. Similarly, the ὕλη ("subjects") for an encomium and comparison are the same, and Aphthonius listed them both times,<sup>16</sup> but the commentary does so only for the encomium (132,30–133,2), no doubt again because a second list would be repetitious.

Other deletions also occur, usually a sentence here and there. These deletions might be Aphthonius's illustrations for the εἴδη ("classes") in the διαίρεσις. Thus, Aphthonius provides an example for each of the three classes of speaking-in-character (ἡθοποιία, εἰδωλοποιία, and προσωποποιία),<sup>17</sup> but only the first example is retained (133,24–25). Moreover, even this example is incomplete, as the situation to which Herakles must respond—"when Eurystheus

<sup>11</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 1 (1,4–5 and 7–10 Rabe).

<sup>12</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 4 (8,7–10 Rabe).

<sup>13</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 11 (34,2–3 Rabe). On the ὅρος as the one essential subject for each progymnasma, see Doxapatres 2:193,22–23 (Walz).

<sup>14</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 3 (4,12 Rabe), 4 (8,3), 8 (21,20), 11 (35,1), and 13 (47,11).

<sup>15</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 3 (4,13–15 Rabe) and 4 (8,3–6).

<sup>16</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 8 (21,12–13 Rabe) and 10 (31,16–17).

<sup>17</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 11 (34,4–18 Rabe).

had ordered him”<sup>18</sup>—has been dropped. And, whereas Aphthonius gives an example for each kind of ἡθοποιία (παθητική, ἡθική, and μικτή)<sup>19</sup>—the commentary keeps only the first two (133,32–134,2). Similarly, when Aphthonius gives two examples of a philosophical thesis—whether heaven is spherical and whether there are many worlds<sup>20</sup>—the commentator keeps only the first (134,16–17). In addition, in the introduction of a law the commentator deletes Aphthonius’s final sentence: “Accordingly, in this way [i.e., using the κεφάλαια listed earlier] the introduction of a law differs from a thesis.”<sup>21</sup>

Finally, the deletion of Aphthonius’s loose quotation of Demosthenes’s definition of a law,<sup>22</sup> as well as the deletion of references to Homer in the narrative chapter,<sup>23</sup> may have another explanation. Elsewhere in the *Rhetorica Marciana* there is ample evidence of Christianizing,<sup>24</sup> especially the use of quotations from ὁ θεόλογος, Gregory of Nazianzus, whose quotations even replace those of Demosthenes in the Hermogenean materials.<sup>25</sup> Thus the deletion of Demosthenes and Homer may be of a piece with this Christianizing redaction elsewhere in the *Rhetorica Marciana*.

It should be clear from these many and varied deletions of Aphthonius’s text that the commentary is not merely a slavish copying of that text but a careful and consistent redaction of what seemed to be inessential, to the commentator at least, for learning the basics of the progymnasmata. But deletions are only half the story. Throughout the commentary—except for the maxim chapter<sup>26</sup>—numerous additions to Aphthonius’s text were made. On

<sup>18</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 11 (34,8 Rabe).

<sup>19</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 11 (35,3–10 Rabe).

<sup>20</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 13 (41,19–20 Rabe).

<sup>21</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 14 (47,15–16 Rabe).

<sup>22</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 14 (47,7–10 Rabe): A law is “a creation and gift of the gods, etc.” (Demosthenes 25.16).

<sup>23</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 2 (2,16–18 Rabe).

<sup>24</sup> On Christianizing in the sample progymnasmata, see *Chreia* 2:258, 261; and Herbert Hunger, *Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner* (HAW 12.5.1–2; Munich: Beck, 1978), 1:85, 106, 117.

<sup>25</sup> On Christianizing and especially the use of Gregory of Nazianzus as a model of style, see DeFalco, “Trattato retorico,” 81–85, 93–101, 114, 118.

<sup>26</sup> The changes made to the maxim chapter are minimal. The deletions of the eight κεφάλαια for the elaboration and of the διαφορά of the maxim with the chreia have already been mentioned; otherwise, the changes are only small

occasion the commentator clarifies some of the differing terms for the εἶδη of the progymnasmata. For example, there were different terms for the εἶδη of the narrative. The commentator repeats Aphthonius's terms but adds others, such as Aphthonius's δραματικόν is equated with others' πλασματικόν, and πολιτικόν with πρακτικόν and δικανικόν (128,25–26).

More typically, however, the additions involve clarification and guidance for actually composing the various progymnasmata. These compositional tips are not new but, as we shall see, were gleaned from Hermogenes, Nicolaus, and John of Sardis, or perhaps, as Rabe thinks, from the Π-scholia.<sup>27</sup> In the fable chapter, for example, Aphthonius says that one of the εἶδη (“classes”) of fable, the ἥθικόν, “imitates the characters [ἥθη] of irrational creatures.”<sup>28</sup> The commentator clarifies what Aphthonius meant by ἥθη by adding, “for example, the pride of the lion, the foolishness of the deer, the wickedness of the fox, the cowardice of the hare, and similarly in the case of the other creatures” (128,10–13).<sup>29</sup> Aphthonius also says that the παραίνεσις (“moral”) of the fable is expressed in the προμύθιον or ἐπιμύθιον, depending on whether it is expressed before or after the fable.<sup>30</sup> The commentator gives guidance on composing this “moral” by suggesting three ways to do it: “By means of example, reasoning, or address. By means of example—‘This fable [presumably Aphthonius’s model fable about the ants and cicadas] teaches us <to do something

textual ones—adding the neuter article, τὸ, before each of the various maxims Aphthonius gave to illustrate his eight εἶδη of maxims (see 130,20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, 32 and 131,1) and changing the subject (from second sing. to third sing.) and mood (from optative to indicative) of ἐργάσαιτο δ’ αὐτήν τοῖς τῆς χρείας κεφαλαίοις (Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 4 [8,3–4 Rabe]) to ἐργάζεται δὲ τοῖς τῆς χρείας κεφαλαίοις (131,3).

<sup>27</sup> See Rabe, “Aus Rhetoren-Handschriften. 3. Die Quellen des Doxapatries in den Homilien zu Aphthonios,” *RhM* 62 (1907): 559–86, esp. 576 n. 1 and 559–62 for the close, yet distinguishable, relationship between the Π-scholia and the P-scholia, the latter being the subject of chapter 2. See also Rabe, *Aphthonii Progymnasmata* (Rhetores Graeci 10; Leipzig: Teubner, 1926), *praef.* xix.

<sup>28</sup> Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 1 (1,13–14 Rabe).

<sup>29</sup> The commentator seemingly draws on John of Sardis, *Comm. in Aphth.* 1 (8,22–9,3 Rabe), who has this precise list of ἥθη. In fact, he goes on to list the creatures simply summarized here by “the other creatures”—“the gluttony of mice, the rapaciousness of hawks, the shamelessness of dogs, and the simplemindedness of sheep.”

<sup>30</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 1 (1,15–2,2 Rabe).

or not>.’<sup>31</sup> By means of reasoning—for example, ‘The one who does not do something is deserving of criticism.’ By means of address—for example, ‘You, my child, must refrain from this or that’” (128,16–21).<sup>32</sup>

Compositional guidance on writing narratives again dominates the additional material in the commentary on the narrative chapter and in fact doubles that taken over from Aphthonius. This material starts as follows: “A narrative can be done in five ways—in the nominative case, in the oblique case, in a questioning manner, in a comparative way, and asyndetically” (128,30–33). These five styles of writing go back to Hermogenes,<sup>33</sup> although the exact same sequence of the styles and the story of Phaethon used to illustrate them come from Nicolaus’s treatment, perhaps through the scholia.<sup>34</sup> For example, “in the nominative case the story would go as follows: ‘Phaethon [Φαέθων], the son [παῖς] of Helios, became enamored of his father’s chariot, mounted it, and so forth’; in the oblique case like this: ‘They say that Phaethon [Φαέθοντα], the son [παῖδα] of Helios, became enamored of his father’s chariot and persuaded his father and mounted it’; in a questioning manner in this fashion: ‘What then? Did not Phaethon, the son of Helios, become enamored of his father’s chariot? Did he not persuade his father? Did he not mount the chariot?’” (128,33–129,7). Once each of the five has been illustrated, further advice is given as to when they would be appropriate to use: “Each of these styles is useful, the nominative in histories and whenever there is a need for clarity; the oblique and questioning style in the argumentative part of a speech; the asyndetic in epilogues; and the comparative where the occasion allows, for we use this style everywhere, both in all the types of speech and in all the parts of a speech” (129,10–17).

<sup>31</sup> The parallels to this example complete it either, as rendered here, by τὸδε τι ποιεῖν ἢ μὴ ποιεῖν (so Nicolaus, *Progymn.* 1 [10,4 Felten]) or, more in line with Aphthonius’s model fable, by τὸδε τι μὴ ποιεῖν (so John of Sardis, *Comm. in Aphth.* 1 [13,1 Rabe]; cf. P-scholia 2:576,4 [Walz]).

<sup>32</sup> These three ways of expressing the παραίνεσις are common (see Nicolaus, *Progymn.* 1 [10,1–7 Felten]; John of Sardis, *Comm. in Aphth.* 1 [12,23–13,5 Rabe]; and P-scholia 2:576,2–8 [Walz]).

<sup>33</sup> See Hermogenes, *Progymn.* 2 (4,21–6,2 Rabe). A much more elaborate system of narrating is found in Theon, *Progymn.* 5 (50–57 Patillon).

<sup>34</sup> See Nicolaus, *Progymn.* 2 (16,1–17,3 Felten); and P-scholia 2:580,18–581,8 (Walz).

It should be clear from these analyses of the fable and narrative chapters that this commentary, despite its brevity, still contains much of value, especially compositional advice that was unavailable in Aphthonius's spare treatments of these progymnasmata.

RHETORICA MARCIANA'S COMMENTARY ON  
APHTHONIUS'S CHREIA CHAPTER

The commentary on Aphthonius's treatment of the chreia follows what we have seen in the other cases—both deletions and additions. One deletion, as already noted in four other instances, is Aphthonius's transitional, if unnecessary, sentence: "This has been the division (into the classes) of the chreia."<sup>35</sup> The other deletion is one that occurs for every progymnasma, namely, the deletion of the model exercise, in this case Aphthonius's elaboration of the chreia attributed to Isocrates: The roots of education are bitter, but its fruits are sweet.<sup>36</sup> Otherwise, the preliminary material—definition, etymology, division, and list of headings for the elaboration<sup>37</sup>—is simply copied,<sup>38</sup> with no comments deemed necessary (1.1–3.4).

The additions follow this material (4.1–9), and once again they provide compositional advice. This advice concerns the elaboration of a chreia and proceeds through each heading, explaining the function of each heading—with one exception, the example heading, although the very exception may be grounds for suspecting a lacuna here.<sup>39</sup> For two of the headings—analogy and example—there is also an illustration (4.6–7). There seems to be no source for this additional material, and there is no interest in comparing the headings with the parts of a speech, as we saw throughout Doxapatres's discussion of the headings.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>35</sup> See Aphthonius 16–17 H/ON (= 4, 12 Rabe).

<sup>36</sup> See Aphthonius 23–78 H/ON (= 4, 16–6, 19 Rabe); and *Chreia* 1:325–26.

<sup>37</sup> See Aphthonius 2–22 H/ON (= 3, 21–4, 15 Rabe).

<sup>38</sup> For the few and minor textual variants from Aphthonius's text, see the apparatus.

<sup>39</sup> See 4.7 and the apparatus.

<sup>40</sup> See Doxapatres 6.24–57.

At any rate, the function of the first heading, or the ἐγκωμιστικόν, is to praise (ἐγκωμιάσαι) (4.2), but there is no mention of having to be brief, as, say, John of Sardis advised.<sup>41</sup> The παραφραστικόν is, rather tautologically, to restate the saying in a paraphrastic manner (παραφραστικῶς) (4.3). The αἰτία (“rationale”) should add what the benefit (ὠφέλεια) would be, if the saying were carried out (4.4); whereas the argument ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου (“from the opposite”) should indicate what the injury (βλαβή) would be, if it were not (4.5). This emphasis on benefit and harm is nicely apparent in the sample chreia elaboration included in the *Rhetorica Marciana*.<sup>42</sup>

For the analogy heading, both the function and an illustration are provided. The function of this heading is to confirm the benefit of the saying, but the remaining phrase remains obscure: “on the basis of what others typically do.” But some clarity is achieved by the following illustration: “Just as those who toil over farming delight in reaping their harvests, so too do those who toil over virtue” (4.6).<sup>43</sup> Nevertheless, this clarity, implicit at best, is a far cry from the fulsome discussion of John of Sardis regarding what a παραβολή entails.<sup>44</sup>

There is no statement of function for the example heading (and hence the suggestion of a lacuna), but there is an illustration, drawn, if vaguely, from the life of the Athenian general Conon (4.7). This illustration comes from no known elaboration. The testimony heading supplies another ancient worthy whom it is right to admire (θαυμάσαι), because he has said the same thing as the speaker of the saying in the chreia (4.8). Finally, the short epilogue is to admire (θαυμάσαι) at the end the one who made the saying (4.9).

Despite the numerous and consistent redactions made in the *Rhetoric Marciana* of Aphthonius’s text, the result, when compared with the previous commentaries, especially that of John Doxapatres, is startling. The basics remain, but students would have been seriously impoverished by using this commentary. They would be unaware of the justification of the τᾶξις of the

<sup>41</sup> See John of Sardis 5.12.

<sup>42</sup> See further *Chreia* 2:265–66.

<sup>43</sup> This analogy is clearly from an elaboration of the chreia attributed to Isocrates, but not necessarily from Aphthonius’s elaboration.

<sup>44</sup> See John of Sardis 5.21–23.

chreia; unaware of the relation of the chreia to its related form ἀπομνημόνευμα and why the common word χρεία is used for this literary form; unaware of the ἐπιδιαίρεσις and ὑποδιαίρεσις of the chreia; unaware of the other manipulations of the chreia, such as κλίσις; unaware of the logic of the order of κεφάλαια; and on and on. Impoverished indeed, unless the teacher had, say, Doxapares's commentary, to fill in what is missing here.

#### TEXT AND TRANSLATION

The only text of the *Rhetorica Marciana*'s commentary on Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata* is that of Walz.<sup>45</sup> He used only one of three manuscripts now known to exist, Marc. gr. 444.<sup>46</sup> In addition, although Walz provided a complete text for much of the commentary, including the chreia, he left out portions of the chapters on speaking-in-character, description, and thesis. Hence a full and critical text is desired, not to mention a complete text of the entire *Rhetorica Marciana*, in order to appreciate it more fully as a rhetorical corpus.

In any case, the text used here is based on Walz's, but chapter title, section titles, and "verses" within sections, along with page numbers from Walz's edition, have been added for easier reference. In addition, a few changes have been made in the text, most of them minor departures from Aphthonius's text, but all of them noted in the apparatus.

This translation, as far as I know, is the first.

<sup>45</sup> Walz, *Rhetores Graeci*, 1:127–35.

<sup>46</sup> Walz, *Rhetores Graeci*, 1:127 n. 1.





# Text 4. Rhetorica Marciana Commentarium in Aphthonii Progymnasmata

<Περὶ Χρείας>  
(I:129,18–130,14 Walz)

## <§1. ΟΡΟΣ>

1. Χρεία ἐστὶν ἀπομνημόνευμα σύντομον εὐστόχως ἐπὶ τι πρόσωπον ἀναφύρουσα (Aphth 2–3 H/ON [= 3,21–22 Rabe]).

## <§2. ΕΤΥΜΟΛΟΓΙΑ>

1. Χρειώδης δὲ οὖσα προσαγορεύεται χρεία (= Aphth 4 H/ON [= 4,1 Rabe]).

## <§3. Η ΔΙΑΙΡΕΣΙΣ ΑΠΟ ΓΕΝΟΥΣ ΕΙΣ ΕΙΔΗ>

1. Τῆς δὲ χρείας τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ λογικόν, <τὸ δὲ πρακτικόν,> τὸ δὲ μικτόν.  
2. καὶ λογικὸν μὲν τὸ τῷ λόγῳ δηλοῦν τὴν ὠφέλειαν, οἷον ὁ Πλάτων τοὺς τῆς ἀρετῆς κλῶνας ἰδρῶτι καὶ πόνοις ἔλεγε φύεσθαι. 3. πρακτικὸν δὲ τὸ πρᾶξιν σημαῖνον, οἷον Πυθαγόρας ἐρωτηθεὶς, ὅσος ἂν εἴη ὁ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίος, μικρόν τι φανεὶς ἀπεκρύψατο, μέτρον τοῦ βίου τὴν θέαν ποιούμενος. 4. μικτόν δὲ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων, λόγου καὶ πράξεως, οἷον Διογένης μειράκιον ἑωρακὼς ἀτακτοῦν τὸν παιδαγωγὸν ἔπαισεν εἰπὼν «τί σὺ τοιαῦτα παιδεύεις;» (= Aphth 5–16 H/ON [= 4,2–41 Rabe]).

|| §3.1 τὸ δὲ πρακτικόν addidi; cf. Aphthonius 6 H/ON (= 4,2 Rabe) ||  
3 ὁ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίος Walz || τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁ βίος Aphthonius 11 H/ON (= 4,6–7 Rabe) || 3 μικρόν Walz || βραχύ Aphthonius 11 H/ON (= 4,7 Rabe) ||  
4 εἰπὼν Walz || ἐπειπὼν Aphthonius 15 H/ON (= 4,10 Rabe) || 4 τί σὺ Walz || τί γὰρ Aphthonius 15 H/ON (= 4,10–11 Rabe)

# Text 4. Rhetorica Marciana

## Commentary on Aphthonius's

### *Progymnasmata*

<On the Chreia>  
(1:129,18–130,14 Walz)

#### <§1. DEFINITION>

1. A chreia is a concise reminiscence aptly attributed to some individual (Aphth 2–3 H/ON [= 3,21–22 Rabe]).

#### <§2. ETYMOLOGY>

1. Because it is useful, it is called “chreia” (Aphth 4 H/ON [= 4,1 Rabe ]).

#### <§3. DIVISION OF THE CLASS INTO ITS SUBCLASSES>

1. Of the chreia, there is the saying class, <the action class,> and the mixed class. 2. The saying class is the one that discloses its benefit by a saying—for example, Plato said that the offshoots of virtue grow by sweat and toil. 3. The action class is the one that reports an action—for example, Pythagoras, on being asked how long human life is, after revealing himself for a short time, disappeared, thus making his appearance the measure of life. 4. The mixed class is the one that is composed of both, a saying and an action—for example, Diogenes, on seeing a youth misbehaving, struck the paedagogus, saying, “Why do you teach such behavior?” (Aphth 5–16 H/ON [= 4,2–11 Rabe]).

## &lt;§4. Η ΔΙΑΙΡΕΣΙΣ ΑΠΟ ΟΛΟΥ ΕΙΣ ΜΕΡΗ&gt;

1. Ἐργάσαιο δ' αὐτὴν τοῖσδε τοῖς κεφαλαίοις· ἐγκωμιαστικῶ, παραφραστικῶ, τῷ τῆς αἰτίας, ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου, παραβολῇ, παραδείγματι, μαρτυρία παλαιῶν, ἐπιλόγῳ βραχεῖ (= Aphth 18–22 H/ON [= 4,12–15 Rabe]).

[130] 2. Καὶ ἔστιν ἐγκωμιαστικὸν μὲν [κατὰ] τὸ τὸν εἰρηκότα τὸ τῆς χρείας ῥητὸν ἐγκωμιάσαι δι' αὐτό. 3. παραφραστικὸν | δὲ τὸ μὴ αὐτολεξεῖ ἀλλὰ παραφραστικῶς τὸ ῥητὸν εἰσάξει. 4. τὸ τῆς αἰτίας δέ, τὸ καὶ τὴν ὠφέλειαν τούτου πραττομένου προσθεῖναι. 5. ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου, τὸ καὶ τὴν βλάβην αὐτοῦ μὴ πραττομένου εἰπεῖν. 6. παραβολή δέ ἐστὶ τὸ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλοις πραττομένων τὴν ὠφέλειαν τοῦ ῥητοῦ πιστώσασθαι· οἷον ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ τὴν γεωργίαν πονοῦντες τοὺς καρποὺς ἡδέως κομίζονται, οὕτω καὶ οἱ περὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν, εἰς ἡδὺ τὸ τέλος αὐτοῖς καταντᾷ. 7. παράδειγμα <δέ ἐστὶ τὸ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐνὶ πραχθέντων τὴν ὠφέλειαν τοῦ ῥήτου πιστώσασθαι· οἷον> τὸ καὶ τοῦ Κόνωνος μνησθῆναι μετὰ θαύματος, εὐδοκίμου τοῖς ἅπασιν γεγονότος, ὅτι δὴ κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ ῥητὸν ἐπολιτεύσατο. 8. μαρτυρία δὲ παλαιῶν, τὸ καὶ ἕτερον ἄνδρα παλαιὸν τῶν ὀνομαστῶν

## &lt;§4. DIVISION OF THE WHOLE INTO ITS PARTS&gt;

1. You can elaborate a chreia by means of these headings: encomiastic, paraphrastic, rationale, from the opposite, analogy, example, testimony of the ancients, and brief epilogue (Aphth 18–22 H/ON [= 4, 12–15 Rabe]).

2. So,<sup>1</sup> the encomiastic heading is for praising the speaker of the chreia's saying on account of it. 3. The paraphrastic is the heading that repeats the saying, not in the same words, but in a paraphrastic manner. 4. The rationale is the heading that adds the benefit of the saying if it is acted on. 5. From the opposite is the heading that describes the harm if the saying is not acted on. 6. The analogy is the confirmation of the benefit of the saying on the basis of what others typically do—for example, "Just as those who toil over farming delight in reaping their harvest, so too do those who toil over virtue; the outcome results in pleasure for them."<sup>2</sup> 7. The example is <the confirmation of the benefit of the saying on the basis of what one individual has done><sup>3</sup>—for example, "One must recall with admiration Conon, who has become respected by everyone because he engaged in politics in accordance with this saying."<sup>4</sup> 8. The testimony of the ancients is the admiration of another famous man of antiquity because that

<sup>1</sup> Up to this point Aphthonius has been simply copied out (with a few but minor changes in the wording).

<sup>2</sup> This example of an analogy seems to be either a very free paraphrase of Aphthonius's (see Aphthonius 59–63 H/ON [= 6, 3–6 Rabe]) or an analogy from another elaboration of the same chreia by someone else.

<sup>3</sup> Something like this seems to have fallen out. See further the apparatus.

<sup>4</sup> Conon was one of the generals of the Athenians in the late fifth/early fourth centuries B.C.E. (Xenophon, *Hell.* 1.4.10; 5.16). This example presumably comes from a chreia elaboration, but since the saying that is being elaborated is not known (unless this example follows on the preceding analogy, which reflects the saying of Isocrates as its subject) and since, in any case, what is said of Conon is rather vague, it is difficult to determine what he did to deserve the admiration mentioned here. Among his achievements and hence possibly deserving of such admiration in the example are his sea-victory off Cnidus (see Xenophon, *Hell.* 4.3.11–12; 8.1; Diodorus Siculus 14.83.4–7) and his rebuilding the walls from the Piraeus on to Athens (Xenophon, *Hell.* 4.8.10; Diodorus Siculus 14.85.2–3). Clearly showing admiration are the bronze statues of Conon in the temple of Hera on Samos and in the temple of Artemis at Ephesus (Pausanias 6.3.16).

θαυμάσαι, ὥς τὸ αὐτὰ περὶ τοῦτον κάκεινον ἀποφηνάμενον. 9. ἐπίλογος  
βραχὺς τὸ ἐπὶ τῷ τέλει διὰ βραχέων θαυμάσαι τὸν εἰρηκότα.

man has also said the same thing about this subject. 9. The brief epilogue is the expression of admiration for the speaker at the end.





# Text 5. Maximus Planudes Commentary on Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata*

Chapter 3: Commentary on the Chreia  
(2:15,6–21,13 Walz)

## Introduction

### LIFE AND WRITINGS

The best known of the commentators on Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata* is the Palaeologan polymath Maximus Planudes.<sup>1</sup> His fame rests, as is well known, on his achievements as an editor of many classical authors, as the author of original grammatical treatises, as a mathematician, and as one of the few Byzantines to know Latin, but not on his contribution to the teaching of rhetoric. A review of his life and times—times that witnessed a cultural renaissance, especially in classical scholarship, that followed the recapture of Constantinople from the Latins in 1261 by Michael

<sup>1</sup> Still fundamental for Planudes's life and writings is the comprehensive study by Carl Wendel, "Planudes, Maximus," PW 20.2:2202–53. See also Karl Krumbacher, *Geschichte der byzantinischen Literatur von Justinian bis zum Ende des Öströmischen Reiches (527–1453)* (2nd ed.; HAW 9.1; Munich: Beck, 1897), 99, 543–46; Herbert Hunger, *Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner* (HAW 12.5.1–2; Munich: Beck, 1978), 1:79, 84–85, 107, 157; 2:14, 16, 68–70; Constantine N. Constantinides, *Higher Education in Byzantium in the Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries* (TSHCyp 11; Nicosia: Cyprus Research Center, 1982), 66–89; Nigel G. Wilson, *Scholars of Byzantium* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 230–41; and Edmund Fryde, *The Early Palaeologan Renaissance (1261–c. 1360)* (MMed 27; Leiden: Brill, 2000), 226–67.

VIII Paleologus (1259–1282)<sup>2</sup>—will help to provide a context for Planudes's educational and intellectual achievements.

A literary epitaph written for Planudes says that he lived for fifty years.<sup>3</sup> But while the span of his life is thus secure, the date of his birth is not. Since Planudes's datable letters end about 1300 and his latest known manuscript, Marc. gr. 481, is dated September 1, 1301, scholars have estimated his death to have been by 1305 or by 1310 at the latest. Since most scholars favor circa 1305, that would put his birth at circa 1255.<sup>4</sup>

Planudes was born into a wealthy family of Bithynian Nicomedia,<sup>5</sup> but he went to Constantinople for his education, perhaps not long after Michael VIII had recaptured the city.<sup>6</sup> The reason for supposing that he went there as a youth is that the broad education he received was possible only in the capital.<sup>7</sup> Michael VIII had immediately re-established the School of Philosophy, which had been closed since the Latin capture in 1204, and put the most distinguished scholar of his day, George Akropolites,

<sup>2</sup> On the exultant mood and subsequent renewal that followed the recapture of the city, see Deno John Geankoplos, "The Byzantine Recovery of Constantinople from the Latins in 1261," in *Essays for George H. Williams: Continuity and Change in Church History* (ed. F. Church and T. George; Leiden: Brill, 1979), 104–17, and, more broadly, George Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State* (trans. Joan Hussey; New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1969), 450–65. This cultural renaissance is all the more surprising because it occurred during a period of economic and political decline. For example, Wilson (*Scholars*, 229) speaks of this period as one "in which the signs of incurable political and economic weakness in the empire became unmistakable and yet the level of cultural life rose to a height as great as had ever been seen."

<sup>3</sup> See Wendel, "Planudes," 2203; and Constantinides, *Higher Education*, 87 and n. 135; both of them cite the relevant line of the epigram: πέμπτην ἑξαγώνων ἐπέων δεκάδ'. For the full text, see Maximilian Treu, ed., *Maximi Monachi Planudis Epistulae* (Breslau: Koebner, 1890), 190–91.

<sup>4</sup> See Wendel, "Planudes," 2203. Scholars vacillate over which dating to prefer but tend toward 1255–1305 (so, e.g., Hunger, *Literatur*, 2:68; Wilson, *Scholars*, 17; and Constantinides, *Higher Education*, 42).

<sup>5</sup> For more on Planudes's home life, see Constantinides, *Higher Education*, 42.

<sup>6</sup> On Constantinople during the Latin period, see David Jacoby, "The Greeks of Constantinople under Latin Rule 1204–1261," in *The Fourth Crusade: Event, Aftermath, and Perceptions* (ed. Thomas F. Madden; Hampshire, U.K.: Ashgate, 2008), 53–73.

<sup>7</sup> See Wendel, "Planudes," 2203.

in charge.<sup>8</sup> The school's location is unknown, but its curriculum included arithmetic, geometry, rhetoric, and Aristotelian philosophy.<sup>9</sup> A similar curriculum was taught at the Akataleptos monastery, headed by Gregory of Cyprus,<sup>10</sup> and among the students there Constantine Constantinides would place Planudes.<sup>11</sup>

Once educated, Planudes would have entered civil or ecclesiastical service. He chose civil service and began teaching, probably in 1280.<sup>12</sup> But either way it would have been difficult for him to avoid getting involved in the controversy over the union of Western and Eastern Churches, a controversy with political as well as theological dimensions. Michael VIII was an adamant supporter of union with the Catholic Church, largely for political reasons, and eventually, in July 1274, he sent an embassy headed by Akropolites to negotiate an agreement of union at the cathedral in Lyons. Opposition at home, however, arose and intensified, in particular over the emperor's acquiescence in his agreement with the Latin view of the procession of the Holy Spirit as from both the Father and the Son (*filioque*).<sup>13</sup>

Planudes at first sided with Michael VIII, though not directly. He translated, perhaps with "official encouragement,"<sup>14</sup> Augustine's *De trinitate* into Greek, which would have aided the unionists' arguments.<sup>15</sup> In addition, Planudes's support of union is suggested by a poem in which he praised the unionist Theoktistos, archbishop of Adrianople, who, however, would later be condemned for his views during the Council of Blachernai in

<sup>8</sup> On this important figure and his role in education, see Constantine N. Constantinides, "Teachers and Students of Rhetoric in the Late Byzantine Period," in *Rhetoric in Byzantium* (ed. Elizabeth Jeffreys; SPByzS 11; Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2003), 39–53, esp. 42–44.

<sup>9</sup> See Constantinides, *Higher Education*, 31–35.

<sup>10</sup> See Constantinides, *Higher Education*, 35–38.

<sup>11</sup> Constantinides, *Higher Education*, 38 and 42.

<sup>12</sup> See Constantinides, *Higher Education*, 71.

<sup>13</sup> On the controversy, see Aristeides Papadakis, *Crisis in Byzantium: The Filioque Controversy in the Patriarchate of Gregory II of Cyprus (1283–1289)* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1983), 13–28 and 34–61.

<sup>14</sup> So Wilson, *Scholars*, 230.

<sup>15</sup> On Planudes as a translator of this writing as well as of many others, see Wendel, "Planudes," 2241–44; Freyde, *Palaeologan Renaissance*, 261–62; and esp. Elizabeth A. Fisher, "Planoudes, Holobolos, and the Motivation for Translation," *GRBS* 43 (2003): 77–104.

1285.<sup>16</sup> When Michael's son, Andronicus II, succeeded to the throne in 1282, he immediately renounced the union agreement. Planudes, like other intellectuals, then opposed union as well, though he refrained from further engagement in theological debates.<sup>17</sup>

Indeed, after Andronicus's accession Planudes became a monk. How soon is difficult to say, perhaps as early as 1283.<sup>18</sup> As was customary, he marked his entrance into monastic life by changing his name from Manuel, his baptismal name, to Maximus, as shown by his manuscript of hexametric poetry, Laur. 32.16, which he had begun in 1280 and revised until about 1283.<sup>19</sup> As a monk, he continued to teach and did so for the remainder of his life, perhaps at the Chora monastery,<sup>20</sup> but certainly at the Akataleptos monastery, as Planudes's manuscript of the *Anthology* and Nonnos's paraphrase of the Gospel of John (Marc. gr. 481) make clear.<sup>21</sup>

Initially, Planudes taught grammar, poetry, and rhetoric, and his earliest dated manuscript contains a collection of poetry for classroom use. This manuscript, Laur. 32.16, completed about 1283, contains, for example, Hesiod's *Theogony* and *Works and Days*; a collection of Hellenistic poets such as Theocritus, Moschus, and Nicander; and a number of poems by the Christian Gregory of Nazianzus.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Wendel, "Planudes," 2220. For the Council of Blachernai and the deposition of Theoktistos, see Papadakis, *Crisis in Byzantium*, 62–78.

<sup>17</sup> See further Constantine N. Constantinides, "Byzantine Scholars and the Union of Lyons (1274)," in *The Making of Byzantine History: Studies Dedicated to Donald M. Nicol* (ed. Roderick Beaton and Charlotte Rouech; CHellSt 1; Brookfield, Vt.: Variorum, 1993), 86–93.

<sup>18</sup> See Wendel, "Planudes," 2205.

<sup>19</sup> See Constantinides, *Higher Education*, 71–72: a note on folio 8v includes the words *πρὶν Μανουὴλ ἀρτίως Μαχίμου*.

<sup>20</sup> Our knowledge of Planudes's stay at the Chora monastery derives from a note in Vat. gr. 177 (see Wendel, "Planudes," 2208; Wilson, *Scholars*, 231 and n. 7; Hunger, *Literatur*, 2:67–68; and Fryde, *Palaeologan Renaissance*, 226–27), but Constantinides raises doubts about whether this conclusion is justified (see *Higher Education*, 68–69).

<sup>21</sup> See Constantinides, *Higher Education*, 69–70.

<sup>22</sup> For details on this manuscript, see now Fryde, *Palaeologan Renaissance*, 229–36.

But as the years passed, Planudes's interests expanded in many directions, as becomes evident from the many manuscripts either he or his students produced, often for classroom use. By the late 1280s Planudes had become interested in astronomy and copied Cleomedes's *Circular Theory of the Stars* and Aratus's *Phainomena* with scholia.<sup>23</sup> By the 1290s he was involved in the study of mathematics—calculus, Arabic numerals, and square roots. An autograph manuscript, Ambros. gr. 157 sup., contains material on the Indian calculus and portions of Diophantus's mathematical writings.<sup>24</sup> Other areas of interest included geography, history, poetry, and music,<sup>25</sup> but of special concern was his effort to retrieve and preserve what he could find of the writings of Plutarch. Plutarch appealed to Planudes, as Edmund Fryde says, because of his high moral tone, charming style, and encyclopedic knowledge of Greek history and culture.<sup>26</sup> By the mid-1290s Planudes and his team of copyists had formed a scriptorium and produced, for example, Ambros. gr. C. 126, which contains the first sixty-nine treatises of the *Moralia* and the *Lives* of Galba and Otho, and Paris. gr. 1671, which contains the *Moralia* and all the *Lives*.<sup>27</sup> It is this work of retrieving, editing, and preserving various classical authors that scholars today see as Planudes's principal contribution to classical scholarship.<sup>28</sup> His editing of texts was not idiosyncratic since others—for example, Gregory of Cyprus—were also involved in this activity, largely because of the need to reproduce the books that had been destroyed or dispersed as a result of the capture of Constantinople in 1204.<sup>29</sup>

To return to his initial subjects: Planudes's interest in poetry continued throughout his life. His last manuscript, Marc. gr. 481, contains his edition of the Greek Anthology, and throughout his life he wrote his own poetry<sup>30</sup>—not always good poetry,

<sup>23</sup> See further Constantinides, *Higher Education*, 72.

<sup>24</sup> See further Constantinides, *Higher Education*, 72–74.

<sup>25</sup> On these other areas, see Wendel, "Planudes," 2210–30; and Constantinides, *Higher Education*, 76–79.

<sup>26</sup> Fryde, *Palaeologan Renaissance*, 241–42.

<sup>27</sup> See further Constantinides, *Higher Education*, 74–75.

<sup>28</sup> On Planudes's scriptorium, see Luana Quattrocelli, "Maxime Planude, Éditeur d'Aelius Aristide," *REG* 122 (2009): 145–61.

<sup>29</sup> See Constantinides, "Teachers and Students," 46–47.

<sup>30</sup> See further Wendel, "Planudes," 2215–20.

according to Nigel Wilson<sup>31</sup>—and he was writing a poem when he died.<sup>32</sup> In the area of grammar, however, Planudes excelled and is regarded by Robert H. Robins as “the most distinguished Byzantine scholar in linguistic science.”<sup>33</sup> This assessment is based on two of his grammatical treatises: *Περὶ γραμματικῆς διάλογος* (*Dialogue on Grammar*) and *Περὶ συντάξεως τῶν τοῦ λόγου μέρων* (*On the Syntax of the Parts of Speech*).<sup>34</sup>

Planudes also taught rhetoric, and some of his writings were doubtlessly aimed at teaching it, while others displayed his rhetorical skill outside the classroom. Among the latter are encomia on Peter and Paul<sup>35</sup> and an imperial panegyric delivered to Andronicus II and his son Michael IX, a few days after the latter’s coronation on May 21, 1294.<sup>36</sup> Dimitar Angelov analyzes this speech as conforming to the Hermogenean category of the “political panegyric,” whose structure has two parts, the first to praise (using the encomiastic topics) and the second to advise (on matters of public debate).<sup>37</sup>

The Hermogenean classification of this speech should not surprise us since Planudes is credited with editing the *Corpus Hermogenianum*, that is, Aphthonius’s *Progymnasmata* and the four treatises of Hermogenes.<sup>38</sup> Each of these writings is provided

<sup>31</sup> Wilson (*Scholars*, 239) speaks specifically of Planudes’s attempt to imitate Theocritus with an idyll about a farmer who tells his friend about an ox he bought from a magician, an idyll that contains “a fair number of errors” and has lines “totally contrary to the classical rules.” For more on this idyll, see Wendel, “Planudes,” 2219–20.

<sup>32</sup> See Constantinides, *Higher Education*, 87 and n. 136.

<sup>33</sup> Robert H. Robins, *The Byzantine Grammarians: Their Place in History* (TLing 70; New York: de Gruyter, 1993), 201–33 (quotation from 201). See also Fryde, *Palaeologan Renaissance*, 223.

<sup>34</sup> For analysis as well as the text and translation of portions of these treatises, see Robins, *Grammarians*, 203–9, 216–19, 220–23, 230–31. See also Hunger, *Literatur*, 2:14, 16; and for Planudes’s other grammatical writings, see Wendel, “Planudes,” 2209–10.

<sup>35</sup> See Wendel, “Planudes,” 2209.

<sup>36</sup> See Wendel, “Planudes,” 2209. At the time Wendel wrote, this speech was unpublished. See now L. G. Westerink, “Le Basilikos de Maxime Planude,” *BS* 27 (1966): 98–103; 28 (1967): 54–67; and 29 (1968): 34–50.

<sup>37</sup> Dimitar G. Angelov, “Byzantine Imperial Panegyric as Advice Literature,” in *Rhetoric in Byzantium* (ed. Elizabeth Jeffreys; SPByzS 11; Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2003), 55–72, esp. 56–63.

<sup>38</sup> See Wendel, “Planudes,” 2230–32.

with an introduction, and the text with commentary. In addition, the whole is introduced with a general introduction to rhetoric and followed by four other treatises at the end. When added up—the introductions and the texts and commentary plus the appended texts—this rhetorical corpus totals fifteen sections.<sup>39</sup> Carl Wendel has reconstructed the corpus (now mostly scattered in various volumes of Christian Walz's *Rhetores Graeci*) as follows:<sup>40</sup>

1. Introduction to rhetoric (= 5:212–21 Walz [= *PS* 64–73 (Rabe)])
2. Introduction to Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata* (= 2:5–9 Walz)
3. Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata* with scholia (= 2:9–68 Walz)
4. Introduction to Hermogenes's *On Issues* (= 5:222–30 Walz)
5. How to read the *On Issues* (= 5:231 Walz)
6. Hermogenes's *On Issues* with scholia (= 5:232–363 Walz)
7. Introduction to Hermogenes's *On Invention* (= 5:363–69 Walz)
8. Hermogenes's *On Invention* (= 5:370–436 Walz)
9. Introduction to Hermogenes's *On Types of Style* (= 5:437–39 Walz)
10. Hermogenes's *On Types of Style* with scholia (= 5:439–561 Walz)
11. Hermogenes's *On Method* with scholia (= 5:562–76 Walz)
12. Synopsis of the figures that Hermogenes mentioned in the books *On Invention* and *On Types of Style* (= 3:704–11 Walz)
13. *The Characters* of Theophrastus (1–15)
14. Epitome of *On Literary Composition* by Dionysius of Halicarnassus
15. Rhetorical Problems in the *On Issues* (= 8:402–13 Walz)

Walz accepted the attribution of the manuscripts containing this corpus to Planudes, but in two lengthy footnotes Hugo Rabe investigated this attribution more closely. In the first footnote, published in 1907, he doubted the attribution because Planudes's authorship is weakly attested, for his name appears only in the

<sup>39</sup> For details, see Wendel, "Planudes," 2231.

<sup>40</sup> Wendel, "Planudes," 2231.

later manuscripts,<sup>41</sup> but in the second footnote, published a year later, Rabe revised his opinion on the basis of the fourteenth-/fifteenth-century manuscript Laur. S. Marc. 294, which has the attribution. Consequently, Rabe accepted Planudean authorship.<sup>42</sup> Years later, in his *Prolegomenon Sylloge*, Rabe edited the general introduction to rhetoric under the name of Planudes.<sup>43</sup>

Scholarship since Rabe has seldom gone beyond a few perfunctory generalizations regarding this corpus—its derivative character; its dependence on early material, such as the P-scholia and (for Aphthonius) Doxapatres; its lack of Christian additions to the tradition;<sup>44</sup> its more manageable size, when compared to the P-scholia and Doxapatres; its suitability for classroom use;<sup>45</sup> and its subsequent popularity.<sup>46</sup> Surprisingly, only the appended collection of Theophrastean characters has received any extended attention.<sup>47</sup> Perhaps more attention will be focused on this corpus, now that related manuscripts of the speeches of the second-century Aelius Aristides, in particular the Florentine manuscript Laur. 60.8, have been dated back to the late thirteenth or early fourteenth century and placed in Planudes's scriptorium. Other copies of this author have also been placed in this scriptorium and were probably used in Planudes's teaching of rhetoric.<sup>48</sup> In any case, much remains to be done on the Planudean corpus, and an initial attempt will be made here to do so, at least for the Aphthorian material.

<sup>41</sup> Hugo Rabe, "Aus Rhetoren-Handschriften: 1. Nachrichten über das Leben des Hermogenes," *RhM* 62 (1907): 247–62, esp. 250 n. 3.

<sup>42</sup> Hugo Rabe, "Aus Rhetoren-Handschriften: 6. Weitere Textquellen für Johannes Diakonos," *RhM* 63 (1908): 512–30, esp. 524 n. 1.

<sup>43</sup> See *PS* 64–73 (Rabe).

<sup>44</sup> See, e.g., Wendel, "Planudes," 223; and Constantinides, *Higher Education*, 80.

<sup>45</sup> See, e.g., Wendel, "Planudes," 2231; Wilson, *Scholars*, 232; and Fryde, *Palaeologan Renaissance*, 216.

<sup>46</sup> See, e.g., Wendel, "Planudes," 2232.

<sup>47</sup> See Hugo Rabe, "Rhetoren-Corpora," *RhM* 67 (1912): 321–57, esp. 332–37; and Fryde, *Palaeologan Renaissance*, 216.

<sup>48</sup> See Quattrocelli, "Planude," 152–56.



PLANUDES'S COMMENTARY ON APHTHONIUS'S *PROGYMNASMATA*

Planudes's commentary on Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata* conforms to the generalizations made above regarding his rhetorical corpus as a whole, as will be illustrated by a close examination of the chapter on speaking-in-character (ῥηθοποιία) before we turn to the chreia chapter.

Conforming to the generalizations in this chapter are the following: The chapter is certainly of more manageable size. Its 87 lines (in Walz's edition) are only 17 percent as long as Doxapatres's chapter (509 lines). The chapter is also derivative, as the chapter is largely made up of quotations, paraphrases, or epitomes of what Doxapatres wrote. There is no mention of anything Christian in the chapter, even though Doxapatres refers numerous times to ὁ θεόλογος, that is, Gregory of Nazianzus, and quotes a passage from him.<sup>49</sup> And Planudes makes his redaction of Doxapatres especially suitable for classroom use by adding material (from Nicolaus) on the important temporal structure of speaking-in-character (54,21–27), a section that Doxapatres inexplicably omitted altogether.

Looking more closely: Planudes's comments cover all five παρεπόμενα of Aphthonius's chapter on speaking-in-character: definition, differentiation, division, style, and structure (52,13–54,27). In addition, he leads off with comments on the order of speaking-in-character in the progymnasmatic sequence (52,2–7) and its utility for the study of rhetoric (52,7–13). He closes with only the briefest of comments on Aphthonius's sample speaking-in-character (55,1–6). We will briefly review Planudes's redaction of these five topics.

Planudes's comments on τάξις ("sequence") (52,2–7) are taken entirely from Doxapatres, though only the first part of the latter's longer discussion.<sup>50</sup> Both include speaking-in-character among the more advanced (τελεώτερα) progymnasmata, and Planudes is even content to take over verbatim a sentence that justifies its position among them. "For in it we are taught plausibility [τὸ πιθανόν], the sine qua non of rhetoric, since we are being

<sup>49</sup> See Doxapatres 2:498,11–13 (Walz).

<sup>50</sup> See Doxapatres 2:493,2–494,6 (Walz).

trained to compose speeches that are appropriate to the characters [τοῖς ἡθροῖς] of the individuals [προσώπων] under consideration" (52,2–7).<sup>51</sup> But Planudes does not specify more-advanced exercises (description, thesis, and introduction of a law), as Doxapatres did,<sup>52</sup> and so eliminates Doxapatres's further justifications of the τᾶξις of speaking-in-character with respect to them.<sup>53</sup>

Planudes's discussion of speaking-in-character as being χρήσιμον ("useful") is the same length (52,7–13) as that of Doxapatres.<sup>54</sup> Planudes follows Doxapatres in pointing out the utility of this exercise for the three kinds of rhetorical speech and the four parts of a speech but otherwise seems to go directly back to Nicolaus, preferring Nicolaus's χρήσιμον<sup>55</sup> to Doxapatres's superlative χρησιμώτατον<sup>56</sup> and quoting verbatim Nicolaus's inclusion of letter writing as involving speaking-in-character (52,10–13),<sup>57</sup> a discussion missing in Doxapatres.

After these preliminary subjects, Planudes turns to Aphthonius's text and specifically to his ὅρος ("definition") of speaking-in-character: It is the imitation of the character of the assigned individual.<sup>58</sup> Planudes takes up Doxapatres's criticism of Aphthonius's definition,<sup>59</sup> a criticism Doxapatres himself took explicitly from Geometres,<sup>60</sup> and Planudes presumably means both Geometres and Doxapatres in his word *τινες* ("some") (52,13). The criticism is twofold. Geometres found Aphthonius's word *μίμησις* ("imitation") to be pleonastic. Aphthonius, he said, should have added a limiting adjective because, as the definition stands, the word *μίμησις* could include the imitations by painters and sculptors as well as those by speakers; consequently, Geometres

<sup>51</sup> See Doxapatres 2:493,3–6 (Walz).

<sup>52</sup> See Doxapatres 2:493,8–9 (Walz).

<sup>53</sup> See Doxapatres 2:493,9–494,7 (Walz).

<sup>54</sup> See Doxapatres 2:494,7–13 (Walz).

<sup>55</sup> See Nicolaus, *Progymn.* 10 (66,17 Felten).

<sup>56</sup> See Doxapatres 2:594,7 (Walz).

<sup>57</sup> See Nicolaus, *Progymn.* 10 (67,2–5 Felten).

<sup>58</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 11 (34,2–3 Rabe): Ἡθοποιία ἐστὶ μίμησις ἡθους ὑποκειμένου προσώπου.

<sup>59</sup> See Doxapatres 2:594,14–495,8 (Walz).

<sup>60</sup> See Doxapatres 2:494,14 (Walz).

recommended adding the adjective λογική (“verbal”).<sup>61</sup> Doxapatres agreed with this criticism,<sup>62</sup> and so did Planudes (52,13–17).

Geometres also criticized the definition’s use of ὑποκειμένου προσώπου (“assigned individual”) as elliptical because these words exclude those who are long dead as well as those that are ἄλογα, or irrational creatures, not to mention πράγματα, which here means inanimate objects.<sup>63</sup> Planudes gives examples of ἄλογα and πράγματα by bringing forward illustrations used in other contexts by Geometres and Doxapatres, namely, when they commented on προσωποποιία, or supplying characters as well as speech.<sup>64</sup> Thus, Achilles’s talking horse is an example of an irrational creature speaking, and Lucian’s talking bed and lamp<sup>65</sup> are examples of inanimate objects speaking.<sup>66</sup> Hence Geometres proposed adding the words καὶ πράγματος to the definition. Doxapatres was not persuaded,<sup>67</sup> and neither is Planudes, who says that providing a προαίρεσις (“determination”) to these horses or beds as well as an ἦθος makes them analogous to πρόσωπα anyway (53,5–7). It is clear in any case that Planudes has thought through the comments of his predecessors’ views on Aphthonius’s definition and has decided for himself which are worth keeping and which are not.

Finally, Planudes gives the word ἦθος (“character”) extended attention (52,17–27), even if he largely depends on Doxapatres.<sup>68</sup> Like his source, Planudes says that speaking-in-character can be approached from a variety of angles: πάθη (“emotions”), διαθέσεις (“conditions”), ἔξεις (“dispositions”), and φύσεις (“natures”) (52,17–19). Thus, since πάθος is a temporary condition of the soul, speaking-in-character in terms of dealing with emotion would include individuals who show mercy, anger, hatred, or jealousy (52,19–21). Διαθέσεις include an individual’s fate, trade, or choice, and so an example of this kind of speaking-in-character might involve “what words a rich or poor man might say, or a sailor

<sup>61</sup> See Doxapatres 2:494,21–22 (Walz).

<sup>62</sup> See Doxapatres 2:494,29–495,1 (Walz).

<sup>63</sup> See Doxapatres 2:495,24–29 (Walz).

<sup>64</sup> See Doxapatres 2:497,10–498,16 (Walz).

<sup>65</sup> See *Il.* 19.405–17; Lucian, *Cat.* 27.

<sup>66</sup> See Doxapatres 2:497,11–30 (Walz). It should be noted that the example of Homer’s talking horse is also cited by Lucian (*Cat.* 2).

<sup>67</sup> See Doxapatres 2:495,1–2 (Walz).

<sup>68</sup> See Doxapatres 2:495,8–20 (Walz).

or farmer might say, or a friend or enemy might say" (52,19–25). Speaking-in-character that depicts ἕξις might be the following: "what words one who is continually mad might say" (52,25–26). And speaking-in-character based on φύσις might be "what words sheep or foxes might say" (52,26–27).

Aphthonius differentiated εἰδωλοποιία and προσωποποιία from ῥητοποιία,<sup>69</sup> but Planudes comments only on εἰδωλοποιία (53,7–12) and again merely follows Doxapatres, citing both his examples and his clarification.<sup>70</sup> Like him, Planudes illustrates by citing Euripides's introduction of the εἰδωλον of Polydorus in the "Hecuba" and that of Patroclus speaking to Achilles.<sup>71</sup> The clarification revolves around admitting only the speech of individuals who are speaking after they have died, not merely of persons who have died but are presented as speaking before they died.

Planudes moves on to Aphthonius's διαίρεσις ("division") of speaking-in-character into those that emphasize emotion, character, or both.<sup>72</sup> Planudes focuses on Aphthonius's choice of the word διαίρεσις,<sup>73</sup> since it occasioned debate. Doxapatres, and Geometres before him, regarded this word choice as infelicitous, and Planudes enters the debate as well. Geometres, according to Doxapatres, preferred ὑποδιαίρεσις ("subdivision"), in that speaking-in-character that emphasizes emotion, character, or both make up its various subclasses, since Aphthonius's examples cite no εἰδωλον or ἄλογον or πρᾶγμα as speaking. Doxapatres, in contrast, preferred ἐπιδιαίρεσις ("additional classification"), in that the three are an entirely different way of classifying speaking-in-character.<sup>74</sup> Planudes is not sure whether Geometres or Doxapatres is correct, but he is also not really concerned, since he finds Aphthonius's choice of διαίρεσις, in the end, to be acceptable (53,13–19).

The only other comment on Aphthonius's διαίρεσις concerns Aphthonius's phrase "character [ῥητορ] is revealed in the counsel" (53,20).<sup>75</sup> This phrase is part of Aphthonius's explanation of the

<sup>69</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 11 (34,4–18 Rabe).

<sup>70</sup> See Doxapatres 2:496,24–497,9 (Walz).

<sup>71</sup> See Euripides, *Hec.* 1–58; and *Il.* 23.65–92.

<sup>72</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 11 (35,1–11 Rabe).

<sup>73</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 11 (35,1 Rabe).

<sup>74</sup> See Doxapatres 2:498,23–499,18 (Walz).

<sup>75</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 11 (35,9 Rabe).

mixed character of the example of speaking-in-character, in which Achilles speaks over a dead Patroclus as he counsels with himself about going back to battle. The other part, although not quoted by Planudes, is: “emotion [πάθος] is revealed at his friend’s death.” This example is therefore mixed, because it contains both ἦθος and πάθος.

Planudes’s comment on this phrase (53,20–54,4) is a much condensed version of Doxapatres’s—seventy-one lines down to eleven.<sup>76</sup> But Doxapatres himself was dependent on Geometres, who had disagreed with Aphthonius’s analysis, saying that the counsel did not reveal ἦθος, but the *πρᾶγμα*, or situation; the ἦθος is that of Achilles.<sup>77</sup> Planudes agrees with Geometres. He cites a similar example—what words an old war hero would say when encouraging (*προτρεπόμενος*) his son to go to war—and says that the man’s encouragement (*προτροπή*) is the *πρᾶγμα*. He goes on to suggest that *προτροπή* calls for a *προτρεπτικὸς λόγος* (“speech of encouragement”), with its complete division (*τελεία διαίρεσις*) of such a speech (53,22–24), by which he means the *τελικὰ κεφάλαια* (“final heads”), as is implicit in his later reference to the complete division of the heads of the thesis (54,1–2). But Planudes, aware of how complex such speaking-in-character would become, backs off, saying that speaking-in-character is concerned only with the ἦθος of the speaker (53,24–54,4) and should keep the temporal structure of speaking-in-character.

If commentary were ever needed, it would be for Aphthonius’s discussion of the *χαρακτήρ* (“style”) of speaking-in-character since he merely gave a list of appropriate stylistic features: clear, concise, flowery, lacking connectives, and devoid of all complicated grammar and figurative language.<sup>78</sup> Commentators, beginning with John of Sardis, expanded on these terms and provided illustrations,<sup>79</sup> and Planudes’s comments generally follow them, especially those of Doxapatres, if also more briefly.

Planudes has no comment on the characteristic *σαφής* (“clear”), as did Doxapatres, and only the briefest comment on

<sup>76</sup> See Doxapatres 2:501,11–503,17 (Walz).

<sup>77</sup> See Doxapatres 2:501,112–14 (Walz).

<sup>78</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 11 (35,11–13 Rabe).

<sup>79</sup> See, e.g., John of Sardis, *Comm. in Aphth.* 11 (208,4–209,9 Rabe).

σύντομος (“concise”), glossing the word with κομματικός (“consisting of short clauses”) (54,4). He ignores Doxapatres’s text at this point, which had σύντονος<sup>80</sup> (“intense”), as well as Doxapatres’s lengthy discussion of the textual variants, in which, when discussing σύντομος, he adds γοργός (“vigorous”) to κομματικός.<sup>81</sup> Planudes expands a bit on ἀνθηρός (“flowery”) (54,4–8), explaining the word with λαμπρός (“brilliant”) (54,5) and adding an analogy: “Just as flowers delight the eyes, so also a pleasant and short-clause style delights the mind” (54,5–7); but then he breaks off with a reference to Hermogenes’s discussion of brilliance in *On Types of Style* (54,7–8).<sup>82</sup> Thus far Planudes has simply followed Doxapatres,<sup>83</sup> but Doxapatres went on to include Geometres’s very helpful comments on what subject matter and language would achieve a flowery style.<sup>84</sup> Unfortunately, Planudes omitted this material. On ἀπόλυτος (“lacking connectives”), Planudes again condenses Doxapatres’s treatment, taking only ἀσύνδετος (“asyndetic” [i.e., without conjunctions]) from Doxapatres’s three synonyms: ἀσύνδετος, ἄφετος (“rambling”), and ἐλεύθερος (“free”).<sup>85</sup> Then Planudes skips ahead to Doxapatres’s further explanation that such a style has a complete thought in each part of a period (54,8–10),<sup>86</sup> but he does not include Doxapatres’s example, which is taken from Aphthonius’s model exercise.<sup>87</sup>

Planudes’s longest comment is reserved for Aphthonius’s last stylistic characteristic, namely, that speaking-in-character should be “devoid of <all [πάσης]><sup>88</sup> complicated grammar [πλοκῆς] and figurative language [σχήματος].” Planudes gives two examples, taken from Doxapatres,<sup>89</sup> of complicated grammar to be avoided: ὑπερβατοί, or transposition of words and phrases, and

<sup>80</sup> Also reading σύντονος is John of Sardis, *Comm. in Aphth.* 11 (208,12 Rabe).

<sup>81</sup> See Doxapatres 2:503,19–29 (Walz).

<sup>82</sup> See Hermogenes, *On Types of Style* 1.9 (264,5–269,9 Rabe).

<sup>83</sup> See Doxapatres 2:503,30–504,5 (Walz).

<sup>84</sup> See Doxapatres 2:504,5–14 (Walz).

<sup>85</sup> See Doxapatres 2:504,15 (Walz).

<sup>86</sup> See Doxapatres 2:504,17–19 (Walz).

<sup>87</sup> See Doxapatres 2:504,20–24 (Walz).

<sup>88</sup> The lemma in Walz’s text (54,10) does not include the πάσης of Aphthonius’s text, but Planudes’s comment presupposes it—hence, its inclusion here and in the text and translation that follow this introduction.

<sup>89</sup> See Doxapatres 2:504,25–26 (Walz).

περίοδοι, or periodic syntax (54,10–11). Figurative language to be avoided is illustrated only by καινοπρεπῆ (“novel means of expression”) (54,11–12), again taken from Doxapatres.<sup>90</sup> Both, in slightly different ways, however, sense the problem of the word “all” in Aphthonius’s stricture inasmuch as every speech, they say, contains figurative language; what Aphthonius meant is that constantly changing figures is to be avoided, such as moving from reproving to questioning and on to something else (54,13–19).<sup>91</sup>

Surprisingly, Doxapatres had no comment on Aphthonius’s temporal structure of an ἡθοποιία into present, past, and future.<sup>92</sup> Nor did the P-scholia, except for a brief restatement of Aphthonius’s temporal structure in the παρεπόμενα-section.<sup>93</sup> And Planudes has only the briefest of comments. What Planudes does is to go back to Nicolaus in the sense that, while he follows Aphthonius’s temporal sequence, he inserts a brief return to the present after the past rehearsal and before looking to the future (54,21–27). Indeed, the language is so close that Planudes clearly has Nicolaus<sup>94</sup> in front of him.

Planudes has only two brief comments on Aphthonius’s model speaking-in-character: “What words Niobe might say as her children lay dead.”<sup>95</sup> Planudes makes one comment, taken from Doxapatres,<sup>96</sup> who identified the words “that which has become familiar causes grief at its loss”<sup>97</sup> as a paraphrase from Thucydides’s funeral oration (55,1–4),<sup>98</sup> and another, again from Doxapatres,<sup>99</sup> clarifies the word ἐκατέρων (“each of two”) as referring to the two sexes, male and female (55,5–6).

Finally, Planudes has no comments on Doxapatres’s extra example of speaking-in-character: “What words Michael might say when he was driven from the palace.”<sup>100</sup>

<sup>90</sup> See Doxapatres 2:504,28 (Walz).

<sup>91</sup> See Doxapatres 2:505,1–6 (Walz).

<sup>92</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 11 (35,13–14 Rabe).

<sup>93</sup> See P-scholia 2:643,21–22 (Walz).

<sup>94</sup> See Nicolaus, *Progymn.* 10 (65,16–21 Felten).

<sup>95</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 11 (35,15–36,20 Rabe).

<sup>96</sup> See Doxapatres 2:506,29–31 (Walz).

<sup>97</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 11 (36,2 Rabe); and Thucydides 2.44.

<sup>98</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 11 (36,11–12 Rabe).

<sup>99</sup> See Doxapatres 2:507,8–14 (Walz).

<sup>100</sup> See Doxapatres 2:508,18–509,3 (Walz).

This detailed summary of Planudes's commentary on Aphthonius's chapter on speaking-in-character has shown the richness, thoroughness, and reflection that he brought to his task. His dependence on others, notably Doxapatres, is frequent and profound, but not without some independence of thought. Though much shorter than Doxapatres's treatment, Planudes's is still detailed enough to inform students of what Aphthonius intended with the exercise speaking-in-character—a far cry from the sharply reduced treatment of the *Rhetorica Marciana*. To judge by this chapter (and, as we will see, on the following one on the chreia), Planudes's commentary on Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata* keeps to the high standards exhibited elsewhere in the scholarship of this Palaeologan polymath.

#### PLANUDES'S COMMENTARY ON APHTHONIUS'S CHREIA CHAPTER

Planudes's commentary on Aphthonius's chreia chapter addresses two topics before turning to the chapter itself, as we have in previous commentaries. He opens with a brief discussion of the *τάξις* ("order") of the chreia in the progymnasmatic sequence. He follows Doxapatres, but not closely. Doxapatres, as we have seen, provided three reasons for justifying Aphthonius's placement of the chreia third in the sequence.<sup>101</sup> Planudes keeps only the second and third reasons: the chreia is third because it is more advanced than the fable and narrative but simpler than the following progymnasmata, and the chreia elaboration is comparable to the third part of a public speech in that most of its headings are concerned with proof. But, unlike Doxapatres, Planudes is still aware—directly or indirectly—that in some *Progymnasmata* the chreia at one time occupied second place (1.1).

The second section concerns the chreia's being *χρήσιμον* ("useful"). Planudes says that only the chreia—the chreia elaboration, to be exact—contributes to students' learning how to compose all parts of a public speech: the encomiastic to the introduction, the paraphrastic to the statement of the case, the next five *κεφάλαια* to the proof, and the brief exhortation to the epilogue (2.1). Planudes has taken this argument from Doxapatres but has

<sup>101</sup> See Doxapatres 1.1–3.



also condensed it—for example, by not listing the five κεφάλαια that correspond to the proof of a public speech. But Planudes has omitted Doxapatres's other argument for the chreia's utility, in that a chreia elaboration has headings that reflect an advisory speech's advice, a judicial speech's arguments, and a celebrative speech's praise.<sup>102</sup>

After these two sections Planudes turns to Aphthonius's text. He treats his definition and generally follows Doxapatres, but not immediately as he omits Doxapatres's initial discussion of why Aphthonius began with the definition.<sup>103</sup> Doxapatres followed with the definitions of Hermogenes and Nicolaus and criticized both,<sup>104</sup> but Planudes keeps only Hermogenes's definition and criticizes it for the same reason, that is, its use of the disjunctive conjunction ἢ (“or”) (3.1–2).

After dispensing with these other definitions Planudes, like Doxapatres, comments on various words in Aphthonius's definition. His definition, Planudes says, is somewhat problematic because it defines a chreia in terms of another literary form, the ἀπομνημόνευμα (“reminiscence”) (Aphth 2 H/ON [= 3,21 Rabe]). Hence Planudes understands the word's adjective σύντομον (“concise”) (Aphth 2 H/ON [= 3,21 Rabe]) as necessary in order to distinguish the chreia from the longer reminiscence (3.3). Doxapatres actually illustrated a reminiscence by quoting one about Demetrius Poliorcetes telling Mithridates to flee,<sup>105</sup> but Planudes omits the lengthy reminiscence and instead merely recites Demetrius's concluding saying, “Flee, Mithridates!” but he does identify its source, Plutarch's *Parallel Lives* (3.3–4),<sup>106</sup> which is not surprising given his interest, as we have seen, in this author.

Planudes's next comment on the definition concerns the word εὐστόχως (“aptly”) (Aphth 2–3 H/ON [= 3,21 Rabe]). He omits Doxapatres's preferred interpretation of the word in that “aptly” refers to the individual to whom the chreia is attributed.<sup>107</sup> Instead, he keeps, but also condenses, Doxapatres's two other interpretations—that the word “aptly” refers to the individual(s)

<sup>102</sup> See Doxapatres 2.1–2.

<sup>103</sup> See Doxapatres 3.1–3.

<sup>104</sup> See Doxapatres 3.4–5.

<sup>105</sup> See Doxapatres 3.7.

<sup>106</sup> See Plutarch, *Demetr.* 4.1–4.

<sup>107</sup> See Doxapatres 3.8–9.

to whom the saying or action is directed or to the content of the saying or action (3.5).<sup>108</sup> The latter, as Doxapatres noted, is the interpretation of Geometres.<sup>109</sup>

Planudes's final comment on the definition concerns the participle ἀναφέρουσα ("attributing") (Aphth 3 H/ON [= 3,22 Rabe]). As did Doxapatres,<sup>110</sup> Planudes focuses, if more briefly, on the gender of the participle (feminine), saying that Aphthonius considered it a matter of indifference whether he used the feminine form (which modifies the feminine noun "chreia," as here) or the neuter form (which would have modified the neuter noun "reminiscence") (3.6). Planudes's brevity, however, misses much. Doxapatres first noted that the active participle, ἀναφέρουσα, is used in a passive sense, that is, "being attributed."<sup>111</sup> Then he explained Aphthonius's choice of the feminine on the grammatical grounds that the feminine gender has priority over the neuter.<sup>112</sup> Only then did he say it may have been a matter of indifference, since Aphthonius sometimes wrote a participle modifying the word being defined, as with the chreia, and sometimes a word in the predicate, as with the maxim,<sup>113</sup> an indifference found in Hermogenes as well.<sup>114</sup>

Planudes's comment on the etymology of the word "chreia" is considerably shorter than Doxapatres's discussion.<sup>115</sup> Planudes keeps only the explanation of the name "chreia." It has this name because it is preeminently (κατ' ἐξοχήν) useful (χρειώδης), in the same way that Demosthenes is the preeminent orator and is called simply "the orator" (4.1).

Planudes spends considerable time discussing the διαίρεσις ("division") of the chreia by going beyond Aphthonius's simple division into saying, action, and mixed chreiai (Aphth 5–6 H/ON [= 4,2–3 Rabe]). To be sure, Planudes's discussion is still much shorter than that of Doxapatres, only 73 lines (in Walz's edition) to Doxapatres's 212. Nevertheless, Planudes takes most of his

<sup>108</sup> See Doxapatres 3.9–10.

<sup>109</sup> See Doxapatres 3.10.

<sup>110</sup> See Doxapatres 3.1–2.

<sup>111</sup> See Doxapatres 3.12.

<sup>112</sup> See Doxapatres 3.12.

<sup>113</sup> See Doxapatres 3.13.

<sup>114</sup> See Doxapatres 3.14.

<sup>115</sup> See Doxapatres 4.1–7.

material from Doxapatres (and he from Theon), in particular the ὑποδιαίρεσις (“subdivision”) of the saying and action chreiai as well as an ἐπιδιαίρεσις (“alternative division”), according to the form of the saying (5.1–18). Only at the end does Planudes stray from Doxapatres and include some material from Nicolaus (5.19).<sup>116</sup>

Doxapatres’s ὑποδιαίρεσις divided saying chreiai and action chreiai into several subclasses.<sup>117</sup> The subclasses of saying chreiai are first divided into those that have statements (ἀποφαντικόν) and those that respond to a question (ἀποκριτικόν). The former are further divided into those statements that are unprompted (καθ’ ἐκούσιον) and those that arise from some circumstance (κατὰ περίστασιν). The latter are divided into those that respond to a simple question (κατ’ ἐρώτησιν), to an inquiry (κατὰ πύσμα), to question requiring an explanation (τὸ κατ’ ἐρώτησιν αἰτιώδεις), and to a question named like the subtype (τὸ ὁμωνύμως τῷ γένει καλούμενον ἀποκριτικόν). Planudes follows Doxapatres rather closely, at times abbreviating Doxapatres’s discussion but not changing any of his examples (5.1–6). Planudes does omit Doxapatres’s citation of Aphthonius’s example of a saying chreia that fits into a statement chreia that is unprompted.<sup>118</sup> One example was presumably enough. Action chreiai are divided into active (ἐνεργητικόν) and passive (παθητικόν), and Planudes once again follows Doxapatres, except that he omits his citation of Aphthonius’s action chreia (5.7–8).

Doxapatres’s ἐπιδιαίρεσις of the chreia identified nine formal categories of saying chreiai, or eight with the ninth being a merely a combination of forms.<sup>119</sup> Planudes seemingly has tried to follow Doxapatres here as well, but he may have gotten confused. At any rate, he follows Doxapatres for the first two—chreiai with a maxim and those with an explanation—complete with the same examples (5.9–10), and then for the fifth through the ninth, again with the same examples, although he drops Doxapatres’s example of the ninth, or combined chreia (5.12–18). The confusion, if it is that, begins with the third, or witty chreia (κατὰ χαριεντισμόν). Doxapatres provided two examples of a witty chreia—one attributed

<sup>116</sup> See Nicolaus 116–24 H/ON (= 22, 10–16 Felten).

<sup>117</sup> See Doxapatres 5.6–14.

<sup>118</sup> See Doxapatres 5.7.

<sup>119</sup> See Doxapatres 5.15–25.

to the Lacedaemonians, the other to Olympias.<sup>120</sup> Planudes keeps only the chreia attributed to Olympias but adds a second example, the chreia attributed to Damon the physical trainer (5.11).<sup>121</sup> In a sense, the latter chreia is witty, but Doxapatres also used this chreia, but for his next formal type, one with a wish (κατ' ἐυχήν).<sup>122</sup> Moreover, Planudes drops the category of chreiai with a wish and moves on to Doxapatres's next category, inferential, and so through the rest of the list. It looks as if Planudes has inadvertently omitted the wish category, and the chreia attributed to Damon by default becomes a witty chreia.<sup>123</sup>

Finally, Planudes leaves Doxapatres and ends his discussion of the division of the chreia by adopting Nicolaus's distinction between chreiai that speak to the way things are and those that speak to the way they ought to be, again keeping the same examples (5.19).<sup>124</sup>

While Planudes has thus preserved what Doxapatres (and Nicolaus) had to add to Aphthonius's simple division, we should also note what in Doxapatres's discussion Planudes decided to omit: comments on Aphthonius's pedagogical methods of definition and division;<sup>125</sup> discussion of why Aphthonius did not include the ὑποδιαίρεσις and ἐπιδιαίρεσις of the chreia;<sup>126</sup> a clarification of the saying type (λογικόν) of the chreia as using λόγος in the sense of προφορικὸς λόγος, or uttered λόγος, rather than ἐνδιάθετος λόγος, or internal λόγος;<sup>127</sup> a detailed discussion of Aphthonius's three sample chreiai in terms of the categories of ὑποδιαίρεσις and ἐπιδιαίρεσις;<sup>128</sup> and a defense of Aphthonius's sequence of saying,

<sup>120</sup> See Doxapatres 5.18. On these chreiai, see *Chreia* 1:326–28 and 330–31.

<sup>121</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:310.

<sup>122</sup> See Doxapatres 5.19.

<sup>123</sup> It must be admitted, however, that the situation is not so clear-cut. Planudes may have other texts in mind, such as Nicolaus's, which does count the chreia attributed to Damon as a witty chreia (see Nicolaus 93–96 H/ON [= 21,10–13 Felten]), and likewise, not surprisingly, the P-scholia (see 5.7), but also John of Sardis (see 6.2).

<sup>124</sup> See Nicolaus 116–25 H/ON (= 22,10–16 Felten).

<sup>125</sup> See Doxapatres 5.15.

<sup>126</sup> See Doxapatres 5.25–26.

<sup>127</sup> See Doxapatres 5.27.

<sup>128</sup> See Doxapatres 5.28–29.

action, and mixed chreiai.<sup>129</sup> These omissions all reflect a rather advanced or sophisticated level of analysis, appropriate to teachers. If so, then Planudes may have expected his commentary to be used primarily by students.

Planudes's treatment of the κεφάλαια ("headings") that Aphthonius prescribed for chreia elaborations (Aphth 18–22 H/ON [= 4, 12–15 Rabe]) is drastically shorter than that of Doxapatres—399 lines to 53. He begins, however, as did Doxapatres, by discussing Aphthonius's introductory sentence—"This, then, is the division [διαίρεσις] of the chreia" (Aphth 16–17 H/ON [= 4, 12 Rabe]). Planudes, following Doxapatres, notes a problem with the word διαίρεσις but resolves it differently. Doxapatres restricted it to the previous division (διαίρεσις) into the subclasses of chreiai and considered the series of κεφάλαια to be an alternative classification (ἐπιδιαίρεσις),<sup>130</sup> whereas Planudes recognizes two senses of διαίρεσις: the first pointing back to the classes of chreiai, ἡ διαίρεσις ἀπὸ γένους εἰς εἶδη; and the second pointing ahead to the elaborative headings, ἡ διαίρεσις ἀπὸ ὅλου εἰς μέρη (6.1).

Both Doxapatres and Planudes comment next on the word ἐργάσαι in the following sentence—"You can elaborate [ἐργάσαι] a chreia under the following headings" (Aphth 18 H/ON [= 4, 12–13 Rabe]). Both are aware of the synonymous κατασκευάσεις ("you will confirm"), which brings up the question, given the twin progymnasmata of confirmation (κατασκευή) and refutation (ἀνασκευή),<sup>131</sup> of whether chreiai should be refuted (6.2–3).<sup>132</sup> Doxapatres said no and backed up his decision with five reasons.<sup>133</sup> Planudes, in contrast, allows refutation but only of chreiai that are neither wholly impossible nor unassailable but somewhere in between (6.2–5). This reasoning comes from Geometres through Doxapatres, even though Doxapatres rejected it.<sup>134</sup> Planudes also departs from Doxapatres's discussion by omitting his further reflections of ἐργάσαι as suggesting the more general meaning of "working" with the chreia, such as doing a declension

<sup>129</sup> See Doxapatres 5.32.

<sup>130</sup> See Doxapatres 6.3–4.

<sup>131</sup> On refuting only those narratives that are neither wholly impossible nor quite unassailable, see Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 5 (10, 11–12 Rabe).

<sup>132</sup> See Doxapatres 6.5.

<sup>133</sup> See Doxapatres 6.5–11.

<sup>134</sup> See Doxapatres 6.11.

of a chreia<sup>135</sup> or expanding and condensing a chreia.<sup>136</sup> To be sure, Planudes does include at least the declension of the chreia, but he does so more briefly and only at the end of his chapter and unrelated to the word ἐργάσαιο (7.1–6).

Besides commenting on ἐργάσαιο, Planudes follows Doxapatres in commenting on another word in the sentence “You can elaborate a chreia under the following headings [κεφάλαις]” (Aphth 18 H/ON [= 4,12–13 Rabe]). Both agree that the word κεφάλαια is used imprecisely but basically analogous to the parts (μέρη) of a speech (6.6).<sup>137</sup> Planudes, however, drops Doxapatres’s defense of κεφάλαια by pointing to similar usage in Hermogenes’s discussion of conjectural cases<sup>138</sup> and Geometres’s linking of the content of Aphthonius’s model elaboration to the τελικά κεφάλαια (“final headings”).<sup>139</sup>

Comments on the individual κεφάλαια follow. Planudes treats the encomiastic and paraphrastic headings together (6.7–10), even though Doxapatres discussed them separately.<sup>140</sup> Both, however, emphasize that the encomiastic heading must be kept brief (6.7–8),<sup>141</sup> although only Doxapatres explains how to do so, that is, by not using the topics appropriate to an encomium.<sup>142</sup> In any case, both provide advice on how to compose this heading, namely, by tailoring it to the individual being praised, with deeds getting the most attention, and the most relevant ones at that; other deeds, to maintain brevity, are to be indicated by the figure “pretended omission” (κατὰ παράλειψιν) (6.9)<sup>143</sup> or, as Planudes adds, by the figures of “abrupt breaking off” (ἀποσιώπησις) or “enumeration” (ἀπαρίθμησις) (6.9–10). Thus Planudes has followed Doxapatres rather closely, even if with less detail. The only thing he has omit-

<sup>135</sup> See Doxapatres 6.13–19.

<sup>136</sup> See Doxapatres 6.20–23.

<sup>137</sup> See Doxapatres 6.24–25.

<sup>138</sup> See Doxapatres 6.26–27, citing Hermogenes, *On Issues* 3 (43,16–59,9 Rabe).

<sup>139</sup> See Doxapatres 6.28.

<sup>140</sup> See Doxapatres 6.29–33 and 34–36.

<sup>141</sup> See Doxapatres 6.29.

<sup>142</sup> See Doxapatres 6.30.

<sup>143</sup> See Doxapatres 6.31–33.

ted is the comparison with the introduction of a public speech whose purpose is to instill goodwill.<sup>144</sup>

Planudes's discussion of the paraphrastic heading is brief to the point of obscurity. He simply says that this heading must not depart from the subject under consideration (6.11). Presumably he means that the paraphrase of the saying in the chreia must not differ so much from that of the saying that the paraphrase amounts to a different subject. Doxapatres made precisely this point: paraphrase alters the wording but keeps the same sense.<sup>145</sup> Planudes omits Doxapatres's main discussion of this heading—a careful differentiation of paraphrase from other words with the same root.<sup>146</sup> Planudes's omission of this makes sense if his commentary was not intended for other teachers (for whom such linguistic sophistication would have been welcomed) but for students, whose needs were simpler.

The treatment of the rationale is drastically shorter—Doxapatres's eighty lines are pared down to only three. Planudes drops entirely Doxapatres's general discussion of the rationale, opposite, analogy, and example as comparable to the argumentative portion of a public speech. Doxapatres classified the rationale as the ἐπιχείρημα, or argument proper, and the opposite, analogy, and example as ἐργασιαί ("elaborations"),<sup>147</sup> and he justified their sequence, including the testimony of the ancients, by explaining why the rationale is first and why the other headings follow in just this order.<sup>148</sup>

Planudes picks up on Doxapatres only when Doxapatres turns to the rationale itself, and here he keeps the essentials, in particular relating the word αἰτία to the six περιστατικά ("circumstantial elements"), and indeed making it the most important one, since without it a case becomes incapable of proof (6.12–13).<sup>149</sup> Planudes, however, drops Doxapatres's lengthy discussion of specific cases and perhaps inadvertently also drops Doxapatres's statement regarding the function of the rationale.<sup>150</sup> In

<sup>144</sup> See Doxapatres 6.29.

<sup>145</sup> See Doxapatres 6.36.

<sup>146</sup> See Doxapatres 6.35.

<sup>147</sup> See Doxapatres 6.37.

<sup>148</sup> See Doxapatres 6.38–40.

<sup>149</sup> See Doxapatres 6.41.

<sup>150</sup> See Doxapatres 6.42–45.

any case, Planudes is silent on the important point of function.

Planudes's treatment of the heading from the opposite owes little to Doxapatres. All he says is that a subject is clearer if it is compared to its opposite, and he illustrates with light and darkness (6.14). Doxapatres was more to the point, saying that this heading takes the opposite view of the point of the rationale, and he illustrated it with examples from Aphthonius's model exercises of the chreia and maxim.<sup>151</sup>

Planudes treats the analogy and example headings together, as did Doxapatres. Planudes justifies the order by saying that a specific example confirms the more general analogy (6.15), an argument that Doxapatres did not make at this point but had made earlier.<sup>152</sup> Both focus on the *διαφοραί*, or the differences between an analogy and example (6.16), although Planudes drops the illustrations of both that Doxapatres took from Aphthonius's model chreia and maxim elaborations.<sup>153</sup>

Planudes shortens Doxapatres's comments on the testimony of the ancients. He omits Doxapatres's concern with the *τάξις*, or placement, of the testimony as coming after the argumentative and elaborative headings.<sup>154</sup> Like Doxapatres, he identifies the testimony as an uninvented proof (6.17),<sup>155</sup> but he drops Doxapatres's examples of such proofs.<sup>156</sup> Like Doxapatres, he advises those who are at a loss for a testimony to use the figure "pretended omission" (*κατὰ παράλειψιν*) (6.18), but he drops Doxapatres's example of what to say in this situation.<sup>157</sup> Further, he drops Doxapatres's linguistic concern over the word *μαρτυρία* itself since it refers, some say, to oral testimony, whereas *ἐκμαρτυρία* is the word for written testimony.<sup>158</sup> But Planudes does include a comment, taken from elsewhere in Doxapatres's commentary, on testimonies for action chreiai, saying that the point of an action can be expressed in words and quoting a sentence from Thucydides<sup>159</sup> to express

<sup>151</sup> See Doxapatres 6.46–49.

<sup>152</sup> See Doxapatres 6.39.

<sup>153</sup> See Doxapatres 6.50.

<sup>154</sup> See Doxapatres 6.51.

<sup>155</sup> See Doxapatres 6.51.

<sup>156</sup> See Doxapatres 6.51–52.

<sup>157</sup> See Doxapatres 6.53.

<sup>158</sup> See Doxapatres 6.54.

<sup>159</sup> See Thucydides 1.69.1.



what Diogenes intended by striking the paedagogus (6.20–21).<sup>160</sup>

Planudes has nothing to say about the epilogue, which is surprising since Doxapatres's comments are brief and practical—a note on etymology and advice on keeping the epilogue brief and composing it in terms of the encomiastic heading or any of the others.<sup>161</sup>

As is typical of Planudes's commentary, there are no comments on Aphthonius's model elaboration of the Isocratean chreia.

Planudes ends his commentary with a section that is not in Aphthonius's chapter on the chreia. He provides a κλίσις ("declension") of a chreia, at least through all the cases in the singular (7.1–6). The chreia is not quoted in full, even in the nominative (7.2), and only the words that change from case to case are provided. The chreia is clearly familiar—indeed, he takes it, not from Doxapatres, but from the P-scholia, where it is recited as follows: "Pittacus of Mitylene, on being asked if anyone escapes the notice of the gods in committing sinful acts, replied, 'Why, not even when contemplating them.'"<sup>162</sup> Clearly, Planudes has found Aphthonius wanting in this respect and has added the declension of a chreia, perhaps as an afterthought (in contrast to Doxapatres's more appropriate placement of it under his reflections on Aphthonius's word ἐργάσιον).<sup>163</sup> At any rate, Planudes presumably regarded declension as an important part of the continuing grammatical training of his students, especially so given his interest, as we have seen, in grammar.

#### CONCLUSION

To sum up: As was true of Planudes's treatment of speaking-in-character, so also his treatment of the chreia chapter is full and detailed. Planudes's dependence on Doxapatres is once again obvious and pervasive, but also discriminating. He was careful to use only those comments that most directly dealt with what Aphthonius said, putting aside comments that betrayed Doxapatres's

<sup>160</sup> See Doxapatres 7.43–44.

<sup>161</sup> See Doxapatres 6.55–57.

<sup>162</sup> See P-scholia 2.2. Planudes himself recited this chreia earlier (see 5.3).

<sup>163</sup> See Doxapatres 6.13–19.

curiosity for the motives and justifications for what Aphthonius said. In any case, with Planudes's helpful commentary, students would have clearly gained a fuller understanding of the chreia and the elaboration of it than was available in Aphthonius's spare treatment of it.

#### TEXT AND TRANSLATION

The text of Maximus Planudes's commentary on Aphthonius's chreia chapter is taken from the edition of Christian Walz.<sup>164</sup> Page numbers from his edition have been inserted where appropriate. Section titles have also been inserted in bold and in pointed brackets, although Planudes himself at one point (6.1) indicates two of them—§5. ἡ διαίρεσις ἀπὸ γένους εἰς εἶδη, and §6. ἡ διαίρεσις ἀπὸ ὅλου εἰς μέρη. In addition, “verses” have been added to aid in referencing. In addition, all departures from Walz's text are noted in the apparatus, including three passages that have been transposed in order to keep to the sequence of Aphthonius's text.

The translation, as far as I know, is the first.

<sup>164</sup> Christian Walz, ed., *Rhetores Graeci* (9 vols.; Tübingen: Cotta, 1832–1836), 2:9–68, esp. 15–21.



# Text 5. Maximus Planudes Commentarium in Aphthonii Progymnasmata

Cap. III. Ἐξηγήσεις τῆς Χρείας  
(2:15,6–21,13 Walz)

## <§1. ΤΑΞΙΣ>

1. Ἰστέον ὅτι τὴν χρεῖαν τινὲς πρὸ τοῦ διηγήματος ἔταξαν, συνάπτοντες αὐτὴν τῷ μύθῳ διὰ τὸ συμβουλευτικόν· οὐ καλῶς δέ· δεῖ γὰρ αὐτῆς προτάττεσθαι ὡς ἀπλούστερον τὸ διήγημα. 2. καὶ <ἰστέον> ὅτι ὁ μὲν μῦθος τῷ προοιμίῳ ἀναλογεῖ, τὸ δὲ διήγημα τῇ διηγῇ, ἡ δὲ χρεῖα τοῖς ἀγῶσιν.

## <§2. ΧΡΗΣΙΣ>

1. Οὐ μὲν δὲ ἀλλὰ καὶ μόνῃ ἡ χρεῖα πᾶσι τοῖς τοῦ λόγου συμβάλλεται μέρεσι· διὰ μὲν τοῦ ἐγκωμιαστικοῦ τῷ προοιμίῳ, διὰ δὲ τοῦ παραφραστικοῦ τῇ διηγῇ, διὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων κεφαλαίων τοῖς ἀγῶσι. διὰ δὲ τῆς ἐν τῷ τέλει βραχείας παρακλήσεως τοῖς ἐπιλόγοις.

# Text 5. Maximus Planudes Commentary on Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata*

## Chapter 3: Commentary on the Chreia (2:15,6–21,13 Walz)

### <§1. SEQUENCE>

1. One should know that some have placed the chreia chapter before the narrative chapter because they attach it to the fable on account of its advisory function.<sup>1</sup> But they are not correct, because it is necessary to place the narrative before it, since the narrative is simpler. 2. Also <one should know> that the fable is comparable to the introduction of a speech, the narrative to the statement of the case, and the chreia to the argumentative part.

### <§2. UTILITY>

1. In addition, only the chreia elaboration contributes to all parts of the speech. It contributes to the introduction through the encomiastic heading; to the statement of the case through the paraphrastic heading; to the argumentative part through the other headings;<sup>2</sup> and to the conclusion through the brief exhortation at the end.

<sup>1</sup> The τᾶξις of the chreia, as we have seen, was still being debated, because Theon had placed it first (see *Chreia* 1:65–66), as did the fragmentary papyrus catechism, PSI I.85 (see *Chreia* 2:94–97).

<sup>2</sup> Planudes means the rationale, opposite, analogy, example, and testimony of the ancients.

## &lt;§3. ΟΡΟΣ&gt;

**Χρεία ἐστίν** (Aphth 2 H/ON [= 3,21 Rabe]). 1. Ἐρμογένης οὕτως ὠρίσατο· «ἀπομνημόνευμα λόγου τινὸς ἢ πράξεως ἢ συναμφοτέρου, σύντομον ἔχον δῆλωσιν, ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον χρησίμου τινὸς εἵνεκα.» 2. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνεπίληπτος ὁ ὅρος διὰ τοὺς διαζευκτικούς συνδέσμους, οὓς οὐ δέον ἐν ὀρισμοῖς τίθεσθαι.

**Σύντομον** (Aphth 2 H/ON [= 3,21 Rabe]). 3. Διὰ τὰ μακρὰ ἀπομνημονεύματα, ὡς ἔχει μετὰ πολλὴν τὴν διήγησιν τὸ τοῦ Δημητρίου τοῦ Πολιορκητοῦ πρὸς τὸν Μιθριδάτην· «φεῦγε, Μιθριδάτα.» 4. ὁ Πλούταρχος ἐν τοῖς παραλλήλοις ἱστορήσεν.

[16] **Εὐστόχως** (Aphth 2-3 H/ON [= 3,21 Rabe]). 5. Ἦ ἀντὶ τοῦ εὐκαίρως· οὐ γὰρ πρὸς τὸν ὀκνηρόν, | ἀλλὰ τὸν διεγρηγερμένον καὶ φιλοκερδῇ χρῆ τὸ τοῦ Μενάνδρου λέγειν,

Βέλτιστε, μὴ τὸ κέρδος ἐν πᾶσι σκόπει·

ἢ εὐστόχως· τὸ ἐν βραχεῖ ἔργῳ ἢ ῥήματι πολλὴν τὴν διάνοιαν περιέχειν.

**Ἀναφέρουσα** (Aphth 3 H/ON [= 3,22 Rabe]). 6. Οὐκ εἶπεν ἀναφέρον, ὅτι ἀδιάφορον ἡγεῖται, ποτὲ μὲν πρὸς τὸ ὀριστὸν ποιεῖν τὴν ἀπόδοσιν, ὡς ἐνταῦθα πρὸς τὸ χρεία, ποτὲ δὲ πρὸς τι τῶν συμπληρούντων τὸν ὅρον· οἷον εἰ ἀναφέρον εἶπε πρὸς τὸ ἀπομνημόνευμα.

§3.1 συναμφοτέρου scripsi; cf. Hermogenes 3 H/ON (= 6,5 Rabe) || τὸ συναμφοτέρων Walz || 4 Plutarch, *Demetr.* 4.1-4 || 5 Menander, *Mon.* 98 (38 Jaekel) || 6 ποτὲ μὲν scripsi || πολὺ μὲν Walz

## &lt;§3. DEFINITION&gt;

**A chreia is** (Aphth 2 H/ON [= 3,21 Rabe]). 1. Hermogenes has defined the chreia: “A reminiscence of a saying or action or both that is concisely disclosed and is generally for the purpose of something useful in life.”<sup>3</sup> 2. But this definition is not without fault, on account of the disjunctive conjunctions, which ought not to be put in definitions.<sup>4</sup>

**Concise** (Aphth 2 H/ON [= 3,21 Rabe]). 3. (This word is used) on account of there being longer reminiscences. After a lengthy narrative a reminiscence has a saying like Demetrius Poliorcetes to Mithridates, “Flee, Mithridates.” 4. Plutarch recounts this reminiscence in his *Parallel Lives*.<sup>5</sup>

**Aptly** (Aphth 2–3 H/ON [= 3,21 Rabe]). 5. Either in the sense of “timely”: For one should address, not the timid man, but the excited and greedy one, with this line of Menander:<sup>6</sup>

My friend, look not for gain in everything.

Or in the sense of “shrewdly”: One should say that which captures much insight in a brief action or saying.

**Attributing** (Aphth 3 H/ON [= 3,22 Rabe]). 6. Aphthonius did not write the neuter participle “attributing,” because he considered it a matter of indifference to formulate the modifier at one time in terms of the word that is being defined, as he did here to agree with the (feminine) noun *chreia*, and at another to agree with one of the words in the definition—for example, if he had written the neuter participle “attributing” in view of the (neuter) noun “reminiscence.”<sup>7</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Hermogenes 2–4 H/ON (= 6,4–6 Rabe).

<sup>4</sup> The disjunctive conjunctions are the two uses of ἢ (“or”). Planudes is echoing the criticism of Doxapatres 3.4.

<sup>5</sup> For this longer reminiscence in full, see Doxapatres 3.7, although Planudes adds that the source of this longer reminiscence is from Plutarch’s *Parallel Lives*, specifically *Demetr.* 4.1–4. That Planudes knew the source is not surprising, since, as we have seen, he produced his own copy of Plutarch’s *Lives* and *Moralia*.

<sup>6</sup> Menander, *Mon.* 98 (38 Jaekel). Planudes has taken this monostichos from Doxapatres 3.9.

<sup>7</sup> On the gender of the participle, see the fuller discussion of Doxapatres 3.12–14.

## &lt;§4. ΕΤΥΜΟΛΟΓΙΑ&gt;

**Χρειώδης δὲ οὖσα** (Aphth 4 H/ON [= 4,1 Rabe]). 1. Κατ' ἐξοχὴν εἴρηται χρεία ὡς χρειωδεστέρα πρὸς παραίνεσιν τῶν ἄλλων προγυμνασμάτων, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν Δημοσθένην ῥήτορα λέγομεν.

## §5. Η ΔΙΑΙΡΕΣΙΣ ΑΠΟ ΓΕΝΟΥΣ ΕΙΣ ΕΙΔΗ

**Τῆς δὲ χρείας** (Aphth 5 H/ON [= 4,2 Rabe]). 1. Ἰστέον ὅτι τὸ λογικὸν καὶ πρακτικὸν καὶ ὑποδιαίρεσιν ἐπιδέχεται. 2. τοῦ μὲν γὰρ λογικοῦ τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀποφαντικόν, τὸ δὲ ἀποκριτικόν· καὶ τοῦ ἀποφαντικοῦ τὸ μὲν εἰς τε τὸ καθ' ἐκούσιον ἀποφαντικόν, ὡς Ἰσοκράτης τοὺς εὐφυεῖς τῶν μαθητῶν θεῶν παῖδας ἔφασκεν εἶναι, καὶ εἰς τὸ κατὰ περίστασιν ἀποφαντικόν, ἐν ᾧ ἕκ τινος περιστάσεως ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον κεκίνηται ὁ εἰπών, ὡς ὁ Διογένης ἰδὼν πλούσιον ἀπαίδευτον εἶπεν, «οὗτος ἐστὶν ἵππος περιηργυρωμένος.»

3. Τοῦ δὲ ἀποκριτικοῦ τὸ μὲν εἰς τε τὸ κατ' ἐρώτησιν, ἥτις ἄρνησιν μόνην ἔχει ἢ συγκατάθεσιν, τὸ ναὶ ἢ οὐ· πολλάκις δὲ καὶ διὰ σχήματος μόνην ἀνάνευσιν ἢ κατάνευσιν, ὡς Πιττακὸς Μιτυληναῖος ἐρωτηθεὶς, εἰ λανθάνοι τις τοὺς θεοὺς κακὰ | πράττων, ἔφη ὅτι μὴδὲ διανοούμενος· περιττὸν γὰρ ἐνταῦθα τὸ μὴδὲ διανοούμενος, ἀρκούσης καὶ μόνης τῆς ἀποφάσεως. 4. καὶ εἰς τὸ κατὰ πύσμα, ὃ μακροτέραν ἀπαιτεῖ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, οἷον· Θεανὼ Πυθαγορικῇ φιλόσοφος ἐρωτηθεῖσα, ποσताία ἀπὸ ἀνδρὸς γυνή καθαρά τοῖς Θεσμοφορίοις κάτεισιν, εἶπεν «ὡς ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τοῦ ἰδίου παραχρῆμα, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἄλλοτρίου οὐδέπο-



## &lt;§4. ETYMOLOGY&gt;

**Since it is useful** (Aphth 4 H/ON [= 4,1 Rabe]). 1. The chreia is perfectly named since it is more useful in terms of giving advice than the other progymnasmata, just as we also call Demosthenes “the orator.”

## §5. DIVISION OF THE CLASSES INTO SUBCLASSES

**Of the chreia** (Aphth 5 H/ON [= 4,2 Rabe]). 1. One should know that the saying and action classes of the chreia also permit a subdivision.<sup>8</sup> 2. Thus, of the saying class one subclass is a statement chreia and another is a response chreia. And further, of the statement subclass one kind is the unprompted statement—such as: Isocrates said that gifted students are the children of gods.<sup>9</sup> Another subclass is a statement prompted by a circumstance, and here the speaker is moved to speak because of some circumstance—such as: Diogenes, on seeing a rich but uneducated man, said, “This fellow is a silver-plated horse.”<sup>10</sup>

3. Of the response subclass there is the division into: A response in accordance with a simple question that requires only denial or assent, the word “yes” or “no.” Frequently, however, a simple question requires a mere refusal or acceptance by means of a gesture. Thus: Pittacus of Mitylene, on being asked if anyone when doing evil deeds escapes the notice of the gods, said, “Not even when contemplating them.”<sup>11</sup> In this case the response “Not even when contemplating them” is superfluous, since the mere negative particle would have sufficed. 4. A response in accordance with an inquiry requiring a longer response. For example: Theano the Pythagorean philosopher, on being asked how long after intercourse with a man does a woman go in purity to the Thesmophoria, said, “With her own man, immediately, but with

<sup>8</sup> In what follows, Planudes provides the full classification of chreiai that appears in Doxapatres 5.6–24 but that ultimately goes back to Theon 36–189 H/ON (= 19–24 Patillon).

<sup>9</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:324.

<sup>10</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:313–14.

<sup>11</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:331–32.

τε.» 5. καὶ εἰς τὸ κατ' ἐρώτησιν αἰτιῶδες, ὅταν τις τὴν αἰτίαν ἀποδῶ, οἷον· Σωκράτης ἐρωτηθεὶς, εἰ εὐδαίμων αὐτῷ δοκεῖ ὁ Περσῶν βασιλεύς, ἔφησε μὴ εἰδέναι· μὴ γὰρ εἰδέναι πῶς ἔχει παιδείας. 6. καὶ τέταρτον τὸ ὁμωνύμως τῷ γένει καλούμενον ἀποκριτικόν, ὃ μήτε ἐρώτησιν ἔχει μήτε ἀπόκρισιν, πρὸς δέ τινα λόγον ἀπλῶς ἀντίρρῃσιν, οἷον· Διογένους ἀριστῶντός ποτε καὶ Πλάτωνα παριόντα πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον προσκαλεσαμένου, ὁ Πλάτων, «ὡς χάριεν ἂν ἦν σου, Διόγενες, τὸ ἄπλαστον,» ἔφη, «εἰ μὴ πλαστὸν ἦν.» καὶ τὸ μὲν λογικὸν οὕτω.

7. Τοῦ δὲ πρακτικοῦ τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ἐνεργητικόν, ἐν ᾧ τι ποιῶν τις ὑπόκειται, οἷον· Διογένης ἰδὼν ἀδδιδάγον παῖδα τὸν παιδαγωγὸν ἔπαισε. 8. τὸ δὲ παθητικόν, ἐν ᾧ τι πάθος ὑποσημαίνεται, οἷον· Διδύμων ὁ αὐλητὴς ἀλούς ἐπὶ μοιχείᾳ ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐκρεμάσθη, τουτέστι τῶν διδύμων.

[18] 9. Ἐτι ἡ χρεία διαιρεῖται κατ' ἐπιδιαίρεσιν· εἷς τε τὰς γνωμολογικὰς, ὅσαι περὶ τινος καθολικοῦ κοινῶς ἀποφαίνονται, ὡς· ὁ Βίας ἔφη τὴν φιλαργυρίαν μητρόπολιν | εἶναι πάσης κακίας. 10. καὶ εἰς ἀποδεικτικὰς, αἱ καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ λεγομένου ἐπιφέρουσιν, ὡς· Ἴσοκράτης παρῆνει τῶν γονέων τοὺς διδασκάλους προτιμᾶν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ζῆν, οἱ δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν γεγόνασιν αἵτιοι. 11. καὶ εἰς τὰς κατὰ χαριεντισμόν, ὡς [τὸ] τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου παῖδα τοῦ Διὸς ἑαυτὸν εἶναι λέγοντος, Ὀλυμπιάς ἀκούσα-

someone else's, never."<sup>12</sup> 5. A response to a simple question calling for an explanation as well. For example: Socrates, on being asked if the Persian king seemed happy to him, said that he did not know, for he did not know where he stood on education.<sup>13</sup> 6. And a response that is called by the same name as the subclass. It contains neither a question nor an answer but simply a retort to some remark. For example: Once when Diogenes was having lunch and had invited Plato, who was present, to join him, Plato said, "How charming your unpretentiousness would be, Diogenes, if it were not so pretentious."<sup>14</sup> So much, then, for the saying class.

7. Regarding the action class, however, there is: The active, in which someone becomes the subject of a chreia by means of his action. For example: Diogenes, on seeing a boy who was a gourmand, struck the paedagogus.<sup>15</sup> 8. And the passive, in which some experience is indicated. For example: Didymon the flute player, on being convicted of adultery, was hanged by his namesake<sup>16</sup>—that is to say, by his testicles.<sup>17</sup>

9. In addition, the chreia is divided according to an alternative division,<sup>18</sup> into: Chreiai with a maxim, which speak plainly about something universal, such as: Bias said that the love of money is the mother-city of every evil.<sup>19</sup> 10. Those with an explanation, which also provide the explanation of what has been said, such as: Isocrates advised honoring teachers above parents, for the latter are the cause of living but the former of living well.<sup>20</sup> 11. Those with wit, such as: When Alexander was saying that he was a son of Zeus, Olympias heard of it and said, "Won't

<sup>12</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:340–41.

<sup>13</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:336–37.

<sup>14</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:332–33.

<sup>15</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:315–16.

<sup>16</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:312–13.

<sup>17</sup> Planudes himself has correctly glossed the word *διδυμοί* as a (slang) expression for testicles (see, e.g., Philodemus in the Greek Anthology [see *AP* 5.126,6]).

<sup>18</sup> This *ἐπιδιαίρεσις* comes from Doxapatres 5.15–24 but ultimately from Theon 124–89 H/ON (= 22–24 Patillon). Note that Doxapatres kept Theon's order but dropped three of the twelve types, numbers 4–6; Planudes followed suit, although he also dropped number 3 (chreiai expressing a wish), but the text may not be secure.

<sup>19</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:307.

<sup>20</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:324.

σα ἔφη· «οὐ παύσεται τὸ μεिरάκιον διαβάλλον με πρὸς τὴν Ἑραν;» ἢ ὥς· ὁ παιδοτρίβης Δάμων χολὸς ὢν ὑφελομένου τινὸς αὐτὸν τὰ ὑποδήματα, «εἴθε,» φησίν, «ἐφαρμόσειαν τοῖς τοῦ κλέπτου ποσίν.» 12. καὶ εἰς τὰς συμβολικάς, οἷον· Διογένης ἰδὼν μεिरάκιον ἐκ μοιχοῦ βάλλον εἰς πλῆθος λίθους, «οὐ παύσῃ,» ἔφη, «μεिरάκιον, μὴ ἀγνοοῦν παΐσης σου τὸν πατέρα.» 13. συμβάλλεσθαι γὰρ ἡμῖν δέδωκεν, ὥς οὐκ ἐξ ὠρισμένου προσώπου τὸ μεिरάκιον ἦν. 14. καὶ εἰς τὰς τροπικάς, ὅσαι ταῖς λέξεσι μεταφορικῶς χρῶνται· ὥς ὁ Πλάτων τοὺς τῆς ἀρετῆς κλῶνας ἰδρῶσι καὶ πόνοις ἔλεγε φύεσθαι. 15. καὶ εἰς τὰς κατὰ ἀμφιβολίαν, οἷον Ἱσοκράτης τινὸς αὐτῷ συνιστῶντος τὸν παῖδα καὶ ἐρομένου, τίνος αὐτῷ δεῖ, «γραφιδίου,» ἔφη, «ΚΑΙΝΟΥ, καὶ πινακιδίου ΚΑΙΝΟΥ.» 16. ἄδηλον γὰρ πότερον λέγει, γραφίδος καὶ καὶ πινακίδος καὶ καὶ καὶ γραφιδίου καὶ φρενός, καὶ πινακιδίου καὶ φρενός. 17. καὶ εἰς τὰς κατὰ μετὰληψιν, ὅταν ἄλλο μὲν τὸ ἐρωτῶμενον ᾖ, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἀποκρινόμενον· οἷον· Ἐπαμινώνδας ἀμφισβητούντων τινῶν περὶ πότον, πότερον | μᾶλλον αὐλητῆς κρείττων Ἀντιγενίδης ἢ Σάτυρος, «ἐμοὶ μὲν,» ἔφη, «δοκεῖ στρατηγὸς Πολυσπέρχων.» 18. καὶ εἰς τὰς συνεζευγμένας, αἵπερ οὐκ ἄλλαι παρὰ ταύτας εἰσίν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τούτων συνίστανται δύο καὶ τριῶν πολλάκις συνελθουσῶν.

19. Ἐτι τῶν χρειῶν αἱ μὲν δηλοῦσιν, ὅποιά ἐστι τὰ πράγματα· ὥς· Αἴσωπος ἐρωτηθεὶς, τί ἰσχυρότατον τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις, «ὁ λόγος,»

that boy stop slandering me to Hera?”<sup>21</sup> or: Damon the physical trainer, who was lame, when someone had stolen his sandals, said, “Would that they fit the feet of the thief.”<sup>22</sup> 12. Those that require an inference, for example: Diogenes, on seeing a youth born to an adulterer throwing stones into a crowd, said, “Won’t you stop, boy? You may unwittingly strike your father!”<sup>23</sup> 13. It is up to us to infer that the youth’s father was unknown. 14. Those using figurative language, insofar as they make figurative use of words, as: Plato used to say that the offshoots of virtue grow with sweat and toil.<sup>24</sup> 15. Those that contain an ambiguity, for example: When someone was enrolling his boy with Isocrates and asked what the boy needed, Isocrates said, A stylus KAINOY and a tablet KAINOY.”<sup>25</sup> 16. For it is unclear whether he means, “A new stylus and a new tablet” or “A stylus and a mind and a tablet and a mind.”<sup>26</sup> 17. Those with a change of subject, whenever the question is one thing and the answer is something else, for example: Epaminondas, when some people were arguing over wine whether Antigenides or Satyrus was the better flute player, said, “In my opinion, Polysperchon is the better general.”<sup>27</sup> 18. Combined chreiai, which are not different from these but are compounded of them, two and frequently three types coming together.<sup>28</sup>

19. In addition, some chreiai disclose the way things are, such as: Aesop, on being asked what the most potent thing among

<sup>21</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:330–31.

<sup>22</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:310. In Theon’s and so Doxapatres’s scheme this chreia about Damon is an example of a chreia that expresses a wish (εὐχή). Planudes, however, seems to think it witty (like the one attributed to Olympias). Thus, given Planudes’s close dependence on Doxapatres, it is possible that the phrase identifying a chreia with wit, such as εἰς τὰς κατὰ εὐχὴν, has dropped out. Perhaps, however, he also has other texts in mind that do identify this chreia as having wit (see Nicolaus 93–96 H/ON [= 21,10–13 Felten]; P-scholia 5.7). If so, Planudes may have deliberately deleted this phrase.

<sup>23</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:317.

<sup>24</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:333.

<sup>25</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:325.

<sup>26</sup> The ambiguity arises over whether the letters KAINOY form one word (“new”) or are divided into two words, KAI NOY (“and” and “mind”)—i.e., “A new stylus and a new tablet” or “A stylus and a mind and a tablet and a mind.”

<sup>27</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:334.

<sup>28</sup> Planudes does not give an example of a combined chreia, although both Theon and Doxapatres did.

εἶπεν· αἱ δέ, ὅποῖα δεῖ εἶναι· ὥς· Ἀριστείδης ἐρωτηθεὶς, τί ἐστὶ τὸ δίκαιον, «τὸ μὴ ἐπιθυμεῖν,» εἶπεν, «τῶν ἀλλοτρίων.»

#### §6. Η ΔΙΑΙΡΕΣΙΣ ΑΠΟ ΟΛΟΥ ΕΙΣ ΜΕΡΗ

**Ἡ μὲν οὖν διαίρεσις** (Aphth 16 H/ON [= 4,12 Rabe]). 1. Αὕτη μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἡ ἀπὸ γένους εἰς εἶδη· ἡ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα ἡ ἀπὸ ὅλου εἰς μέρη.

**Ἐργάσαιο δ' αὐτήν** (Aphth 18 H/ON [= 4,12–13 Rabe]). 2. Ἀντὶ τοῦ κατασκευάσεις. 3. ἔδει οὖν, φασί τινες, καὶ ἀνασκευάζειν τὴν χρεῖαν, ἀλλ' οὐ δεῖ τὰς ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ παραινέσεις ἀνασκευάζειν, 4. καὶ ἔτι ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς διηγήμασιν οὔτε τὰ λίκαν σαφῆ, οὔτε τὰ παντελῶς ἀδύνατα ἀνασκευάζομεν ἢ κατασκευάζομεν, 5. οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν χρεῶν οὔτε τὰς λίκαν ἀμέμπτους κατασκευάζομεν, περιττὸν γάρ, ἢ ἀνασκευάζομεν, ἀδύνατον γάρ, οὔτε τὰς λίκαν μοχθηράς, αὐτόθεν γὰρ ἔχουσι τὴν ἀτοπίαν, ἀλλ' ὅσαι μέσσην τὴν φύσιν ἔχουσιν.

**Κεφαλαίους** (Aphth 18 H/ON [= 4,13 Rabe]). 6. Ἀντὶ τοῦ μέρεσι· καταχρηστικῶς δὲ εἶπεν· οὐ γὰρ ὥς τὰ κεφάλαια τοῦ πολιτικοῦ λόγου, [καὶ ταῦτα].

[19,20]

<Ἐγκωμιαστικῷ> | **παραφραστικῷ** (Aphth 19 H/ON [= 4,13 Rabe]). 7. <Ἰστέον δέ,> ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐγκωμιαστικὸν βραχὺ εἶναι δεῖ, ἵνα

§6.5 περιττὸν scripsi || παριττὸν Walz || 5–6 Κεφαλαίους ... τοῦ πολιτικοῦ λόγου transposui ex 20,12–14 (Walz) || 6 καὶ ταῦτα deleui || 6 Ἐγκωμιαστικῷ addidi || 7 Ἰστέον δέ addidi

men is, said, “Speech.”<sup>29</sup> Other chreiai disclose the way things ought to be, such as: Aristeides, on being asked what justice is, said: “Not desiring what belongs to others.”<sup>30</sup>

#### §6. DIVISION OF THE WHOLE INTO ITS PARTS

**This, then, has been the division** (Aphth 16 H/ON [= 4,12 Rabe]). 1. The former division has been that from classes into subclasses. The one after this is the division of the whole into its parts.<sup>31</sup>

**You can elaborate it** (Aphth 18 H/ON [= 4,12–13 Rabe]). 2. (“Elaborate”) in the sense of “you will confirm.” 3. Therefore, it was also necessary, some say, to refute a chreia,<sup>32</sup> but one must not refute its exhortations, which are recited for some good purpose. 4. Moreover, just as in narratives we do not refute or confirm either those that are very clear or those that are wholly impossible, so also in the case of chreiai we neither confirm those that are quite unassailable—for it would be superfluous—nor refute them—for it is impossible. 5. Nor do we confirm or refute chreiai that are quite fallacious, for they obviously possess no grounds for argument. On the contrary, we confirm and refute as many chreiai as have a nature that is in between.<sup>33</sup>

**By the headings** (Aphth 18 H/ON [= 4,13 Rabe]). 6. In the sense of “by the parts (of a speech).” But Aphthonius spoke imprecisely, for these headings are only similar to the parts of a public speech.

<**Encomiastic**,> **paraphrastic** (Aphth 19 H/ON [= 4,13 Rabe]). 7. <One should know> that the encomiastic heading must

<sup>29</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:301.

<sup>30</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:305. This way of classifying chreiai goes back to Nicolaus 116–124 H/ON (= 22,10–16 Felten).

<sup>31</sup> Planudes is distinguishing between two meanings of *διαίρεσις*. Aphthonius previously used it in the sense of classifying the various kinds of chreiai, now in the sense of dividing the elaboration of chreia into its eight headings.

<sup>32</sup> Introducing *κατασκευάζειν* as a synonym for “elaborate” calls to mind the pair of progymnasmata, refutation and confirmation.

<sup>33</sup> Planudes takes a middle position on the question of whether students should refute chreiai. Theon discussed refutation of a chreia (see Theon 334–83 [= 28–30 Patillon]), whereas John of Sardis rejected refutation of a chreia at length (see John of Sardis 5.2–8).

μὴ μεῖζον ἢ τὸ προοίμιον τῆς ὑποθέσεως. 8. τὸ δὲ παραφραστικόν, ὡς ἂν βουλοίμεθα, νῦν μὲν ἐκτενοῦμενον, νῦν δὲ συνεσταλμένον αὐτὸ ποιήσομεν· καὶ ἄλλως δὲ βραχὺ τὸ ἐγκωμιαστικὸν εἶναι δεῖ, ἵνα μὴ μεῖζον ἢ τοῦ ἔργου τὸ πάρεργον·

[20] 9. Δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς τὸ προοίμιον, | ὃ ἀναλογεῖ, οἰκεῖον εἶναι τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ προσώπῳ καὶ τῇ ὑποθέσει, ὥστε μὴ κοινὸν φαίνεσθαι, μηδὲ πολλοῖς δύνασθαι ἀρμόζειν· ἂν μὲν ἢ τινα αὐτῷ ἕτερα πεπραγμένα ἢ ἔργοις ἢ λόγοις, ἐν παραλείψεως ἢ ἀποσιωπήσεως σχήματι διὰ βραχέων αὐξάνειν τὸν ἔπαινον. 10. ἂν δὲ μηδὲν ἔχωμεν τοιοῦτον, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος, οἷον ῥήτωρ ἢ στρατηγός· ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθνους, οἷον Ἀθηναῖος καὶ ἀξίως τῶν τοῦ Σόλωνος νόμων τετραμμένος· ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ δίχα τοῦ κατὰ παράλειψιν σχήματος ψιλὴ ἀπαρίθμησις τὸ αὐτὸ ποιεῖν δύναται. 11. τὴν δὲ παράφρασιν δεῖ μῆτε ἀφίστασθαι τοῦ προκειμένου, μῆτε ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν λέξεων ἀκριβῶς μένειν.

<Τῷ τῆς αἰτίας (Aphth 19–20 H/ON [= 4,14 Rabe]). 12. Ἐκ τῶν περιστατικῶν τὴν αἰτίαν μόνην παρείληφεν, ὡς κρείττονα τῶν ἄλλων. 13. παρὰ τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν ζητημάτων ὅσα μὴ ἔχει αἰτίαν ἀσύστατά εἰσιν.>

<Ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου (Aphth 20 H/ON [= 4,14 Rabe]). 14. Πέφυκε γὰρ τὰ πράγματα τῇ παραθέσει τῶν ἐναντίων ἐκδηλότερα φαίνεσθαι, ὡς τὸ φῶς τῇ τοῦ σκότους παραβολῇ.>

[20,15] | Παραβολῇ, <παραδείγματι> (Aphth 20–21 H/ON [= 4,14–15 Rabe]). 15. Ἐπεταί τῇ παραβολῇ τὸ παράδειγμα· κατασκευαστικὸν γὰρ αὐτῆς ὡς μερικώτερον.

16. Διαφέρει δὲ ἀλλήλων, ἢ ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν καθ' ἑκάστην γινομένων λαμβάνεται, τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ἁπαλῶν γεγονότων· ἢ ὅτι ἡ μὲν διὰ

8 ἐκτενοῦμενον scripsi || ἐκτενοῦμεν Walz || 11–13 Τῷ τῆς αἰτίας ... ἀσύστατά εἰσιν transposui ex 20,21–24 (Walz) || 13 Ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου ... παραβολῇ transposui ex 20,24–27 (Walz) || 14 παραδείγματι addidi



be short, to keep the introduction from being longer than the presentation of the subject. 8. But with regard to the paraphrastic heading we will make it longer at one time, shorter at another, however we wish. But, in any event, the encomiastic heading must be short, to keep the subsidiary point from being longer than the main one.

9. The encomiastic heading, like the introduction to which it is analogous, must be appropriate to the individual and subject under discussion, so that it does not seem too general and so capable of fitting many individuals. Now if some other things have been accomplished by him, either through deeds or words, one must briefly amplify the praise by means of the figure “pretended omission” or “abrupt breaking off.” 10. But if we should have no such specific individual, one must amplify on the basis of profession—an orator or general. Or on the basis of nationality, for example, “He is an Athenian and was raised in a manner that is worthy of the laws of Solon.” Sometimes, however, even without the figure “pretended omission” a mere enumeration can accomplish the same purpose. 11. Still the paraphrastic must not depart from the subject under discussion nor keep too closely to the same words.

<**The rationale** (Aphth 19–20 H/ON [= 4,14 Rabe]). 12. Aphthonius has taken only the cause [αἰτία] from the list of circumstantial elements since it is better than the other elements.<sup>34</sup> 13. Consequently, all public cases and investigations that have no cause are incapable of proof.>

<**From the opposite** (Aphth 20 H/ON [= 4,14 Rabe]). 14. Subjects naturally seem more lucid when compared with their opposite, just as light is in juxtaposition to darkness.>

**Analogy, <example>** (Aphth 20–21 H/ON [= 4,14–15 Rabe]). 15. The example follows the analogy. The example is confirmatory of it since it is more specific than an analogy.

16. Analogy and example differ from one another: an analogy is taken from actions that occur daily, whereas an example

<sup>34</sup> Planudes assumes his students know what the six περιστατικά (“circumstantial elements”) are from Aphthonius (*Progymn.* 2 [2,23–3,2 Rabe]): the individual who acted, the action that was done, the time it occurred, the place where it occurred, the manner in which it occurred, and the reason why it happened. Planudes does not identify them in his commentary but merely notes that some add a seventh element to the six by the addition of ὕλη, or material used, such a sword or stone (in a murder) (see 2:13,24–14,1 Walz).

πράξεως, τὸ δὲ διὰ προσώπου εἰσφέρεται· ἢ ὅτι ἡ μὲν καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλό-  
γων καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀψύχων λαμβάνεται· τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ μόνων τῶν λογικῶν.

[20,27]

| **Μαρτυρία παλαιῶν** (Aphth 21 H/ON [= 4,15 Rabe]). 17. Τοῦ-

το τῶν ἀτέχνων ἐστὶ πίστεων. 18. εἰ δέ ποτε ἀποροῖμεν αὐτοῦ, τῷ κατὰ  
[21] παράλειψιν χρησόμεθα. 19. ζητητέον | δέ, πῶς ἂν ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς  
χρεῖαις μαρτυρία τεθείη λόγων οὐκ ὄντων. 20. δεῖ οὖν ἐν τούτοις λέγειν,  
ὅτι καλὸν τὸ γεγεννημένον, καὶ ὅτι τὸν σκοπὸν τῆς πράξεως ἐγνωμολό-  
γησεν ἕτερος, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ Διογένους τοῦ τυπτήσαντος τὸν παιδαγωγόν.  
21. εἰσάξομεν τὸν Θουκυδίδην λέγοντα· «ὁ γὰρ δυνάμενος παῦσαι, πε-  
ριορῶν δέ, ἀληθέστερον αὐτὸ δρᾷ.»

### <§7. ΚΛΙΣΙΣ>

1. Ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι αἱ χρεῖαι κατὰ πᾶσαν πτώσιν προφέρονται· κατ' εὐ-  
θεῖαν, οἷον· Πιττακὸς ἐρωτηθεὶς . . . ἀπεκρίνατο 2. κατὰ γενικὴν, οἷον·  
Πιττακοῦ ἐρωτηθέντος . . . λόγος φέρεται <εἰπόντος> 3. κατὰ δοτικὴν,  
οἷον· Πιττακῷ ἐρωτηθέντι . . . ἐπῆλθεν εἰπεῖν 4. κατ' αἰτιατικὴν, οἷον·  
Πιττακὸν ἐρωτηθέντα . . . φασὶν εἰπεῖν 5. κατὰ κλητικὴν, οἷον· «Σύ, ὦ  
Πιττακέ,» ἐρωτηθεὶς . . . εἶπας 6. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀριθμῶν.

is taken from actions that have occurred once; an analogy is expressed through action, whereas an example is expressed through an individual; and an analogy is also based on irrational creatures and inanimate objects, whereas an example is based only on rational beings.

**Testimony of the ancients** (Aphth 21 H/ON [= 4,15 Rabe]).

17. This heading belongs to the uninvented proofs.<sup>35</sup> 18. But if we are at a loss for an ancient authority, we will make use of the figure “pretended omission.” 19. One should also investigate how a testimony could be composed for the elaboration of action chreiai since there are no sayings in them. 20. One must, therefore, say in these cases that what has occurred is noble and that another person has expressed in words the intent of the action, as in the case of Diogenes: He struck the paedagogus. 21. We will introduce Thucydides, who said: “For the one who is able to stop something but allows it to occur does it more truly.”<sup>36</sup>

#### <§7. DECLENSION>

1. One should know that chreiai are expressed in every case. In the nominative—for example: Pittacus, on being asked. . . , answered. . . .<sup>37</sup> 2. In the genitive—for example: The saying of Pittacus, on being asked. . . , is related, <when he said>. . . . 3. In the dative—for example: It occurred to Pittacus, on being asked. . . , to say. . . . 4. In the accusative—for example: They say that Pittacus, on being asked. . . , said. . . . 5. In the vocative—for example: “O Pittacus,” on being asked. . . , you said, “. . .” 6. And so in the other numbers.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>35</sup> Doxapatres lists testimonies and oaths as examples of uninvented proofs (see Doxapatres 6.51).

<sup>36</sup> Thucydides 1.69.1. Note that Planudes says nothing about the last heading, the brief epilogue.

<sup>37</sup> This chreia, on which see *Chreia* 1:331–32, reads in full: “Pittacus, on being asked whether anyone escapes the notice of the gods when committing some sin, answered: ‘Not even when contemplating it.’” Planudes has kept only the words that change case or added the words that are necessary to make the case changes work grammatically.

<sup>38</sup> For an example of a declension of both the dual and plural numbers, see Brit. Mus. addit. MS 37516 (see *Chreia* 2:62–66).



# Text 6. Matthew Camariotes

## Epitome of Aphthonius's

### *Progymnasmata*

Chapter 3: On the Chreia  
(1:122,23–123,5 Walz)

#### Introduction

##### LIFE AND WRITINGS

With Matthew Camariotes the role of Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata* in the educational curriculum survived even the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453. Thus over a thousand years have passed since Aphthonius composed this textbook. As will become apparent, however, the tradition of vigorous and detailed analysis of this textbook as represented most fully by John Doxapatres has all but ended. Thus we conclude this volume with a commentator who had little desire to reflect at length on Aphthonius's treatment of the chreia or any other of the *progymnasmata*.

Matthew Camariotes, the son of a priest, was born in Thessalonike toward the end of the Palaeologan period.<sup>1</sup> He went to Constantinople for his education and had as one of his teachers Gennadios II Scholarios, who, after the fall of Constantinople,

<sup>1</sup> Still fundamental for biographical data and the corresponding sources is A. Biedl, "Mattheus Camariotes: Specimen Prosopographiae Byzantinae," *ByzZ* 35 (1935): 337–39. See also Hans-Georg Beck, *Kirche und theologische Literatur im byzantinischen Reich* (HAW 12.2.1; Munich: Beck, 1959), 772–73; and Alice-Mary Talbot, "Kamariotes, Matthew," *ODB* 2:1097–98. For a more general assessment of the teaching of rhetoric after 1453, see Thomas M. Conley, "Greek Rhetorics after the Fall of Constantinople: An Introduction," *Rhetorica* 18 (2000): 265–94.

served three times as Patriarch and in that position appointed Camariotes, probably in 1455, to be μέγας ῥήτωρ ("Grand Rhetor") of the patriarchal school, where he taught rhetoric and philosophy.<sup>2</sup>

Camariotes not only taught philosophy but also got caught up in the Plato-Aristotle controversy, which was sparked in 1439 by George Gemistos Plethon's *De differentiis Aristotelis et Platonis*.<sup>3</sup> Plethon not only defended Platonic views but also argued that Aristotle's philosophy did not support Christian theology.<sup>4</sup> Scholarios, an ardent Aristotelian, responded in 1443/44 with an attack on Plethon's views, and later, in 1455, Camariotes joined his teacher with his *Contra Plethonem*, which attacked especially his deterministic and idolatrous ideas.<sup>5</sup>

Several other writings of Camariotes were intended for the classroom. They include an Εἰσαγωγή εἰς τὴν γραμματικὴν (*Introduction to Grammar*), which remains unedited,<sup>6</sup> and introductory texts on the Corpus Hermogenianum. Christian Walz edited his epitome of Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata*,<sup>7</sup> though only those on Hermogenes's *On Issues* and *On Invention*, the latter perhaps only partially.<sup>8</sup> Since then Herbert Hunger has learned of a

<sup>2</sup> On the rather grim picture of education in Constantinople after 1453, see Apostolos E. Vacalopoulos, *The Greek Nation, 1453-1669: The Cultural and Economic Background of Modern Greek Society* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1976), 151-86.

<sup>3</sup> On this controversy, see further John Monfasani, *George of Trebizond: A Biography and a Study of His Rhetoric and Logic* (CSCT 1; Leiden: Brill, 1976), 201-29.

<sup>4</sup> See Monfasani, *George of Trebizond*, 205-6: Plethon "demonstrated Aristotle's ambiguity on the immortality of the soul, as well as his belief in the eternity of the world, in a God who is merely 'primus inter pares' among the unmoved movers, in a compromising and hedonistic ethic, and in the lack of Providence over the world. In short, Pletho[n] rendered Aristotle completely unfit for Christian use."

<sup>5</sup> On Camariotes's views, see further Monfasani, *George of Trebizond*, 206-8, and esp. C. M. Woodhouse, *George Gemistos Plethon* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), 39, 180, 187, 362.

<sup>6</sup> So Biedl, "Camariotes," 338, who adds that the text is preserved in a seventeenth-century manuscript, Bodleian misc. 120.

<sup>7</sup> Christian Walz, ed., *Rhetores Graeci* (9 vols.; Tübingen: Cotta, 1832-1836), 1:121-26.

<sup>8</sup> See Walz, *Rhetores Graeci*, 6:601-44. That Walz may have only partially edited the epitome of *On Invention* arises from the fact that there is nothing on the last book, book 4.

manuscript, dated about 1500 (UB Salamanca M 285), that contains epitomes of the entire corpus.<sup>9</sup>

Besides these classroom texts, Camariotes wrote on a number of other subjects, mostly theological: the already-mentioned *Contra Plethonem*; an encomium of Saints Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, and John Chrysostom;<sup>10</sup> a lament over the capture of Constantinople;<sup>11</sup> and a number of others that remain unedited.<sup>12</sup> Finally, he also wrote some letters and poetry.<sup>13</sup>

As a teacher and writer, Camariotes became, as one modern scholar has put it, “the dean of intellectual life in the city after its capture.”<sup>14</sup> At any rate, Friedrich Fuchs tells of a John Laskaris who traveled to Constantinople and desired to visit Camariotes in order “to see in that one man the entire chorus of men who had previously reached the heights in eloquence and philosophy.”<sup>15</sup> Camariotes died about 1490.<sup>16</sup>

#### CAMARIOTES’S EPITOME OF APHTHONIUS’S *PROGYMNASMATA*

Camariotes begins his treatise, as did the commentators before him, with a general introduction. While very brief, this introduction touches on familiar themes: definitions of the word προγύμνασμα, both as a general noun and as a rhetorical exercise (121,2–5); the number of progymnamata and a list of all fourteen in the Aphthonian sequence (121,6–9); and the relation of various progymnasmata to the three kinds of public speech, such as the fable, chreia, maxim, and thesis to the advisory speech (121,10–122,3).

But we get a better grasp of what Camariotes has done by looking at the end of his treatise on Aphthonius’s *Progymnasmata*. He names it an ἐπίτομος λόγος (“short treatise”) (126,24), and short

<sup>9</sup> Herbert Hunger, *Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner* (HAW 12.5.1–2; Munich: Beck, 1978), 1:88 n. 93.

<sup>10</sup> See Biedl, “Camariotes,” 338.

<sup>11</sup> See PG 160:1060–69.

<sup>12</sup> See further Biedl, “Camariotes,” 338–39.

<sup>13</sup> See Biedl, “Camariotes,” 339.

<sup>14</sup> Vacalopoulos, *Greek Nation*, 102.

<sup>15</sup> Friedrich Fuchs, *Die höheren Schulen von Konstantinopel im Mittelalter* (ByzA 8; Leipzig: Teubner, 1926), 75–76 (my translation).

<sup>16</sup> Talbot, “Kamariotes,” 1097.

it is, less than 15 percent of what Aphthonius has written. Clearly, “epitome” is an apt word, but perhaps “deletion” is more apt, as so much has been deleted. The lion’s share of the omissions is accounted for by the elimination of all of Aphthonius’s model exercises, but, unlike the *Rhetorica Marciana*, Camariotes did not replace Aphthonius’s with his own model exercises.<sup>17</sup>

Besides the model exercises, Camariotes deleted whatever seemed unnecessary, even some of the *παρεπόμενα*, the material that was considered essential to each *progymnasma*. Here is a sample: in the fable chapter Camariotes eliminated the sections on *γένεσις* and *κλήσις*;<sup>18</sup> in the narrative chapter the *διαφορά*, or difference, between *διήγημα* and *διήγησις*;<sup>19</sup> in the common place and encomium chapters the etymology of the exercises;<sup>20</sup> in the encomium chapter the *διαφορά* between *ὕμνος* and *ἔπαινος*, as well as the *ὑλη* (“subjects”) of an encomium.<sup>21</sup> In the invective chapter, which has been incorporated into the encomium chapter, the *ῥος* alone remains (124,19–20);<sup>22</sup> in the comparison chapter the section on *εἶδος* has been rephrased but the illustrations deleted;<sup>23</sup> and in the thesis chapter the *διαφορά* between a thesis that is *πολιτική* and one that is *θεωρητική* has been dropped.<sup>24</sup>

In addition to deleting various *παρεπόμενα*, Camariotes also deleted most of the examples that Aphthonius had provided for illustrating the *εἵδη* (“classes”) of his various *διαίρεσεις*. For example, not one example of the eight classes of maxims remains; all examples of the subjects of an encomium have been dropped; in the speaking-in-character chapter not one of the three examples of the *διαφορά* nor any of the three examples of the *εἶδος* survives; no examples of the subjects of a description are kept; and so on. Finally, Camariotes deleted (as had the *Rhetorica Marciana*) Aphthonius’s frequent, if unnecessary, transition sentence *ἡ μὲν οὖν διαίρεσις αὕτη κατλ.* in all five exercises where it occurs (*chreia*,

<sup>17</sup> See *Chreia* 2:258–69.

<sup>18</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 1 (1,4–5 and 7–10 Rabe).

<sup>19</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 2 (2,16–18 Rabe).

<sup>20</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 7 (16,20–21,2 Rabe) and *Progymn.* 8 (21,6–

7).

<sup>21</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 8 (21,8–19 Rabe).

<sup>22</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 8 (27,13 Rabe).

<sup>23</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 10 (31,15–17 Rabe).

<sup>24</sup> See Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 13 (41,22–42,5 Rabe).



maxim, encomium, speaking-in-character, and introduction of a law).<sup>25</sup> The brevity of this epitome is so severe that it is difficult to imagine its utility in a classroom setting. To be sure, the brevity might be useful as an introductory overview of a progymnasma, but the deletion of illustrations hardly contributes to clarity and understanding.

But if little of Aphthonius's text remains, even less of the commentary tradition that elucidated it has been kept. There is no concern to justify the *τάξεις* of particular progymnasmata, little concern for the *παρεπόμενα*, no explanations of the meaning of individual words, no interest in various grammatical features of Aphthonius's Greek, no awareness of differences of opinion over what Aphthonius was saying, no use of previous commentators or other *Progymnasmata*, no citations of classical authors. In short, the copious and profound commentary tradition on Aphthonius that reached its peak in John of Sardis, John Geometres, and especially John Doxapatres has fallen, in Camariotes's epitome, into the arid and diminishing intellectual landscape in Constantinople after its capture. Herbert Hunger characterizes this epitome as a dull and unpretentious reduction to essentials.<sup>26</sup> And Camariotes is not alone. Hunger elsewhere describes a manuscript (Riccard. gr. 58) that contains an epitome of the Corpus Hermogenianum by an older contemporary of Camariotes, John Chortasmenos. The latter's epitome of Aphthonius contains, Hunger says, little more than the definitions of all fourteen progymnasmata.<sup>27</sup> Such, then, is the end of the commentary tradition on Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata*.

#### CAMARIOTES'S EPITOME OF APHTHONIUS'S CHREIA CHAPTER

The chreia chapter differs little from the ways that Camariotes has epitomized the other chapters. The *παρεπόμενον* of the *ἐτυμολογία* has been deleted.<sup>28</sup> He has omitted the introductory sentence of

<sup>25</sup> See Aphthonius 16–17 H/ON (= 4,12 Rabe). Cf. Aphthonius, *Progymn.* 4 (8,3 Rabe), 8 (21,20), 11 (35,1), and 14 (47,11).

<sup>26</sup> See Hunger, *Literatur*, 1:88.

<sup>27</sup> Herbert Hunger, *Johannes Chortasmenos (ca. 1370-ca. 1436/37): Briefe, Gedichte und kleine Schriften* (WByzSt 7; Vienna: Böhlau, 1969), 30–31.

<sup>28</sup> See Aphthonius 4 H/ON (= 4,1 Rabe).

the εἶδος section, which identifies the three classes of chreia before explaining each.<sup>29</sup> Only Aphthonius's example of a saying chreia remains (2);<sup>30</sup> those for action and mixed chreiai have been excised.<sup>31</sup> The transitional sentence to the elaboration headings, as we have already noted, has been left out as well.<sup>32</sup>

What remains of Aphthonius's chapter has been changed in various ways. The ὅρος ("definition") is identical, except for the final participle (1.1).<sup>33</sup> Camariotes (or the scribe) has written the neuter form (ἀναφέρον), which would then modify the neuter noun ἀπομνημόνευμα rather than Aphthonius's feminine form (ἀναφέρουσα) that modifies the feminine noun χρεία. Doxapatres, we recall, had defended Aphthonius's choice on the grammatical rule that the feminine trumps the neuter.<sup>34</sup>

As for the division of the class into subclasses, Camariotes paraphrases Aphthonius's definition of the saying chreia and copies his example, the chreia attributed to Plato, exactly except for writing the plural (ιδρῶσι) for Aphthonius's singular (ιδρῶτι) (2.1).<sup>35</sup> The definition of the action chreia has been changed. Aphthonius's tautological "an action chreia is one that depicts [σημαῖνον] an action"<sup>36</sup> has become "[one that] depicts [σημαίνουσα] the action of someone worth emulating for the purpose of exhortation and imitation" (2.2). The definition of the mixed chreia has likewise been changed, by substituting the dual ἐξ ἀμφοῖν (2.3) for Aphthonius's ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων<sup>37</sup> and dropping Aphthonius's unnecessary expansion, namely, λόγου καὶ πράξεως.<sup>38</sup>

The only other place where there is some expansion of Aphthonius's text occurs in the section dealing with the κεφάλαια ("headings") to be used in an elaboration. Aphthonius had merely listed the eight headings.<sup>39</sup> Camariotes, however, expanded on

<sup>29</sup> See Aphthonius 5–6 H/ON (= 4,2–3 Rabe).

<sup>30</sup> See Aphthonius 8–9 H/ON (= 4,4–5 Rabe).

<sup>31</sup> See Aphthonius 9–12 and 14–16 H/ON (= 4,6–8 and 9–11 Rabe).

<sup>32</sup> See Aphthonius 16–17 H/ON (= 4,12 Rabe).

<sup>33</sup> See Aphthonius 2–3 H/ON (= 3,21–22 Rabe).

<sup>34</sup> See Doxapatres 3.12–14.

<sup>35</sup> See Aphthonius 6–9 H/ON (= 4,3–5 Rabe).

<sup>36</sup> See Aphthonius 9–10 H/ON (= 4,5–6 Rabe).

<sup>37</sup> See Aphthonius 13 H/ON (= 4,8 Rabe).

<sup>38</sup> See Aphthonius 13 H/ON (= 4,9 Rabe).

<sup>39</sup> See Aphthonius 19–22 H/ON (= 4,13–15 Rabe).

three of them, but only minimally. Thus Aphthonius's simple ἐγκωμιστικόν has been expanded to read "the encomiastic (praising) the one who has acted or who has made the exhortation that one must emulate" (3.1); Aphthonius's αἰτία<sup>40</sup> has become "the rationale for why this was said or done" (3.3); and Aphthonius's ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου<sup>41</sup> now reads, "the heading from the opposite is what would have been if this had not been said or done" (3.4). The remaining five κεφάλαια are, as in Aphthonius, merely listed: παραφραστικόν (3.2) as well as παραβολή, παράδειγμα, μαρτυρία παλαιῶν, and ἐπίλογος βραχύς (3.5). In short, aside from the general introduction, it is difficult to imagine the classroom utility of such a severe epitome of an already spare text.

#### TEXT AND TRANSLATION

The text of Camariotes's epitome of Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata* used here is that of Walz,<sup>42</sup> who based his text on one manuscript, Taurien. gr. 230. Despite the brevity of the text, section titles have once again been inserted, as we have for the previous texts. In addition, "verse" numbers along with the page numbers in Walz's edition have been added to facilitate referencing. A few changes have been made in Walz's text, all noted in the apparatus.

This translation is the first that I know of.

<sup>40</sup> See Aphthonius 19 H/ON (= 4, 14 Rabe).

<sup>41</sup> See Aphthonius 20 H/ON (= 4, 14 Rabe).

<sup>42</sup> Walz, *Rhetores Graeci*, 1:120–136, esp. 122, 23–123, 5.

# Text 6. Matthaei Camariotae Epitome in Aphthonii Progymnasmata

Cap. III. Περὶ Χρείας  
(I:122,23–123,5 Walz)

<§1. ΟΡΟΣ>

1. Χρεία ἐστὶν ἀπομνημόνευμα σύντομον εὐστόχως ἐπὶ τι πρόσωπον ἀνα-  
φέρον.

<§2. Η ΔΙΑΙΡΕΣΙΣ ΑΠΟ ΓΕΝΟΥΣ ΕΙΣ ΕΙΔΗ>

1. Ἔστι δὲ ἡ μὲν λογική, ἡ λόγῳ μόνῳ δηλοῦσα τὴν ὠφέλειαν· οἷον ὁ  
Πλάτων τοὺς τῆς ἀρετῆς κλῶνας ἰδρῶσι καὶ πόνοις ἔλεγε φύεσθαι· 2. ἡ  
δὲ πρακτική, ἡ πρᾶξιν σημαίνουσα τινος τῶν ἀξιοζηλωτῶν εἰς προτρο-  
πὴν τε καὶ μίμησιν· 3. ἡ δὲ μικτὴ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν.

<§3. Η ΔΙΑΙΡΕΣΙΣ ΑΠΟ ΟΛΟΥ ΕΙΣ ΜΕΡΗ>

[123] 1. Κεφάλαια δέ, οἷς κατασκευάζεται ἡ χρεία· ἐγκωμιαστικὸν | τοῦ εἰπόν-

§1.1 ἀναφέρον Walz || ἀναφέρουσα Aphthonius 3 H/ON (= 3,22 Rabe)  
|| §2.1 ἰδρῶσι Walz || ἰδρῶτι Aphthonius 8 (= 4,4 Rabe) || 2 προτροπήν  
scripsi || τροπήν Walz

# Text 6. Matthew Camariotes

## Epitome of Aphthonius's

### *Progymnasmata*

#### Chapter 3: On the Chreia (1:122,23–123,5 Walz)

##### <§1. DEFINITION>

1. A chreia is a concise reminiscence aptly attributed to some individual.

##### <§2. DIVISION OF THE CLASS INTO ITS SUBCLASSES>

1. There is the saying chreia, which reveals its benefit with speech alone—for example, Plato said that the offshoots of virtue grow by sweat and toil.<sup>1</sup> 2. There is the action chreia, which depicts the action of someone worth emulating for the purpose of exhortation<sup>2</sup> and imitation. 3. And there is the mixed chreia, which is made up of both.

##### <§3. DIVISION OF THE WHOLE INTO ITS PARTS>

1. The headings by which a chreia is confirmed are: the encomiastic, (praising) the one who has acted or who has made the

<sup>1</sup> On this chreia, see *Chreia* 1:333.

<sup>2</sup> The manuscript reading here is *τροπή* (“change”), which may be correct, but the emendation to *προτροπή* (“exhortation”) seems preferable, especially in the light of the use of this word in Camariotes’s explanation of the encomiastic heading (3.1).

τος τὴν προτροπὴν ἢ τοῦ πράξαντος, ἢν χρὴ ζηλοῦν. 2. παραφραστικόν, 3. τὸ τῆς αἰτίας, δι' ἣν τόδε τι εἴρηται ἢ πέπρακται. 4. τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου, τί ἂν ἦν, εἰ μὴ τόδε ἐλέγετο ἢ ἐπράττετο. 5. παραβολή, παράδειγμα, μαρτυρία παλαιῶν, ἐπίλογος βραχύς.

exhortation that one must emulate;<sup>3</sup> 2. the paraphrastic; 3. the rationale for why this was said or done; 4. from the opposite: what would the situation be if this were not said or done; 5. analogy, example, testimony of the ancients, and brief epilogue.

<sup>3</sup> The syntax of this sentence is not clear. Seemingly the words “the exhortation that one must emulate” should be the object of both participles, *εἰπόντος* and *πράξαντος*. But “making an exhortation” makes little sense.





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# Index of Technical Terms

Listed below are the technical terms, both grammatical and rhetorical and cited by page number, that appear in the six texts. Frequently occurring terms are not cited in full but only with representative examples.

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