# Lexical Semantics of the Greek New Testament

SOCIETY OF BIBLICAL LITERATURE
Resources for Biblical Study

Edited by
David E. Aune

Number 25
Lexical Semantics
of the Greek New Testament

by
EUGENE A. NIDA
JOHANNES P. LOUW

# LEXICAL SEMANTICS OF THE GREEK NEW TESTAMENT

A Supplement to the
Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament
Based on Semantic Domains

by
Eugene A. Nida
Johannes P. Louw

*Scholars Press*
Atlanta, Georgia

# Lexical Semantics of the Greek New Testament



**Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data**

Louw, J. P.
Lexical semantics of the Greek New Testament / Johannes P. Louw, Eugene A. Nida.
p. cm. — (Resources for biblical study / Society of Biblical Literature ; no. 25)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 1-55540-577-0. — ISBN 1-55540-578-9 (pbk. )
1. Greek language, Biblical—Semantics. 2. Greek language, Biblical—Lexicology. 3. Bible. N.T.—Language, style. I. Nida, Eugene Albert, 1914- . II. Title. III. Series: Resources for biblical study ; no. 25.
PA875.L59 1992
487'.4—dc20 91-44994
CIP

Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper

# CONTENTS

# PREFACE

The primary purpose of this analysis of lexical semantics in the Greek vocabulary of the New Testament is to provide scholars, translators, and students with a more complete statement about the principles and procedures employed in the preparation of the *Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament Based on Semantic Domains* (abbreviated as *L and N*). Although this lexicon contains an introduction which outlines the major principles and indicates the scientific basis for such a treatment of New Testament Greek vocabulary, it has become increasingly evident that most users would appreciate a more detailed analysis of the lexicological principles and their implications.

A secondary purpose is to provide readers with an introduction to lexicology as illustrated by a number of issues involved in treating the meanings of words and idioms in the New Testament. This has meant highlighting the methods used in analyzing similarities and contrasts in meaning and in classifying domains. This volume does presuppose a considerable knowledge of the Greek of the New Testament, but it is not designed merely for New Testament specialists. Anyone interested in the problems of lexical meaning and exegesis should find the contents helpful.

Two introductory chapters, one on "The Problems of Lexical Semantics" and another on "The Nature of Language," provide the conceptual setting for the core chapters: "Analyzing the Different Meanings of the Same Lexeme" and "Analyzing the Related Meanings of Different Lexemes," which focus on the syntagmatic and paradigmatic approaches respectively. The fifth chapter

treats the problems of domain classification, and a final chapter deals with the scientific basis for a study of lexical semantics. Some bibliographical data is cited in the text, but most citations of scholarly resources on lexicography are reserved for discussion in the final chapter.

An extended bibliography is included, but it is not restricted to works dealing with biblical semantics. In combination with comments in Chapter 6, it can become a useful guide to those who may wish to extend their study of lexicology.

There is no glossary, since the defining of technical terms apart from specific contexts is usually unsatisfactory. The Index, however, highlights with asterisks those pages in the text where key terms are treated and employed in particularly significant ways.

An especially useful addition to this text is a series of forty-four problems which illustrate a number of issues which are discussed in it. These may be useful for teachers employing this book as a textbook in lexicography, and they may also be of benefit to students and scholars who may wish to explore more fully the implications of the methodology.

A distinctive feature of this volume is the manner in which it deals realistically with both the systematic and the unsystematic nature of meaning. In so many cases lexicographers have concentrated primarily on the logical relations involved in the meanings of words and idioms and have failed to note the unsystematic, anomalous, and nonorthogonal elements. Since the lexical resources of any language are a reflection of the culture and since the culture is subject to all the anomalies of human behavior, it is not strange that in a number of respects the meanings of words and idioms reflect many of these unsystematic and paradoxical factors.

This treatment of lexical semantics does not conform to any one theory of linguistics, since the authors do not regard any one theory as adequate to explain all the multifaceted aspects of meaning. In a sense this approach to semantics is eclectic, but the dominant orientations are sociolinguistic and sociosemiotic, with obvious sociological implications. Language as a code can only have meaning in terms of the social setting in which it is used.

It is important to recognize that the Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament edited by Louw and Nida should not be regarded as taking the place of other types of dictionaries, e.g. the Bauer Lexicon, which contains a great deal of very important material, but is organized in a different manner and designed to be used in somewhat different ways. The Greek-English Lexicon by Louw and Nida is simply a new lexicographical approach to some of the basic semantic problems which can be best treated in terms of distinctive domains rather than in the alphabetical order of words.

The authors are deeply indebted to a number of persons who have reviewed the *Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament Based on Semantic Domains* and in doing so have mentioned a number of matters which are not adequately treated in the Introduction to the Lexicon. Furthermore, they have noted several principles and procedures which require further explanations. The authors are especially appreciative of the important contribution of Karen Munson to editorial details and to the process of making this book more understandable and helpful for the average reader.

# ONE

# THE PROBLEMS OF LEXICAL SEMANTICS

In no area of New Testament studies is there such a dearth of valid information and such a wealth of misinformation as in lexical semantics, the study of the meaning of words. But in large measure this is also true of linguistics in general, since there are so many disparate views about the nature and role of lexical meaning and about the procedures which need to be employed in sorting out the nagging problems about the meaning of words and how that meaning can best be described. In fact, there is no consensus about the meaning of *meaning*. **Problem 1**.

Sometimes dictionaries attempt to help readers by listing so-called synonyms for *meaning*, e.g. *significance*, *purport*, *reference*, *denotation*, *sense*, and *import*, but these do not assist the reader very much. Furthermore, in the study of Greek lexicography an examination of the Greek expressions for *meaning* provides little or no insight, since these are also numerous and almost equally nebulous in significance, e.g. δύναμις (1 Corinthians 14.11), θέλει εἶναι (Acts 2.12), λέγω (Acts 9.36), ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν (Hebrews 7.9), φημί (1 Corinthians 7.29), ἐπιλύω (Mark 4.34), ἑρμηνεία (1 Corinthians 12.10), and σημαίνω (Acts 25.27).

Though dictionaries do not assist a reader very much in understanding the meaning of *meaning*, they often do help greatly in understanding the meaning of individual words and idioms, especially if they are monolingual dictionaries containing definitions. But most bilingual dictionaries, which depend primarily on listing glosses, i.e. possible translational correspondences, can be quite misleading or at least confusing. Giving the meaning of ἔπος as

'word, saying, speech' is not very helpful if practically the same glosses are given for ῥῆμα.

What is even more confusing about some Greek-English dictionaries is the manner in which information is organized. Sometimes the order of meanings depends on etymology (the presumed growth of meaning), in other instances on syntactic constructions in which the words occur, in still other cases on an assumed logical set of relations between meanings, and finally on the basis of frequency of occurrence in texts. **Problem 2.**

Perhaps the most misleading approach to meaning is the one based on etymology, usually interpreted as discovering the "true" meaning of a word by examining the literal or original meaning of the root and/or affixes. For example, some persons have argued that ὡσαννά should be rendered in the New Testament as "Help, please," because this would be an appropriate translation of the underlying Hebrew expression. But in Matthew 21.9, Mark 11.9, and John 12.13 the crowds of Jesus' followers were exalting in his presence. They were confident that he was bringing salvation and help, so that they were not pleading with him for help but were rejoicing in his triumphant arrival in Jerusalem. Most standard translations have preserved the transliteration, since the expression is well known liturgically as an expression of praise. Some translators have tried to communicate more directly the impact of the word by translating it as "praise" in Today's English Version and as *Heil* in the German text of Gute Nachricht.

Theological dictionaries seem to have a built-in proclivity to read into meanings somewhat more than is actually there. Some scholars, for example, would apparently like to see in the terms ἁγιάζω and ἁγιασμός a type of consecration and holiness which would imply sinlessness. But more often these scholars are only guilty of constructing verbal theologies without recognizing that what matters is not the words in isolation but the way in which words are put together into sentences and paragraphs.

On the other hand, some dictionaries have definitions which are entirely too neat and precise, when in reality the boundaries between words which are closely related in meaning are often quite fuzzy and indefinite, as in the case of φιλέω and ἀγαπάω. The traditional idea that ἀγαπάω represents a divine kind of love and that φιλέω is only love on a human level does not stand up to inspection, e.g. in John 5.20 "the Father loves the Son" with the verb φιλέω, and in Luke 11.43 "the Pharisees love the reserved seats in the synagogues" with the verb ἀγαπάω.

Unfortunately some dictionary makers are guilty of covering up problems of fuzzy boundaries of meaning by eliminating contexts in which the classification of meaning is difficult. One editor of a dictionary

remarkable for the precision of its definitions confessed that strictly marginal uses of words were sometimes merely set aside so as not to make the definitions too vague and fuzzy.

Simply because a Greek term can be translated in a certain context by a particular term in English does not mean that the translation is one of the meanings of the Greek word. For example, in some contexts it is entirely appropriate to translate αἰτέω as 'pray,' but the meaning of αἰτέω is 'to ask for or request with a degree of urgency.' In contexts in which the request is made to God, it is appropriate to use the English term 'pray,' but this is only a contextually conditioned equivalent of αἰτέω and not the meaning of the Greek term. Similarly, the Greek term ἄνθρωπος (generally translated 'person, man, human being') refers in John 16.21 to a baby, but this does not mean that one of the meanings of ἄνθρωπος is 'baby.'

Although the alphabetical order employed in most dictionaries is extremely useful for practical reference, it often disguises or fails to note some very important relations in meaning, namely, the close meaningful relations between different words within the same semantic area or domain (often marked in this text by superscript letters used in the *Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament Based on Semantic Domains*, abbreviated as *L and N*), for example, νοῦς[a] 'the psychological faculty for understanding, reasoning, and deciding,' καρδία[a] 'the causative source of a person's psychological life, but with special emphasis upon thoughts,' ψυχή[a] 'the essence of life in terms of thinking, willing, and feeling,' συνείδησις[b] 'the psychological faculty which can distinguish between right and wrong,' φρήν 'the psychological faculty of thoughtful planning, often with the implication of being wise and provident,' and πνεῦμα[e] 'the non-material, psychological faculty which is potentially sensitive and responsive to God.'

One of the principal reasons for the inadequacy of most dictionaries is the failure to distinguish between the meaning of a word and the various specific contexts in which a word may be used. For example, *The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, Second Edition, Unabridged* lists one hundred seventy-nine meanings for *run* (including noun, verb, and adjective uses), with an additional sixty-seven special idiomatic usages. It is useful to have a list of the two hundred forty-six different kinds of contexts in which *run* can occur, but this does not mean that there are that many distinctly different meanings of *run*. Similarly, in the Greek New Testament the verb γινώσκω occurs in a number of different contexts and can be legitimately rendered into English as 'know,' 'come to know,' 'learn,' 'ascertain,' 'find out,' 'comprehend,' 'understand,' 'perceive,' 'notice,' 'realize,' 'feel,' 'recognize,' 'desire,' 'have sexual intercourse with,' and 'acknowledge,' but this does not

mean that γινώσκω has fifteen different meanings. In fact, there are only six distinct meanings listed in *L and N.* **Problem 3.**

The *Greek-English Lexicon* by Bauer groups various contexts of λόγος more or less satisfactorily, but still ends up with quite a grab bag of major and minor contexts identified largely by a series of glosses: 'speaking,' 'word,' 'expression,' 'question,' 'preaching,' 'prophecy,' 'report,' 'story,' 'account,' 'proclamation,' 'teaching,' 'message,' 'speech,' 'assertion,' 'declaration,' 'conversation,' 'exposition,' 'matter,' 'thing,' 'treatise,' 'writings,' 'command,' 'revelation,' 'commission,' 'gospel,' 'computation,' 'reckoning,' 'account,' 'with respect to,' 'reason,' 'motive,' 'concern for,' and 'Word' (as a title for Christ).

Rather than grouping glosses into seemingly related sets, though often in a somewhat haphazard manner, it is much more satisfactory to define meanings in terms of those distinctive features which may be said to determine the range of usage of a lexeme (namely, a word or an idiom). Most people, however, are so entranced with the usefulness of words that they assume that in some way or other the words used in speaking about certain phenomena must provide a clue as to their true nature. But words are not labels for the contents of concepts. They are simply signs or symbols by which entities, activities, characteristics, and relations are represented in the process of communication. And this is possible only by virtue of the fact that verbal signs are all part of a system of signs. As will be evident later, it is this system which makes meaning possible, since the signs of any code are only defined by other signs.

The signs of language are unique in the sense that they can be used to refer to the total range of human experience, including purely imaginary things, e.g. unicorns and mermaids, as well as referents which, though never directly experienced by means of the senses, are regarded as real or logically necessary, e.g. *infinity*, *quarks*, *black holes*, and *God.*

### *The Basis for Much of the Confusion in Discussing Lexical Meaning*

Perhaps the most obvious reason for difficulty in treating the meanings of Greek words in the New Testament is that some words have a very specific meaning, e.g. τόξον 'bow,' while others may have a number of different meanings, e.g. πνεῦμα: 'Holy Spirit,' 'spirit' (in the sense that God is spirit), 'an evil spirit,' 'a ghost,' 'the inner being of a person,' 'a way of thinking,' 'wind,' and 'breath.'

Certain related problems occur in the analysis of the meanings of words which primarily refer to characteristics. For example, the Greek term τέλειος occurs in a wide range of contexts, since it may represent that which is 'morally perfect,' 'genuine,' 'physically perfect,' 'complete,' 'mature,' 'adult,' or 'initiated.'

The real problem with so many terms is that the meanings tend to shade into one another. For example, the term χάρις may represent the personal quality or characteristic of graciousness or kindness or it may represent the act of being gracious to someone. In a number of New Testament contexts it is not always clear whether "the grace of God" is to be understood as a reference to God's nature or to his act of undeserved kindness to people (cf. Romans 5.15), which in turn shades off into the meaning of gift. For a fuller discussion of χάρις, see pages 62-68. **Problem 4.**

The meanings of many words tend to overlap and these are generally called "synonyms," since in some contexts they may represent or stand for the same referent. Compare the following sets: φιλέω/ἀγαπάω 'love,' λέγω/λαλέω 'speak,' ὁράω/βλέπω 'see,' γινώσκω/οἶδα 'know,' and ῥῆμα/ἔπος 'word, speech.'

A further basis for difficulty in talking about the meaning of words is that the referents of the verbal signs may be very different. Some lexemes designate only unique referents, generally called "proper names," but most lexemes may represent a number of different entities, activities, characteristics, or relations, i.e. they are the so-called "common names," e.g. *man*, *house*, *run*, *think*, *good*, *tall*, *through*, and *because*. But another class of words, e.g. *he*, *we*, *those*, *it*, *whom*, serves as substitutes for other words or groups of words. Some words, however, only serve to call special attention to the importance of what is being said. This seems to be especially true of Greek ἰδού, traditionally translated as "behold," even where there is nothing to see. In colloquial American English the use of *Man!* serves a similar function. But there are also lexemes which serve primarily to mark other lexemes or groups of lexemes. For example, in the Gospel of Luke the frequent initial use of ἐγένετο δέ 'and it happened' in most instances marks the beginning of a section in the discourse, and similarly the so-called "recitative" ὅτι only marks the following statement as direct discourse. In addition, all languages have exclamatory expressions, and Hellenistic Greek had a number of these (abundantly illustrated in the plays of Aristophanes), but in the New Testament there are relatively few, e.g. οὐά 'aha' and οὐαί 'how horrible.'

In studying the meanings of lexemes in a foreign language, it is especially confusing to find that meanings simply do not match the way in which corresponding expressions are used in one's own mother tongue. For example, the Greek term ἔρχομαι means either 'to come' or 'to go,' and how it is to be translated depends entirely on the context. In the Gospels it is often not clear what person or object constitutes the spatial point of orientation. However, in a context in which the Greek term ὑπάγω 'go' occurs, then ἔρχομαι means 'come.' In contexts in which it is not relevant to mark the direction to or

from, ἔρχομαι serves quite well as a general term for movement in space, but in contexts in which movement away from a point is specified, then the opposite direction is designated by ἔρχομαι. **Problem 5.**

It is especially confusing in the study of lexical meaning to discover that a word may have acquired a highly restricted or specialized meaning. For example, ἀγάπη regularly means 'love,' but in some contexts it designates a 'fellowship meal' in which early Christians participated. It is not difficult to imagine how the term ἀγάπη could have acquired the meaning of a fellowship meal, but it is impossible to be absolutely certain about the process.

People are usually quite consistent about how they use words in speaking about various entities and activities, but they are frequently unable to explain precisely why one word is chosen in place of another. Almost every native speaker of English uses the terms *run* and *walk* correctly, but most speakers believe that the distinctive difference in the two events is speed, while in reality some people can walk faster than others can run. The distinctive contrast is that in running there are alternating moments in which neither foot is touching the ground or supporting surface, while in walking at least one foot is touching the ground at all times.

In some cases particular uses of a term reveal a great deal about the attitudes of speakers concerning the phenomena in question. For example, one ten-year-old boy thanked the guest preacher for the morning sermon by saying, "Man, that sure was a good talk!" The boy's mother, however, immediately tried to correct her son by insisting that it was a "sermon." But the boy defended his use of "talk" by saying, "It could not have been a sermon, because he made us all laugh."

How useful it would be if Paul could be asked what he really meant by using πνεῦμα ἁγιωσύνης, literally 'spirit of holiness' (Romans 1.4), rather than πνεῦμα ἅγιον 'holy spirit.' There must have been some reason, since the epistles of Paul certainly give the impression that the author knew what he meant and said what he thought. Since ἁγιωσύνης may represent not only the state of holiness but also the causative of this state, it may mean 'holiness' (88.25 in *L and N*) or 'sanctifying act' (53.45). The term πνεῦμα may represent the Spirit of God, namely, πνεῦμα$^{a}$ (12.18) or it may represent πνεῦμα$^{e}$ 'the inner being' of a person (26.9), a meaning essentially equivalent to 'true nature.' Accordingly, the phrase πνεῦμα ἁγιωσύνης can have several different meanings: (1) 'the sanctifying Spirit,' (2) 'the Spirit of holiness,' and (3) 'holy inner being,' essentially equivalent to 'holy nature' or 'divine nature.' The third meaning seems to be more in keeping with the context since it provides the most relevant contrast with σάρκα in Romans 1.3.

Words not only serve as signs for various entities, activities, characteristics, and relations, but they also serve as signs to tell us a great deal about speakers and circumstances. A string of vulgar, scatological expressions normally marks a speaker as uncouth and ill-mannered, unless the words are spoken in jest or as a quotation. On the other hand, a person who insists on speaking about "desiccated prunes" rather than "dried prunes" is likely to be a pompous pseudo-intellectual. A foreign accent immediately signals something about a speaker's background, and a strictly formal invitation to a function carries a signal about the kind of clothes that a person is expected to wear. Some scholars insist that these associative meanings are not really semantic, but pragmatic, but regardless of their origin or classification, words do clearly carry two kinds of signals: designative and associative, traditionally often spoken of as denotative and connotative. Although most of this book deals with designative meaning, a section in Chapter 2 treats a number of different aspects of associative meaning.

Idioms function very much like single words, but though they consist of two or more words, a person cannot predict the meaning on the basis of adding up the meanings of the constituent parts. Accordingly, idioms must also be regarded as "lexemes," and their semantic analysis involves essentially the same procedures as in the case of individual words. Idiomatic expressions do, however, exhibit varying grades of idiomaticity. For example, in the expression *he gave out the money* there may be nothing idiomatic since the statement can mean that the money was actually distributed as a gift, but in some contexts the same words could mean that the money was distributed as wages, in which case the phrase *gave out* could be classified as a "low grade" or "partial" idiom. But in the expression *the money gave out* the phrase *gave out* is fully idiomatic, since the absence of money does not imply either a process of "giving" or a relation of "outness." In the statement *the man gave out* it is not a matter of the absence of an object but of the lack of a characteristic, namely, strength.

In the New Testament βλέπω εἰς πρόσωπον, literally 'to look at a face' but meaning 'to judge on the basis of external appearances,' consists of relatively straightforward shifts in meaning. But δίδωμι δόξαν τῷ θεῷ, literally 'to give glory to God' (John 9.24), really means 'to promise under oath to tell the truth.' The precise legal or sociological context for this meaning is not known. Nor does anyone know exactly why 'to heap coals of fire on someone's head' apparently represents being so kind to someone as to make that person ashamed.

At this point it may be useful to mention briefly some of the problems of terminology in talking about lexical meaning. As already mentioned, there are

two quite distinct types of meaning: designative, which represents referents, and associative, which involves supplementary features relating to the lexemes, e.g. the vulgar associative meanings of the four-letter words in English. The term *referent* represents a chunk of experience, whether direct or indirect (through someone else's explanation), and in general is of four major types: entities, activities, characteristics, and relations. These four major classes are paralleled in varying degrees by the formal word classes of nouns, verbs, adjectives/adverbs, and prepositions/conjunctions. The meaning of a lexeme in a specific context may be regarded as a "particular meaning," while a set of particular meanings which share the same distinctive semantic features may be said to have a "class meaning" (this distinction will be clearer as different examples are analyzed). Instead of saying that a lexeme "refers to" a referent, it seems more appropriate to speak of a lexeme as "representing" a referent. And finally, it may be useful to distinguish between "lexemes" (words or idioms) and certain sublexemic elements, i.e. derivative and inflectional affixes, which are discussed rather fully in Chapter 2.

### *Special Problems Involved in New Testament Lexicography*

In trying to determine the designative and associative meanings of New Testament words and idioms, there are a number of distinct problems. First, the New Testament is a limited set of documents, and what makes the difficulties even more acute is that there were many different writers, each with his own characteristic message and way of using words. The various books of the New Testament were written over a period of some seventy-five years, during which time any language usage is bound to change and the highly distinctive message of any religious community inevitably becomes more and more specialized in both vocabulary and content.

These historical factors do not pose too many problems for a dictionary in which the entries are organized in alphabetical order, but for a dictionary such as *L and N* there are particularly acute problems resulting from the strictly limited subject matter. A dictionary based on semantic domains is in many ways like a classification of flora or fauna based on families, genera, and species. One may say that the domains constitute families of meanings, the subdomains are the genera, and the individual entries are the species. Multiple listing under the same entry indicates subspecies.

When the texts on which a dictionary is based are strictly limited, as they are in the case of the New Testament, several of the domains are likely to be only sparsely represented and large gaps are inevitable. A number of domains and subdomains are very incomplete, e.g. Kinship, Body Parts, Constructions, Artifacts, Agriculture, and Military Activities.

The one very large domain in the New Testament is Communication (33), consisting of fifty-six subdomains and four hundred eighty-nine entries. Three other important, large domains are Linear Movement (15), Attitudes and Emotions (25), and Moral and Ethical Qualities and Related Behavior (88). In view of the message of the New Testament and the activities of the believers, the concentration of vocabulary in these domains is perfectly understandable.

The long period of transmission of the text of the New Testament has produced a few problems of lexical semantics, but these are relatively minor in comparison with the difficulties which have arisen during almost two thousand years because of different interpretations of words and idioms, especially those involving major themes of the Scriptures. For example, Paul's concept of δικαιοσύνη 'righteousness, justification' would seem to reflect a Jewish background and understanding of the Old Testament, especially in view of the crucial significance Paul attached to the key passage about Abraham trusting God and therefore being "counted as righteous." The sociological setting for such an interpretation of δικαιοσύνη was undoubtedly the covenant relation of the Old Testament, in which a person who put his trust (Hebrew *'aman*) in a chief or leader would be regarded as in a right relation to such a person (that is, he would be *tzedeq* 'righteous') and would become a part of the covenant loyalty reflected in the Hebrew term *hesed*. But this personal dyadic relation within the setting of a covenant did not make much sense in the Graeco-Roman world, in which society was organized along quite different lines. As a result δικαιοσύνη and the related verb δικαιόω 'to make righteous' or 'to declare innocent' were readily reinterpreted to conform to the judicial system, with growing emphasis upon the so-called "forensic" nature of justification and forgiveness. **Problem 6.**

In all religions there is a tendency to make idols out of certain key words, that is to say, to invest such words with far more designative and associative significance than they originally had. Particular words often become badges of adherence to one or another system of interpretation or to membership in one or another confession. Words are, of course, only vehicles for carrying semantic features and what matters are these features. For example, the English term *heir* and the corresponding Greek term κληρονόμος have in certain contexts the distinctive semantic features of (1) a person (2) who receives something (normally valuable) (3) as provided by someone else (4) through legal or quasilegal means and (5) usually after the death of the provider. Note that some of these features of meaning are obligatory while others are optional, e.g. value of the inherited object and the death of the provider, since a person can inherit property before the death of the one who

grants the inheritance. In some languages, however, translators have chosen a term for 'inheritance' in which the death of the provider is both distinctive and obligatory. Accordingly, an expression such as "heirs of God" would mean that God had died—hardly a functional equivalent for κληρονόμος in such a context.

What is important about any word is its use. Paul did not hesitate to use the Greek term μυστήριον 'mystery,' but he did not mean by this word precisely what First Century pagans would have understood by its reference to the mystery religions of Greece and Egypt. By using the Greek term θεός, the New Testament writers were not making their deity a candidate for the Graeco-Roman pantheon, nor were they merely using a title of respect when they spoke of Jesus as κύριος. In fact, hundreds of believers died because they called Jesus κύριος, a title which Roman edicts had reserved for the emperor.

It is a serious mistake to regard meaning as only a matter of how individual lexemes can represent certain referents. An entire discourse, e.g. a sermon, a parable, or a letter, can also have meaning, and as will be seen later, the meaning is always more than and in some respects different from the sum total of the lexical parts. Moreover, it is not necessary for something to have actually happened (i.e. to be factive) in order for a discourse to be true. The parables of Jesus are some of the most richly true utterances which have ever been made.

Even a nonverbal event may have meaning, for example, the way in which Jesus would touch lepers and in this way make himself ritually unclean in order to identify with the plight of these outcasts.

In addition to lexical meaning, it is important to recognize the function of syntactic meaning, i.e. the meaning of the relation between the constituent parts of syntactic structures. For example, the syntactic meaning of the statement *John hit Bill* is simply "A (*John*) does B (*hit*) to C (*Bill*)," but the meaning of a deceptively similar construction, e.g. *John heard Bill*, is quite different, namely, "C (*Bill*) did X (something not specified) to cause A (*John*) to experience B (*heard*)."

The absence of words may also have meaning. For example, a Bible which has no marginal notes to identify places where there are significant differences in manuscript evidence or places where there are different possible interpretations is often regarded by more knowledgeable people as pointing to a lack of integrity on the part of the translators, but less knowledgeable persons may be confused and disconcerted by such notes.

In fact, everything about language carries meaning, in the sense that everything about words and their combinations signals something significant about the communicators, the nature of the message, and its relevance for the

hearers or readers. In biblical times anything expressed in poetic form carried great significance, since it suggested a special measure of divine inspiration and hence truth. But for many present-day English speakers anything printed in poetic lines is almost immediately regarded as suspect and less reliable. In fact, some persons have insisted that printing the dialogues of the Book of Job as poetry makes the book only a fairy tale. And to recite the beatitudes as poetry is to rob them of their truth and power.

Since there are so many aspects of language which may be said "to carry meaning" or "to signal something to people," it is essential to look at language from a somewhat broader perspective in order to understand more about the basic assumptions which underlie our knowledge of language and how it functions.

### *Basic Assumptions about the Lexical Semantics of Language*

There are a number of basic assumptions about language which relate to the nature of language as a code, and these will be treated in Chapter 2. But the assumptions which are especially relevant to the meanings of words and combinations of words are particularly important for a better understanding of the meaning of lexemes and will be discussed at this point.

1. Unless a string of sounds is mere gibberish, the words generally serve to name entities, activities, characteristics, and relations. But as already noted, there are also words which serve as markers of discourse units or grammatical elements, and other words which serve as substitutes (usually pronouns). In addition, all languages have words which are primarily emotive accompaniments of events or settings, e.g. *Ouch! Damn!* and *Hurrah!*

2. If the context does not suggest two or more meanings of a word, one should assume that in any one context a lexeme has a single meaning. Most people do not constantly endeavor to be ambiguous or obscure in what they say, and if they do want to employ double entendres, they normally use devices which will point to their rhetorical adroitness. In John 3 the writer clearly wants πνεῦμα to be understood as both 'wind' and 'Spirit' and ἄνωθεν as meaning 'from above' and 'again.' But whether he also wants καταλαμβάνω in John 1.5 to be understood as both 'to overcome' and 'to comprehend' is not clear. In John 3 the play on the meanings of πνεῦμα and ἄνωθεν is overt and in John 1.5 it is covert.

3. When a word has a central meaning as well as peripheral meanings, it is best to assume that the central meaning is intended unless the context points to a peripheral meaning. For example, in the phrase *the big fish* one should assume that *fish* is to be understood in the central meaning of an aquatic animal usually having scales. But in the sentence *Bill Jones is the big*

*fish around here* the reference is obviously to a person, and the phrase *the big fish* is to be understood as a figurative title for a dominant or dominating person. Similarly, in Greek σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα 'flesh and blood' would seem to represent biological substances. But in Matthew 16.17 'flesh and blood did not reveal it to you,' the phrase pertains to a human being.

In speaking about "central" and "peripheral" meanings or about "literal" and "figurative" meanings or even about "literal" and "extended" meanings, we are not suggesting that the central meaning is somehow always incorporated into the extended meanings, as a kind of generic semantic base to be found in all occurrences of a lexeme—what in German is called a *Grundbedeutung* and in English is sometimes referred to as "basic meaning." Being a central or a peripheral meaning is simply a matter of so-called "markedness," the extent to which various degrees of peripheral meaning need to be specially marked by more and more specific features of the context.

4. Combinations of words normally make sense, but the sense is not merely the sum of the meanings of individual words, because any combination of words also involves the meaning of the grammatical constructions, and in many cases one must also consider various rhetorical features (e.g. parallelism, contrast, hyperbole, etc.). In addition, there are always matters of setting within the discourse and within the practical events of the communication.

5. In all speech communities there is general consensus as to the meanings of words (otherwise societies could not function), but there is often disagreement among members of a community as to how specific expressions should be understood. The evidence for this is abundant in the numerous arguments people have about the meanings of words and in the lucrative benefits that some persons, e.g. lawyers and judges, derive from interpreting what words do or should mean. And theologians even write entire books about the meanings of single words. Nevertheless, in most practical contexts agreement about verbal meaning is quite sufficient for almost all interpersonal endeavors.

6. The correct meaning of a word within any context is the meaning which fits the context best. That is to say, languages maximize the importance of context, since verbal signs are always defined by other signs, either within the linguistic context (i.e. by other words in the same verbal environment) or within the practical context of the setting of the communication.

The significance of the setting in determining the meanings of words is quite evident in the case of the English word *stock*. When a farmer talks about his *stock*, he is probably referring to his cattle, but when a broker talks about

*stock*, he is generally talking about shares in the equity market. And a retail merchant talking to customers about his *stock* is more likely than not to be talking about his supply of merchandise.

For the New Testament it is often difficult to determine the precise setting of a communication, although many times the immediate verbal context provides very important leads. As already noted, in Romans 1.4 the occurrence of πνεῦμα 'spirit' in the phrase κατὰ πνεῦμα must be carefully studied in relation to σάρξ in the parallel phrase κατὰ σάρκα (Romans 1.3). And the relevance of 1 Corinthians 13 can be fully appreciated only when it is understood in the light of chapters 12 and 14.

7. Particular texts may represent a very restricted "chunk" of a language, in the sense that such data may only be typical of the use of the language by a specific group of people who have developed rather specialized ways of speaking and writing. For example, it must have seemed very strange to the average pagan of the First Century to hear Christians speak of ταπείνωσις with great approval, since most speakers of Hellenistic Greek would have understood this term as a reference to moral baseness and even to vileness instead of humility. But it would be quite wrong to think that the Greek in the New Testament is a kind of "sanctified Greek" or "Holy Ghost Greek" because of its inspired character. What is inspired is the content of the message.

8. Language may be used to perform a number of different functions and a single discourse may fulfill several functions at the same time. A person may use language to do all kinds of things, e.g. curse enemies, pray for the sick, order a meal, argue a point, answer a question, figure out the solution to a problem, express grief, or get acquainted with neighbors.

Linguists tend to talk about the major functions of language as being expressive, cognitive, informative, imperative, performative, emotive, and interpersonal, since these are some of the principal ways in which sources (speakers and writers) use language to satisfy their personal needs and to bring about certain changes in receptors (hearers or readers).

A speaker may actually use language only to express some emotion and may do so without regard to any person who may be listening. Most swearing and profanity is only expressive speech in which the speaker merely lets off steam. Singing in the shower may also be a form of expressive language, since usually there is no intent to communicate to anyone else. But the expressive function of language may also occur in far more refined and intricate ways. For example, the urge to write poetry may be simply the desire to use language in an aesthetically pleasing manner, and the writer may have no concern for an audience. In fact, most people who write poetry probably hope no one will ever read it.

Language can also be a means of having fun—playing with words, either alone or with other persons, with no intent to communicate information but only to enjoy the sounds, delight in the subtleties of meaning, and make "heavenly hash" out of mixed metaphors.

But a speaker or writer may use language for much more serious business, namely, for thinking. In fact, most serious thinking about intricate matters requires the use of verbal signs. This cognitive function of language is perhaps the most frequent and most extensive way in which language is used. It would, however, be wrong to conclude that all thinking requires the use of language. People can think in terms of spatial structures or in terms of sequences of events, e.g. planning a trip. Some scholars have been so impressed by the close relation between thought and language that they have assumed that language actually dictates the way people are able to think and ultimately what they can think. But although any language reflects the culture and the ways in which people classify their cognitive world, it does not determine or control what people can think.

Language is generally used by a speaker or writer to influence hearers or readers, but these people should not be regarded as mere "targets," as is suggested by the technical terminology of communication theory. Receptors must take in what is said or written. That is to say, the message must be filtered through their own linguistic and cultural experience. As a result the interpretation by the receptors is never exactly what was intended by the source. Though words are the common possession of a speech community, there are always subtle differences of experience and values which inevitably influence a receptor's understanding.

For the most part, people assume that the primary function of language is informative, that is, passing on information. But this is an illusion. In fact, most estimates suggest that, except for purely technical "textbook communication," the transmission of information accounts for no more than twenty percent of what takes place in verbal communication between a speaker and an audience. This seems to be especially true of some sermons, except for a lone joke or vivid illustration. In fact, most members of a congregation are much more impressed by the earnestness of the presentation, by the shortness of the sermon, and by peculiarities of pronunciation, gestures, and vestments than by the verbal content.

While informative communication is designed to increase a receptor's cognitive awareness, imperative communication is designed to influence a receptor's behavior. But this does not mean that a discourse must be filled with imperative utterances. The parables of Jesus have no doubt changed more people's behavior than any of his direct commands.

Performative communication is the use of language to alter a receptor's social state. When the priest or minister says, "I now pronounce you man and wife," those words, uttered with the accompanying civil and ecclesiastical authority, actually change the legal status of two people. Arranging for such a performative function of language may cost a few dollars, but to undo such a declaration may cost quite a fortune!

For the Hellenistic world of the First Century, cursing and blessing were powerful performative acts which had abiding and supernatural validating power. It is no wonder that the magician Simon in Samaria pled with Peter and John to pray for him after Peter had laid a curse on him. Nor is it strange that even today the words "This is my body" are interpreted by many people as being the verbal means by which a substantive miracle is performed.

The emotive function of language involves the use of words to change the emotive state of people as a means of inducing contrition, comfort, sorrow, joy, or humor. In the New Testament, expressions such as *hosanna*, *hallelujah*, *he is risen*, *praise the Lord*, and *glory to God* serve just such an emotive function. But there is also humor in the New Testament and especially in the parables of Jesus. When Jesus told the story of the "Great Banquet" (Luke 14.15-24), the audience must have roared when they heard the lame excuses of the three men: one who claimed to have bought some land without first looking at it, a second who insisted that he must test some oxen that he had bought without examining them, and finally the poor henpecked fellow who couldn't go to the banquet because he had just gotten married. Altering the emotive state of receptors is one of the most effective ways of getting an important message across.

The interpersonal function of language is designed to establish or maintain effective relations between a source and receptors. And the translation of terms designating interpersonal relations creates a number of complex problems. When Jesus spoke to the paralytic who was let down through a roof, he addressed him as *τέκνον*, literally 'child' (Mark 2.5), but this was actually an expression of kind regard. Similarly, when Jesus addressed the woman who was healed of menstrual hemorrhaging, he used the term *θυγάτηρ*, literally 'daughter' (Mark 5.34), which expressed his sensitivity to her plight and faith. Jesus addressed his own mother as *γύναι*, literally 'woman' (John 2.4), but this vocative form was often used to express respect or affection (cf. Euripides and Theocritus, as well as later papyri). Literal translations of these terms for interpersonal relations have seriously distorted the meaning of these accounts. If *τέκνον* is to be understood and translated literally as 'child,' why would it take four men to carry him to Jesus? In some languages Jesus' use of 'daughter' in speaking to a woman could only mean that he was acknowledg-

ing her as his own offspring. And in a number of languages the use of 'woman' in addressing his own mother could only be interpreted as a denial of her relation to Jesus.

The use of words in the interpersonal function of language illustrates very well the special problems encountered in the associative meanings of terms. That is to say, it is the manner in which words are used and not their literal meanings which is significant. Normally in English the phrase *son of a bitch* is highly derogatory, but good pals who have not seen each other for some time may very well say, "And how are you doing, you old son of a bitch?" With the right intonation and a smile on the face, such an expression can break through any uncertainty as to the intimacy and affection involved in the relationship. **Problem 7.**

Although words are a very important part of a language and for some people they even are *the language*, there are three other parts of language which must also be carefully considered, namely, the phonology, the grammar, and the structure of the discourse. That part of language which carries the least amount of information is the sound system. In fact, isolated sounds are not supposed to have any meaning, except where they are integral elements in onomatopoeic words or where they may constitute complete morphemes, e.g. the plural *-s* suffix on nouns, in which case it is not just a sound but it has the status of a morpheme (a minimal unit of meaning) and accordingly becomes meaningful. But overly precise enunciation of words may carry the meaning of hypercorrectness and hence of linguistic and social insecurity. A heavy foreign accent can signal a particular ethnic background, and inordinate speed of speech can indicate nervousness and irritability.

But the system of sounds plays a really significant role on the level of rhetoric, where sets of sounds are employed for important acoustic purposes of emphasis, amusement, and aesthetic effect. Note, for example, how lines 2, 3, and 4 of the Greek text of the Matthaean form of the Lord's Prayer (Matthew 6.9-13) all have nine syllables and end in the same sound. In addition the verbs all end in the same syllable, as do the nominal subjects. The use of verbal sounds for special effects is not really a part of the phonology as such but rather is an aspect of the formal features of discourse traditionally called "rhetoric." These phonological features are, however, mentioned at this point simply to highlight the fact that lexical semantics is not an isolated part of language, but something which fits into a much larger scheme of things. **Problem 8.**

In addition to lexical semantics there is also the area of grammatical semantics, the meaningful relations between words, often spoken of in terms of government, agreement, attribution, and substitution. And it is important

to recognize that the formal features of grammar do not always parallel the meaningful relations. For example, in the phrase κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τοῦ κράτους τῆς ἰσχύος αὐτοῦ, literally 'according to the working (or force) of the power of his strength' (Ephesians 1.19), there is really no significant difference between κράτος and ἰσχύς. The two terms simply reinforce each other, and the complete phrase can be effectively rendered as 'according to his exceptionally powerful activity.'

The organizational (or rhetorical) aspect of language involves the intricate patterning of formal and thematic elements to produce discourses of various types, e.g. sermons, parables, letters, conversations, dialogues, apocalyptic visions, dramatic accounts, genealogies, and poems; in other words, the various genres of the New Testament. But studies of grammatical meaning and organizational patterning will be considered in subsequent volumes.

### *Basic Assumptions about Methodology in Analyzing Lexical Meaning*

Although many of the fundamental aspects of lexical semantics have already been mentioned in this chapter, it may be useful to summarize briefly some of the more important basic assumptions about methodology in analyzing the meanings of lexemes, since these will be important in understanding the procedures and contents of the following chapters:

1. Since languages have a limited number of verbal signs (words and idioms) with which to represent an unlimited number of entities, activities, characteristics, and relations, multiple meanings for many lexemes are inevitable.

2. Languages consist of open systems, since lexemes may be added or lost and the range of their meanings may expand or contract. Without this feature of language there would be no figurative use of language and no poetry.

3. The boundaries of meanings are indeterminate in the sense that they can be vague and have fuzzy edges. For example, it is impossible to tell how thick a string has to be before it should be called a cord, or how thick a cord must be before it should be called a rope.

4. As in the case of all systems, languages are incomplete and have anomalous features, which can perhaps be best described as involving "parallax," a kind of systematic distortion such as occurs in all maps of the earth and in all photographs. Since languages reflect culture and culture is often unsystematic, languages also represent cultural distortions, e.g. *sea lions* are not lions, *ringtail cats* are not cats, and the *evening star* is not a star but a planet.

5. The meanings of verbal signs are determined by other verbal signs, and this means that ultimately there is no such thing as an absolute definition of the meaning of any sign, although there may be practical definitions.

6. A combination of verbal signs is never the same as the meanings of the individual lexemes, since in addition to the lexical meanings there are also meaningful syntactic and rhetorical relations.

7. The meaning of a sign is the minimum of what that sign contributes to the context. This represents the principle of entropy (often spoken of as the second law of thermodynamics) in which the significance of the context is maximized and the role of the individual element is minimized.

8. The meanings of lexemes are not equivalent to reality, but only represent the manner in which the speakers of a language perceive reality—an important implication of the sociology of knowledge.

9. Modern taxonomic classifications are not based on a concept of rigid "pigeon-hole" distinctions based on "necessary and sufficient features" but on the concept of family resemblances, bundles, clusters, continuums, and multidimensional relations. As a result, definitions must often express uncertainties by such expressions as *perhaps*, *probably*, *sometimes*, *in general*, *often*, and *usually*.

These basic assumptions about language and methods of semantic analysis have several practical implications which need to be considered before attempting to analyze lexical meanings.

The nature of language inevitably influences the manner in which a person should go about the analysis of lexical meaning. The Hellenistic Greek of the New Testament should be treated by essentially the same techniques as can and should be applied to any language, while at the same time recognizing something that has already been pointed out, namely, the restricted nature of the vocabulary and the special purposes of the communication.

The Greek of the New Testament is a "natural" language. That is to say, the lexemes do not have one single meaning in all their contexts, as do the words or signs in a mathematical or logical language. Furthermore, lexemes do not have rigid boundaries. In fact, they sometimes seem to be as squashy as jellyfish or play putty. Their boundaries are often fuzzy and the meanings of words tend to overlap with one another. In certain contexts it is possible to distinguish between βούλομαι and θέλω, but both can be translated into English as 'to purpose' or 'to want.' Why in 2 Peter 3.9 does the text have βούλομαι in speaking about God not wanting any people to be lost, although in Colossians 1.27 Paul uses θέλω in speaking about God wanting to make known the riches of his grace? It is often impossible to explain such preference for terms, and it is unwise to read too much into such differences. Some

persons have sought to explain such semantic differences on the basis of etymological factors, e.g. the fact that βούλομαι is related to βουλή, which they interpret as meaning 'plan,' and the fact that θέλω is related to θέλημα, which they interpret as meaning 'will.' But this type of exegesis is only "playing with words" and misses the crucial fact of semantics, namely, that meanings are defined by contexts and not by mere formal resemblances. **Problem 9.**

These overlapping, fuzzy edges to the boundaries of meaning are the bane of some theologians, who would like to make systematic theology completely logical and systematic, but words are slippery signs, which in fact they must be or language could not function in an ever-changing culture. If meanings were fixed for all time, people would find it hard to say anything they had not heard before, nor could they readily interpret anything which they had not previously understood. There would be practically no poetry and no figurative language or fresh insights about yet undiscovered semantic relations of meaning. We would be living in a quite dull and boring intellectual landscape.

In trying to arrive at a satisfactory analysis of the meaning of any one sign, it is essential to consider the meanings of all the other signs within the same semantic domain. And in setting up the limits of any domain, it is necessary to consider the semantic ranges of other contiguous domains. This ultimately means that one cannot really know the meaning of any one sign without determining the meaning of all other signs, since the verbal signs of any language constitute a complex but remarkably integrated system.

Although it is impossible to be completely certain about particular meanings, it is surely possible to be relatively certain, at least sufficiently so to use words in practical circumstances and to obtain satisfactory results.

As already noted, the same word may have critically different meanings in different contexts. For example, the δικαιοσύνη of God in Matthew 6.33 designates behavior which is in accordance with what God demands, but in Romans 1.17 the δικαιοσύνη of God is God's way of 'putting people right with himself' or 'declaring them right' or 'righting wrong.'

One of the serious difficulties encountered in the analysis of lexical meaning is that many more semantic features may be involved than what occur in a brief dictionary definition. For example, ὀμνύω is defined by some as 'taking an oath' or 'making an oath,' but in reality this Greek lexeme means that a person 'affirms the truth of a statement by calling on a divine being to execute sanctions (i.e. to punish) if the person has not told the truth.' In most modern societies the performative function of taking an oath involves only legal consequences, but for the church of the First Century the supernatural

sanctions for lying were frighteningly powerful, as evidenced by the deaths of Ananias and his wife Sapphira.

Allusions, which depend upon intertextual resemblances, are particularly subtle features which must enter into the semantic analysis in some contexts. For example, the frequent occurrence in the Gospel of John of the sequence ἐγώ εἰμι 'I am' (and especially in the absolute usage in John 13.19) is certainly a literary echo of the Old Testament declaration 'I am that I am.'

For such associative meanings of words it is essential to look constantly to the cultural setting. The term δοῦλος in the phrases δοῦλος Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ (Romans 1.1 and elsewhere) and δοῦλος θεοῦ (Titus 1.1 and elsewhere) should not be understood as having the same associative meaning as 'slave' has in English. In Old Testament times anyone who was called 'Servant of the King' or 'Slave of the King' was a person of considerable rank. In fact, such a title carried great prestige. An important aspect of this associative meaning of the Hebrew expression undoubtedly carries over into the New Testament usage.

### *The Purpose and Organization of This Volume*

One of the principal purposes of this volume is to explain the analytical principles underlying the *Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament Based on Semantic Domains* published by the United Bible Societies. Although the Lexicon contains an introduction in which a number of basic principles are listed, it does not pretend to be a sufficient explanation of either the principles or the methodology employed in analyzing the semantic domains of the Greek vocabulary found in the New Testament. Accordingly, this volume attempts to explain in much greater detail the fundamental principles employed in the semantic analysis of lexemes and to provide a systematic discussion of the methods used in ascertaining the meanings of lexemes and how the various meanings relate to one another.

This first chapter consists of an introduction to some of the obvious problems in arriving at a satisfactory understanding of lexical meaning. The second chapter deals with some of the fundamental features of language, particularly as these relate to the meanings of words and idioms. The third chapter treats the problems involved in the analysis of different meanings of a single lexeme, and the fourth chapter discusses the different ways to analyze the related meanings of different lexemes. The fifth chapter deals with the problems of domain classification, and a final chapter treats the principal scholarly contributions which have been made to the analysis and description of lexical meaning.

# Two

## THE NATURE OF LANGUAGE

Language is essentially a set of internalized vocal habits shared by a speech community. Some theoretical linguists look upon language as a complex neural program which speakers or writers activate when they wish to communicate. Others, however, view language as what is actually said or written. In any case, language is a system (not a random series of noises or letters) by which a source communicates intentions to receptors.

Language is a code, in the sense that it consists of signs and arrangements of signs. The signs consist largely of lexemes which serve to represent something to someone. They primarily designate referents, i.e. chunks of experience, either (1) in the real or imagined world of entities, activities, characteristics, and relations or (2) in the linguistic world of discourse as markers and substitutes (usually called pronouns). **Problem 10**.

Language may also be described as a "rule-governed code," in the sense that there are strict limitations on (1) the number and sequences of sounds (the phonology), (2) the ways in which words are formed, e.g. by compounding, reduplication, and affixation (the morphology), (3) the ways in which phrases, clauses, and sentences are put together (the syntax), and (4) the formal and thematic organization of a discourse by employing various types of scenarios or schemata and by introducing various devices to enhance both the impact and the appeal of a text (often spoken of as "rhetoric," but included as part of "poetics" and "discourse linguistics").

The formation of words (the morphology) is quite similar in English and Greek, since both languages have both prefixes and suffixes, and these occur on two different levels of structure: derivational and inflectional. In English

derivational affixes may significantly alter the class and/or meaning of an underlying form, e.g. the change from *friend* to *friendly* and from *friendly* to *friendliness*. Inflectional affixes do not alter the grammatical class of an underlying form, but only add elements which are syntactically relevant and semantically isolatable. The change from *boy* to *boys* by means of the plural suffix -s does not alter the semantic features of *boy*, but only adds the fact that more than one boy is involved.

In Greek the derivational and inflectional affixes are much more numerous and complex than in English. Consider, for example, the following derivative suffixes: γράμ-μ-α 'thing written' (from γράφω 'to write'), ἱερ-εύ-ς 'priest' (from ἱερός 'sacred'), ναύ-τη-ς 'sailor' (from ναῦς 'ship'), βασιλ-ικό-ς 'royal' (from βασιλεύς 'king'), ψευδ-ή-ς 'false' (from ψεύδω 'to deceive'), θαυμά-ζ-ω 'to wonder' (from θαῦμα 'marvel'), σημα-ίν-ω 'to signify' (from σῆμα 'sign'). The derivative suffixes combine with certain features of the base (the root or stem) and alter the grammatical and/or semantic class of the base. Accordingly, in any dictionary organized in terms of semantic domains, it is only logical that the derivative meanings should be treated following the underlying forms. The nominative derivative suffix -μα in γράμμα merely indicates an entity which results from the action of the base, and the adjectival derivative suffix -ικο- in βασιλικός indicates a feature or characteristic of the base.

The inflectional affixes in Greek refer to a number of syntactic and semantic categories: number (singular and plural), case (formal categories of nominative, genitive, dative, accusative, and vocative, but semantic categories of agent, experiencer, instrument, source, possessor, etc.), person (speaker, the one or ones spoken to, those spoken about), tense (i.e. time relative to the discourse or to an event within the discourse, e.g. simultaneous, previous, and later), aspect (durative, simultaneous, inceptive, momentary), mode (in formal terms: subjunctive, indicative, and optative, but in semantic terms: probable, actual, and desirable), and gender (based primarily on formal classes of substantives and only incidentally on biological classes).

All of these inflectional affixes are semantically important, but they are semantically distinct from the bases to which they are attached, and they all have words as semantic parallels. For example, singular and plural number is paralleled by ordinal and cardinal numbers, tense is paralleled by adverbial expressions of time, certain case relations may be marked by prepositions, mode is frequently indicated by adverbial phrases, and person is shown by independent pronouns.

Because of the morphological and syntactic complexity of Greek as a code, some persons have argued that it is the most elegant and efficient of all

languages. And some theologians have even argued that because of its subtle features of meaning and structure, it was especially chosen by God for the revelation of the gospel. Greek is a remarkable language, but so are all other languages, for each language is structurally capable of being used to speak about the entire range of experience of its speech community.

Some languages are less or more efficient and elegant than others in the manner in which they can speak about certain phenomena, but this is not because of any inherent weakness or strength in the structure of the language, but simply the result of the fact that speakers of that language may or may not have seen the need for increasing the vocabulary or elaborating various rhetorical patterns and devices. In certain respects languages are what people make them. If they create an extensive technology, they will have tens of thousands of technical terms; and if they place great emphasis on public speaking as a way to power or prestige, as the ancient Greeks did, they will have created elaborate rhetorical devices.

But all languages have their communicative deficiencies. There is nothing particularly efficient about numerous irregular verbs, nor is there any semantic advantage in having two different roots for different tenses, as in the case of Greek λέγω and εἶπον or ὁράω and εἶδον, nor is English better off for having *go* and *went* or the series *be*, *am*, *is*, *are*, *was*, and *were*. As linguist Edward Sapir used to say, "All languages leak."

In addition to words which fit the regular phonological patterns of permitted consonant and vowel combinations, apparently all languages have some nonconformist ideophones which perform a number of functions and which in some languages are particularly numerous. Most of the Bantu and Khoisan languages of Africa, for example, have hundreds of these ideophones, but even English has more than some people realize, for example, a tongue-tip click usually written as *tsk-tsk* as a means of admonishing a person to stop doing something, the palatal sibilant *shsh* meaning to keep quiet, *pssst* as an attention-getter, and a repeated or dragged out *uh* as a way to prevent another speaker from taking over a conversation or as a signal that something else is coming as soon as the right words can be found.

In addition to the word-building formations involving affixation, Greek also employs partial reduplication to mark both perfect tenses (e.g. λέλυκα and πέποιθα) and the present formation of -μι verbs (e.g. τίθημι and δίδωμι). English employs complete reduplication in such compounds as *put-put* and *choo-choo*, and partial reduplication in such words as *flip-flop* and *piggily-wiggily*.

Compounding is also a very important word-building device in Greek. The results are often semantically equivalent to restrictive clauses, e.g.

ὁλοκαύτωμα 'an offering which has been completely burned up,' ἀρχισυνάγωγος 'one who is the leader of a synagogue,' θεοστυγής 'characteristic of a person who hates God,' μισθαποδότης 'a person who gives a reward,' and προκηρύσσω 'to preach beforehand' (i.e. before some other event). **Problem 11.**

When the meanings of the component parts of compounds are quite evident, there is very little difficulty in determining the combined meaning. But in some instances, initial elements may lose their individual meanings. In some cases προέρχομαι means simply 'to go prior to some other event,' but it may also mean 'to go along.' The compound ἐπιγράφω means 'to write on,' but ἐπιλαμβάνομαι can mean 'to experience,' while ἐπίσταμαι may mean 'to know' or 'to understand' and ἐπιστρέφω may mean 'to change one's beliefs.'

Idioms constitute the most semantically complex lexemes, since they are so intimately and integrally related to the cultural contexts out of which they have developed. The meanings of some idioms are rather obvious, e.g. ἐπιβάλλω τὴν χεῖρα ἐπ' ἄροτρον καὶ βλέπω εἰς τὰ ὀπίσω, literally 'to put one's hand to a plow and glance back' but meaning 'to start to do something and then hesitate.' But κοινωνέω αἵματος καὶ σαρκός, literally 'to share blood and flesh' but meaning 'to be a person,' may seem to some to be both arbitrary and strange. Those idioms, however, which refer to psychological states or moods are even more difficult to explain, e.g. ζέω τῷ πνεύματι, literally 'to boil in spirit' but meaning 'to show enthusiasm,' πλατύνω τὴν καρδίαν, literally 'to broaden the heart' but meaning 'to show affection for,' and ῥαντίζομαι τὴν καρδίαν, literally 'to sprinkle the heart' but meaning 'to purify.' The study of the possible historical development of such idioms is interesting, but usually quite frustrating since there are few valid clues about their history, and the variety of possibilities is more frustrating than elucidating. Accordingly, one must generally accept such phrases for what they are and analyze the meanings as if they were single words. **Problem 12.**

### *The Principal Function of Lexemes*

The principal function of lexemes is naming, and as already noted, this process of naming applies to both the linguistic and nonlinguistic worlds of entities, activities, characteristics (including states), and relations. But the naming capacity of a lexeme (whether inflectional morpheme, word, or idiom) depends upon its being a part of a system of such units, in which the various units serve to define each other.

In order to better understand the significance of this relation between a verbal sign, its referent, and the system of verbal signs, it may be useful to compare the structure of a very simple code such as traffic signals. In order to

signal the meanings of 'go,' 'stop,' and 'prepare to stop,' there are three different colors: green, red, and yellow. But red does not mean anything in and of itself. Its meaning of 'stop' depends upon the code in which the contrasting color green means 'go' and the color yellow means 'prepare to stop.' Not only do the colors occur in a particular sequence, but each color serves a distinctive function in regulating traffic.

To understand how lexemes (the signs) can name particular referents (what is named), one must look to the system of signs, which constitute the formal basis of what Charles Peirce called the "interpretant," the process by which the meanings of verbal signs are defined by means of other signs. Instead of the traditional Saussurean binary system of *signifiant* 'the signifier' and *signifié* 'what is signified,' Peirce insisted upon a triad of sign, referent, and interpretant (the process of relating sign to referent by means of the system of signs). But Peirce was so impressed by the logical consequences of the system of verbal signs in language that he did not give adequate attention to what takes place in the "interpreter," the one who must receive the lexical signs and arrive at meaning by an elaborate neural process, which at this stage of our knowledge of brain function we can only deduce from observations about the relations between lexemes and their contexts, both linguistic and nonlinguistic, i.e. the practical world of human experience.

In addition to an interpretant (a system for decoding meaning), we must also reckon with an "intendant" (a system for selecting and arranging lexemes to match a speaker's or writer's intention).

This triadic view of the functioning of language in communication has very important implications. If a verbal sign can only be defined by other signs, and if these in turn must be defined by still other signs, there can be no ultimate way of arriving at an absolute definition of any sign. The problems involved in defining terms such as *goodness* and *truth* seem obviously difficult, especially since they have been argued about by philosophers for centuries, but there are even problems involved in defining such a seemingly simple term as *dog*, which in *The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, Second Edition, Unabridged* is defined as "any carnivore of the dog family Canidae, having prominent canine teeth and, in the wild state, a long and slender muzzle, a deep-chested muscular body, a bushy tail, and large, erect ears. Cf. canid." But even this definition primarily substitutes one level of vocabulary for another. The definition might just as well have been "any animal of the family Canidae," because the description of dogs, even in the wild, does not fit all examples in this family.

In the same dictionary *canid* is defined as "any animal of the dog family Canidae, including the wolves, jackals, hyenas, coyotes, foxes, and domestic

dogs," but *hyena* is also defined as "a doglike carnivore of the family Hyaenidae." No doubt many people refer to hyenas as dogs, though they actually belong to a quite different family of animals.

This attempt to define the meaning of *dog* is an excellent illustration of the essential difficulty in any thorough definition. Saying that a dog is simply an animal of the family Canidae only helps if one knows about the family Canidae, and when this is defined by listing examples, one of which technically does not belong, then obviously the boundaries of the meaning of *dog* are fuzzy and indefinite. **Problem 13.**

One of the basic reasons for the indefiniteness of meanings is that language is a social reality. It is a set of habits shared by people and not all people are alike. Even within a single speech community not all people have had the same experiences, nor do they have the same interests in precision of speech. Being completely precise often seems a serious waste of time and energy, so that conservation of energy wins out over explicitness. Even semanticists can be misled by an informant's elicited expressions, since there are so many factors which govern the context. Only a comparison of such elicited data with data representing the natural use of language can protect an analyst from making serious mistakes.

Since language is essentially a social activity, encoding or decoding a text is primarily a dialogic process. The encoders inevitably anticipate the way in which hearers or readers are likely to understand their words, and they continually select the appropriate terminology in order to get across their ideas. In an interpersonal context a good speaker will constantly depend upon visual and audible feedback in order to adjust the use of vocabulary to the level of comprehension and the degree of receptivity of the audience. It would be a mistake to emphasize too much the social aspect of language, since individual speakers and writers often develop special devices to create greater impact and appeal, and these may gain widespread acceptance and significantly influence the manner in which a language is used in communication.

A decoder generally pays close attention to several different features of a communication so as to understand both the explicit and the implicit messages. In addition to the designative and associative meanings of the words, a decoder of an oral discourse takes into consideration a number of quite diverse factors, e.g. what is known about the speaker, the gestures and mannerisms, the level of language, the relevance of the content to the setting, and the speaker's evident degree of sincerity. Usually a decoder also matches his own interpretation of a discourse with what he imagines would be a standard interpretation arrived at by people regarded as experts in the field. But the most important factor in decoding a text is the context (both linguistic

and nonlinguistic). In Hellenistic Greek εὐτραπελία generally designated 'ready wit, lively conversation, and verbal pleasantries,' but in Ephesians 5.4 (its only occurrence in the New Testament) it obviously must mean something like 'vulgar speech,' for it is combined with such terms as αἰσχρότης 'shamelessness' and μωρολογία 'foolish speech.' In many instances, however, it is the practical (or nonlinguistic) context which provides a clue to the appropriate meaning. For example, δημηγορέω in Acts 12.21 is a standard Hellenistic Greek term for public speaking, but it may be used in a pejorative sense of talking eloquent nonsense. In Acts 12.21 the ostentatious setting and the flattering response of the crowd point to the use of δημηγορέω in the worst sense of crowd-pleasing humbug, in this case a particular, rather than a class, meaning. **Problem 14.**

***Relations Between Signs and Referents***

Some signs relate to referents by means of imitation, that is to say, the phonological forms of the words in one way or another resemble the referents. Such signs are often spoken of as being "iconic" or "onomatopoeic." Although they are quite abundant in the writings of the Greek dramatists, they are relatively scarce in the New Testament. Note, however, the first part of βατταλογέω 'to utter senseless words' (an imitation of stuttering), γογγύζω 'to complain' (an imitation of muttering), and βάρβαρος 'barbarian, foreigner' (presumably the imitation of sounds made in foreign speech). The iconic, or imitative, character of such words may have been largely lost in the perception of many speakers of Hellenistic Greek, even as many English speakers are unaware of the iconic nature of words such as *cluck*, *clack*, and *click*.

Other signs, called "indexical," serve to point to features of the setting of the text, e.g. English terms such as *here*, *there*, *now*, *then*, *this*, *that*, *he*, *they*, *we*, *the former*, *the latter*, and similar types of terms in the Greek of the New Testament, e.g. ἐγώ, ἐμός, ἡμεῖς, σύ, αὐτός, τις, ὅς, οὗτος, ἐκεῖνος, ὅδε, ποῖος.

The iconic and indexical signs of any language, however, represent a very small percentage of a language's total verbal inventory. This ratio is, of course, an essential feature of any language, since it must have many more signs which bear no resemblance to their referents or which merely point to other signs or participants in communication, if it is to represent the infinite variety of phenomena. The unlimited variety of entities, activities, characteristics, and relations is far more numerous than the possible number of consonant and vowel combinations in vocally imitative lexemes. Furthermore, it would not be efficient for people to have a separate word for every pebble, grain of sand, leaf, cloud, star, wave, chair, bird, dish, spoon, vehicle, and path. In other words, human language could not be efficient if it consisted entirely of

proper names, that is, individual names for each isolatable object. Objects must be put into classes in order to talk about them meaningfully and efficiently. Specific items can, however, be identified in languages by using phrases which restrict the class terms. The word *chair*, for example, can be used to refer to millions of different chairs in the world. But it is possible to single out a specific chair in English by saying, "The chair in which I am now sitting." This capacity for specification is one of the major roles of syntax.

It is important to recognize that on every level of structure, languages employ a limited number of signs to perform a great many functions. Although the vocal apparatus is capable of making several hundred different sounds, most languages employ only a limited number of sounds which contrast on at least two dimensions. Similarly, in the vocabulary of any language there are always many fewer words than the infinite number of entities, activities, characteristics, and relations which are continuously represented. In the syntax, languages employ a restricted number of constructions to cover a wealth of relations. In fact, without such doubling up, languages would be monstrously awkward and inefficient. And even in the area of discourse there are only a limited number of discourse types, e.g. narratives, lyric poetry, didactic poetry, history, speeches, prayers, genealogies, and laws.

### *Types of Referents*

Much has already been said about different types of referents of lexemes but it may be useful to specify these more systematically and precisely in order to have a more global view of what is involved. One basic distinction which is particularly important for detailed analyses of texts is the fundamental difference between practical-world referents, e.g. *man*, *tree*, *house*, *boat*, *mountain*, *sun*, *moon*, and *cloud*, and language-world referents, e.g. *word*, *sentence*, *grammar*, *noun*, *verb*, *pronoun*, and *discourse*. The practical world referents (whether real or imaginary) are also of two different types: unique and multiple. The unique referents are also designated by two different types of lexemes: proper names, e.g. *Simon Peter*, *Tiberius Caesar*, *William Shakespeare*, *Mount Everest*, and the *Atlantic Ocean*, and titles, e.g. *The Word*, *Sons of Thunder*, *Son of Consolation*, and *Son of Man*, but only in specific contexts.

One of the problems with proper names and titles is that they readily cross over from one status to another. The term χριστός was first a title, meaning 'anointed one,' but it gradually acquired the value of a proper name. In the New Testament one cannot always be certain as to the precise function of χριστός. Similarly, *Caesar* began as a proper name, but became a title, not

only in Latin but in other languages, as it was borrowed in the form of *Kaiser* in German and *Tsar* in Russian.

Although proper names normally have only one referent, in some cases more than one person may have the same name (e.g. Herod). But within any one context a proper name has a unique referent. Titles on the other hand can refer to a number of different individuals, but within any one context they normally specify only a single referent.

Terms with multiple referents constitute by far the majority of lexemes in any language. There is a certain parallelism between the various classes of referents and the formal (morphological and syntactic) classes of words. In both English and Greek most entities are represented primarily by nouns, but nouns may also represent events, e.g. *arrival* and εἴσοδος, *punishment* and κόλασις, and characteristics, e.g. *length* and μῆκος, *heat* and θέρμη. Verbs represent primarily activities, but may also designate characteristics of activities, e.g. *begin* and ἄρχομαι, *finish* and τελέω (as aspects of verb complements).

### *Special Problems in the Semantic Structure of Words*

One of the most complex problems involved in the analysis of lexical meaning is that many words belong to more than one major semantic class, that is to say, a word may combine two, or even more, of the major semantic classes of entities, activities, characteristics, and relations. Furthermore, these semantically complex terms become very important in syntactic constructions. For example, in English a word such as *dancer* refers to both an entity and an activity, i.e. a person who dances (usually on a professional basis). But in a construction such as *good dancer*, the lexeme *good* applies normally not to the person, but to the activity of dancing. The same is true of a phrase such as *good doctor*, in which *good* characterizes the capacity to treat the sick.

In Greek similar problems occur with words such as σωτήρ 'one who saves people,' ἀρχηγός 'one who begins or initiates,' and τελειωτής 'one who makes possible the completion of something.' In the case of compounds the complex nature of the semantic structure is usually quite evident, e.g. προκυρόω 'to validate something in advance' (a combination of an activity and a feature of time), δυσερμήνευτος 'something which is hard to interpret,' and φιλαδελφία 'love for a fellow believer.' **Problem 15.**

Collectives, e.g. *nation*, *people*, *church*, often cause problems because the context does not always indicate whether the referent is the total group or the constituent members of a group, and accordingly, it may be difficult to determine whether a cross reference to such terms should be singular or plural. Similarly, indefinite pronouns such as *whoever* and *any* are semantically plural even though they are singular in form.

In both English and Greek the generic reference to both males and females has been through the use of the masculine form of words. In Greek the noun ἄνθρωπος generally refers to a human being, whether male or female, but the pronominal cross reference to such a noun is characteristically a masculine singular pronoun. This has led to the practice in English of using masculine pronouns in translations of the New Testament, since traditionally the third person masculine pronouns in English have also been neutral as to gender. But increased sensitivity about such matters and a rapid shift to the use of "inclusive language" means that one must reconsider problems of semantic reference. For example, in Matthew 18.15 ἀδελφός, literally 'brother,' certainly does not refer exclusively to a person's own brother, nor merely to men who sin, but to any fellow believer who sins. Similarly, in Luke 9.23 the indefinite pronoun τις refers to anyone, whether male or female, and so in English it may be necessary to shift this into the second person which is gender neutral, e.g. "if you want to come with me, you must forget yourself." On the other hand, it would be possible to shift to the plural, which is also inclusive, e.g. "if people want to come with me, they...must forget themselves."

Personification implies a number of subtle semantic difficulties, especially if one must translate such personifications into languages which do not permit talking about events or characteristics as though they were entities. In 1 John 4.18, ἡ τελεία ἀγάπη ἔξω βάλλει τὸν φόβον 'perfect love casts out all fear,' both ἀγάπη and φόβος are personified. In reality, love does not exist apart from those who love, and the same is true of fear. The noun ἀγάπη refers not only to an event, but implies that this is something which people experience. Accordingly, in some languages the only way to express the fact that the experience of love can eliminate the experience of fear must be 'If people completely love, they do not need to fear' or 'When people love totally, they do not fear.' Similar problems of personification occur with χάρις 'grace' (Romans 5.21), σοφία 'wisdom' (Matthew 11.19), and νόμος 'law' (Romans 4.15).

Languages are unique codes in that they can be used to speak about themselves. Not only does the Greek of the New Testament have words for speaking, e.g. λέγω, λαλέω, φωνέω, and writing, e.g. γράφω, but it has other words which refer to what may be regarded as "verbal artifacts," e.g. ὕμνος 'song,' ὄνομα 'name,' ῥῆμα 'statement,' λόγος 'message,' ἔπος 'word,' νόμος 'the Law of Moses' (as a designation of the Pentateuch), ἐπιστολή 'letter,' προφῆται 'the writings of the prophets,' and βιβλίον 'book.' There is, however, a serious problem involved with a number of these words which refer to verbal entities, since it is not always possible to determine whether

the focus is upon the entity as a verbal unit or as content. In some contexts a word such as *βιβλίον* refers to a written artifact (Luke 4.17), but in other instances, to the content of a document (Mark 10.4), although in Mark 10.4 one cannot be certain as to whether the focus is on the content of the document or upon the document itself. The same problem occurs in most terms for verbal artifacts, except for those terms referring to formal syntactic features such as *noun*, *verb*, *subject*, *predicate*, etc.

A number of terms which are formally adjectives in English and Greek imply more than mere features or characteristics of a person but suggest that such features are integrally related to an event or activity. Note, for example, terms such as *ἀγαθός/good*, *χρηστός/kind*, *πονηρός/evil*, and *ἄδικος/unjust*. These expressions relate primarily to behavior, and it is no wonder that Greek contains verb formations such as *ἀγαθόω* 'to do good' (not in the New Testament), *χρηστεύομαι* 'to be kind,' *πονηρεύομαι* 'to do evil' (not in the New Testament), and *ἀδικέω* 'to be unjust.' In a number of languages the translation of these adjectives involving implied events can only be accomplished by employing verbs.

It is often difficult to determine whether a lexeme represents an entity or an activity or a state resulting from an activity. For example, in English the noun *growth* may represent either a process of growing, e.g. *the growth of the child*, or an object resulting from such a process, e.g. *the growth on his leg*. Similarly, Greek *ἀκοή* may be the act of hearing (Hebrews 4.2) or the message which is heard (Romans 10.16). The noun *δόσις* may represent the act of giving (Philippians 4.15) or a gift (James 1.17).

### *Associative Meanings*

Although associative meanings have already been mentioned, it is important at this point to discuss them somewhat more fully in order to distinguish them clearly from designative meanings, which are the principal concern of the next two chapters. An adequate treatment of the associative meanings in the Greek of the New Testament, however, would require an entire volume.

Lexemes not only acquire designative meanings from their use in representing phenomena in the real and linguistic worlds, but they also acquire certain associations based on how, when, where, and by whom they are used. In the same way that dirt and stains on clothing reveal a great deal about where and how they have been used, so words pick up associative meanings from the people who characteristically use them, from the circumstances or settings in which they customarily occur, from their associations with literary productions, and from their referents.

Because certain ethnic or socioeconomic classes traditionally use certain terms, these words acquire the associations of the class in question. Differences of sex, age, education, geography, religion, and work are also reflected in terms which people use, and this means that certain words become associated with such classes. Or one may say that the differences of class "rub off on" the words. It would be wrong to think that lexemes acquire associative meanings only from lower-class persons. Upper-class usage is every bit as distinctive as lower-class usage and is often bitterly criticized and denounced.

But associative meanings are not limited to matters of vocabulary. Pronunciation, grammatical constructions, and the organization of discourse also acquire associative meanings based on speakers who typically employ distinctive phonological, lexical, syntactic, and rhetorical structures.

Some religious groups use a quite distinctive religious vocabulary, and they may even employ distinctive syntactic constructions. The more a religious group attempts to be "separated from the world," the more likely they are to develop a highly specialized "other world" vocabulary, and to use such expressions as *brothers and sisters*, *true to the faith*, *saved by the blood*, *washed in the blood*, *saved to serve*, *born-again believers*, and *filled with the Spirit*. Unfortunately it sometimes happens that a religious group develops such a distinctive "holy ghetto language" that they cut themselves off from effective communication with all but their own in-group.

Words also pick up associative meanings from the circumstances in which they are typically used, and the same word may have different associative values depending on where and how it is uttered, e.g. *hell* on the golf course or in church. But different words, e.g. *run*, *basket*, *eagle*, *goal*, and *set*, may have somewhat similar positive associative meanings from quite different settings, in baseball, basketball, golf, hockey, and tennis, respectively.

The significance of the associative meanings shows up most clearly when words are used in the wrong setting. At a meeting of the Linguistic Society of America a speaker who was well known for his religious affiliation spoke of the audience of linguists as a "congregation." Immediately, smiles and titters rippled through the audience.

A well known literary discourse may provide the basis for a good deal of associative meaning. Phrases such as *verily*, *verily* and *in the heavenlies* sound strictly biblical, and a political candidate's statement *to run or not to run* echoes Hamlet's "to be or not to be." Special events can also develop significant, short-lived expressions with considerable associative meaning, for example, *Where's the beef?* and *Where was George?* repeated frequently during the 1988 presidential campaign in the United States.

The referents of words also contribute to their associative meaning. In American English expressions such as *mother*, *country*, *nation*, *flag*, and *apple pie* all have positive associative values, while *blood*, *terrorist*, *Mafia*, and *communist* are generally negative. But in any heterogeneous society the same word may have quite different associative meanings for different sectors of the society, e.g. *liberal*, *conservative*, *Democrat*, *Republican*, *big business*, and *labor*.

The very same entity or event may be referred to by quite different expressions in order to communicate distinct associative values, e.g. *freedom fighters* in place of *insurgents*, *destabilizing* instead of *defeating*, and *inoperative* rather than *broken*. The same type of contrast occurs in the case of the vulgar four-letter words in English, which have acquired their associative meanings, not so much from their referents (since the same referents may also be referred to by technical expressions), but from the kinds of people who habitually use such terms in what many other people regard as the wrong social settings.

Without contributions from native speakers of Hellenistic Greek, it would be difficult to tell much about the subtle associative meanings of many Greek terms in the New Testament. Moreover, the New Testament does not deal with many themes in which radical differences of associative meaning would likely occur. But there are certainly some lexemes which are very positive and others which are quite negative. For example, πνεῦμα, πνευματικός, and πνευματικῶς would surely be positive in contrast with σάρξ, σάρκινος, and σαρκικός. Words such as λέπρα 'leprosy,' δυσεντέριον 'dysentery,' and μάστιξ[b] 'a type of disease implying divine punishment' would have negative associative meanings. The term σταυρός 'cross' would have had strongly negative associative meanings for most speakers of Hellenistic Greek, but for Christians the term became a symbol of their newly found faith and a sign of divine forgiveness. Similarly, the term ἀγαπάω, which in Hellenistic Greek would have been more or less associatively neutral for most speakers, became highly valued among believers. And ἐράω 'passionate love,' very highly regarded in amorous texts, as well as in some of Plato's philosophical discourses, does not even occur in the New Testament. But in the writings of the early Christian Fathers it has a strongly negative associative value. The term δαίμων has a favorable associative value in Classical and most Hellenistic Greek, since it was used to refer to deities, personal destiny, and semi-divine beings, but in the New Testament the δαίμονες became 'demons' and 'evil spirits.' **Problem 16.**

Many persons have the impression that associative meanings (or values) are rather ephemeral (subject to rapid change) and highly individualistic. But that is really not the case. Extensive investigations of this phenomenon by C.

E. Osgood (1964) and his colleagues have shown that associative meanings are widespread and remarkably stable within any society. In fact, they seem to be every bit as extensive and enduring as designative meanings. But it is also true that a high percentage of the lexemes of a language are largely neutral as far as associative meanings are concerned.

# THREE

## ANALYZING THE DIFFERENT MEANINGS OF THE SAME LEXEME

Before discussing methods which may be employed in analyzing the different meanings of the same lexeme, it is important to review briefly what has already been said about the features of lexemes, which are sometimes defined simply as any free form. But this is almost the same as saying "any verbal unit set off by spaces." Such a pseudo-definition is, of course, very misleading. In Greek it is preferable to speak of non-idiomatic lexemes as "stems (simple, derived, and compound) without their inflectional affixes," despite the fact that when words are cited, they almost always occur in their so-called "citation form" with suffixes. The only exceptions to this definition are the uninflected particles, adverbs, and borrowed terms, which are generally not inflected. Inflectional affixes should also be treated as part of the lexical inventory (as will be pointed out below), but since their functions are so closely related to the syntax, their meanings are usually handled as a matter of syntactic functioning.

In addition to (1) uninflected words (both clitics and nonclitics), (2) inflectional affixes, and (3) stems (simple, derived, and compound), there are also (4) idioms, including (a) so-called "set phrases," in which the meaning of at least one element cannot be determined on the basis of its normal, unmarked meaning (these expressions are sometimes called "low-grade idioms") and (b) full idioms, in which the meaning of the whole expression cannot be determined by adding up the meanings of the constituent parts.

In English there are a number of set phrases with specialized meanings, e.g. *turn in* (*he turned in the money*) and *passed out* (*he passed out because of the heat*). Such phrases may, however, be entirely unidiomatic in such expressions as *he turned in the doorway and shouted to her* and *he passed out the money to the people.* In Greek most set phrases have become compounds consisting of verbs with prepositions or preposed adverbs, e.g. ἐκπίπτω 'to run aground' (of a ship) (Acts 27.17) and παραλογίζομαι 'to deceive' (Colossians 2.4). Full-grade idioms in both English and Greek are abundant and the following are typical of those found in the New Testament: ἐπιτίθημι ζυγὸν ἐπὶ τὸν τράχηλον (literally 'to put a yoke on the neck' but meaning 'to burden with obligations'), τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρτον ἐσθίω (literally 'to eat one's own bread' but meaning 'to work for a living'), and αἴρω τὸν σταυρόν (literally 'to take up the cross' but meaning 'to be prepared to suffer, even unto death').

This chapter, however, is concerned not so much with the various classes of lexemes which may have one or more meanings, but with the methods which may be used in ascertaining the possible meanings of such lexemes. But it is essential to distinguish between (1) the practical means used by the average speaker of a language when he or she is trying to understand what is being said and (2) the technical or analytical procedures which a linguist may employ in formulating definitions of meanings of words within his own mother tongue and in deciding upon the meanings of words in a foreign language, for which there may or may not be qualified informants.

As a person listens to a discourse in his or her mother tongue and hears a word or phrase which is either entirely new or is known but not in a sense which fits the context, the hearer immediately begins to interact with the context in trying to determine precisely what is meant. This usually means checking first with other words in the immediate context in order to narrow down the meaning of any obscure or ambivalent expression. If this doesn't prove satisfactory, a hearer is likely to do a "retake" of the pronunciation to see if there was a possible mistake in speaking or hearing. If this doesn't help, there is always the possibility that the intonation patterns or voice quality will reveal a statement as being ironic or humorous. Information about the speaker's background may also be of help. In the actual process of decoding an oral utterance it seems as though a number of these procedures take place almost simultaneously.

For a reader the situation is very similar, and clues are sought in the verbal context, in general background information known to the reader about the subject matter, in what is known about an author's typical way of writing, and in what can be learned in a dictionary or encyclopedia.

Participants in an actual communication are seldom concerned with a systematic analysis of the total range of meaning of a term, but with its specific meaning in a particular statement. Knowing something of the total range of meaning of a term can help in isolating the specific designative meaning in a discourse, but in the practical day-to-day use of language the focus is on the particular meaning of lexemes and not upon the variety of meanings or their relations one to another.

Because of this concern for the particular meaning within specific contexts, many monolingual dictionaries do not attempt to classify diverse meanings. They simply list different uses, usually in the order of their frequency or on the basis of their possible historical development. Most semantic analysts, however, are interested not only in the range of usage of a term but in the kinds of meanings and their interrelations. And if they are preparing a monolingual dictionary in their own mother tongue, they can call upon their own linguistic experience with the various terms and upon their encyclopedic knowledge of how the world works. Accordingly, in preparing definitions they usually begin with the most generic features of the entities (also called "objects" and "participants"), activities (events, happenings), characteristics (quantities and qualities), and relations, and by adding a series of restrictive qualifications, they narrow down the range of contexts in which such a term can be appropriately employed. For example, in defining *fish* as an entity, it is possible to say that the term *fish* represents "an animal, vertebrate, living in water, which is cold-blooded, and normally obtains oxygen through the gills (though a few fish have a lung-like sack which also serves for the exchange of oxygen)." One may also say that most fish have scales, but this, as well as the use of a lung-like sack, is not a distinctive feature.

To arrive at this same information it would be theoretically possible to put together all the innumerable contexts in which the term *fish* has been used and from these extract this same information, but there is no reason to perform unnecessary procedures when a person is fully familiar with the language and with the ecological and cultural context in which the term *fish* is used.

But this approach does have some liabilities, because it tends to overlook the fact that the term *fish* is used in other ways, e.g. *he went fishing*, that is, he undertook to catch some fish, and *he fished the lake*, meaning not only that he fished in the lake, but presumably he fished throughout the lake. One can also say *he fished out an old tire*, probably from water, but not necessarily so; it might have been from a pile of tires or from a heap of refuse. But one can also say *he fished through his pockets for two quarters*, and in a figurative sense, a

person can be called *a cold fish* or be described as *a fish out of water*. Finally, a person can be told to *fish or cut bait*.

The first meaning of *fish* may be regarded as the unmarked meaning (often called "core" or "central" meaning), and the rest represent varying degrees of extended, peripheral, or marginal meanings. In this series of meanings the uses of *fish* in *he went fishing* and *he fished the lake* seem to be very closely related, while *he fished out an old tire* and *he fished through his pockets* also appear to be related. This last extended use of *fish* must be treated as figurative and only distantly related to the aqueous vertebrate with gills. Although we describe different uses of *fish* as constituting different meanings, we are in a sense also describing different types of contexts, since it is the nature of the contexts which determines the distinctive semantic features. **Problem 17.**

But what can be done by lexicographers who do not speak a certain language as their own mother tongue and who are not fully familiar with the culture? If they have informants, as most linguists do who work with so-called "primitive languages," they can use a method involving prototypes and can obtain from informants some idea about what a word cannot mean. In fact, the meaning of lexemes in such a situation is determined primarily by stating the boundaries or ranges of usage, and not by specifying all the possible features.

Lexicographers can present informants with a picture of a typical fish and ask what people would call such a creature. Then they can show pictures of various other animals in the sea, e.g. shark, eel, dolphin, lobster, crab, sea urchin, clam, etc., in order to determine how many of these animals can be included within the range of the term which also designates a typical fish.

One of the problems encountered in this approach is that native speakers of a language often differ as to the range of application of a term. But ordinary people are not the only ones who argue about the meanings of words, e.g. various kinds of screwdrivers, chisels, and wrenches; philosophers have been arguing for centuries about the concepts represented by the meaning of such words as *truth*, *beauty*, *insight*, *knowledge*, and *goodness*.

The problems of semantic range and equivocation are no better illustrated than in the comparison of lexical meanings which involve differences in shape and size, e.g. *mound*, *hill*, and *mountain*. How large does a mound have to be before it becomes a hill? And how big does a hill have to be before it becomes a mountain? The distinctions are not fixed, however, but relative, since what is called a "mountain" in New England would only be a "hill" in the Rockies, and a typical "mountain" in the Rockies would be nothing more than a "hill" in the Himalayas. It is the relative difference, not the absolute

difference, which is relevant. Compare also the lexemes *boot*, *shoe*, *slipper*, and *sandal*. How high and how heavy does a shoe have to be before it becomes a boot? And how small and light does a shoe have to be before it becomes a slipper? And what happens if a person uses a sandal as a slipper? Does this change the name? For some people it does, while for others, it does not. **Problem 18.**

For lexicographers working with the Greek of the New Testament the situation is often quite complex, since, as already noted, the contexts in which many words occur are strictly limited. For the Hebrew of the Old Testament the situation is even worse, since there is practically nothing else in Hebrew which is contemporaneous with the biblical text. And almost ten percent of the vocabulary of the Old Testament occurs only once, so that intertextual evidence for numerous words is totally lacking, though there may be some evidence from cognate languages. Such evidence must, however, be treated with suspicion, since there are always so many "false friends" between related languages, i.e. words which are historically related, but which may have quite different meanings, e.g. English *deer* and German *Tier*, meaning 'animal.'

For the biblical languages there are no native speakers, although there are dictionaries, but as already noted, these have their limitations, especially since they depend almost wholly on specifying meaning by using glosses. Accordingly, if one is to do a thorough piece of work and arrive at verifiable results, it is essential to begin with the empirical evidence of the texts and use an inductive approach with as few apriori theological presuppositions as possible. It is a serious mistake to always begin with a so-called "basic meaning," because there may not even be such a core meaning. The relations between the various meanings of lexemes may sometimes resemble constellations rather than galaxies.

Once a specific, fairly large, and illustrative set of occurrences of a term in any language has been put onto separate slips of paper and the slips sorted into piles of seemingly related sets of meanings, one must then ask the question, "What do the meanings of the slips in any one pile have in common, and what distinguishes them from meanings in the other piles?" If there is no relation between the meanings, then one must be dealing with homophones, e.g. *read* and *reed* (two words pronounced the same way but with meanings which share no relevant components or features), or homophones and homographs, e.g. *light* (in color) and *light* (in weight).

After setting up a tentative system of classification of different meanings, one must test the system by seeing how readily and how well the rest of the occurrences of the term fit the classification. But the task is by no means

complete, since one cannot determine fully the meaning of any one term without comparing the range of meanings of all other terms in the same domain. And this involves the techniques outlined in Chapter 4. In actual practice, however, a lexicographer does not delay looking at sets of related meanings in other lexemes until all the possible meanings of a single lexeme have been analyzed. But for the sake of a clear explanation of the two approaches, it is helpful to consider first one and then the other approach, and then study the manner in which they can be successfully coordinated in actual practice.

Having examined various problems relating to different meanings of certain English terms, it is essential to compare the application of lexicographical methods to several terms in the Greek of the New Testament. The following is a list of typical uses of γῆ, followed by a translation of the context, but retaining the Greek term, so as not to be unduly influenced by renderings which could prejudice results. These brief contexts should also be supplemented by looking at the various passages in the Greek New Testament if there is significant doubt as to the meaning of γῆ in any instance.

1. γῆ Ζαβουλὼν καὶ γῆ Νεφθαλίμ 'the γῆ of Zebulun and the γῆ of Nephthali' Matthew 4.15.
2. ἕως ἂν παρέλθῃ ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ γῆ 'until heaven and γῆ pass away' Matthew 5.18.
3. ἐξουσίαν...ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἀφιέναι ἁμαρτίας 'power on the γῆ to forgive sins' Matthew 9.6.
4. ἓν ἐξ αὐτῶν οὐ πεσεῖται ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν 'not one of them falls to γῆ' Matthew 10.29.
5. κύριε τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῆς γῆς 'Lord of heaven and γῆ' Matthew 11.25.
6. ὅπου οὐκ εἶχεν γῆν πολλήν 'where there was not much γῆ' Matthew 13.5.
7. τὸ δὲ πλοῖον ἤδη σταδίους πολλοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ἀπεῖχεν 'the boat was already many stades from the γῆ' Matthew 14.24.
8. ἔκρυψα τὸ τάλαντόν σου ἐν τῇ γῇ 'I buried your talent in the γῆ' Matthew 25.25.
9. σκότος ἐγένετο ἐπὶ πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν 'darkness came upon the entire γῆ' or 'the entire γῆ became dark' Matthew 27.45.
10. πᾶς ὁ ὄχλος πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἦσαν 'the entire crowd was on the γῆ facing the lake' Mark 4.1.

11. *αὐτομάτη ἡ γῆ καρποφορεῖ* 'the *γῆ* produces a harvest on its own' Mark 4.28.
12. *οἷα γναφεὺς ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς οὐ δύναται οὕτως λευκᾶναι* 'like no bleacher on the *γῆ* is able to make them so white' Mark 9.3.
13. *καταγαγόντες τὰ πλοῖα ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν* 'bringing the ships to the *γῆ*' Luke 5.11.
14. *ἆρα εὑρήσει τὴν πίστιν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς;* 'will he indeed find faith on the *γῆ*?' Luke 18.8.
15. *κλινουσῶν τὰ πρόσωπα εἰς τὴν γῆν* 'they bowed their faces to the *γῆ*' Luke 24.5.
16. *ἦλθεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς...εἰς τὴν Ἰουδαίαν γῆν* 'Jesus went to the *γῆ* of Judah' John 3.22.
17. *τῷ δακτύλῳ κατέγραφεν εἰς τὴν γῆν* 'with his finger he wrote on the *γῆ*' John 8.6.
18. *ἕως ἐσχάτου τῆς γῆς* 'to the end of the *γῆ*' Acts 1.8.
19. *ἔξελθε ἐκ τῆς γῆς σου* 'leave your *γῆ*' Acts 7.3.
20. *ὅπως διαγγελῇ τὸ ὄνομά μου ἐν πάσῃ τῇ γῇ* 'so that my name may be announced in all the *γῆ*' Romans 9.17.
21. *κατέβη εἰς τὰ κατώτερα μέρη τῆς γῆς* 'he went down into the lower part of the *γῆ*' Ephesians 4.9.
22. *νεκρώσατε οὖν τὰ μέλη τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς* 'so put to death the body parts on the *γῆ*' Colossians 3.5.
23. *ὁ γεωργὸς ἐκδέχεται τὸν τίμιον καρπὸν τῆς γῆς* 'the farmer receives the valuable harvest of the *γῆ*' James 5.7.
24. *οὐκ ἔβρεξεν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἐνιαυτοὺς τρεῖς* 'it did not rain on the *γῆ* for three years' James 5.17.
25. *ἡ γῆ ἐβλάστησεν τὸν καρπὸν αὐτῆς* 'the *γῆ* produced its crops' James 5.18.
26. *πειράσαι τοὺς κατοικοῦντας ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς* 'to test those dwelling on the *γῆ*' Revelation 3.10.
27. *βασιλεύσουσιν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς* 'they ruled as kings over the *γῆ*' Revelation 5.10.
28. *ἐβοήθησεν ἡ γῆ τῇ γυναικί* 'the *γῆ* helped the woman' Revelation 12.16.
29. *ἐθαυμάσθη ὅλη ἡ γῆ ὀπίσω τοῦ θηρίου* 'the whole *γῆ* marveled at the beast' Revelation 13.3.

30. οἱ ἔμποροι τῆς γῆς...ἐπλούτησαν 'the businessmen of the γῆ grew rich' Revelation 18.3.

31. ἥτις ἔφθειρεν τὴν γῆν ἐν τῇ πορνείᾳ αὐτῆς 'who destroyed the γῆ by her adultery' Revelation 19.2.

It may seem both strange and arbitrary to render the meanings of the various biblical expressions by translating everything but γῆ, since the contexts would permit the translation of γῆ in a number of different ways. That is, of course, the heart of the problem. It is possible to translate γῆ in these various contexts as 'earth,' 'country,' 'world,' 'land,' 'homeland,' 'region,' 'area,' 'territory,' 'shore,' 'ground,' 'soil,' 'dirt,' 'society,' and 'people.' And unless analysts are careful, they are likely to fall into the trap of making decisions about the English glosses and not about the Greek term γῆ.

As already recommended, the first procedure is to put the various contexts into different easily recognized classes in a tentative analysis of the meaning of γῆ. But this presupposes that there are certain principles to follow in such a grouping. The first such principle is that distinctions should be made on the basis of evident contrasts, and these can be seen more readily by using appropriate glosses. For example, by means of contrasts such as 'heaven and earth' (2) vs. 'the land of Zebulun' (1), and 'businessmen of the earth' (30) vs. 'the earth produced its crops' (25), and 'the whole earth marveled' (29) vs. 'where there was not much earth' (6), it is possible to establish certain tentative distinctions in meaning: (A) earth as the entire extent of land and water (2), since it contrasts with heaven and in combination with οὐρανός 'heaven' designates the entire created cosmos, (B) a limited area of the earth, e.g. 'land of Zebulun' (1) and 'land of Judah' (16), (C) land as the firm surface of the earth, in contrast with water (10), (D) soil or ground that produces crops (6, 25), and (E) people who inhabit the earth (29).

The obvious question is "Why not begin with all the possible glosses and try to reduce them to a few sets by comparing their related meanings?" This is certainly one way in which to analyze different meanings, but it is usually a risky procedure to work primarily with glosses, since these inevitably introduce semantic features which are likely to be alien to the meaning of the Greek terms. It is far better to use glosses as only tentative indicators of minimal contrasts rather than to depend on comparisons. Working with contrasts is always a safer and more decisive technique.

The second principle of organizing related meanings is to adopt no more meanings than are completely necessary to account for the evidence. This is, of course, a fundamental principle of all scientific work, since the fewer the

necessary categories or principles needed to explicate the data the more likely is the analysis to be correct.

But some people may very well question the whole idea of trying to set up different meanings of words. Why not be satisfied with a list of glosses which one can employ whenever the context seems to imply one or another? But this does not resolve significant differences of opinion about the meanings in specific contexts nor does it help in seeing how various sets of particular meanings of a term cluster in different ways. These bundles of glosses reflect important relations which need to be investigated if one is to avoid naive judgments and misleading conclusions about different meanings of the same lexeme. This is even more true in dealing with the related meanings of different lexemes, which are usually much closer together in semantic space. In this process of sorting and classifying meanings, we are essentially classifying the contexts in which such lexical elements occur. This involves recognizing bundles of contexts and determining what a particular lexeme contributes to the meaning of such contexts.

The next step in the procedure is to examine all the selected contexts in order to test the adequacy of the tentative listing of possible meanings, namely, A "the entire earth," B "a limited and particular region of earth," C "land, in contrast with water," D "ground as surface of the earth or as soil," and E "people of the earth." Context 2 ('until heaven and earth pass away') and Context 5 ('Lord of heaven and earth') clearly belong to Meaning A, as does Context 3 ('power on the earth to forgive sins'), since the focus is on the total extent. Context 1 ('the land of Zebulun and Nephthali'), however, belongs to Meaning B. In the case of Context 4 ('not one of them falls to the ground') the context indicates the surface of the earth (Meaning D).

Context 6 ('where there was not much earth') points to Meaning D, but Context 7 ('the boat was already many stades from the land') involves Meaning C. In Context 8 ('I buried your talent in the ground') γῆ is related to Meaning D. In Context 9 ('darkness came upon the entire earth') there is a problem since some exegetes claim that because Jesus' death had cosmic consequences, the darkness must have been at least over the entire earth and possibly throughout the entire cosmos. Others, however, insist that since there are no independent confirmations of such a widespread darkness, γῆ in this context must designate only the immediate region of Jerusalem or Judea. Such arguments are, however, largely beside the point. What is important in the Matthean account is the symbolic, theological, and metaphysical significance of the event.

Context 10 ('the entire crowd was on the land facing the lake') clearly belongs to Meaning C, while Context 11 ('the earth produces a harvest on its

own') surely favors Meaning D. Context 12 ('like no bleacher on earth is able to make them so white') poses a problem of exegesis, since the phrase ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς may be an attributive of γναφεύς, i.e. 'any bleacher on earth,' or it may serve to designate the ancient custom of bleaching clothes by spreading them out on the ground under the hot sun in order to bleach them white. The first interpretation is generally preferred, but the meaning could be A or D.

In Context 13 ('bringing the ships to land') the meaning is clearly C, but in Context 14 ('will he indeed find faith on the earth') the most likely meaning is A. In Context 15 ('they bowed their faces to the ground') γῆ belongs to Meaning D, and in Context 16 ('Jesus went to the land of Judah') γῆ belongs to Meaning B, but in Context 17 ('with his finger he wrote on the ground') to Meaning D. In Context 18 ('to the end of the earth'), however, γῆ belongs to Meaning A, in Context 19 ('leave your land') to Meaning B, and in Contexts 20 ('so that my name may be announced in all the earth') and 21 ('he went down into the lower part of the earth') to Meaning A.

Context 22 ('so put to death the body parts on the earth' or '...the earthly body parts') represents a number of semantic problems. In the first place, νεκρώσατε 'put to death' is strictly figurative, since nothing is killed. At the same time τὰ μέλη (literally 'body parts') is used in an extended, generic sense of 'parts' or 'aspects.' This is evident from the context, since these aspects are spelled out as consisting of sexual immorality, indecency, passion, and evil desires, and these aspects are further qualified as being typical of what happens on earth (Meaning A). Accordingly, some translations have rendered this command as "treat as dead those earthly desires of yours." Contexts 23 ('the farmer receives the valuable harvest of the earth'), 24 ('it did not rain on the earth for three years'), and 25 ('the earth produced its crops'), which involve harvest, rain, and crops, may be regarded as belonging to Meaning D, although one can also argue that Meanings A and B are also possible.

In Contexts 26 ('to test those dwelling on the earth'), 27 ('they ruled as kings over the earth'), and 30 ('the businessmen of the earth grew rich') γῆ is best interpreted as representing Meaning A, and this is also probably true of Context 31 ('who destroyed the earth by her adultery') because of the presumed intention to include the entire earth. Context 28 ('the earth helped the women'), however, presents certain problems, since γῆ has been personified and made the agent of help for the woman being pursued by a dragon. Such a usage of γῆ may be best described as a figurative extension of Meaning A (although not conventionalized), since the events in Revelation are to be interpreted generally in symbolic terms. But in Context 29 ('the whole earth marveled at the beast') the occurrence of γῆ in the sense of 'all the people of

earth' is not a personification but a metonym (Meaning E). But this sense of γῆ is not unique, since it also occurs in Matthew 5.13, ὑμεῖς ἐστε τὸ ἅλας τῆς γῆς 'you are the salt of the earth.' The term γῆ in this context designates much more than the physical earth. In fact, it is parallel to κόσμος in the phrase τὸ φῶς τοῦ κόσμου 'the light of the world' (John 8.12), and must be regarded as an example of Meaning E.

For many persons the frequent use of such terms as *may*, *probably*, *possible*, *could*, *generally*, *tendency*, *however*, *but*, and *somewhat* at various points in the preceding sections gives the impression that semantics is a very inexact discipline, but this is the very nature of language. Words are not points of meaning or well-defined pieces of mosaic covering a society's cultural landscape. Nor is language a topographical map of a culture's cognitive experience. It is a highly useful and adaptable set of symbols for getting things done in an interpersonal world, but not a set of mathematical formulas or of strictly logical signs having only one well-defined meaning.

A still further procedure in dealing with the meanings of γῆ would be to test the series of Meanings A through E in all the other New Testament contexts in which γῆ occurs. But even then the task would not be complete, for the meanings of γῆ would still need to be tested with those different lexemes which belong to the same semantic domain, e.g. κόσμος, οἰκουμένη, ἔδαφος, and χαμαί. But this latter procedure again involves the methods described in Chapter 4. **Problem 19.**

A somewhat different set of problems and applicable methods of analysis may be illustrated by considering the range of meanings of πατήρ 'father.' Whereas in the case of γῆ it is impossible to determine just what is the central, core, or unmarked meaning, there is no such difficulty in the case of πατήρ. Furthermore, greater familiarity with the range of meanings makes possible a somewhat simpler methodology, though there are many more instances of πατήρ than of γῆ in the New Testament.

1. ἀφέντες τὸ πλοῖον καὶ τὸν πατέρα αὐτῶν 'leaving the boat and their father' Matthew 4.22.
2. τὸν πατέρα ὑμῶν τὸν ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς 'your Father in heaven' Matthew 5.16.
3. ὡς ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν ὁ οὐράνιος τέλειός ἐστιν 'as your heavenly Father is perfect' Matthew 5.48.
4. ὁ φιλῶν πατέρα ἢ μητέρα ὑπὲρ ἐμέ 'whoever loves father or mother more than me' Matthew 10.37.
5. πατέρα μὴ καλέσητε ὑμῶν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς 'do not call anyone on earth father' Matthew 23.9.

6. *εἰ ἤμεθα ἐν ταῖς ἡμέραις τῶν πατέρων ἡμῶν* 'if we were in the days of our fathers' Matthew 23.30.
7. *εὐλογημένη ἡ ἐρχομένη βασιλεία τοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν Δαυίδ* 'blessed is the future kingdom of our father David' Mark 11.10.
8. *καθὼς ἐλάλησεν πρὸς τοὺς πατέρας ἡμῶν* 'as he said to our fathers' Luke 1.55.
9. *ποιῆσαι ἔλεος μετὰ τῶν πατέρων ἡμῶν* 'to show mercy to our fathers' Luke 1.72.
10. *ὅρκον ὃν ὤμοσεν πρὸς Ἀβραὰμ τὸν πατέρα ἡμῶν* 'oath which he swore to our father Abraham' Luke 1.73.
11. *ἐν τοῖς τοῦ πατρός μου δεῖ εἶναί με* 'it is necessary for me to be in the house of my Father' Luke 2.49.
12. *πατέρα ἔχομεν τὸν Ἀβραάμ* 'we have a father who is Abraham' Luke 3.8.
13. *ὅταν ἔλθῃ ἐν τῇ δόξῃ αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ πατρός* 'when he comes in his glory and that of the Father' Luke 9.26.
14. *οἱ δὲ πατέρες ὑμῶν ἀπέκτειναν αὐτούς* 'your fathers killed them' Luke 11.47.
15. *ὁ πατήρ μου ἕως ἄρτι ἐργάζεται* 'my Father is still working' John 5.17.
16. *οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν τὸ μάννα ἔφαγον ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ* 'our fathers ate manna in the desert' John 6.31.
17. *ὑμεῖς ποιεῖτε τὰ ἔργα τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν* 'you do the works of your father' or 'you do the same as your father did' John 8.41.
18. *ὑμεῖς ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ διαβόλου ἐστέ* 'you are from your father the devil' John 8.44.
19. *ὅτι ψεύστης ἐστὶν καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ* 'because he is a liar and the father of it' John 8.44.
20. *ἄνδρες ἀδελφοὶ καὶ πατέρες, ἀκούσατε* 'men, brothers, and fathers, listen' Acts 7.2.
21. *ἀλλ' οὐ πολλοὺς πατέρας* 'but not many fathers' 1 Corinthians 4.15.
22. *ἔσομαι ὑμῖν εἰς πατέρα* 'I will be a father to you' 2 Corinthians 6.18.
23. *εἷς θεὸς καὶ πατὴρ πάντων* 'one God and Father of all' Ephesians 4.6.

24. ἐκρύβη τρίμηνον ὑπὸ τῶν πατέρων αὐτοῦ 'he was hid three months by his parents' Hebrews 11.23.

Since all scientific classification depends upon the twin principles of comparison and contrast, it is important in relating any series of particular meanings into a set of diverse class meanings to employ a two-step procedure: first, attempt to find distinctive contrasts, and second, sort out the related sets on the basis of comparing the ways in which tokens (the contextually particular meanings) exhibit similar types of contrasts.

If one can begin with a seemingly central or core meaning, as in the case of this series with πατήρ, this is useful. Then one can examine one context after another in order to determine whether this core meaning is applicable. The meaning of πατήρ in Contexts 1 ('leaving the boat and their father') and 4 ('whoever loves father or mother more than me') is easily defined in terms of direct biological relation, male, and one generation prior to the reference person, namely, a son or daughter. But in Contexts 2 ('your Father in heaven') and 3 ('as your heavenly Father is perfect') these features simply do not apply. God as 'Father' is not biologically related, is only figuratively antecedent by the act of creation, and is only metaphorically male.

In Context 5 ('do not call anyone on earth father') the use of πατήρ is quite different from what it is in the previous contexts, since this is certainly not an injunction against speaking about one's own father nor is it a taboo about speaking of God as 'Father.' In Matthew 23.9 the focus is on authority within the believing community, and so a term appropriate to God is not to be used in speaking about persons.

In Context 6 ('if we were in the days of our fathers') πατήρ occurs in the plural, and it is also not applicable to an immediate human father, or to God, or to an authority figure among the believers. The biological relation holds good, and the issue of direct descent is at least metaphorically applicable, but these 'fathers' in Matthew 23.30 were many generations separated from the kinship reference point. Contexts 8 ('as he said to our fathers') and 9 ('to show mercy to our fathers') appear to employ the plural of πατήρ in the same sense as in Context 6, while in Contexts 7 ('blessed is the future kingdom of our father David') and 10 ('oath which he swore to our father Abraham') the singular of πατήρ is used in essentially the same sense as in Contexts 8 and 9, although the form is singular.

Notice how πατήρ in Contexts 11 ('it is necessary for me to be in the house of my Father') and 13 ('when he comes in his glory and that of the Father') designates God, while in Contexts 12 ('we have a father who is Abraham') and 14 ('your fathers killed them') the designation is to an ancestor. In Context 15 ('my Father is still working') the designation is likewise of

God, since Jesus is speaking, but the precise semantic components of πατήρ in this context have challenged the subtle acuity of theologians for centuries, and no explanation, whether metaphorical, metaphysical, adoptive, or biological, has served to satisfy everyone. Unique relationships between entities for which there are no parallels in finite existence cannot be readily defined on the basis of distinctive features.

In Context 16 ('our fathers ate manna in the desert') the designation is to the ancestors, but in Contexts 17 ('you do the works of your father'), 18 ('you are from your father the devil'), and 19 ('because he is a liar and the father of it') the referent is the Devil, as the archetype or prototype for the behavior of the leaders of the Jews to whom Jesus was speaking. In Context 19, however, one may argue that 'father' is not to be understood as a mere prototype, but in a symbolic sense as an originator of something, i.e. the one who instigated the custom of lying. In the same way that the expression 'son of...' in the Hebrew of the Old Testament and in the Greek of the New Testament means 'one who has the qualities of...,' so 'father of...' suggests that people follow the pattern of life characteristic of those who have metaphorically produced them. When the Jews in conversation with Jesus spoke of themselves as having Abraham as their father (John 8.39), the use of πατήρ should be considered as designating a prototype or model, as well as an ancestor.

In Context 20 ('men, brothers, and fathers, listen') the plural of πατήρ is not a designation of ancestors, but of contemporaneous elders, as persons of distinction and authority. In Context 21 ('but not many fathers') the designation is to leaders within the believing community, while in Context 22 ('I will be a father to you') there is a marked metaphorical use of πατήρ, in which God speaks of himself as a father, paralleling the use of πατήρ in Contexts 2, 3, 11, and 13.

In Context 24 ('he was hid three months by his parents') the plural of πατήρ specifies the parents of Moses.

On the basis of the series of evident contrasts and similarities in various contexts, it is possible to set up the following series of meanings: (A) father, as human biological male parent, (B) parents, (C) elder (older male of distinguished rank), (D) leader, (E) authority figure of high rank, addressed by title, (F) archetype, prototype, (G) ancestor, (H) God as Father. It is, of course, possible to arrange these meanings in a variety of orders, but from the standpoint of the number and diversity of applicable features of age, gender, relations, rank, and authority, it would seem that this sequence is probably justified. At the same time it is impossible to determine whether there should be a distinction between Meanings D and E, since there is no way of knowing

whether the reference in 1 Corinthians 4.15 belongs to the same class of persons as is mentioned in Matthew 23.9.

Given a list of meanings such as in the series A to H, it seems only logical to think of a string of meanings, related one to another in a kind of descending order from the so-called central or core meaning. But this is actually seldom the case. Other sets of meanings may develop along quite different lines, e.g. a galaxy radiating out from some central point. For example, in this set of meanings of πατήρ, two meanings, parents (B) and ancestors (G), have as focal features biological descent, while leader (D) and high authority figure (E) represent primarily authority and control. The meaning of elder (C) combines both biological relations and respect (an aspect of authority and status), and the meanings of archetype (F) and God (H) are essentially metaphorical (or metaphysical). These may be diagrammatically represented by the following figure:




**Figure 1.**

This type of diagram, however, should not be taken too seriously, since it only suggests possible relations and is not based on any mathematical foun-

dation in graph theory, whereby parameters can be given to various features and the interrelations of parts can be plotted with a high degree of accuracy.

Some persons naively imagine that it is possible to set up central meanings on the basis of frequency of occurrence. One might be able to spot a central meaning in this way if all the instances of the use of a term could be counted during a reasonable period of time, but this statistical approach can certainly not be applied to a restricted body of texts, e.g. the occurrence of πατήρ in the New Testament, where the use of πατήρ as a designation of God occurs far more frequently than any other meaning, in fact, more frequently than all the other meanings combined.

Central meanings do not depend on frequency of occurrence but on the extent of "markedness," that is, the extent to which particular meanings are marked by the context. The greater the specificity of marking the more peripheral the meaning, and if a meaning is always marked by a specific accompanying expression, the result is not a separate meaning but may constitute a part of a fixed phrase or idiom.

In order to appreciate more fully the difference between particular and class meanings and how a definition of meaning is expressed in terms of distinctive features, it may be useful to examine a number of ways in which *father* is used in English: (A) a male biological parent, (B) a male adoptive parent, (C) a progenitor, that is, a male founder of a family, race, or line, (D) a man who is a paternal provider for persons, e.g. *a father of the indigent,* (E) a person who has originated or established something, e.g. *the father of modern physics* and *the fathers of the church,* (F) a prototype or precursor, e.g. *the windmill was the father of the modern turbine,* (G) a leading male person in a community, e.g. *the city fathers,* (H) a priest, and (I) God as the supreme being.

For Meaning A, the three distinctive features are male, preceding generation, and direct descent. In the case of Meaning B, there is no direct descent, but another significant feature has been added, namely, a formal or informal relation recognized by the society and involving the usual obligations of a father. For Meaning C the distinctive features are male, direct descent, and person of importance, but separated by a number of generations. In the case of Meaning D, the features of male and older generation are both relevant, but there is no reference to biological descent. What is important is a feature similar to the case of B, in which a person shows paternal concern for a class of persons requiring such help. For Meaning E there is a feature of male and a figurative sense of older generation (in fact, several generations may have intervened, as in the case of Meaning C), but there is also a figurative sense in which the person in question has "given birth to" a new idea or institution.

For Meaning F, the feature of male is lost entirely, prior generation becomes merely prior time, and biological descent becomes "significant similarity and design dependency." For Meaning G, the feature of male is still present, but generation is not relevant and paternal concern is largely absent. But the features of authority and rank are significant. For Meaning H, the feature of male is generally applicable, but not necessarily the feature of older generation, and for the priests of some confessions, biological offspring are prohibited. For Meaning I, the feature of male is figurative, "creator" takes the place of biological relation, and in place of prior generation the relevant feature is "eternal." For many people who speak about God as Father, there is also a feature of paternal care combined with stern authority and punishment for doing wrong.

Some persons may object to the above tentative list of meanings of English *father,* since they also use *father* when referring to a *stepfather* or a *father-in-law,* while other people may claim that an adoptive father is really not a father and that a father-in-law should never be called a father. Such differences in usage simply illustrate the fact that the semantic boundaries or ranges of lexemes are often fuzzy and imprecise, since each person in a speech community will have had certain personal experiences which become a part of that person's own personal semantic grid. **Problem 20.**

In order to get a bird's-eye or composite view of the relation between various meanings and their distinctive features, some linguists like to employ a matrix, in which the meanings are listed horizontally and the features vertically, but the resulting information, except in the case of small, tightly structured domains, such as kinship terms, is generally disappointing. Matrices do offer more possibilities for relating meanings of different terms which are very close in semantic space and for which the contrasts are quite evident. But for the average set of different meanings of the same lexeme, matrices are of little practical value. In fact, they are often misleading since the pluses and minuses may have quite different meanings in different parts of the matrix. This is especially true of figurative meanings.

Having now examined several terms designating entities, it may be useful to investigate some of the semantic problems involved in ἐκβάλλω (literally 'throw out'), a term which designates movement caused by some agent or force. Accordingly, there are essentially three semantic features involved: the actual movement in space, the agent which causes the movement, and the entity which experiences the movement. In translating the following Greek contexts, the expression 'throw out' is purposely used as a means of highlighting the fact that in so many instances a literal rendering does not fit.

1. ἔκβαλε πρῶτον ἐκ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ σοῦ τὴν δοκόν 'first throw out the beam from your own eye' Matthew 7.5.
2. τῷ σῷ ὀνόματι δαιμόνια ἐξεβάλομεν 'we threw out demons in your name' Matthew 7.22.
3. οἱ δὲ υἱοὶ τῆς βασιλείας ἐκβληθήσονται εἰς τὸ σκότος τὸ ἐξώτερον 'the sons of the kingdom will be thrown out into complete darkness' Matthew 8.12.
4. ὅτε δὲ ἐξεβλήθη ὁ ὄχλος 'when the crowd had been thrown out' Matthew 9.25.
5. ἕως ἂν ἐκβάλῃ εἰς νῖκος τὴν κρίσιν 'until he throws out justice into triumph' Matthew 12.20.
6. ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ θησαυροῦ ἐκβάλλει ἀγαθά 'a good person throws good things out of his good treasure' Matthew 12.35.
7. εἰς ἀφεδρῶνα ἐκβάλλεται 'it is thrown out into the drain' Matthew 15.17.
8. ἐξέβαλεν πάντας τοὺς πωλοῦντας καὶ ἀγοράζοντας ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ 'he threw out all the buyers and sellers in the temple' Matthew 21.12.
9. λαβόντες αὐτὸν ἐξέβαλον ἔξω τοῦ ἀμπελῶνος 'they took him and threw him out of the vineyard' Matthew 21.39.
10. εὐθὺς τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτὸν ἐκβάλλει εἰς τὴν ἔρημον 'right then the Spirit threw him out into the desert' Mark 1.12.
11. ἀναστάντες ἐξέβαλον αὐτὸν ἔξω τῆς πόλεως 'they got up and threw him out of the city' Luke 4.29.
12. ὅταν...ἐκβάλωσιν τὸ ὄνομα ὑμῶν ὡς πονηρόν 'when they throw out your name as evil' Luke 6.22.
13. ὅπως ἐργάτας ἐκβάλῃ εἰς τὸν θερισμὸν αὐτοῦ 'that he may throw out workers into his harvest' Luke 10.2.
14. ἐκβαλὼν ἔδωκεν δύο δηνάρια τῷ πανδοχεῖ 'throwing out two denarii he gave them to the inn-keeper' Luke 10.35.
15. πάντας ἐξέβαλεν ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ τά τε πρόβατα καὶ τοὺς βόας 'he threw them out of the temple together with the sheep and the cattle' John 2.15.
16. τὸν ἐρχόμενον πρὸς ἐμὲ οὐ μὴ ἐκβάλω ἔξω 'I will not throw out anyone who comes to me' John 6.37.

17. ἤκουσεν Ἰησοῦς ὅτι ἐξέβαλον αὐτὸν ἔξω 'Jesus heard that they had thrown the man out' John 9.35.
18. ὅταν τὰ ἴδια πάντα ἐκβάλῃ 'when he had thrown out all his own (sheep)' John 10.4.
19. ἐκβαλόντες ἔξω τῆς πόλεως ἐλιθοβόλουν 'when they had thrown him out of the city, they stoned him' Acts 7.58.
20. ἐκβαλλόμενοι τὸν σῖτον εἰς τὴν θάλασσαν 'when they had thrown the wheat out into the sea' Acts 27.38.
21. ἔκβαλε τὴν παιδίσκην καὶ τὸν υἱὸν αὐτῆς 'throw out the servant and her son' Galatians 4.30.
22. ἑτέρᾳ ὁδῷ ἐκβαλοῦσα 'she threw (them) out by another road' James 2.25.
23. αὐλὴν τὴν ἔξωθεν τοῦ ναοῦ ἔκβαλε ἔξωθεν 'throw out the outer court of the temple' Revelation 11.2.

One reason for translating ἐκβάλλω as 'throw out' is to indicate the absurdity of thinking that ἐκβάλλω somehow always implies 'throw out,' when in reality it occurs with this meaning in very few contexts. In this series the one specific context with this meaning is Acts 27.38, which designates the action of the crew in throwing the wheat into the sea in order to make the ship lighter and therefore less likely to run onto submerged rocks or sandbars. But the literal renderings also serve to highlight various contrasts in meaning, which would probably not have been so evident in more contextually acceptable renderings.

In Context 1 ('first throw out the beam from your own eye') the rendering 'throw out' does not fit, since the focus is not on throwing something but on removing it. This is an action in which the agent (the one performing the action) does not move, but the beam does. An appropriate rendering in English would be 'remove' or 'get rid of.'

Likewise in Context 2, the demons were not actually thrown through space but were forced out by the agent, presumably with considerable metaphysical force. In fact, the meaning of ἐκβάλλω in Context 2 is very similar to what occurs in Context 1, but since the demons were regarded as entities in New Testament times, a more appropriate rendering might be 'caused them to go out' or '...to come out' or '...to leave.'

In Context 3 'the sons of the kingdom' (those who should rightfully be a part of the kingdom) are 'thrown out into' or 'forcibly sent to' or 'forced out into' utter darkness. It is impossible to be precise about this, since the movement is a kind of "metaphysical movement," but it is clear that the agents of the action use force of some kind and that they do not accompany those who

are sent, as is the case in contexts in which renderings such as 'bring' and 'lead' are appropriate.

In Context 4 ('when the crowd had been thrown out') an English translation on a strictly popular level might very well render ἐκβάλλω as 'throw out,' but 'forced them to leave' or 'made them get out' would seem more fitting for the actual event.

In Context 5 ('until he throws out justice into triumph') the rendering 'throw out' is entirely inappropriate. In Matthew 12.20 ἐκβάλλω in combination with the phrase εἰς νῖκος is reduced to a causative verb introducing a resulting state, and so ἐκβάλῃ εἰς νῖκος τὴν κρίσιν means 'to cause justice to be victorious.' The verb ἐκβάλλω probably also suggests a 'forceful event,' but there is no residue of actual movement in space.

In Context 6 ('a good person throws good things out of his good treasure') the literal translation suggests getting rid of good things, rather than bringing them out for some good purpose. In this context the movement is in the direction of the agent, while in Contexts 1 through 4 the action is away from the agent.

In Context 7 ('it is thrown out into the drain') the movement is away from the point of reference and there is no implicit, active agent since the process is physiological.

In Context 8 ('he threw out all the buyers and sellers in the temple') the agent uses force to cause people to leave, an action essentially similar to what occurs in Context 4, but in Context 9 ('they took him and threw him out of the vineyard') the phrase 'threw him out' could be quite appropriate in view of the violence involved, but the man was probably not literally hurled through the air. In Context 10 ('right then the Spirit threw him out into the desert') the action of the Spirit would certainly not involve such violent force, although the use of ἐκβάλλω suggests the imperative nature of the Spirit's action, in which case a rendering such as 'made him go out into the desert' would be appropriate.

In Context 11 ('they got up and threw him out of the city') the action of the crowd in Nazareth against Jesus was certainly characterized by force and those exerting the force no doubt went along with Jesus. An appropriate expression in English might be 'they dragged him out' or 'they chased him out.'

In Context 12 ('when they throw out your name as evil') the phrase ἐκβάλωσιν τὸ ὄνομα should be understood as an idiom, because a 'name' is not actually thrown, and furthermore, in this context ὄνομα is a symbol of the person in question. Accordingly, an equivalent expression in English could be

'when they talk about you as being evil' or 'when they denounce you as being evil.'

In Context 13 ('that he may throw out workers into his harvest') the action of ἐκβάλλω is one of sending, but there is no indication of violence or force, though there may be an aspect of insistence, and this could explain the use of ἐκβάλλω in place of πέμπω.

In Context 14 ('throwing out two denarii he gave them to the innkeeper') there is no throwing or force, but the same kind of action as in Context 6, in which the good man takes good things out of his good treasure. In Context 15 ('he threw them out of the temple together with the sheep and the cattle'), however, there is force involved, and the men as well as the sheep and cattle are 'driven out.'

In Context 16 ('I will not throw out anyone who comes to me') ἐκβάλλω has lost the features of force and movement, though one could interpret the 'rejection' as implying a kind of separation. Accordingly, one may translate 'I will not reject anyone who comes to me.' But in Context 17 ('Jesus heard that they had thrown the man out') ἐκβάλλω is used in the sense of drastic action in putting a man out of the synagogue, in which case he could lose both social and property rights.

In Context 18 ('when he had thrown out all his own sheep') the relation of agent to the action is entirely different from what a literal translation of ἐκβάλλω would suggest, since the shepherd always led his sheep. They did 'come out' at his call or command, but he went with them, and hence ἐκβάλλω in this context needs to be rendered as 'he led out all his own sheep.'

In Context 19 ('when they had thrown him out of the city, they stoned him') there is no actual throwing in the sense of tossing a person into the air and out of the city. The action is essentially the same as in Context 11. But in Context 20 ('when they had thrown the wheat out into the sea'), as already noted, there is an instance of actual throwing.

In Context 21 ('throw out the servant and her son') the action involves forcing persons to leave, in a manner somewhat similar to the action in Context 4, but in Context 22 ('she threw them out by another road') ἐκβάλλω is primarily an expression of 'cause' with a measure of insistence, while in Context 23 ('throw out the outer court of the temple') ἐκβάλλω and ἔξωθεν form an idiom, meaning 'to omit' or 'not to consider.'

This series of contexts in which ἐκβάλλω occurs in the New Testament is highly instructive since it illustrates so well how a term which literally refers to an action of forcefully projecting something through the air and away from an agent may develop a series of different meanings, some of

which have nothing to do with the original meaning of the compound. One could speculate about how such meanings could have developed, but this would be largely a waste of time. There is no way to retrace the steps of semantic development in a term such as ἐκβάλλω, which in Classical and Hellenistic Greek had a number of additional uses, e.g. 'carry out,' 'put ashore,' 'banish,' 'turn out to be,' 'expose,' 'depose,' 'throw an opponent in wrestling,' 'publish,' 'break in (doors),' 'let fall,' 'spit out,' 'throw up,' 'vomit,' 'annul,' 'lose,' 'give birth (especially prematurely),' 'put (a bone) out of joint,' 'upset,' 'start (astronomical counting),' and 'branch off (of a river).' What is important is to realize that a term may be highly productive of different meanings, some of which appear to have nothing to do with the original, literal meaning.

A feature of meaning such as 'force' can have a very wide range of application, from excessively violent to mild insistence. In fact, the element of force in ἐκβάλλω may be entirely lacking, and the verb can become essentially an auxiliary meaning 'to cause to.'

In ἐκβάλλω the feature of 'movement' likewise takes on several different forms. Originally, the meaning must have been 'movement from or out from a point associated with the agent,' but this feature of movement was greatly expanded to include a number of different kinds of caused movements, e.g. remove, go out, bring, lead, send, and drive.

Some uses, however, have nothing to do with movement, e.g. Contexts 5 ('until he throws out justice into triumph'), 12 ('when they throw out your name as evil'), and 23 ('throw out the outer court of the temple'). It is possible to see how such meanings may have developed, but the average native speaker of Hellenistic Greek may never have been aware of such semantic relations. For many people some of the meanings might just as well have been interpreted as belonging to entirely different words, i.e. to homophones. In fact, the resemblances between various meanings of a term are similar to what happens at some reunions of extended families, in which people sense that because of geographical factors, similarities of names, and historical coincidences they must be related, but they cannot define the relationship—it is just too distant and tenuous. The same is true of a family of meanings of a lexeme. In order to appreciate some of the problems involved in determining a set of class meanings, try listing the various class meanings of ἐκβάλλω and their distinctive features. Then assign the different contexts as suggested by the various glosses to their respective class meanings.

One may legitimately ask, therefore, what is the point of studying the relations between particular and class meanings, other than to know something about possible historical developments? Why not be like Humpty

Dumpty in Alice in Wonderland and let any word mean anything that anyone would like to have it mean? Why not let any reader of the Bible read into the meaning of any word whatever strikes his or her fancy—something which has happened plenty of times in the past? For example, many people have used the etymology of the Greek term ἐκκλησία to mean that all church members should be completely sanctified since ἐκκλησία means 'called out,' and this is interpreted as meaning "total separation from worldly behavior."

The answer to such issues is to be found in the fact that particular and class meanings of a term are generally linked in a dynamic way and serve as mutually restrictive and creative. From the range of particular meanings of a lexeme, one may determine the distinctive features which in turn may define the potential for further extension of meaning. By knowing the relations between particular and class meanings one may have a much better idea as to which interpretations are legitimate and which are dubious. But all this will become clearer when it has been possible to study the meanings of lexemes having important theological implications. Such theologically important lexemes are not, however, essentially different from other lexemes except insofar as they so often involve metaphysical implications and have no literal parallels in the everyday world of time and space. The concepts symbolized by such lexemes are, of course, cognitively possible. We can "think them" but we cannot easily describe them since we usually lack the metalanguage with which to speak about such realities in rational ways. **Problem 21**.

In analyzing the meanings of terms with special theological significance, it may be useful to change the approach, and instead of beginning with different senses of a term in different contexts, we may begin with recognized differences of meaning and then explore some of the special problems. For example, σάρξ may be said to have the following class meanings, identified here primarily by glosses:

A. flesh, that which covers the bones of the body: φάγητε σάρκας βασιλέων 'eat the flesh of kings' Revelation 19.18.

B. body: ὃς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί 'who appeared in a physical body' 1 Timothy 3.16.

C. human beings, people: πᾶσα σὰρξ ὡς χόρτος 'all people are like grass' 1 Peter 1.24.

D. human and physical, in contrast with spiritual or symbolic: εἶτα τοὺς μὲν τῆς σαρκὸς ἡμῶν πατέρας 'in the case of our human fathers' or '...our own fathers' Hebrews 12.9.

E. nation, ethnic unit: εἴ πως παραζηλώσω μου τὴν σάρκα 'perhaps I can make the people of my own nation jealous' Romans 11.14.

F. human nature, as responsible for typical behavior and in contrast with the spiritual nature: *οὐ πολλοὶ σοφοὶ κατὰ σάρκα* 'not many are wise in terms of their human nature' or '...from a human point of view' 1 Corinthians 1.26.

G. physical nature: *κατὰ σάρκα γεγέννηται* 'was born in accordance with his physical nature' or '...in a natural way' Galatians 4.23.

H. lifetime: *ὃς ἐν ταῖς ἡμέραις τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ* 'during his lifetime' Hebrews 5.7.

There are also several idioms which reveal certain important aspects of *σάρξ*, e.g.:

1. *σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα* (literally 'flesh and blood'): *σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα οὐκ ἀπεκάλυψέν σοι* 'no person revealed it to you' Matthew 16.17.
2. *κοινωνέω αἵματος καὶ σαρκός* (literally 'share in blood and flesh'): *ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ παιδία κεκοινώνηκεν αἵματος καὶ σαρκός* 'since, then, the children are human beings' Hebrews 2.14.
3. *ἀπέρχομαι ὀπίσω σαρκὸς ἑτέρας* (literally 'to go after other flesh'): *ὡς Σόδομα καὶ Γόμορρα...ἀπελθοῦσαι ὀπίσω σαρκὸς ἑτέρας* 'like those of Sodom and Gomorrah...they committed homosexual intercourse' Jude 7.
4. *σαρκὸς θέλημα* (literally 'desire of the flesh'): *οἳ οὐκ ἐξ αἱμάτων οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήματος σαρκὸς οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήματος ἀνδρὸς ἀλλ' ἐκ θεοῦ ἐγεννήθησαν* 'who were not born (as God's children) by having human parents, or because of sexual desire, or because of the will of a man, but God made them his children' John 1.13. In this context there is no suggestion of anything sinful.

For a number of contexts in which *σάρξ* occurs, the real issue is to determine to what extent *σάρξ* designates or suggests a sinful nature imbued with sexual desire. There is no doubt about *σάρξ* being physical in contrast with *πνεῦμα* being spiritual, e.g. 1 Corinthians 5.5 'to hand such a person over to Satan for the destruction of the body, in order that the spirit may be saved on the day of the Lord,' and in 2 Corinthians 7.1 the text speaks of 'any defilement of body and spirit.'

In Colossians 1.22 Christ is spoken of as having *τὸ σῶμα τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ* 'his body of flesh' or simply 'human body,' and in John 8.15 there is the statement *ὑμεῖς κατὰ τὴν σάρκα κρίνετε* 'you judge from a human point of view.' In neither of these contexts, however, is there anything depreciating or pejorative. But in Romans 8.3b, *σὰρξ ἁμαρτίας* 'flesh of sin' or better 'sinful flesh,' and in Galatians 5.16, *ἐπιθυμίαν σαρκός* 'desires of the flesh' or 'sinful

desires,' there is a reference to what is sinful, but this comes primarily from the terms ἁμαρτία and ἐπιθυμία. The proclivity of the flesh (or body) to sin is clearly stated in Galatians 5.19 and Romans 7.5, but it would be quite wrong to read into σάρξ a constant reference to sexual sin.

Literal translations of the New Testament which employ "flesh" to render Greek σάρξ in each and every context have sometimes been responsible for a serious misunderstanding of Paul's teaching. For example, largely because of a literal translation of the Pauline Epistles, one psychiatrist wrote a treatise on Paul's preoccupation with sex.

Many persons who have studied some New Testament Greek have been misled in understanding the meaning of σάρξ because they have learned the meaning as simply "flesh." They then tend to equate this more or less associatively neutral term in Greek with the English word "flesh," which in so many contexts suggests sexual improprieties. But there is a much more basic reason for the confusion, namely, the gnostic view which found something basically inferior and sinful in what is physical. And even those early theologians who opposed gnosticism fell victim to the idealism of Plato and the tendency to exalt the conceptual and spiritual at the expense of the physical. The strong movement into asceticism only increased this error.

But even on a purely linguistic level of semantic analysis the study of the semantic range of σάρξ cannot be completed until one has also studied the range of σῶμα 'body.' Certain meanings of σάρξ and σῶμα are very closely related, but this involves the somewhat more complex procedures discussed in Chapter 4. **Problem 22.**

In trying to understand the meaning of biblical terms, many people make the serious mistake of reading into the meaning of specific words all the features of meaning found in all the contexts in which such a word occurs. This is precisely the error in the Amplified New Testament, in which the translator has tried to introduce into almost every context all the senses of a word in its various uses. Context is important in determining meaning, but in most instances priority should be given to the immediate context, with only secondary consideration being given to the total range of possible contexts.

One must not assume that the English glosses in a Greek-English lexicon can provide accurate information about the designative and associative meanings of a Greek term. But this is precisely what has happened with such English words as *redemption* (into which some people always read a payment, even to the Devil), *atonement* (in the meaning of 'at-one-ment,' based on late ecclesiastical Latin *adunamentum*), *salvation* (into which people read 'safe'), and *saints* (which many understand as people who are extremely good and

devout, although in the Epistles it is simply a term for 'the people of God' or 'the believing community').

Before discussing additional Greek theological terms, it may be useful to examine a series of contexts containing *light* in order to clear up certain matters of terminology and to illustrate more clearly some aspects of the methodology for deciding about similarities and contrasts in meaning.

Contexts with the form *light:*

A. light travels over 186,000 miles a second
B. the light of the sun
C. the light just turned green
D. the light in her eyes
E. the porch roof cuts off the light
F. turn on the light
G. light the candle
H. please light the way for him
I. the color is too light
J. this is a light load
K. this package is quite light
L. the toy plane will light on the house

In the above series, *light* in Contexts A through I designates something that makes objects visible, while in Contexts J and K *light* designates a feature of weight, and in Context L, the action of coming down upon a surface. In these three types of contexts most English speakers would agree that there appear to be no shared semantic features of *light*. In the past most dictionaries of English have treated these semantically different lexemes as being homonyms or homophones, as well as being homographs. The reason for this type of analysis and classification has, however, been based more on the history of the language rather than on clear distinctions in semantic features. The classification into distinct lexemes can nevertheless be made on the basis of the meanings belonging to three different semantic domains. This is clearly a much more satisfactory principle for classification and the three lexemes could be listed as *light*$^1$, *light*$^2$, and *light*$^3$, as is done in many dictionaries. More recently, however, a number of dictionaries have abandoned this type of practice and simply list various particular and class meanings under any lexical form, although in most instances they attempt some grouping of related meanings.

But how many different meanings are there in Contexts A through I? We can say that in each context the particular meaning, i.e. the specific features (qualities, quantities, etc.), is somewhat different, and yet we recognize that some of the occurrences of *light* are much closer together in meaning than are others. In Contexts A and B the meanings seem to be essentially the same, but in C the *light* designates a particular source of light (an object emitting light). In D, however, there is also a seeming source of light, but it turns out to be more a glittering reflection of light than an actual source. In Context E the meaning of *light* seems to be very similar to what occurs in A and B, while *light* in Context F seems to have the same features as in C. In both G and H *light* designates an activity of causing light, while in Context I *light* designates a particular quality of light or color.

It would be wrong to give an impression that the contexts for the three words having the form *light* are representative of their complete ranges of usage. In *The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, Second Edition, Unabridged,* eighty-eight different glosses and idiomatic uses are listed and grouped largely on the basis of semantically related contexts, which to a certain extent is only another way of talking about related features of meaning.

As already indicated, any final decision as to the number of meanings and the relations between meanings must depend upon an analysis of other terms in closely related domains, but one can arrive at a tentative set of distinctions by putting together the occurrences of *light* in Contexts A, B, and E as a physical phenomenon which makes things visible. *Light* in Contexts C and F may be defined as particular sources of light; and *light* in G and H may be defined as causing light to exist, while *light* in Context I is a quality of color which contrasts with dark. But what should be done with *light* in Context D? Is it a source of light as in Contexts C and F? Or is it more like *light* in Contexts A and B? Or is it a completely distinct meaning in the sense of being a kind of glistening reflection? This would seem to be a valid distinction, but there is no final and fully satisfactory answer to such a question. Lumpers and splitters will always differ with respect to these fuzzy boundaries. To recognize the problem of fuzzy boundaries and the overlapping character of classifications is, however, more important than endeavoring to set up neat distinctions, when the distinctions are simply not always neat. These problems are part of the quirks of history, so well exemplified by the two imperative phrases: *Lights out!*, meaning "to turn out the lights," and *Light out!*, meaning "to leave in a hurry."

Native speakers of English differ considerably about the issues of the classification of meanings and some see no reason for even considering the

problems. In fact, many speakers react negatively to any distinction in the meaning of *light* in Contexts A, B, C, and F. "What difference does it make?" they say. And in a sense they are right. Not only do meanings overlap but many minor distinctions are simply not recognized by native speakers. Lexicographers should recognize this fact and not attempt to make more distinctions than actually exist for most speakers. This is an especially important matter for exegetes of ancient documents, because there is always a temptation to read into a text more precise distinctions than the original author ever imagined.

But the discussion of the different occurrences of *light*$^1$ in Contexts A through I is important in calling attention to certain terminological distinctions which may be useful. We can say that the different occurrences of *light*$^1$ in Contexts A ('light travels over 186,000 miles a second'), B ('the light of the sun'), and E ('the porch roof cuts off the light') represent minor distinctions in meaning in specific contexts and are traditionally spoken of as differences of "reference." But the occurrence of *light*$^1$ in all three of these contexts represents a class meaning, that is, a meaning resulting from the process of analyzing and grouping different particular meanings into a so-called "dictionary, or class, meaning." This process of forming class meanings is a very natural and essential one, since the human mind cannot operate efficiently with hundreds of slightly different meanings, whose boundaries are often indistinct. A degree of lumping is necessary. **Problem 23.**

In order to have a more adequate appreciation of some of the basic problems involved in determining the particular and class meanings of lexemes, it is important to examine in considerable detail the term χάρις, already discussed briefly in the first chapter. There are several reasons for choosing χάρις, namely, the variety of renderings in different contexts, the chain-like linkage between different meanings, the difficulties involved in determining which meaning fits which context, and the problems encountered in determining the number of different class meanings. In addition there are significant insights to be gained from seeing the way in which derived terms shed light on the meanings of χάρις and from noting the differences between the limited range of meanings of χάρις and its derivatives in the New Testament and the much more extensive range of general Classical and Hellenistic usage.

The following are key contexts of χάρις, illustrated by renderings from the Revised Standard Version (RSV), the New English Bible (NEB), Today's English Version (TEV), and the New Testament in Modern English by J. B. Phillips (NTME):

Ἰησοῦς προέκοπτεν...χάριτι παρὰ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώποις Luke 2.52

RSV: Jesus increased...in favor with God and man

NEB: Jesus...advanced...in favour with God and men

TEV: Jesus...gaining favor with God and men

NTME: Jesus...grew...in the love of God and of those who knew him

ἐθαύμαζον ἐπὶ τοῖς λόγοις τῆς χάριτος Luke 4.22

RSV: wondered at the gracious words

NEB: surprised that words of such grace

TEV: marveled at the eloquent words

NTME: amazed at the beautiful words

ποία ὑμῖν χάρις ἐστίν; Luke 6.32

RSV: what credit is that to you?

NEB: what credit is that to you?

TEV: why should you receive a blessing?

NTME: what credit is that to you?

ὁ λόγος...πλήρης χάριτος καὶ ἀληθείας John 1.14

RSV: the Word...full of grace and truth

NEB: the Word...full of grace and truth

TEV: the Word...full of grace and truth

NTME: the word of God...full of grace and truth

ἐκ τοῦ πληρώματος αὐτοῦ ἡμεῖς πάντες ἐλάβομεν, καὶ χάριν ἀντὶ χάριτος John 1.16

RSV: from his fulness have we all received, grace upon grace

NEB: out of his full store we have all received grace upon grace

TEV: out of the fullness of his grace he has blessed us all, giving us one blessing after another

NTME: indeed, every one of us has shared in his riches—there is a grace in our lives because of his grace

ἔχοντες χάριν πρὸς ὅλον τὸν λαόν Acts 2.47

RSV: having favor with all the people

NEB: enjoyed the favour of the whole people

TEV: enjoying the good will of all the people

NTME: all the people respected them

ἔδωκεν αὐτῷ χάριν καὶ σοφίαν ἐναντίον Φαραώ Acts 7.10

RSV: gave him favor and wisdom before Pharaoh

NEB: gave him a presence and powers of mind which so commended him to Pharaoh

TEV: gave him a pleasing manner and wisdom

NTME: gave him favor and wisdom in the eyes of Pharaoh

διαμαρτύρασθαι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς χάριτος τοῦ θεοῦ Acts 20.24

RSV: to testify to the gospel of the grace of God

NEB: bearing my testimony to the gospel of God's grace

TEV: to declare the Good News about the grace of God

NTME: declaring the good news of the grace of God

θέλων τε χάριτα καταθέσθαι τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις Acts 24.27

RSV: desiring to do the Jews a favor

NEB: wishing to curry favour with the Jews

TEV: wanted to gain favor with the Jews

NTME: wanted to remain in favor with the Jews

δι' οὗ ἐλάβομεν χάριν καὶ ἀποστολήν Romans 1.5

RSV: through whom we have received grace and apostleship

NEB: through him I received the privilege of a commission

TEV: through him God gave me the privilege of being an apostle

NTME: from whom we received grace and our commission

τῷ δὲ ἐργαζομένῳ ὁ μισθὸς οὐ λογίζεται κατὰ χάριν Romans 4.4

RSV: to one who works, his wages are not reckoned as a gift

NEB: if a man does a piece of work, his wages are not 'counted' as a favour

TEV: a person who works is paid his wages, but they are not regarded as a gift

NTME: if a man *works*, his wages are not counted as a gift

οὐ γάρ ἐστε ὑπὸ νόμον ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ χάριν Romans 6.14

RSV: since you are not under law but under grace

NEB: because you are no longer under law, but under the grace of God

TEV: for you do not live under law but under God's grace

NTME: you are no longer living under the Law, but under grace

*χάρις ὑμῖν καὶ εἰρήνη ἀπὸ θεοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν* 1 Corinthians 1.3

RSV: grace to you and peace from God our Father

NEB: grace and peace to you from God our Father

TEV: may God our Father...give you grace and peace

NTME: grace and peace be to you from God the Father

*πέμψω ἀπενεγκεῖν τὴν χάριν ὑμῶν εἰς Ἰερουσαλήμ* 1 Corinthians 16.3

RSV: I will send (them) to carry your gift to Jerusalem

NEB: send them to carry your gift to Jerusalem

TEV: send them to take your gift to Jerusalem

NTME: send (them) to take your gift...to Jerusalem

*ἵνα καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ χάριτι περισσεύητε* 2 Corinthians 8.7

RSV: that you excel in this gracious work also

NEB: you should show yourselves equally lavish in this generous service

TEV: we want you to be generous also in this service of love

NTME: could you not add generosity to your virtues

*γνόντες τὴν χάριν τὴν δοθεῖσάν μοι* Galatians 2.9

RSV: when they perceived the grace that was given to me

NEB: recognizing, then, the favour thus bestowed upon me

TEV: recognized that God had given me this special task

NTME: saw how God had given me his grace

*χάριν ἔχω τῷ ἐνδυναμώσαντί με Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ* 1 Timothy 1.12

RSV: I thank him who has given me strength for this, Christ Jesus

NEB: I thank him who has made me equal to the task, Christ Jesus

TEV: I give thanks to Christ Jesus, who has given me strength for my work

NTME: I am deeply grateful to Christ Jesus our Lord (to whom I owe all that I have accomplished)

*ὡς καὶ συγκληρονόμοις χάριτος ζωῆς* 1 Peter 3.7

RSV: since you are joint heirs of the grace of life

NEB: because you share together in the grace of God which gives you life

TEV: because they also will receive, together with you, God's gift of life

NTME: equally heirs with you of the grace of life

Perhaps the most serious problem with the preceding renderings is the tendency to translate χάρις by 'grace,' a term which has little or no religious content for many English-speaking people. *Grace* may represent (1) attractive manner and/or movement, (2) a period of time before one must make a payment (e.g. ten days' *grace* in paying bills), and (3) the name of a woman. If a person happens to have had considerable church background or has taken seriously the meaning of the hymn *Amazing Grace, grace* probably suggests something religious and good, but few people are able to explain what the term really means in a context speaking about "the grace of God." People who remember something of the catechism they learned in Sunday School may define grace as "unmerited favor," but when asked what that means, they are usually at a loss to know what to say.

The phrase *unmerited favor* is basically inadequate for most people, since a *favor* is often something rather insignificant and almost always suggests a quid-pro-quo. In addition, the term *unmerited* focuses the attention on the receiver rather than the giver. Accordingly, for most people the Scriptures would make much more sense if the *grace of God* were spoken of as 'God's loving kindness' or 'God's loving goodness.' The crucial feature in the meaning of χάρις is the complete absence of any feature of compensation.

Certain standard biblical phrases in English are particularly meaningless and misleading, e.g. *grace upon grace, full of grace and truth,* and *under grace.* People seldom realize that in most contexts *grace* is not an abstract quality but what God actually does as an expression of his loving goodness toward people. Nevertheless, it is because of this activity feature of χάρις that there are so many different ways in which the term is rendered, even in these representative passages, e.g. *grace, blessing, generous service, privilege, gift, credit, special task, grateful, thanks, favor, generosity, good will, gracious work, service of love, respect, love, presence, pleasing manner, gracious, beautiful,* and *eloquent.* In many instances translators have not tried to express a distinctly new meaning, but have used expressions which only seem to fit the context better, that is to say, translators are concerned with particular meanings, not class meanings. Some of the above renderings focus upon the activity of showing kindness and loving concern, e.g. *grace, blessing, generous service, generosity, gracious work, special task,* and *service of love,* while others designate the result of such activity, e.g. *gift, favor,* and *privilege.*

In response to a blessing or gift χάρις may designate *thanks* and *gratefulness,* and an additional set of expressions characterizes the attitudes of persons toward others, e.g. *love, respect, good will,* and *favor.* In some contexts *favor* can designate a particular action, e.g. the RSV rendering in Acts 24.27,

"desiring to do the Jews a favor." Finally, terms such as *presence, pleasing manner, gracious, beautiful,* and *eloquent* designate a quality of behavior or activity which seems quite distinct from the other meanings.

One may, accordingly, set up as tentative the following six class meanings of χάρις: (A) a favorable attitude toward someone or something (e.g. Luke 2.52, Acts 2.47), (B) to show kindness to someone with the implication of a gracious attitude on the part of the one showing such kindness (2 Corinthians 8.7), (C) that which is given generously and freely (1 Corinthians 16.3), (D) a state of thankfulness and gratitude (NTME 1 Timothy 1.12), (E) the lexical expression of thanks (RSV, NEB 1 Timothy 1.12), and possibly (F) that which is attractive in form, manner, or movement (Luke 4.22), but in Luke 4.22 χάρις is much more likely to designate the content of the spoken words rather than any eloquent or pleasing form.

It would be very convenient if words always designated one particular meaning, but there is no one-to-one correspondence within languages, and not even a one-to-many relationship. What makes translating and interpretation so difficult is that there is generally a set of many-to-many relationships. For example, the term "favor" in the RSV rendering of Acts 24.27 designates a beneficial action, but the same word in the renderings of NEB, TEV, and NTME designates a favorable attitude, and in the NEB rendering of Romans 4.4 the term "favour" designates a gift.

One particularly strange rendering of χάρις, namely, "credit," is found in three renderings of Luke 6.32, "what credit is that to you." In this somewhat idiomatic expression χάρις actually refers to an unusually generous act of kindness (Meaning B), but the English expression shifts the focus to a reward which one could expect from presumably having been kind. This is also why the TEV shifts to the expectation of a blessing, i.e. "why should you receive a blessing."

The sixth meaning (F), which designates something attractive in form, manner, or movement, may seem strange since it appears to have little or nothing to do with kindness. The basis for this meaning, however, can be seen if one examines Classical and Hellenistic Greek usage, in which χάρις frequently designates 'outward grace' and 'beauty,' and in the plural becomes the name of the three divine attendants of Aphrodite. But if Luke had intended this meaning, he could have used the adjectival derivative χαρίεις, meaning 'graceful,' 'beautiful,' 'elegant,' or 'courteous.'

The problems involved in trying to set up the class meanings of χάρις and the obvious lack of any one-to-one set of correspondences simply highlight the fact that words are not points of meaning nor even well-defined areas of meaning, but are open symbols always ready for expansion into some

new semantic territory. For example, in Hellenistic Greek χάρις can also designate a 'love charm' or a 'thank-offering' as well as 'gratification,' 'delight,' 'sexual pleasure,' and even 'partiality.'

Further insight about the meanings of χάρις can be gained through an examination of the two causative derivatives, χαριτόω and χαρίζομαι. The meaning of χαριτόω in the New Testament is related to the second class meaning, namely, 'to show kindness.' Some persons have thought that χαριτόω implies a semantic feature of intensity or emphasis and have rendered the verb in Ephesians 1.6 as 'to bless greatly' or 'to favor highly,' and in Luke 1.28 they have translated the participle as 'greatly favored.' Such renderings are, however, based more on context than on semantic features of the verb χαριτόω.

On the basis of its derivational structure the term χαρίζομαι has the causative sense in Philippians 1.29 and Galatians 3.18, e.g. 'cause to have the privilege of,' but in other contexts it more often has either a generic sense of 'to give' or a very specific sense of 'to forgive.' All of these meanings are related to the activity in Meaning B of χάρις.

A special problem is involved in Meanings A, B, and C of χάρις, in that they are closely linked temporally as three stages in a single complex process. That is to say, a benevolent attitude normally produces an act of kindness, which in turn may result in a particular gift. Meaning A provides the motivational basis or presupposition, Meaning B focuses on the activity, and Meaning C points to the result. For any one of these three meanings, the others become "implicatures." For Meaning B, namely, the act of kindness, Meaning A is presuppositional and Meaning C is inferential, since an act of kindness presupposes a favorable attitude and implies a valued result.

In most contexts it is possible to recognize which class meaning is involved, but in a context such as Acts 20.24 it is difficult to know whether the phrase χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ represents God's gracious attitude or his act of kindness. In most contexts χάρις represents his gracious act.

The tentative Class Meanings D and E involve 'a feeling of gratitude' and 'an expression of thanks,' but it is the performative function of the zero imperative construction which marks this difference between D and E, rather than significant lexical semantic contrasts. **Problem 24.**

A somewhat different set of problems is posed by lexemes which designate verbal entities, e.g. *word, book, statement, law, psalm, hymn,* and *parable.* The uttering or writing of such forms of discourse represents activities, but the resulting verbal form is regarded by some as a verbal artifact, since it has a fixed form which can be repeated or copied and can function as an entity.

Such expressions, however, have a built-in problem since it is often extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether the focus in a particular context is on the formal features of the verbal entity or on the content. In addition, such verbal entities may have a physical, manufactured form, as in the case of the *βιβλίον* (Luke 4.17) which was handed to Jesus. As a result, one can distinguish between the physical form of a document, the verbal features of a document, and the semantic content of a document. But often this involves a relatively fruitless task of splitting lexical hairs.

In the case of Greek *νόμος*, however, there are a number of serious difficulties because the same word may apply to different units of a longer discourse. In many contexts *νόμος* specifically designates the Pentateuch, and it is marked in some contexts as 'the Law of Moses.' In some cases *νόμος* represents the Scriptures in general, as in John 10.34, where the phrase 'in your Scriptures' applies to a passage quoted from the Psalms. The phrase *ὁ νόμος καὶ οἱ προφῆται* may be regarded as a low-grade idiom in that it designates the entire Scriptures known as the Old Testament, which included the Pentateuch, the Prophets (early and later), and the Writings. In addition, *νόμος* may designate law in general, that is, secular as well as religious law, for example, *ὃς οὐ κατὰ νόμον ἐντολῆς σαρκίνης γέγονεν* 'he was not made (a priest) by the law of human decree' Hebrews 7.16.

Some theologians make a further distinction in *νόμος* by attempting to distinguish the law given specifically on Mount Sinai from the rest of the Pentateuch. This can be done theologically, and perhaps historically, but it is impossible to base this distinction upon specific, linguistic markers.

The crucial problems in the use of *νόμος* occur in the Pauline corpus, and especially in Romans and Galatians. Some translators have endeavored to distinguish between the law of Moses and law in general by using the device of a capital letter versus lower case. In a number of passages one can readily make such a distinction on the basis of thematic content. But it is difficult, if not impossible, to be consistent in employing such an orthographic device. Translations such as the Revised Standard Version and the New English Bible use lower case throughout, and hence avoid problems by shifting the decision-making responsibility to the readers. But the New Testament in Modern English does make a distinction by means of capitalization and so does Today's English Version, but in Chapter 7 of Romans there are several cases in which these two texts disagree. This only illustrates the complexity of making a distinction when the contexts are obscure.

In Paul's letters to the Romans and to the Galatians there are an unusual number of instances in which *νόμος* occurs without an article. In fact, the absence of the article is more frequent than its occurrence. It would appear that

in certain contexts Paul was intent upon explaining the principle of law in contrast with grace as something with a wider scope of application than simply the Mosaic code. Accordingly, it is a dangerous procedure to insist that in every instance in which Paul used *νόμος*, he had in the back of his mind the regulations announced on Sinai or that all later developments associated with *νόμος* have to be interpreted as part of that Sinaitic revelation.

Paul's usage of *νόμος* seems to go even further than talking about law in general. For example, in Romans 7.23, *βλέπω δὲ ἕτερον νόμον ἐν τοῖς μέλεσίν μου* "I observe an entirely different principle at work in my nature" (NTME), *νόμος* is a kind of regulatory principle of behavior, rather than a verbal discourse or formulation. Compare Romans 3.27: *Ποῦ οὖν ἡ καύχησις; ἐξεκλείσθη. διὰ ποίου νόμου; τῶν ἔργων; οὐχί, ἀλλὰ διὰ νόμου πίστεως* 'What then of our boasting? It has been eliminated. By what law? Is it by the law which says what we must do? Not at all! But it has been eliminated by the principle of faith.' In this case *νόμος* cannot be only a verbal formulation, since it is clearly used in two quite different senses. Note also the expression in Romans 8.2, *ὁ γὰρ νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ ἠλευθέρωσέν σε ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου τῆς ἁμαρτίας καὶ τοῦ θανάτου* 'for the principle employed by the Spirit in bringing life in Christ Jesus has freed you from the law which brings sin and death.' The phrase *ὁ νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος* can also mean 'the spiritual principle of life.'

The rendering of *νόμος* as 'principle' in the sense of 'principle of operation' or 'normal procedure' should not be regarded as unduly strange, since in both Classical and Hellenistic Greek *νόμος* is regularly used in the sense of 'custom' and 'customary practice.' But a much clearer picture of the meaning of *νόμος* results from a comparison of its class meanings with those of other terms in the same semantic domain, e.g. *δόγμα*, *δικαίωμα*, *κανών*, *κέλευσμα*, *ἐπιταγή*, *διάταγμα*, *ἐντολή*, and *ἔνταλμα*. **Problem 25.**

### *Special Problems*

In dealing with the numerous difficulties involved in determining the particular and class meanings of lexemes, a person almost inevitably encounters a number of special problems, including figurative language, idioms, the influence of traditional usage, lexemes having exceptionally wide ranges of meanings, and highly generic terms expressing relations.

Figurative meanings pose some of the most complex problems in lexicography, and this is especially true of religious language. From the standpoint of lexical semantics, figurative meanings may involve traditional sayings (e.g. proverbs and adages such as 'putting one's hand to the plow and then looking back' and 'do not cast your pearls before swine'), idioms (e.g. 'heap coals of

fire on his head'), conventional figures of speech (e.g. 'horn of salvation,' meaning 'a mighty Savior'), and fresh figurative usage (e.g. 'breastplate of righteousness,' 'shield of faith,' 'helmet of salvation,' and 'sword of the Spirit'). Dictionaries should deal with traditional sayings, idioms, and conventional figures of speech since these consist of more or less fixed sets of terms in a particular order. Nonconventional figurative usage is normally excluded from dictionaries but is treated in commentaries. There are, of course, other discourse units with figurative meanings, e.g. parables, but the significance and meaning of these units is primarily the concern of discourse interpretation.

The role of figurative language is especially important since it contributes so much impact and insight to any statement. Except for stale or overworked figurative expressions, which can actually detract from a discourse, figurative language adds a particular dimension through the psychological tension which exists between the literal and the figurative meanings. Gradually the force of this is lost as a figurative expression becomes common, but in proportion to its being new and insightful, it can contribute greatly to the effectiveness of a discourse. For example, Jesus could have called Herod an 'unreliable and clever rascal,' but calling him a 'fox' (or possibly 'jackal') carried far more impact and involved the listener much more actively in determining what characteristics of a fox were most like Herod. In addition, figurative language adds a component of listener or reader identification, since most figurative language depends very heavily on cultural specialties. When appropriate figurative language is used, an audience can readily identify with the usage and accordingly feel that the message has been communicated particularly to them.

The use of figurative language is universal, in the sense that the speakers of all languages use figurative expressions. In some languages, great emphasis is placed upon figurative expression, while in other languages very little attempt seems to be made to cultivate this style of speaking or writing. And what seems to be a perfectly normal expression in one language may be very strange in another. In the Bible the kidneys and bowels figure prominently in figurative expressions of emotion, while in other languages the stomach and liver may be common in corresponding figurative expressions.

One of the particularly difficult problems in semantic analysis is to determine the precise area of meaning involved in figurative expressions. For example, the figurative organ of desire in English is primarily the *heart*, but in the Hebrew of the Old Testament the word *leb*, usually translated 'heart,' designates primarily the mind rather than desire. In the Greek of the New Testament it is not always possible to know whether καρδία is to be understood as a reflection of Hebrew *leb* or as more directly related to the feelings

and emotions of joy and sorrow, as well as of love and anger. In more than half of its occurrences in the New Testament καρδία appears to designate the mind rather than the emotions. For the twenty-two occurrences of καρδία in the Gospel of Luke, the New English Bible and the Today's English Version employ 'heart' in only nine instances, and the New Testament in Modern English has 'heart' in only ten cases. Moreover, several of these occurrences of 'heart' are based more on traditional biblical usage than on the actual meaning of the Greek text. It is interesting to note that in the New Testament καρδία is never used to designate the physical organ of the body.

For any text dealing with supernatural phenomena there are numerous difficulties with figurative language, since a very high percentage of religious language is essentially figurative, though in many cases people are not aware of it. Anthropomorphisms become so common that people are usually unaware of the figurative significance, e.g. 'God sees,' 'God hears,' or even 'the hand of God.' Some of the less used expressions such as 'finger of God' and 'God rested' may seem to be more figurative simply because they occur more rarely.

It may be quite difficult to determine the extent of the literal semantic features in some figurative expressions. For example, many preachers make a great deal of what they regard as "the original meaning" of ἀγωνίζομαι 'to engage in the fierce competition of an athletic contest,' and in order to confirm the intensity of the struggle such preachers often cite the cognate borrowing 'to agonize.' But since the word ἀγωνίζομαι was so often used in Hellenistic Greek in the more general sense of 'to make an effort' or 'to strive,' such sermonizing is largely out of place, especially in Colossians 4.12, where ἀγωνίζομαι involves prayer to God. **Problem 26.**

All idioms pose certain problems of semantic analysis since one cannot add up the meanings of the lexemes and the meanings of the syntactic relations and come out with a meaning which fits the context. As has already been noted, an idiom containing a radically shifted meaning of only one element is often considered a low-grade idiom (e.g. κνήθομαι τὴν ἀκοήν 'to itch to hear,' meaning 'desirous of hearing' 2 Timothy 4.3), but when both or all the elements are semantically shifted in meaning, the idiom may be regarded as a full-grade idiom (e.g. τοῖς ὠσὶν βαρέως ἀκούω, literally 'to hear heavy with the ear,' but meaning 'to be mentally dull' or 'to be slow to understand' Acts 28.27). But there are no fixed demarcations between low-grade and full-grade idioms.

Some terms may be said to be particularly productive of idiomatic expressions. Note, for example, the following series with ἀκοή and/or ἀκούω: ἀκοῇ ἀκούω, a Semitic idiom, literally 'to hear with hearing,' but meaning 'to

listen intently'; *ἀνοίγουσιν αἱ ἀκοαί*, literally 'hearing opened,' but meaning 'become able to hear'; *εἰσφέρω εἰς τὰς ἀκοάς*, literally 'to bring to the hearing,' but meaning 'to cause to hear' or 'to speak about'; *νωθρὸς ταῖς ἀκοαῖς*, literally 'slow in hearing,' but meaning 'slow to understand'; *ἀκούω εἰς τὸ οὖς*, literally 'to hear into the ear,' but meaning 'to hear in secret.' Such idioms should be treated simply as individual lexemes, and though the history of how the meanings might have arisen may be of interest, what matters semantically is their role in specific contexts. One can be completely misled by trying to base the meanings of idioms on the meanings of their parts.

Some problems of semantic analysis can be caused by a tradition which has not kept up with developments in a receptor language. For example, practically all translations of the Bible into English render the Greek term *ἀκρίς* as 'locust,' since this has been the rendering in traditional translations, such as the King James Version and the English Revised Version. In England the term *locust* has traditionally been used to identify the large members of the acrididae family of insects, although the smaller members of this family are called *grasshoppers*. In the United States, however, all acrididae are generally called *grasshoppers*, and the term *locust* designates an entirely different family of insects, namely, the cicadidae or 'cicadas' (e.g. the seventeen-year cicadas which make a shrill noise in the trees but which do not eat leaves). Perhaps one reason for the hesitation on the part of some Bible translators to render *ἀκρίς* as 'grasshopper' is the reaction which some people might have in reading about John the Baptist eating grasshoppers. But in many parts of the world various kinds of grasshoppers are eaten. There is no doubt that the devastating hordes of insects which from time to time ravage the Middle East and Africa are acrididae, even as the Septuagint rightly translates.

Some terms occur with an unusually high number of class meanings. For example, in *L and N* *εἰς* is listed as having seventeen meanings and *διά* as having ten. There are certainly numerous types of contexts in which these words can occur, but whether or not they should be regarded as having quite so many meanings depends very much upon the manner in which one regards their roles. The range of meanings of *διά* can perhaps be best used to illustrate some of the basic problems:

A. through (marking an intermediate agent): *τὸ ῥηθὲν ὑπὸ κυρίου διὰ τοῦ προφήτου λέγοντος* 'the word spoken by the Lord through the prophet' Matthew 1.22.

B. with (marking an instrument): *γράφειν οὐκ ἐβουλήθην διὰ χάρτου καὶ μέλανος* 'I would rather not write with paper and ink' 2 John 12.

C. through (marking the means by which something is accomplished): *ἡγιασμένοι ἐσμὲν διὰ τῆς προσφορᾶς τοῦ σώματος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* 'we have been made holy through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ' Hebrews 10.10.

D. for the benefit of (marking the person or event benefitted by some occurrence): *τὸ σάββατον διὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐγένετο καὶ οὐχ ὁ ἄνθρωπος διὰ τὸ σάββατον* 'the Sabbath was made for the benefit of people and not people for the benefit of the Sabbath' Mark 2.27.

E. because of (marking the cause or reason for an event caused by an animate agent): *ἔσεσθε μισούμενοι ὑπὸ πάντων διὰ τὸ ὄνομά μου* 'you will be hated by everyone because of me' (literally '...because of my name') Matthew 10.22; *ἔδησεν αὐτὸν ἐν φυλακῇ διὰ Ἡρῳδιάδα* 'he put him in jail because of Herodias' Mark 6.17.

F. because of, as the result of (marking the cause or reason for an event caused by another event): *μὴ δυναμένου δὲ αὐτοῦ γνῶναι τὸ ἀσφαλὲς διὰ τὸν θόρυβον* 'he was not able to find out exactly (what happened) because of the confusion' Acts 21.34; *ἀπέλυσεν δὲ τὸν διὰ στάσιν καὶ φόνον βεβλημένον εἰς φυλακήν* 'he released the one who had been put in prison because of a riot and murder' Luke 23.25.

G. through (marking extension through an area or object): *ἐπορεύθη ὁ Ἰησοῦς...διὰ τῶν σπορίμων* 'Jesus was walking...through the wheatfields' Matthew 12.1.

H. along (marking an extension along a route): *ὥστε μὴ ἰσχύειν τινὰ παρελθεῖν διὰ τῆς ὁδοῦ ἐκείνης* 'so that no one was able to pass along that road' Matthew 8.28.

I. during (marking the extent of time within which an activity may occur): *ἄγγελος δὲ κυρίου διὰ νυκτὸς ἀνοίξας τὰς θύρας τῆς φυλακῆς* 'but during the night an angel of the Lord opened the prison gates' Acts 5.19.

J. throughout (marking the extent of time throughout which an event occurs): *δι' ὅλης νυκτὸς κοπιάσαντες οὐδὲν ἐλάβομεν* 'we worked hard throughout the night and caught nothing' Luke 5.5.

The analysis of this set of meanings poses several methodological problems. In the first place, should *διά* be considered in isolation from the genitive (A, B, C, G, H, I, J) and accusative (D, E, F) case markers or should the meaning be assigned to a discontinuous combination of preposition plus case? On the other hand, one may say that a particular meaning of *διά* simply

"governs" a specific case. If the combination of διά plus case had a specific correlation with a one-to-one distinction in meaning, this might be helpful.

In the second place, it is important to decide whether διά does, in fact, have ten different meanings, which are simply "pointed to" or "identified by" the context, or whether διά is actually semantically almost "empty" and the resulting meanings come from a composite of διά as a marker and the specific contexts. In general, however, people assume that words have different meanings or various contextual ranges into which they fit, and they determine which meaning is involved in a particular context on the basis of the semantic features of the context. This latter approach is certainly the more usual way of looking at or thinking about the meanings of words, whether in isolation or in context. But it is also possible, though counterintuitive, to assign meaning only to the context as a whole and then to sort out what part of the meaning of the whole is contributed by the various parts. In fact, it would be theoretically possible to avoid any assignment of meaning to lexemes and talk only about contexts, but this would only increase the size and number of the units to be analyzed, and the semantic difficulties would increase exponentially.

There are, however, some serious difficulties with this series of meanings assigned to διά and even though setting up this series of rather specific meanings may be useful to the user of a lexicon, it may not be the most insightful and helpful way to grasp the basic roles of διά. At the same time, one must recognize the fundamental problem in all scientific descriptions, namely, the opposing tendencies in lumping and splitting. Those who favor lumping often insist that this simplifies the description and highlights the relations, but those who favor splitting insist that lumping only moves the difficulties to another level of abstraction or analysis. There is generally no final answer to the issue of lumping versus splitting, since the ultimate criteria should be based upon what appears to be the most unified correlation of all the relevant data, and this cannot be determined without a holistic view of the total use and potential of a language. Since this goal will never be reached because of the dynamic nature of language, one can only make proximate analyses of data in the hope that these will at least be useful to those who wish to build on what has been found. Whether meanings are combined (lumped) or left separate (split) is not really too important. What is important is the definition of the range of potential usage. Dichotomous classes always appear neat and "scientific" since people are entranced with positives and negatives and clear-cut contrasts. But most semantic classes are loosely organized groups with varying degrees of semantic attachment or cohesion.

Even a preliminary analysis of some of the contexts in which διά occurs reveals some obvious difficulties. In Meaning A the contrast between ὑπό and διά in marking agency is clearly illustrated. The preposition ὑπό marks the causative or ultimate agent of an action, while διά marks the intermediate agent or immediate agent, the one through whom an action takes place. There are, however, some contexts in which διά marks the causative or ultimate agent, e.g. πιστὸς ὁ θεός, δι' οὗ ἐκλήθητε 'God is faithful through whom you were called' (1 Corinthians 1.9). In the New Testament the calling of a person to obedience or special ministry is done by God, and one would expect ὑπό in 1 Corinthians 1.9. There is no easy way to resolve this type of difficulty, and one should not read too much theology into such an apparent anomaly. This is only another instance of the indefinite borders of a semantic range.

In the case of Meaning B there is also a difficulty, since an instrument is generally marked by the dative case, with or without ἐν (as does occur in 2 Corinthians 3.3), though means is regularly marked by διά (as a statement about how one event influences another). In Colossians 1.20 διά occurs with τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ σταυροῦ αὐτοῦ, but both αἷμα and σταυρός designate events, not objects, literally 'making peace through the blood of his cross,' but meaning 'making peace through his death and crucifixion.' The restricted use of διά in 2 John 12 (Meaning B) may also illustrate the same type of problem of range as occurs in A.

Meaning C differs from Meaning B only in a semantically minor matter of instruments (i.e. paper and ink) in contrast with means (i.e. offering), but the phrase "paper and ink" designates primarily the process of writing and as such is also an expression of means. Accordingly, the usage of διά in both B and C could be combined.

In Meanings D, E, and F there is a clear contrast between what is done for the benefit of someone or some institution (Meaning D) and what is done because of some person or event (Meanings E and F). But in F the reference to John the Baptist being put in jail because of Herodias is essentially ambiguous, since Herod may have jailed John because of what Herodias had said or done, or he may have done so in order to please Herodias. Quite likely both factors were involved in the event. Reasons are so often broken down into future and past orientations, with the future orientation suggesting purpose and the past orientation pointing to cause.

The series in Meanings G through J all indicate some type of extension, whether in time or space. It would be possible, therefore, to reduce the ten meanings to three, or at least to group the meanings into three sets, which would designate (1) means/instrument (including both agents and events), (2) reason/cause, whether as the result of past events or for future benefits,

and (3) extension, whether in time or space. The justification for one or another of these approaches to the semantic data depends ultimately upon the overall consistency and coherence of the analysis and the insight it provides about the function of particular lexemes. In general, it is assumed that the lumping of meanings tends to provide a broader perspective on the range of relations between meanings, while splitting tends to read too much into the diversities of contexts. Scientists and philosophers have, however, never been able to determine the necessary criteria for judging the respective values of lumping or splitting other than to favor that lumping or splitting which is most useful in explaining the similarities and contrasts in the data being examined. **Problem 27.**

In the case of γῆ, πατήρ, ἐκβάλλω, σάρξ, χάρις, νόμος, and διά, most of the diverse class meanings seem to reflect basically logical developments, and in some instances it is possible to recognize chains of related meanings. As a result, the impression from such data is that semantic developments are largely systematic. At least the variety appears to make sense. But in some instances the diversities of meaning are so great as to defy logical explanation. Note, for example, the following series of meanings of ἔχω:

A. to possess: *τίς γυνὴ δραχμὰς ἔχουσα δέκα* 'a woman who had ten drachmas' Luke 15.8.

B. to hold: *ἔχων ζυγὸν ἐν τῇ χειρὶ αὐτοῦ* 'holding a pair of scales in his hand' Revelation 6.5.

C. to consider: *ὅτι ὡς προφήτην αὐτὸν εἶχον* 'because they considered him a prophet' Matthew 14.5.

D. to wear: *ὁ Ἰωάννης εἶχεν τὸ ἔνδυμα αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ τριχῶν καμήλου* 'John wore clothes made from camel hair' Matthew 3.4.

E. to be able to: *ἵνα ἔχῃ μεταδιδόναι τῷ χρείαν ἔχοντι* 'in order to be able to help the one in need' Ephesians 4.28.

F. to experience: *ἵνα ἐν ἐμοὶ εἰρήνην ἔχητε* 'in order that you might experience peace in me' John 16.33.

G. to be: *εἶπεν δὲ ὁ ἀρχιερεύς,* Εἰ *ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει;* 'the High Priest said, Is this really so?' Acts 7.1.

H. to cause/produce: *οὕτως καὶ ἡ πίστις, ἐὰν μὴ ἔχῃ ἔργα* 'and so faith, if it does not produce action' or '...cause someone to do something' James 2.17.

I. to contain (a marker of verbal content): *ἐπιστολὴν ἔχουσαν τὸν τύπον τοῦτον* 'a letter containing this content' or '...with this content' Acts 23.25.

There are several problems involved in analyzing the meanings in this series of contexts. In the first place, one can be misled by various possible translations into English. For example, in Context B it would also be possible to translate as 'had a pair of scales in his hand'; in Context D, as 'had clothes made from camel hair'; in Context F, as 'in order that you might have peace in me'; in Context H, as 'if it does not have works'; and in Context I, as 'a letter having this content.' One might be tempted, therefore, to insist that in Contexts A, B, D, F, H, and I ἔχω has only one meaning, but this error results from not realizing that the English word *have* also has a number of different meanings.

The meaning in Context B is distinct from A in that one may hold something without necessarily owning it, and in Context D John not only possessed such clothing but habitually wore it. In Context E there are two occurrences of ἔχω; the first means 'to be able to' while the second means 'to experience.' The confusion in Context H concerning 'having works' (a typical rendering in the King James Version tradition) is largely the result of literally translating from Greek into English, and in Context I the letter does not 'possess content' in the sense of ownership (as in Context A), but the letter simply contains or consists of a particular verbal content.

This assortment of different meanings of ἔχω results primarily from the fact that in so many contexts it basically designates a relationship. Possession is simply an exclusive right to use something. Such a relation can, however, apply to many different entities, and thus the different meanings (or uses) of ἔχω may develop in a number of different semantic directions. *The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, Second Edition, Unabridged* lists twenty-six meanings for *have*, apart from its occurrence in a number of idioms.

Since the semantic developments in Greek ἔχω are so similar to those in English *have*, some people might assume that this is precisely what happens in all languages, but this is far from being so. In both English and Greek one may be said 'to have a disease' (although in Greek συνέχω occurs more frequently than ἔχω), but in many languages a person does not 'have a disease,' but 'a disease has a person.' The reality is the same, in that persons experience a state, but in English the focus is on the person and in other languages the focus is on the agent. Similarly, in many languages one cannot 'possess God' or even speak of 'my God,' since God 'possesses people.' In such languages the verb translated 'possess' implies some measure of control.

The analysis of the different meanings of single lexemes is only a relatively limited part of the process required in obtaining an adequate picture of the range of particular meanings and of the relations between these meanings.

But it is also essential to see these same data from the perspective of the related meanings of different lexemes, since only in this way can one describe with some degree of accuracy the areas of meaning covered by the different class meanings of different lexemes. This, then, is the focus of Chapter 4, but as already noted, it would be a mistake to think that one set of procedures must be completed before the next can be employed. In actual practice both must be constantly employed to act as checks and balances in order to obtain a more consistent and coherent picture of the entire semantic structure. **Problem 28.**

# FOUR

## ANALYZING THE RELATED MEANINGS OF DIFFERENT LEXEMES

In comparison with the data and problems treated in Chapter 3, the analysis of the related meanings of different lexemes is much more complex, since these related meanings are generally much closer in semantic space, that is to say, they are more closely related because they share many more features. Compare, for example, the following series of different terms for psychological faculties with the diverse meanings of πνεῦμα.

Related psychological faculties (Domain 26 in *L and N*):

νοῦς[a]: the psychological faculty of understanding, reasoning, thinking, and deciding

καρδία[a]: the causative source of a person's psychological life in its various aspects, but with special emphasis upon thoughts

ψυχή[a]: the essence of life in terms of thinking, willing, and feeling

συνείδησις[b]: the psychological faculty which can distinguish between right and wrong

φρήν: the psychological faculty of thoughtful planning, often with the implication of being wise and provident

πνεῦμα[c]: the non-material, psychological faculty which is potentially sensitive and responsive to God and which in some contexts may suggest a glorious reality, e.g. 1 Peter 3.18 and Romans 1.4.

Principal meanings of πνεῦμα:

1. the Holy Spirit
2. non-material being (spirit)
3. an evil, non-material being (demon, evil spirit)
4. an apparition of an animate being (ghost)
5. a psychological faculty potentially sensitive and responsive to God
6. a particular mode of intellectual activity (way of thinking)
7. atmospheric air in motion (wind)
8. air coming from the lungs (breath)

Because of the semantic proximity of the related meanings of different lexemes, it is essential to consider very carefully the subtle ecological and cultural differences in the sociological setting of any communication. There are, nevertheless, serious difficulties in doing this for the New Testament since we are separated historically from the New Testament context by some two thousand years and there are no present-day speakers of the Greek of the New Testament to provide the kind of information about usage that only native speakers can know. Despite much excellent lexicographical work already done on New Testament vocabulary, it often seems that what we do not know greatly outweighs what we know.

A study of the different contexts in which a lexeme can occur (as described in Chapter 3) provides much information about possible contexts, but this process does not help establish the boundaries of such uses. And since the size of the New Testament is quite limited, there are many gaps in the occurrence of terms which might help determine just how extensive a range of contextual application a particular lexeme might have.

Whereas in Chapter 3 the methodology of analysis is based primarily on studying the syntagmatic (or "combinatory") contexts of words, that is to say, the verbal contexts in which such lexemes occur, in Chapter 4 the analysis is based more on paradigmatic contexts in which two or more semantically related lexemes might occur. If, for example, two seemingly related words occur in parallel or analogous contexts and especially if they occur within the same type of context, this is useful in establishing potential ranges and possible meanings. For example, πνεῦμα[e] and νοῦς[a] contrast effectively in 1 Corinthians 14.14, ἐὰν γὰρ προσεύχωμαι γλώσσῃ, τὸ πνεῦμά μου προσεύχεται, ὁ δὲ νοῦς μου ἄκαρπός ἐστιν 'for if I pray in a strange tongue, my spirit indeed prays, but my mind has no part in it.' Note also the occurrence of ψυχή[a] and πνεῦμα[e] in a parallel construction in Hebrews 4.12,

διϊκνούμενος ἄχρι μερισμοῦ ψυχῆς καὶ πνεύματος 'it cuts all the way through to where physical life and spirit meet.'

But unless there is some distinguishing feature in the context, the mere occurrence of words with related meanings does not guarantee their existence as distinct entities. For example, the command in Matthew 22.37, ἀγαπήσεις κύριον τὸν θεόν σου ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ καρδίᾳ σου καὶ ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ σου καὶ ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ σου 'love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind,' does not necessarily mean that καρδία, ψυχή, and διάνοια are distinct faculties. The use of all three terms may be simply a rhetorical device for emphasis, rather than an assertion that these faculties are distinct entities. In fact, in *L and N* νοῦς[a] and διάνοια[a] are treated under the same entry, since there seems to be no way to distinguish two different designative meanings. Before studying sets of semantically related lexemes, it is, however, useful to note a number of important features of semantic domains.

### *Semantic Domains*

Semantic domains are organized in terms of the number and types of shared semantic features of lexemes. The major divisions of these domains are (1) entities (also called objects), (2) activities (events, happenings), (3) characteristics (quantities, qualities, states), and (4) relations. The class of entities includes proper names of places (e.g. *Jerusalem*, *Galilee*), persons (e.g. *Pontius Pilate*, *Isaiah*), and events (e.g. *Passover*, *Pentecost*), all of which have unique referents and hence do not have designative meanings, but may have associative meanings, e.g. *Saul* vs. *Paul*. The pronouns substitute primarily for entities, though they may also substitute for activities (e.g. *it* in *I didn't do it*) and for characteristics (e.g. *it* in *it was hideous*, as a response to a question about a particular color).

As already noted, negatives are generally combined with positives (unless the subtypes are too numerous), e.g. ἀγαθός/κακός 'good/bad' and πολύς/ὀλίγος 'many/few' or 'much/little.' Derivatives are placed with their morphological bases, e.g. δικαιόω 'to declare or make righteous' with δίκαιος 'righteous,' and σαλπίζω 'to play the trumpet' and σαλπιστής 'trumpeter' with σάλπιγξ 'trumpet,' since in the case of derivatives at least some of the semantic content of the base is incorporated into the meaning of the derived forms, usually by the addition of one or two semantic features, e.g. 'to cause to' or 'one who' (κρεμάννυμι 'to cause to hang' from κρέμαμαι 'to hang' and κριτής 'a judge' from κρίνω 'to judge').

In the lexical inventory of any language there are a number of major and minor domains, and how many layers of such domain structure should be recognized depends largely upon the complexity and number of semantically

included sets. As already noted, for *L and N* only two major layers are recognized, namely, domains and subdomains, but attention is also called to groupings of domains, e.g. intellectual activities, including the domains of Psychological Faculties; Learn; Know; Memory and Recall; Think; Hold a View, Believe, Trust; and Understand. A number of interpersonal relations are grouped together in the domains of Association; Help, Care For; Guide, Discipline, Follow; Control, Rule; Punish, Reward; Hostility, Strife; and Reconciliation, Forgiveness. And there are several domains involving space, e.g. Space, Spatial Dimensions, Spatial Orientations, Spatial Positions, Spatial Extensions, and Existence in Space. It would certainly have been possible to put all of these distinct sets together into a single domain, with two or more levels of subdomains, but for the sake of ready reference and simplicity of notation in indices, splitting seems to be more advantageous than lumping.

In general there are few problems involved in assigning domain or subdomain classifications when the terms refer to physical entities or to activities, e.g. people, geographical objects, flora, fauna, artifacts, movement, impact, and agricultural activities. But the characteristics of probability, power, capability, and ethics involve a number of crucial difficulties in which different classifications seem almost equally valid. In a sense, this is not strange, since these involve the very same problems which have concerned lexicographers and philosophers for centuries. In fact, we have not gone much beyond Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and its remarkably astute analysis of many value-laden words.

Insight into the relations between similar class meanings of different lexemes depends to a large extent upon recognizing the distinct ways in which various meanings relate to one another in clusters, included sets, overlapping sets, complementary pairs, and series.

In clusters the meanings of different lexemes are close but distinctly different, and they belong to the same hierarchical level, which means that the meaning of one word is not included within the meaning of another. The following terms, which designate different kinds of oral communication, may be said to form a typical cluster:

1. κράζω: 'to shout.' ἠκολούθησαν αὐτῷ δύο τυφλοὶ κράζοντες 'two blind men followed him and shouted' Matthew 9.27.
2. βατταλογέω[a]: 'to speak repetitiously and somewhat meaninglessly.' προσευχόμενοι δὲ μὴ βατταλογήσητε 'when you pray, don't repeat meaningless words' Matthew 6.7.

3. *πρὸς τὸ οὖς λαλέω*: 'to whisper,' literally 'to speak to the ear.' *ὃ πρὸς τὸ οὖς ἐλαλήσατε ἐν τοῖς ταμείοις* 'what you whispered in the inner room' Luke 12.3.
4. *ᾄδω*: 'to sing.' *ᾄδουσιν ὡς ᾠδὴν καινὴν ἐνώπιον τοῦ θρόνου* 'they sang a new song before the throne' Revelation 14.3.

These lexemes may be said to constitute a semantic cluster since they share certain features of oral communication in which words are used, but they differ in loudness (e.g. 'whisper' versus 'shout'), in extent (repetitiousness), and in musical accompaniment. **Problem 29.**

An included set is typical of a taxonomic hierarchy, such as in English *animal*, *dog*, and *collie*, in which all collies are dogs, and all dogs are animals, that is to say, *animal* is the most inclusive, *dog* is on the second level of inclusion, and *collie* is the term on the third level. In the New Testament the following terms constitute an included set: *ζῷον*[a] 'any living creature, whether wild or domesticated, but excluding plants'; *θηρίον*[b] 'any four-footed animal, wild or domesticated'; *κτῆνος* 'a relatively large domesticated animal, primarily used for riding or carrying burdens'; and *ὄνος* 'donkey.' Note how *ὄνος* is a member of the class of *κτῆνος*, and *κτῆνος* is a member of the class of *θηρίον*[b], and *θηρίον*[b] is a member of the class of *ζῷον*[a].

A typical instance of overlapping in meaning exists in the case of *λέγω*[a] and *φημί*[a]. In fact, there seems to be little or no difference in designative meaning, but there must be some subtle distinctions in associative meaning as reflected in their different frequencies and total ranges. Here is a case of almost complete overlapping. The terms *φιλέω*[a] and *ἀγαπάω*[a] also appear to overlap to a considerable extent and may be simply stylistic variants in John 21.15-17. In some contexts of the New Testament there seems to be a significant difference in meaning in that *ἀγαπάω*[a] may be commanded, while *φιλέω*[a] is never commanded. Is there something in the nature of *φιλέω* which seems to preclude its being commanded? Or is this lack of imperative usage only the result of the limited text of the New Testament? The fact that *ἀγαπάω*[a] is based upon a sincere appreciation for the worth and value of someone or something, while *φιλέω*[a] is based upon personal attachment and association seems to be congruent with the distinction in the use or non-use of the imperative. This distinction may be based on the presumption that appreciation of something is much more likely to be commanded than personal attachment arising out of association. **Problem 30.**

The meanings of *κακός*[a] and *πονηρός*[a] also overlap in certain contexts, but bad behavior is spoken of as *κακός*[a] in view of its resulting in harm and damage, while *πονηρός*[a] focuses more upon moral corruption and evil.

Complementary pairs of meanings may contrast in three different ways: (1) as positive and negative, e.g. ἀληθής/ψευδής 'true/false,' (2) as reversives, e.g. δέω/λύω 'bind/loose,' and (3) as shifts in roles, e.g. δανείζω/δανείζομαι 'lend/borrow' and ἀγοράζω/πωλέω 'buy/sell.' These sets of complementary meanings have much in common, since they all involve clear distinctions in values, procedures, and roles.

Meanings which relate to one another as series are of three major types: (1) infinite, e.g. the cardinal and ordinal numbers from one to infinity, (2) repetitive, e.g. the days of the week and the months of the year, and (3) ranked, e.g. λεγιών 'a Roman army unit of about 6,000 soldiers,' σπεῖρα 'a Roman military unit of about 600 soldiers,' and στράτευμα[b] 'a small detachment of soldiers.' Among religious functionaries one may speak of ἀρχιερεύς[a] 'chief priest,' ἱερεύς 'priest,' and λευίτης 'levite.' But in series marking rank there is a tendency for the same term to have more than one meaning. For example, στράτευμα[b] designates a small detachment, while στράτευμα[a] consists of an entire army, which could consist of several regiments. Similarly, ἀρχιερεύς[a] designates a principal priest, in view of his belonging to one of the highpriestly families, but ἀρχιερεύς[b] designates the principal member among chief priests. For this distinction only a knowledge of the historical situation can supply the crucial information in some contexts.

### *Methodology for the Analysis of Related Meanings of Different Lexemes*

The methodology for analyzing the related meanings of different lexemes builds on the procedures outlined in Chapter 3, whereby a set of possible meanings of a lexeme is based on similarities and contrasts in ranges of occurrence. In Chapter 4 the methodology involves several crucial steps: (1) selecting a small set of meanings which seem to be quite close in semantic space, (2) specifying the type and number of their shared features of meaning (the basis for their constituting a set), (3) determining what features separate the meanings from one another, (4) distinguishing between the core of crucial minimal features (those which are necessary and sufficient) and any additional supplementary features which may be important, and (5) determining the types of relations between the meanings of any set: clustering, included, overlapping, complementary (positive/negative, reversive, or role-shifting), and serial (infinite, repetitive, and ranked).

The following lexemes constitute a cluster in view of closely related meanings of movement in space by the use of lower limbs, but not because of the fact that many of the lexemes have the same stem. What is important are the shared semantic features:

1. περιτρέχω: to run or go hurriedly about. περιέδραμον ὅλην τὴν χώραν ἐκείνην 'they ran throughout the whole region' Mark 6.55.
2. εἰστρέχω: to run in or to run into. εἰσδραμοῦσα δὲ ἀπήγγειλεν ἑστάναι τὸν Πέτρον πρὸ τοῦ πυλῶνος 'she ran back in and told them that Peter was standing at the gate' Acts 12.14.
3. κατατρέχω: to run down to. ὃς ἐξαυτῆς παραλαβὼν στρατιώτας καὶ ἑκατοντάρχας κατέδραμεν ἐπ' αὐτούς 'at once he took some officers and soldiers and ran down to them' Acts 21.32.
4. προστρέχω: to run into the presence of someone. προστρέχοντες ἠσπάζοντο αὐτόν 'they ran up to him and greeted him' Mark 9.15.
5. προτρέχω: to run ahead of someone else, with the implication of arriving at a destination sooner. προδραμὼν εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν 'so he ran ahead to the front (of the crowd)' Luke 19.4.
6. ἐκπηδάω: to run or rush out quickly. διαρρήξαντες τὰ ἱμάτια αὐτῶν ἐξεπήδησαν εἰς τὸν ὄχλον 'they tore their clothes and rushed out into the middle of the crowd' Acts 14.14.
7. εἰσπηδάω: to run or rush quickly into. αἰτήσας δὲ φῶτα εἰσεπήδησεν 'and he called for a light and rushed in' Acts 16.29.
8. περιπατέω[a]: to walk along or around. περιπατῶν δὲ παρὰ τὴν θάλασσαν τῆς Γαλιλαίας 'as he walked by Lake Galilee' Matthew 4.18.

This cluster is unusual in that so many of the distinguishing features are clearly marked by the preposed compounded elements περι, εἰς, κατα, ἐκ, προς, and προ, but it would be a mistake to assume that the stem remains the same in all contexts. Not all of these lexemes designate the linear motion of running in these contexts. For example, in Mark 6.55 the text probably does not mean that the people ran throughout the entire region, but that people throughout the region went quickly and collected the sick whom they wished to bring to Jesus. In any event, the people may have done some running, but it was not a marathon. **Problem 31.**

In the case of ἐκπηδάω in Acts 14.14 and εἰσπηδάω in Acts 16.29, the persons involved may very well have run, but the focus seems to be on the rapid movement rather than the actual motion of running.

A more typical cluster of meanings may be found in the following complexly organized set of meanings:

1. γῆ[b]: dry land, in contrast with the sea. τὸ δὲ πλοῖον ἤδη σταδίους πολλοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ἀπεῖχεν 'the boat was already far away from the land' Matthew 14.24.

2. παράλιος: a territory bordering on the sea, in contrast with an inland area. πλῆθος πολὺ τοῦ λαοῦ ἀπὸ...τῆς παραλίου Τύρου καὶ Σιδῶνος 'a great crowd of people from...the coastal region of Tyre and Sidon' Luke 6.17.

3. χεῖλος[a]: the strip of land close to a body of water. ὡς ἡ ἄμμος ἡ παρὰ τὸ χεῖλος τῆς θαλάσσης ἡ ἀναρίθμητος 'as innumerable as the sand on the shore of the sea' Hebrews 11.12.

4. αἰγιαλός: a strip of land immediately bordering the edge of a body of water and gradually sloping down into the water. κόλπον δέ τινα κατενόουν ἔχοντα αἰγιαλόν 'they noticed a bay with a beach' Acts 27.39.

5. ἄμμος[b]: a sandy beach or shore. ἐστάθη ἐπὶ τὴν ἄμμον τῆς θαλάσσης 'he stood on the shore of the sea' Revelation 12.18.

6. νῆσος: an area of land completely surrounded by water. ἐπέγνωμεν ὅτι Μελίτη ἡ νῆσος καλεῖται 'we learned that the island was called Malta' Acts 28.1.

7. τόπος διθάλασσος: a bar or reef produced in an area where two currents meet. περιπεσόντες δὲ εἰς τόπον διθάλασσον ἐπέκειλαν τὴν ναῦν 'but the ship ran into a sandbank and went aground' Acts 27.41.

This series of meanings is rather unusual because in each instance the primary shared feature depends on a contrast with something which is not included in the cluster, namely, a body of water. And within this set the distinctions in meaning in Items 2 through 5 differ primarily in terms of (1) the distance from the water and (2) the breadth of territory near the water. In each case the terms may designate a strip of land which borders the water, but παράλιος would appear to be a somewhat broader band than χεῖλος[a], with χεῖλος[a] broader than αἰγιαλός, and αἰγιαλός broader than ἄμμος[b].

The phrase τόπος διθάλασσος is one of those fixed phrases of doubtful meaning which may designate either (1) a sandbar or reef usually under the surface of the water or (2) a place where two currents meet, i.e. cross-currents, a place where sandbars are often formed. **Problem 32.**

But in order to grasp more adequately the methods of analysis and their implications for explicating complex semantic relations, it is better to begin with a highly restricted set of meanings and then gradually take on more complex sets of relations. In this way one can better appreciate the complex nature of domain structures and be able to recognize more readily some of the

underlying problems. In fact, it may be useful to begin by examining a set of meanings in English associated with the terms *run*, *walk*, *skip*, and *crawl*.

The only meanings of the terms *run*, *walk*, *skip*, and *crawl* which are relevant are those which have significant features in common, namely, movement in space by an animate being using the limbs. This immediately eliminates the meaning of *run* in *run for office*, the meaning of *walk* in *he built a walk around the house*, of *skip* in *he skipped class*, and of *crawl* in *the traffic came to a crawl.*

In an initial analysis it may even be useful to restrict a series of meanings in a somewhat artificial manner in order not to be confused by too many alternative interpretations. Accordingly, it may be desirable to restrict this series of meanings to those which are relevant to the movement of human beings, since four-footed animals do not skip (except in poetry) and the order and movement of limbs differs greatly depending upon differences of speed and gait.

Having reduced the area of analysis to a small set and having determined the shared features, it is essential to look for the distinguishing or diagnostic features. Most people assume the diagnostic feature between *run* and *walk* would be speed, but in reality some people can and do walk faster than others usually run. As already noted, the distinctive contrast is really the relation of the feet to the surface. In running there are repeated moments when neither foot is in touch with the supporting surface, but in walking one foot or the other is in touch with the surface at all times. This is the one crucial difference between running and walking, despite the fact that the psychologically more relevant distinction is one of speed, which underlies the use of *run* in such expressions as *I'll run do it*, implying quick action, although not necessarily actual running. For *run* there are also the supplementary features of energy and competition, and these underlie the extended meaning of *run* in *he ran for office.*

The distinguishing feature between *skip* and *run* or *walk* is one of order of the limbs. In *run* or *walk* the order is 121212 etc., while in *skipping* the order is 112211221122, with moments in which neither foot is touching the surface or is only lightly touching it. *Skipping* also has supplementary features of recreational activity.

In contrast with *run*, *walk*, and *skip*, the distinctive feature in the meaning of *crawl* is the use of all four limbs in various orders, but with at least two limbs touching the supporting surface at all times. But added features involve slowness, and often unfavorable circumstances.

It is essential to note that in the analysis of *run*, *walk*, *skip*, and *crawl*, we have not been talking about the terms *run*, *walk*, *skip*, and *crawl*, but only about certain meanings of these terms. Accordingly, it is entirely misleading

to talk about "the meaning of *run*," because *run* has a great many meanings, which fit into a number of different domains. Compare, for example, the following types of contexts:

1. the water runs
2. his wife runs him
3. he runs the office
4. the ship runs from New York to Rotterdam
5. the motor runs
6. the run on the bank
7. the run in her stocking
8. he built a run for the chickens
9. they live up the run
10. he ran the horse in the third race

Each one of these contexts involves a different designative meaning of *run*. And it should be obvious that in analyzing any set of related meanings of different lexemes, it is essential to determine precisely which meaning of each lexeme is being compared.

Even when a particular meaning of a word like *run* has been determined for a specific type of context, the analytical process is often not complete since in very similar contexts the same distinctive features may not be relevant. For example, when a snake moves slowly over a surface most people normally speak of the movement as *crawl*, but if it moves rapidly, many people use the term *run*, though certain other terms can also be used, e.g. *slide*, *slither*, *streak*, and *dash*. Should *run* in the context *a snake ran across the lawn* be grouped with *run* in the context *the boy ran fast* or should the fast movement of a snake be regarded as a completely distinct meaning? Intuitively most persons would lump the fast movement of a snake with that of a person or four-footed animal, despite the fact that a snake has no limbs and the body is constantly in touch with the supporting surface. In this case the significant feature is speed, which in a sense compensates for the loss of two of the distinctive features of running by humans and quadrupeds. The same feature of speed is also relevant for movement by insects, spiders, and crabs. Accordingly, the statement about the distinctive features of *run* must be modified to indicate that for arthropods and snakes the distinctive feature is speed rather than the relation to the supporting surface.

This seeming inconsistency and irregularity in the distinctive features of meaning should not be regarded as either unusual or contradictory. The fact that a feature is diagnostic in certain contexts but not in others is quite com-

mon. This semantic "fluidity" is the norm, not the exception, as has already been noted in Chapter 3, and will be even more evident in the rest of this chapter.

It may be helpful at this point to compare four Greek terms expressing various types of movement:

1. τρέχω[a]: δραμὼν ἐπέπεσεν ἐπὶ τὸν τράχηλον αὐτοῦ καὶ κατεφίλησεν αὐτόν 'he ran and threw his arms around him and kissed him' Luke 15.20.
2. περιπατέω[a]: περιπατῶν δὲ παρὰ τὴν θάλασσαν τῆς Γαλιλαίας 'as he walked by Lake Galilee' Matthew 4.18.
3. ἅλλομαι[a]: εἰσῆλθεν σὺν αὐτοῖς εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν περιπατῶν καὶ ἁλλόμενος καὶ αἰνῶν τὸν θεόν 'then he went into the Temple with them, walking and jumping and praising God' Acts 3.8.
4. ὀρχέομαι: ηὐλήσαμεν ὑμῖν καὶ οὐκ ὠρχήσασθε 'we played the flute for you, but you would not dance' Matthew 11.17.

The differences in meaning between τρέχω[a] and περιπατέω[a] are in many contexts more or less the same as in the corresponding meanings of English *run* and *walk*, but ἅλλομαι[a] involves leaps or jumps into the air in which both feet are much farther above the supporting surface and for a considerably longer period of time than in the case of running. And ὀρχέομαι involves patterned rhythmic movement of all or parts of the body, and this normally occurs with the accompaniment of music.

The contrasts in τρέχω[a], περιπατέω[a], ἅλλομαι[a], and ὀρχέομαι are so obvious that it seems almost a waste of time to note the distinctions, but there are sets in which a close examination of linear movements may provide useful insight in deciding not only certain differences in meaning, but also how one can most readily determine the closest natural equivalent expression in another language. Compare, for example, the following terms for linear movement:

1. πέμπω[c]: πέμψαντες πρὸς αὐτὸν παρεκάλουν μὴ δοῦναι ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸ θέατρον 'they sent word to him to urge him not to present himself in the theater' Acts 19.31.
2. συνοδεύω: οἱ δὲ ἄνδρες οἱ συνοδεύοντες αὐτῷ εἱστήκεισαν ἐνεοί 'the men who were travelling with him had stopped, not saying a word' Acts 9.7.
3. ἀκολουθέω[b]: ἠκολούθησαν αὐτῷ ὄχλοι πολλοὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Γαλιλαίας 'a great crowd from Galilee followed him' Matthew 4.25.

4. διώκω[a]: *μὴ ἀπέλθητε μηδὲ διώξητε* 'do not go and chase after them' Luke 17.23.
5. σύρω[b]: *ἔσυρον Ἰάσονα καί τινας ἀδελφοὺς ἐπὶ τοὺς πολιτάρχας* 'they dragged Jason and some other fellow believers to the city authorities' Acts 17.6.
6. ἄγω[a]: *ἤγαγον τὴν ὄνον καὶ τὸν πῶλον* 'they led the donkey and colt' Matthew 21.7.
7. φέρω[a]: *ἐπέθηκαν αὐτῷ τὸν σταυρὸν φέρειν ὄπισθεν τοῦ Ἰησοῦ* 'they put the cross on him and made him carry it behind Jesus' Luke 23.26.

In this set of meanings there is always some linear movement involving at least two entities, and sometimes three: X, the agent which moves or causes movement; Y, the entity which is made to move; and Z, an entity which is moved by Y. In the case of πέμπω[c], X ('they') causes Y ('word') to move, but X does not move. In συνοδεύω X ('the men') consists of multiple entities which move together. In ἀκολουθέω[b] X ('a great crowd') goes behind Y ('him'), as is also the case with διώκω[a], except that in διώκω[a] there is greater haste and urgency. In σύρω[b], however, X ('they') moves Y ('Jason'), which is moved only by force, but in ἄγω[a] X ('they') directs the movement of Y ('the donkey and colt') and moves along with or ahead of Y, while in φέρω[a] X ('him') causes Y ('the cross') to be moved and moves with it. **Problem 33.**

As in so many cases, meanings may have subtle supplementary features which need to be carefully examined. For example, διώκω[a] more often than not implies hostile intent, and so is frequently translated into English as 'pursue' or 'persecute,' while ἀκολουθέω[b] generally suggests friendly intent and even a desire to associate with or to imitate. If διώκω[a] is to be understood as having friendly intent, the context must clearly mark this fact; otherwise, hostile intent will be understood. Similarly, if ἀκολουθέω[b] is to be used with hostile intent, then the context must overtly mark this fact. In some languages, however, any use of a term meaning 'to follow' is automatically understood to mean hostile intent, and some Bible translators have inadvertently made the initial mistake of turning all the followers of Jesus into enemies.

Some clustered sets of meanings pose problems because different meanings are so close that in some contexts there is apparent overlapping. Compare, for example, the following set:

1. ἀποφθέγγομαι: *ἤρξαντο λαλεῖν ἑτέραις γλώσσαις καθὼς τὸ πνεῦμα ἐδίδου ἀποφθέγγεσθαι αὐτοῖς* 'they began to talk in other languages, as the Spirit enabled them to speak' Acts 2.4.

2. φωνέω[b]: αὐτὸς δὲ κρατήσας τῆς χειρὸς αὐτῆς ἐφώνησεν 'he took her by the hand and called out' Luke 8.54.
3. βοάω: βοῶντες μὴ δεῖν αὐτὸν ζῆν μηκέτι 'they scream that he should not live any longer' Acts 25.24.
4. ἀνακράζω: ἔδοξαν ὅτι φάντασμά ἐστιν, καὶ ἀνέκραξαν 'they thought that it was a ghost and screamed' Mark 6.49.
5. βατταλογέω[b]: προσευχόμενοι δὲ μὴ βατταλογήσητε ὥσπερ οἱ ἐθνικοί 'and when you pray, do not babble like the heathen' Matthew 6.7.

The meanings of all the lexemes in this set involve speech, but in the case of ἀποφθέγγομαι the focus seems to be upon the verbal sounds rather than upon the content. In φωνέω[b] the utterance is evidently somewhat loud and distinct, although in βοάω the volume is even greater. In ἀνακράζω there is evidently loudness and at the same time a possible high pitch, which would justify translating the term as 'scream.' In βατταλογέω[b], however, the focus is upon the meaninglessness of the utterance or the difficulty in understanding, based on the fact that in Classical and Hellenistic Greek other terms having the stem βαττα- generally mean 'to stammer' or 'to stutter.' **Problem 34.**

Earlier in Chapter 4 βατταλογέω[a] was included in a somewhat different set of meanings involving oral utterance, and more often than not βατταλογέω in Matthew 6.7 is rendered as 'to use many words,' since in the same context the word πολυλογία 'long utterance' is used as a presumed interpretation of βατταλογέω. The basic difficulty encountered in trying to determine the meaning of βατταλογέω in Matthew 6.7 is the fact that it is a very infrequently used term, occurring only once in the text of the Greek New Testament and also being relatively rare in Hellenistic Greek. It is quite possible, of course, that the two meanings (1) 'to be repetitious' and (2) 'to babble' or 'to be meaningless' could have developed from the same base meaning 'to stammer' or 'to stutter.' This is simply another case of semantic indefiniteness. **Problem 35.**

The sets of meanings involving movement and oral utterance have rather evident features in comparison with the more complex and subtle distinctions which occur in the following series of mental activities involving learning:

1. ὁράω[f]: ἐραύνησον καὶ ἴδε ὅτι ἐκ τῆς Γαλιλαίας προφήτης οὐκ ἐγείρεται 'search and learn that from Galilee no prophet ever arises' John 7.52.
2. διερωτάω: ἰδοὺ οἱ ἄνδρες οἱ ἀπεσταλμένοι ὑπὸ τοῦ Κορνηλίου διερωτήσαντες τὴν οἰκίαν τοῦ Σίμωνος ἐπέστησαν ἐπὶ τὸν πυλῶνα

'meanwhile, the men sent by Cornelius had learned where Simon's house was and were standing at the gate' Acts 10.17.

3. μανθάνω[a]: δύνασθε γὰρ καθ' ἕνα πάντες προφητεύειν, ἵνα πάντες μανθάνωσιν καὶ πάντες παρακαλῶνται 'all of you may speak God's message, one by one, so that all will learn and be encouraged' 1 Corinthians 14.31.

4. μυέομαι: ἐν παντὶ καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν μεμύημαι καὶ χορτάζεσθαι καὶ πεινᾶν 'I have learned the secret (of being content) in any and every situation, whether well-fed or hungry' Philippians 4.12.

5. εὑρίσκω[a]: ὃν εὑρὼν ἄνθρωπος ἔκρυψεν 'a man happens to find it, so he covers it up' Matthew 13.44.

6. ζητέω[b]: Ἰουδαῖοι σημεῖα αἰτοῦσιν καὶ Ἕλληνες σοφίαν ζητοῦσιν 'Jews ask for signs and Greeks search for wisdom' 1 Corinthians 1.22.

7. καταδιώκω: κατεδίωξεν αὐτὸν Σίμων καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ 'but Simon and his companions went out diligently searching for him' Mark 1.36.

8. πειράζω[a]: ἑαυτοὺς πειράζετε εἰ ἐστὲ ἐν τῇ πίστει 'put yourselves to the test as to whether you are in the faith' 2 Corinthians 13.5.

In deciding upon the relations within a set of closely related meanings, it is important not to be misled by English glosses. For example, in John 7.52 a translation of ὁράω[f] (ἰδεῖν) could be 'to see,' but the referent is not visual perception but the learning process involving perception. Similarly, one could render διερωτάω in Acts 10.17 as 'to ask questions about,' but the questioning is simply one aspect of the learning process. Likewise, μανθάνω[a] suggests a process of instruction, and μυέομαι says something about the nature of what is learned, namely, that it is a secret. In fact, each of these meanings concerning the acquisition of knowledge contains features which describe or suggest certain aspects of the knowledge or of the process in acquiring it. We may say, therefore, that all of these meanings are related to γινώσκω[b] 'to learn,' which can serve as a type of "semantic primitive" or "semantic prototype" for this process, and that all the included meanings exhibit certain variations or modifications. This is really not different from what occurs in a set related to *eat* (a semantic prototype or primitive for ingesting food): *gobble*, *mince*, *gorge*, *guzzle*, *gulp*, and *feast*. **Problem 36.**

There are a number of cases in which a subset of meanings constitutes a cluster defining different aspects of a semantic primitive or prototype. Compare, for example, a subset related to δίδωμι[a]: δωρέομαι 'to give an object or benefit to someone, with the probable implication of greater formality than

in the case of δίδωμι[a]'; μερίζω[c] 'to give someone a part of something'; μετρέω[b] 'to give a measured portion to someone'; κοινωνέω[a] 'to share one's possessions, with the implication of mutual interest and participation'; and χαρίζομαι[a] 'to give or grant graciously and generously.' This subset characterizes various aspects of δίδωμι[a] 'to give,' and usually implies something of value.

*Δίδωμι[a] as Semantic Prototype*

δίδωμι[a]: κλάσας ἔδωκεν τοῖς μαθηταῖς τοὺς ἄρτους 'he broke the loaves and gave them to the disciples' Matthew 14.19.

*Subset of δίδωμι[a]*

1. δωρέομαι: ἐδωρήσατο τὸ πτῶμα τῷ Ἰωσήφ 'he granted Joseph the body' Mark 15.45.
2. μερίζω[c]: ᾧ καὶ δεκάτην ἀπὸ πάντων ἐμέρισεν Ἀβραάμ 'to whom Abraham gave a tithe of everything' Hebrews 7.2.
3. μετρέω[b]: ἐν ᾧ μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε μετρηθήσεται ὑμῖν 'the measure you give will be the measure you get' Mark 4.24.
4. κοινωνέω[a]: κοινωνείτω δὲ ὁ κατηχούμενος τὸν λόγον τῷ κατηχοῦντι ἐν πᾶσιν ἀγαθοῖς 'the man who is being taught the Christian message should share all the good things he has with his teacher' Galatians 6.6.
5. χαρίζομαι[a]: τῷ δὲ Ἀβραὰμ δι' ἐπαγγελίας κεχάρισται ὁ θεός 'but because of his promise God graciously gave it to Abraham' Galatians 3.18. **Problem 37.**

Special problems of analysis are involved when terms have meanings which are essentially indefinite in extent. Compare, for example, the following series of meanings relating to indefinite units of time:

1. ἡμέρα[c]: an indefinite unit of time (whether singular or plural), but not particularly long—'time, period.' ἐγένετο ὡς ἐπλήσθησαν αἱ ἡμέραι τῆς λειτουργίας αὐτοῦ 'when his period of service (in the Temple) was over' Luke 1.23.
2. αἰών[a]: a unit of time as a particular stage or period of history—'age, era.' οὐκ ἀφεθήσεται αὐτῷ οὔτε ἐν τούτῳ τῷ αἰῶνι οὔτε ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι 'he will not be forgiven, not in this age, neither in the following' Matthew 12.32.
3. γενεά[d]: an indefinite period of time, but in close relationship to human existence and in some contexts, a period of time about the

length of a generation—'age, epoch.' ὃς ἐν ταῖς παρῳχημέναις γενεαῖς εἴασεν πάντα τὰ ἔθνη πορεύεσθαι ταῖς ὁδοῖς αὐτῶν 'in the past ages he allowed all peoples to go their own way' Acts 14.16.

4. καιρός[c]: an indefinite period of time, but probably with the implication of the relation of a period to a particular state of affairs—'age, era.' ἐὰν μὴ λάβῃ ἑκατονταπλασίονα νῦν ἐν τῷ καιρῷ τούτῳ 'and would not receive a hundred times as much now in this present era' Mark 10.30.

5. ὥρα[b]: an indefinite unit of time which is relatively short—'a while.' ὑμεῖς δὲ ἠθελήσατε ἀγαλλιασθῆναι πρὸς ὥραν ἐν τῷ φωτὶ αὐτοῦ 'and you were willing to enjoy his light for a while' John 5.35.

6. ἡλικία[a]: the period of time when a person is alive—'span of life, lifetime, age.' τίς δὲ ἐξ ὑμῶν μεριμνῶν δύναται προσθεῖναι ἐπὶ τὴν ἡλικίαν αὐτοῦ πῆχυν ἕνα; 'which one of you by worrying can add a single day to his lifetime?' Matthew 6.27. (See also ἡλικία[c] 'stature,' 81.4 in *L and N.*)

A series of meanings involving indefinite extent, whether in space or time, presents a number of problems, since there may be serious overlapping in some contexts. For example, καιρός[c] in Mark 10.30 may be every bit as long as αἰών[a] in Matthew 12.32. Accordingly, one may ask why there is a difference. Or is there any difference? One cannot insist upon a clear distinction in extent of time, but καιρός[c] usually implies a particularly significant occasion or episode. This aspect of καιρός[c] may be regarded as a kind of semantic carry-over from the meaning of καιρός[a] 'occasion.' Similarly, γενεά[d] and ἡλικία[a] suggest essentially the same indefinite time period, but viewed from different perspectives. In the case of γενεά[d] the perspective is a series of indefinite periods of time which overlap each other, and in ἡλικία[a] the perspective is the indefinite extent of one such period. **Problems 38, 39, and 40.**

As has already been repeatedly indicated in these discussions of meaning, it is unwise to expect precise meanings and rigid categories. Language is not a kind of mosaic with well-defined borders of meaning covering a fixed surface. It is far more like a series of bubbles on a constantly moving liquid surface. Even as bubbles change location, grow, diminish, and even disappear as they adjust to the liquid surface and ambient air, the meanings of words likewise shift location, increase or decrease in range of possible contexts, and also drop out of usage, as the sustaining culture also constantly changes.

One can readily overlook a cluster of meanings because the translation of certain terms may be so different as to hide the fact that such meanings are all

closely related. Note, for example, how in the following series the translations employ such divergent expressions as 'to come up,' 'to fulfill,' 'to happen,' 'to occur,' 'to take place,' 'to come about,' 'to come,' and 'to accompany':

1. γίνομαι[d]: to happen, with the implication that what happens is different from a previous state—'to happen, to occur, to come to be.' γίνεται λαῖλαψ μεγάλη ἀνέμου 'a strong wind came up' Mark 4.37.
2. ἐπιτελέω[b]: to cause to happen, with the purpose of some end result—'to accomplish, to bring about.' εἰδότες τὰ αὐτὰ τῶν παθημάτων τῇ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ὑμῶν ἀδελφότητι ἐπιτελεῖσθαι 'knowing that these same experiences are happening to your fellow believers in the world' 1 Peter 5.9.
3. ἐνίσταμαι[a]: to happen, with the implication of there being a particular set of circumstances—'to happen, to occur, to take place, to come about.' ἐν ἐσχάταις ἡμέραις ἐνστήσονται καιροὶ χαλεποί 'difficult times will come in the last days' 2 Timothy 3.1.
4. εἰσέρχομαι[b]: to happen, with the focus upon the initial aspect—'to happen, to come into.' ἡ ἁμαρτία εἰς τὸν κόσμον εἰσῆλθεν 'sin came into the world' Romans 5.12.
5. ἥκω[c]: to have come or to be present, with respect to some temporal reference point—'to happen, to have happened.' καὶ τότε ἥξει τὸ τέλος 'and then the end will come' Matthew 24.14.
6. ἐπακολουθέω[b]: to happen in conjunction with some other happening—'to happen along with, to happen at the same time, to accompany.' τοῦ κυρίου συνεργοῦντος καὶ τὸν λόγον βεβαιοῦντος διὰ τῶν ἐπακολουθούντων σημείων 'the Lord worked with them and confirmed their preaching by the accompanying signs' Mark 16.20.
7. πληρόω[g]: to cause to happen, with the implication of fulfilling some purpose—'to cause to happen, to make happen, to fulfill.' τοῦτο δὲ ὅλον γέγονεν ἵνα πληρωθῇ τὸ ῥηθὲν ὑπὸ κυρίου διὰ τοῦ προφήτου 'all this happened in order to fulfill what was spoken by the Lord through the prophet' Matthew 1.22.
8. προγίνομαι: to happen or occur previous to some point of time—'to happen previously, to occur formerly, to happen before.' διὰ τὴν πάρεσιν τῶν προγεγονότων ἁμαρτημάτων 'by overlooking their former sins' Romans 3.25.
9. πίπτω[g]: to happen suddenly to, with the implication of something bad and adverse—'to happen to, to come upon, to fall upon.' παραχρῆμά

τε ἔπεσεν ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἀχλὺς καὶ σκότος 'suddenly a dark mist came upon him' Acts 13.11.

In this series there is only one central distinctive feature of meaning, namely, the event or happening, but it is represented by several different lexemes, all of which have certain supplementary semantic features which distinguish the referents of the respective lexemes. It is also essential to recognize that in many instances a verb meaning 'to happen' performs primarily a grammatical function. For example, in the statement γίνεται λαῖλαψ μεγάλη ἀνέμου (Mark 4.37) the focal event is ἄνεμος 'wind.' The blowing is what happens, and the phrase λαῖλαψ μεγάλη 'strong gust' serves to characterize the wind. But in order for λαῖλαψ μεγάλη ἀνέμου to become an assertion about something, a verb is required, and so it is not unusual that for this type of event a highly generic expression for happening (in this instance γίνομαι) is employed.

In 1 Peter 5.9 ἐπιτελέω[b] (in a middle or passive form) also designates an event, but with the added features of purpose or result, while in Romans 5.12 εἰσέρχομαι[b] also refers to an event, but with special focus on the initial aspect. The meaning of the term ἐνίσταμαι[a] (2 Timothy 3.1) involves an event which is related to a particular set of circumstances. And ἐπακολουθέω[b] (Mark 16.20) designates an event associated with some other event or happening. Both ἥκω[c] (Matthew 24.14) and προγίνομαι (Romans 3.25) designate events, but in the case of ἥκω[c] it is something which has taken place in respect to some temporal reference point, and in the case of προγίνομαι the happening occurs previous to some point in time. The term πίπτω[g] (Acts 13.11) involves quite a different feature of meaning, namely, the fact that what happens is unfavorable. The meaning of πληρόω[g] (Matthew 1.22) is the most complex of all, namely, 'to cause to happen something which has been previously promised or announced.' **Problem 41**.

Several cases of included relations between related meanings have been mentioned, but there are some instances which involve more than one layer of inclusion and which do so only under special conditions. As already noted, the verb ἔρχομαι[a] means 'to move from one place to another, either coming or going' and its translation into English depends upon the contextual reference point, i.e. the person or thing which is focal to the action. When the verb ὑπάγω[b] 'to go, to depart' occurs in a context in contrast with ἔρχομαι[a], then the latter should be translated as 'to come.' This means that normally ἔρχομαι[a] is more generic than ὑπάγω[b] and contrasts with it. This is essentially no different from saying that *animal* in the tripartite distinction of *animal*, *vegetable*, and *mineral* exists on a generic level which includes the meaning of *animal* when it refers to quadrupeds in contrast with insects.

The meaning of πορεύομαι[b] 'to travel' (Luke 10.38) is included within the joint range of ἔρχομαι[a] and ὑπάγω[b], while πεζεύω 'to travel on foot' (Acts 20.13) is included within the range of πορεύομαι[b].

In some instances overlapping meanings are the result of physical inclusion of one referent within another. For example, ναός[a] 'a building in which a deity is worshiped and where the deity is often regarded as dwelling or symbolically present' is actually a part of ἱερόν 'the temple and the surrounding consecrated area.' But this distinction is not always preserved, and so in some contexts there is complete overlapping.

In many instances, however, the overlapping depends primarily upon different levels of language and becomes a factor of associative meaning. For example, both κατάλυμα[a] and πανδοχεῖον can designate an inn, but κατάλυμα[a] is the much more common and colloquial term. **Problem 42.**

There are also conspicuous differences of meaning based on technical distinctions. As already noted in Chapter 1, the term δικαιοσύνη in the Gospel of Matthew normally represents conformance in behavior to specified rules and regulations (e.g. Matthew 5.20, 6.1) and in some contexts specifically to alms-giving (Matthew 6.1), but in many contexts in the Pauline Epistles δικαιοσύνη is a type of right relation made possible by God on the basis of faith (e.g. Romans 1.17, 3.22, 4.3, 9.30, 10.4), and as such constitutes both a state and a principle for conduct. This referent of δικαιοσύνη is a distinctly Christian concept and becomes for Paul a technical meaning of the term.

In the case of negative/positive contrasts it is very easy to think merely in terms of polar contrasts, e.g. *big/little*, *hot/cold*, *good/bad*, without realizing that the contrasts are not that simple. The term κακός is regarded as the polar opposite of ἀγαθός, but only in certain respects, since both κακός and ἀγαθός cover relatively wide areas of meaning. The term ἀγαθός, for example, may be used in the sense of useful, beneficial, advantageous, and valuable, as well as in the sense of morally good. In many contexts, therefore, κακός opposes ἀγαθός only in the sense of being harmful, injurious, and pernicious, while in other contexts as being evil and base, but in still other contexts κακός seems to include both 'harmful' as well as 'evil.' But for a contrast to ἀγαθός in the sense of moral goodness, the more appropriate term is usually πονηρός or ἄδικος.

Negativized derivatives may constitute a serious problem for analysis, since one cannot assume that the negative prefix α- or αν- merely shifts the meaning of the base to a neutral position between positive and negative. In the case of δυνατός[a]/ἀδύνατος[b] 'possible/impossible' the negativized form is

essentially neutral. But in ὅσιος[a]/ἀνόσιος 'holy/godless' the term ἀνόσιος does not mean simply 'not holy,' but positively 'bad' and 'sinful.'

In the case of ἀληθεύω 'to tell the truth' and ψεύδομαι 'to lie' the contrast is not so much in the activity, since both involve speaking, but in the content of what is said. In the case of εὐλογέω[b] 'to bless' and καταράομαι 'to curse,' the contrast is to be found not so much in the verbal activity (since both involve the use of words with supernatural power and sanctions) but in the effects on those who have been blessed or cursed.

### *Special Problems with Related Meanings of Different Lexemes*

It is common enough to have the range of meaning of one term include the range of meaning of another, e.g. θηρίον 'animal' and λύκος 'wolf,' or ἄνθρωπος 'person' and ἀνήρ 'man,' but what constitutes a problem in some instances is something which has already been noted, namely, the fact that two different meanings of the same lexeme may involve inclusion. The meaning of θηρίον[a] 'any living creature, but not including people' includes the range of meaning of θηρίον[b] 'any four-footed animal, wild or domestic.' Compare also ἄνθρωπος as 'person' (John 10.33, Romans 2.16) and as 'adult, male person' (Matthew 10.35).

Meanings of terms relating to religious events, states, and persons often have quite different semantic features depending upon the types of referents. For example, ἅγιος 'holy' as applied to persons may designate individuals who are specially consecrated to a particular sacred activity, e.g. a priest or prophet, or it may simply indicate religious affiliation, as when ἅγιοι is used to identify believers in various communities, e.g. Romans 1.7, 1 Corinthians 1.2, and Colossians 1.2. When referring to objects, e.g. writings, sanctuary, and sacrifices, ἅγιος normally indicates exclusive dedication to religious function. But when ἅγιος is applied to God, the feature of dedication or consecration is entirely absent, and the applicable features are the inherent superior moral and divine qualities which set God off from human beings and which contribute to the awesome quality of deity.

A similar type of problem occurs with καθαρός and ἀκάθαρτος. There are two principal meanings of καθαρός: one which is secular, i.e. 'pure, clean,' and another which is religious, i.e. 'ritually pure, acceptable.' The same is true of ἀκάθαρτος, namely, 'dirty, unclean' and 'ritually unclean, unacceptable.' But in the phrase πνεῦμα ἀκάθαρτον 'unclean spirit,' the adjective ἀκάθαρτον not only indicates the ritually defiled nature of the spirit, but the fact that on entering into people such a spirit defiles them (an inferential feature of the meaning).

With the exception of χάρις (discussed extensively in Chapter 3), the different features of meaning of a term have been treated as having more or less the same status or relevance. But this is not the case in many instances. For example, the meaning of μετανοέω 'to repent' contains three significant features which have an historically ordered sequence: (1) a presuppositional feature of having done something wrong, (2) a core feature of contrition about such an event, and (3) a crucial inferential component of a future way of life which will not repeat the wrong behavior. This third semantic feature in μετανοέω was no doubt one of the factors which led to the doctrine that any sin after conversion was unforgivable (the major theme of The Shepherd of Hermas, an important document in the early church).

Different meanings may have some of the same features but have them in different degrees of intensity. For example, in English *remorse* and *repentance* both share presuppositional features of previous wrongdoing and of sorrow for what has been done, but remorse normally appears to be more intense. Furthermore, with remorse there is no escape by means of a feature of behavioral change. Remorse, therefore, becomes a dead-end experience.

Differences of degree are quite common in meanings involving qualities or quantities. In fact, in Greek this is highly systematized with comparative and superlative forms. The positive form ἀγαθός is supplemented by βέλτιον and κρείσσων for the comparative and by ἄριστος for the superlative (although the superlative form does not occur in the New Testament). In the case of μέγας, there are two comparative formations, μείζων and μειζότερος (an analogical formation with the customary comparative suffix -τερος), and one superlative, μέγιστος.

One would assume that πρῶτος 'first' would itself be superlative in meaning (it is in fact a superlative of πρό), but the New Testament also contains πρότερος meaning 'former,' while πρωτιστός (the superlative form) does not occur in the New Testament.

Different degrees of intensity may also be expressed in quite different ways. For example, διαρπάζω 'to plunder thoroughly' (Mark 3.27) differs in intensity and completeness from ἁρπάζω 'to forcibly seize' (Matthew 12.29). Compare also ἀναλίσκω 'to destroy' (Luke 9.54) and καταναλίσκω 'to destroy completely' (Hebrews 12.29). **Problem 43.**

In many instances one or more features of a meaning may not always be present in every context or there may be uncertainty as to whether a particular feature is relevant. Accordingly, definitions must often contain such expressions as *probably*, *possibly*, *usually*, or *often*. Note, for example, the following definitions:

1. ὄχλος[b]; λαός[d]: the common people, in contrast with those who are rich, leaders, and/or authorities in the society, often with the implication of disdain and low esteem—'common people, rabble.'
2. ἀλώπηξ[b]: a wicked person, probably with the implication of being cunning and treacherous—'wicked person, cunning person, fox.'
3. πλεονεκτέω; πλεονεξία[b]: to take advantage of someone, usually as the result of a motivation of greed—'to take advantage of, to exploit, exploitation.'
4. ὑπεραίρομαι[a]: to become puffed up with pride, with the probable implication of being disparaging toward others—'to be overly proud, to be puffed up with pride, to feel overly self-confident.'

In setting up or classifying any set of domains there are always serious problems involved in knowing precisely to which domain certain meanings should be assigned. The meanings of ὄναρ and ἐνύπνιον ('dream') are combined in the same entry because there is apparently no real distinction in semantic features. Some Greek authors, however, have suggested that ὄναρ (and the more Classical form ὄνειρος) implied a more important communication, but this is difficult to prove. However, it is probably true that ὄναρ/ὄνειρος has a more important associative value and would appear to be more literary. But in terms of designative meaning, one must decide whether focal features are related to the psychological experience or to the communication. The latter seems to be much more relevant in the New Testament since the significance of the dreams lies in their role as means for divine communication. **Problem 44.**

In the classification of meanings the most difficult distinction to make is the one between (1) attitudes and emotions, which include such positive emotions as desire, love, hope, contentment, and joy, as well as negative emotions such as shame, astonishment, worry, fear, sorrow, and discouragement, and (2) moral and ethical qualities and related behavior, which include such positive elements as holiness, honesty, modesty, kindness, self-control and such negative elements as evil, lawlessness, deception, hatred, favoritism, laziness, impurity, and sin. In the first set the focus seems to be upon certain ethically neutral attitudes which tend to produce particular types of behavior, while in the second set the focus appears to be upon (a) basic qualities of personality which directly produce particular forms of behavior having ethical and moral implications or (b) certain types of moral and ethical behavior which directly relate to basic qualities of personality. This type of distinction inevitably gives rise to classificatory difficulties, since trying to

sort out the focal significance of certain features is extremely difficult, particularly since these often shift depending on contexts.

For those persons who tend to think primarily in terms of syntactic categories rather than in terms of semantic classes, some semantic domains and subdomains may appear to be completely anomalous. For example, in the subdomain of Purpose there is a noun, preposition, conjunction, adverb, idiom, and adjective:

1. τέλος[c]: the purpose of an event or state, viewed in terms of its result—'purpose, intent, goal.' τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς παραγγελίας ἐστὶν ἀγάπη ἐκ καθαρᾶς καρδίας 'the purpose of the order is love from a pure heart' 1 Timothy 1.5.
2. εἰς[f]: a marker of intent, often with the implication of expected result—'for the purpose of, in order to.' εἰς τὸ καταξιωθῆναι ὑμᾶς τῆς βασιλείας τοῦ θεοῦ 'for the purpose of your becoming worthy of the kingdom of God' 2 Thessalonians 1.5.
3. πρός[h]: a marker of purpose, pointing to the goal of an event or state—'for the purpose of, for the sake of, in order to.' αὐτὸς ἦν ὁ πρὸς τὴν ἐλεημοσύνην καθήμενος ἐπὶ τῇ Ὡραίᾳ Πύλῃ 'he was the one who sat at the Beautiful Gate for the purpose of receiving alms' Acts 3.10.
4. ἕνεκεν[b]: a marker of purpose, with the frequent implication of some underlying reason—'in order that, for the sake of, for.' ἕνεκεν τοῦ φανερωθῆναι τὴν σπουδὴν ὑμῶν 'in order that your zeal might be made known' 2 Corinthians 7.12.
5. ἵνα[a]: a marker of purpose for events and states (sometimes occurring in highly elliptical contexts)—'in order to, for the purpose of, so that.' μήτι ἔρχεται ὁ λύχνος ἵνα ὑπὸ τὸν μόδιον τεθῇ ἢ ὑπὸ τὴν κλίνην; 'does anyone ever bring in a lamp in order to put it under a measuring bowl or under a bed?' Mark 4.21.
6. εἰκῇ[c]: pertaining to being without purpose—'for no purpose, without purpose.' οὐ γὰρ εἰκῇ τὴν μάχαιραν φορεῖ 'he does not carry the sword for no purpose' Romans 13.4.
7. κατὰ σκοπὸν διώκω: (an idiom, literally 'to pursue to a goal, to press toward a goal') to strive energetically for some purpose—'to strive toward a goal, to press on with the purpose of.' κατὰ σκοπὸν διώκω εἰς τὸ βραβεῖον 'I press toward the goal for the prize' or 'I strive for the purpose of the prize' Philippians 3.14.
8. κενός[d]: pertaining to being totally without purpose—'in vain, for no purpose.' εἰ δὲ Χριστὸς οὐκ ἐγήγερται, κενὸν ἄρα καὶ τὸ κήρυγμα

ἡμῶν 'if Christ has not been raised, our message is indeed in vain' 1 Corinthians 15.14.

In previous discussions of complex meanings, that is to say, with features belonging to quite different domains, e.g. σαλπιστής, involving a person (an entity) who plays (an activity) and a trumpet (an entity), the various elements constitute essentially an embryo proposition or sentence. But there are some lexemes whose meanings consist of quite different combinations, e.g. μή[c] (Acts 27.42) which combines negation and purpose and μάτην (Matthew 15.9) which combines negation and result.

The fact that several different terms with indistinguishable meanings have often been listed under a single entry in *L and N* has already been mentioned, but it may be useful to note four different types of such entries. βούλομαι[b] and βουλεύομαι[a] are simply alternative forms of the same lexeme, but they probably differ slightly in level of formality. The terms κρίνω[a] and ἐπικρίνω, meaning 'to come to a conclusion in the process of thinking and thus make a decision,' may differ slightly in meaning in that ἐπικρίνω may focus greater attention upon what is decided, but for all intents and purposes they should be classified together. Corresponding verbs and nominal derivatives are generally placed in the same entry, e.g. συμβουλεύομαι and συμβούλιον[a] 'to engage in joint planning, often with harmful intention,' since the distinction is essentially one of syntactic rather than semantic class. But in many instances there are terms with quite different stems which for all practical purposes are essentially the same in meaning, e.g. ἐκλέγομαι[a], αἱρέομαι[a], and λαμβάνω[e], meaning 'to make a choice of one or more possible alternatives':

ἐκλέγομαι[a]: ἐντειλάμενος τοῖς ἀποστόλοις διὰ πνεύματος ἁγίου οὓς ἐξελέξατο 'he gave instructions by the power of the Holy Spirit to the men whom he had chosen as his apostles' Acts 1.2.

αἱρέομαι[a]: μᾶλλον ἑλόμενος συγκακουχεῖσθαι τῷ λαῷ τοῦ θεοῦ ἢ πρόσκαιρον ἔχειν ἁμαρτίας ἀπόλαυσιν 'he chose to suffer with God's people rather than enjoy sin for a little while' Hebrews 11.25.

λαμβάνω[e]: πᾶς γὰρ ἀρχιερεὺς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων λαμβανόμενος ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων καθίσταται τὰ πρὸς τὸν θεόν 'every high priest is chosen from his fellowmen and appointed to serve God on their behalf' Hebrews 5.1.

It would be a serious mistake to think that a lexicon based entirely upon an analysis of semantic domains would be sufficient for all that is necessary in analyzing the meanings of lexemes. The *Greek-English Lexicon of the New*

*Testament Based on Semantic Domains* published by the United Bible Societies is only one way of looking at problems of meaning. It should always be combined with the more traditional approach of dictionaries based on alphabetical listing and focusing upon the various ranges of individual lexemes. But a picture of the lexical system of a language from the perspective of semantic domains does provide a fresh approach and new insights, especially about the high degree of indeterminacy in plotting the boundaries of meanings. The fact that verbal signs are defined by other signs leaves many open questions, but it also protects a student or scholar from dogmatism and from the tendency to erect theological structures on the foundation of words with fuzzy ranges of meaning.

This approach to lexical meaning through the system of domains also forces one to recognize the dependence of language upon culture, of which language is only a part. Meanings arise within a culture, are changed by the culture, and in turn influence the culture. Linguistics alone cannot resolve all the problems of New Testament interpretation, since these involve not only various critical approaches (source, redaction, and canon) but also a new awareness of the sociological factors both within the Christian community and also in the larger cultural context. But linguistics, based on a sociosemiotic orientation, can help to define the problems and provide a means for arriving at closer approximations to satisfactory answers to complex questions. In helping to accomplish this goal, linguistics is serving the valid purpose of any and all types of scientific investigation.

# FIVE

# DOMAIN CLASSIFICATION

Although at various points in Chapters 1 through 4 there are brief discussions about problems of domain classification, a more extensive review and analysis of these problems seems warranted in view of the many complexities that have arisen in the editing of *L and N*.

The important issues are discussed here in terms of basic divisions, principles of classification, order of domains and subdomains, problems of lumping and splitting, the naming of domains, and the assignment of particular lexical meanings.

### *Basic Divisions*

As already noted in Chapter 4, the basic divisions of semantic classes of lexemes consist of entities (Domains 1-12), activities (Domains 13-57), characteristics (Domains 58-88), relations (Domains 89-90), discourse markers (Domain 91), discourse referentials (Domain 92), and proper names (Domain 93). This classification is based primarily upon the types of referents and the roles of the lexemes.

In Domains 1-12 the referents are primarily entities, although for the sake of combining derivatives with their semantic bases, some activities and characteristics are included, e.g. αὐλέω (6.87) 'to play a flute' derived from αὐλός 'flute' (6.86).

In Domains 13-57 the referents are primarily activities, although some derivatives are also included, e.g. ἐπίσκοπος[a] (35.43) 'a person responsible to care for others' derived from ἐπισκοπέω[a] (35.39) 'to care for or look after.'

In Domains 58-88 the referents are primarily characteristics (principally qualities and quantities), but there are also some derivatives in view of the need to include lexemes which are built on underlying semantic bases, e.g. μορφόω (58.4) 'to cause something to have a certain nature or form' and συμμορφίζομαι (58.6) 'to come to be similar in nature or form' derived from μορφή[a] (58.2) 'nature or character of something.'

In Domains 89 and 90 the referents are relations, and there are very few formal derivatives, but there are many instances in which verbs and nouns express relations. For example, in addition to πρός[i] (89.44), εἰς[g] (89.48), and ἵνα[b] (89.49) indicating result, there are also idioms, e.g. ἀποβαίνω εἰς (89.41) and ἔρχομαι εἰς (89.43), as well as nouns, e.g. ἔκβασις[b] (89.39) and τέλος[b] (89.40), which may represent the relation of result.

A particularly important class of relations is represented by lexemes marking case, e.g. agent or force (ὑπό[c], 90.1), instrument (ἐν[i], 90.10), source (παρά[d], 90.14), and experiencer (ἐν[m], 90.56). Some verbs may also mark case relations. For example, ποιέω[a] (90.45) and λαμβάνω[k] (90.48) mark the agent of a numerable event, and τυγχάνω (90.61) and ἔχω[f] (90.65) mark the experiencer.

Unfortunately, many people become so accustomed to thinking solely in terms of the formal classes of words that they sometimes find it hard to realize that the semantic classes are often quite different from the formal classes and are even more important in understanding the meaning of syntactic constructions. Some persons assume that characteristics are always expressed by adjectives and adverbs, but the characteristic of being 'capable' or 'able' is often expressed in Greek by a verb, e.g. δύναμαι (74.5) and ἰσχύω[a] (74.9). Degree may likewise be expressed by verbs, e.g. ὑπερβάλλω (78.33), πίμπλαμαι[b] (78.46), and προηγέομαι[b] (78.35).

Discourse markers are lexemes which only represent the fact that a particular type of discourse unit has preceded or will follow. As already noted, in English the preposition *to* may serve simply to mark the fact that an infinitive follows. Similarly, the preposition *of* is primarily a marker of the fact that the following word or phrase is syntactically related to what precedes, but the particular semantic relation depends on the meanings of the related words or phrases and not upon any specific meaning of *of*.

In Greek the particle ὦ (91.14) marks the following word or phrase as being direct address, and ὅτι[c] (91.15) marks the following phrase or clause as being explanatory or identificational. The particles μέν[b], γέ, and δή (91.6) often serve as markers of weak emphasis, while ἰδού[a] (91.13) is a marker of strong emphasis, a type of "attention-getter."

In *L and N* a number of particles in Domains 89 and 90 are also called "markers" when their function is essentially syntactic rather than representing some relation in the practical world, e.g. ὑπό[c] (90.1) as a marker of the agent of an activity with no semantic relation to anything or anyone being beneath something or someone else.

Discourse referentials are semantic substitutes for elements within the discourse (generally referred to as "pronouns") and for participants which are marked by the practical setting of the communicative event. These discourse referentials include the personal pronouns (of speaker, those spoken to, and those spoken about), reciprocals, e.g. ἀλλήλων and ἑαυτῶν (92.26), relative pronouns, demonstrative or deictic pronouns, and emphatic adjuncts, e.g. αὐτός[c] (92.37) used for emphasis.

The proper names (Domain 93) have unique referents within any context and may represent both persons and places. Technically speaking, the names for events, whether unique, e.g. ἔξοδος[a] (15.42), or ritually repeated, e.g. πάσχα[a] (51.6), belong to this domain, but because of the nature of the activities they are treated in those domains in which there are similar types of activities.

### *Principles of Classification*

The primary basis for classification of meanings into domains and subdomains is the existence of shared features, e.g. size, shape, time, movement, number, importance, etc. A secondary basis consists of association, e.g. the ways in which entities or activities may be closely associated. For example, it seems much more relevant to put all body parts together into a single domain rather than distribute them into a number of domains on the basis of form or function, e.g. 'eyes' with 'sight' or 'hands' with 'tools.' Similarly, the parts of buildings are in the large domain of constructions (Domain 7) rather than, for example, putting 'windows' in a domain including 'holes.'

There are, of course, many alternative ways of organizing semantic domains, especially when distinctions are based on such semantically "slippery" features as values and degree. The primary criteria for domain classification depend upon the consistency with which the grouping of meanings reflects the 'world view' of the native speakers. This means that definitions in a lexicon based on semantic domains are not supposed to represent a classification of "things as they are" but of "things as they are perceived and named." Although it is often useful to consider the physical features of a referent, the results must always be judged on the basis of the native speaker's likely understanding and interpretation. This is especially

difficult in the case of any lexicon of the Greek New Testament since there are no native speakers of such Greek. And despite all the documents which give us some insight about the designative and associative meanings of lexemes, our ignorance greatly outweighs our knowledge. It does mean, however, that for an analysis of lexical semantics of the Greek New Testament it is essential to examine both Classical and Hellenistic usage, with special attention to Septuagint usage and later patristic evidence. The editors attempted to make use of as broad a basis of evidence as possible, but it is clear that the results can only be partial and are often strictly inferential.

*Order*

The order of major categories of meanings has already been described in the first section of this chapter, and the order of domains within these larger sets, as well as the order of subdomains, has been briefly indicated. But the principles which determine such orders have only been implied. There is, however, no way in which one can maintain a strictly logical ordering of domains and subdomains, since the referents of the respective lexemes exhibit no such logical sets.

In general the first domain or the first entries within a domain contain the more generic meanings. For example, Domain 13 consists of the generic meanings of activities, including lexemes meaning 'become,' 'exist,' and 'happen.' Similarly, Domain 58 contains a number of lexemes representing such meanings as 'nature,' 'class,' and 'example.' For strictly practical reasons the generic meanings involving entities are distributed into the diverse domains of 1-12 since the semantic features of the meanings are so similar to the different kinds of entities. In the case of relations the highly generic meanings are simply listed at the beginning of Domain 89.

The grouping of domains within the larger categories depends primarily upon the principle of "family resemblances," or, stated in somewhat more precise terms, on the number and type of shared semantic features. For example, the set of domains involving interpersonal association begins with a generic domain of *Association* (Domain 34) and is followed by two domains with largely positive features: Domain 35 *Help*, *Care For* and Domain 36 *Guide*, *Discipline*, *Follow*. The three domains which follow, namely, Domain 37 *Control*, *Rule*, Domain 38 *Punish*, *Reward*, and Domain 39 *Hostility*, *Strife*, have largely negative features. Domain 40 *Reconciliation*, *Forgiveness* may be regarded as a behavior response to meanings in Domain 39.

Related positive and negative meanings are generally placed as close together as possible, since they often share a number of semantic features and only differ in polar values of positive and negative associations. In some

instances the positive-negative contrasts are placed in juxtaposed subdomains if there are a number of such semantic sets, e.g. Domain 69 *Affirmation, Negation*, but in general the contrasting meanings occur within the same subdomain, e.g. Subdomains 71B *Probable, Improbable*, 71C *Certain, Uncertain*, 72A *True, False*, and 72B *Accurate, Inaccurate*. But even within domains with largely positive meanings, e.g. Domain 74 *Able, Capable* and Domain 75 *Adequate, Qualified*, negative contrasts are included.

As already noted at several points in the preceding chapters, derivatives are classified together with their semantic bases, but figurative meanings (whether of single lexemes or of idioms) are treated in the domains which contain lexemes having similar meanings. For example, *πρὸ προσώπου* 'previous' is in Domain 67 *Time*; *πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον* 'face to face' is in Domain 83 *Spatial Positions*; *τὰ κατὰ πρόσωπον* 'matters of outward appearance' is in Domain 31 *Hold a View, Believe, Trust*; *θαυμάζω πρόσωπον* 'to flatter' is in Domain 33 *Communication*; *στηρίζω τὸ πρόσωπον* 'to decide firmly' is in Domain 30 *Think*; and *λαμβάνω πρόσωπον* 'to show favoritism' is in Domain 88 *Moral and Ethical Qualities and Related Behavior*.

### *Problems of Lumping and Splitting*

Although certain principles of classification have already been treated, it seems appropriate to consider somewhat more fully the basic issue of lumping and splitting in the classification of meanings. Any classification of phenomena depends very much upon the fineness of one's semantic grid, or stated in somewhat different terms, on the "delicacy" of one's classificatory framework. For example, it would be possible to make a distinction between qualitative characteristics based on form, e.g. *tall, fat*, and *beautiful*, and those based on behavior, e.g. *good, kind*, and *violent*. In some languages these distinctions may be quite important in syntax, but they are not particularly significant in the lexical structure. Similarly, one may distinguish (1) characteristics which are the result of events, e.g. *dead*, the result of dying, and *tired*, the result of expended effort, and (2) characteristics which are inherent features of entities, e.g. *large, intelligent*, and *stately*. Such distinctions may be syntactically quite important in some languages, but for any lexicon of the Greek New Testament such a fine grid is not particularly relevant.

There seems to be almost no limit to the extent to which further distinctions can be introduced into sets of related meanings. For example, in Subdomain 25B *Desire Strongly* it would be possible to separate those psychological attitudes which are ethically positive from those which are ethically negative, with certain entries being ethically neutral. But this type of distinction is semantically irrelevant from the standpoint of the lexical patterning.

Rigorous, logical classification can lead to absurd multiplication of minute subdomains, especially for any lexicon of New Testament vocabulary, which represents such a limited and specialized collection of writings. For example, in the case of Domain 6 *Artifacts* it seems much more practical to set up a miscellaneous category rather than attempt to multiply subdomains which may have only a single entry.

Certain distinctions in classification are always subject to possible differences in treatment. For example, in *L and N* artifacts and constructions are divided into two different juxtaposed domains. They could, of course, be combined since they both represent entities which are made. But their size and forms are so distinct that it seems better to separate them. On the other hand, supernatural beings and powers are generally distinguished by specialists in religious beliefs and behavior, but in the New Testament it is extremely difficult to make clear distinctions. The various rulers, principalities, and authorities in the heavens seem to have been largely personified in the thinking of many people. Accordingly, Domain 12 *Supernatural Beings and Powers* is divided into two subdomains, but the artificiality of the distinctions is clearly stated.

In some domains a great many subdivisions are required because of the clear distinctions in highly relevant semantic features. For example, in Domain 15 *Linear Movement* there are thirty-five subdomains, in which such features as direction, relation to points in space, means of movement, and relation to the movements of other entities are all distinctive.

### *The Naming of Domains and Subdomains*

One of the major problems encountered in the development of this lexicon has been the serious need to find enough satisfactory names for many of the domains. The primary reason for this is the fact that English does not have an adequate nomenclature for semantic classes. In many instances, the only thing which can be done is to employ a descriptive phrase, but such phrases may seem strange, especially if both positive and negative meanings are included. Note, for example, Domain 22 *Trouble, Hardship, Relief, Favorable Circumstances*, Domain 11 *Groups and Classes of Persons and Members of Such Groups and Classes*, and Domain 88 *Moral and Ethical Qualities and Related Behavior*. The lack of appropriate terminology is especially obvious in the title for Domain 58 *Nature, Class, Example*, which is a highly generic domain for all types of semantic abstracts, namely, qualities, quantities, and degree.

*Assignment of Lexical Meanings*

Where to place certain lexemes with highly specialized meanings is often quite a problem. For example, σῴζω[b] 'to save' in the religious sense could be regarded as a type of religious activity, but it really does not fit into Domain 53, which includes such events as sacrifice, baptize, worship, and exorcism. σῴζω[b] might also be placed in Domain 35 *Help, Care For*, but this seems rather too generic. In *L and N* it occurs in Domain 21 *Danger, Risk, Safe, Save* in a final Subdomain F *Save in a Religious Sense*, as a special type of semantic "reversive" of the meanings of 'danger' and 'risk.'

Characteristics are generally treated in domains involving only qualities, quantities, and degree, but in some instances particular meanings of certain lexemes, e.g. χαλεπός[a] 'troublous' (22.29), βαρύς[b] 'burdensome' (22.30), ἐλαφρός[c] 'easy' (22.38), and εἰρήνη[a] 'peace, tranquility' (22.42), are placed in domains which involve primarily activities. The basic reason for this classification is the fact that the lexemes in question represent a series of circumstances or events and are particularly applicable to the negative and positive aspects of Domain 22, entitled *Trouble, Hardship, Relief, Favorable Circumstances*. Such problems of placement of meanings simply highlight the fact that classification involves as much overlapping as does synonymity.

Causatives often create problems in classification because there are always two activities involved, one overt and the other covert. For example, in συνάγω[a] 'to cause to gather together' (15.125) there is the activity of the agent who causes entities to come together and also the activity of the entities in coming together. In Matthew 2.4 the statement 'Herod gathered together all the chief priests and teachers of the people' means that there was activity on the part of Herod as well as on the part of the people who gathered together. Herod's activity was probably only verbal, but the priests and teachers moved from one place to another. In many languages the causative activity implied in such a construction must be made explicit.

In many instances there are problems involved in the statement of meanings. For example, in Domain 67 *Time* one must be concerned with points of time, duration of time, and units of time. As a result some of the definitions seem rather heavy and involved, e.g. καινότερον (67.28) 'pertaining to a point of time preceding another point of time, with a relatively short interval and with the implication of something different.'

Defining figurative meanings may be quite complex, especially if there is too much dependency on glosses. For example, the following lexemes may all be rendered into English as 'person,' 'people,' or '-self' (see 9.14 and 9.16-22): σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα (σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα οὐκ ἀπεκάλυψέν σοι 'no person ever revealed it to you' Matthew 16.17); γόνυ[b] (ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι Ἰησοῦ πᾶν γόνυ κάμψῃ 'at the

name of Jesus every person shall bow' Philippians 2.10); χείρ[b] (*οὐχὶ ἡ χείρ μου ἐποίησεν ταῦτα πάντα*; 'did not I myself make all these things?' Acts 7.50); γλῶσσα[g] (*καὶ πᾶσα γλῶσσα ἐξομολογήσηται ὅτι κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός* 'and every person will confess that Jesus Christ is Lord' Philippians 2.11); ὄνομα[b] (*ὄχλος ὀνομάτων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὡσεὶ ἑκατὸν εἴκοσι* 'a gathering of about one hundred and twenty people' Acts 1.15); ψυχή[c] (*ψυχαὶ ὡσεὶ τρισχίλιαι* 'about three thousand people' Acts 2.41); σκεῦος[d] (*πορεύου, ὅτι σκεῦος ἐκλογῆς ἐστίν μοι οὗτος* 'go, for he is a person I have chosen' Acts 9.15); οἰκουμένη[c] (*ἔστησεν ἡμέραν ἐν ᾗ μέλλει κρίνειν τὴν οἰκουμένην* 'he has fixed a day in which he will judge all people' Acts 17.31). In these contexts the figurative expressions do have persons as referents, but the figurative usage adds certain semantic features. For example, *σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα* designates a human being in contrast with a divine being, γόνυ[b] implies a person in the attitude or position of worship or as one submitting to authority, χείρ[b] represents a person as an agent in some activity, and γλῶσσα[g] a person who utters something.

Definitions of degree may be especially complex in view of an implied norm. For example, the terms μέγας[b], μεγάλως, and μέγεθος (78.2) may be defined as 'the upper range of a scale of extent, with the possible implication of importance in certain contexts,' and πολύς[c] (78.3) may then be defined as 'the upper range of a scale of extent, but probably somewhat less than for μέγας[b], μεγάλως, and μέγεθος.' Any scale implies some type of expected norm, and differences of degree must be stated in terms of such a norm.

Particularly acute problems of analysis occur when there are distinctions between technical and common usage. For example, εἰκών[a] (6.96) is technically an artifact which represents an object formed to resemble a person, god, animal, etc., while εἴδωλον[a] (6.97) is a similar type of artifact, but one thought to embody certain supernatural power and hence be an object of worship or awe. In many contexts, however, an εἰκών[a] may be an object of worship. Does this mean that εἰκών[a] has two different meanings or does it mean that εἰκών[a] belongs to the class of resemblances together with such lexemes as τύπος[b] and χάραγμα[b] (6.96) and is used loosely or commonly to represent an idol? There is no easy way to resolve such a problem of classification, since we really do not know precisely how native speakers of Hellenistic Greek thought about such matters and how they may have distinguished between "things as they are" and "things as they are perceived."

# Six

# SCHOLARLY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SEMANTIC ANALYSIS OF LEXEMES

As already mentioned in the Preface, it seems best to concentrate statements concerning scholarly contributions to lexicography in a separate chapter, rather than to interrupt the text by numerous bibliographical citations and references. In this way a reader can obtain a broader picture of what is involved and can better appreciate the relations between the diverse contributions.

The study of lexical meaning has benefited greatly from contributions by persons in a number of different disciplines, e.g. philosophy, psychology, linguistics, anthropology, communication theory, and artificial intelligence. Certain subdisciplines have been especially important in view of their close relations between language and the respective areas of research, e.g. sociolinguistics, psycholinguistics, and sociosemiotics, which have focused on the problems of lexical semantics from the perspective of the societies and cultures in which language constitutes such a crucial element in all interpersonal relations and activities.

Interest in the meaning of lexemes has a long and varied history: from the time when scribes wrote out bilingual lists of words in cuneiform characters on clay tablets in ancient Mesopotamia to the present day when translators make increasing use of mammoth data banks containing lexical correspondences in all major languages. Thousands of dictionaries (both bilingual and monolingual) have been published, but unfortunately the science of lexicography has often fallen behind the practice of dictionary

making. This is something which linguists and especially semanticists are increasingly trying to remedy.

Ever since the debates of the Aristotelians, Platonists, and Sophists about the nature of lexical meaning, philosophers have been arguing about the meaning of words. Many have held that words have certain inherent properties which determine how they can and should be used, while others have contended that words and idioms are only verbal signs to which people attribute meaning. During the Medieval period the study of lexical meaning was primarily the concern of philosophers and theologians, who largely continued the philosophical debates of Classical times.

Prior to the twentieth century, dictionary makers were principally concerned with the definitions of words and idioms in terms of the Aristotelian concept of the "necessary and sufficient" features required to state the meaning or meanings of a verbal symbol. Some philosophers even confused words and concepts, not realizing that the concepts are semantically much broader than single words and can often be represented by a number of different terms or phrases.

During this same period psychologists became seriously involved in the study of lexical meaning, since language provided one of the most important sources and instruments for the study of how the human mind operates. But the lack of a sound understanding of the nature of language often resulted in thinking about words as being mere tags for thoughts and equating meaning with nothing more insightful than a theory of "mental images."

During most of the history of philosophy in the Western World the focus has been on constructing systems of thought to explain the nature of existence, both human and material. For this enterprise the systematic use of terms was crucial, but there was in some instances a good deal of naivete about the nature of language and a good deal of confusion about language and thought. In the twentieth century, however, the focus of attention has shifted from a concern for philosophical systems to a keen interest in the verbal symbols which have proven to be so central to and so misleading for any formalization of philosophical ideas.

Philosophers such as Cassirer (1953), Wittgenstein (1953), and Quine (1960) challenged many of the prior postulates about the nature of words and focused attention on the analysis of language itself. They emphasized the difference between natural languages and logical (or mathematical) languages, i.e. those in which each symbol has only one function or meaning. They talked about the openness of natural languages, discussed the importance of context, and insisted on the essential fuzziness of semantic boundaries between lexemes. This shift in philosophy from the systems to the symbols used

in talking about the systems has proven to be a tremendous gain for a proper understanding of the role of verbal symbols in human behavior.

Wittgenstein's insight about language being a "game" has been especially significant, since it has helped to break down the idea that languages are strictly rule-bound systems of human behavior. Languages do have certain rules, as in all games, but within the range of the rules the players always have certain tactics which they may employ. It is the possibility of such tactics in language which provides the basis for distinctive styles and forms of verbal communication. Furthermore, even the rules of language are subject to constant change, although such matters are rarely obvious to the average speaker of a language.

Peirce's concept of the triadic nature of the sign, referent, and determinant (1934), in contrast with Saussure's binary distinction (1959) between the "signifier" and the "signified," has provided the basis for realizing that signs are only defined by other signs. The fact that the signs of a language code are only defined by other signs within the same code, and primarily by signs in the same semantic domain or set, has meant that no sign can be fully and completely defined.

Psychologists such as Osgood and his associates (1963) have done highly significant work on connotative (or associative) meaning and have shown how such meanings can be studied in a verifiable way. By employing a good deal of cross-cultural sampling, they have also been able to demonstrate that such meanings are as systematic and enduring as are denotative (or designative) meanings.

George A. Miller, who is both a psychologist and linguist, has produced very important studies of meaning based on the use of semantic prototypes as cores for a variety of distinctive features (1976, 1978). For example, a police dog can be regarded as a prototype, and the meanings of *pointer*, *collie*, *dachshund*, and *bulldog* can be "defined" in terms of distinctive differences from the prototype. Similarly, the meaning of *eat* could be prototypical for a series of related meanings such as *dine*, *gobble*, *gorge*, and *wolf down*.

Linguists with a background in cultural anthropology and with considerable field experience in languages completely outside of the Indo-European and Semitic families have made some of the most significant contributions to lexical semantics. Malinowski's work in the Western Pacific (1922) and the extensive grammars and lexical studies of Boas and his associates (1911-1938) in the indigenous languages of North America brought an entirely new perspective to the study of meaning and the crucial role of culture in determining meaning. Linguists with experience in cultural anthropology realized that the methods used in traditional dictionaries based on etymologies,

grammatical classes, and the categories of "necessary and sufficient" features are totally inadequate.

One of the first linguists to break new ground in tackling the problems of lexical meaning was Sapir, whose notes on texts in Southern Paiute (1931) and a seminal article "Grading, a study in semantics" (1944) pointed to a new approach to lexical semantics. This was followed by Voegelin's article (1948) on distinctive features and semantic equivalence. Soon there were several important treatments of the meanings of sets of words, using a technique known as "componential analysis" or "distinctive feature analysis," in which distinctions in meaning were marked as binary plus-or-minus features. Sets of related meanings were then organized into taxonomic hierarchies or into matrices.

Most of these early studies were restricted to a relatively small set of closely related terms, e.g. kinship, color, plants, and animals. Some of the most important articles were by Lounsbury on varieties of meaning (1955) and on Pawnee kinship (1956), by Goodenough on kinship in Trukese (1956), and by Conklin on flora in a Philippine language (1962). Other scholars extended these studies and dealt with pronominal systems (Hoijer, 1951) and verbal aspects (Friedrich, 1979). An excellent example of an ethnographic dictionary based on these types of insights is *The Great Tzotzil Dictionary of San Lorenzo Zinacantan* by Robert Laughlin (1975).

Various aspects of this distinctive-feature analysis of meaning are effectively treated by Lehrer in *Semantic Fields and Lexical Structure* (1974) and by Nida in *Componential Analysis of Meaning* (1975), which has been rewritten for a revised edition, and in *Exploring Semantic Structures* (1975).

Despite some of these significant breakthroughs, a number of linguists remained skeptical of the role or importance of lexical semantics. In fact, some linguists suggested that the analysis of linguistic structure could be carried out without taking into consideration the meanings of lexemes. Transformationalists (linguists employing the methods of transformational-generative linguistics) generally regarded lexical semantics as essentially a marginal feature of language, a kind of appendage to syntax, to be treated largely as matters for so-called "subcategorization." Others even believed that the system of binary contrasts in syntax could be employed in lexical semantics. Katz and Fodor (1963) attempted to devise a system for handling lexical meaning by using a typical transformational-generative "tree structure" for listing sets of binary contrasts in distinctive features. For example, they thought that the meaning of *bachelor* could be adequately described by choosing the left-hand alternatives in the series animate/inanimate, human/animal, male/female, and unmarried/married. This procedure did not define *the* mean-

ing of *bachelor* but only one of the meanings of the term. How, then, is one to define *bachelor* in the phrase *bachelor girl* or in contexts in which *bachelor* is used to speak of a person who has received a bachelor's degree or in articles about young male animals which have been kept from breeding by dominant males?

This approach employed by Katz and Fodor seemed to have the advantage of combining both syntax and vocabulary, but as Bolinger (1965, 1977) pointed out, there is no end to the number of semantic features which may be relevant in a series of peripheral meanings.

Of all the transformationalists who have dealt with lexical semantics, the most insightful comments have come from McCawley, who in his two volumes on *The Syntactic Phenomena of English* (1988) has contributed remarkably astute analyses of the meanings of syntactically significant lexemes, e.g. *each*, *either*, *one*, *other*, *only*, *some*, *any*, and *with*.

Fillmore (1965) skillfully exploited certain transformational techniques in dealing with implicational and entailment rules in verbs, and extended such methods in treating case (1967). Leech, in his attempt to bring linguistic theory and semantic description closer together (*Towards a Semantic Description of English*, 1969), made a number of valuable analyses of English lexicography and syntax. A summary of various aspects of these linguistic approaches to lexical semantics is contained in Lyons' two volumes on *Semantics* (1977). An excellent volume on *Lexical Semantics* (1986) by Cruse updates the most recent insights in lexicography with a discussion of English words and meanings.

The developments in lexical semantics have been greatly enriched by research in sociolinguistics, especially in the articles and books by Labov (1972), Hymes (1974), and Gumperz (1982). Labov's study of the use of English by different groups in New York City has proven to be particularly revealing in the areas of core and peripheral meanings, the fuzzy edges of meanings, semantic ambivalence, and vagueness. Labov showed how people have no difficulty naming prototypical objects such as cups, mugs, and demitasses, but the boundaries between such objects are indeterminate. How thin, for example, does a string have to be before it is called a thread, and how thick does it have to be before people will rightly call it a cord? Such problems of indeterminacy and fuzzy boundaries exist in all languages and provide unlimited work and worry for lexicographers, lawyers, and theologians.

The semiotic perspective of language as a code is attracting more and more attention, particularly in view of the fact that language is by far the most complex code known to exist. Peirce's insights about the triadic relations in

meaning have provided a much sounder basis for a realistic epistemology, in which people can use language to speak meaningfully about the real or imagined worlds. His distinction between iconic signs (onomatopoeic expressions, such as *cuckoo* and *put-put*), indexical signs (lexemes that "point," e.g. *here*, *he*, and *that*), and conventional signs (the vast majority of lexemes) has been very helpful in sorting out a number of problems in lexical semantics. His concept of three levels or types of meaning, spoken of as "firstness," "secondness," and "thirdness," is especially useful in talking about certain distinctions in meaning of a single lexeme. For example, one meaning of *cross* may be described first as a sign designating a widely employed instrument for execution used in the Roman world, second as a sign representing the sacrificial death of Jesus, and third as a sign representing Christendom, e.g. in an expression such as *the conflict between the Cross and the Crescent.*

Jakobson (1970, 1972) dealt with a number of these semiotic aspects of meaning, especially in his treatment of metaphor and metonymy, in which he likened metaphor to imitative magic and metonymy to contagious magic. He also pointed out important parallels in different forms of aphasia. Other important treatments of the sociosemiotic implications of verbal signs are found in the work of Baron (1981), Krampen (1979), Merrell (1980), and in Eco's basic, but rather difficult, volume *A Theory of Semiotics* (1979).

Several scholars have recognized the importance of new developments in lexical semantics for a reexamination of the meanings of key biblical terms. Barr's volume on *The Semantics of Biblical Language* (1961) was particularly important in helping biblicists avoid "word theology," that is, deriving biblical theology from the presumed history of key biblical terms. Barr was able to point out that the distinctive features of Old Testament theology are not the result of certain words, but of particular combinations of words. Other ancient Semitic societies had cognate lexemes with corresponding meanings, but these did not give rise to religious concepts comparable to what are found in the Hebrew Scriptures.

Hill (1967) produced a very useful volume on the influence of Hebrew on the meanings of words in the New Testament, with special emphasis on expressions relating to salvation. And Caird (1980) dealt with numerous problems of figurative language in the Bible, while Louw (1982) treated a broader spectrum of problems, ranging from lexical through discourse meaning, in his book on *Semantics of New Testament Greek.* A fine volume by Silva (1982) is a basic introduction to the lexical semantics of the Bible, from both an historical and a descriptive point of view. A good deal about biblical semantics can also be found in several books on Bible translation, e.g. by Nida in *Toward a Science of Translating* (1964), by Nida and Taber in *Theory and*

*Practice of Translation* (1969), and by de Waard and Nida in *From One Language to Another* (1986), as well as in a number of the *Translator's Handbooks* and in many articles in *The Bible Translator*, published by the United Bible Societies.

For future developments in a more sound interpretation of the biblical text, there are three important implications arising out of new insights about the meanings of words: (1) the inadequacy of most dictionaries, in that they depend so much upon glosses rather than definitions, lack a perspective based on culture, and fail to see the sociological factors underlying the designative and associative meanings of words, (2) the need to consider more closely the role of setting, both literary and cultural, and (3) the necessity to recognize the fundamental indeterminacy of lexical meaning, which, however, does not grant a license for indiscriminate reading into a text anything the reader wishes to find. These three implications highlight the urgency for basic sociolinguistic and sociosemiotic studies of biblical lexicography, which for the New Testament will require a series of careful, detailed analyses of the distinctive semantic features in such key terms as κύριος, πνεῦμα, δικαιοσύνη, νόμος, ἀγαπάω, ἀγάπη, ἅγιος, σάρξ, σῶμα, σῴζω, καρδία, ἀντί, ὑπέρ, μετανοέω, ἀρχή, δόξα, πληρόω, πίστις, πιστέω, χάρις, κρίνω, and κρίσις. This list is in no sense complete, but it does illustrate a number of typical semantic problems of multiple meanings, fuzzy boundaries, overlapping semantic areas, and theological controversies.

# PROBLEMS

*Problem 1*

Compare the definitions of *meaning* in three standard English dictionaries on the basis of the number of meanings, the arrangement of meanings, and the clarity of definitions. Which dictionary appears to be superior and why?

*Problem 2*

Compare the order and classification of the meanings of λόγος in three different Greek-English dictionaries, e.g. Bauer (in German or in the English translation), Liddell and Scott, and Abbott-Smith. What seem to be the primary reasons for the differences?

*Problem 3*

Compare the different meanings of ἐκπίπτω, ἀπολαμβάνω, βλέπω, and ἔχω in any standard Greek-English dictionary, and in each series identify those meanings which seem to have no semantic relation to the other meanings.

*Problem 4*

Describe how in each series the respective meanings of ἀργός, ἀρνέομαι, and λέγω, as listed in any standard Greek-English dictionary, tend to shade into one another.

*Problem 5*

First compare the meanings of ὄνομα in Liddell and Scott with those in *L and N*. What are the primary differences and why? Then compare the meanings of ὄνομα in *L and N* with those of *name* in any standard English dictionary. What are the principal differences in number and types of meanings?

*Problem 6*

By comparing the meanings of ἀγάπη, ταπεινός, δίκαιος, and φιλοσοφία in Liddell and Scott with those in *L and N*, try to determine the basis for the highly specialized meanings of these terms in the Greek New Testament.

*Problem 7*

Describe the different purposes for the information contained in the following passages: Matthew 1.1-17, Matthew 5.17-48, Matthew 6.9-13, Luke 15.1-2, and Luke 15.11-32.

*Problem 8*

What is it about the lexical and grammatical organization of John 1.1-5 that makes the passage so meaningful and effective?

*Problem 9*

Compare the overlapping meanings in the following sets: βλέπω/ὁράω, λέγω/λαλέω, λαμβάνω/δέχομαι, and ἁμαρτία/παράπτωμα/ὀφείλημα. Can you indicate those types of contexts in which the respective meanings would not overlap?

*Problem 10*

By consulting standard dictionaries and encyclopedias, list as many different kinds of codes as you can, e.g. Morse code and DNA code, and state the different types of referents represented by the signs of the respective codes.

*Problem 11*

Describe the different syntactic relations between the stems in the following compounds: γενεαλογέομαι, διανυκτερεύω, διαφημίζω, δικαιοκρισία, εἰρηνοποιέω, ἑπτακισχίλιοι, θεοδίδακτος, καρποφορέω, καταπίπτω, μονόφθαλμος, φίλανδρος, θεόφιλος, and χιλίαρχος. One may, for example, describe the syntactic relations of the stems in αὐτοκατάκριτος as "B (=κατακριτος) does something to A (=αυτο)."

*Problem 12*

Note how little of the literal meanings of ὄνομα, οὐρανός, and ὀσφῦς occur in some of the idioms listed in the respective entries of the Greek-English Index in *L and N*. What are some of the possible reasons for this?

*Problem 13*

Describe some of the indefinite and ambiguous boundaries of meaning in the adjectives occurring in the following phrases: *good friend*, *fine jewelry*, *large sum of money*, and *cheap books*. For example, note the differences of meaning of *good* in the two contexts: *we had a good time at the party* and *Saturday was a good time to get the work done.*

*Problem 14*

On the basis of different contexts try to explain the reasons for the considerable distinctions in the meanings of προκόπτω, σκεῦος, and τύπος.

*Problem 15*

Classify the various meanings of the following terms as representing entities, activities, characteristics, and relations: ἄνθρωπος, ἀντί, γεννάω, γηράσκω, ἐπίσκοπος, ζῳογονέω, κατήγορος, μάρτυς, and μάχαιρα. Note how the meaning of a term may be semantically complex, i.e. belong to more than one class, for example, προφήτης is primarily an entity (i.e. a person) and secondarily (as an underlying element) an activity, namely, prophesying.

*Problem 16*

From typical contexts in which the following words occur in the New Testament, describe the likely associative meanings: ἀπογραφή, ἀργός, βδέλυγμα, ἑπτά, κοινός, πορφύρα, and σωτήρ.

*Problem 17*

On the basis of what you find in a standard English dictionary, list the various meanings of *bat* and *ball* and decide how many sets of meanings there are for each lexeme. Also try to determine how closely the various meanings in each set are related to each other.

*Problem 18*

Describe as specifically as possible the indeterminacy in the following series: *thread / string / cord / rope / hawser*, *path / lane / road / highway*, *shanty / cabin / bungalow / townhouse / mansion*, and πόλις/ κωμόπολις/ κώμη / ἀγρός / παρεμβολή.

*Problem 19*

Without consulting *L and N*, analyze the different uses of γλῶσσα and δίδωμι as determined by studying the respective contexts in a concordance of the Greek New Testament. Why do the different meanings of these terms seem to have such wide ranges of meaning?

*Problem 20*

Using the treatment of πατήρ in *L and N* as a model, analyze the meanings of κόσμος and ἐγείρω without consulting the Greek-English Index in *L and N*.

*Problem 21*

Without consulting *L and N*, analyze and define the different meanings of λαμβάνω as found in Bauer. Please note that a series of glosses does not constitute a definition.

*Problem 22*

Arrange the different meanings of λόγος, μέγας, ἔχω, πληρόω, and πρός in such a way as to reflect in each set the extent of shared semantic features. That is to say, meanings that share the greater number of semantic features should be closer together. At the same time, try to determine why it is not possible to reflect accurately the various degrees of similarity.

*Problem 23*

Analyze the different meanings of *fly* and *mind* in the following sets of contexts, with special attention to ambiguous contexts:

*fly*

1. There's a fly on the butter.
2. He caught a fly ball.
3. He tried to fly out of the room.
4. The bird flew into the window.
5. He flew to California.
6. He fishes with flies.
7. He flew at her in anger.
8. The flag was flying at half mast.
9. His insistence is the fly in the ointment.
10. The tent fly was torn.

*mind*

1. He changed his mind.
2. His mind is very sharp.
3. She does not mind the noise.
4. The boy refuses to mind his mother.
5. Will you mind the baby while I'm downtown?
6. Do you mind if I leave now?

***Problem 24***

Try to determine the reasons for the different renderings of *κρίσις* in the following series of contexts involving the New Revised Standard Version (NRSV), the New Testament in Modern English (NTME), Today's English Version (TEV), and the New International Version (NIV):

*ὃς δ' ἂν φονεύσῃ, ἔνοχος ἔσται τῇ κρίσει* Matthew 5.21

NRSV: and 'whoever murders shall be liable to judgment'

NTME: and anyone who does so must stand his trial

TEV: anyone who does will be brought to trial

NIV: and anyone who murders will be subject to judgment

*ἵνα μὴ ὑπὸ κρίσιν πέσητε* James 5.12

NRSV: so that you may not fall under condemnation

NTME: and then you cannot go wrong in the matter

TEV: and then you will not come under God's judgment

NIV: or you will be condemned

*μὴ κρίνετε κατ' ὄψιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν δικαίαν κρίσιν κρίνετε* John 7.24

NRSV: Do not judge by appearances, but judge with right judgment.

NTME: You must not judge by the appearance of things but by the reality!

TEV: Stop judging by external standards, and judge by true standards.

NIV: Stop judging by mere appearances, and make a right judgment.

*πῶς φύγητε ἀπὸ τῆς κρίσεως τῆς γεέννης;* Matthew 23.33

NRSV: How can you escape being sentenced to hell?

NTME: how do you think you are going to avoid being condemned to the rubbish heap?

TEV: How do you expect to escape from being condemned to hell?

NIV: How will you escape being condemned to hell?

***Problem 25***

Determine the reasons for the diverse renderings of *σκεῦος* in the following contexts involving the New Revised Standard Version (NRSV), the New Testament in Modern English (NTME), and Today's English Version (TEV) (note the problem of alternative interpretations in 1 Thessalonians 4.4):

*καὶ οὐκ ἤφιεν ἵνα τις διενέγκῃ σκεῦος διὰ τοῦ ἱεροῦ* Mark 11.16

NRSV: and he would not allow anyone to carry anything through the temple

NTME: and he would not allow people to carry their water pots through the Temple

TEV: and he would not let anyone carry anything through the Temple courtyards

*ἢ πῶς δύναταί τις εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν τοῦ ἰσχυροῦ καὶ τὰ σκεύη αὐτοῦ ἁρπάσαι* Matthew 12.29

NRSV: Or how can one enter a strong man's house and plunder his property

NTME: How do you suppose anyone could get into a strong man's house and steal his property

TEV: No one can break into a strong man's house and take away his belongings

*ὡς τὰ σκεύη τὰ κεραμικὰ συντρίβεται* Revelation 2.27

NRSV: as when clay pots are shattered

NTME: he shall 'dash them in pieces like a potter's vessel'

TEV: to break them to pieces like clay pots

*οὐδεὶς δὲ λύχνον ἅψας καλύπτει αὐτὸν σκεύει* Luke 8.16

NRSV: No one after lighting a lamp hides it under a jar

NTME: Nobody lights a lamp and covers it with a basin

TEV: No one lights a lamp and covers it with a bowl

*ἀλλ' οὐ δύναται οὐδεὶς εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν τοῦ ἰσχυροῦ εἰσελθὼν τὰ σκεύη αὐτοῦ διαρπάσαι* Mark 3.27

NRSV: But no one can enter a strong man's house and plunder his property

NTME: No one can break into a strong man's house and steal his property

TEV: No one can break into a strong man's house and take away his belongings

πορεύου, ὅτι σκεῦος ἐκλογῆς ἐστίν μοι οὗτος Acts 9.15

NRSV: Go, for he is an instrument whom I have chosen

NTME: Go on your way, for this man is my chosen instrument

TEV: Go, because I have chosen him to serve me

εἰδέναι ἕκαστον ὑμῶν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σκεῦος κτᾶσθαι 1 Thessalonians 4.4

NRSV: that each one of you know how to control your own body *or* ...how to take a wife for himself

NTME: Every one of you should learn to control his body

TEV: each of you men should know how to live with his wife *or* ...how to control his body

***Problem 26***

By using *L and N*, examine the extended meanings of πρόσωπον, υἱός, and ἐκπίπτω, and try to determine those features of the literal meanings which may have been the basis for the extended meanings.

***Problem 27***

Examine the different meanings of κατά as listed in *L and N* and study the possibility of reducing the number of meanings or of a different type of classification, as has been done in the treatment of διά in the text.

***Problem 28***

Why can ποιέω be translated in so many different ways? Compare the use of ποιέω as a semantically "empty verb" with the use of English *do* in similar types of constructions, e.g. *he did the work, did you go?, he didn't help her,* and *I did go!*

***Problem 29***

Examine the meanings of the following lexemes as listed in the entries of *L and N*: ἀδελφός[c] (11.25), κοινωνός (34.6), μέτοχος[b] (34.8), φίλος (34.11), ἀναγκαῖος[b] (34.14), σύντροφος[b] (34.15), and γνωστός[e] (34.17). What are the shared semantic features and the distinguishing semantic features of this set? Why is the meaning of ἀδελφός[c] in a different domain?

*Problem 30*

Study the extent of overlapping in the meanings of the following lexemes: εἰσακούω[a] (24.60), γρηγορέω[b] (27.56), βλέπω[c] (27.58), σκοπέω[b] (27.58), προσέχω[a] (27.59), σημειόομαι (29.3), ἀφοράω[a] (30.31), and ἐκκρέμαμαι[a] (30.34). Determine the extent of shared features and of distinguishing features. What are the reasons for the overlapping in meanings? In view of the overlapping, why are these meanings not in the same domain?

*Problem 31*

Examine the contributions of the prefixal elements in the following lexemes: πέμπω[a] (15.66), ἐκπέμπω (15.68), συμπέμπω (15.69), ἀναπέμπω[a] (15.70), ἀναπέμπω[b] (15.71), προπέμπω[a] (15.72), and μεταπέμπομαι (15.73).

*Problem 32*

Determine the shared and distinctive semantic features of the following lexemes: πέτρα (2.21), πετρῶδες (2.22), λίθος[a] (2.23), λίθος[b] (2.24), and ψῆφος (2.27).

*Problem 33*

Determine the shared and distinctive semantic features of the following lexemes: οἰκία[a] (7.3), ἔπαυλις (7.4), βασίλειον (7.5), αὐλή[b] (7.6), πραιτώριον[a] (7.7), σκηνή[a] (7.9), and πανδοχεῖον (7.11).

*Problem 34*

Determine the different types of "totality" in the meanings of the following lexemes: πᾶς[a] (59.23), πᾶς[b] (59.24), ἀμφότεροι[a] (59.25), ἀμφότεροι[b] (59.26), ἕκαστος (59.27), ὅλος[b] (59.29), and πλήρωμα[b] (59.32).

*Problem 35*

Analyze the meanings of the following lexemes and determine what might be the semantic features which could have given rise to the figurative meanings: πρόσωπον[b] (9.9), σάρξ[c] (9.11), σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα (9.14), γλῶσσα[g] (9.18), ὄνομα[b] (9.19), ψυχή[c] (9.20), and σκεῦος[d] (9.21).

*Problem 36*

Examine the extent to which the instrument employed in the following activities is a distinctive feature of the meaning of the respective lexemes: τύπτω[a] (19.1), δέρω (19.2), πατάσσω[a] (19.3), ῥαπίζω (19.4), προσκόπτω[a] (19.5), προσρήγνυμι (19.6), κολαφίζω[a] (19.7), ῥαβδίζω (19.8), and μαστίζω (19.9).

*Problem 37*

Examine the possibilities of plotting the meanings of the following lexemes in terms of their relations to one another, in a manner somewhat similar to what was done for related sets of meanings of the same lexeme in Chapter 3: καίω[a] (14.63), τύφομαι (14.64), ἅπτω (14.65), κατακαίω (14.66), καυματίζω (14.68), σβέννυμαι (14.69), and τεφρόω (14.72).

*Problem 38*

Analyze the distinctive semantic features of the following set of lexemes and determine what features may have been relevant for grouping these meanings into the same socio-religious subdomain: τέλειος[g] (11.18), νεόφυτος (11.21), ἀδελφός[b] (11.23), πατήρ[f] (11.26), and προσήλυτος (11.54).

*Problem 39*

What semantic features of the following set of lexemes are relevant for their classification as representing socio-religious groups: λαός[b] (11.12), ἀδελφότης (11.22), ἐκκλησία[a] (11.32), σῶμα[c] (11.34), συναγωγή[a] (11.44), αἵρεσις[a] (11.50), οἱ ἐκ περιτομῆς (11.51), and ἀκροβυστία[b] (11.53)?

*Problem 40*

Examine the problems of indefiniteness of time in the following lexemes specifying temporal units: αἰών[a] (67.143), γενεά[d] (67.144), καιρός[c] (67.145), ἐνιαυτός[b] (67.146), ὥρα[b] (67.148), στιγμή (67.149), διάστημα (67.150), ἡλικία[a] (67.151), βρέφος[b] (67.152), and γῆρας (67.157).

*Problem 41*

What are the semantic features of the following lexemes which make it possible for them to serve essentially as markers of causative relations (i.e. equivalent in many contexts to the difference between transitive and intransitive usage): βάλλω[f] (13.14), προτίθεμαι[b] (13.15), προφέρω (13.85), ἐπιτελέω[b] (13.108), παρεισάγω (13.132), and καταφέρω (13.133)?

*Problem 42*

Determine the shared and distinctive semantic features of the following set: λάμπω (14.37), φαίνω (14.37), φωτίζω[a] (14.39), ἀνατέλλω[b] (14.41), διαυγάζω (14.43), ἀστράπτω (14.47), and κατοπτρίζομαι[b] (14.52).

***Problem 43***

Determine the relative degrees of comparison in the meanings of the following lexemes: πλείων[b] (78.28), περισσῶς (78.31), παρά[k] (78.29), ὑπερπερισσῶς (78.34), and τηλικοῦτος[b] (78.36).

***Problem 44***

Determine the relative degrees of status and their implications for different associative meanings in the following series: ὕψος[c] (87.19), μεγαλωσύνη[a] (87.21), δόξα[f] (87.23), καλός[f] (87.25), εὐγενής[a] (87.27), ἐκ δεξιῶν καθίζω (87.34), ἀνάστασις[b] (87.39), and πρωτοστάτης (87.52).

# BIBLIOGRAPHY


Austin, J. L. 1962. How to do things with words. Oxford: Clarendon.

Baron, Naomi S. 1981. Speech, writing, and sign: A functional view of linguistic representation. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Barr, James. 1961. The semantics of biblical language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 1968. Comparative philology and the text of the Old Testament. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bauer, Walter. 1981 (5th revised edn.). Griechisch-Deutsches Wörterbuch zu den Schriften des Neuen Testaments und der übrigen urchristlichen Literatur. Berlin: de Gruyter. Translated and adapted into English by William F. Arndt and F. W. Gingrich [A Greek-English lexicon of the New Testament and other early Christian literature], 1957; 2nd edn. revised and augmented by F. W. Gingrich and F. W. Danker, 1979. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bendix, E. M. 1966. Componential analysis of general vocabulary. The Hague: Mouton.

Berlin, B.; D. E. Breedlove; and P. H. Raven. 1973. General principles of classification and nomenclature in folk biology. American Anthropologist 75.214-242.

Bierwisch, Manfred. 1967. Some semantic universals of German adjectives. Foundations of Language 3.1-36.

———. 1980. Formal and lexical semantics. Linguistische Berichte 80.3-17.

Boas, Franz. 1911-1938. Handbook of American Indian languages. Parts I-III. (Introduction, Part I, 1911.) Washington: U. S. Bureau Ethnology, Bulletin 40.

Bolinger, Dwight. 1965. The atomization of meaning. Language 41.555-573.

———. 1972. Degree words. The Hague: Mouton.

———. 1977. Meaning and form. London and New York: Longman.

Caird, G. B. 1980. The language and imagery of the Bible. Philadelphia: Westminster Press.

Calixte, Micheline C. 1987. Problématique lexicale. Diglossologia 1.49-60.

Carnap, R. 1952. Meaning postulates. Philosophical Studies 3.65-73.

Cassirer, Ernst. 1953. The philosophy of symbolic forms. Vol. 1, Language. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Chafe, Wallace L. 1970. Meaning and the structure of language. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Coleman, Linda, and Paul Kay. 1981. Prototype semantics: The English word *lie*. Language 57.26-44.

Conklin, Harold C. 1962. Lexicographical treatment of folk taxonomies. Problems in lexicography (Publication 21, International Journal of American Linguistics), ed. by F. Householder and Sol Saporta, 119-141.

Coseriu, Eugenio. 1975. Vers une typologie des champs lexicaux. Cahiers de Lexicologie 27,2.30-51.

Cruse, D. A. 1986. Lexical semantics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cuyckens, Hubert. 1982. Componential analysis in psycholinguistics. Review of Applied Linguistics 57.53-75.

Danker, Frederick W. 1970. Multipurpose tools for Bible study. 3rd edn. St. Louis: Concordia.

Eco, Umberto. 1979. A theory of semiotics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Fillmore, Charles J. 1965. Entailment rules in a semantic theory. Project on Linguistic Analysis Report No. 10, 60-82. Columbus: Ohio State University Research Foundation.

———. 1967. The case for case. Proceedings of the 1967 Texas Conference on Language Universals, ed. by E. Bach and R. Harms, 1-88. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

———. and D. T. Langendoen (eds.) 1971. Studies in linguistic semantics. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Fitzmyer, Joseph A. 1981. An introductory bibliography for the study of Scripture. Rome: Biblical Institute Press.

Friedrich, Paul. 1979. Language, context, and the imagination. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Fromkin, Victoria, and Robert Rodman. 1978. An introduction to language. 2nd edn. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Geckeler, Horst. 1971. Strukturelle Semantik und Wortfeldtheorie. Munich: Fink.

———. 1981. Structural semantics. Words, worlds, and contexts, ed. by H.-J. Eikmeyer and H. Rieser, 381-413. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Goodenough, Ward H. 1956. Componential analysis and the study of meaning. Language 32.195-216.

Grice, H. P. 1968. Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning. Foundations of Language 4.225-242.

———. 1975. Logic and conversation. Syntax and semantics, vol. 3, ed. by P. Cole and J. L. Morgan, 41-58. New York: Academic Press.

Gumperz, John Joseph. 1982. Language and social identity. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hill, David. 1967. Greek words and Hebrew meanings: Studies in the semantics of soteriological terms (SNTSMS, 5). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hoijer, Harry. 1951. Cultural implications of some Navaho linguistic categories. Language 27.111-120.

Hüllen, Werner, and Rainer Schulze (eds.) 1988. Understanding the lexicon: meaning, sense and world knowledge in lexical semantics (Linguistische Arbeiten 210). Tübingen: Niemeyer.

Hymes, Dell. 1974. Foundations in sociolinguistics: An ethnographic approach. Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press.

Ikegami, Yoshihiko. 1967. Structural semantics: a survey and problems. Linguistics 33.46-67.

Jakobson, Roman. 1970. Main trends in the science of language. New York: Harper and Row.

———. 1972. Verbal communication. Scientific American 227.72-81.

Joos, Martin. 1958. Semology: A linguistic theory of meaning. Studies in Linguistics 13.53-70.

———. 1972. Semantic axiom number one. Language 48.257-265.

Katz, Jerrold J., and Jerry A. Fodor. 1963. The structure of a semantic theory. Language 39.170-210.

Kempson, Ruth M. 1977. Semantic theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kittay, Eva, and Adrienne Lehrer. 1981. Semantic fields and the structure of metaphor. Studies in Language 5,1.31-63.

Kittel, G., and G. Friedrich (eds.) 1964-1976. Theological dictionary of the New Testament. 10 vols. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.

Krampen, Martin. 1979. Profusion of signs without confusion. Ars Semeiotica 2.327-359.

Labov, William. 1972. Language in the inner city. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

———. 1978. Denotational structure. Papers from the Parasession on the Lexicon, ed. by Donka Farkas et al., 220-260. Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society.

Lakoff, G. 1973. Hedges: a study in meaning criteria and the logic of fuzzy concepts. Journal of Philosophical Logic 2,4.458-508.

Laughlin, Robert M. 1975. The great Tzotzil dictionary of San Lorenzo Zinacantan. Washington, D. C.: Smithsonian Institution Press.

Leech, Geoffrey N. 1969. Towards a semantic description of English. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

———. 1974. Semantics. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Lehrer, Adrienne. 1972. Cooking vocabularies and the culinary triangle of Levi-Strauss. Anthropological Linguistics 14.155-171.

———. 1974. Semantic fields and lexical structure. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

———. 1983. Semantic aspects of lexical structure. Quaderni di Semantica 7.127-134.

Lenneberg, E. H. 1961. Color naming, color recognition, color discrimination: a reappraisal. Perceptual and Motor Skills 12.375-392.

Levinson, S. C. 1983. Pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lounsbury, Floyd G. 1955. The varieties of meaning. Monograph Series No. 8, 158-164. Washington, D. C.: Georgetown University Institute of Language and Linguistics.

———. 1956. A semantic analysis of the Pawnee kinship usage. Language 32.158-194.

Louw, Johannes P. 1982. Semantics of New Testament Greek. Philadelphia: Fortress Press.

———, and Eugene A. Nida. 1988, 1989. Greek-English lexicon of the New Testament based on semantic domains. New York: United Bible Societies.

Lutzeier, Peter Rolf. 1982. The relevance of semantic relations between words for the notion of lexical field. Theoretical Linguistics 10,2-3.147-178.

Lyons, John. 1977. Semantics. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1981. Language and linguistics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Makkai, A. 1972. Idiom structure in English. The Hague: Mouton.

Malinowski, Bronislaw. 1922. Argonauts of the Western Pacific. London: Routledge.

McCawley, James D. 1988. The syntactic phenomena of English. 2 vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Merrell, Floyd. 1980. Of metaphor and metonymy. Semiotica 31.289-307.

Miller, George A. 1978. Semantic relations among words. Linguistic theory and psychological reality, ed. by Morris Halle, Joan Bresnan, and George A. Miller, 60-118. Cambridge, MA and London, England: MIT Press.

———, and P. N. Johnson-Laird. 1976. Language and perception. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Moravcsik, Julius M. 1973. Mass terms in English. Approaches to natural language. Proceedings of the 1970 Stanford Workshop on Grammar and Semantics, ed. by K. J. J. Hintikka, 263-285. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

Morris, Charles W. 1938. Foundations of the theory of signs. International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. II, No. 2. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Mounin, Georges. 1972. Clefs pour la semantique. Paris: Editions Seghers.

Nida, Eugene A. 1964. Toward a science of translating. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

———. 1975. Componential analysis of meaning. The Hague: Mouton.

———. 1975. Exploring semantic structures. Munich: Wilhelm Fink.

———, and Charles R. Taber. 1969. The theory and practice of translation. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

Osgood, Charles E. 1963. Language universals and psycho-linguistics. Universals of language, ed. by Joseph H. Greenberg, 236-254. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

———. 1964. Semantic differential technique in the comparative study of cultures. Transcultural studies in cognition, ed. by A. K. Romney and R. G. d'Andrade, 171-200. Special Publication of American Anthropologist 66, No. 3, part 2.

———; George J. Suci; and Percy H. Tannenbaum. 1957. The measurement of meaning. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

———; William H. May; and Murray S. Miron. 1975. Cross-cultural universals of affective meaning. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Palmer, F. R. 1976. Semantics: A new outline. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Partee, Barbara H. 1977. Possible worlds semantics and linguistic theory. The Monist 60.303-326.

Peirce, Charles. 1934. Collected papers. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Quine, Willard V. 1960. Word and object. New York: Wiley.

The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, Second Edition, Unabridged. 1987. New York: Random House.

Sapir, Edward. 1931. Southern Paiute dictionary. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

———. 1944. Grading, a study in semantics. Philosophy of Science 11.93-116.

———. 1949. Selected writings of Edward Sapir in language, culture and personality. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Saussure, Ferdinand de. 1959. Course in general linguistics. Translated by Wade Basking from Cours de linguistique génerale (Paris: Payot, 1916). New York: Philosophical Library.

Searle, J. R. 1969. Speech acts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Silva, Moisés. 1982. Biblical words and their meaning: An introduction to lexical semantics. Grand Rapids: Zondervan.

Steinberg, D. D., and L. A. Jacobovitz (eds.) 1971. Semantics: An interdisciplinary reader in philosophy, linguistics, and psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Traugott, Elizabeth Closs. 1978. On the expression of spatio-temporal relations in language. Universals of human language, vol. 3, ed. by Joseph H. Greenberg, 369-400. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Trier, Jost. 1934. Das sprachliche Feld. Eine Auseinandersetzung. Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung 10.428-449.

Ullmann, Stephen. 1978 [orig. pub. 1962]. Semantics: An introduction to the science of meaning. New York: Barnes & Noble.

Voegelin, C. F. 1948. Distinctive features and meaning equivalence. Language 24.132-135.

Waard, Jan de, and Eugene A. Nida. 1986. From one language to another. Nashville: Thomas Nelson.

Weinreich, Uriel. 1966. Explorations in semantic theory. Current trends in linguistics, vol. 3, ed. by T. A. Sebeok, 395-477. The Hague: Mouton.

———. 1980. On semantics. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Wierzbicka, Anna. 1972. Semantic primitives. Frankfurt: Athenaum.

———. 1980. Lingua mentalis: The semantics of natural language. Sydney: Academic Press.

———. 1984. Apples are not a 'kind of fruit': The semantics of human categorization. American Ethnologist 11,3.313-328.

Wittgenstein, L. 1953. Philosophical investigations. New York: Macmillan; Oxford: Blackwell.

Wotjak, Gerd. 1971. Untersuchungen zur struktur der Bedeutung. Berlin: Max Hueber.

———. 1987. La Sémantique lexicale: état actuel et perspectives. Linguistische Studien, Reihe A: Arbeitsberichte 166.45-85.

———. 1988. Wie konnte ein optimaler Wörterbuchartikel aussehen? Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Ernst Moritz Arndt Universität Greifswald: Gesellschaftswissenschaftliche Reihe 37.18-22.

*Bibles*

The New English Bible. 1970. Oxford and Cambridge: Oxford University Press and Cambridge University Press.

The New International Version of the Holy Bible. 1984. East Brunswick, NJ: International Bible Society.

The New Revised Standard Version Bible. 1989. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

The New Testament in Modern English. 1960. J. B. Phillips, translator. London: Geoffrey Bles.

The Revised Standard Version of the Bible. 1952. New York: Thomas Nelson.

Today's English Version of the New Testament. 1966. New York: American Bible Society.

# GENERAL INDEX

# GREEK INDEX

Only the Greek words that have been discussed in terms of meaning are listed in this Index. Superscript letters are not included.

# INDEX OF NEW TESTAMENT PASSAGES

# Problem Index


9 781555 405786