THE CHANGING SHAPE OF FORM CRITICISM

THE CHANGING SHAPE OF FORM CRITICISM

A RELATIONAL APPROACH

Martin J. Buss

edited by
Nickie M. Stipe

Sheffield Phoenix Press

2010

Contents

Concluding Reflections Concerning Relational Form Criticism

Part III. Appendix

Relational Form in Various Disciplines

Bibliography

Index of Authors

Index of Biblical Passages

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Editor's Preface

The Changing Shape of Form Criticism contains selected essays written throughout Martin Buss's career. While there is a degree of overlap in subject matter, the essays build on one another, illustrating the development and "fleshing out" of many of Buss's key concepts regarding relational form criticism. They also demonstrate his abiding concern for the social implications of intellectual life, his engagement with the deeper questions of existence, and his consistent interest in and interaction with a number of disciplines in addition to biblical studies.

The essays found in Part I are presented chronologically, and range in time of original publication from 1964 to 2003. The presentation of these essays seeks a middle ground between merely reproducing historical documents and completely updating and rewriting each offering. The first approach would have offered little beyond convenience of collection; the second was impossible given the limits imposed by volume length and time. Therefore, the essays have not been updated bibliographically, although some cross-references to Buss's more recent works have been added, pointing the reader to fuller discussion of particular points. The reader is alerted to differences in the author's past and present opinions through the judicious addition of clarificatory footnotes, and some further editing has been done in the interest of style and clarity. A short introduction precedes each essay, providing general orientation and context. The original citation systems have for the most part been retained; therefore, some essays provide bibliographic references in footnotes, while others contribute to the bibliography at the end of the volume.

Part II and the Appendix are new, longer essays, both with a marked interdisciplinary interest. They provide more current bibliographic references.

Martin Buss's life—his scholarly writings; his teaching, mentoring, and encouragement of both undergraduate and

graduate students over several decades; and his social concerns—
continues to demonstrate the very best the relational approach has
to offer. I am honored to have a part in bringing these essays to
readers who may not be familiar with the breadth and the depth
of his work.

Nickie M. Stipe

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABD	David Noel Freedman (ed.), *The Anchor Bible Dictionary* (New York: Doubleday, 1992)
ANET	James B. Pritchard (ed.), *Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950)
AusBR	*Australian Biblical Review*
BA	*Biblical Archaeologist*
BBET	Beiträge zur biblischen Exegese und Theologie
BFC	*Biblical Form Criticism in its Context*
Bib	*Biblica*
BZAW	Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft
CBQ	*Catholic Biblical Quarterly*
CF	*The Concept of Form in the Twentieth Century*
DBSup	*Dictionnaire de la Bible, Supplément*
EncJud	*Encyclopedia Judaica*
FOTL	The Forms of the Old Testament Literature
GBS	Guides to Biblical Scholarship
GHAT	Göttinger Handkommentar zum Alten Testament
HKAT	Handkommentar zum Alten Testament
HR	*History of Religions*
HSM	Harvard Semitic Monographs
IBT	Interpreting Biblical Texts
IDBSup	*Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible*, Supplementary Volume
Int	*Interpretation*
JAOS	*Journal of the American Oriental Society*
JBL	*Journal of Biblical Literature*
JBR	*Journal of Bible and Religion*
JCS	*Journal of Cuneiform Studies*
JPOS	*Journal of the Palestine Oriental Society*
JR	*Journal of Religion*
JSOT	*Journal for the Study of the Old Testament*

JSOTSup	*Journal for the Study of the Old Testament*, Supplement Series
KD	*Kerygma und Dogma*
PI	*Philosophical Investigations*
PSB	*Princeton Seminary Bulletin*
RB	*Revue biblique*
RE	*Realenzyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*
RGG	*Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*
SR	*Studies in Religion*
TJ	*Trinity Journal*
TLZ	*Theologische Literaturzeitung*
TRE	*Theologische Realenzyklopädie*
VTSup	*Vetus Testamentum*, Supplements
ZAW	*Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*
ZDPV	*Zeitschrift des deutschen Palästina-Vereins*
ZNW	*Zeitschrift für neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*
ZS	*Zeitschrift für Semitistik und verwandte Gebiete*
ZTK	*Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*

INTRODUCTION

The present volume accompanies the history of biblical studies that was presented in *Biblical Form Criticism in its Context* (1999, hereafter *BFC*) and *The Concept of Form in the Twentieth Century* (2008, hereafter *CF*). Together, the earlier volumes furnish a long-range historical and theoretical perspective of form. The present volume discusses specifics of how the recommended relational orientation to form criticism can be carried out in biblical studies. There is sufficient overlap so that the present study can be read on its own.[1] Yet two sets of observations in the earlier studies are sufficiently crucial for the present work to be repeated here in summary form.

As was discussed in *BFC*, Gunkel developed the notion of genre in an attempt to counter the one-sided particularism that reigned in "historical criticism." In the process he adopted a broad "history of religion" perspective.[2] Gunkel's immediate students also noted cross-cultural parallels, although many later biblical scholars thought of genres almost purely in terms of local patterns.[3]

Gunkel, furthermore, resurrected Aristotelian essentialism, which holds that there is a single correct way to identify genres and classify texts. In a compromise with the historical perspective, however, he gave essentialism a historical twist by thinking not only of general-human genres but also of strictly definable local genres.

---

1. Cross-references will be made from time to time to *BFC* and *CF*, where fuller details and documentation can be found. Some of the highlights of *BFC* are included below, Part I, essay 9.

2. The word "religion" is deliberately singular, as the plural form conjures up essentialist notions of different religions.

3. Close followers of Gunkel with comprehensive religiohistorical views included Hedwig Jahnow, Walter Baumgartner, Adolf Wendel, Sigmund Mowinckel, Martin Dibelius, Rudolf Bultmann (all Gunkel's students), and Claus Westermann (who discovered Gunkel's relevance later, according to an oral communication in 1964). Less concerned with the general history of religion were members of the tradition emanating from Albrecht Alt (including G. von Rad) and most subsequent Hebrew Bible scholars.

This questionable hybrid, "historical essentialism," was accepted by many scholars after him.

As discussed in *CF*, beginning in Gunkel's time a broad stream of scholarship outside of biblical studies also moved away from one-sided particularism, but without resurrecting essentialism. This movement regarded relations just as real as particulars. Its key thesis was that relations simultaneously connect and separate objects and thus involve both particularity and generality. The word "general" does not here mean "universal," or "frequent," but "repeatable."[4] In fact, a general term may not have even a single exemplification. Many mathematical forms (such as a perfect circle) do not exist in actuality; neither do "unicorns." Rather, in this view, "forms" are complexes of relations and are thus best thought of as possibilities that may or may not be actual.[5]

The fact that relations partly connect and partly separate means that phenomena appear neither in a completely haphazard fashion nor with strict necessity; this combination shows itself in various degrees of probability. Indeed, it is likely—although it cannot be proven—that a combination of continuity and discontinuity is built into our universe. More specifically, on the human level a relational outlook is old and has ranged worldwide. The current version of this outlook can thus be understood as the reappearance of an old view in new form, overcoming one-sided perspectives that appeared along the way, even while learning from them.

The present writer's relational approach to form criticism appears in Part I of the current study, which reprints several essays in slightly modified form. They present both the principles and some illustrations of such a procedure. Part II focuses on one particular aspect of form criticism—the idea of *Sitz im Leben*—and traces its course as it wends its way back and forth between biblical and other studies. The Appendix shows that relational approaches have become widespread in a number of disciplines; in fact, most of us may implicitly approximate such an approach in our daily lives.

4. In philosophy from the Middle Ages on, the word "universal" refers to a feature that appears in all objects that in fact have that feature; but it does not deal with possibility. More popularly, the word refers to a property that supposedly appears in all objects of a certain type, whether or not it is part of the definition for that type; such a claim is usually no more than approximately true (for instance, "all humans have two hands" is not quite true).

5. The ontological status of possibility is debated. In any case, possibility is the broader category: all actual objects are possible, but not all possible objects are actual. See *CF*, 5.3, and the Concluding Reflections of the present study.

Part I

ESSAYS TOWARD RELATIONAL FORM CRITICISM

Essay 1

THE MEANING OF 'CULT' AND THE INTERPRETATION OF THE OLD TESTAMENT

One of the most vexing problems in present-day Old Testament studies is a definition of what is meant by 'cult.' Yet the concept of cult provides a middle way between a positivistic historiography, on the one hand, and a rationalistic, ideational approach, on the other. That is, it recognizes the nature of Israelite reality as a structure of existence.

In order to approach a structure, one must engage in what has been called 'understanding' (German *Verstehen*). This attitude is different from both the gathering of factual data and the contemplation of abstract ideas. Both factual and ideational approaches were signally important methods in the nineteenth century. The structural approach has reached relatively greater dominance in the twentieth century, although it should be made clear that all three paths have been employed in varying ways in both periods. In the light of our modern knowledge, there is now little point in arguing, as still often happens, for the relative importance of historical and ideational approaches as opposed to each other[1]; both of these are, to a considerable extent, transcended by the process of structural understanding.

This paper was written at a time when there was much attention on 'the cult,' which was conceived both very concretely and as a collective rather than an individual or small group process. The paper still accepts many of these opinions; however, indebted to the general history of religion and anthropological perspectives, it argues in favor of cult (not 'the cult') as a dynamic structure, that is, a complex of relations. (Some details have been omitted, since they overloaded the discussion. Others, noted by the use of an asterisk, remain but would require more cautious conceptualization now.)

1. This alternative still hangs over the discussion of J. Stanley Chesnut, 'Problems in Teaching the Old Testament,' *JBR* 30 (1962), pp. 284-90, though Chesnut has dealt with cultic structures elsewhere.

At any rate, the concept of cult is one that must be discussed primarily from the structural side,[2] for cult is not a mere fact, though all of its parts are composed of factual data. Cult is no mere idea, though it contains ideas. Cult is a pattern of facts which have a reasonable connection with each other in the mind and attitude of the person who stands within it. For instance: The cutting of an animal is an observable fact. The notion that the world was created by the death of some being is an idea. The recognition that this notion is somehow linked with that act is part of structural understanding. Human reality is best approached by this third route, since man's life consists essentially of symbolic, meaningful activity.

It is not easy to get rid of the rule of factual and ideational tendencies in interpretation. Extraneous considerations arising out of misapplied categories easily also enter into discussions about the cult. For instance, the very phrase 'the cult' is a reification that leads to such images as observable activities somehow sitting alongside the rest of life. Yet the role of cult can no more be understood by isolated observation than the role of a king can be described without reference to the rest of society. Cult and government are not so much isolatable data as they are operations which become concretized in varying ways. Thus questions about whether a given literary expression is a cultic one or not has no immediately clear meaning. An affirmative answer, as we shall see, would not necessarily mean that the item in question has to appear at the New Year festival, nor need such an answer deny the uniqueness of an expression, for cultic structures make room for individual exclamations to and specific inquiries of a deity. It is best to avoid all factual-sounding questions, which can be answered with a yes or a no, and instead to concentrate on considerations about how a datum relates, positively and perhaps negatively, to the symbolic pattern of active existence in which it is embedded.

Within Israel, the pervasiveness of references to concrete religious organization has been recognized more and more in the last several decades.* In fact, it is now possible to relate almost every part of the Old Testament in some way to a specific cultic situation. Furthermore, to turn the matter around, when the extant Israelite materials preserved in the Old Testament have been distributed to different local and temporal situations, one can form a fairly vivid picture of what went on at almost every Palestinian cult center at virtually any time of the year during most of the thousand-year period covered by the literature.

---

2.   This has been finely executed by Kurt Goldammer, *Die Formenwelt des Religiösen* (Stuttgart: Kröner, 1960).

∗   Ideas in the next three paragraphs need to be expressed more cautiously now.

Such a history has not yet been written[3]; it is in principle possible to produce one, though several nagging questions remain open and at many points one would have to rely on reasonable analogies from other centers. In any case, the Old Testament can be seen as a literary entity which is the result of the confluence of living (more-or-less organized) traditions current in Palestine—with particular, though not exclusive, emphasis on those located in the center and the south.[4] Some of these traditions were part of a dramatic presentation (so, probably, the crossing of the Jordan and, symbolically, of the Red Sea at Gilgal); others were told whenever an appropriate occasion arose (such as Jacob's sleeping on the sacred stone at Bethel).

The different local traditions must not necessarily be thought of as rivals to each other. On the contrary, most of them played a role in a larger symbolic unit. It is a distinct possibility, for instance, that two major festivals (in the spring and in the fall) were at one time celebrated, consciously, at two different centers—Gilgal and Shechem—just as Greece possessed specialized local shrines which were part of a larger whole.[5]

The literature of the Old Testament reflects not only divergent local traditions but also a division of labor which corresponds to an internal structural differentiation within the society. In fact, the grouping of books in the Hebrew canon follows roughly the role-division between priest, prophet, and layman. It is in the relatively lay-oriented third part of the Old Testament that one finds works that bear a fairly secular character, in the sense that they are largely not the result of professional priestly or prophetic activity.

The book of Ecclesiastes,[6] certain portions of Proverbs, and perhaps most of the court records reported in the Deuteronomic

---

3.   Strong steps in this direction, however, have been taken by Hans-Joachim Kraus (most connectedly, *Gottesdienst in Israel* [2nd edn; München: Kaiser, 1962]).

4.   The major centers are: Beersheba, Hebron (with the Oak of Mamre), Jerusalem, Bethel, Shiloh, Gibeon, Gilgal, Shechem (with Mt Gerizim and the Oak of Moreh), Mt Tabor, Mt Carmel, Dan, and Baal-Peor (cf. M. Noth in *ZDPV* 68 [1951], p. 47; for secondary literature, see especially R. de Vaux, *Ancient Israel* [New York: McGraw–Hill, 1961], pp. 539-41). In addition, one could mention the oak or palm or Deborah (Gen. 35:8 and Judg. 4:5, with different heroic attachments), Jabesh-gilead (Joshua 24?), Mizpah, Penuel, Ophrah, the representation of Lot's wife, localities pointed out as burial places of the Patriarchs, etc.

5.   See H. Wildberger, *Jahwes Eigentumsvolk* (Zürich: Zwingli Verlag, 1960), pp. 65-68.

6.   It is true that Ecclesiastes came to be associated with the Feast of Tabernacles, but a connection with 'the element of lamentation' at that festival (G. Östborn, *Cult and Canon* [Uppsala: Lundequistska Bokhandeln, 1950], p. 69) is strained.

history have only a tenuous connection with recognizable sacral structures. Generally speaking, politics is the area that is furthest from priestly tasks, but politics, too, receives legitimization from ritual processes.[7] Interestingly enough, the book of Esther, which might appear to be almost secular, has been linked with Passover, perhaps as a preparation rite, emphasizing in effect the more nationalistic aspect of that festival.[8] At any rate, the social and humanistic dimension is an inseparable part of Israelite religion, for faith pervades all of life, while permitting some instances of almost autonomous reasoning.

The task that we set ourselves, however, was not to ask whether some element is cultic but rather to get a picture of the cult as it may reasonably be visualized or understood. Here, first of all, it should be clear that what may be classified as cult is a complex and varied affair. Ritual goes on not merely at the great festivals but throughout the year (perhaps every day) at the sanctuaries. Ceremonies are carried on at home, at regular times or as occasion demands. Any catastrophic event or pointed success will draw ritual attention to itself. When passing by a sanctuary or a sacred spot or object, one will stop and engage in a rite of mystery or supplication. Simple mechanical means for decision-making are used constantly in some groups throughout their daily activities.[9] The more serious the problem, the more extreme the measures one takes and the more likely it will be that a professional religious functionary is consulted.

It is often possible to distinguish between private and public cult, but a sharp dividing line can hardly be drawn. Firstfruits and firstling presentations are, or can be, both public and private, in that

---

7. This view of the matter stands in rather sharp contrast to the opinions of many of the leading students of Israelite cultic phenomena. The evidence for divine kingship in Israel, however, is rather slim (cf. M. Noth, *Gesammelte Studien zum Alten Testament* [München: Kaiser, 1957], pp. 188-229). Though the king undoubtedly was thought of as a son of Yhwh, he plays a rather minor role in the Pentateuchal and prophetic literature, which embody the most sacred Israelite traditions. According to A. Falkenstein and W. von Soden (*Sumerische und akkadische Hymnen und Gebete* [Zürich: Artemis, 1953], p. 26), Babylonian royal psalms never have genre designations and are thus 'outside of the cult' (a rather strong statement).

8. J. van Goudoever, *Biblical Calendars* (Leiden: Brill, 1959), pp. 92-94. On further connections between Esther and the spring festival, see Helmer Ringgren, *Das Hohe Lied, Klagelieder, Das Buch Esther* [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht], 1958, pp. 8, 113, 115, 119.

9. Most impressive is the description by E.E. Evans-Pritchard, *Witchcraft, Oracles, and Magic among the Azunde* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937], pp. 261-62.

both the community as a whole, and each member of it, bring them to deity. Initiation into the adult community is an event of significance for both the individual and the group. In Israel, a 'credo' with reference to national history is part of the firstfruits ritual, while the presentation of the human firstborn is hallowed, in part, by the story of Abraham and Isaac. Circumcision acquired significance in connection with salvation history. Passover, a home rite, is related to the Exodus, a central public fact.

One distinction that has been made fairly widely is between 'calendrical' and 'critical' rites or between 'regular' and 'contingent' rituals. Rites of passage, however, already occupy an ambivalent position.[10] Furthermore, it has been widely noted that the content of private and special rituals is often similar to that of the great cults.[11] In Mesopotamian ritual, it is quite likely that identification with Tammuz is practiced in the case of an individual's sickness, even at times other than the regular festival.[12] Within Israel, in all likelihood there was continuity between rites of repentance and covenant renewal at the major festivals, on the one hand, and between rituals of mortification and expectation of help at special fasts, on the other. For later Judaism, that is expressly attested.[13]

---

10. See the survey of R.E. Downs, 'On the Analysis of Ritual,' *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 17 (1961), pp. 75-80.

11. This is pointed out by I. Engnell, 'Methodological Aspects of Old Testament Study,' *Congress Volume, Oxford 1959* (Leiden: Brill, 1960), p. 19, though he still insists that the 'cult pattern' refers specifically to the annual festival. E.E. Evans-Pritchard (*Nuer Religion* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956], p. 22) reports that 'each petition may be used separately and at any time and not only in public invocations but also in private and spontaneous prayer, whether spoken or inward, and as pious ejaculations.' Similarly, in general, C.M. Bowra, *Primitive Song* [Cleveland, OH: World Publishing Co., 1962], p. 49. For higher religions, H. von Glasenapp, *Glaube und Ritus der Hochreligionen in vergleichender Übersicht* (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Bücherei, 1960), pp. 106-13. Mircea Eliade theorizes: 'Sacred times, generally established by communal feasts set by the calendar, may be established at any time and by anyone, simply by repeating an archetypal, mythical gesture' (*Patterns in Comparative Religion* [New York: Sheed & Ward, 1958], p. 398: examples, pp. 405-406).

12. So, E. Ebeling, *Tod und Leben nach den Vorstellungen der Babylonier*, I (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1931), pp. 47-56, 65-69. S.H. Hooke follows this interpretation closely, but—probably correctly—also emphasizes a divergence between public and private levels of the cult (*Babylonian and Assyrian Religion* [Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963], pp. 46, 52, 56).

13. Ismar Elbogen, *Der jüdische Gottesdienst* [4th edn; Hildesheim: Olms, 1962], pp. 221-31.

After all, in ancient life many cycles are recognized simultaneously: the day (as emphasized in Egypt and perhaps reflected in Old Testament references to the 'morning'),[14] the week, the month, the year and the sabbatical year, the jubilee, the reign of the king or the continuance of the dynasty, the age or aeon.[15] Cutting across them, individuals and groups have their lifespans and their ups and downs. The crucial festivals can then be seen as the focal points in which all the recurring situations of life gather themselves. To make a sharp separation is inappropriate.[16]

Despite such observations, however, it may rightly be noted that there are different levels of cult in Israel, although these levels do not always coincide with the distinctions already discussed. The traditions of the Exodus and Mount Sinai seem to have belonged to a different part of Israelite structure from that occupied by the Patriarchal narratives. The psalms attributed to David probably served in situations other than those for which Asaph and Korah psalms were employed.[17] The rituals of cleanliness show little contact with any of the traditions mentioned. It is perhaps a major drawback of J. Pedersen's *Israel* that everything appears therein as lying on one plane. A proper account will have to combine the materials in such a way that different structures are recognized, though not without an architectonic relation to each other. The attribution of individual laments to the national figure David is only one example of the evidence of unity within differentiation. Incidentally, the question of how a sick person, far from the cult place, would compose psalms of lament must be answered by the supposition that the psalms in question were not first composed on the sickbed, but were used there, or whenever opportunity demanded (including probably the major festivals), as part of the healing ritual; thus they are neither tied to the great festivals nor free from the poetic process of the professional singer or composer.

14.   Emphasized by Sverre Aalen, *Die Begriffe 'Licht' und 'Finsternis'* (Oslo: Dybwad, 1951).

15.   On certain cyclical periods in the Old Testament, cf. G. Östborn, *Yahweh's Words and Deeds* (Uppsala: Lundequistska Bokhandeln, 1951), pp. 63-65.

16.   Thus the question of whether the covenant-renewal festival was celebrated yearly (Mowinckel, von Rad), every seven years (Alt), or in times of distress (K. Baltzer, *Das Bundesformular* [Neukirchen Kr. Moers: Neukirchener Verlag, 1960], p. 69) may well be resolved in the answer that each of these divergent types of occasion probably possessed their own application of the general theme.

17.   Martin J. Buss, 'The Psalms of Asaph and Korah,' *JBL* 82 (1963), pp. 382-92.

It is now appropriate to go a step further and to analyze carefully the inner meaning and structure of the cult.* In his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, Hegel defined cult as the participation of finite existence in essential being,[18] in other words, as the realization and enjoyment of true reality. Cassirer pointedly remarked that modern study of the cult since Hegel has underscored the correctness of this intuitive definition.[19] For in the cult the worshipper unites himself with the activities of deity, which represent the founding of the world insofar as it is true or good. In ritual, human beings unite themselves with paradise and establish harmonious relations with the powers of Life, a situation from which they unfortunately diverge in actual existence.[20]

In Israelite worship, the participant shares in the 'righteousness' or 'life' of the cult.[21] Participation in ritual—in Israel and elsewhere; for instance, in Greece—presupposes a certain standard to which one must conform.[22] Negative confessions and curse liturgies express the characteristics which exclude one from sharing in the divine graciousness. Psalm 15 expresses positively the qualities which mark the righteous who may approach deity. A priestly declaration of acknowledgment—'this person is righteous' or 'this person is wicked'—functions as recognition of the positive or negative status of the individual.[23] The cult, however, not only presupposes but also, in a sense, dispenses righteousness. Through sacrifice and in the very act of participation in the ritual, the worshipper is caught up into the sacred sphere.

The contrast between good and evil expresses itself regularly according to an in-out dichotomy.[24] 'In' is the good, 'out' is the bad. Inside

* This paragraph needs to be partially modified but it exemplifies a formal analysis.

18. G.W.F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, I [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962], pp. 70, 237.

19. E. Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, II [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955], p. 220.

20. For a discussion of Being and existence, cf. Martin J. Buss, 'The Language of the Divine "I",' *JBR* 29 (1961), pp. 102-107.

21. S. Mowinckel, *Religion und Kultus* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1953), pp. 61-66, 81-90.

22. For Greece, see, e.g., Thassilo von Scheffer, *Hellenische Mysterien und Orakel* (Stuttgart: W. Spemann, 1948), p. 171, with reference to the temple of Asklepios as well as the Apollo cult in Delphi.

23. This has been discussed by G. von Rad, R. Rendtorff, and W. Zimmerli.

24. Well known since William G. Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1907), p. 12. For a recent relevant analysis, cf. L.C. Faron, 'Symbolic Values and the Integration of Society among the Mapuche of Chile,' *American Anthropologist* 64 (1962), p. 1163.

the ritual sphere stand the righteous; outside, the wicked. Theoretically the wicked should not be present at all at the ceremony, but if they should be, the singeing fire of the ritual curse is intended to pursue them. Only the faithful qualify for communion with deity, and those who allow themselves to be caught up by the sacred cultic offers and demands of deity *are* the faithful. 'Outside' are the 'enemies,' often described as dogs or other animals; in Israel at least, they are often described as morally reprobate. Quite characteristic is the later solemn wording of Rev. 22:15: 'Outside are the dogs and sorcerers…and murderers and idolaters, and everyone who loves and practices falsehood.'

Against these outsiders—absent in body or in spirit—the ritual directs its curses. The evil persons excoriated may be moral deviators, as in the liturgy of Deuteronomy 27. They may be national enemies, as in the ritual presupposed by Amos 1 and 2 and attested by Egyptian execration texts. Or they may be personal enemies or personifications of evil forces (sickness and misfortune), as in individual psalms of lament.

It should be carefully noted that the dividing line between In and Out is not a physical and observable one. Rather, it is a mental category which can be applied and stretched as the occasion demands. It is thus not necessary to assume that each approach to a sacred place required an entry ritual or that the priest had to declare every participant, individually, righteous. Entry and participation, requirements and power, life and death, are rather phenomenological constructs within which everyone operated. These constructs were embodied in quite concrete operations, but these operations formed a complete symbolic whole only from the point of view of the participant; an observer would probably not find everything neatly ordered.

The sphere of cultic activity (including 'white' but not 'black' magic) is supremely good, identified with Being. As a sacral realm it has to be carefully guarded against defilement by ordinary life, and ordinary life needs to be protected against the searing power of the divine. As a result, separation has to be enforced in some way, to be overcome only by careful procedures. However, this separation does not express a deep antithesis between the sacred and the profane. On the contrary, the sacred realm furnishes the power by which the profane lives. The contrast between them is that of the difference between the finite and the infinite. The finite and imperfect, with its striving, seeks the infinite, the self-sufficient. Existence concerns itself with Life or Being. It is the purpose of religious persons to have Being take over their whole life. In practice, a complete take-over is not possible, but cultic activities—of different kinds and varieties—grant varying degrees of life and health.

Not all religions follow the same pattern, however. In ancient religions, cultic action typically unifies humanity with deity and nature.[25] In the horse sacrifice of India, both the animal and the sacrificer are identified with Prajāpati the Creator.[26] Totemic rituals furnish another example of union with the non-human world. In Israel, also, union is an important theme, but identification gives way to a covenant structure. Kingship therefore becomes relatively more humanistic.

The lesser importance of the king led to the development of a psalm type not otherwise known in the Near East: the collective lament or thanksgiving.[27] Yet even here one should not envision communal unison singing, which becomes prevalent only later, especially in religions of grace (including Amida Buddhism).[28] Ancient festivals, rather, were very confusing occasions, in which individual sacrifices, visitations with friends, public processions, priestly recitations, and sacred actions were all mixed up with each other. There was little formal, ordered procedure which, say, a prophet like Amos could have interrupted if he had wanted to. Yet within the covenant theory of Israel, the concept of a people of God became a symbol, determinative for legal and narrative recitations, for major prophecy, and for some of the psalms. Old Testament religion did not go so far as later Judaism, which in some of its forms ruled all selfish prayers illegitimate;[29] after all, it permitted the use of individual laments, with relatively low aims. But it did put various limitations on the exercise

25. So, rightly, C.M. Edsman, *RGG*, 3rd edn, II (1958), col. 907. Similarly, A. Kirchgässner, *Die mächtigen Zeichen* (Vienna: Herder, 1959), pp. 79, 192.

26. J. Gonda, *Die Religionen Indiens*, I (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1960), pp. 189, 194.

27. H. Gunkel and J. Begrich, *Einleitung in die Psalmen* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1933), p. 123.

28. Cf. F. Heiler, *Prayer* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1932), pp. 15-40; G. Parrinder, *Worship in the World's Religions* (London: Faber & Faber, 1961), pp. 78, 131-32, 175; on bakhti sects, L.S.S. O'Malloy, *Popular Hinduism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1935), pp. 111-12. Small-group prayer, however, can have a 'we' form, as this Nuer prayer: 'Our Father, it is thy universe, it is thy will, let us be at peace, let the souls of the people be cool, thou art our father, remove all evil from our path' (Evans-Pritchard, *Nuer Religion*, p. 22).

29. G.F. Moore, *Judaism*, II (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1927), pp. 208, 219, pointing to a transition in Talmudic times. The individual prayers quoted (pp. 215-16) are not selfish, but this was not yet a firm rule in early rabbinic times, as J. Bonsirven, *Le judaïsme palestinien,* II (Paris: Beauchesne, 1935), p. 150, shows clearly. For later uncompromising standards, cf. Dagobert D. Runes, *Lost Legends of Israel* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1961), pp. 32, 34, 85.

of self-seeking in religion, partly through a rigorous reference to a unitary lord who rules over the cult community.

Sacrifice is one of the more important phenomena of cultic activity. Indeed, there is no inherent conflict between sacrifice and prophecy; however, they deal with different aspects of religion. Rituals depend on primordial revelation and call forth powers of origin. Prophecy deals more directly with deviations from order and sizes up the present trend of the world. In a typical cult, these aspects cooperate nicely. David Mandelbaum describes the following ritual procedure among the Kotas, a hill-tribe in South India: 'At specified times during the course of every major ritual, the priest stands aside and the focus of attention rests on another religious officiant, the diviner [who falls into a trance]. With jerky, strangulated utterance, the diviner's voice serves as the mouthpiece of the deity. The voice tells the tribesmen wherein they have transgressed, and what they must do if the gods are no longer to frown.' Questions relating to specific forms of evil are answered, then 'the god withdraws' from the diviner.[30] Even when groups do not integrate the diviner closely into the regular ritual, his function is correlated to it in theory.

Yet while there is no inherent incompatibility between cultic forms and prophecy, conflict can develop under certain circumstances. Ritual, as we have seen, relates (human) existence to (divine) Being. Certain Israelite prophets turned against existence, no longer confident of the possibility of melioration by cultic union. A significant feature of doom prophecy is that the 'in-group' becomes empty or at least extremely small, because the ritual community itself becomes an enemy of God. The prophets' curses, influenced by tradition, become cult turned against itself. This turning away from present reality is comparable to the development of mysticism in the East, which is similarly anticultic, or at least antisacrificial, in its outlook.

It has been repeatedly said that a better understanding of issues surrounding Israelite cult will depend on conceptual clarifications. In the process of discussion, the present paper has offered the following suggestions. First: Cult is a structure. An accumulation of facts, which might enhance visualization, is useful but still insufficient for understanding. Secondly: Cult is a very complex, many-layered structure, but with far-reaching cross connections between its various aspects. Although the writer has found members

---

30. D.G. Mandelbaum, 'Social Trends and Personal Pressures,' in *Language, Culture, and Personality: Essays in Honor of Edward Sapir* (Mendash, WI: Sapir Memorial Publication Fund, 1941), p. 221.

of the 'cult-historical' school willing to agree in conversation that cult pervades all of life, in practice their writings tend to exhibit a monolithic conception focused on festivals, which may be called into question.[31] Thirdly: Cult can be understood only in recognition of basic structures of existence, especially in relation to the ultimate. An examination from this point of view will reveal similarities and differences between Israelite faith and other religions. Specifically, Israel's religious activity sets up existence as a loyal and worshipful partner with, but not as a participant in, the Infinite.

31.   So, e.g., W. Beyerlin, *Die Kultraditionen Israels in der Verkündigung des Propheten Micha* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1959).

Essay 2

FORM CRITICISM AND MORPHOLOGICAL METHOD

The present work stands simultaneously within the form-critical tradition stemming from H. Gunkel and within general anthropological studies. Gunkel summarized his method succinctly by stating the following thesis: A literary type or genre is characterized by (1) its 'thoughts and moods,' (2) its 'form-language,' including vocabulary, grammatical and expressive peculiarities, and other aspects of style, and (3) a 'life-situation' (*Sitz im Leben*) out of which it grows.[1]

The concept of a life-situation refers not to a historical occasion, but to a structural element in a society (an 'institution'). In this respect, Gunkel's approach parallels a widespread interest since about the year 1900 in structure or function rather than in history. Thus, for instance, in anthropology, functional and structural approaches were developed in addition to the older historical ones.

A morphological approach, as here defined, differs somewhat from Gunkel's pattern by not limiting itself to analysis of genres and by dealing freely with any form of verbal patterns and also with stylistic tendencies which may not be absolutely rigorous or may cut across other aspects of classification.[2] It consciously relates the element of the sociological life-situation to a conception of human existence developed in cooperation with other disciplines—such as the social sciences, criticism (in the humanities), systematic theology,

---

The dissertation that lay behind this study used the term 'form-critical,' but the term 'morphological' was adopted there in order to differentiate the approach used from a kind of form criticism that sought to identify the oral prehistory of a text. To be sure, Bruce Vawter, reviewing the study in *Theological Studies*, considered the term 'a needless neo-logism for what form criticism would convey nicely.' The writer reintroduced the description 'form criticism' later, when others also rejected the previous usage.

1.   *ZAW* 42 (1924a), pp. 182-83.

2.   See the Appendix of the present study for probabilistic and multidimensional views in sociology, psychology, linguistics, rhetoric, and literary criticism (§§4-8).

and philosophy. It tends to take the concept of 'institution' in the broad sense (now widely employed in sociology) of a structural aspect of culture which may receive varying concrete embodiments. In reference to Gunkel's three aspects of genre, it explicitly* develops a fourth, that of rationale (*raison d'être*), interrelating any two or all three of these with each other in order to reach 'insight' (*Verstehen*). These points are not altogether new, but are deliberately embraced.[3]

While the English term 'form-critical' can designate such an approach, that term often has a historical, diachronic connotation (derived from the German *Formgeschichte*, which refers to history based on formal considerations) that the term 'morphological' can avoid. The diachronic dimension can never be ignored, but its conclusions must be reached for the most part by methods other than structural analysis.

In the study, some examples of the methodology thus outlined are the following[4]: A multidimensional, cross-cutting procedure appears in the description of three kinds of content (threats, accusations, and positive motifs) in the book of Hosea; each is described first in relation to the speaker (God or the prophet) and then in relation to the addressee (employing second- or third-person speech). Probabilistic, rather than rigid, correlations are noted and readily accepted for these relations, but observable correlations (for instance, the association of symbolic and personal expressions with divine speech and of third-person speech with negative words) are regarded as not arbitrary. One of the items noted in the positive structure within the book is that radical salvation is a result of divine, not human, action, as is stated everywhere else in the Hebrew Bible and as stands to reason.

This analysis is hardly affected by microhistorical considerations (which, in fact, are not discussed). More prominent are macrohistorical perspectives presented on the basis of comparative religion and other disciplines.

The study ends by saying that the book offers 'a joy beyond anguish, challenging the hearer to an openness toward love.' Whether this conclusion is justified can be debated, but it reveals that the aim of the study is to present a morphological rather than a particularist analysis.

---

*   The word 'explicitly' did not stand in the 1969 original. However, the writer probably had an implicit awareness of Gunkel's interest in rationale. See below, Part II, text with n. 125.

3.   The method of F. Zwicky, *Morphological Astronomy* (Berlin: Springer, 1957), followed now by others, also emphasizes both multidimensional categories and correlations between coexisting phenomenon.

4.   These last three paragraphs did not stand in the original, but summarize some of its main points.

Essay 3

Appropriate and Not-So-Appropriate Ways of Relating Historical and Functional Methods: A Draft

1. *The Basic Issue*

H. Gunkel's orientation, which has become a model for various kinds of form criticism, included both formal and historical concerns. Specifically, one can think of his work as falling into four dimensions: the three synchronic relations of language, content (mental and emotional), and life situation—which can be compared to the three dimensions of space—and the diachronic dimension of history (or time). In each of these respects, Gunkel had contact with other disciplines. His approach will thus be genuinely continued only if form critics make contact with linguistics, including semantics (the relation of language form to content), sociology and anthropology (for the *Sitz im Leben*), psychology (for mood, etc.), the history of religion (for content and other aspects), philosophy (for method and ideas), theology (the ultimate relation of the whole to oneself), and literary criticism in its various guises.[1] In Gunkel's day, there was earnest discussion concerning the relation of form to history. Gunkel

The present essay joins an edited version of a paper that was presented to the SBL task force on Methodology and its History with briefer sketches that were presented in more informal contexts in the years around 1970. The present version of the essay continues the original draft format with its informal documentation.

At that time, there was extended discussion about a possible reconceptualization of form criticism. Specifically, the central question involved the relation of form to history. The position outlined is in part compatible with, and in part different from, views that were set forth at roughly the same time by Rolf Knierim and Gene Tucker, who became co-editors of the series The Forms of the Old Testament Literature (cf. below, Part II, § 13).

1. A similar call for a broad orientation comes from Amos Wilder, *The New Voice: Religion, Literature, Hermeneutics* (New York: Herder & Herder, 1969), p. 23.

largely chose form but did not discard history, although he rejected detailed historical 'criticism' in favor of recognizing the movement ('history') of literature and religion.[2]

2. Concepts and Methods of History

a. Aims of history writing

Perhaps the most important aspect of methodology is the nature of the question. If one is clear about what one wants to know, the proper steps to be taken may not be so hard to find. For this purpose, a brief sketch of what history writing aimed for during the last two hundred years may be of help. As will be seen, questions raised are at least in part related to the totality of the questioner's existence.

1. *History as a passion*. 'History' was a banner term for the period 1790-1890, as the terms 'reason' and 'nature' were a little earlier and 'form,' 'structure,' and 'function' were later.[3] The word 'history' covered several rather different orientations, but with one meaning or another the term became increasingly prominent during the eighteenth century, until its importance began to wane toward the end of the nineteenth. In Old Testament studies, the term 'historical criticism' was introduced in 1794.[4]

The major components of the sense of history were: (1) factuality (an interest in the past for its own sake), (2) evolution (usually with some reference to the future), and (3) the particularity of individuals and groups. These components, singly or in conjunction, also formed major elements of Old Testament scholarship in this period, including the relatively traditional concept of 'salvation history' (*Heilsgeschichte*).

Major foundations for the general development of historical thought lay within the main emphasis of the previous era: reason. Reason, in addition to its other concerns, sought to apprehend the past critically, free from tradition or anything that would impose an authoritative position. The idea of reason expressed self-confidence, so that between 1700 and 1800 a predominantly

2.   See BFC, pp. 209-14.

3.   For instance, S. Kierkegaard referred in 1846 to those who considered world history the task of the nineteenth century ('Concluding Unscientific Postscript' [= *Samlede Vaerker*, VII, 1902, p. 107]). He mocked objectivity, but he also made a certain kind of 'history' the center of his theology.

4.   Hans-Joachim Kraus, *Geschichte der historisch-kritischen Erforschung des Alten Testaments* (2nd edn; Neukirchen–Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1969, p. 176.

pessimistic view of history gave way to relative optimism. Christianity probably also contributed to a sense of individuality and to a positive expectation for the future, but the extent of its contribution remains unclear.

For all its human self-assertion, or perhaps paradoxically because of it, the historical perspective contained a large element of negation, which was at once its strength and its weakness. Objectivity meant self-transcendence into the other, sometimes expressly described as losing oneself. Evolution meant negation of prior existence; individualism meant the negation of generality. Strife and contradiction were major themes, handled in quite different ways by Hegel, Marx, Schopenhauer, and Darwin.

Significant sociological developments took place in conjunction with the historical consciousness—as cause, effect, or both. The Industrial Revolution (not unrelated to the scientific revolution preceding it) required a view of change and progress and brought about such a view by its obvious impact upon society. Individualism served, especially in England, as a justification for 'free enterprise.' National individualism (the notion that nations each have a different character) became widespread.

Understandably, the notion of moderate, and perhaps infinite, progress was at home especially in the entrepreneurial middle class, in contrast to an aristocratic interest in the past and the other-worldly or revolutionary bent of those at the bottom.[5] In addition, evolution was needed in the nineteenth century as a justification for colonialism. Egalitarian notions of the Enlightenment, which included admiration for newly contacted cultures, gave way to the view that non-Europeans required education through rule, trade, missions, or slave-holding, or else deserved eradication.

2. *A chastened and new history*. Concern with history is old and indeed world-wide, but interests do fluctuate in strength and vary in kind. Each of the major components of the historical orientation came under attack toward the end of the nineteenth century.

The concept of factual neutrality ('objectivity') was questioned not only in terms of possibility but, even more so, in terms of desirability (as Nietzsche did). Specifically, claims to objectivity were called into question, perhaps sometimes unjustly so, by skepticism about the possibility of transcending one's peculiar perspective. Alternatively, the self-abnegation required by objectivity seemed excessively humiliating. The creating rather than the finding of historical meaning was expressed, for instance, in Theodor Lessing's *History as Giving Sense to the Senseless* (1919).

5. Compare, e.g., Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, 1936, Chap. 4.

The idea of evolution or, specifically, of progress was also questioned for both its intellectual and its emotional or moral legitimacy. If one holds with Hume and other nominalists that values cannot be determined by the facts of reality, the idea of progress, which implies evaluation, cannot be supported on a purely intellectual basis. Certain insights, such as Lang's recognition of 'primitive' high gods and the discovery of ancient cave-paintings (whose high quality delayed acceptance of their genuine antiquity for a while), required a revision of some evolutionary schemes. The Second Law of Thermodynamics encouraged long-range pessimism (unnecessarily, as it turned out).[6] None of the possible alternative attitudes to progress were emotionally satisfactory: to view oneself at the top of development, to excuse the presence of evils in view of a better future, or to have the present serve as a stepping-stone for countless generations to follow. The impact of Charles Darwin's work was ambiguous. His research effectively extended the idea of social evolution to biology. But his theory of natural selection—though for a good while rejected by fellow-scientists—dealt the evolutionary perspective an almost fatal moral blow. World wars created further disillusionment.

Particularity in its various forms was subject to disenchantment. Human individualism was countered toward the end of the nineteenth century by new social movements, including moderate kinds of socialism. Intellectually, the aridity of particular facts, amassed by historical investigation, occasioned critical comments. In literary criticism, it was recognized early in the twentieth century that knowledge of the facts surrounding a literary work often detracted from appreciation of the work instead of adding to it. In biblical studies, the spatiotemporal emphasis of critical historical scholarship tended to disintegrate history into particular facts that possessed no authority, thus liberating the reader from premodern patterns (as was in part intended) but also potentially from any meaning. In various fields, students raised the question, 'So what?,' and turned away from historical studies in large numbers, so that the low point of student interest in history was in the early decades of the twentieth century.

The resulting change has been described as the development of 'post-historic man.'[7] That is an extreme formulation, however. New styles of history that involve the categories of structure or relationship have developed. For instance, James Harvey Robinson's 'new

    6.   As is shown in *CF*, 10.2.
    7.   R. Seidel, *Posthistoric Man*, 1950. The change is bemoaned by
C. Antoni, *From History to Sociology*, 1959.

history' (1913) emphasized the relation of the past to the present, not as precedent but for comprehension. Max Weber applied a sociological approach that employed a theory of ideal types. Johan Huizinga's *The Waning of the Middle Ages* (1919) was more synchronic than diachronic. The French school of *'histoire totale,'* led by M. Bloch, L. Febvre, and F. Braudel, emphasized structure and the synthesis of various disciplines. Cautious generalization was advocated by R. Aron and others.[8]

Influential views relating history to the present came from Croce and Collingwood. Both of these men bracketed out the irrational (inappropriately?) as not belonging to history.[9] Martin Heidegger, in *Sein und Zeit* (1927, pp. 385-86), presented an existential analysis of one's relating to the past in the light of one's 'possibilities.' Some theorists have pointed out that one's past is part of one's self-concept.[10]

Perhaps even more significant was a renewed interest in long-range social development, which tend to show that problems (such as stratification)[11] grow together with good, for instance, if processes are evaluated in line with biblical perspectives. Interesting new models derived in part from information theory allow for a statistical understanding of long-term developments; incidentally, they also allow for an accidental end.[12]

Twentieth-century theological discussions of the topic began with Martin Kähler's 1892 distinction between *Historie* and *Geschichte*, which was not unlike the difference between old and new history. Part of the difficulty for theology was the belief that the central Biblical perspective is 'historical'; that is a problematic view, however, partly since the word 'history' has many possible meanings.

In a sense, the traditional aims of history writing (factuality, evolution, and particularity) remain. But awareness that the observer is inextricably involved in its construction is more than ever an integral part of any approach to the subject matter. The past's *relation* to oneself is both procedure and aim.

8.   O. Anderle's call for 'theoretical history,' available in a strongly abridged translation in *History and Theory* 4 (1965), 27-56, unfortunately is vague, even in the longer original.

9.   B. Croce, *History as the Story of Liberty*, 1941, p. 163; R. Collingwood, *An Autobiography*, 1939, pp. 29-43, and elsewhere.

10.   A. Heuss, *Verlust der Geschichte*, 1959, pp. 17, 56, 73; psychological comparison is well brought in by S. Mead, 'History and Identity,' *JR* 51 (1971), pp. 1-14.

11.   M. Fried, *The Evolution of Political Society*, 1967.

12.   See *CF*, 10.6.

*b. Methods of history writing and their employment of formal
   considerations*

While the 'old' history has been relativized, the procedures it devel-
oped are still worthy of serious consideration. They were extensively
formulated in well-known lectures by J.G. Droysen, first given in
1857, and brought to a pinnacle of detailed explication by E. Bernheim
(first edition in 1889). Bernheim was sensitive enough to the newer
movements of history to incorporate some of their insights.

The method falls into four parts: (1) gathering the documents,
(2) criticism of the sources, (3) conceptualization, and (4) presenta-
tion to the public. Criticism is subdivided into 'external' criticism,
which dates the documents and their parts, and 'internal' criti-
cism, which evaluates the reliability of the information contained
therein. Conceptualization includes: interpretation, recreation in
one's mind, and the understanding of 'general factors.' Presentation
involves 'concentration' of the data. All of these steps involve ques-
tions of form. Even gathering the documents is presumably based
on some principle. It is thus apparent that formal considerations
make important contributions to historiography.

Dating documents involves both positive and negative argu-
ments. Positive arguments concern a structural fit, especially allu-
sion to (or assumption of) events or conditions that can be located in
time and place on other grounds. In fact, this is probably the most
important criterion for dating material. Sometimes several kinds
of positive evidence can work together: multiple types of evidence
for the same event, paleographical analysis, carbon 14 dating, etc.
Negative arguments are based primarily on dissonance, which is a
structural concept. Examples include: contradictions or style differ-
ences within a text, a lack of fit between the language of the text
and that of other texts attributed to the same author or period, and
conflicts between statements in the text and known data.

In fact, a sense of lack of fit frequently leads to an explanation
that evokes history. That is, if one is asked to explain a situation that
makes good sense, one will tend to explain it in terms of its func-
tion, but an oddity is usually explained historically.[13] For instance,
a desk in an office can be explained in terms of its usefulness as a
writing surface, not by the fact that workmen brought it. But other
features of the same office may be explained by the fact that it was
at one time an apartment (a reference to past function).

To determine fit requires both reflective analysis of functions
and knowledge of particular conventions. However, caution is in
order when applying this principle. A positive fit—even by ancient

13.   Cf. G. Tucker, *Form Criticism of the Old Testament*, 1971, pp. 47-48.

standards—does not necessarily mean that all elements of a phenomenon were constructed together, and a negative fit does not prove the opposite. Rather, the various components may have been skillfully combined secondarily, and many a writing is fairly incoherent in its earliest version. In fact, in his analysis of Hosea, the present writer judged that the jaggedness of the book reflects early attempts to recall oral prophecies.[14]

Analysis of oral materials requires special consideration. Oral transmission regularly molds traditions together so well that they can no longer be separated. (An exception may be found in India, where the words of a tradition were valued even when not understood). An important corollary of this consideration is that the oral prehistory of a written work is even more difficult to reconstruct than an earlier written history. In other words, 'form criticism' in the sense of a reconstruction of the prior history of a text is in principle illegitimate or, in any case, highly problematic.

Form analysis also enters into the evaluation of the historical value of data. The most important consideration for determining the accuracy of a report is probably related to the spatiotemporal distance between a statement and the event to which it refers. Modern historiography is based on the recognition that, in the vast majority of cases, oral tradition cannot be trusted beyond a few years for anything except the most momentous aspects of events. Seeming exceptions are to be found primarily in Islam, where the written Koran provided a check, and in India for reasons already mentioned. Perhaps the question should be left open for the Near East, pending further study of Homeric and Arabic traditions. Jan Vansina argues that some (quite limited) historical information can be gained from oral sources. As conditions for reliability he names: political history (preferably a very public event) as content, professional bards or memorialists as a vehicle, and a genuine desire of the work to record history.[15] However, the manner in which Albrecht Alt (on the patriarchs) and Gerhard von Rad (on the Hexateuch) employ late data to support conclusions relating to many centuries earlier appears to fly in the face of historical procedure.

Generally speaking, extrapolation—for instance, drawing a conclusion about a tradition that is earlier than two known texts—is questionable. In contrast, interpolation, which deals with a tradition that lies between two known texts, is fairly valid and significant.

---

14. Buss, *The Prophetic Word of Hosea*, 1969, p. 34, having in mind anthropological reports of prophets' efforts to recall what they had said.
15. *Oral Tradition*, 1965, p. 50.

Access to this method can often be provided by comparative data.[16] The relation of Mari prophecies to biblical prophetic formulations is a good example. The fact that a combination of critique and threat appears both in Mari and biblical texts allows one to postulate that a similarly complex form of prophecy lay between these two in early Israel, contra speculation (based on extrapolation from biblical data) that early Israelite tradition presented threat with no grounding in accusation. In other words, one should not attempt to reconstruct the prior history of biblical forms without looking at comparative data.

3. *Structural-Functional Methodology*

a. The aims of formal study

Persons trained in a historical perspective tend to be puzzled by formal concerns or else seek to assimilate them as new means to a historical end. Formal, including structural and functional, methods, however, have a different purpose. In fact, there is good reason to believe that the search for form is built into the human system, as one of its major ways of coping with reality. One must hasten to add that playful, loosely structured thinking also plays a significant role in human life.[17]

A structure is best defined as 'a system of relationships.' When this system is dynamic, the category of 'function' becomes relevant. These terms will be discussed in somewhat greater detail below. In the meantime, one may draw attention to the very notion of 'relationship.' Relations come in three kinds: one-way relationality, which is characteristic of diachronic patterns; mutual relations, in which elements of an at least partially continuing system interact with each other synchronically; and independent relationality (like 'simultaneity' in physics), which can be of interest trans-spatially and thus also transchronically, since similar operations may be in play (such as comparable patterns in Israel and China).

To grasp a structure may be called 'to understand.' An extensive discussion took place in the early decades of the twentieth century concerning *Verstehen*. At that time, Dilthey and others contrasted 'understanding' with 'explanation,' with the latter appropriate to non-human reality. The contrast, however, was somewhat out of touch with developments in the natural sciences; since then,

---

16.   Saussure already pointed to the comparative method as the only proper one for 'retrospection' (*Course in General Linguistics*, 1959, p. 213).

17.   D. Berlyne, *Structure and Direction in Thinking*, 1965, pp. 311-12.

distinction has become even more difficult.[18] Better than saying that human beings are peculiarly the object of understanding is to declare that they are especially those who understand.

The discussion of *Verstehen* has tended to see human beings as oriented toward values; such a view has found expression in T. Parson's theory of 'action.' In any case, the dynamic quality of human life becomes an object of understanding in formal analysis. A basic question of such an analysis is, 'How does human life operate?'

b. The sketch of newer movements and their place in history

Analyses of form, structure, and function in various fields of study made a strong appearance virtually simultaneously around 1900. Of course, these concerns had never been completely dead, but the relative emphasis was different. A few of the highlights can be mentioned briefly.

In economics, 'general equilibrium analysis' dealt with the interaction of variables. F. Saussure examined synchronic linguistics (without discarding diachronics). E. Durkheim elaborated a global sociology, and B. Malinowski developed a functional anthropology. Field theories in physics led to Gestalt psychology. Formal logic, language analysis, phenomenology (dealing with 'forms' appearing in consciousness), and existentialism came to dominate philosophy in different times and places. Art, too, became highly formal. 'Primitive' art was admired for its abstractness, and non-representational art put virtually all of its emphasis on internal structure.

While the newer interests often revived pre-nineteenth-century concerns, they usually did not proceed as though nothing had happened in between. One of the main differences lay in the fact that the notion of a *normative* form disappeared. For instance, genre forms were no longer treated as binding.[19] The relativism and sense of movement of the nineteenth century became for the most part an integral part of the newer perspectives. Forms may be held to stimulate but not to be authoritative, and they may be viewed as changing.

c. Gunkel and Formgeschichte

Gunkel's approach fit closely with other early-twentieth-century movements. The concept of genres was for him, as for most

18.   Cf. *CF*, 5.5.
19.   Earlier, prescriptive grammar had reigned. (In fact, Bishop Lowth's *A Short Introduction to English Grammar*, 1762, established standards for modern English).

of his literary friends, a means for understanding the literature. 'If we wish to look at the inner life of the Psalmists we must start from these types.'[20] He was apparently conscious of the fact that eighteenth-century notions were being revived in part. For instance, he referred to Linnaeus as a model of what he was doing for psalm research.[21]

The concept of *Sitz im Leben* is perhaps the most interesting of Gunkel's contributions, although it builds on antecedents.[22] It refers not to a particular situation, but to a type of situation. In fact, Gunkel is misunderstood in a historicist manner when the term is defined as a '*geschichtlich-soziale Lage*' (historical-social situation), as by M. Dibelius (*Die Formgeschichte des Evangeliums*, 2nd edn, 1933, p. 7). The question concerning a *Sitz im Leben*, when viewed as a type, seeks understanding; insofar as a historical situation is meaningful, it belongs to a form which can be explicated. One might put it this way: the *Sitz im Leben* answers the question, 'To what kind of problem is this an answer?,' or 'What kind of situation would occasion such an expression?'

Furthermore, the history of genres was an interest of Gunkel's. For this history, the term *Formgeschichte* ('history of forms' rather than 'history determined by or on the basis of form') is appropriate. The very careful procedures demonstrated in Gunkel-Begrich still provide an excellent model for such a task. They involve: (1) a careful phenomenology of usages and (2) a cautious search for histori- cally determinable locations. Unfortunately, most genre histories published since then are quite speculative, weak in both structural and historical procedure.[23]

It is probably not a coincidence that form-critical studies in active contact with contemporary work outside of Old Testament studies tend to be strongly structural and cautiously historical. That would seem to be the proper procedure.

d. Aspects of formal methodology

1. *Form*. A form has been understood: (1) as an ideal structure which is more real than the concrete world (Plato), (2) as the essence of a group of objects (Aristotle), (3) as the actual shape

---

20.   *What Remains of the Old Testament? and Other Essays*, 1928, p. 62.

21.   *RGG*, 1st edn, on 'Psalms'; dropped in the second edn.

22.   See Part II, below.

23.   One example is the analysis by J. Jeremias, *Die Theophanie*, 1965. There are not enough examples of the genre discussed to support the histor- ical conclusions concerning its changes.

of a given object (Ockham, etc.), or (4) as a possibility (Husserl, Whitehead, and others).[24] If the Platonic and Aristotelian versions are rejected, the other two meanings can be used as follows: 'form' designates a possibility (meaning 4); form may be actualized (meaning 3). The possibility constitutes a type, while actuality is particular.

The word 'form' is commonly used with a qualifier, for instance, 'linguistic' or 'poetic.' In that case, a certain aspect of a text (or other object) is noted. Sometimes a restrictive adjective is implied, even when it is not expressly stated, such as when 'form' is contrasted with 'content,' in which case only the verbal pattern is indicated.

Formal analysis is a comprehensive category that includes attention to structure and function. It deals not only with synchronic but also with diachronic processes insofar as these are 'organic,' that is, involved in an organization of the material.

2. *Structure*. Structure is a precisely definable term. It designates the 'totality of relations between the parts of a whole,' viewed synchronically. While the meaning is clear, its application is flexible; it depends on how the parts are defined. This flexibility of application is a cardinal principle of the relativistic procedure of modern studies (already found in nominalism). There is no 'objective' structure, for structure depends on the interest of the observer as well as on the object.

The procedure of structural analysis is thus to examine as many relations—in language, ideas, mood, etc.—as one finds useful or interesting. Old Testament studies are now beginning to learn literary criticism, in which varied literary structures are observed. Steps taken in this direction are still quite rudimentary, however. What has come to be known in Old Testament scholarship as 'structural analysis' (since E. Galbiati, *La struttura letteraria dell'Esodo*, 1956) but is elsewhere usually called 'composition' deals with only a small part of structure or form, that of surface organization.[25]

Experimental studies in psychology and sociology and systematic 'content analysis' look for correlations and employ statistical methods. A special treatment of such correlations produces 'factors,' or, more simply, 'clusters.' For Old Testament studies, factor or cluster analysis may render in the future a service comparable to that of genre studies, but that remains to be seen.

24.   For details, see *CF*, 1.1; 5.3. For Whitehead, 'eternal objects' are 'possibilities' that lure particulars.

25.   For a fine study, see D. Lohmann, *Die Komposition der Reden in der Ilias*, 1970.

Indeed, structural analysis should include the recognition that more than one factor or dimension operate together in a given phenomenon. This means that stylistic conventions can overlap and cut across each other. For instance, legal forms were not 'borrowed' by the prophets, but so-called legal (more accurately, strife) forms were the normal way of expressing opposition of any kind, whether between human beings or in relation to deity.

Information theory, which codes the amount of information in a series of yes-or-no bytes, is now being applied to works of art to measure 'organization,' 'complexity,' and 'unity.'[26] For a while, Old Testament professionals will want to rely instead on intuitive approaches; however, the power of information theory is that it expressly combines individuality and relationships (also involving an observer) by means of the theory of probability. With the aid of information theory, it is possible to see that tight unity and close conformity to a standard are not highly aesthetic, for little 'information' is then provided.

3. *Function*. A 'function,' in general, is a relation between two variables. Outside mathematics, it refers to a dynamic relation. It can designate a consequence if this is viewed as a repeated, not merely one-time, occurrence (such as in the statement, 'one of the functions of repetition is emphasis'). Usually, function identifies the contribution of a phenomenon to the effect of a larger whole of which it is a part. For conscious beings, function involves purpose. For instance, Gunkel said: 'What effect is aimed at?'[27]

Generally speaking, different parts within a whole have different functions, that is, different kinds of relation to the over-all dynamic structure. In the relatively poorly organized whole of a human society, the parts (individuals and smaller groups) have their own purposes and engage in conflict with one another. However, 'synergy' is a state in which the benefit of one also tends to involve the benefit of another.[28]

4. *Summary for the major methods of formal analysis*. The primary methods of formal analysis in all fields are as follows:

   (1)   Description of relationships, including (a) the classification of individual entities or systems into types, with description

---

26.   H. Kreuzer (ed.), *Mathematik und Dichtung*, 3rd edn, 1969. The best available formulae for complexity, unity, and organization are perhaps in: R. Zajonc, *Journal of Abnormal Psychology* 61 (1960), pp. 159-67.

27.   *What Remains?*, p. 62. (Note: the above paragraph states more clearly what was said briefly in an early draft).

28.   Ruth Benedict, 'Patterns of the Good Culture,' *Psychology Today*, June 1970.

of the recurrent features of members; and (b) for individual units (however identified), an observation of their parts and of the relation of these parts to the whole, partially in the light of types or in terms of a model.

(2) Recognition of correlations, with (a) attention to the closeness of correlation, an indicator of the strength of a structural or functional (dynamic) relationship; (b) theoretical analysis of causation lines, determinable by experiment when possible or otherwise by reasoning, that is, by judging on the basis of available knowledge; and (c) recognition of relatively independent groups of correlations within a system: 'factors,' which constitute intersecting dimensions.[29]

(3) Theoretical descriptions of the functioning of the parts within a single or recurrent system, either (a) as perceived by an observer of non-conscious entities, with the help of mathematical models, sometimes with an 'as if' teleology (as in physics and biology); or (b) as perceived by an observer of conscious beings (with varying levels of awareness or symbolization), with the help of logical models, including recognition of the 'meaning' of words, actions, etc.; and, in any case, (c) with ideal or trial models as tools.

(4) Evaluation of the significance of a system, in terms of (a) the degree of coherence, consistency, and rationality of the parts within the whole, without assuming that complete coherence is ideal; (b) the effectiveness of the structure in its context (successfulness); (c) the degree of complexity evident, which may or may not constitute a positive value; and (d) the value or usefulness of the other system to one's own by giving assistance or furnishing stimulation.

5. *Genre, or literary form*. The notion of 'genre' includes both structure and function, at least if one accepts the notion that a certain role in life is part of the way a genre is identified. In line with conceptualizations of 'form' presented earlier, but omitting the Platonic and Aristotelian views, a literary genre can be defined as follows:

(1) A genre equals 'what a literary text is or may be.' Such a genre may have many, one, or no examples. In this view, genre represents a possibility for either speaker or recipient. It should be noted, however, that, although a theoretician's genre may be 'pure,' reasonably competent speakers or recipients probably do not have pure genres in mind,

---

29. Buss 1969 discusses intersecting dimensions in Hosea, and one can observe overlapping 'factors,' 'clusters,' or 'voices' of complaint, faith, and ethics in the psalms.

since they have probably encountered more than one varia-
tion of them.

(2) A genre equals 'a standardized or widely used verbal pattern.'
In this view, genre is an abstraction from particular texts,
and therefore less varied than individual texts.

(3) A genre equals 'the sum-total of all verbal expressions
that fit a given pattern' (such as prayers). This meaning is
employed when people say, 'this text belongs to that genre.'
In this view, genre is a collectivity. This definition might be
acceptable, but note the following appropriate observation
by E. D. Hirsch (*Validity in Interpretation*, 1967, p. 108): 'At
the level of history there is no real entity such as a genre if
by that word we mean a type concept that can adequately
define and subsume all the individuals that are called by
the same generic name.'[30]

In formal logic, definition (1) is close to W. Quine's 'virtual class,'
definition (2) designates a 'class' (especially one that is well repre-
sented), and definition (3) refers to a 'set.'

Three theses about genres:

(1) Styles of expression are variable and flexible, although this
is more true for some genres than for others.

(2) An item can exhibit more than one genre, if they are not
mutually exclusive. For instance, the category of royal
psalms overlaps other psalm types. A 'letter' can be a 'fare-
well message.' A 'creation account' can be a 'cult aetiology.'
Hymnic style often appears in laments. The *rib* styles in
prophecy and psalms express controversy, which has many
forms in life. Prophetic style appears on the lips of personi-
fied wisdom. There is nothing strange about any of these
phenomena, as long as genres are not considered to be
isolated categories. By combining two or more characteris-
tics, one can designate a narrow type, such as farewell letter
or royal or collective lament. Deuteronomy can be described
as a 'successor treaty,' combining several characteristics
(with Lohfink, referring to Assyrian parallels).

(3) Different levels of a text can exhibit different genres. For
instance, what on the surface is praise may be an instruc-
tion or a subtle critique. High literary style typically allows
more than one level of meaning, as Empson, *Seven Types of
Ambiguity*, 1930, has shown.

---

30. Added note: In Gunkel's terminology, a collectivity is a 'class,' not
a 'genre' (see *BFC*, p. 247).

4. *The Relative Importance of Historical and Formal Approaches**

Whether to choose a primarily historical or a primarily formal (structural-functional) approach is a matter of personal choice. Priority in aim is, however, not identical with chronological priority in procedure. For instance, one can begin with formal analysis and then move toward historical assessment, which may be the primary aim. Or one can examine historical data as a step toward identifying form. In practice, the two paths will often alternate or interact closely. In any case, the conclusion that one reaches in a study, not its beginning point, is probably the best indicator of one's primary goal.[31]

It is true, a historian's interest may lie beyond the historical analysis presented in the practical relevance of the work of literature, even though this relevance is not highlighted. A (one-sidedly) particularist study, however, often furnishes a barrier toward possible relevance. To provide such a barrier may, in fact, be one of the writer's aims. A combination of formal and historical study can indicate both the relevance and the lack of relevance of a given work.

Alternatively, a combination of historical and formal approaches can set up an expressed or implicit analogy; that is, the *relation* between past datum A and past datum B may be seen as one that can be repeated. Yet in regard to a comparable relation between present data C and D, such an approach is valid only if the relation between data A and B can be established without the prior assumption of a certain pattern that might be drawn from sociology or psychology; otherwise, one will simply repeat one's preconception. A pre-existing social or psychological model or theory can be heuristic but should not be determinative for the conclusion.

The application of a formal pattern to a new historical situation is normally another step that is not strictly a part of biblical study. However, a formal analysis, including a reflective rationale, can provide a way toward such an application.

---

* The ideas in this section were set forth in early drafts, but their wording is new to a considerable extent.

31. For instance, W. Richter's in many ways excellent study *Die sogenannten vorprophetischen Berufungsberichte* (1970) concludes that prophets and 'judges' at one time interacted; he ends with the words: '*Die Schriftpropheten können hier auf eine reiche Tradition zurückblicken*' ('the writing prophets have behind them a rich tradition'). Was history his primary goal?

A special topic concerning the relation of history to form is that of uniqueness, which can be viewed in two different ways:

(1) Every event is historically unique in the sense that only one event can occur at a given spatiotemporal location. This phenomenon can be called 'identity.' Each such event has an irrational aspect that is beyond intellectual grasp—not to be confused with structural uniqueness.

(2) An event is structurally unique if no other event has precisely the same set of features. Such uniqueness is likely to occur in a complex phenomenon that shares many individual features ('forms') with other phenomena. Uniqueness in this sense is thus not opposed to comparability but is more likely when many comparisons can be made rather than only a few. This can be called 'complex uniqueness.'

A theoretical third kind of uniqueness would mean that an event is incomparable in the sense that it has no features that appear in any other event. Such an event, however, is unknowable.

Much of Christian (especially, Protestant) theology, adopting the notion of incomparable uniqueness in its view of the biblical tradition, has undermined its own position by making it entirely irrational. A better approach (for biblical as well as other literature) would recognize uniqueness in the complex sense by means of attention to forms that are each shared, although not all forms appear in all traditions.

Essay 4

THE IDEA OF *SITZ IM LEBEN*

The value of focusing on situation or *Sitz im Leben* lies in its recognizing the relation of literature to human life. Some of H. Gunkel's views on the nature of this relationship are untenable, however. It is therefore necessary to cleanse the concept of situation of such views and at the same time to enrich it, in order to rescue and deepen the genuine insight that literature must be seen in its connection with life in order to be understood. Fortunately, a new scholarly movement emerging a little over a decade ago explored the sociology of language in such a way that it can at least contribute to such a reconceptualization. Early antecedents of this movement already had an (indirect) impact on Gunkel, although his connection with sociology was relatively weak.[1] The following observations are not entirely dependent upon, yet are to some extent aided by, such recent research, as an attempt is made to reach an over-all theory.

One can distinguish between several kinds of 'situation.' The dividing lines are not altogether sharp—as is true for most differentiations—but they do represent fairly different aspects under which a literary work or genre can be viewed. For individual utterances one can note the physical circumstances, the mental considerations of the speaker and hearer, and the literary context. In linguistics, situation theory has usually dealt with such individual phenomena or else with repeated contexts for specific items

1.   The prime stimuli of more recent studies appear to be B. Malinowski, J. Firth, K. Pike, and K. Burke; see Part II, below, Chapter 9, on their role and background.

such as words.[2] The three most important aspects of situation for a genre (our main concern here) are: the human process, the conventional setting, and the evolutionary condition.

'Human process,' 'human situation,' or 'life situation' refers to the context as understood or interpreted by a human being.[3] It is not something purely external. Examples include the death of a friend, a threat to one's life, the birth of one's child, marriage, sickness or loss of status, achievement of any sort, sexual interest, artistic pleasure, religious or idealistic exaltation, victory for one's group, small-scale or large-scale conflict, instruction, alienation, etc. One can call these processes 'socio-psychological,' since they simultaneously involve social and psychological aspects. The basic processes tend to be relatively universal, so that the genres in which they are expressed are also quite widespread, such as love poetry, mourning rites, praise, and commands.[4]

Every society shapes the expression and setting of basic human processes in a conventionalized manner. Thus, for instance, in connection with a death, both verbal behavior and other actions are closely determined by tradition. In their details such traditions are to a greater or lesser degree arbitrary. In fact, the linguistic aspects are almost entirely arbitrary, as is generally recognized. The physical settings, too, can vary considerably from one culture to another without a major difference in meaning or effect. The exact nature of the conventions, or symbols, thus often does not matter. What is important is the human process they embody. The study of the conventions—whether of the genre itself or of the setting—should ordinarily not be an end in itself, but a step toward insight into the operation of life.

One may restate the matter thus: the basic genres expressing human processes (such as mourning) are given concrete shape in

2.   For surveys, see: G. Mounin, *Les temps modernes* 22 (1966), 1066-69; J.F.A. Sawyer, 'Context of Situation and Sitz im Leben,' *Proceedings of the Newcastle upon Tyne Philosophical Society* 1 (1967); R. Lapointe, *Bib* 52 (1971), 469-87; W. Raible in U. Gerber and E. Güttgemanns (eds.), '*Linguistische' Theologie*, 1972, pp. 9-12; and add C. Ogden and I. Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning*, 8th edn., 1946.

3.   One may compare E. Kähler's 'Lebenssituation,' quoted by M. Weiss, *Bib* 42 (1961), p. 257; views of 'Situation' surveyed by K. Løgstrup, *RGG*, VI, 1962, 3rd edn, pp. 95-97, and by H. Knuth, *Zur Auslegungsgeschichte von Psalm 6*, 1971, pp. 369-76 (held to be in line with H. Gunkel [pp. 353-55, 377]); and the 'context' or 'universe of discourse' of W. Urban, *Language and Reality*, 1939, p. 203.

4.   As part of his situational theory, J. Firth called these genres 'types of linguistic function' (*Papers in Linguistics 1934-1951*, 1957, p. 31).

genre variants (e.g., the conventional form in Hebrew at a given time and place), while the human situation (death and burial) is handled in conventional settings (the exact circumstances of burial). Now it is important to recognize that while basic processes and situations inherently belong together, genre variants are not necessarily matched precisely with concrete settings and practices.[5] There may be alternatives either in speech or in non-verbal actions (or in both) for dealing with a given fundamental problem (e.g., sickness), so that a number of combinations are possible.[6] One cannot make any a priori assumptions in this matter. In a given society some occasions are structured more precisely than others; conversely, a given genre is assigned more sharply to defined occasions by some societies than by others.[7] Indeed, it is misleading to say that a concrete genre emerges from a specific external setting. Rather, a genre variant grows out of an earlier form in an antecedent social organization. The current organization of activity may contribute to the shape of a genre, but often the fit is only a rough one.

Especially important is the fact that styles and content of speaking are not determined directly by the external setting, but by the interplay or the roles of participants.[8] Roles form a dynamic set of relations, influenced in part by the setting, yet more immediately involved in the social process. Since individuals play more than one role and have multiple opportunities, speech can change in character without a change in circumstances.[9] Thus it has been suggested that

5. Earlier, M. Buss, *The Prophetic Word of Hosea*, 1969, 1, 4-5. Similarly, D. Hymes, *Foundations in Sociolinguistics*, 1974, pp. 52-54 (adapted from 1964), and R. Knierim, *Int* 27 (1973), pp. 441-46.

6. E.g. C. Frake in: W. Goodenough (ed.), *Explorations in Cultural Anthropology*, 1964, p. 125; A. Dundes, *Southern Folklore Quarterly* 28 (1964), pp. 261-64.

7. Ruth Finnegan, *Limba Stories and Story-Telling*, 1967, reports: 'Limba stories about [the high god] Kanu are not told on prescribed occasions' (p. 36); his 'name is often to be heard on Limba lips, especially in situations of unexpected joy or misfortune' (p. 19—note the connection with the human situation). She observes that, among the Limba, narrative types and external occasions do not correlate with each other (p. 30). Among the Makah, in contrast, popular tales were told only at bedtime with children present, usually in the winter (R. Miller, *Journal of American Folklore* 65, 1952, pp. 29).

8. For example, E. Arewa and A. Dundes show the relation of the genre of proverbs to 'situation' in the sense of role patterns involving age (*American Anthropologist* 66, 6/2, 1964, pp. 79-81).

9. Ethel Albert, J. Blom, and J. Gumperz in J. Gumperz and D. Hymes (eds.), *Directions in Sociolinguistics*, 1972, pp. 83-84, 105, 424-32; R. Fowler, *Understanding Language*, 1974, p. 232.

speech patterns be 'described in terms of non-observable factors which enable the analyst not so much to predict as to understand.'[10] A biblical scholar's task of deducing the life structure of a text on the basis of internal evidence is then not altogether different from that of the contemporary observer of a conversation. Fortunately, it is often possible to solve the more significant questions regarding textual problems, even though the more incidental details of context may remain obscure.

It is easy to apply this understanding to biblical literature. A psalm of lament gives a clear picture of the human situation—someone suffers 'unjustly,' i.e., for reasons other than perceived guilt—but yields only an unclear image of the settings in which it may be used. In all probability the lament style was applied to a wide range of concrete problems and accompanied by different steps toward a solution.[11] So-called 'wisdom' was not the sole possession of a professional class,[12] any more than modern instruction is limited to schools (although this activity is the latter's specialty). Conflict and its settlement employed standard forms which were by no means restricted to court situations. It is probably inappropriate to say that psalms and prophecy 'borrowed' legal phraseology, for there is ample evidence that in ancient Israel the judicial realm had not yet become as specialized as it has in the modern legal system.[13] Similarly, 'hymnic' participles were used in many contexts—within laments, in wisdom descriptions, and for royal and divine self-presentations—so that one cannot assign them a particular setting, but must see them as embodying the human operation of descriptive praise.[14] On the other hand, participles with a derogatory content naturally fulfilled the function of blame or denunciation, as they did when preceded by

10.   J. Pride, in J. Lyons (ed.), *New Horizons in Linguistics*, 1970, p. 293, with reference to other supporting data.

11.   H. Gese, *ZTK* 65 (1968), p. 12, relates them partly to the 'Situation der Not.' Cf. H. Gunkel, *Einleitung in die Psalmen*, p. 181 (and, ed. J. Begrich, p. 284).

12.   Cf. R.N. Whybray, *The Intellectual Tradition in the Old Testament*, 1974 (possibly one-sided in the other direction).

13.   See: M.J. Buss, *Hosea*, pp. 76-77 (n. 99), 91-92, 95, 115.

14.   Cf. F. Crüsemann, *Studien zur Formgeschichte von Hymnus und Danklied in Israel*, 1969, pp. 83-154 (hypothesizing an original pure form), and literature cited there. The participial praise style in other (such as Greek) traditions was not connected especially with festivals; festival praise tended to employ narration. (Cf. the Orphic hymn in A. Dietrich, *Abraxas*, 1891, p. 139; the work was cited by Gunkel in *Schöpfung und Chaos*, pp. 294, 300).

hôy, 'O!'[15] Many theories concerning the movement of a genre or style have unnecessarily assumed that the usage was 'originally' highly circumscribed.

Since Gunkel held an excessively compartmentalized view of Israelite society—apparently influenced by his experience of the modern specialized social system[16]—he had to resort frequently to the notion of borrowings, imitations, or spiritualized versions, when certain features or complexes were found outside of the basic context he assigned them. Although one may differ with him in relation to particular applications, the principle that secondary extensions of usages occur is a sound one. Extensions can vary from the fairly natural to the deliberately striking or humorous.[17] Metaphorical extensions are effective only as long as the more normal use remains in effect; such synchronic adaptations must be clearly distinguished from changes in a genre. A powerful example of stylistic adaptation is the well-known 'song of the vineyard' (Isa. 5: 1-6), which derives its aesthetic subtlety and effectiveness from operating simultaneously on three interacting levels: about a vineyard, about a beloved, and about Israel (Israel being designated both under the image of the beloved and directly by that of the vineyard).[18]

Changes in genres and in social organization are related in greater or lesser degree to the development of technology and socioeconomic conditions. An excellent example is furnished by the movement from prophecy to apocalyptic, connected with profound changes in conditions and organizations of power. Such shifts involve not merely the conventions of a genre or setting, but the nature of experience and activity. Israelite spokesmen had no reason to appeal to the conscience of foreign oppressive powers; during persecutions,

15. *Hôy* is a vocative or interjection, expressing emotion, including sorrow and anger; the nature of the emotion is determined by the context. With derogatory participles or images, it yields an insult or invective (cf. H. Gunkel, *RGG*, I, 1909, p. 1192), as do equivalents in Arabic (T. Canaan, *JPOS* 15, 1935, p. 257, noted by W. Janzen, *Mourning Cry and Woe Oracle*, 1972, p. 32; H. Schmidt and P. Kahle, *Volkserzählungen aus Palästina*, I, 1918, p. 72 [text 30, section 12]), and Egyptian (H. Grapow, *Wie die alten Ägypter sich anredeten*, 1960, 2nd edn, pp. 6-7, 9, 34, 94), etc. It is not derived from lament. Cf. below, Part II, n. 128.

16. E.g., *Reden und Aufsätze*, p. 33 ('wie noch heute').

17. Similarly, G. Fohrer *et al.*, *Exegese des Alten Testaments*, 1973, pp. 96-97. For analyses, cf. J. Fishman, in Gumperz and Hymes (eds.), *Directions in Sociolinguistics*, p. 450, and, at length, E. Goffman, *Frame Analysis*, 1974 (e.g., p. 560).

18. For certain aspects, see W. Schottroff, *ZAW* 82 (1970), pp. 68-91. Cf. W. Empson, *Seven Types of Ambiguity*, 1955.

encouragement for perseverance was needed by their audience. On the whole, as societies become larger, one can observe an increase in functional specialization and probably in conflict between groups. Future histories of Israelite genres will need to devote attention to such macrohistorical factors.[19]

One of the strengths of biblical form criticism has undeniably been its attention to 'settings.' Nevertheless, this concern has been one-sided and ill-controlled. Biblical studies needs to deal more sharply with process-oriented sociology and with issues of social development. The concept of 'situation' is rich and involves a number of dimensions.[20] One may hope that social and psychological aspects will be further explored—to open the human meaning of a text.

19.   Some hint in this direction is given by W. Richter, *Exegese als Literaturwissenschaft*, 1971, p. 147.

20.   D. Crystal and D. Davy, *Investigating English Style*, 1969, 60, pp. 66-82, list eight (largely situational) dimensions. Similarly also D. Knight in *Society of Biblical Literature*, *1974 Seminar Papers*, I, 1974, pp. 105-25.

Essay 5

UNDERSTANDING COMMUNICATION

1. *Communication: Present Concerns*

Communication is a dynamic relation between two entities. It implies both individuality (for the two partners) and sharing, that is, holding in common. In its general sense, the term 'communication' refers to any process of transmitting, imparting, or giving to another. What is transmitted is known as 'information,' since it imparts form. These broad meanings, which are quite old, are utilized in recent conceptualizations stressing the continuity of interactions at different levels of existence.

An interest in communication is characteristic of the present century. The development and use of telephone, radio, radar, television, computers, and new means of transportation constitute a second phase of the Industrial Revolution, with a stress on interdependence. Broad movements of intellectual conception are connected with this social change. The previous emphasis on history, associated—in different forms—with individuality and power during the first phase of industrialization, receded in favor of orientations toward mutual and general relations.[1] Of course, such a shift in perspective is gradual and does not proceed in uniform fashion; sometimes it over-reacts against the old.

The present study introduced a volume that was produced by a task force on method and illustrated a variety of methods through attention to the Jacob story. The study presents in greater depth what was sketched in 1971. Its theoretical side is elaborated in *CF*.

1.   On the beginning of the present era in the last decades of the nineteenth century and on its social condition, cf. Buss 1974: 32 (the break is placed similarly by Whitehead 1941: 271), noting especially the movements of labor and feminism. (Cf. *CF*, 2.1.)

In philosophy major attention has been directed to language. This includes the use of artificially defined signs in symbolic logic, the examination of ordinary speech by 'language analysis,' and a considerable concern with language in comprehensive views of reality. Language is at once material and mental, reaching from the human to all of known reality (via mathematics); it is observable, active, and social ('intersubjective'), and expresses relationships and potentialities. It thus provides a focus by which it is possible both to go beyond a one-sided individualism and to narrow the contrast between matter and mind, phenomena associated with earlier tendencies. Many of the relevant reconceptualizations are already present in the pragmatism of C.S. Peirce (dating from 1867 to 1910). He opposed nominalism (for which individuals are primary) as well as dualism and assigned a central role to the 'sign.'[2] Somewhat later, Karl Jaspers (perhaps indirectly influenced by Peirce)[3] made communication the cornerstone of his philosophy; he both discussed interpersonal relationships as the origin of the self (1931: 338) and argued in favor of unlimited communication between groups (1948). Similar reflections are now being used in integrative views by many thinkers.[4]

The development of new modes of transmission and observation has led to a formal, mathematical framework for 'communication theory.' This framework includes several major foci. One, often called 'information theory,' measures the complexity and variation of messages, channels, and codes, and discusses ways of protecting messages against interference (Hartley 1928 and, especially, Shannon 1948); it involves the mathematics of probability, with 'entropy' (unpredictability) as the standard for the

2. Peirce not only anticipated but also significantly influenced subsequent thought; his early impact was largely indirect, e.g., through William James. Like others, Peirce was aware of the political and economic (libertarian and competitive) correlates of nominalism (1931-58, 1.17, 6.294). K. Marx noted that dualism is transcended in a practical, social perspective (1963: 162). Peirce, and then Russell and Whitehead, developed a logic of relations.

3. Added note: The words 'perhaps indirectly' have been added to the text here, like the word 'probably' later in this note. Peirce's influence extended through J. Royce to G.H. Mead, a major source of Jasper's thought. The recent discussion of communication by J. Habermas is probably indebted to Jaspers; it explicitly refers to Peirce (1971a: 91-112). Cf., further, *CF*, 5.6.

4. E.g., influenced by Peirce, G.H. Mead (1934: 324, etc.), J. Habermas (1971a), K.-O. Apel (1973) and H. Peukert (1976) view communicative interaction as the basis of both knowledge and ethics. Logic and linguistics are converging in the work of R. Montague (1974), T. van Dijk (1977), and others (e.g., the many contributors to Keenan 1975). It should be observed, however, that this 'new' movement picks up an old and widespread concern for language (see, e.g., Gusdorf 1965: 11-21, 127).

potential amount of information. Another, called 'cybernetics' by Norbert Wiener (in 1948), examines the relation between signals and goals in mechanical or organic systems; its central concept is positive or negative 'feedback,' which can be represented mathematically by 'directed graphs' or 'digraphs' (networks of movement). A third deals with the usefulness of messages for a recipient within the context of 'decision theory,' which examines probabilities in relation to preferences (Savage 1954 [with a 'personalistic' theory of statistics], R. Ackoff [in Buckley 1968: 209-18], MacKay 1969, Nauta 1972, Menges 1974). Other aspects of the theoretical complex deal with questions regarding the nature of human and non-human interactions. The different elements will contribute to discussion below in regard to structure, history, and meaning.

Communication theory has great unifying power, which extends across both political and disciplinary boundaries. Its basic categories have now been axiomatized, so that the presuppositions and operations are open to inspection and to appropriate modification for particular purposes. Applicability of the theory extends to all known levels of existence, although these levels are by no means identical to each other in their patterns. For instance, potentiality of or need for 'information' is formally equivalent to 'entropy' (unpredictability of details) in thermodynamics (Fisher 1935: 47 and others) and to 'uncertainty' in quantum theory (Gabor 1946). Communication theory now furnishes key concepts in the fields of biology, psychology, linguistics, sociology, anthropology, and aesthetics.[5] Particularly significant is the development in psychology. Models of 'information processing' connect body with mind; therapy can be understood as dealing with both interpersonal and intrapersonal communication (Ruesch and Bateson 1951, Mucchielli 1970, Peterfreund 1971, Mandler 1975). Such conceptualizations are especially important in relation to religious experience, for they provide an understanding which is both rigorous and appropriate to the subject matter, thus contributing to the integration of science and theology.

It is likely that both divergence and convergence are needed for cognitive advance. A long-term trend toward specialization has

5.   In biology, one refers to 'codes' and 'messengers.' Linguistic theory now deals with statistical and multidimensional patterns (cf. Herdan 1966 for a survey), with the flow of information through a discourse (such as the use of pronouns, relations between 'topic' and 'comment,' and 'presuppositions' [cf. van Dijk 1977: 117, 219-28]), and with the nature of communicative action. Among anthropologists, Lévi-Strauss (1963: 83, 296-310; 1966: 75, 268; 1976: 66, 255), Leach (1969, i.e., 3), and M. Douglas (1975) employ communication (and specifically information) theory. For overviews of virtually all phases, see Pierce 1961, Smith 1966, and Silverstein 1974.

aided the accumulation of knowledge. In recent centuries this trend has accelerated to the point of threatening the unity of knowledge. A contrary move toward interaction and integration, however, recognizes and establishes connections between the various disciplines (e.g., Wendland 1900: 243; Mathews *et al.* 1924; Bonhoeffer 1967: 200; Polanyi 1959: 72; McLuhan 1962: 254). Thus G. Ebeling notes that 'systems theory, information theory, cybernetics, or structural analysis,' together with their mathematical forms, reach toward the humanities, although he is skeptical of their relevance (1975: 94, as was Betti 1967: 135-36). More enthusiastically, H. Rapp (1967) and C. Welsh (1974) argue on the basis of communication theory for a theology which interprets reality as a whole. For the study of the Bible, K. Meyer zu Utrup (1966) and N. Wagner (1976/77) have applied cybernetic and related concepts as an interdisciplinary step. In a general manner, G. von Rad expressed hope for 'the greatest gift which can be given to us: once more a common language' for faith and science (1974: 140 [from 1967]).

In the age of individualism, so-called 'secularization' and an emphasis on Christian uniqueness (cf. TeSelle 1975: 168) represented an increased splitting apart of lived reality. The split aided human freedom and power, but undermined ethical concerns and spiritual wholeness (similarly, Moltmann 1968: 269-87). For instance, the viciousness of North-American slavery and the Nazi extermination of Jews were due in part to a widespread attitude that judicial affairs are not the church's business.[6] Ethical involvement requires understanding and interaction among various groups; at the present time, that includes relations with Marxists. In the words of L. Russell, the reality of a common humanity allows one to 'move beyond identity toward mutuality' with all people (1974: 165). Within the Bible, several Genesis stories emphasize the ethical sensitivity of non-Israelites.[7] Such an appreciation for members

---

6.   North American slavery was unusually vicious, apparently in part because Protestant churches played a weak role in protecting slaves; American theology has learned much from that failure. R. Herrmann (1971: 29) rightly complained in 1933 diary entries that the church was publicly silent on the destructive side of the Nazi revolution. Added note: It is important to note that the sentence above says 'in part'; the opposite side, pogroms against Jews and support for slavery by Christians must be recognized also. In other words, non-involvement by the church was not the only problem.

7.   Gen. 20:4-11; 21:26; 33:1-11. These passages employ Elohim as a designation for deity. (The view—expressed by Jaroš 1974: 58, 401-402 and others—that E is critical of Canaanite religion is based primarily on passages in which Elohim does not appear, at least not as a name. E.g., 'elohim' in Exod. 32:16 is best translated by 'divine'; Num. 23:9 stands within a passage largely using the name Yahweh. For a tradition of religious wisdom in the Northern Kingdom, see Buss 1969: 69, 82.

of other groups does not mean acceptance of any activity that may occur; on the contrary, a considered involvement leads to significant criticism.

Important theoretical considerations speak in favor of a broad vision for theology. On the one hand, expressions of faith can be studied by the human sciences in such a way that light is shed on the character of faith (Buss 1965). On the other hand, faith itself—at least in its biblical form—views God as involved in all of reality (Rust 1953; Peacocke 1971: 149-93). Theology, as is widely acknowledged in theory, deals not with an aspect of existence but with its totality in relation to the Infinite. The special sciences, applying intelligent effort, correspond to what Israelites considered to be 'wisdom' under God. Just as wisdom plays an important role in biblical literature, both in a relatively pure form and as an aspect of priestly and prophetic speech, so scientific knowledge can and must be supported and appropriated by theological disciplines.[8]

A partially correct, but seriously misleading, contrast which emerged in the division of knowledge and experience is between history and nature (as still in Bultmann 1934: 3). When the distinction between these two categories became prominent early in the nineteenth century, the idea of progressive evolution had taken hold in reference to human change; however, in the realm of biology the notion of the fixity of species still reigned.[9] The contrast set human freedom over against subhuman regularity. Further investigation has made clear that long-range development, apparently coupled with a degree of indeterminism, is a feature of the entire known world. At the same time, it is amply clear that human events are not altogether arbitrary but can be understood to a large extent in the light of connections or according to patterns (e.g., Bernheim 1908: 85-145; Dilthey 1921, V: 258; Hempel 1965: 241-43). It is quite proper to make a distinction between particular events and general processes—as did W. Windelband and H. Rickert about 1900—but this distinction does not coincide with a difference between the human and the non-human (with Pannenberg 1976: 123-24).

8. On wisdom as an aspect of various types of speech, including narratives and prophecy, see Buss, 1967: 149; 1969: 63-71, 82, 101, 107, 123-24, 139, etc. (Crenshaw [1969] rightly argues against regarding certain literary expressions simply as examples of wisdom, but that tradition appears widely as an aspect or element, just as other 'forms' should not be regarded as originally or ideally independent.)

9. Schelling 1927-59, I/III: 588-89; I/V: 218 (although ultimately he transcends the distinction); Hegel 1832-87, IX: 67; Droysen 1943: 9-12, 357 (from 1858). In modern times, the idea of social evolution anteceded that of biological evolution by about a century.

Rather, on all known levels the world contains both particularity and generality. Objects and events are general in the sense that they have a describable form; furthermore, the potential effect of an activity has a mathematically continuous side, such as of a field or wave. At the same time, all objects or events act as particular wholes. The combination of continuity and particularity in an event shows itself in statistical phenomena or probability relations.[10] Probability represents the observable aspect of significant action, for the latter requires both a certain freedom for the acting individual and a degree of predictable effectiveness. Without a combination of influence and surprise, there would be no genuine events and no meaningful future. The logic for an open future was outlined by Aristotle in connection with his discussion of tenses (*On Interpretation*, 19a) and received attention in the Middle Ages. It has been developed in considerable detail since the latter part of the nineteenth century in interaction with both science and art (Feuer 1974: 178-80).

Communication is closely related to probability in joining particulars within a relationship. Specifically, measures for information can be stated as equivalent to those of conditional probability (the likelihood of one event, given another), so that either of these can be derived from the other. Indeed, some mathematicians (e.g., Kolmogorov 1967) regard information as conceptually simpler than probability. Insofar as both variability and connection are universal, it is possible to view information as an aspect of all known processes.[11]

The highest and deepest form of communication is surely love. Because of the comprehensive character of love—which includes both freedom and pattern—Peirce suggested *agapism* as an overarching

10.   One reason for probability is the fact that any given event is subject to more than one influence. Bohm showed that the data of modern physics can be reconciled with determinism if one assumes an infinity of influences (1957); such an infinity can never be known, just as (with von Wright 1974: 136) full determinism can never be proved. Thus the question of ultimate indeterminacy is left to intuitive commitment, but that is true for all visions of the whole. Formally it is possible to state causality either externally as conditional probability or internally as action (see, e.g., Nagel 1961: 406-22 on the equivalence of causality and teleology and, further, below, §4, on 'direction').

11.   So, C.F. von Weizsäcker (1971: 351-61) and some Marxists (Kirschenmann 1970: 123, 183-84; Kubát and Zeman 1975: 187-200, 254). The speed of light (pure energy) represents the limit for the propagation of (at least ordinary) information and causation. Communication is a useful image for causality, since determinism is not assumed (Brillouin 1964: 69-72) and since it is likely that causality is not a one-way process but a phenomenon of mutual interaction (with Mach 1975: 205-206; cf. Barbour 1966: 331).

theory of reality. Although *agape* can describe the ground and fulfillment of existence, it seems too ideal for the more negative aspects of experience (Peirce included negativity in *agape* [1931-58, 6.287, 304]) and too tender for subhuman relations. The broader term 'communication,' however, serves readily as an overall symbol by which to express interaction in reality. This symbol fits well the tradition that speaks of the creative and redemptive word of God.

In formulating what is ultimate, theology must employ a metaphor which reflects the basic experience of the world. In an aristocratic age, God was readily pictured as Monarch. In the post-feudal 'bourgeois' or early industrial period, the image developed into the dual notion of Artisan (cf. Barbour 1966: 40-42) and Personal Spirit. Such symbols were not without justification in their respective contexts; however, they do not adequately express the fundamental orientation of the present time and therefore give the impression of the 'death of God.' In recent decades, probably the most impressive 'root metaphor' (Pepper 1942) is that of communication. Influenced by Peirce, Josiah Royce characterized God as the Interpreter (1968: 319), on the grounds that interpretation is a communal process establishing a world. Writing at about the same time, Franz Rosenzweig employed the symbols of mathematics to provide a key to the phases of the All (1972). Close to him stood a number of other 'dialogical' thinkers, including Martin Buber, who defined God in terms of the relational word 'Thou' (1923). Quite differently, Karl Barth emphasized the 'Word of God,' which he set in considerable opposition to man and at considerable distance from nature (1936-58, III/4: 332-33; nevertheless, Howe 1970: 75-91 has shown parallels between Barth's theology and modern physics). Emil Brunner, influenced in part by Buber, viewed God as 'the Self-Communicating One' (1940: 199). More recently, 'speech event' or 'language event' has been identified as divine reality by Ernst Fuchs and Gerhard Ebeling, although they describe it only in terms of an engagement of human beings with the Gospel (Fuchs 1968: 248; Ebeling 1963: 328). According to H.N. Wieman (1975), creative interchange is ultimate.[12] Rejecting separation and reification,

12.   Schillebeeckx (1967: 35) applied the 'word of God' to all of God's activities. Perspectives that view love as basic in reality appear in Charles Hartshorne (1941, stimulated by Peirce), Nels Ferré (1951: 15-16, with a cybernetic analogy), Paul Tillich (1951-63, I: 279; III: 422), and Martin Luther King, Jr. (1963: 11). According to Casalis, the place of God is now taken by the sign which refers to itself (1976: 64); one can speak, differently, of a new metaphor for God. Recently, T. Altizer has located God's presence in speech (1977: 43, although—in a nominalist fashion—with

Mary Daly (1973: 32, 198) holds God to be 'The Good Who is self-communicating Be-ing, Who is the Verb from whom and with whom all true movements move.'[13]

If interpretation is grounded in communication as fundamental, nothing will be foreign to its path. The logic of relationship, including mathematics, and all the sciences belong to it, as does intuitive sensitivity to the individual and to the whole.

2. *Interrelationships (Structure)*

The study of interrelationships involves the recognition of structure. Structure exhibits the relations of smaller units within a larger one (B. Russell 1948: 250). The larger whole may be a verse, a book, or a culture; the parts may be words, themes, or standard forms. Structural analysis is a part of all thoughtful endeavors, but it can receive different kinds and degrees of attention. It can be employed as a means to some other end, such as historical reconstruction or technological application, or it can be an intrinsic goal, as in aesthetic enjoyment or intellectual contemplation.

Variety

The status of structures concerns a long-standing philosophical debate between 'realism' (according to which structures are real or ultimate) and 'nominalism' (for which structures are only mental or are merely names). Nominalism is logically and historically associated with individualistic modes of existence, while realism expresses a collective and universal sense. Elements of both positions are combined in a communicational perspective, in which source and recipient are viewed in interaction. An object does indeed exhibit a structure in the sense that its parts—however defined—truly stand in certain relationships. Yet there are a very large number of ways in which wholes and parts can be identified, and these parts stand in different kinds of relations. Therefore no single structural analysis can lay claim to exclusive validity. Each analysis is relative to the procedures and interests of the observer

---

primary emphasis on otherness and actuality rather than on sharing and possibility, so that silence is ultimate). Whitehead joins particularity and generality in God; similarly, in his view a 'proposition' is a 'hybrid' of actuality and potentiality (1929: 282; applied to Christ by Beardslee 1966: 150). Whitehead's system, however, lacks coherence as well as mystery through its failure to identify God with the ultimate (1929: 11, 47, 73), perhaps as a differentiated unity ('dialectic') of communication.

    13.   For further on theology, see the Appendix, §10.

(Pool 1959, *passim*; Ashby 1962). In a particular description, one should thus speak not of 'the structure' of an object but of 'a structure' or 'structures.' A textual study can pay attention to logical relations between content elements,[14] to the sequential arrangement of items (traditionally known as 'composition'),[15] to spatial and temporal relations between scenes, to the roles of figures in a story, or to a large number of other features (cf. Olsson 1974: 74-248).

The recognition of relativity should not be confused with relativism, according to which no right or wrong descriptions can be made (against Hirsch 1976, which fails to make the needed distinction, but with Crane 1953: 27; similarly, Martinet 1970). Relativity means, rather, that all statements must be made in relation to a frame of reference or—metaphorically expressed—that assertions are answers to questions. One of the crucial aspects of information, as defined technically, is that it can only be stated in terms relevant to a certain set of concerns and expectations (so, e.g., Nauta 1972: 227); consequently, it is neither purely objective nor purely subjective. Since general considerations are implied by questions in an investigation, it is not possible to 'begin with individuals,' as a nominalist position encourages one to do.[16] Because of the variety of potential considerations, however, it is also not possible to point to the 'essential' form of an object (expressing

14.   So, Buss 1969: 116-40. Logical (or thought) relations loom large in structural analyses by A. Weiser (1931: 22), W. Eichrodt (1961: 31), and Y. Kaufmann (1960). For 'generative semantics' (diverging from Chomsky 1965), the semantic content is the deep structure of a sentence (see van Dijk 1972: 17-18).

15.   Sequential structures, together with various stylistic features, have been described by E. Galbiati (1956), L. Alonso Schökel (1963, Chap. 9), W. Richter (1971: 79-114), and others. Some scholars seek to combine compositional with logical relations (e.g., Fohrer *et al.* 1973: 86); often, however, different aspectual patterns do not coincide (see Oomen 1971: 212; M. Weiss 1971).

16.   Against Richter (1971: 138, etc.) and others. Richter's distinction between genre and individual 'form' is problematic, for it is a characteristic of forms that they are general. Richter, although seeking openness to systematic thinking, remains fundamentally particularist, viewing genres only as abstractions from individuals. The modern philosophy of science has shown that induction from particulars, favored by the nominalistic tradition during the last few centuries, is theoretically weak. (So, rightly, Polzin 1977: 19-26, 48, with Karl Popper—although Popper's view is again one-sided. Induction plays a legitimate role in conjunction with other procedures. For critique of a view that stresses only prior assumptions, see below, n. 69.)

what it fundamentally *is* or is designed to be) in an Aristotelian sense.[17]

The observation that different configurations can be recognized applies to literary genres (cf. Hernadi 1972, Hempfer 1973, Gülich and Raible 1972).[18] Gunkel made a major contribution in drawing attention to generic patterns but erroneously implied that only one view of genres is correct (e.g., 1933: 10). Generic study serves the goal of furnishing as much insight as possible in a brief compass; it does so by relating repeated features (e.g., characteristics of psalms) to a single model. A form-critical analysis therefore needs to select and organize the data in the manner most helpful for its particular purpose. Thus Gunkel's category of 'Zion psalms'—odd in its placement among other genres—is useful in that it compresses information about a number of poems. Yet significant classifications can be carried out according to different principles (cf. Rofé 1970; Culley 1976: 70; Sawyer 1972; and, for multiple classification, Lindsay and Norman 1972: 391). This multiplicity is reflected in the varied and flexible character of generic labels within biblical literature.

In a communicational perspective, a genre is best viewed as an open or virtual class which describes a possibility, rather than as a class of actual objects which meet a certain description.[19] The genre of lament,

17.   Thomas Aquinas states the issue thus: 'Since that by which a thing is constituted in its proper genus or species is what is signified by the definition expressing what the thing is, philosophers have taken to using the word *quiddity* for the word *essence*. The philosopher [Aristotle] frequently calls this the what a thing was to be [in Latin, *quod, quid erat esse*], in other words, that by which a thing is a *what*. It is also called *form*' (1949: 28). Biblical form criticism often attempts an uneasy (and illogical) combination of the nominalist and Aristotelian positions; both must be transcended.

18.   See, further, the Appendix.

19.   This position opposes both Platonism (according to which forms are more 'real' than are concrete objects) and nominalism (which is reserved about an ontological status for possibility and emphasizes particular actuality [see, e.g., the descriptions by Faust 1931: 190; and by Horkheimer and Adorno 1972: x, 23]). The issue is a central one in modern logic; cf. below, nn. 54, 56. Cantor's 'set' contained possible or conceivable objects (1895: 481); Bernays described 'classes' as an 'open universe' (1958: 57). According to Wittgenstein (1922, 2.033), 'form is the possibility of structure.' Husserl's *eidos* ('form') brackets out the question of actuality and deals with 'possibility' (1952: 29, 47). Quine's semi-nominalist 'virtual class' or class 'abstract' is similar to what is here called an open or virtual class, but without an ontological status (1970: 64-72). (It should be noted that there are many degrees and varieties of both nominalism and realism; see, e.g., Martin 1958: 269. Seldom is either alternative now held in an extreme form, but perhaps a genuine union cannot be fully brought about within philosophy.)

for instance, is not constituted by the collectivity of all psalms of this type, but by the type itself, i.e., by what constitutes a possible psalm of lament. One advantage of such a conceptualization is that it is in line with the way genres function in human life, namely, as expectations of the speaker or hearer regarding what can or will be said. Genres can also be viewed as theoretical entities, independent of the habits of a specific culture. Such theoretical genres describe what is in principle possible and thus become the expectations of a theorist.

If genres are understood as open classes, it is not difficult to recognize their interaction. Normally, more than one possibility is realized in a given phenomenon. Thus the book of Job reflects elements of several forms, such as dispute, lament, comedy, and irony, just as the genres of ancient Greek and Mesopotamian literatures were fluid and interacted with one another.[20] The flexibility and multiplicity of structures is an important recognition of modern study. While most traditional science was oriented in a quasi-Aristotelian manner toward mutually exclusive categories, modern science (although presupposing classification) sees the need to 'progress from classification to mathematics' in order to capture 'the complex possibilities of multiple relations' within a system (Whitehead 1925: 43; 1933: 150, 176). Biblical form criticism can incorporate the richness of patterns reflected in mathematics by recognizing a multidimensional array of overlapping forms.

Multidimensionality serves both simplicity and complexity. Experimental studies have shown that the human organism perceives best by paying attention to several axes of discrimination simultaneously. When focusing attention on a single scale, an unaided ear or eye can discriminate between about seven items on that scale. When additional types of contrast are added, the number of effective distinctions along any one axis is reduced, but the total number of distinguishable forms rises; e.g., three dimensions with four steps each will yield 64 categories. Observation is most effective when attention is paid to a very large number of dimensions, with a binary or triple disjunction in each (Garner 1962: 122-29). These data regarding information processing show the psychological basis for the widespread occurrences of binary contrasts in language and culture. (In fact, the recognition of multidimensional binary perception stands in sharp contrast to so-called 'binary' thinking, which is unidimensional and thus simplistic.)[21] The perceptual system also

20.   See Babbitt 1910: 249; Nietzsche 1912, XVIII: 157; Grayson 1975: 5. As R. Williams (1977: 180) rightly points out, the theory of fixed genres is a neo-classical construction, more rigid than ancient Greek thought.

21.   This sentence has been added for clarity.

supports triple contrasts, with three positive steps or with a neuter
position between a positive and a negative one; other divisions, such
as fourfold, are of course not ruled out.

The simultaneous operation of several twofold or threefold
contrasts is well known in systems of phonemes. The same basic
principle is apparent in other aspects of language. Hebrew has three
'persons,' two 'genders,' two (or three) 'numbers,' and two aspectual
'tenses'; its seven stems of verbal conjugation designate three levels
of action, each with two or three 'voices' (active, passive-reflexive).
On a larger scale, speech acts—as analyzed in part by Aristotle
(*Rhetoric*), Searle (1969: 66-67), and others—reveal several major
dimensions: emotive tone in respect to oneself or others (positive,
negative, or neutral), time orientation (past, present, future), rank
relationship (toward one of higher, lower, or equal rank), and asser-
tive character (affirmation, imagination, question). Culturally
defined genres tend to agree fairly closely with this general organi-
zation, although numerous variations are standard in different
traditions. The system of Israelite genres includes the following
dimensions, or sets of contrasts: (1) the nature of the speaker
and addressee, divine or human (e.g., law is largely divine speech
directed to human beings); (2) particularity (especially in history
and prophecy) or generality; (3) temporal orientation; (4) focus on
the individual or on a group; and (5) positive or negative tone.[22]

It is doubtful that conventions for expression apply independently
to each precise genre. Most likely, an individual lament utilizes the
forms applicable to its components: a human speaker addressing
God, individuality, negativity, etc. Some clerical psalms present
divine speech to a general, repeatable audience; in this regard, then,
they are both similar to and different from prophecy, which presents
divine speech in relation to particular occasions.[23] Within biblical
Hebrew, most conventions probably are available to any speech act
for which they are appropriate. If this is true, a speaker can generate

22.   On such intersecting dimensions in genres, see Mowinckel 1962: 39;
Westermann 1965 (in part); Buss 1969: *passim*; 1974: 54-55; Beauchamp
1971; Pike 1967: 136-39; Jason 1969: 415. Generally for language, Hartmann
(1963: v, vi) defines 'form' in terms of multidimensional combination and
'structure' as a relation between possibilities.

23.   See Buss 1963. (Many of the relevant psalms are now attributed to
Asaph; whether they originated from a group called Asaphites—a question
discussed by others—is not immediately relevant here.) It is not likely that
oracles within psalms are adapted from prophecy (as found in the prophetic
books); rather, they share a component with prophetic speech, agreeing with
it in one dimension (divine speech) and disagreeing in another (general vs.
particular); cf. the next two notes.

various constellations of speech. In such a 'generative rhetoric,' the number of basic elements to be learned is much smaller than the number of possibilities they engender.[24] Of course, a special genre representing an intersection of more basic elements may develop some peculiarities not predictable from the components.

If conventional forms are not, for the most part, assigned to mutually exclusive genres, there is less need to speak of an 'imitating' or 'borrowing' of forms than is often thought. The appearance in prophecy of hymnic language, of laments, and of invectives (critical descriptions preceded by *hôy*) is quite natural; the fact that descriptions of evil in Hosea are similar to those in psalms does not mean that they were taken over from the other tradition.[25] Again, there is no need to ask whether the prophetic call was derived from the call of a political leader or vice versa; both uses are also found outside of Israel and presumably form within Hebrew two different realizations of a summons to represent authority. Similar observations hold in regard to calls to attention and other expressions appearing in different contexts.

A multidimensional organization, with cross-classification, requires greater intellectual maturity than a hierarchical 'tree' system in which comprehensive genres, like psalms, are separately

24.   A generative *rhetoric* can probably be stated in terms of a finite number of rules. A generative *poetics* (cf. van Dijk 1971 for a survey) can be similar. In fact, the description of genres in Güttgemann's 'generative poetics,' 1971: 229, is similar to the one presented here.

25.   See Buss 1969: 83-105; 1978: 169 (invectives are not derived from mourning, although it is possible that in some cases they are affected by the latter because of the similarity in style); cf. also below n. 37. Hardmeier recognizes the wide applicability of specific forms, but does not go quite far enough in reconceptualizing genres. Although following 'generative semantics' (see above, note 14), he does not carry through with a distinction between genres in semantic 'deep' structure (1978: 267, which transcend a particular tradition; cf. 113-15) and genres as instruments (286, presumably conventions); what he calls 'forms' apparently are conventions that serve as expressions for the components of genres. Amos 5:2 can be analyzed as follows: (1) basic speech act: prophetic threat (componentially: a negative projection for a specific group or person on the basis of revelation); (2) prophetic conventions, including the following: (a) threats are usually stated in the form of announcements; (b) the future can be described as present or past; (c) metaphoric and dramatic style is frequently employed; (3) general conventions, among others: (a) a certain style for lamenting the downfall of a person or group (expressing negativity with sympathy); (b) a widespread habit of personifying groups. Prophetic lament over a nation, as a complex, became a conventional genre in Israelite culture.

divided into subtypes, such as hymns. It is reasonable to believe, however, that the common Israelite possessed the needed capacity to employ it both consciously and unconsciously.[26]

Uncertainty

The detailed forms which can be expressed in a communication system have been called 'logons' (Gabor 1946). The larger the number of such forms, the greater the unpredictability of each, if all are equally probable. In other words, entropy (unpredictability in detail, also called 'uncertainty') generally increases with variety. Under natural conditions some forms will appear more frequently than others. Shannon's measure of entropy for the surprise value of a message takes account of the relative frequencies, for these affect the average predictability of occurrences.[27] A complex form or one stated in a complex manner is usually less common and thus more surprising than the simpler elements combined within it. For instance, there are fewer critical prophecies than there are prophecies or criticisms in general. A system with complex forms thus will tend to have higher 'uncertainty' than one with simple forms.

Entropy constitutes a potential for information (Nauta 1972: 177). Information as a process reduces the recipient's uncertainty in that what was unknown becomes known; the information yielded by a signal which has been received is, therefore, equal to its prior uncertainty or unpredictability. Thus, in order to be able to increase information, one must increase entropy in a system. This is a profound—although very simple—insight of communication theory. If the perceivable variability of a source or channel is high, rich and surprising messages can be conveyed.

---

26.   In modern children, cross-classification becomes consciously operative before adolescence (e.g., Anderson 1975: 225-56, following Piaget).

27.   Average unpredictability is highest when all options occur with equal frequency. For instance, a person who knows how to make five different responses to a frustrating situation but customarily uses only one of these is more 'predictable' than a person who knows only two responses but uses these with roughly equal frequency. Thus entropy normally rises with, but is not simply equal to, variety. If one logon is considerably more common than another, an efficient language normally employs a shorter coding for it. (Natural languages make use of this principle, so that word length is inversely related to a word's frequency; Zipf 1949: 19-55.) Shannon's measure for information is usually stated in 'bits' (the logarithm, with the base of two, of the improbability of a signal); it corresponds roughly to the number of digits in a binary code, if the signal is economically represented.

For a human being, as for any system, there is an upper limit for the speed at which information can be processed. Apparently the human organism seeks communication at a rate near this limit when awake and during certain phases of sleep. Under conditions of sensory deprivation or lack of external input, it produces its own stimuli in hallucinations or in dreams. Similarly, play and art largely represent activity and communication for their own sake.[28] They constitute enjoyable living in the present and serve an important long-range function in the maturation of activity and perception (Fiske and Maddi 1961). Indeed, it is likely that communication, or growth on the basis of internal or external stimuli, is the prime intrinsic good within experience.[29]

As shown by experiments, entropy and information are connected with aesthetic value. Two somewhat different connections appear in the 'interestingness' and the 'pleasingness' of a work of art (see especially Berlyne 1974). Interestingness, shown in the amount of attention given to a structure, increases with subjectively assessed complexity and with numerically computed uncertainty—two measures which closely correlate with each other. It appears that interest is positively related to information or the promise of information. It is possible (although not demonstrated) that the evoking of interest declines with very high levels of complexity, which may no longer be observable. Pleasingness, as rated by an observer, is highest with levels of intermediate uncertainty. The optimum level is relative to the observer's capacity and experience; it is higher for more mature persons and for those trained in a given medium or tradition than for others. If a relatively simple object is encountered repeatedly it becomes less pleasing, while a more complex one gives increasing pleasure with repetition until a plateau is reached. Apparently entropy contributes to aesthetic pleasure insofar as it is not completely resolved within a unified whole (similarly, Moles 1966: 162). Literary works of high quality typically include several levels of complexity and unity, so that they can be enjoyed repeatedly.

28. According to R. Jakobson (in Sebeök 1960: 203), the poetic function of language highlights the message as such. Art has repeatedly been compared with play since Kant and Schiller (cf. Gadamer 1975). A major difference between art and science lies in the fact that the former, more so than the latter, creates uncertainty to be reduced; this distinction corresponds to a difference between play and (other) exploratory behavior, which take place under secure and uncertain conditions, respectively (Lieberman 1977: 109).

29. Sources of happiness identified so far include primarily interaction with others and, especially, variety of experience (e.g., Bradburn 1969: 132-46, 227; Izard 1977: 266).

Unity has long been recognized as a characteristic of beauty. At the same time, the value of variety received partial attention in ancient times (e.g., with regard to choice of words and plot) and even more in the modern period, when interest in novelty became widespread.[30] A degree of unity is needed for the perceiving of variety within a work, for consciousness can attend to only a small number of unrelated items; short-term memory, in fact, has a limit of about seven independent items (G. Miller 1956). A uniting of variety is described thus by Arnheim: 'The great works of art are complex, but we also praise them for 'having simplicity,' by which we mean that they organize a wealth of meaning and form in an over-all structure that clearly defines the place and function of every detail in the whole' (1974: 59-60). In literature, aesthetic unity and richness lie in part on the level of verbal patterns but even more in what is said—with fullness, tensiveness (including irony), and subtlety of meaning (Walzel 1923: 185, 385; Brooks 1947: 178-79; Wellek and Warren 1956, Chap. 18; Beardsley 1966: 125-52, 552 [with references]; Ingarden 1960: 395-99). Beauty is by no means restricted to non-scientific language; proofs or theories are 'elegant' if they accomplish or account for much by means of a few steps.

A simple richness appears in the Bible, which H.L. Mencken has called 'unquestionably the most beautiful book in the world' (1946: 289). Since this literature was largely directed to a popular audience—that is in fact one of its strengths—one should not expect highly intricate productions. Yet Israelite narratives contain delightfully surprising twists, intriguing characters, and stark confrontations (cf. Good 1965, Sandmel 1972, and illustrations below). Fullness of patterning can be seen in combinations of alternatives within a single dimension. Some psalms and prophecies contain both positive and negative elements, while narratives

---

30. In 1671 and somewhat later, Leibniz characterized harmony as 'diversity compensated by identity' and as 'unity in plurality'; the harmonious is 'the uniformly difform' (1969: 138, 426). He held that such harmony was divinely pre-established, since he denied influence or 'communication' among created substances (457). A view of beauty as 'unity in the manifold' (Moses Mendelssohn) became widespread in the eighteenth century; according to François Hemsterhuis, 'the beautiful is that which gives the greatest number of ideas in the shortest time' (see Gilbert and Kuhn 1939: 241, 261, 275, 296-97). Hemsterhuis's formulation furnished inspiration for informational-theoretical analyses of the arts (see Nake 1974 for a survey). Modern analyses of this sort have shown the relative complexity and unpredictability of artistic expressions, including literature (e.g., Lotman 1972: 43, 113-14), and how even familiar realities are presented in a fresh way (Mukařovský 1978: xiv and others).

frequently express emotional ambivalence. Both divine and human speech appears in prophetic expressions. Very often, individual and communal concerns are joined. In the stories of Genesis, the level of family relations is closely interwoven with a national perspective; this phenomenon does not represent a weakness, but rather enhances enjoyment.[31]

The amount that can be communicated within the capacity of a medium or of a recipient is reduced by competition from other messages ('noise'). 'Redundancy' in the form of additional signals (more than are necessary in a noiseless situation) can protect against loss caused by interference. Redundancy has other functions as well. Appropriately organized, it enhances unity and intensifies feeling. Rhythm, parallelism, and repetitions of word or sound focus the attention of hearers, in addition to aiding their memory. Such regularity, however, must be broken up in order to avoid monotony. As a matter of fact, redundant patterns create new opportunities for surprise, namely through the possibility of deviating from them (Erlich 1955: 184; Garner 1962: 339). Redundancy thus forms the basis for more complex structures. Indeed, both music and literature derive their effect to a large extent from the varying of patterns. Thus, for instance, a very regular chiasm is not highly aesthetic, although a partial chiasm aids in organizing a passage (cf. Gammie 1979).

Patterns, as they appear in existence, are marked not by complete regularity but by conditional probabilities in implicative tendencies (Meyer 1956: 31, 57; 1973: 29, 130; Moles 1966: 57, 74). When a rhythm is set up, its continuation may be expected, yet not with certainty. Similarly, during a festival an Israelite prophet may well, but need not, pronounce an oracle. The strength of implications between phenomena ranges from the somewhat likely to the virtually certain. It is important to note that most culturally defined

---

31.   In Genesis, as in the story of David, family and national relations are so closely interwoven that it is unlikely that they represent stages in the development of these texts. Hardly any of the stories would make sense without both aspects, although the individual motifs undoubtedly have divergent histories. (These histories ordinarily cannot be reconstructed from the story itself but can be traced to some extent through comparative research; see, e.g., Gaster 1969: 164.) A combination of personal and political elements appears also in ancient and modern drama, in historical novels, and in recent studies of psychological factors in history. The conjunction thus reflects neither an odd juxtaposition of genres nor an outmoded form of narrative. These observations, however, do not rule out the possibility that in some instances unresolved tensions occur within the present form of the story as a result of its prior history.

genres are constituted not by rigid norms but by probability relations (with Todorov 1973: 18). Whatever is rigidly required furnishes no information; it may, however, provide security and reinforce a cultural system (important functions of repeated ritual). It is quite appropriate that psalms are highly predictable, since their aim is not to describe a condition in detail but to issue an unambiguous call for help or to express joy, etc. (Psalms do vary, however, so that a large number of them are preserved; see Ridderbos 1972: 100). Other genres serve as vehicles for widely varying content and need to be flexible.

A structural apprehension reduces the manifold character of existence to a manageable form. Although this is an advantage for the mastery of life, it does not yield full contact with it. Some religious experiences seek to meet reality without such reduction. For instance, Zen aims at continually fresh perception; if predictability is erased from consciousness, even a repeated stimulus constantly carries new information (Tart 1969: 485). A highly unstructured state (as described, for instance, by V. Turner 1974) does not provide a good basis for practical achievement, but permits intimate relations with others. According to the Book of Job, the divine is manifested in the structures of natural order, yet God's way in its completeness is beyond human knowledge. Not the lack of information but an inexhaustible fullness constitutes mystery.[32]

3. *History*

While forms express what is possible, history represents actuality. The actual is particular—not identical (at least in spatiotemporal location) with any other. This particularity contains the seeds of alienation and conflict, but it is necessary for love. A major aspect of actuality is realistic possibility, or potentiality.[33] Such possibility develops in steps; for instance, the invention of the wheel must in principle precede the building of carts. New options emerge as the result of previously actualized opportunities. Particularity and evolution thus constitute the two basic ingredients of history.

Biblical scholarship has fully incorporated the element of particularity into its framework of operation. In fact, as other disciplines

32.   Similarly, H. Schilling (1973, with a discussion of relevant views).

33.   On 'real,' as distinct from formal, possibility, cf. Peirce (1931-58, 2.664, 5.453, 6.217-20), Whitehead (1929: 102), P. Weiss (1958: 105-15), E. Bloch (1959: 237), and N. Rescher (1975: 193). Such possibility (or potentiality) can be assigned a probability greater than zero. (Probability measures a relation between future actuality and formal possibility.)

did during the nineteenth century, it has emphasized that element one-sidedly. Form criticism since Gunkel countered an individualistic perspective through paying attention to repeated styles and content in relation to typical situations. Yet, in this tradition, genres have largely been conceived of as norms within a single culture,[34] and for many scholars genre criticism has served primarily as a tool for examining particular phenomena.

The methods of particularistic historiography are well known. (They are summarized in Bernheim 1908.)[35] A few fundamental issues, however, require special attention. All historical judgment is probabilistic, so that every historical statement must give an indication of the degree of certainty ascribed to a proposal. If one inference is based on another, rather than directly on primary evidence, reliability quickly evaporates. Constant reliance on hard data and lack of dogmatism constitute the foundation of critical historiography. During the period of intensive historical criticism (from about 1770 to 1880), the goal of obtaining a more correct view of historical development, on the basis of free critical inquiry, was on the whole achieved. For once a question is formulated and a procedure is developed for it, a conclusion warranted by the data is ordinarily reachable within a reasonable period of time. The effective limit of knowledge in regard to the history of biblical literature was probably approached at the turn of the century.[36]

34.   In Germany, as well as in some other countries, there was a strong movement against both individualism and universalism in favor of nationalism or group identity (e.g. Rosenberg 1937: 537). A more appropriate balance between these three factors is needed.

35.   See above, essay 3.

36.   For the Pentateuch, the insight remains that four strata can be distinguished to a considerable extent on the basis of style and content (cf. Bentzen 1949). Sharp divisions cannot be made between the strata, but their tendencies can be handled statistically and the strata can be treated as complexes of correlations. For instance, E is probably best understood as material employing Elohim but not exhibiting characteristics of P. Added note: The precise dates of these strata are debatable. A number of form critics after Gunkel have dated much of that literature considerably earlier than Wellhausen did, on the assumption that earlier forms can be discerned on the basis of formal analysis, but this is a highly questionable assumption. Similarly, a very late dating also rests on insecure grounds. These datings are of less significance for the ordinary reader or for a meaningful understanding of the Hebrew Bible than are macrohistorical considerations, which involve millennia rather than centuries. The negative conclusion that traditional ascriptions of authorship are problematic is significant, however; this is religiously important, since it undercuts a literal interpretation of biblical history.

Past form critics have attempted to reach an earlier stage of literature by determining the 'origin' of forms. Yet a search for 'origins' is on the whole unhistorical. Origin is basically a religious and perhaps a philosophical category; the appropriate words for historical study are 'earlier' and 'later.' Specifically, a confusion of languages and procedures becomes apparent in attempts to determine the 'original' *Sitz im Leben* of a genre. The notion of a life-situation is very useful if it refers to a human role in a 'form of life' (Wittgenstein 1953, I: § 23). The idea, however, that a genre arises from a typical spatiotemporal setting is largely mistaken. A genre may have a preferred, or even a prescribed, setting of this kind; however, the genre is often older, and as a rule a specific setting (such as five times a day) serves a genre (such as prayer), rather than vice versa.[37] Furthermore, in most cases 'pure' forms do not represent an earlier stage but arise from differentiation (with Mowinckel 1962: 96, against Gunkel). For instance, hymnic language probably belonged to the human process of praise in connection with other elements—including lament, wisdom, and prophecy—before it became the exclusive content of certain psalms. Instead of searching for hypothetical origins, historical investigation properly focuses on three issues: the sociopsychological meaning of an interaction (the human process or role), the organizational factors at a given time (which form a setting), and long-range development (evolution).

Macrohistorical perspectives have been far less adequately developed by biblical scholars than has particularistic historiography. One reason for this lack lies in a justified skepticism toward the idea of progress. Evolution, however, does not necessarily imply progress. Another reason lies in a reluctance—widespread in the first half of the century—to engage in interdisciplinary cooperation. Indeed, a broad vision, made difficult by modern specialization, was explicitly rejected by the so-called 'biblical theology' movement (sketched by Childs [1970]). In the biblical field, W.F. Albright is

37.   According to Mowinckel (1962: 28), 'situation' determines aim and content; that is true only if a human 'life-situation' is distinguished from such a 'setting'; a setting is generally secondary in relation to the other factors. Against traditional setting theory, see Long 1976. On role and situation (distinguishable from setting): Buss 1969: 1; 1970: 2; 1978 (see above, essays 3, 4); Ruesch and Bateson 1951: 27, 276; Hasel 1972: 383; Joshua Fishman and others in Pride and Holmes 1972: 19-31, 75, 260-335; W. Kummer in Gülich and Raible 1972: 37-39; Schutz and Luckmann 1973: 113, 252; Hempfer 1973: 188 (reporting observations by M. Waltz, learning from and correcting Gunkel's notion of 'Sitz im Leben'), 225; J. Fabian in Eister 1974: 255-66; Mehan and Wood 1975: 75; K. Berger 1977: 111-27; and, for religious education, Grosch 1971: 35, 63.

almost the only one who concerned himself with macrohistory. He constructed an 'organismic' theory and, furthermore, regarded as probable that evolution can be stated in mathematical form; he was confident that 'God controls evolution' (1942: 3, 179, 184).

The best formulation of development is probably still that of Herbert Spencer, who proposed that the general trend of evolution is toward an increase in differentiation and integration, as aspects of a single process (1862).[38] Spencer's view was highly optimistic. Not long after his writing, however, a more pessimistic outlook arose, propelled in part by the discovery of the Second Law of Thermodynamics, which recognizes the growth of entropy or 'disorder' in the physical universe. Since then, it has been a puzzle to many thinkers how increases in complexity, observable in biology and sociology, relate to this increase in entropy. According to a widely followed theory propounded by E. Schrödinger in 1945 (cf. Buckley 1968: 143-46), 'order' is transferred from the inorganic world to the organic. While this theory may be correct in part, it does not distinguish between degree of order, or predictable orderliness (the opposite of entropy) and grade of order, or complexity. On the whole, these relate negatively to each other.[39] Thus the development of complexity is not contrary to a growth of entropy. The main question of evolution, then, is how richer wholes are formed, that is, how communication makes use of 'uncertainty.'

A whole may be defined as an entity within which there is a continuing process of interaction, so that an event in one part tends to affect the rest more than would be the case if the parts were relatively isolated. There are many levels of organization and many degrees of integration. In higher animals, a central nervous system serves to guide the whole. Among human beings, some families are closely knit, while others barely hang together. What is it that

38.   Increase in complexity must be regarded as probabilistic, not inevitable. (Toulmin 1972: 334, like others, rightly argues against inevitability.) That differentiation is normally associated with increase in size can be seen in Blau's data (1974); it is not given sufficient recognition by Teilhard de Chardin, who places an integrating 'Omega point' into the future (1959). The development of complexity and, with it, freedom in sociocultural, including religious, history is well known (e.g., Bellah 1970: 44).

39.   That complexity is related to entropy is recognized in part in connection with the question of evolution by S. Bok and V. Somenzi in Dockx and Bernays 1965: 219-27, 234; Kirschenmann 1970: 72, 151; K. Denbigh in Kubát and Zeman 1975: 84. As has been known for some time, a high-entropy state is 'probable' overall precisely because it is realizable in a large number of ways and thus unpredictable in detail. See, further, *CF*, 10.2, 3.

joins elements together? A number of processes do so: attraction, exchange of particles, resonances, and—especially important— various systems of mutual contribution or 'synergy.'[40] Atoms 'share' electrons in molecules; in an organism the various parts contribute to each other directly or indirectly. As a unit increases in size, internal communication becomes more difficult, so that there is a limit to growth by agglomeration. When such a limit is approached, further complexity arises when such a whole enters into relations with other similar-sized units within a more inclusive one (T. Parsons 1966: 113; Parsegian 1973). With each level, unpredictability in detail tends to increase, and with this the potential information in an interaction rises. The individualistic divergence which provides the basis of entropy can thus be both overcome and furthered by mutuality.

The contribution which a part renders to a whole is often called its 'function' (it is always necessary to make clear the whole in relation to which the function is considered). Such a function is a special form of causality and no more teleological than causality in general. It can be stated in terms of a mathematical function, which determines one object in a given domain on the basis of another (cf. Nagel 1961: 520-35). In both mathematical and realistic functions, a given value can be reached from more than one base; in other words, the same result can be achieved by functional alternatives.

Functions contributing to a whole participate in feedback loops. Negative feedback stills an operation when it reaches a certain 'goal' and therefore plays a crucial role in stabilizing a system. Positive feedback is open-ended and increases an operation, until checked by other processes. Uncontrolled positive feedback involving only part of a system leads to the destruction of the larger whole (see M. Maruyama in Buckley 1968: 304-13). But in conjunction with negative processes, which protect structure already attained, positive feedback leads to the growth of a system in quantity or richness. Such enhancing processes include pleasure in organisms and the formation of meaning in cultural life. For instance, biblical narratives informed the self-definition of hearers; this in turn contributed to the preservation of the stories, whose impact is now worldwide.

40.   On 'synergy,' see Maslow 1971: 199-211, following Ruth Benedict; in physics a form of this appears as 'binding energy,' with a negative cost to the system (so also Weizsäcker 1974: 211, having learned from Shannon the role of entropy as a potential). Peirce regarded love (conceived quite broadly) as the basis of creativity (1931-58, 6.287-317); similarly, Wood (1973). Freud held that eros builds up unities (1950: 57). According to J. and R. Maritain, liberating poetic creativity arises from communication (1955: 7, 79).

Growth in amount or complexity does not constitute moral advance but yields an increase in real possibilities, including destructive ones (so also Wiener 1948: 37). Variety and unpredictability are paradoxical in that they provide both the need and the opportunity for information. Uncoordinated and clashing activities form a problem to which communication responds. Indeed, Jewish and Christian traditions see in history a growth of both good and evil (comparable to the interplay between form and uncertainty)— the good giving opportunity to evil and evil providing occasion for good (see Buss 1967: 144-47; 1969: 132, 140).

An interweaving of good and evil is clearly discernible in the story of Jacob, who is pictured as a rascal and yet the chosen of God. Although deception is not condemned sharply in biblical stories (especially if practiced by the weak), Jacob is in no sense a moral hero; in some ways he is outshone by Esau, especially in the latter's generosity in reconciliation. The Israelite willingness to be self-critical in this way can be assessed as spiritually profound. Such self-irony is continued in later 'Jewish humor,' which exhibits the general character of the Jacob accounts and furnishes a significant literary form for a conception of history.[41]

The complex character of Israelite narration becomes apparent in a comparison with V. Propp's analysis of imaginary tales involving magic (1968). Propp isolates over thirty 'functions,' i.e., processes which advance the drama of a narrative, and argues that an individual story selects from these in sequence. Of these, the first two-thirds appear in Genesis 25-35. Functions 1-8 deal with trickery, for which the victim may share some blame through violating an interdiction or by failing to resist the villain. Jacob's acquisition of Esau's birthright, in part because of the latter's lightheartedness, and his deception of Isaac, who acts rather stupidly (cf. Gammie 1979, Allen 1979), fit this pattern. Functions 8a-19 involve the solution of the problem created by the villainy: the hero is dispatched from home, finds a donor who willingly or unwillingly provides magical aid, and defeats the villain in a struggle in which the hero is branded

41. On early, medieval, and modern Jewish humor, see, e.g., Waxman 1933: 605; Jónsson 1965: 87; Buss 1969: 74, 126; and the Israeli satirist Ephraim Kishon. In a stimulating manner, Kenneth Burke and Haydon White (1973) have applied literary models to views of history. According to Burke (1959: 171), the comic frame allows joining action with self-observation. That holds true especially for the self-ironic comedy of 'Jewish humor,' which best expresses the character of the Genesis accounts. (Good 1965: 106 speaks of 'comic irony' for the pattern of the Jacob stories, but 'ironic comedy' is preferable, since compassion is dominant.)

or marked. Jacob's departure, blessing by God, involvement with Laban (are both of them donors?), and struggle with deity (Genesis 28-32) provide a fairly close parallel. It is startling that Jacob plays the role of both villain and hero and that God acts as opponent as well as guide. Roland Barthes, who recognized the connection between Jacob's struggle and the branding 'function,' compared the paradoxical role of God with extortion (an act in which support and injury go together [1971]). Such a comparison, however, unduly rationalizes the situation. At a similar period in Moses' travels, God meets him with threatening force and is held off by a branding of some sort (Exod 4: 24-26). The mystery of a union of positive and negative sides in humanity and deity lies at the heart of these stories.[42]

A careful survey of other traditions is needed for an assessment of the extent to which moral ambiguity is characteristic of different sorts of stories. Complex evaluation is especially appropriate for sagas or historical narratives (as distinguished from fairy tales), since they seek to represent actuality.[43] Yet many imaginative narratives also contain ambiguity, especially in the image of a trickster. The trickster is selfish, lawless, and in need of correction, but dupes primarily the foolish, avaricious, or proud (cf. Radin 1956; R. Armstrong in Pool 1959: 168-69; Lévi-Strauss 1963: 226; J. Ackerman in Gros Louis *et al.* 1974: 349; and Reid 1979: 155). One can raise the question whether the Israelite interpretation of the name Jacob as 'deceiver' reflects the tradition of this figure.

42.   The parallel in Exod. 4: 24-26 is noted by Gunkel 1910: 360-65, but as an isolated, and thus unparadoxical, motif. (On general similarities between the Jacob and Moses stories, cf. Hos. 12: 13-14 and Daube 1963: 62-72.) The idea of a morally complex God is sophisticated, not 'primitive' (with D. Robertson [1977], against Gunkel; Robertson, however, fails to adequately see God's negative aspect in Exodus and God's positive side in Job). On the duality of the experience of the divine, cf. Otto 1917. A. de Pury correctly sees that the Jacob cycle must be viewed as a whole, not in terms of isolated scenes. He briefly compares the cycle with Propp's functions (1975: 496-97); in greater detail, Couffignal presents such a comparison, recognizing the complex role of Jacob and interpreting it in terms of an Oedipal relation (1977). May 1969: 170 illustrated the role of the 'daimonic' in creativity by means of the Peniel story. For other examples of paradox see D. Seybold, J. Ackerman, and H. Barzel in Gros Louis *et al.* 1974: 64, 68, 118, 140. Role reversal is an element of humor (Cooper 1975: 167).

43.   J. Pitt-Rivers tells how he was startled by Genesis stories, until he realized that it 'was not moral truth that was being expounded…but historical truth' (1977: 126). Moral complexity appears also in the Hindu epic *Mahābhārata* (Narasimhan 1965: xx-xxiv).

It seems that every significant element of the Bible can be found elsewhere. Still, the total constellation is unique, as is true for highly complex phenomena. Whether Hebrew faith possesses fewer or more peculiarities than do other religions is difficult to determine. Uniqueness may enhance individuality, but it is not inherently related to theological truth or to moral validity (with Barth 1936-58, I/2: 70-71). Thus it is not possible to support the validity of biblical views by claiming that they have a special character. On the contrary, an emphasis on peculiarity and on 'distance' between individuals, nations, and times—including the notion of different religions (cf. Troeltsch 1924: 32, 80; Westermann 1960: 18-21)—is a feature of historical criticism that is rather consciously designed to undercut the non-competitive economy of the Bible (see, e.g., Buss 1974: 26-27). True individuality, as Bosanquet has rightly argued (1912), lies positively in wholeness rather than negatively in idiosyncrasy. Uncertainty introduced by variety, however, provides opportunity for communication.[44]

Comparisons with history are not easy, but they are important for interpretation. It is necessary to pay close attention to the functions of items compared, in their respective contexts. Sometimes a surface similarity reflects two very different social roles. More frequently, surface differences mask pronounced parallels in dynamic relations. For this reason functional analysis is crucial for biblical theology. A recipient cannot comprehend a message without recognizing the problem to which it presents a solution.[45] If one understands the relation of item A to context B, however, one can construct or comprehend item C, which stands in a corresponding relation to context D. This is the pattern of analogy, which combines difference and similarity. Analogy can be used for the comprehension of historical events (e.g., Heinrici 1899: 726), just as it is crucial for the application of a text to another context (e.g., Lowry 1977: 417-38; Sanders 1976: 406; and Patrick 1976, below); in fact, the possibility of comparative study and the continuing applicability of a text imply each other.

44. Barr 1973: 45-46, argues for the possibility of communication. Brueggemann states (in part on the basis of Gen. 11: 1-9 and the Abraham tradition) that the 'idea of a divided, hostile, non-communicative world is not willed by God' (1976: 44). See further, *CF*, 10.1,3.

45. Similarly, Collingwood 1939: 29-43. Collingwood, however, stresses the role of an answer in relation to a problem in such a way as to weaken the significance of a thesis for another context. Dynamic analysis (not sufficiently pursued by Gadamer [1975], who is concerned with application) can be used to recognize the appropriate relevance of a text for another situation.

The variety of traditions aids the development, preservation, and recognition of messages, through protective and clarifying redundancy together with new growth from interactions. Within Israel, the duality of North and South provided in part analogous and in part complementary versions of faith, subsequently fused in the biblical canon. Western culture is paralleled and complemented by that of the East (India, China, and contiguous areas). Dual streams like these provide for a wider exploration of possibilities and illuminate each other.[46] For instance, Jesus' words against anxiety and judgment—which seem very strange—are comparable to Taoist theses in such a way that they cannot be brushed off easily as hyperboles. Similarly, Israel's emphasis on economic equality even in a relatively advanced society is supported by the Confucian ideal of the 'well-field' system (with equal family plots). In aspects in which East and West differ, mutual enrichment is possible and has already taken place; e.g., Buber's 'I and Thou' (1923) merges elements of Jewish and Taoist experience. While most persons are likely to value continuity with their background, love and intellectual interest call for opening to the other. So-called secular movements similarly furnish both clarification and fresh stimuli.

History is to a large extent cumulative (although one must allow for the possibility of sharp discontinuities).[47] Genuine advance does not mean the abolition of the old but its inclusion in a wider perspective. In the intellectual realm that means that progress proceeds not so much through furnishing new answers to old questions as through raising new issues which may presuppose the older ones. Israelite faith emerged within the spearhead of ancient civilization, near the center of the land mass of Asia, Africa, and Europe. There communications from all directions could and did converge to stimulate cultural development, with its positive and negative sides. In turn, insights presented in the Bible, like those of Greek philosophy, are still valuable, although they need to be reformulated. Fortunately, modern reformation can draw on significant contributions by Jews, continuing the tradition of the Hebrew Bible in an important way.[48]

46.   Fifty percent redundancy appears to be ideal for most systems of communication; it is approximated in these cultural developments.

47.   So, e.g., Foucault 1972: 8, 169; the mathematical form of discontinuities is analyzed by 'catastrophe theory.' It should be recognized, however, that an advance is possible only with continuity.

48.   Jews must be regarded, on the whole, as the truest heirs of the Hebrew Bible (against H.W. Wolff in Westermann 1960: 161). Jewish leaders of the present century include Freud, Adler, Wertheimer, Lewin, Fromm, Erikson, and Maslow in psychology; Durkheim, Simmel, and

It is probably not necessary to produce a Bible again or to establish a new set of specific dates for biblical material. A more promising task and opportunity for the present is the study of dynamic relationships. Pure (nonfunctional) structuralism would mean a return to the tradition dominant before the rise of historical criticism; nevertheless, recent structuralists point to valuable insights to be retained and developed. Future work must include both structural and broadly historical perspectives, not merely adding them to each other, but merging and transcending them.[49]

The present situation, like any other, contains dangers as well as opportunities. Increasing sophistication in technology, which enhances world-wide connections, undoubtedly poses a severe threat to the quality—and even the survival—of human life. Responsible action opposes such a threat and involves itself in the positive potentialities of the same process.

4. *Meaning*

When a relationship is perceived or conceived by someone, it constitutes a 'meaning' for that person. (A sheer relation in itself is only a 'function.') Meaning is largely, although not entirely, a human phenomenon. In animals instinctive reactions respond to a stimulus

Lévi-Strauss in sociology; Bergson, Husserl, Wittgenstein, Popper (Wittgenstein's father and Popper's parents had been born in households with overt Jewish affiliation), Langer, Jonas, Bloch, and other notables in philosophy; Einstein, Minkowski, and Pauli in physics; Wiener and Gödel in mathematics; Harris and Chomsky in linguistics (it may be noted that Harris, who started recent developments in text linguistics, was acquainted with literary analysis or 'form criticism' of West Semitic, to which he contributed significantly [e.g., Montgomery and Harris 1935: 10, 31]; Chomsky, son of a professor of Hebrew and a student of Harris, developed the germs of his transformational theory in a thesis on modern Hebrew [Mehta 1971: 48]); in addition to many outstanding literary and musical creators. Their work is spiritual, not merely technical, and shows that the line between theological and 'secular' disciplines is not sharp.

49.   The scholarly situation is illustrated by developments in biology. In this field the descriptive-structural approach reached a certain highpoint in the eighteenth century with Linnaeus' classification, before the historical perspective triumphed in the following century with Darwin; since 1900, the analytical or functional method—including and going beyond both of the older steps—has become dominant, now involving concepts drawn from communication theory. Both J. Piaget (1977) and L. Goldmann (1970) developed a functional, or 'genetic,' structuralism; for other attempts to go beyond static structure, see the work of R. Barthes, P. Ricoeur, J. Derrida, and others.

automatically, without a direct reference to consequences; with increasing complexity, meaning gradually develops in terms of learned associations between events. Human life becomes characterized by an extensive, complex network of meanings.

The meaning of signs—which point to the actuality or possibility of another object or event—has been discussed continuously since ancient times. Recent discussions are heavily indebted to the conceptualization of Peirce. He distinguished between three kinds of signs: (1) the 'icon' directly represents a quality or characteristic of a possible referent (a map exhibits the shape of a real or hypothetical country); (2) the 'index' reflects the influence of an actual object (swaying trees show wind motion); (3) the 'symbol' or 'legisign' is conventional and usually associated with a general idea (1931-58, 2.247-49, 304). The structure of a sign is triadic. It is not only related as a signifier to a signified, but it 'addresses somebody' (2.228). Furthermore, a sign is not just a thought or a connection resting in itself; rather, it is 'informing thought, or cognition,' establishing new connections (1.537, 2.231). The sign is creative, like sympathy and evolution in general (1.337-39, 6.32, 8.328-32). However (as Peirce eventually saw), its meaning is 'something virtual' (5.289), a potentiality.

Possibility

Possibility is central to the process of communication, in which it plays several different roles. One role is the opportunity for expression given in a code or convention (with Ullmann 1962: 19-21). A set of conventions, such as Hebrew, is known as a language (*langue*, in Saussure's terminology); when acquired by individuals, it becomes their 'competence' (Chomsky 1965: 4). The possibility given in such a system is actualized in the 'performance' of a particular utterance or text (*parole*).[50]

The meaning of a text is a potential or, more precisely, a set of potentials. A potential becomes realized as the expression is interpreted by someone in relation to a code and in connection with relevant circumstances.[51] The author envisions a certain code and

50.   Saussure 1967: 40. (It is necessary to go to the manuscripts for Saussure's precise views. The distinction social-individual does not coincide with the distinction potential-actual, as was perhaps recognized by him; cf. Leont'ev 1971: 20; Coseriu 1974: 117, 223.)

51.   The relation of circumstances to meaning has been treated by P. Wegener (1885: 21-29), B. Malinowski (e.g., in Ogden and Richards 1946: 296-336), K. Bühler (1934), T. Slama-Cazacu (1961), R. Montague (1974: 95-147), and P. Grice (especially in Cole and Morgan 1975: 43-58). Relating a text to a code and circumstances is the task of the 'grammatico-historical' method, which remains valid in principle.

knowledge in the audience. The recipient, in turn, applies to the text a language frame believed to have been used by the speaker. For the interpreting of biblical literature, few data are available concerning the concrete circumstances of individual authors and recipients or their variations in linguistic convention. Moreover, the material has been modified in oral or written tradition so that idiosyncrasies are toned down. It is therefore difficult to reconstruct an author's meaning, if that is different from what would be normal in that culture (against Ernesti 1822, §§3, 188). On the whole, the interpretation of a biblical text must rest with the determination of its normal potential in the language system.[52] The fact that a text can be connected only somewhat loosely with a specific occasion does not limit its relation to human existence. On the contrary, that fact may indicate an extensive potential for involvement. For 'literature,' i.e., material suited for repeated use, speaks to a human situation which is more than purely individual.[53] In psalms, for example, 'enemies' represent hostile forces in general, which can be particularized differently by those who use a given lament.

Words and sentences indicate possibilities. One of the key strengths of human speech is that it deals not only with objects or events in the immediate vicinity of the speaker, but also with those that are distant in time or space or even altogether non-existent. Descriptive words designate members of virtual classes, e.g., possible or conceivable trees, not only those actually existing. Sentences similarly designate possible events or states. It has long been known that speech does not refer directly to reality but expresses the content of thought. At the end of the nineteenth century, F. Brentano renewed medieval notions and terminology by characterizing the direction of thought as 'intention' (1874, II: 124, etc.). In the tradition of phenomenology emanating from him, thought is viewed as oriented outward toward the world, yet the intended world need not be actual. The idea of possibility, stimulated in part by earlier discussions of divine power, has now become

---

52. The redactor's meaning, for transmitted texts, remains somewhat unclear also. On the other hand, it is inaccurate to say that a text as such has meaning.

53. The recognition that 'literature' to a considerable extent transcends particular circumstances runs from ancient to modern times (see, e.g., Staiger 1955: 33; Eliot 1957: 113; Gadamer 1975: 356-57; S. Schmidt in Gülich and Raible 1972: 66). Particularity of author and audience is especially relevant to prophetic speech, since it is characteristic of Israelite prophecy to address actuality with a revelatory word by means of an inspired agent. Many prophetic words, however, speak to a deeply human and thus continuing process.

prominent in formal semantic theory.[54] A 'name,' it is true, specifies
a particular person or group, but even this entity may exist only in
the imagination.

Descriptions forming open classes can be analyzed in terms of
components, i.e., as combinations of more elementary features.[55]
For instance, the notion of a tree contains the elements of vegeta-
tion and largeness. Contrasts formed by single features—such as
living vs. non-living and small vs. large—represent different dimen-
sions cutting across each other, so that the meaning of words exists
in a multidimensional space. One advantage of the componential
character of word meanings is that images can be formed creatively
through the combination of known features, e.g., a cherub (winged
bull) or, in technology, the idea of an improved tool.

Possible realities play a central role in literature.[56] Worlds
depicted in art can be related to actual existence in different ways.
According to an ancient theory, literature 'imitates,' or repre-
sents, human life (Plato, Aristotle). With the development of indi-

54.   For the notion of possibility in semantics (not always with onto-
logical assumptions), cf. Faust 1931; Frei 1974: 98 (on the view of C. Wolff);
Prior 1971: 111-70; Lewis 1969: 171-72, 207 (with reference to R. Carnap,
J. Hintikka, S. Kripke, R. Montague, and others); and above, n. 19. The
characteristics (or 'functions') which define an open class of (possible)
objects are often named its 'intension,' while the actual objects covered by
this class are called its 'extension.' Peirce (1931-58, 2.418 [in 1867]) distin-
guished between (1) an actual object referred to, (2) the character of an
(actual or hypothetical) object which forms the 'ground' of the symbol, and
(3) associated notions not directly expressed by the symbol; Frege, in 1892
(1967), made almost exactly the same distinction with the terms *Bedeutung*
(reference), *Sinn* (sense), and *Vorstellung* (conception). E.g., 'Messiah' desig-
nates an intension or sense (in some cases, 'final human leader under God')
with which different ideas can be associated; messianic texts in the Hebrew
Bible predict not a specific individual (e.g., Jesus, who is the extension or
reference of the term in Christian belief), but a certain kind of person.

55.   Crucial studies by linguists and anthropologists are listed in Lyons
1968: 489; essays by Katz, Bierwisch, Dixon, and Hale are conveniently
reprinted in Steinberg and Jakobowitz 1971. (Other significant approaches
to semantics stress contrasts and associations. For the componential anal-
ysis of genres, see above, nn. 25, 28)

56.   The role of the 'possible' in literature has long been recognized
(cf. now Schmidt 1975: 170-90). The nominalist Goodman, however, views
fictive statements as possible descriptions of the actual rather than as
possibilities as such (1973: 51-57). Susan Langer describes all the arts as
'virtual.' See *CF*, 5.3.

vidualism, emphasis was placed on the poetic personality which expresses itself. Thus Carlyle wrote concerning Shakespeare: 'His works are so many windows, through which we see a glimpse of the world that was in him' (1901: 110). Interest in progressive movement led readers and theorists to expect imaginative creations of a different world (so, among more recent ones, Dewey 1934: 348; E. Bloch 1959; Frye 1976: 184). These ways of relating to actuality are not mutually exclusive, for a writer may depict both established and alternative states of affairs.

Every actuality exhibits a realized possibility. A biblical story can thus be viewed as factual (for instance, by an ancient audience) without losing its character as embodying a potential. According to Heidegger, the point of historical narration is to indicate a 'possibility of existence' (1949: 385). To combine historical actuality with transhistorical meaning was, in fact, the aim of the traditional belief in the multiple senses of Scripture.[57]

Direction

Alongside the question of possibility arises the issue of directionality. One aspect of directionality is a goal, which expresses a value. To envision a state as possible does not imply that it is desirable. Conversely, to say that a condition is desirable does not imply that it is realistically possible when combined with other realities and leaves open the question of how it may be brought about. One of the differences between Judaism and Christianity is that the former places value on activities largely within the power of the human being, while the latter takes a special interest in states over which one has no control, so that their possibility is left in God's hands.[58] The presence of the 'Old Testament' within the Christian canon means, for some interpreters at least, that the dimension of effective action and social morality is included in Christianity. Jews, on the other hand, recognize the fundamental role of divine activity. Religions, in general, are concerned in a major way with ideal or desirable states and with steps toward reaching these.

57.   This combination was more characteristic of Jewish and Christian interpretation than of Greek views of Homer (see *BFC*: 38, 54-62).

58.   Without an express theological concern, P. Nowell-Smith (1957: 248, 271-73) points out that one may be praised or blamed for one's basic value orientation, although one cannot will to change it (for to will to do so already implies that one no longer holds it). On the whole problem, cf. Buss 1961. The logic of value is formalized in 'deontic' logic (since Mally in 1926 [1971]), a division of 'modal' logic, which includes also the logic of possibility and tense logic.

Statements about value are part of an 'inside' view of reality, one which states the frame of reference within which one exists and acts. A descriptive approach, in contrast, is an outside view. The internal perspective includes an external one, since the understanding of one's situation involves reference to other beings. At the same time, an external (descriptive) view cannot be isolated from, but is a part of, an active orientation.[59] An inside view is necessarily more comprehensive than an external one, for it refers to the whole which includes both oneself and others; it intertwines self-commitment with observation. In so-called 'practical reasoning,' desired ends and factual data together form the basis for specific decisions (Rotter 1954: 152; Anscombe 1957: 56).

In human existence, 'inside' views can be expressed verbally or in other similarly symbolic expressions. One person can thus enter imaginatively into another's internal world by giving attention to another's expressions, together with observing that person's actions. In such empathetic participation one can recognize a system of beliefs and desires (cf. E. Stein 1964). The sharing of another orientation is a profoundly enjoyable experience, truly 'ecstatic' (beyond oneself). Ethically it is important, since it both embodies respect and allows the other to enrich one's orientation. Somewhat similarly, it is possible to attribute aims to non-human processes on the basis of the 'as-if' teleology; such aims express the direction of a being, although not verbally.[60] Empathy can then be extended to these processes, so that one participates sensitively in them.

The human world into which one enters through verbal or non-verbal communication need not be one of full awareness. Indeed, subconscious and unconscious factors play a major role in human life. Such factors must be inferred, since they are not directly given, but that is also true for the recognition of another's consciousness. In fact, it is often difficult to determine whether a given belief or desire is conscious or not, for implicit knowledge hardly differs from

---

59.   Experience for Dilthey is also a holistic structure that includes reference to others (1921, V: 201-7, 247; VII: 238), although he contrasted the natural and human sciences. Peirce viewed the meaning of observational sentences as inextricably connected with a 'practical maxim expressible as a conditional sentence having its apodosis in the imperative mood' (1931-58, 5.18; cf. 5.2, 9, 402); he thereby laid a foundation for discussions regarding verifiability and use as criteria for meaning, which have included some positions more extreme than his—such as Wittgenstein 1977: 59, which seems to ignore the theoretical aspect. (On Peirce's influence on British thought and thus on Wittgenstein, cf. Thayer 1968: 304-13. Peirce, however, was weak in the area of describing goals.)

60.   Added note: This is not 'unscientific'; see *CF*, 5.5.

conscious thought in its effect on expression. Thoughts repressed because of their threatening character appear in normal speech only intermittently and as oddities ('Freudian slips'). It appears that they emerge more clearly in imaginative literature, where they enjoy a certain safety in a presentation with which both author and recipient identify only in part (Lesser 1957). In biblical literature, confrontation with the dark side of existence appears quite frequently; whether this confrontation was conscious for the writer is less important than whether it is likely to elicit a similar engagement in the reader.

Since literature embodies conscious and unconscious movements of human existence, the psychology of literary works is an important aspect of criticism.[61] Such a psychological interpretation does not need to deal specifically with an individual author's experience and thought (as for Schleiermacher 1959: 81) but can lay bare the 'emotional dynamics' expressed in a text (Voss and Harsch 1972: 148). Furthermore, it need not wait for application to particular recipients (although, with Wink 1973, that is an important step eventually). Rather, a psychological, together with a sociological, examination can aid in clarifying for a public audience forms of existence exhibited in, or readily elicited by, a text.

In its dynamic structure, human life reflects a small number of basic dimensions of experience, especially the following three: nature of evaluation (positive, negative, or mixed), degree of arousal (major

61. For surveys of approaches both to consciousness and unconsciousness, see Wellek and Warren (1956, Chap. 8), Lawall (1968), Strelka (1976), Spiegel (1972), Batson *et al.* (1973, one-sidedly against ontology), and Detweiler (1978). The psychology of the reader is stressed, e.g., by N. Holland 1968 and W. Iser 1974. Buss 1969, attempted a social psychology of the book of Hosea, with special attention to the nature of eschatology; one can therefore regard the study as an application of semiology, defined by Saussure as the social psychology of language (1966: 16). 'Pragmatics,' according to van Dijk (1972: 341), 'is the place where linguistic, psychological and sociological parameters interact.' As F.C. Grant states (1968: 117-19), the 'truth' of Psalms, Job, etc., lies not in their authorship but in their psychology. G. Fohrer (1972: 110) and W. Herberg (1976: 110) point to experiential structures. Of course, it is possible to come to different conclusions in this as in any other area of discussion. E.g., O. Keel's interpretation of enemies in psalms as a projection (1969), while containing a partial truth, does not adequately recognize the reality and psychology of unjust suffering (better, Seebass 1974: 37-41; according to I. Parsons 1972, the pattern of psalms allows the sufferer to structure the chaos). Jung's study of Job (1954) deserves the attention it has received recently; newer psychological approaches may prove helpful.

or minor), and effective role (dominance, receptivity, or relative equality).[62] Gratitude, for instance, involves a sense that one has received some good. The psychologist Osgood (1957) has found that ordinary descriptive words ('father,' 'stone,' etc.) can be placed into a semantic space with the primary dimensions of evaluation (good or bad), activity (motion vs. rest), and potency (strength of effect). Even more clearly, 'expressive' symbols represent basic emotional and pragmatic structures. Thus an actual tree or the word 'tree' can express flourishing vitality. Individuals (Leary 1957: 154-91) and groups communicate their roles and hopes to themselves and to others through such symbols. An analysis of relational patterns, then, is crucial for understanding the meaning of symbols.

Ricoeur—examining active life—argues that symbols precede thought (1967). One needs to distinguish, however, between emblems (such as a sacred stone or a name) and metaphors (such as the word 'lion' for hostile power). Emblems are objects or expressions directing life with only limited intellectual content. Metaphors, on the other hand, include an awareness of a more literal meaning, which is employed for the sake of the action or experience it embodies. Metaphors presuppose formal thought, although emblems need not. Symbols that refer to what is ultimate hint at the fundamental organization and movement of existence (cf., e.g., Sewell 1964); they imply a fairly high degree of awareness.

Like all activity viewed internally, speech is oriented toward a goal (cf. Parsons and Shils 1952, C. Morris 1946, Austin 1975, Searle 1969, Hutchison 1963, Leont'ev 1971). The goal sought by a speech act is a reaction in the audience; to recognize this purpose is crucial to understanding an expression.[63] The aim of many prophetic words, for instance, is to bring about a change of activity in the hearer. Other prophecies, including many of those known as apocalyptic, encourage perseverance in the face of external pressure. Ordinarily it is not difficult to discern the purpose of a word, for there is a logical connection between the pragmatic thrust of a text (e.g., criticism or promise) and the desired response (such as change

---

62.   See Davitz 1969: 128-42; Buss 1969: 38 (degree), 83-113 (positive or negative), 133-34 (active or receptive role); Berlyne 1974: 52, 317-19; Mehrabian 1976: 31. Compare the analysis of genres, above.

63.   To understand an expression involves the reverse of the generative process in which a purpose (the most fundamental level of an expression) leads via conventions of language to an audible or visible phenomenon. (On these levels, cf. W. Weaver in Shannon and Weaver 1949: 95-96, and G. Miller in Silverstein 1974: 6-16.) This is part of friendship, with which M. Platt 1975 compares interpretation.

or trust).[64] Thus Genesis texts revealing a divine origin and an ambiguous human past naturally evoke—if they are accepted—such affects as gratitude and at least partial self-criticism.

For the recipient who accepts a message, its meaning has an 'organizing function' (MacKay 1969: 35). A word about or from the ultimate has a high potential in this regard. One can say that it carries a large amount of 'semantic information,' if this is defined as the number of items implied by a given message.[65] Ordinarily, a notice which attracts attention is one which has a carry-over to other parts of the recipient's cognitive system. Religious and similar holistic declarations are intrinsically rich in such information. They shape not only a small portion of existence but give form to (inform) its pattern as a whole, so that every aspect is, in principle, affected. In Genesis 25-35 God's speech appears at critical points[66] to give direction to life.

5. *Understanding*

To obtain insight into an action or expression means to reduce its uncertainty. Maximum information is obtained when a very

---

64.   The meaning of a statement, if accepted, sets up tendencies of probabilities of action (Peirce 1931-58, 5.475-76, 504; MacKay 1969: 24, 84-91). Austin (1975) called the 'force' or nature of what is immediately done by a text (e.g., promise) its 'illocution,' and the effect or response (e.g., a resulting trust) its 'perlocution.' For van Dijk (1977: 174) 'intention' refers to the desired act itself (as in Tucker 1971: 16, 51-54, such as, 'to explain') and 'purpose' to a hoped-for consequence (with Berlo 1960: 16 and others). Austin came to realize that *all* texts are 'performative' (1975: 150-52, etc.).

65.   This definition follows in part a suggestion by R. Carnap and Y. Bar-Hillel (Bar-Hillel 1964: 10, 221-74). Their theory is based on negations of state-descriptions; e.g., if one person out of a group of ten is chosen for a certain task, it is implied that nine are not so chosen. Since logically there is no difference between positive and negative descriptions, their theory can be extended to include all implications for a given recipient. Such an extension enters the area of the 'value' or 'significance' of information (cf. Cherry 1957: 242-43, 264; Harrah 1963: 6, 59, 81; Hintikka and Suppes 1970). On the relations of learning to reorganization, see also Powers 1973: 82-204 (postulating a mystical, or religious, level as the highest level of psychological organization). Great literary works are emotionally involving in part because of their extensive implications for lived existence. Thus 'existential' involvement, in the sense of human commitment and decision, is not opposed to information but rather constitutes a holistic process.

66.   It comes in an oracle (25: 23), in dreams (28: 13-15; 31: 11), and in an unspecified form (35: 1, 10-12). This divine role is not incompatible with humanistic elements of the story, as Gammie agrees (according to a recent communication), although he assigns the humanistic elements to another layer of tradition.

large uncertainty is reduced to a very small one. For a system involving more than one element, understanding takes place when the elements are seen as appropriate in the sense that one element implies another, which in the realm of practical reasoning may mean that a certain step is likely to lead to a given goal. For instance, Jacob's flight makes sense in view of danger and a normal human desire for safety, although other ways of meeting the issue can be imagined. In mathematics and logic, relationships are necessary and inevitable, given certain assumptions. In the actual world, connections are looser, ranging from very low to very high probability, requiring or yielding different amounts of information. How tight a connection needs to be in order to be viewed as 'appropriate' is a matter for individual judgment.[67]

An important step in the process of gaining understanding involves recognition of actual correlations within the system to be understood. For instance, D. Verner (1976) has shown that Jacob is described more frequently as the son of Rebekah than as the son of Isaac, while the reverse holds true for Esau. Such correlational 'content analysis' has been employed with considerable success for sociological and psychological purposes as well as for literary study; with or without formal statistical calculations, it is useful for biblical investigations.[68] One of the advantages of such an approach is its focus on the data themselves in relation to statable

67.   Acceptable uncertainty depends on particular situations, available alternatives, etc., and cannot be fully rationalized. For Schleiermacher, one extreme of understanding is to recognize something as 'necessary,' but this is (in relation to a text) an 'infinite task' (1959: 31). Added note: Furthermore, more than the present writer recognized in 1979, complete understanding is not only impossible but also undesirable, for it would violate the mystery of the other.

68.   See, e.g., Pool 1959, North, *et al.* 1963, Holsti 1969, Carney 1972, and Baird 1976. Buss 1969: 42-49, 61-69 employed correlations without formal control (cf. also the association discussed above, n. 7.). The distribution noted by Verner (1976, according to which Jacob is called Isaac's son once and Rebekah's nine times, while for Esau the corresponding numbers are six and two) is statistically 'significant' at a level below .01, as measured by both the chi-square and Fisher's exact tests; i.e., there is less than one chance in a hundred that there is no reason (other than sheer fluctuation) for the phenomenon. A well-trained judgment does not always need formal control, but it is easy to err in the estimation of probability. The formula of Fisher's exact test, for four numbers of an array in which c corresponds to d as a does to b, is as follows: $(a + b)!(c + d)!(a + c)!(b + d)!$ divided by $(a + b + c + d)!$ $a!$ $b!$ $c!$ $d!$ (exclamation marks designate factorials). This is now not difficult to execute with a computer or advanced calculator and requires no tables or special training. The basic reasoning

hypotheses. There is no limit to the kinds of phenomena that can be investigated in this manner: sounds (for assonance), words (for semantic, syntactic, or poetic issues), verbal 'components' (to determine the dynamic pattern of a text, for instance, in terms of emotional quality), or ideas extracted from sentences or passages.

Correlations carry no meaning unless they are interpreted in the light of an ideal structure or model.[69] A back-and-forth relation obtains between the correlational data and the model chosen or constructed to account for them. In scientific procedure with access to more than one sample, the test of a model is applied to a sample different from the one which initially suggested the model. For the study of unique phenomena, it is not possible to pass on to other data, although a certain amount of comparison with other complexes is possible.[70] The examination of an individual text necessarily oscillates between a constructive view and specific observations. The normal result of such an operation is that the text increasingly makes sense as one's view is refined. For instance, the fact that Jacob is often called Rebekah's son coheres with the thesis (developed by Allen 1979) that Rebekah plays a major role in the history of salvation.

The possibility for understanding a phenomenon increases with expansion of the horizon. For instance, Rebekah's prominence in Genesis 27 (where she guides Jacob) remains a relatively

of statistics, together with a number of formulas and tables, can be found in F. Williams 1968. Statistics can also be used for examining authorship, as by Radday 1973.

69.   On models, see, e.g., Black. It should be noted that Black (1962: 244-57) and others question the notion that thought is determined by prior models, such as language forms (see the Appendix, §6, for a balanced view). Recent experimental work suggests that perception is built up to a large extent by correlation between the elements of perception and is not altogether determined by stored patterns (Uttal 1975). Bultmann's view that comprehension 'is governed always by a prior understanding of the subject' (1955: 239, 253), while valuable, is partially incorrect. More balanced is Peirce's concept of 'abduction' as an explanatory hypothesis (1931-58, 2.776-77, 5.171-73, 6.475); the construction of such a hypothesis involves creativity, which is apparently based on a combinational modification (see, e.g., Taylor and Getzels 1975: 10, 333).

70.   Kapelrud applied a number of the procedures used in Buss 1969 to Zephaniah and noted some differences, at least in expression (1975: 49). The hermeneutical 'circle' does not oscillate between parts and a whole (to some extent against Schleiermacher 1959: 89-90), for understanding of the whole is a (perhaps unreachable) goal; thus the procedures of the natural sciences and of the humanities are not fundamentally distinct.

meaningless phenomenon until it is placed within a larger context. A more comprehensive framework deals with the role of women in existence, with the nature of Israelite faith, and with other relevant issues. A broader view can take account of further texts (biblical or otherwise) and of what may be known about social and psychological processes. Since the ultimate horizon is infinite and since one must allow for indeterminacy, complete understanding is impossible.

When little uncertainty is left in a text, most of the available information will have been extracted. What happens to the information? It may be forgotten, for there is no law guaranteeing its preservation. Ideally, however, it will be incorporated into the mental structure of recipients, who are enabled by it to act more intelligently and sensitively.[71] The models by which reality is understood can serve as suggestive models for life (Geertz 1966: 8, 34). What fits one situation can fit another, insofar as the two are comparable. Although decisions require a degree of openness in order to be meaningful, they gain in wisdom and power from insight into connections with reality.

An informed 'regard' enhances life. Such a view—connecting intellect with concern—is expressed in the Hebrew Bible with the aid of a number of words for understanding, knowing, attending, and teaching. The broader implication even of words addressed to a quite particular situation was seen by Israelites. For instance, the conclusion of the Book of Hosea indicates a general application of the words of that prophecy: 'Who will be wise and understand these things, discerning and recognize them? For straight are the ways of Yahweh—the righteous walk in them, but the transgressors are brought to stumble in them.' Certainly, interpretation cannot be separated from the transformation of existence; whether a message has been understood can be determined only from the recipient's response (even the devils react, in a 'shudder,' according to Jas 2: 19).

Not all texts speak to all issues. On the contrary, one of the essential insights of genre analysis is that different problems in life call for different responses. A psalm of lament deals with a condition of trouble. A certain kind of law is designed to solve ordinary conflicts between members of a group (Buss 1977). Narratives provide orientation in

---

71.   The recipient will presumably have a greater ability to predict future events (Stachiowiak 1969: 24) and a more complex pattern of perception and action (J. Springle in Buckley 1968: 259-80). Animals and especially human beings have facilities for a memory in which data can be stored with relative permanence and from which they may be recalled through certain triggers. A message, like thermodynamic 'order,' naturally decays; this decay can be counteracted only by its inclusion in a larger system. In human culture, collective memory is preserved through oral and written transmission.

life. The problem situation addressed by a text is ordinarily stated or implied within it.[72] The *topoi*, or standard elements of content, represent typical questions and answers, reflecting experience. The most crucial task of the examination of forms ('form criticism') is not discovery of arbitrary conventions but recognition of what solutions represent a fit response to a given concern.

To a considerable extent, historical study relativized the past in such a way as to weaken its significance for the present (so also Gunneweg 1977: 107). This negative function played a significant role in liberating human society and culture from external authority and unquestioned tradition. When this freedom has been obtained, however, it is necessary to seek guidance unless ethical action is left simply to impulse. To offer guidance has been an aim of modern anthropology, which attempts to examine particular phenomena not so much for their own sake as for the light they can shed on others. Thus Radcliffe-Brown stated in 1929: 'If anthropological science is to give any important help in relation to practical problems of government and education it must abandon speculative attempts to conjecture the unknown past and must devote itself to the functional study of culture' (41). Much biblical scholarship, as has been pointed out, continues a historical style and leaves others to show the significance of the Bible in a critical manner. A formal relational analysis would provide an intermediate step.

An understanding of relationships aids a new kind of liberation, which goes beyond negative freedom from past authority to the positive freedom of meaningful action. The first kind of freedom is associated with the revolutions overthrowing aristocracy. The second kind belongs to the exerting of rights and the enjoyment of opportunities by all. Both are needed and are to a large extent possible.[73] If dynamic

72. For written literature, it is usually not necessary to add much in the way of outside data for a recognition of the issue being considered. The text as a rule furnishes sufficient indication of the problem situation with which it deals (called *aitia* or *causa* in traditional rhetoric), as long as the general nature of its language system and of the community in which it stands is known. Even though the date of the Jacob stories is unclear, their meaning potential can be largely understood.

73. Marxists have rightly been critical of the predominance of irrationality (recently called 'positivism') in 'bourgeois' thought, such as in its historiography (e.g., Lukács 1954, Kolakowski 1968). On the other hand, if a government does not pay careful attention to the first freedom, then— through the manipulation of uncertainty (cf. Luhmann 1975: 8)—it exerts power over, rather than gives power to, the populace. Similarly, Güttgemanns 1978: 61, 117-19, 129, points out that, in a communicational perspective, guidelines for ethics can be constructed. See, further, *CF*, 1.3; 2.

relations are grasped through social and psychological investigation, one can effect 'translation' of an ancient word in such a way that a functional equivalent (cf. Nida 1960: 59) is obtained. Furthermore, when directions are seen as appropriate to existence, they act as an intrinsic guide rather than as an external imposition on one's actions.

It is often possible to discern the appropriateness and inner logic of biblical patterns. For instance, in Israelite prophecy ultimate salvation is always announced as a divine act. Indeed, an infinite reality cannot well be produced by finite human activity. The psychological correlate of this insight is that the ultimate is met receptively. More specifically, analysis of expressions in Israelite prophecy shows that a certain form of eschatology (such as Hosea's) embodies both self-transcendence and fulfillment. Self-transcendence, which appears also in the Jacob stories, is an integral part of faith in God and plays an important role in social existence. Like the God of the Bible, 'high gods' in religious traditions are normally not called upon in competitive magic,[74] but are related primarily to ethics and to a view of the world as a whole. Such an outlook recognizes that the ultimate cannot be manipulated and that orientation toward it implies concern for other beings.[75] Many other, and simpler, examples of appropriate elements can be given for law, wisdom, psalms, and narratives, with the aid of the human sciences. Often form-critical analysis reaches what appears to be a very obvious conclusion, such as that a psalm of lament complains of evil and calls for help. Yet it is precisely in seeing a close connection between phenomena that insight is reached.[76]

74.   Added note: 'Magic' is a highly disputed topic, in part since the definition of that word is variable. Suffice it to say that words are only more-or-less useful terms in a given context. The point made here is that chief deities are commonly approached at least somewhat differently from the way others are. This expresses a description, not necessarily an evaluation.

75.   The analysis by von Rad (1962: 212-19) of the prohibition of images fails to take account of the high-god figure, well-known in the history of religion since the end of the nineteenth century (see, e.g., Eliade 1958: 38-123, with reference also to the Near East). Apparently the Canaanite El was occasionally represented by an image, but high gods are not normally imaged concretely. For further data regarding aspects of the divine represented in Yahweh, see Stolz 1970 and Cross 1973: 147-94.

76.   Lonergan calls insight 'the act of organizing intelligence,' including the 'apprehension of relations' (1970: ix, x), so that what 'was an insoluble problem, now becomes incredibly simple and obvious' (6). Similarly, according to Meyer (1973: 21), 'a piece of music must be seen in retrospect to have fitted together—to have been right.' Insight is an express aim of the morphology of Buss 1969: 1.

The particularist tradition, which still strongly dominates biblical study, lays little emphasis on insight. The will and action of a nominalist God is fundamentally inscrutable and must simply be believed or obeyed. Apart from reference to God, nominalism favors descriptions over norms or guidance. Biblical scholarship accordingly often oscillates between critical description and capricious faith, calling the one 'historical' and the other 'theological.' One attempt to overcome this duality thinks of forms as 'essences' in an Aristotelian way, but this approach is unduly rigid. A better perspective appears in the notion of relationship, which incorporates probability. If love and *sedeq* ('rightness') are ultimate, neither particularity nor sharing is more basic than the other.

Three aspects of interpretation can be identified, then, by the terms fact, form, and faith. Fact represents the particular actuality; form, the possible or general; faith, one's apprehension of the whole or ultimate, which includes and transcends the other two. In Israelite faith the name Yahweh symbolizes the more particular side of deity; the designation Elohim, the more general.[77] These two sides are held together in communication. As both are apprehended together, one can recognize what the Bible—or any word—has to 'say.'

77. Of course, one must not regard these symbols as rigid, but see above, n. 7. No matter what its etymological derivation, Yahweh functions as a name. The use of Elohim and similar general designations in Near Eastern wisdom is well known. Within Chinese religion, Shang-ti and T'ien express the individualized and general aspects of deity. In India, Ramanuja explicitly pointed to the fact that love requires an element of individuality (in opposition to a strong unitive drive in Hinduism). Zimmerli (1976: 13) is among many who declare that the Old Testament is primarily concerned with the particular; Heschel 1973: 194, however, is correct in seeing that neither irrationality nor rationalism adequately represent Judaism.

Essay 6

PRINCIPLES FOR MORPHOLOGICAL CRITICISM WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO LETTER FORM

The central task of the present study is to outline principles for the appropriate study of form. Illustrations will be derived for the most part from the form or structure of letters, which furnish convenient examples for several theses. It will be natural to refer to the writings of Paul, since the honoree has contributed toward their understanding in a major way.

First, a word about terminology. The term 'form criticism' is difficult to use for several reasons. One lies in the fact that it has developed three rather distinct meanings: a systematic or historical study of genres (*Gattungsforschung* or *Gattungsgeschichte*); a reconstruction of oral tradition with attention to genres (for some, *Formgeschichte*); and the examination of a text as it stands (*Form-kritik*, according to Wolfgang Richter).[1] Furthermore, the term is not one used in ordinary conversation or, indeed, in writing outside of biblical studies, so that it does not have the benefit of protection and clarification through frequent usage. Most seriously for the use of the term, endeavors designated as 'form critical' have often been based on the view that there is a firm conjunction between linguistic form, content, and recurring circumstances in oral expression.[2]

This essay focuses on New Testament materials, since the honoree was a New Testament scholar. Comparative data ranging from Greece to China, presented in detail in the footnotes, show that the patterns noted are not arbitrary. The Chinese examples were triggered by the author's childhood memories.

1. Wolfgang Richter, *Exegese als Literaturwissenschaft* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971), p. 79; similarly, in part, Gene M. Tucker, *Form Criticism of the Old Testament* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971).

2. Especially sharply stated by Albrecht Alt, *Essays on Old Testament History and Religion* (trans. R.A. Wilson; Oxford: Blackwell, 1966), p. 87.

Closely connected with this outlook is the belief that a given socie-
ty's genres are clearly separated from one another. What label shall
be used for a study of forms if these assumptions are not accepted?

An alternative possibility can be found in the term 'morphology,'
derived from the Greek *morphē* (roughly equivalent to the Latin
forma). This designation is current in a number of disciplines; after
all, forms appear in many contexts.

In biology, the word 'morphology' refers to the shape and arrange-
ment of organisms or their parts, examined with attention to the
development, functions, and types of such forms. In geology, it
describes rock and land formations, viewed in relation to the proc-
esses which cause their appearance. In linguistics, it designates
inflected word forms, with their use and meaning. In the field of
history, 'morphological' theories attempt to combine holistic treat-
ment of data with a view of organic development, including growth
and dissolution.[3] In economics, structural anthropology, and the
study of religion, the term has been applied to patterns present in a
given culture and subject to classification for comparison with those
of other cultures.[4] In theology, the word morphology was employed
by E. Stauffer, W. Elert, and E. Schlink for the structure of human

3.   The most notable historical theory with this name is that of Oswald
Spengler, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes: Umrisse einer Morphologie der
Weltgeschichte*, I. *Gestalt und Wirklichkeit* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1918). In
anthropology an outlook close to Spengler's was developed by Leo Frobe-
nius, followed in part by Adolf E. Jensen, *Myth and Cult among Primi-
tive Peoples* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. vii-viii. Such
combinations of holistic treatment with the theme of organic change are
not, in my opinion, altogether successful. Somewhat differently, Maurice
Halbwachs, *Morphologie sociale*, 2nd edn (Paris: A. Colin, 1946), describes
the geographical and biological conditions of social life, in part following
earlier French scholarship.

4.   Karl Menger, *Grundzüge einer Klassifikation der Wissenschaften*
(Jena: G. Fischer, 1899), p. 13 (if one wishes to ground intellectual move-
ments in economic developments, one can find support in the fact that the
modern contrast between morphology and historicism was first formulated
by Menger, who also criticized unfettered capitalism); A.R. Radcliffe-
Brown, *A Natural Science of Society* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1957), p. 56;
P. Chantepie de la Saussaye, *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte* (Tübingen:
J.C.B. Mohr, 3rd edn, 1905), p. 7; Mircea Eliade, *Patterns in Comparative
Religion* (trans. R. Sheed; New York: Sheed & Ward, 1958), p. 410, and 'Spirit,
Light, and Seed,' *HR* 11 (August, 1971), p. 1. Similarly, a contrast between
morphology and the genetic dimension is made by Alfred North Whitehead,
Process and Reality (New York: Macmillan Co., 1929), pp. 334-35, and Hans-
Jürgen Hermisson, *Studien zur israelitischen Spruchweisheit* (Neukirchen:
Neukirchener Verlag, 1968), p. 34.

existence and expression in relation to God, with attention to verbal genres as embodying dimensions of life and thought.[5]

The expression 'morphology' has also been used fairly widely in the field of literature, especially—although not only—in regard to genres. Already F. Schleiermacher spoke of the 'morphology' of a genre, referring to common features of comparable works. Later, in a manner not unlike Gunkel's, R.G. Moulton presented for biblical and other literature a morphological treatment of the existing text as an 'inquiry into the foundation forms of literature.' A. Jolles insightfully described under such a rubric the general character of basic forms (legend, riddle, etc.). R. Wellek and A. Warren used the word to designate the study of genres and their history. More generally, 'morphology' was employed in Russian and German investigations of fundamental processes and structures of expression (in the 1920s by B. Eichenbaum, H. Pongs, and V. Propp, and thereafter by G. Müller). This approach, as one aspect of interpretation, is given a notable place by the Italian E. Betti for the recognition of recurring or 'lawful' patterns, including those of major genres.[6]

5.   E. Stauffer, *Grundbegriffe einer Morphologie des neutestamentlichen Denkens* (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1929), e.g., pp. 14-16 on the relation of style and thought in genres; Werner Elert, *Morphologie des Luthertums*, 2 vols. (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1931-32); Edmund Schlink, *Der Mensch in der Verkündigung der Kirche* (Munich: C. Kaiser, 1936), e.g., pp. 20-28, 99, and 'Die Struktur der dogmatischen Aussage als oekumenisches Problem,' *KD* 3 (1957), pp. 251-306 (e.g., p. 299). Schlink presented a fairly sharp criticism of national socialism at a time when that was not easy (*Der Mensch*, pp. 3, 16-17); this observation is relevant here, since the topic of form (*Gestalt*, etc.) was also pursued by Nazis (see, e.g., Klaus W. Hempfer, *Gattungstheorie* [Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1973], p. 80).

6.   Friedrich   Schleiermacher,   *Hermeneutik*,   ed.   H.   Kimmerle (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1959), p. 148; Richard G. Moulton, *The Literary Study of the Bible* (Boston: D.C. Heath & Co., 2nd edn, 1899), pp. v, ix; André Jolles, *Einfache Formen* (Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1930), p. 1 (this work has repeatedly inspired biblical form criticism); René Wellek and Austin Warren, *Theory of Literature* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1949), p. 273; on Boris Eichenbaum, Vladimir Propp, and others, see Viktor Erlich, *Russian Formalism* ('s-Gravenhage: Mouton & Co., 1955), pp. 145, 208, 217; Hermann Pongs, *Das Bild in der Dichtung*, I. *Versuch einer Morphologie der metaphorischen Formen* (Marburg: N.G. Elwert, 1927); Günther Müller, *Morphologische Poetik: Gesammelte Aufsätze* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1968), pp. 146-246 (cf. pp. 3-45 for a genre study); Emilio Betti, *Allgemeine Auslegungslehre als Methodik der Geisteswissenschaften* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1967), pp. 213, 341, 419 (for morphology Betti also uses the term *technisch*, derived from the Greek *technē*, 'rules of art').

A distinct advantage of the word 'morphology,' then, is its use in many fields, ranging from the physical sciences to the humanities and theology. In fact, the word is often employed to express such continuity.[7]

Closely connected with this is a further advantage, namely, that the term lends itself to the avoidance of both the Aristotelian contrast between essence and accidents and the split between content and (external) form—oppositions which in the past became associated with the word 'form' but are problematic now. In medieval Latin, *forma* was used to translate the Greek *eidos*, employed by Aristotle for the essential pattern of an object which is expressed in a defini-tion.[8] The problem with Aristotle's conception lies in a failure to see clearly enough that no one characteristic is necessarily more basic than another. For instance, a rubber ball can be described either as a ball which is, furthermore, made of rubber or as a piece of rubber which is, also, round. The primacy of one or another characteristic depends on one's purpose, habit, or terminology and is not given in the nature of the object itself. Rejection of objective essence is important for post-Aristotelian nominalism. Extreme nominalism also denies that any form—generality or structure—exists apart from the mind which conceives it. In such a view, form is external, representing an appearance, while true reality itself is particular.[9] In regard to literature, this outlook stresses that genres are conven-tions that each society can shape as it wishes.

Neither the Aristotelian nor the nominalist perspective is adequate for any of the sciences. Instead, one can envision and recog-nize a variety of forms interacting with each other. As expressed by

---

7.   Inspiration for stressing the continuity between fields by means of the word 'morphology' was furnished by the poet Goethe, who was inter-ested in biology, color, and other regularities. See, e.g., Horst Oppel, *Morphologische Literaturwissenschaft: Goethes Ansicht und Methode* (Mainz: Kirchheim & Co., 1947).

8.   E.g., *Metaphysics*, 5.2 (1013a); *Posterior Analytics*, 2.3 (91a), 10 (93b).

9.   A divorce between content and form proceeded in the theories of G. Agricola (1494-1555) and P. Ramus (1515-1572), with strong individu-alistic overtones; see, e.g., Walter Ong, *Ramus: Method and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason* (New York: Octagon Books, 1974, reprinted from the 1958 edn), pp. 102 (leaving only stylistic elocution for rhetoric), 203, 290. It is probably not accidental that a major work by the nominalist logician Nelson Goodman is entitled *The Structure of Appearance* (Indianapolis: Bobbs–Merrill, 1951). Goodman's work, however, sets forth a quite moderate form of nominalism (called 'realistic') that conceives fundamental individuals as qualities rather than particulars; a radical nominalism would probably be untenable.

Myron S. Allen, 'morphology stresses the finding of all possible relationships.'[10] The distinction between 'deep' and 'surface' structure—made in different ways by a number of current theorists—must be viewed as relative to a given consideration. Yet relationships can be truly discovered and are not merely imposed by the mind, for the mind is a part of nature. Often they may be described in terms of statistical correlations, which can be connected with logically coherent patterns.[11]

If the usage of the term 'form criticism' can be purged of certain philosophical and historical assumptions, the phrase may continue to be a convenient one in biblical studies. If not, one may need to adopt another, such as 'morphology.'[12] Perhaps the expression 'the study of forms' can serve as a simple and neutral designation. In any case—whatever term is used—central principles appropriate for such an investigation can be set forth in the following seven theses.

1. *Genres, as they appear in history, are not cleanly divided from one another.* In letter writing, for instance, there is continuity between private and public letters. As is well-known, A. Deissmann distinguished between 'true' or 'real' letters, directed to a particular recipient in a certain situation, and epistles, which are 'literary' in the sense that they are designed for repeated use; writings standing between these two designations he regarded as 'bad letters.'[13] In reality, however, all writing participates in both particularity and generality, even though to different degrees and in divergent ways. The medium range between the two poles is by no means an anomaly,

---

10. Myron S. Allen, *Morphological Creativity* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice–Hall, 1962), p. 35.

11. For a comprehensive view, see M. Buss, 'Understanding Communication,' in *Encounter with the Text* (ed. M. Buss; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979), pp. 3-44, reprinted above, Part I, Essay 5.

12. I chose the term for *The Prophetic Word of Hosea: A Morphological Study* (Berlin: A. Töpelmann, 1969) in order to express both continuity with, and differentiation from, the established tradition of form criticism emanating from H. Gunkel. Since then, the same word has been used, with a narrower range of meaning, by some other biblical scholars. Rolf Knierim, 'Old Testament Form Criticism Reconsidered,' *Int* 27 (October, 1973), pp. 435-68 (456), employed 'morphology' for the linguistic side of a genre. In John Collins, 'Towards a Morphology of a Genre,' *Semeia* 14 (1979), pp. 1-20, it designates the recurring features, primarily of content, of a genre.

13. Adolf Deissmann, *Bible Studies* (trans. A. Grieve; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1901), pp. 26, 37 (following Franz Overbeck), pp. 43-44; *Light from the Ancient East* (trans. L. Strachan; 2nd edn; New York: G. Doran, 1927), pp. 230, 234.

but may furnish some of the very finest expressions. Certainly, it is proper to make distinctions; indeed, in the Hebrew Bible, the difference between a private letter (which may even lead to the death of the bearer who does not realize its content)[14] and an 'open letter,' intended for circulation (Neh. 6:5-7), is known. Nevertheless, one can usually observe numerous gradations between types, and there is no special virtue in standing at one extreme or the other. Furthermore, in most instances, contrasts are not 'original,' but become sharper over time. For instance, some of the earliest letters known to us, from Greece to China, contain general exhortations and warnings, so that a division between letter and treatise is fluid.[15]

2. *Genres stand within a larger system, within which they are often complementary to one another.* As a society grows in size and complexity, an increasing number of recognized types of expression arise, each with a more-or-less peculiar function. In Hebrew literature, a distinction was made between priestly transmission of older revelation, with fundamental general directions for life, and prophetic mediation of fresh revelation, relevant especially for particular occasions and showing their relation to the general will of God. These two dimensions together were, in turn, distinguished from more natural insight, known as wisdom. These three major aspects were enshrined in the three parts of the Hebrew canon. Similarly, the letters of the New Testament play a complementary role in relation to the Gospels. To a large extent, Christian tradition regarded the Gospel materials (which, like the Pentateuch, include both narrative and ethical words) as fundamental; the letter writers did not seek to replace the Gospels, but—like prophecy—directed themselves more especially to particular circumstances, and—like Wisdom—included their own reflection as a subsidiary source of insight. As has already been noted, however, the various

14.   2 Sam. 11:14-17. This motif appears elsewhere in ancient literature, presumably reflecting the assumption either of a low degree of literacy on the part of the bearer or of a protective envelope for the letter (fairly widely used), or both.

15.   Adolf Erman, *The Literature of the Ancient Egyptians* (trans. A. Blackman; New York: Benjamin Blom, 1971, reissued from the 1927 edition), p. 205. On the fluidity between private and public productions in antiquity, see, e.g., Hermann Peter, *Der Brief in der römischen Litteratur* (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1901), p. 10; Paul Wendland, *Die urchristlichen Literaturformen* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1912), pp. 344-46; Wilhelm von Christ, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*, 6th edn, II (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1920), pp. 53-54, 825-26. In China, literary and open letters are very old (since the turn of the era; cf. *Brockhaus Enzyklopädie*, 1967 edn, s.v. 'Brief').

differentiations are not altogether sharp. Thus, Paul treated specific issues at such a basic and theoretical level that his writings were worthy of being shared and preserved, as was true of the messages of the great Israelite prophets.

3. *Generic divisions cut across one another, so that they form a multidimensional pattern.* This pattern can be described in terms of a series of distinctions. For instance, a letter can convey a reproof,[16] a warning,[17] or an expression of appreciation and even love,[18] as well as many kinds of information, commands, and requests. These elements of content or thrust form a multidimensional array, reflecting such considerations as emotional tone (positive or negative) and the relative status of sender and addressee. In relation to such factors, the distinction between a written letter and an oral message furnishes an additional contrast independent of, and thus overlapping with, the others. Types are then best arranged not hierarchically, with separate subtypes, but in an intersecting fashion.[19]

A corollary of this thesis is that genres cannot be sharply distinguished from other forms. It is true that certain kinds of patterns are often called 'genres,' while others are not, but such a division is a matter of tradition and convenience, not one that is adequately justifiable in theory.[20] Indeed, usage of the term 'genre' differs

16. E.g., Erman, *Egyptians*, p. 203; Jer. 29:26-28; Isocrates, Letter 2 (to Philip, I).

17. See, e.g., C. Roetzel, 'The Judgment Form in Paul's Letters,' *JBL* 88 (1969), pp. 305-12; Yigael Yadin, *Bar-Kokhba* (New York: Random House, 1971), pp. 125-28, 137.

18. For pre-Christian Greek and eighth-century Chinese examples, see Christ, *Geschichte*, p. 825, and S. Obata, *The Works of Li-Po* (New York: Dutton, 1922), pp. 151-53.

19. Multiple classification is recognized in the *Excerpta rhetorica* (appendix on 'De epistolis'); William G. Doty, 'The Classification of Epistolary Literature,' *CBQ* 31 (1969), pp. 197-98; and, in other fields, by Fritz Zwicky, *Morphological Astronomy* (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1957), pp. 14, 20, and Thomas Munro, *Form and Style in the Arts: An Introduction to Aesthetic Morphology* (Cleveland: Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1970), p. 261.

20. William G. Doty, *Letters in Primitive Christianity* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1973), p. 53, wants to use the word 'form' only for small elements, out of which genres are constituted. However, this usage involves problems both in theory and in practice. For instance, thanksgiving can be treated either as a subsidiary element of letters or as a genre which utilizes various expressions; greetings occur in an oral context as well as in letters. Thus, the relative primacy of such forms depends on the particular purpose for which they are viewed.

widely; it covers such disparate categories as 'poetry,' 'hymn,' and 'letter.' The proper solution to this diversity lies not in creating a definition which one may hope will be accepted by all users, but in recognizing that the classification system for which one chooses to employ the word is only one of several possible systems. For the discussion of the present paper, it would make very little difference if the word 'form' were everywhere substituted for 'genre.'

4. *Genres exhibit various degrees of flexibility, so that their patterns should normally be described in terms of probabilities rather than rigid standards.* Letter styles provide an excellent illustration. The flexibility of epistolary forms—despite their formulaic character—has been frequently noted. Thus, in regard to ancient Greek letter style, F. Exler remarks that 'so great is the variety in detail, that hardly any two forms are quite alike,' and J. White appropriately states that a certain kind of letter 'prefers' a given form, or uses it 'often' or 'sometimes.'[21] Variable tendencies, indeed, are a hallmark of most, and perhaps all, styles.[22] One major reason for such variability is the fact that a particular expression is affected by a large number of considerations. For instance, a given letter may exhibit the following characteristics: it may be an angry one, written by a brother who is a priest, and concerned with financial matters. Each of the elements mentioned—in addition to others, such as the prior history of the persons involved—contributes to the form of the expression. Another reason for variety lies in the freedom permitted by tradition or taken by the author.

In generic patterns, a high degree of correlation between two features implies a strong press toward regularity in this respect, one which takes precedence over other factors. There is no reason,

21.   Francis Xavier J. Exler, *The Form of the Ancient Greek Letter of the Epistolary Papyri* (Chicago: Ares Publishers, 1976), p. 133; John L. White, 'Epistolary Formulas and Cliches in Greek Papyrus Letters,' *Society of Biblical Literature: 1978 Seminar Papers* (ed. Paul J. Achtemeier; Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1978), II, pp. 291-92, 312.

22.   For flexibility in Near Eastern letters, see, e.g., Edmond Sollberger, *The Business and Administrative Correspondence Under the Kings of Ur* (Locust Valley, NY: J.J. Augustin, 1966), p. 2; Sally W. Ahl, *Epistolary Texts From Ugarit* (PhD diss., Brandeis University, 1973), p. 104. More generally, Pongs, *Morphologie*, p. vii, stressed a combination of law and freedom. Similarly, Everett C. Olson and Robert L. Miller, *Morphological Integration* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 57-83, 268, considered probabilistic 'covariance' to be central to form. According to the analysis of Buss, *Hosea*, pp. 61-64, a relative—not absolute—difference obtains between speech in which Yahweh appears in the first person and other statements by the prophet.

however, why more moderate tendencies should not operate as well, with allowance for a variety of considerations.

5. *Genres are related to human situations.* This thesis has a negative aspect, namely, a denial of the view that genres are tightly connected with spatial or temporal settings, for genres vary greatly in the degree to which they are associated with external occasions. Some expressions are virtually confined to a certain time or place, but others, including letters, have no such constraint, and for many forms (such as hymns or folk songs) there are preferred, but by no means mandatory, settings. Often an organization with which a genre is associated is secondary in relation to the literary form; thus the post office was created to facilitate the transmission of letters. Someone who delivers a letter privately is not deviating from the 'original' practice, just as someone who sleeps on the floor does not (secondarily) 'imitate' what is now often done on a raised bed. Rather, what is primary is the intimate connection of a genre with a human process, such as communicating or resting. This assertion is the positive side of the thesis. In the case of letters, the 'epistolary situation' is that of physical—and sometimes emotional—distance, the effect of which the writer seeks to overcome or at least mitigate.[23] Writing is employed in this case not primarily to insure permanence, but to extend the range of a word which would be given orally if that were possible or convenient.

The specific situation addressed by a document can usually be deduced from the data of the text, especially with the aid of comparative materials. In part this is because there is an inner or logical connection between what is said and what the speaker seeks to accomplish in a presupposed situation. Furthermore, a written work is as a rule relatively self-contained in order to avoid ambiguity, since it will be used in a different time and place. Some ancient letters discovered by archaeology lie on the border between written and oral messages; certain items, often even the name of the addressee or sender, are left to be supplied by the carrier. The letters of biblical literature, however, all provide the relevant information. Thus they specify the kind of person who writes or for whom the message is intended. Some of them describe their addressees in quite general terms, with an indication of the condition in which they are situated; others are more narrowly focused.

---

23.   An extensive discussion of this 'letter situation' has been presented by Heikki Koskenniemi, *Studien zur Idee und Phraseologie des griechischen Briefes bis 400 n. Chr.* (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Kirjapaino, 1956). On the overcoming of emotional distance, cf. the letters cited by Deissmann, *Light*, pp. 188, 192.

Here it is important to note that, as is often the case in biblical literature, an individual figure stands for others with the same or similar task or role. Titus and Timothy are pastors; Peter and others represent apostolic authority.[24] In later times, handbooks for letter writing headed their samples with descriptions of the type of situation involved, such as: 'Letter to a Friend in Favour of Another,' 'To a friend, upon a report of an unfaithful dealing,' or 'From a Young Tradesman to Wholesale Dealers, with an Order.'[25] Historical and form criticism have in the past sometimes overemphasized precise circumstances to an extent not needed for understanding a text and not warranted by its data. More important for interpretation is recognition of sociopsychological or anthropological questions concerning the dynamics of existence.

6. *As human situations change, genres develop with them.* Some aspects of human life, it is true, are well-nigh universal, being to a large extent grounded biologically; accordingly, genres associated with these evidence relatively little change over centuries and even millennia. Thus, modern love poetry is still remarkably like that of the Song of Songs, expressing both the joy of being together and sorrow over absence. Other human experiences, however, are affected much more deeply by variable conditions. In particular, as social complexity grows—with an increase in the size of effective communities—a paradoxical phenomenon occurs. On the one hand, communication extends to a large number of persons; on the other hand, contact with a particular partner who moves to another area or position in society becomes weaker. The use of writing, such as in letters, both furthers this development and becomes desirable in the new circumstances. By facilitating empire formation, writing contributed to stratification and social tensions, but it was also used to counteract these tendencies through laws and expressions

24.   In Leviticus, instructions given through Moses, the archetypal figure for law, specify those to whom they apply: Aaron (the high priest), Aaron and his sons (i.e., priests), or the people in general. Similarly, psalms for non-clerical individuals are frequently attributed to David. Already Moulton, *Literary Study*, pp. 266-67, pointed out, in a nuanced manner, how modes of address and the contents of what is discussed indicate the situation to which New Testament letters are addressed.

25.   P.S. de la Serre, *The Secretary in Fashion* (trans. J. Massinger; London: G. Emerson, 1640), p. 56; anonymous, *A Speedie Post* (London: W. Sheares, 1625), letter 1; anonymous, *The Letter Writer, or, The Art of Correspondence* (Richmond, VA: J.W. Randolph, 1863), p. 7. Among many others, and using the word 'situation,' cf. William H. Butterfield, *How to Use Letters in College Public Relations* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944), p. 144.

of protest. The overcoming of distance in letters exhibits at once the positive and the negative sides of this condition; this shows itself in their content,[26] which repeatedly includes a concern with persecution and similar problems.[27] The limited use of letters in the Hebrew Bible and their heavy use in the New Testament can thus be seen as connected with important social developments. Christianity, for instance, can hardly be understood without reference to the existence of an empire, which creates profound alienation for many groups and at the same time provides for the easy spread of a faith. Christianity in part made use of a new genre relevant to such a political situation: apocalyptic, which expresses a universal perspective and embodies hope in a transcendent salvation as ordinary social fulfillment becomes impossible for many. The New Testament's letter style and its strongly eschatological faith are, then, related.[28]

7. *Generic structures are not merely a matter of convention, but exhibit a rationale which allows one to recognize certain elements as appropriate in relation to others.* The format of letters furnishes a number of relevant examples. Thus, a written communication from one person to another requires, in most instances, identification of

26. The content of ancient Near Eastern letters is largely economic, administrative, political, and military; a major category of Greek private correspondence is that of soldiers' letters. In the Hebrew Bible, the majority of recorded or reported letters are by or, in a few cases, to royalty (2 Sam. 11:15; 1 Kgs 21:9-10; 2 Kgs 5:6; 10:2-3, 6; 19:10-13; 20:12; 2 Chron. 2:10-15; 21:12-15; 30:1, 6-9; Ezra 1:2-4, as decrees); the rest are similarly political (Jer. 29; Neh. 6:6-7, 17-19; Est. 9:20). Archaeologically discovered Hebrew letters are predominantly administrative, often military, in character; see now Dennis Pardee, *Handbook of Ancient Hebrew Letters* (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1980). Cultural growth and political expansion as correlates of letter writing have been noted also by Peter, *Brief*, p. 13, and Doty, *Letters*, p. 6.

27. Persecution forms a major theme of ancient Jewish letters (in some from Elephantine and in Ezra, Esther, and Maccabees). Some of Paul's letters were written in prison, a condition from which important modern statements by Dietrich Bonhoeffer (especially on 3 August, 1944) and Martin Luther King, Jr ('Letter from the Birmingham City Jail,' 16 April, 1963) have emanated as well. Exile as a topic or as a situation also occurs frequently (cf. Jeremiah 29; *EncJud*, 1971, s.v. 'Letters and Letter Writers,' p. 60, referring to communications by Jewish exiles; Herbert A. Giles, *Gems of Chinese Literature* [Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 2nd edn, 1922], p. 80, presenting a letter from the first-century BCE exile).

28. On somewhat different—phenomenological—grounds, Klaus Berger, 'Apostelbrief und apostolische Rede,' *ZNW* 65 (1974), pp. 207-17, argues that the 'genres' of letter, testament, and apocalyptic should not be too sharply separated.

the sender and of the addressee. The precise phrasing and location of such data can be largely a matter of convention, but even these aspects are not entirely arbitrary, for some forms or positions are much more useful than others. A natural place for that information is at the beginning of a letter, since it needs to be known immediately, although the sender's name may be given at the end (also easily noticed) in a gesture of politeness.[29] Furthermore, an initial, or final, greeting cultivates the relationship upon which the letter is based.[30] Especially effective in this regard is a word of appreciation for the addressee.[31] That such expressions are not a meaningless formality is supported by the observation that they can be omitted for a number of reasons, including (momentary) anger.[32] Indeed, the nature of greetings is generally closely attuned to the relationship between the parties.[33]

29.   In Near Eastern and Greek tradition, both sender and addressee are identified at the beginning, but with a tendency (not a rigid one!) toward placing the name of the one with higher rank first (Robert H. Pfeiffer, 'Assyrian Epistolary Formulae,' *JAOS* 43 [1923], pp. 26-27; White, 'Formulas,' pp. 291-93).

30.   Various steps toward a *captatio benevolentiae*, i.e., to gain an addressee's favorable attention, have been recommended for both oral presentations (Heinrich Lausberg, *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik* [Munich: Max Hueber, 1960], p. 277), and letters (Charles Homer Haskins, *Studies in Mediaeval Culture* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1929], p. 3).

31.   Praise for the recipient appears in the following cases, among others: a letter by an Egyptian priest (Erman, *Egyptians*, p. 200); Sumerian petitions (e.g., James B. Pritchard [ed.], *ANET* [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 3rd edn, 1969], p. 382); Plato's seventh letter (the genuineness of which is disputed); Isocrates' letters 5, 7, 8; the Letter of Aristeas; Seneca, *Ad Luciliam epistulae morales*, Nos. 2, 4, 5, 13, 34, 47; New Testament letters; Josephus, *Life*, 365-66 (quoting King Agrippa); later Jewish letters (*EncJud*, XI, 1971, cols. 57-58; Franz Kobler, *Letters of Jews through the Ages* [New York: East and West Library, 1952], pp. 135, 141, 204, 450, 465, 532, 607); an eighth-century Chinese letter to a potential patron (Cyril Birch [ed.], *Anthology of Chinese Literature* [New York: Grove Press, 1965], p. 233); and more recent Western letters (George Saintsbury, *A Letter Book* [London: G. Bell & Sons, 1922], pp. 123, 141, as advised also by Lillian E. Watson, *Standard Book of Letter Writing and Correct Social Forms* [Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice–Hall, 2nd edn, 1958], p. 30).

32.   No praise occurs at the beginning of Galatians or 2 Corinthians—letters that are fairly critical in tone. Well-wishing is omitted in 'sarcastic letters' (Pfeiffer, 'Assyrian,' p. 27; cf. A. Leo Oppenheim, *Letters from Mesopotamia* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967], p. 170). There are other reasons for the lack of a greeting, such as a need for brevity (especially on ostraca) and, it appears, a major difference in rank.

33.   As noted by Paul Schubert, *Form and Function of the Pauline Thanksgiving* (Berlin: A. Töpelmann, 1939), pp. 181-83; Otto Kaiser,

Although the body of a letter can be devoted to a large variety of themes, some topics stand out as especially appropriate. These include the mention of a previous message by either of the parties; such a reference is natural, since a letter is half of a dialogue, according to one of the oldest preserved comments on epistolary style.[34] Similarly, a discussion of past or future travel is relevant to the epistolary situation of physical distance, either in regard to its cause or as a means to abolish it.[35] Inquiries and assurances concerning health and welfare form not only a standard greeting but may constitute a significant element of the communication, for this topic is of major concern in one's relation to an absent friend.[36] Finally, insofar as a letter is designed to reach from a particular person to a specific audience, it is fitting that the personal character of the writer is revealed in the content.[37]

Significant features of letters have been outlined in ancient and modern guides to such writing. To some extent, these guides furnish an introduction to conventions. Much more importantly, however, they seek to point to what is fitting and effective. When they present classical examples, it is for the most part for the purpose

---

'Zum Formular der in Ugarit gefundenen Briefe,' *ZDPV* 86 (1970), p. 22. For instance, in the ancient Near East a wish for divine blessing often reflected a relatively personal relation, such as between actual or fictive relatives (as noted by Ahl, *Ugarit*, p. 53), and also was especially common—understandably so—when one of the parties had a cultic role or belonged to a priestly family (as observed by Pfeiffer, 'Assyrian,' p. 34). This distribution is probably related to the usage of the New Testament.

34.   Artemon, quoted by Demetrius, *On Style*, par. 223 (perhaps c. 300 BCE). References to previous messages are very numerous; cf., e.g., Oppenheim, *Mesopotamia*, pp. 96, 103, 135, 137; Lachish ostraca 3, 4, 5, 6 (Pritchard, *ANET*, p. 322); Epicurus to Pythocles (according to Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, X, 84); 1 Cor. 5:9; 7:1.

35.   Cf. Plato's letters 3, 7, 11; New Testament epistles (Robert W. Funk, *Language, Hermeneutic, and Word of God* [New York: Harper & Row, 1966], pp. 265-67); and letters from other areas and times (Obata, *Li Po*, pp. 151, 153; Birch, *Chinese*, p. 219; Kobler, *Letters of Jews*, p. 322; Saintsbury, *Letter Book*, pp. 117, 240.

36.   Cf. Erman, *Egyptians*, p. 201; Pritchard, *ANET*, p. 490; Joseph A. Fitzmyer, *A Wandering Aramean* (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1979), pp. 219-26; 1 Macc. 12:22; 2 Cor. 1:8-11; 1 Tim. 5:23; 3 John 2; Arthur Waley, *Translations from the Chinese* (New York: A. Knopf, 2nd edn, 1941), p. 218. To ask about the other's welfare was also standard for an oral meeting (André Lemaire, *Inscriptions hébraïques*, I. *Les ostraca* [Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1977], p. 180).

37.   As stressed already by Demetrius, *On Style*, par. 227. Personal characteristics and relations are strongly expressed in Paul's letters.

of illustrating commendable characteristics. Modern scholarship can add to these traditional notices a comparison with phenomena in other cultural contexts, in order to establish general and thus possibly integral connections.

   If positions or expressions of the Bible are to play a normative role for readers and not merely function as curiosities, they need to be seen as appropriate in the situations to which they are directed. Such recognition involves an element of rationality—as William A. Beardslee also argued.[38] Insight into the human significance of the Bible, then, does not stand outside of scholarship, as an afterthought; instead, it lies at the heart of the study of form.

   38.   William A. Beardslee, 'Natural Theology and Realized Eschatology,' *JR* 39 (July, 1959), pp. 157-58, speaking of 'fragments of knowledge.' Similarly, for Susanne K. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1942), p. 238, the 'morphology' of feelings, revealed in music, includes their 'rationale.' Understanding in theology does not rule out paradox, for paradox is appropriate in relation to the ultimate.

The Notion of 'Aptness'

Analyses of the *chreia* in rhetorical literature describe it as the report of an action or a short statement by a specific person. More particularly, they refer to the action or statement as being apt, or aptly attributed, and to its being effective—either by being useful for life generally or by solving a given problem, such as by wit (see the studies by Hock and O'Neill and by Butts, listed by Williams).

With perceptiveness, Williams recognizes the 'biographical impulse' of Q's *chreiai*, together with a tendency to make Jesus himself the subject of the parables ascribed to him. This tendency represents a shift in focus from Jesus' orientation to that of his followers, but there are, as Williams well observes, important literary continuities between the two levels. These include, in general, metaphoric patterning and, in particular, forms of intensification that emphasize radical commitment.

Interestingly, these literary phenomena not only constitute continuity between Jesus and Q—so that one can say that Q's representation is 'apt' for Jesus—but they also show that there is not a sharp break between the words of Jesus and human life. As Williams properly indicates, metaphoric expressions, as in Jesus' speech, embody continuity even while they deal with the Other. In regard to intensification, he rightly points out that this phenomenon describes the metaphoric process in parables on the whole more adequately than does paradox. The notion of paradox too readily sets the divine in opposition to the human, an outlook which

The notion of 'aptness,' prominent in traditional rhetorical theory, has been frequently ignored in recent biblical scholarship, probably as a reflection of particularist thought, which downgrades that notion. The following two portions of the above essay, responding to James Williams, 'Parable and Chreia: From Q to Narrative Gospel,' *Semeia* 43 (1988), pp. 85-114, argue for recognition of its significance.

does not harmonize well with a certain wisdom quality of Jesus'
teaching.[1] While Jesus' words do not express a comfortable accept-
ance of ordinary social life and underscore a divine operation that is
different from the human, they are at the same time not irrational,
for it stands to reason that the infinite transcends the finite.

   The notion of aptness allows for a variety of religious, philo-
sophical, and scholarly perspectives, but it goes beyond a purely
atomistic, conventional, or fideistic outlook on reality. It is a better
standard than accuracy, which is externally descriptive. Many may
hold that a judgment concerning aptness or appropriateness belongs
to neither an academic nor a theological context. It is time, however,
for an opinion which accepts the significance of one of the concepts
used by ancient rhetorical thought in regard to *chreiai*.

---

   1.   In a recent work on aphorisms in Proverbs, James Williams (*Those
Who Ponder Proverbs*, 1981) rightly points out that Israelite wisdom includes
recognition both of (significant) order and of (relative) disorder. The latter
is not to be disregarded, even for wisdom, but a one-sided emphasis on
paradox hardly does justice to Jesus' words.

Essay 8

Form Criticism: An Introduction

Introduction

According to the psychologist Jean Piaget, who systematically studied the development of thinking both in individuals and in cultures, young people living in the present century pass from a 'concrete' way of thinking to a 'formal' one. Formal thinking deals not so much with specific objects or events as with the way in which they are related to each other within complex patterns. Piaget believed that this transition represents an intrinsic development of the mind, proceeding with an inner logic. That thesis is questionable, but within Western culture there was indeed a movement beyond the inclination to accept tradition, first to a concrete ('objective' or 'historical') way of thought and then to a 'formal' one, which is more abstract and relational. Institutional education largely reflects this path of cultural development, in which earlier insights are not necessarily rejected but may be incorporated into newer and, if all goes well, richer perspectives.[1]

The expected readership of this volume consists of advanced college and seminary students. In its second edition, a chapter presenting form criticism in a more concrete and less reflective way was substituted for this one. It was written by a member of the team producing 'The Forms of the Old Testament Literature' series and shows clearly the difference as well as the similarity between these two paths, which are complementary rather than contradictory. In any case, the purpose of the present essay is not to give instruction in a technique to be 'applied' externally, but to outline a mindset for interpretation, including its social implications.

1. Clarification: This assessment of the intellectual development of individuals judges that they reflect cultural developments rather than vice versa. Adolescent intellectual development is apparently not universal in its course but heavily dependent on schooling; thus one should not think that Western history recapitulates individual development.

One problem confronting students of biblical literature is that this subject is often not taught at educational levels below college. Thus youths are not trained step-by-step to apply reflective ways of thinking to the Bible. Another problem lies in the fact that the professional study of the Bible has itself experienced difficulty in making the transition, as we will see.

The readers of the present chapter are, then, challenged to think formally—not just concretely—in relation to the Bible and to take into account the fact that the discipline of biblical studies includes significant divergence. To simplify the situation, we will consider only briefly several approaches that call themselves 'form-critical,' but we will sketch in more detail the line that is fully relational.

Form as Pattern

'Form criticism'—to give a definition with which almost everyone will agree—can be described as 'integrative pattern analysis.' The word 'integrative' in this definition indicates that form criticism gives attention to all aspects of a text, including its language, content, and contextual function.[2] The word 'pattern' highlights the fact that the concern of form criticism is not merely with phenomena that appear once but with features that are shared or can be shared by other texts, past or present; texts possessing common features are regularly grouped into types, or 'genres.'

These two sides of form criticism—integration and a recognition of general patterns—go together. That is, the view that emphasizes connections between different aspects of a text also holds that textual features are at least potentially shared by other texts. This view opposes the outlook that thinks of reality as consisting of separate, basically unrelated, items.

To clarify this issue, it is necessary to consider the different opinions that have been held in Western thought about the nature of a pattern. In fact, biblical form criticism, as it has been carried out during the twentieth century and earlier, can be well understood only against this background.

According to one traditional philosophy, a pattern or 'form' is a non-temporal structure of which the observable world is an impure reflection. (A circle drawn on a board is an imperfect reflection of a real circle.) This position was argued by Plato in some of his writings.

---

2.   Clarification: The word does not mean 'unitive' but only that the various aspects are treated together.

Another view, held by Aristotle, regards form as the essential structure of an object that it shares with objects of the same kind. For instance, a table or a human being is considered to have a basic structure, an 'essence,' that it shares with members of the same category; other features are thought to be superficial. According to this outlook, the most appropriate way to classify objects is to place them into groups whose members have their basic structure, their essence, in common.

A third position is that a pattern is only a convenient verbal or conceptual tool by which to refer to several similar objects together. This philosophy—which was anticipated in ancient Greece by Democritus and Epicurus, sharply formulated in the fourteenth century by William of Ockham, and then accepted increasingly until the nineteenth century—can be called 'particularist.' Those holding this position believe that only particular, individual objects belong to the primary level of reality. According to this outlook, objects can legitimately be classified in different ways, depending on one's purpose.

A fourth view regards a pattern as a system of relations that are an intrinsic part of reality. An important feature of relations is that they include both particularity and generality, for the objects related to one another are particular, but a relation itself is general. For instance, the relation of sisterhood or of one person being taller than another applies to more than one set of beings, although these each have distinct identities. A perspective that regards relations as a part of fundamental reality thus assumes that particularity and generality are equally ultimate, neither having been secondarily derived from the other. (In a theological formulation, one can say that they are both aspects of God.)

This 'relationism' maintains that associations between objects or phenomena are not merely a matter of accident (as particularism holds) but that they have intrinsic reasons that can be stated in general, including logical, terms. Yet it also holds that connections are neither altogether necessary nor inevitable, for without the semi-independence of objects there is nothing to be related. Rather, it regards a duality of partial connectivity and partial separateness as basic to existence.

One of the relations in which an object stands is with an observer. Thus, according to relationism (at least in a thoroughgoing form of it), a pattern is perspectival; that is, it is relative to the standpoint from which a perspective is taken and represents that aspect of the object to which one gives attention. Such a view accepts a variety of possible classifications, but it differs from particularism in that a pattern exists for it not only in the observer's mind or speech but also in the object, or—perhaps more precisely—in the relation

between the object and the observer, neither of which is believed to have characteristics in isolation.

A way of thinking that emphasizes relations was implied in early Jewish and Christian thought, as well as in other traditions (e.g., African and Asian).[3] In Western philosophy, the Stoic Zeno presented a distant approximation of it, partly on the basis of a Near Eastern (perhaps Jewish) background. The American philosopher C.S. Peirce and others developed a more systematic relational view from the end of the nineteenth century on. It has come to permeate much of the procedure of the natural sciences and, to some extent, the humanities; it is accepted by this writer as the best outlook available at the present time.

A fifth perspective has a certain similarity with the one just described in that neither particularity nor generality is seen as being by itself absolute. Instead of affirming both, however, it casts doubt on both and opts for skepticism. Skepticism has been especially strong during periods of cultural and social dissolution, specifically in the late phase of Greek civilization and during the transition from the medieval to the modern order in Western Europe. Since the end of the nineteenth century, it has ebbed and flowed in various versions and may have indicated that a major transition—apparently toward a relational perspective—was underway. By itself, a skeptical attitude is only negative; it has value, however, in pointing to the limitations of human thought.

These five views have different sociopolitical implications. Plato's perspective was aristocratic or elitist; it implied that ordinary people should be guided by persons in possession of high truth. The Aristotelian vision was partially democratic. Particularist traditions lent themselves either to libertarian politics (each person has a right for self-assertion, with no special regard for those who are weak)[4] or to authoritarianism (the one on top has the right to rule for the sake of the collective good).[5] In contrast, relationism is associated with social involvements that are concerned with general social welfare while supporting differences between human beings[6]—a

---

3. For its presence in the Hebrew Bible, see *BFC*: 26; *CF*, 3.1.

4. This includes much of nineteenth-century 'liberalism' and the program of the current 'Libertarian' party in the United States.

5. That includes positions emphasizing royal authority, as advocated by Jean Bodin (sixteenth century) and Thomas Hobbes (seventeenth century), as well as Leninism and fascism.

6. Examples are 'populism' and twentieth-century 'liberalism' in the United States, European 'social democracy,' and most current 'liberation' movements.

commitment shared by the present writer. The approach has close connections with feminism. Skepticism can justify non-involvement in politics; when it moves toward 'nihilism,' a (paradoxically) positive denial of truth, it supports the naked assertion of power, as happened, to a large extent, in Nazism.

This overview indicates that if one is intellectually consistent, the kind of criticism one chooses reflects a larger worldview, which is also expressed in one's attitude toward society. The application of a method is not just a mechanical process but implies a basic intellectual and moral orientation in life. Specifically, form criticism involves a definite social concern, over against pure individualism.

Biblical Form Criticism: Some Varieties in History

Form criticism of biblical literature began within the Bible itself, although it was carried out there only implicitly, without systematic reflection. Especially striking is the fact that the books of the Bible were, by and large, internally organized and externally arranged by groups in such a way that similar kinds of material stand next to one another. This sort of arrangement was true for the several known orderings of the Jewish scriptures as well as for the New Testament. In fact, biblical books and groups of books each present specimens of a unique literary type, such as laws or proverbs. Since each kind of speech represents an aspect of existence, different aspects of life are thus covered in the Bible.

During subsequent centuries, biblical interpretation applied rhetorical and literary principles that were associated with then-reigning philosophical views, as they have just been sketched. Within the Roman Empire, the favored way of apprehending the text was Platonic, with the admixture of a Stoic orientation. Aristotelian exegesis became dominant in the High Middle Ages (as in Maimonides and Thomas Aquinas). Particularist approaches arose gradually thereafter and came to play a major role in nineteenth-century historical criticism. Toward the end of that century, when many voices were raised against unbridled individualism, interest in general literary types reemerged in biblical studies. A pivotal figure in that pursuit was Hermann Gunkel, who had both a strong social orientation (in politics and otherwise) and a concern for individuality.

Reacting against a purely particularist way of looking at texts, Gunkel provided a careful characterization of genres or types of speech. Genres, in his view, each have a characteristic content, a definite linguistic form, and a 'seat [normal location] in life' (*Sitz im Leben*)—a connection with a repeating social occasion. This formulation was useful for stimulating research, but it was also misleading since the correlation of content, linguistic form, and

'seat in life' was asserted too strongly. It is clear that in literature these three aspects do not strictly cohere with one another; a certain idea can be expressed in more than one linguistic form and under different external conditions. Gunkel knew that such variation was true for written products, but he imagined that in oral life a given content would regularly be expressed in a characteristic manner on one kind of occasion. That notion, however, was not based on any empirical observation and was, on the whole, simply mistaken.

Gunkel's rigid characterization resembled the Aristotelian concept of species, according to which each type exhibits a peculiar essence or well-defined structure. In fact, he believed that there is a single correct or 'natural' classification for literary texts. Other scholars followed him in this. They discussed such questions as whether a given piece of biblical literature is truly a psalm of lament or truly a biography (e.g., of Jesus); they asked what 'the' genre of a text is or to which genre a text 'belongs,' as though a clear classification, and only one, is appropriate. Such an essentialist outlook is quite widespread in current biblical scholarship, although it often stands in an illogical combination with a particularist view of genres, according to which they are regarded only as conventions.

In fact, Gunkel's mistaken belief in the regularity of genres on an oral level gave his approach a special historical twist. He and, even more, some of his followers, thought it possible to reconstruct oral antecedents for the written texts present in the Bible on the assumption that such antecedents exhibited the features of a single genre 'purely' or 'simply.' Accordingly, for some interpreters—especially in New Testament studies—'form criticism' became identified with the reconstruction of oral forms of expressions lying behind the text. Pursued in this way, form criticism became a tool for historical criticism, instead of being considered worthy in its own right as a quest for patterns in human expression and life. Thus it was subsumed under an older, historical approach.

Over a period of several decades, however, it became apparent that form criticism is not well suited to the task of answering historical questions such as those that concern oral antecedents. Especially when belief in the simplicity of oral forms was rejected, little basis remained for speculative reconstructions. Thus the attempt to use the method as a tool for reconstructing early forms has now largely been abandoned.

Following a rather different line, a number of exegetes renewed an interest in forms as normative models. An orientation of this kind had been implicit in the structure of the biblical canon (in which each portion serves as the model for an aspect of life) as well as in a more general religious concern with archetypes, or transtemporal models; Plato produced a philosophical version of this orientation.

A major advantage in the analysis of biblical structures as model patterns is that it avoids treating the Bible as though each individual item speaks separately. The interrelationship of biblical data was important for early and medieval exegesis, which gave attention to the function of literary genres (prayers, exhortations, laws, narratives, etc.) and to the structure of faith that forms the basis of spiritual and practical interpretations. When, through modern criticism, the details of the Bible were rendered questionable both historically and morally, an approach seeking dynamic wholes—such as structures of a covenant or promise or expression of joy—became attractive to those who maintained an attitude of respect toward that literature. Not specific items of history or law, but the patterns of which they are a part, are regarded as having a claim on belief or action. Such an outlook is now widespread for biblical interpreters—including persons who believe in the verbal inspiration of the Bible but hold that God made use of different genres (see L. Ryken).

A potential problem with this outlook is that it gives no ground other than authority or tradition for treating biblical forms as models to be followed. Why should precisely these patterns and not some others be normative? An authoritarian answer to that question refers to the mystery of divine revelation, with the implication that there is no reason. An answer relying on tradition is purely relativist ('this is the belief of our community, which need not be that of another') and ends in self-defeating skepticism. Both of these answers implicitly rely on force, whether divine or human; either God or the community is thought to have the power and therefore the right to impose regulations and prescribe beliefs. With these two answers, a problem arises in regard to change. The validity of change must be denied—God's will is eternal or tradition is to stay firm—as long as the models are strictly accepted.

Although Gunkel's reach toward forms took place in the context of a general cultural turn toward a relational perspective, several of the paths taken by twentieth-century form criticism have continued previous ways of interpretation, singly or in combination: essentialist, particularist (historical), or archetypal. It is now appropriate to turn to a kind of form criticism that goes more clearly beyond the older orientations, while accepting useful insights that have been reached by work within them.

Relational Form Criticism

Gunkel's simultaneous attention to content, linguistic form, and context and his interest in generality are still important for form

criticism. Yet a number of his specific views need to be modified to bring them in line with further insights and with a more adequate philosophical position.

First of all, his belief that oral genres are firmly fixed while written forms are variable (already-discussed) must be rejected as unfounded. Both oral and written forms are probabilistic structures— neither rigid nor freely variable. The notion of probability, in fact, is an integral part of a relational philosophy; it points to the fact that there is not only a connection but also a partial independence between phenomena that stand in relation to one another.

Second, it should be recognized that classifications emerge, properly, from an interaction between the text and the interpreter, not from either one alone. The interpreter brings to the literature various interests and a knowledge of other texts and, therefore, certain questions and expectations. It is helpful to be aware of one's prior mindset—not in order to impose it on a text (as easily happens when one is unaware of it!), but to sharpen or enrich prior understanding. There is, in fact, little advantage in approaching a text ignorantly. Rather, the apprehension is usually deeper if the observer also knows other texts and is familiar with a variety of angles of vision, such as the psychological, sociological, philosophical, and aesthetic.

The classificational distinctions employed can be based on a number of different criteria as they represent the interests of the interpreter. For instance, it is possible to deal with poetry in contrast to other kinds of literature. Or the focus can be on differences between prophetic and priestly speech, regardless of whether or not it is poetic. An alternative project is to look at all positive expressions (hymns of praise, blessings, prophecies of weal, descriptions of the wise, etc.) in distinction from the negative ones. Divisions made according to these different criteria cut across one another, so that they constitute a multidimensional array. Such a system of organization stands in contrast to a hierarchical one, according to which literature is, say, first divided into priestly, prophetic, and other kinds, with each then subdivided into poetic, narrative, and other forms and these, as a next step, broken down into positive and negative versions, etc. A hierarchical organization (which may reflect a classifier's hierarchical view of society) assumes, unnecessarily, that some distinctions are primary in relation to others. One advantage of a multidimensional view is that it can conveniently handle characterizations that apply only by degrees; for example, a text might be heavily priestly, largely poetic, partially negative, etc.

Since an analysis needs to be related to one's questions, it is appropriate to reflect on what are basic goals in studying a text. An

elementary formulation is that the goal is to understand what is expressed. The word 'understand,' however, has at least two meanings. According to one, to understand means to recognize someone else's thought. (This is the major aim of a so-called idealist, thought-centered historiography.) For instance, if someone says, 'the window is open,' the idea conveyed is that the window is set in such a way that air can pass through it. A second meaning of 'understand' answers a 'why' question. It involves the grasping of relationships, including those of purpose and cause. Thus, in this sense of the word, we 'understand' someone's saying the above-quoted sentence when we know its purpose (perhaps to get another person to close the window) and its cause (presumably including the natural desire to maintain a moderate temperature). Relational form criticism reaches toward this kind of understanding.

Specifically, relational form criticism asks in what ways content, linguistic form, and the human context are related to one another. Are observable correlations accidental, or are there intrinsic connections? Particularism, which denies any intrinsic relations, regards all associations within speech as being due to arbitrary conventions. There is partial truth in this view, for language is indeed to a large extent a matter of convention. Yet ordinary language is not without a reason for its forms; it observes well-established principles for effective coding and is adapted to the human body as well as, to some extent, to the reality spoken about. More important, correlations between content (thought and mood) and life are usually not fortuitous. For instance, in view of common human forms of relationship, it is understandable that grief is expressed at a funeral, either because genuine sorrow is felt at a loss of a loved one or because the mourner wants to pretend attachment and respect.

In order to engage in the different levels of analysis, several steps need to be taken. An elementary one—the only one possible within a particularist view—is descriptive; it gives an account of the patterns of expression current in a given society. This process is useful for furnishing knowledge of conventions, which is necessary for a first level of 'understanding.' For example, it is helpful to know that 'dear,' followed by a name, frequently opens a letter without any necessary indication of affection.

A second step probes further and asks for reasons that account for the patterns of expression that are used. Thus it is possible to recognize that the opening 'dear' reflects the important rhetorical principle that speech or writing should begin with the establishment of a bond, as do most of Paul's letters in the New Testament. This principle is not merely a matter of convention but a part of communicative pragmatics that can be analyzed in terms of universal or

near-universal rules.[7] Amateur psychology and sociology are enough to provide reasons for why it is useful to begin a communication with a friendly word. It is, after all, a matter of common experience that a friendly approach tends to elicit a cordial response and that communication is usually more effective and more pleasurable if the partners involved have a friendly disposition toward each other.

Probing still further, it is possible to develop a theoretical framework for such considerations. Theories of that sort fall into the domains of professional psychology, sociology, and anthropology. A reflective form criticism thus needs to interact with these fields. It can do so by drawing on established theories, but it can also modify these or create new ones so that insights move in both directions. In fact, at the heart of the sciences—including the humanities—lies a constant checking of existing theories and the creation of new ones on the basis of the data being examined. A past barrier to interaction between biblical and other fields has been the belief that the Bible is special to such an extent that its processes of operation are not shared with those of other human expressions; yet if the Bible can shed no light on human life, it represents only a curiosity.

Gunkel himself did not hold to an isolationist view of the biblical material; on the contrary, he frequently compared it with texts in many parts of the world, including those that are far distant from Israel. He did not deny the peculiarity of major aspects of the Bible, but even specialness can be recognized only through comparison. He was interested in the psychological and sociological dimensions of texts. A similar breadth of perspective characterized Sigmund Mowinckel and other major figures who have dealt with the forms of biblical literature (see the bibliography).

Indeed, an important concept for Gunkel was the connection of a genre with 'life.' It is true, he made the ungrounded assumption that forms of expression originate in concretely describable settings, such as those of a temple ritual or a legal process; this assumption can no longer be supported. Verbal expressions are, however, closely linked with basic human processes, which include a search for healing (which need not occur at a temple) and an attempt to resolve a conflict (which may not involve an assembled court). It is primarily upon these general human processes that light can be shed through an examination of texts.

---

7. The social philosopher Jürgen Habermas treats such rules as central for social action and human morality. The present writer has indicated elsewhere that patterns of Chinese letter writing agree in major ways with those of the Bible. See above, Part I, Essay 6.

We have come to a fundamental assumption of form criticism: a pattern is general in the sense that it is shared or shareable; it thus has relevance to present existence. This assumption stands in contrast to the fact that if objects are purely particular, they belong only to their own time. The general applicability of the pattern of a text can hold even if the text is the only one that actually exhibits that structure. A form of organization does not need to be actually shared by more than one entity in order to be treated as a pattern; it need only be potentially shared (we can thus speak of a clothes pattern, even if no one copies it).

A major interest of historical criticism in postmedieval times has been to emphasize particularity and thus differences and to show, through differences, that the structures of the past, such as those of the Bible, do not need to be taken as a blueprint for one's current way of life—a deliberate rejection of the earlier view that regarded ideal patterns as unchanging. This antitraditional emphasis was important for the development of 'modern' (including capitalist) society. In contrast, a relational approach, which goes beyond a merely particularist historical one, combines differences with sameness. In applying older texts, it uses the principle of analogy. Two different complexes are analogous if elements within one bear the same relation to one another as corresponding elements do in the other. For instance, a biblical critique of bribes can find a partial analogy in a current provision for legal aid, in that both of them move toward providing equality in the legal process.

Appropriate transformation of a structure, which serves some of its former ends under new conditions, is possible only through an understanding of its rationale. This is a major reason why one should 'understand' texts in the second, deeper, sense—grasping the nature of relationships. Insight of this sort means that the use of ancient texts need not be simply authoritarian. If one sees their grounds and purposes, one can, rather, find in them stimuli for one's own life and will have a basis for at least partial acceptance or rejection of them.

Relations to Other Approaches

'Formal analysis,' in general, can be defined in line with a typically twentieth-century understanding of form as the study of a system of relationships. Form criticism is a comprehensive version of this. A number of other approaches, which are similarly formal, focus more specifically on one aspect of texts. Structuralism, as normally conceived, largely deals with logical relations between elements of a pattern; poststructuralism has a similar focus but includes special attention to inconsistencies. Social-scientific and reader-response

criticisms highlight dynamic relations of texts with either actual or potential contexts. Rhetorical criticism (which varies greatly according to its philosophical orientation) either deals with general persuasive characteristics (when following a classical outlook) or concentrates on style (so, in the particularist tradition). Narrative criticism examines the characteristics of one manner of expression. When different textual relations—including content, style, and role—are integrated and comparison is made between a number of texts, so that it is possible to see they are not merely accidental, an observer has insightful grasp of a pattern, which is the object of form criticism.

Formal analysis stands as one of a trio of approaches to literature, the other two being the historical (factual) and the evaluative (expressing one's faith or overall orientation toward life). These three perspectives can be distinguished theoretically. In practice, however, the different considerations can never be treated entirely in isolation from one another; in fact, they influence each other.

To begin with, formal analysis contributes to historical study. For instance, the application of form-critical analysis to a particular text in its own setting is a historical task. Since one's understanding of the meaning of a text and one's assessment of its likely factuality are affected by this analysis, indirect light is shed also on the extraliterary historical matters for which the text serves as evidence. Furthermore, the tracing of the development of a literary form is a historical enterprise.

Conversely, historical study contributes to form criticism. It does so primarily by furnishing large-scale background information concerning the cultural and physical context of literature. For instance, the knowledge that Genesis employs the Hebrew language and presupposes locations both west and east of the Jordan River is important for perceiving meaning in the book. Nevertheless, it should be noted that a grasp of the dynamic structure of the book (its 'form') is affected only to a limited extent by its precise circumstances.

The looseness of form criticism in regard to historical details is fortunate, for otherwise the understanding gained by it would be limited to professional scholars, who alone can handle a detailed history. True, the form-critical approach is a demanding one. However, a relevant knowledge of psychology, sociology, anthropology, and the history of religion—all of which are extremely important for form criticism—is often available to those who are not biblical specialists even when less important technical information is not. Since the end of the nineteenth century, in fact, the study of literary patterns has been a favored way of introducing the Bible to the general reader. Furthermore, since little commitment

to controversial historical hypotheses is required, form criticism is a procedure in which religious liberals and conservatives can cooperate.

Formal analysis also interacts reciprocally with faith, that is, with one's overall orientation toward life. In fact, form-critical analyses commonly exhibit a deeply emotional tone because of their proximity to basic human issues. As has already been seen, conceptions of the nature of a form are connected with overall (including social and political) commitments. To give another example of this association: A person who believes that humanity is an integral part of nature should not object to continuity between the humanities and the natural sciences and to form criticism's use of the behavioral sciences, which share features of both these fields of knowledge. Finally, the specific patterns to which attention is given will reflect vital concerns.

In a reverse movement, the apprehension of a form contributes to an investigator's sense of existence. Life commitment, it is true, involves an intuitive orientation that goes beyond what can be understood, for all understanding is limited. Yet recognition of forms enters into a faith that is not blind. Form criticism, by giving insight into relations between phenomena, allows human beings to have reasons for their intellectual and practical decisions, so that these are neither externally imposed nor arbitrarily chosen.

Illustration: Genesis 1 and 2

Even a quick look at Genesis 1 and 2 reveals that these two chapters are narrative in character. In fact, there seem to be two stories here, the second one beginning in the middle of the fourth verse of chapter 2.

The first story deals with how the different parts of the world were 'generated' (2:4a), that is, came to be. Its organization involves six creative days and a day of rest for God. The second one describes how relations of human beings with each other (male and female) and with God, animals, and so forth, were established.

In terms of content—which Gunkel regularly listed first among the characteristics of a genre—the narratives are, clearly, origin stories. Origin stories represent a genre that is extremely common in religious traditions. In fact, the notion of origin is one of a small number of basic religious categories. In these two chapters, the origin of much of what lies in one's normal field of vision (animals, celestial objects, etc.) is accounted for. Other parts of the Bible deal with the origin of social organizations (including that of the people of Israel) and, especially in the New Testament, with the basis of salvation, including love (where does love come from?). Sometimes

origin narratives are called 'myths'; this is confusing, however, for there is no agreed-upon meaning for that term. It is much clearer to use the term 'sacred stories.'

When one reflects on the notion of origin, it becomes apparent that this category deals not so much with temporal objects or events as with the question of where they come from, that is, with the relation of such limited realities to what is infinite or ultimate. The transtemporal nature of the concept of origin has long been recognized in philosophy and theology. It is also implicit in the way in which originating events—including the Exodus, a critical part of the origin of Israel, and Jesus' death, viewed as a basis of salvation—are presented, with disregard to temporal distance, again and again in ritual. According to Gen. 2:3, rest after creation is to be repeated in the ritual of the Sabbath.

Why are religions concerned with origins? One reason surely is that human beings have a perspective that extends beyond the limit of their own lives (they may be the only beings who know that they are born and will die). Given such a large perspective, human beings must see specific, concrete problems in its light. It is true, individuals are usually engrossed in little problems without asking the larger questions, but cultural values cannot be maintained, it seems, without providing a frame for them.

Questions of origin are, then, not just idle ones. One important issue they address is the question of what is good and legitimate. (Bronislaw Malinowski has described origin stories as 'charters,' that is, as authorizations for life.) The biblical creation account makes explicit that the physical world is 'good,' to be valued and accepted. It authorizes, and even commands, sexual propagation. In later parts of the Bible, the origin of Israel is presented in conjunction with extensive legal and ethical implications stated in the laws on Mount Sinai.

Another question that origin stories seek to answer is how what is good (or what is evil) has been brought about. In social psychology, that is known as the question of 'attribution': To whom, or to what, should one attribute the cause of an event? Most religious stories, certainly those of the Bible, give credit to Deity, especially for that which is good. Such an acknowledgement has a number of practical implications. In relation to the past, it involves gratitude, which many persons express ritually by giving thanks at mealtime. Gratitude counteracts vaunting pride and, insofar as it is genuine, leads to a readiness to give care to others who are also objects of divine concern. In relation to the future, the belief that true life comes from God leads to an attitude of receptivity toward divine action or support.

A biblical symbol for divine action is that of speech by God. Although a symbol contains elements of arbitrariness, its meaning

is based largely on a correspondence between the symbol and that which is symbolized. Divine speech stands for a process in relation to which one is receptive—as one normally is in relation to another's speech—and which, like all speech, has 'personal' (both intellectual and emotional) qualities. To allude to a current idiom, something 'speaks to' one. Thus, in Genesis 1, God creates by giving a command, 'Let there be…' An expected and encouraged human response is to allow oneself and the world to be created. There is not an emphasis here purely on receptivity, however, for human beings are also asked, as 'images of God,' to participate in God's rule. In fact, both receptivity and activity are extremely important in human life. Research has shown that they play a role together in creativity and a sense of wellbeing.

There are social advantages (as well as disadvantages, perhaps) in a focus on divine action and will. By imaginatively adopting the orientation of a reality larger than themselves, human beings move out of a strictly self-centered mode of operation. In fact, human society relies for other-oriented ('altruistic') activity not so much on automatic reflexes as on the mental and emotional 'de-centering' of individuals (i.e., on their finding a center of perspective outside of themselves). This cultural—partially voluntary—process allows for more flexibility than does a strictly biological one. Its openness supports adaptability and creativity. Of course, it also creates the possibility of deviation from social ideals. The topic of evil as a consequence of disobedience, in fact, comes next in the biblical narrative.

It is clear that the stories have a major symbolic and guiding function in human life. They have this not because they are connected with a specific occasion, such as being customarily or originally recited on the Sabbath, but because they express a basic kind of human interaction and experience. That is, a text's external 'setting' is not as important for form criticism as its sociopsychological functioning, which is its logical and effective (more clearly 'formal') connection with life.

If origin stories are concerned with the relation of the spatio-temporal world to something more encompassing, it follows that their details should not be understood as representing events within that world. In other words, historical accuracy is not an interest in this sort of literature. Recognition of their looseness in regard to history is not simply a recent Western one but has been reported from so-called 'primitive' groups (which are not unsophisticated) and has been widespread in Christian theology since at least the third century, after appearing in the thought of the first-century Jewish thinker Philo. Within this biblical text disinterest in sequential detail is shown by the fact that two somewhat contradictory accounts are laid side-by-side. The editor and early readers of the

accounts can hardly have failed to notice an apparent discrepancy in regard to the sequence of the creation of animals, but the divergence apparently was not a problem for them. Similarly, a person giving thanks before a meal is not worried about the exact manner by which God provided the food.

If origin is a somewhat abstract (not simply factual) category, why are creation accounts given in narrated form? The major reason appears to be that we commonly shape our life orientations in the form of stories. Narratives are vivid, picturing acting persons, which we can readily visualize. They contain at least some tension, resulting in a drive toward resolution that maintains interest. This practical literary reason—namely, that the form comes close to human life and thus captures attention—can also have theoretical significance, for the employment of temporal imagery in an account of intimacy can imply that temporal processes are valued highly. It is necessary to exercise caution here, to be sure, for literary form and thought do not always strictly cohere. Nonetheless, it appears to be significant for Israel's view of life that the biblical account projects Deity as dynamic, dealing with tensions and with the realization of possibilities. Humanity, which mirrors the divine, is accordingly expected to be active in time.

Most of the observations made so far apply to both Genesis 1 and 2. However, a single type of speech—in this case, that of creation narratives—can vary considerably in the form it takes. One difference between the two accounts is that the narrative style of Gen. 1:1-2:4a is more orderly and stately than that of the subsequent material. The orderly style fits the priestly orientation of the first story, which is reflected in its reference to the Sabbath. A major task of priests is the execution and supervision of ritual, one of the characteristics of which is the maintenance and establishment of order (i.e., regularity). Orderliness appears not only in the style but also in the content of the first story; beings are described as classified and as systematically 'ruled' (with the sun and the moon over day and night and humanity over animals).

The story beginning in Gen. 2:4b, by comparison, places more emphasis on exploration and surprise. It, too, arrives at a duality (and, perhaps, equality) of the sexes, but it does so as a result of a movement in which God appears genuinely in doubt about how to proceed and fails in an experiment. The actions of human beings in the chapter that follows lead to difficulty, which in turn provides a challenge for God. Certainly, human life, like all of existence, requires both order and disorder. Thus only a combination of both of these accounts provides a realistic image.

We have examined the contents, stylistic features, and sociopsychological roles of these texts in their relation to one another. We

have dealt with generality (two creation stories in Genesis and other origin stories in the Bible and elsewhere) to shed light on the particular texts and, more importantly, to indicate that the questions addressed by them, as well as some of their answers, have a wide-ranging relevance. Such a process constitutes form criticism.[8]

Limitations

The analysis of Genesis 1 and 2 just presented makes virtually no contribution to the dating of the chapters or to answering other historical questions. On the contrary, its value for these issues may lie in raising the reader's level of caution in regard to them. For instance, dating the texts may be difficult precisely because they deal with important issues that must have been discussed many times in Israel's history.

Another limitation of this analysis is that it does not remove the need to make a decision about how one sees one's own origin— whether or to whom one is grateful and to what reality, if any, one owes allegiance. The investigation can aid a person in making such a commitment in a more reflective manner than would otherwise be possible. It can draw attention to a significant dimension of existence—in this case, to that aspect of life in which a person is 'spoken to,' such as by the pain or joy of another or the presence of nature or sheer mystery. It cannot, however, do the actual speaking.

8.   It is true that within form-critical procedure there are possible variations that have not been chosen in this analysis. If the discussion had followed an essentialist line, it would have asked such questions as whether the stories are myths or not, assuming that there are clear-cut categories in existence. If it had adopted particularism, it would have emphasized external circumstances and would have treated all forms strictly as conventions, with the implication that the texts have no relevance for the present. (It is possible, of course, that God may have the same word for persons in the present as for the ancient Israelites, but such congruence would be treated as a matter of accident.) If the analysis had thought of the stories as eternally normative archetypes, it would not have left the final decision about existence to the reader or hearer (see the section on limitations) and might not have made an effort to explain the role of the patterns, as is done now in order to aid such a decision. These alternative ways of proceeding can all be called 'form-critical,' but they do not follow the relational outlook assumed here, which accepts both commonality and a degree of non-rational divergence.

Essay 9

FORM CRITICISM: HEBREW BIBLE

The term *form criticism* designates not just one but several different procedures that deal in one manner or another with patterns— usually thought of as dynamic and oriented toward a function. The variations reflect, in part, divergent conceptions of form. Proce- dures designated thus include (1) the study of kinds of speech (genre analysis, *Gattungsforschung*), which has been carried out throughout the history of biblical interpretation; (2) the tracing of the history of a type of speech (genre history, *Gattungsgeschichte* or *Formengeschichte*), of which there are relatively few examples, two of them provided by H. Gunkel; (3) the reconstruction of the history of a tradition on the basis of formal considerations, largely in the belief that the simplest forms are early (history on the basis of form, often *Formgeschichte*), attempted to some extent by Gunkel and even more by many of his followers; and (4) the examination of the structure of a particular text (form-oriented criticism), as executed by W. Richter (*Formkritik*) and (with attention to genres) by many ancient and modern exegetes, including recent contributions to the series The Forms of the OT Literature.

Classical Greek theory distinguished between rhetorical and poetic genres, although it did not draw an altogether sharp line between them, and discussed levels of style in terms of phenomena belonging to both. Insofar as one follows this distinction, rhetor- ical and poetic (or 'literary') study become subdivisions of formal analysis. One can also contrast the portrayal of general patterns

This article compactly presents very many data furnished in greater detail in other studies, including the history of form criticism published during the same year (*BFC*). Both that volume and this article point out that formal analysis, with attention to genres, has been pursued for a long time, although it was overshadowed by historical criticism in the nineteenth century. The end of the article covers some studies after 1965, as *BFC* did not; for these, see also below, Part II, Chapter 13.

(theory, including attention to genres) with the examination of the structure of a specific text; the former plays a role in the various operations that go under the name form criticism.

Genres were described by Gunkel in 1924b as involving (a) characteristic thoughts and feelings, (b) typical lexical and syntactic features ('form' in a narrow sense), and (c) a traditional connection with human (especially social) life (*Sitz im Leben*). It thus becomes characteristic of work inspired by Gunkel to given attention to all three of these aspects, which are comparable to the semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic dimensions of linguistics. Classical rhetoric had already considered all three, the second at least insofar as it entered into questions of style. An acquaintance with this tradition contributed to the production of multifaceted analyses in early (including medieval) interpretations of the Bible.

The beginning of form criticism lies within the canon itself, although the process was often only implicit. Those who collected the biblical materials gathered them largely according to types of speech and social location. For instance, the third division of the Hebrew canon almost exclusively contains literature belonging to the realm of wisdom and of singers, with three of its books devoted entirely to proverbs, psalms, and love poetry; little of this kind of literature appears in any of the other books. Major types of biblical speech were represented by prototypical figures: Moses for laws, Solomon for wisdom, David for psalms of lament. Israelites had names for genres, although they were fluid in meaning, as are classificatory terms in most language systems.

Early post-biblical interpreters frequently analyzed biblical materials according to their literary types. For instance, rabbinic tradition formulated rules for the halakhic exegesis of laws, which differed from standards applicable to the aggadic interpretation of other literature, such as narratives. Philo described biblical genres as complementary to one another, with a central focus on precepts, which he regarded as persuasive (rather than dogmatic) and as personal, with direct address (e.g., *Decal.*, 36-39). Stories of world origins, as he knew from comparative data, contain symbolic elements. According to Origen (and others), the primary aim of biblical literature is not the narration of ancient history, but 'discipline and usefulness' (Homily 2 on Exodus). The anonymous *Teaching of the Twelve Apostles* (3rd cent.) regarded as unnecessary the use of non-Christian literature on the grounds that the Bible already gives examples of the various types.

The use of rhetorical categories in early Christian interpretation became especially common after the state establishment of Christianity early in the fourth century. A description of speech by type according to its purpose (e.g., to exhort or praise), partially

following Greco-Roman patterns of exegesis, was widespread. Psalms were classified (into prayers, hymns, etc.) and characterized according to their major thrust, e.g. by Athanasius (d. 373) and Gregory of Nyssa. Of these, Athanasius regarded the representation of different feelings in the psalms as a mirror that can either support or therapeutically correct one's own emotions and as a guide for expressing appropriate feelings in words (*Letter to Marcellinus*). Some commentators, including Cyril of Alexandria, paid attention to characteristic forms of prophecy. Ambrose and Chrysostom, among others, analyzed the roles of several major genres.

An especially thorough overview was presented by Hadrian (d.c. 440) in the first work to be called an 'introduction' to the Scriptures. He distinguished between 'prophetic' (strictly revelational) and 'historical' or 'inquiring' types of speech; each of these was divided according to its orientation toward the past, the present, or the future, as Aristotle had already divided secular rhetorical genres. The books normally called prophetic were described by a hybrid term meaning 'prose-poetry.' A fourfold classification was outlined by Julius Africanus (c. 550): history, prophecy (manifesting the concealed), proverbs, and 'simple' teaching (descriptive of ordinary life, e.g., Qohelet). Cassiodorus described psalms both as a division of sacred literature, for the characterization of which he drew on Augustine's *De doctrina christiana*, and as a special type that can be further subdivided. He paid attention to their role as worship and to the aptness of their content and style in relation to their use.

Jewish medieval interpreters, especially the greatest philosophical thinkers, analyzed the kinds of speech found in the Bible. Saadia Gaon placed them into three major classes: commandments, announcements of consequences, and narratives, each with a positive and a negative aspect. He viewed the commandments as central and the others as effective ways to support them. In the psalms he recognized eighteen forms of speech, differentiated by such criteria as speaker and temporal orientation and connected with a variety of roles in worship. In his view they were not so much actual prayers as divinely revealed models for prayer. Two centuries later Maimonides made use of the philosophical framework derived from Aristotle that analyzes the essences (inherent central nature) of objects. For him the psalms were in their essential nature really human prayers, inspired but not in a specific sense revealed by God (*Guide*, II, 46). To a number of genres (such as creation accounts and prophetic autobiographies) he attributed an at least partially symbolic nature.

Many Karaite and rabbinic exegetes from the tenth century on, including Yefet ben 'Ali and D. Kimhi, characterized biblical texts according to their kind of speech act or thrust, e.g., to explain, reprove,

or comfort; this thrust was called *kawwanah* (Heb., intention) by Abravanel (c. 1500). Some commentators—often the same ones, including Saadia and Samuel ben Meir (Rashbam)—noted relations of parts of a text to one another, as well as stylistic features.

Medieval Christian interpretation of the Bible was in many ways similar to the Jewish. A widespread outlook regarded biblical patterns as archetypal models for life; it reflected a traditional perspective according to which an origin expresses a standard. (A Platonic understanding of forms as transhistorical models provided a philosophical version of this perspective, appealing especially to the intellectual and social elite.) Indeed, from pre-Christian Hellenistic Judaism on, biblical patterns were often thought to be both older and better than those of Greece, with the latter not infrequently believed to have been derived from the former. This view, expressed especially in relation to non-Christian literature, implied a fairly positive attitude toward that literature and did not object to recognizing its at least partial continuity with the Bible. Biblical literature, in harmony with this orientation, was analyzed in terms of established rhetorical or poetic categories. For instance, Abelard (in part like Augustine in his 'literal' interpretation) gave a metaphoric view of the details of the creation story, with express reference to Plato's view of myth.

Women interpreters, having on the whole received less formal classical rhetorical training than men, relied in good part on mystical illumination, but did not ignore literary forms (e.g., Angela of Foligno, 13th cent.). Such interpretation continued beyond the Middle Ages (e.g., by Teresa of Avila, 16th cent.).

A prominent feature of medieval Christian exegesis was a system of analysis that appeared also (perhaps first) in introductions to non-Christian Greco-Roman works; drawing on a mixed philosophical background, the analysis specified a work's circumstance, literary form (poetic or rhetorical genre, etc.), type of content ('kind of philosophy'), aim, and value for the reader. That system was widespread in eleventh- and twelfth-century commentaries like those by Rupert, Hugh of St. Victor, Peter Lombard, and Gerhoch. In the thirteenth century the scheme was reformulated in terms of the four causes of Aristotle's conception of form (efficient cause: author; material cause: contents; formal cause: the patterning of a text, including its organization; final cause: goal). Analyses of this sort were applied systematically to the entire text of biblical books by Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure and included reflections about the interrelationships between different aspects and phenomena; e.g., Aquinas observed that the symbolic mode of Jeremiah's words was appropriate to his office as a prophet. This kind of systematic 'scholastic' exegesis continued into the fourteenth century.

The popularity of Aristotelianism reflected a partial movement away from an aristocratic structuring of society, a development exhibited in the spirit of emerging universities; a major step in the same direction was taken by a philosophical way of thinking that was called 'modern' since it consciously broke to a considerable extent with the traditions of the past. This new way recognized only particulars as primary realities and was thus closely related to the rise of individualism, which occurred in late medieval semi-independent cities. For this kind of thought (formulated profoundly by William of Ockham [d. 1349]), form represents, not a general reality reflected by, or present in, an object, but a particular shape. In many spheres of thought, practice, and experience, the new perspective gradually gained ground until it became close to being dominant in the nineteenth century as part of what was known as a historical orientation.

Structural observations continued within the varied traditions during the period from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. For instance, stylistic and classificatory comments were made during the sixteenth century by Erasmus, T. Cajetan, Luther, P. Melanchthon, Zwingli, Calvin, J. Bullinger, T. Cranmer, and others. The Lutheran M. Flacius Illyricus presented a thorough analysis of biblical patterns. Although he sought to be less humanistic than Melanchthon, he was deeply influenced by Aristotle. He believed that genres, determined especially by content but also by style, each have a special impact on life, so that a consideration of them clarifies the aim of biblical literature. Biblical genres, as he described them, form a rich set of structures, including both divine address and speech directed toward God. Thereafter, often in association with Aristotelian ideas, classifications of biblical materials continued to appear, as in treatments by C. Lapide (1625), A. Francke (1693), and J. Turretin.

Three major tendencies moving away from a consideration of general forms marked the period from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries: a strong interest in factual history, increased attention to differences between the styles of individual authors (partially present already in Jerome), and a removal of content from rhetorical analysis. The last of these reflected in part skepticism about coherence in reality, e.g., about the relation of appropriateness between forms of expression and thought.

Another tendency, related to the three just mentioned, was the placing of a dividing line between biblical forms and those of classical or other non-Christian traditions. This showed itself in directions that one should not combine in the same poem contents derived from both of these sources and in analyses that suggest that sacred rhetoric has special rules. One of the factors contributing to the

differentiation was a sharpened contrast between faith and reason, characteristic of particularism; another was a sense of the variety of traditions, an integral part of that outlook. A third, more special, contributing factor was the avoidance of ornate forms in middle-class public speaking, which caused the style of biblical speech, like that of the prophets, to seem out of the ordinary. R. Lowth in 1753 effectively addressed these and related issues in what is probably still the finest overall study of biblical poetry. He solved the problem of style by characterizing prophecy—together with parallelism, which had previously been considered a rhetorical feature— as poetic rather than rhetorical. In regard to differences in poetic standards, he argued that the biblical forms were more basic and less special or artificial than the Greco-Roman. In its careful treatment of biblical structures together with their purposes, this work represents in important ways the culmination of a classical approach, while showing sensitivity to the newer movement toward a historical outlook.

M. Mendelssohn (in a January 1757 letter to G. Lessing) pointed in this new direction by rejecting the idea of separate classes in literature. Nevertheless, he recognized three kinds of poetry—song, elegy, and ode (the last kind, reflective)—in the psalms. J.G. Herder, who interacted with him, provided sensitively drawn pictures of biblical literature in *The Spirit of Hebrew Poetry* (1782-83) and other studies. He continued to employ classifications but did so quite loosely and sometimes in an unusual manner; for instance, he classed the psalms according to their complexity (1787). A sign of the change in outlook is that J.G. Eichhorn (1780-83) viewed genres as external forms (*Einkleidung*, 'clothing').

W. de Wette rejected Mendelssohn's typology since de Wette believed that Hebrew poetry is 'formless and special.' Radicalizing an older view that each genre requires a special hermeneutics, he said that 'every writing requires its own hermeneutic' (*Beiträge* 2 [1807] 25). He ordered the psalms by 'content,' however; the resulting classification was very similar to the one later set forth within a different theoretical framework by Gunkel. Somewhat like de Wette, F. Bleek (in his 1860 introduction) regarded older psalms as personal in character and later ones as imitations.

One consequence of the emerging historical orientation was the sequencing of genres according to their antiquity. Thus, myth was treated as the oldest form of expression by the classicist C. Heyne near the end of the eighteenth century, and, following him, by Eichhorn, J.P. Gabler, G. Bauer, and J. Jahn (Catholic). This perspective modified the view that revelation took place during an original period; it envisioned at least intellectual progress beyond that time.

Nevertheless, the liberal critical approach far from dominated all publications. Conservative works or those oriented toward a general public continued to present literary and full-scale rhetorical analyses, usually with extensive typologies. They included analyses by A. Gügler, J. Wenrich, C. Plantier, G. Gilfillan, I. Taylor, C. Ehrt, T. Nöldeke (1869), J. Fürst, and D. Cassel; the majority of these authors, the last two of whom were Jewish, were not specifically biblical scholars. In a partial contrast, specialists in the field attended more closely to external forms that are not directly related to content, such as meter.

As particularism reached a high point during the nineteenth century, its problematic side also became apparent. Intellectually it threatened all rationality. Socially it created a free-for-all in which the strong defeated the weak. Some thinkers, notably Nietzsche, largely affirmed these consequences. Many, however, found them intellectually and ethically unacceptable and resurrected a partial interest in commonness, which supported a socially integrative role for the socioeconomic lower classes.

The new social orientation was important to the 'school' that pursued a *religionsgeschichtliche* approach, meaning by 'religion' a general category of human experience. For the content of its investigation, this school gave close attention to the social structures that embody popular life. Its members, including Gunkel (who politically held some sympathy for socialism), made efforts in lectures and writings to propagate the results of their investigations to a broad audience.

Sensitive to the social dimension, Gunkel reversed the position of the psalms held by de Wette and Bleek; he regarded standardized features not as secondary developments but as temporally primary generic patterns that are adapted in individual psalms. For other traditions Gunkel also envisioned highly predictable structures that closely relate to recurring events in the life of a group where they have their 'seat in life' (*Sitz im Leben*). Still, Gunkel was ambivalent about individuality. He appreciated the 'living' character of patterned popular, largely oral, culture, but he valued, at least equally, the individualized personal expressions available in the written documents (e.g., in his commentary on Psalms [1926]).

Gunkel's interest in generality reached far beyond the Israelite or even the Near Eastern sphere. By frequently citing evidence from all parts of the world, he made clear that he was concerned with human structures and not merely with isolated and accidental phenomena. This general orientation was not shared by all of the many scholars inspired by him; it was, however, well represented by H. Jahnow in her study of the dirge (1923).

Gunkel considered linguistic form to be an easily recognizable feature, but he listed content first among the determiners of a generic structure. Accordingly, he could take over de Wette's content-oriented classification of psalms. Thus the word *form* in the term *form criticism*, as it was applied by other scholars to his procedure, refers, not primarily to external phenomena, but to a structure or pattern. Crucial for Gunkel was the connection of genres with life; that interest gave his work a sociological cast. Mood, a psychological category, was also significant for him—placed next to thought as part of content.

Gunkel's generic and structural orientation fit in well with the revolt against individualism and historicism widely current in the culture. For him as for others, however, the question was not one of choosing between the different visions but one of finding appropriate ways to combine them. In regard to the historical dimension, he made the debatable assumption that the early stage of genres as well as of particular texts exhibited simple and 'pure' forms, while later ones combined those into complex structures.

Quite a few scholars took this historical view very seriously and attempted to reconstruct on its basis the prehistory for a text, often thought to be oral. Many, especially in NT studies, focused exclusively on small units. Somewhat differently, G. von Rad argued that the ritual 'credo' of Deut. 26:5-10 formed one of the two basic structures out of which the Hexateuch as a whole emerged (1938). (More holistically, G. Mendenhall [1954] derived the structure of the Pentateuch and many other features of biblical literature from Hittite and other treaty forms.) Gradually, however, it became clear that the assumption that early forms are simple or pure is largely unfounded. Thus the enterprise of writing history on the basis of formal consideration (form criticism in sense 3 above) came under a cloud; the procedure used (formal analysis) was not well matched to this aim (history).

A significant consequence of the concern with genres was the realization that many of them were complementary to one another, operating simultaneously in the service of varied human needs. Indeed, it became apparent that, although biblical literature was given its shape over a period of perhaps one thousand years—much of it after the first fall of Jerusalem—the genres exhibited in it were virtually all copresent in the culture even before the exile. Although few scholars denied that genres changed to some extent over the centuries, there was widespread willingness to acknowledge that many biblical psalms, proverbs, ritual laws, etc., were pre-exilic in a form at least closely approximating that in which they now appear. Similarly, in structural-functional sociology and anthropology a largely synchronic view could displace a primarily diachronic one.

The shift in perspective was far from universal, of course. For instance, the historian A. Alt (1934) viewed the several kinds of Israelite law as competing structures derived from different traditions. However, with a widened knowledge of ancient culture and a more functional view, H. Cazelles argued that they represent complementary genres with a range comparable to that of both Hittite and modern laws and instructions (1946).

When structural and historical perspectives, each with its own procedure, were combined systematically, the history of a genre or group of related genres resulted. Gunkel furnished such histories for prophecy (1917) and psalms (1933, with J. Begrich). The same topics were treated again, with at least some attention to history, by S. Mowinckel (psalms [1951; ET 1962]); C. Westermann (psalms [1954; ET 1981]; judgmental prophecy [1960; ET 1967]; words of salvation [1987]); and J.-N. Aletti and J. Trublet (psalms [1983]). P. Hanson, among others, traced the emergence of apocalyptic forms (1975). Partial histories of the genres of wisdom included one by H. Schmid (1966). A. Rofé examined prophetic stories from a developmental perspective (1982; ET 1988); S. Niditch, symbolic visions (1983); J. Van Seters, historiography (1983); and D. Damrosch, narrative forms more generally (1987).

Partially diverging from Gunkel, one step envisioned a genre not as a structure lying behind and utilized in a text, but as the dynamic pattern of the text seen as an actually or potentially general one. It was possible to follow this line only if a genre was permitted to have a considerable amount of variability, for clearly the individual texts that are examples of the genre are not completely stereotyped.

Thus Mowinckel considered most of the biblical psalms to be cultic, i.e., used on organized ritual occasions (1916). In this he was followed at least partially by many others. H.G. Reventlow took the cultic approach perhaps farther than anyone else, especially by viewing Jeremiah's confessions largely in non-personal terms. In most cultures, to be sure, the line between organized ritual and other expressions of religion is very fluid, if it can be drawn at all. Perhaps to some extent aware of this (his father was an important Africanist), Westermann rejected a specifically cultic view and related the psalms to the basic operations of praise and lament (1954). W. Brueggemann reformulated their patterns in sociopsychological terms (orientation, disorientation, and new orientation [1984]).

One line of endeavor related the structures of biblical literature to linguistics. W. Richter (1971), who moved in this direction, distinguished between form and genre. In his view form represents the organization of a particular text; he treated separately its 'external,' syntactic-stylistic, and 'inner' meaning aspects. A genre, according

to Richter, was to be identified on the basis of the external features of the texts. Furthermore, unlike most twentieth-century linguistic theorists, he held that one should operate inductively, proceeding from the particular to the general. His was thus a thoroughly particularist viewpoint, which, as noted, typically separates the external from the internal. K. Koch (1974) also sought to relate genre criticism to linguistics. He referred to a version of the latter known as text linguistics or discourse analysis, which, as is not well known, has absorbed insights from biblical studies. C. Hardmeier (1978) provided a detailed reformulation of form criticism in terms of a theory of linguistic action. He was supported by linguistics in his view that verbal features are not strictly correlated with content or situation. A reflective analysis of biblical genres within the framework of a general communication theory that explores the human meaning of the literary structures has been furnished by a group of scholars in a work edited by F. Deist and W. Vorster (1986).

The works just mentioned increasingly entered into the realm of theoretical discussions of language, which, especially since about 1920, had focused on the variety of speech 'functions' (expressed especially by the first, second, or third person, according to K. Bühler), language 'games' (constituting 'forms of life,' L. Wittgenstein), or speech 'acts' (performances, J. Austin). A theological wing of this discussion had begun, also about 1920, with a distinction between personal ('I' and 'you') and impersonal speech. Following this tradition, a number of biblical scholars and theologians emphasized the personal thrust of much of biblical speech. Thus A. Heschel showed the directness of divine speech toward humanity (1936; ET 1962); W. Zimmerli discussed divine self-presentations (1963); and C. Westermann argued that many biblical expressions are not assertion but direct address (1984, 202). It was also noted that psalms are often directed toward God. A number of theologies of the HB (including von Rad's [1957; ET 1962]) were based largely on attempts to identify textual generic patterns like those outlined above. Rather than focus on particular ideas or directives, the theologian focused on generic forms and structures to understand how these forms functioned in the faith community.

A recognition of different types of speech with divergent functions allowed those who believe in the divine verbal inspiration of the Bible to distinguish between biblical truth and historical or scientific accuracy. Such an orientation has been discussed intensively by Roman Catholics since the turn of the twentieth century (M.-J. Lagrange [1896]), resurrecting and extending medieval and earlier reflections. It was given official approval by the encyclical *Divino afflante Spiritu* (1943), which encouraged the study of genres. Similar considerations have moved a number of

traditional Protestants to reject a highly literal (better: historicist) interpretation of biblical narratives, although not many of them have gone so far as C. Pinnock (1984). Analyses along these lines should not be understood as being primarily negative, for their main interest is in apprehending the purposes of the texts on the basis of literary types (e.g., W. Kaiser 1981: 95), in a manner not unlike that of earlier exegesis.

Interpreters who are more questioning of biblical authority, including non-theologians, also found in literary analysis a way to reveal the character and significance of the Bible and to do so in relation to a broad public. C. Briggs, who presented an overview of the literary forms (types and styles) of the Bible with the aim that 'the ordinary reader can enjoy it' (1883: 216), believed that a new critical period was dawning, for which literature rather than history would be the central focus (1899: 247). This judgment proved to be largely correct. Not only biblical specialists but also others provided an extensive and notable succession of literary, often generic, studies. Representing a variety of religious orientations, they included M. Arnold, W.R. Harper, R. Moulton, C. Kent, J. Gardiner, H. Fowler, L. Wild, J. Muilenberg, A. Culler, M. Buber, F. Rosenzweig, E. Good-speed, S. Freehof, Z. Adar, E. Good, J. Ackerman, and L. Ryken. Many of them were deeply involved in social issues, including women's rights. A number of the studies have been partially forgotten in academia, since they did not concentrate on providing technical information for the academic specialist. Repeatedly, however, they raised profound theoretical issues about the relation of the content and manner of biblical expression to human life.

Twentieth-century applications of rhetorical criticism have included a number of analyses based on a narrow conception of rhetoric, with a focus primarily on external form as advocated by members of the particularist tradition since the fifteenth century. Other studies partially revived a more comprehensive classical approach, attending closely to content. A full-scale revival of the theories of Aristotle and Menander (c. 300 CE) would have resembled much of twentieth-century form criticism, since genres identified within the latter were to a large extent treated by the former.

Interaction with folklore studies has been fruitful and was important, e.g., for Gunkel. An analysis that can serve as a model for form criticism was furnished by C. Fontaine (1982); she integrated a folklore perspective informed by Gunkel's approach, attending simultaneously to content and use without following his more questionable assumptions.

The acquisition of a post-historical perspective—one that includes, but is not limited to, historical criticism—has not been easy for biblical scholarship. Older ways of thinking have repeatedly been

resurrected without much change and added to the historical, even though they are not strictly compatible. Specifically, Gunkel and many following him relied in good part on Aristotelian essentialism, i.e., the notion that there is only one correct typology for objects. In doing so they failed to take part in an intellectual development that in a certain way both synthesizes and transcends the previous approaches. Most important, for a point of view often called relationism—closely connected with pragmatism, following C. Peirce—both particularity and generality are fundamental, playing roles in real relations; an object is not separated from a subject. Characteristic of this view is an acceptance of probability connections (partial indeterminacy) and a variety of orders (with relativity to a standpoint). Within this outlook, form can be treated as a complex of relations.

A number of attempts have been made to reformulate the form-critical task along such lines. A probabilistic multidimensional approach was applied by M. Buss to Hosea (1969). In a theoretical article, R. Knierim opposed a 'monolithic conception of genre' (1973: 476); this article received widespread attention. G. Fohrer, in his OT introduction (1965; ET 1968: 28), rejected the equating of life setting with an 'institution'; other scholars followed suit by arguing for a loose connection between texts and situations insofar as these are externally describable. The question then arises whether particularism should prevail after all—or perhaps skeptical relativism. One can answer in the negative by pointing to a rationale that places phenomena at least partially into intrinsic relations (as opposed to those, including J. Barton [1984: 32], who describe genres only as conventions). An exploration of such relations requires the continued and expanded investigation of psychological and sociological, as well as logical, questions.

About 1970 a group of scholars gathered to produce an overview of the forms of OT literature. G. Tucker (1971) presented a model for their procedure based in good part on the joint discussions. Notably, the procedure discusses particular texts in the light of applicable genres and provides an outline ('structure') and identifies a context ('setting') and thrust ('intention') for each unit, both large and small. This procedure implies a basically synchronic understanding of the task of form criticism. It may also reflect some skepticism about the feasibility of separately describing the many genres of biblical literature; nevertheless, an essentialist tendency appears in the series in that its form of presentation typically implies that a text's structure and especially its genre are correctly identifiable in only one way. A consequence of this text-centered, synchronic, and partially Aristotelian approach is that the analysis resembles medieval, especially scholastic, exegesis—a fact that is largely to its credit. It does not

simply represent a return to earlier exegesis, however, for a critical-historical perspective shines through at various points.

One basic issue remains current, mentioned when R. Murphy (a member of the group just discussed) calls the psalms a 'school of prayer' (1983: 113). Do biblical forms constitute models for the expressions and beliefs of all time? Insofar as forms are not just particular they potentially apply to the present, but are there not divergences between past and present that require changes in speech and behavior? In answer one can say that a relational analysis, with a recognition of the roles of forms in their contexts, provides the basis for an application of the principle of analogy, which joins sameness with difference.

Essay 10

TOWARD FORM CRITICISM AS AN EXPLICATION OF HUMAN LIFE: DIVINE SPEECH AS A FORM OF SELF-TRANSCENDENCE

Form criticism has often been described as a kind of historical criticism. A simple statement like this is not very meaningful, for the terms 'form criticism' and 'historical criticism' can both be used in a variety of ways. I will show that 'form criticism,' as I understand it, is not a subdivision of 'historical criticism,' if that is understood as being interested primarily in the particularity of a text. Yet it is indeed a subdivision of 'historical criticism,' if this is understood as an 'explication of human life' which recognizes particularity but does not limit itself to this aspect.

To see the difference between these conceptions, it is best to begin with a sketch of how this issue developed in modern and postmodern times. I have given a detailed account of this earlier[1] and so will present here only some of the highlights of that development.

'Historical criticism' as a procedure that focused primarily on the particularity of a text became prominent from the end of the Middle Ages on. During that time, an interest in particularity increased in large parts of Europe, especially in England, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, and France, and in countries contiguous with these.[2] The interest in particularity played a role in at least four contrasts: (1) between human individuals; (2) between groups, such as 'nations'

Although form is not limited to what is possible, an actual object exhibits a form, in fact, more than one. The present essay delineates a form of human life. No claim is made that all or only human beings exhibit this form but only that it appears in human existence.

1. In *BFC*.

2. Prominent early figures were William of Ockham (fourteenth century CE) in England and Lorenzo Valla (fifteenth century) in Italy.

and 'religions'; (3) between time periods, with their respective cultures; and (4) between 'facts' and 'values,' for 'facts' were thought to be particular and have no intrinsic connection with anything else. In philosophy, such an outlook was known as 'nominalism,' for it held that all general terms and all terms for relations are human constructions—'names'—while in reality itself there are only particulars.

The particularist outlook gradually became more and more pervasive until the nineteenth century, although it was never held in pure form. (In fact, it is not certain that pure nominalism is viable in a non-skeptical form.) It was a feature of what is commonly called 'modernity.' The whole complex was closely associated with the rise of the middle class, which favored individualism, and led to such phenomena as republican forms of government and capitalism.

This 'modern' development can be clearly seen in biblical studies in the rise of particularist historical criticism. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there was an interest in the differences between individual authors, with their characteristic styles and emphases. Detailed attention was also given to the fact that manuscripts and translations of the biblical text differed from each other, as well as to numerous concrete matters, such as the design of Solomon's temple. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the interest in differences brought about a veritable revolution in the picture of the historical development of biblical writings. This revolution was aided by an important aspect of individualism, namely, that individuals were permitted and indeed encouraged to think for themselves and to submit the authorities of their groups to critical evaluation.

The relativization of the authority of the Bible had definite social, economic, and political implications. Specifically, republican forms of government probably drew some inspiration from the Bible (which is to a considerable extent skeptical of kings), but they also moved well beyond biblical politics. Capitalism built on Christian, especially Calvinist, skepticism about human generosity, but it gained even more from the downgrading of the Bible's authority, such as of the tenth commandment, which prohibited 'coveting' and thus condemned the accumulation of property (which happens, of course, in non-capitalist societies, also; cf. Isa. 5:8; Mic. 2:2).

Most biblical scholars held the Bible in high regard in certain respects. However, the particularist distinction between 'fact' and 'value,' useful as it might be in supporting accurate ('objective') investigation, created difficulty for approaching biblical literature as a source of inspiration. A division of labor was created, at least in theory. Historical scholarship was to focus on particular facts, while evaluative questions—including the continuing relevance of a text—were assigned to 'theology' or some similar kind of reflection. This was true especially in Protestantism, which was deeply indebted to nominalism. From the

point of view of societal change, there was an advantage in the distinc-
tion between 'fact' and 'value,' for it meant that the recognition of a
certain situation in the past did not automatically imply approval of
it. Yet the distinction also meant that, when historical criticism was
pursued with only facts in mind, it is meaningless.

At the end of the nineteenth century, a social and intellectual
reorientation took place. This reorientation was based in large
part on the recognition that modernity (including capitalism) had
created major problems in addition to providing valuable features.
Specifically, the new ethos rejected a one-sided interest in particu-
larity. This meant: (1) that individualism was balanced by social
concern; (2) that international and interreligious connections were
established (although this development had a rocky path); (3) that
more appreciation was again expressed toward past phenomena,
in the recognition that current conditions by no means represented
unadulterated 'progress'; and (4) that 'facts' and 'values' are not
distinct or, in any case, not separate.

Gunkel's work in biblical criticism was very much a part of this
postmodern[3] reorientation, as the following considerations show: (1)
He balanced an individualistic approach with attention to genres.
(2) His vision extended beyond Israel to worldwide phenomena. (3)
Although he did not automatically accept the authority of biblical
texts, his treatment of them had a personal, enthusiastic character
that is rare in writings addressed to biblical specialists. (4) He saw
intrinsic connections between phenomena and did not envision
merely discrete facts. Accordingly, Gunkel's program was directed
against what he called 'historical criticism,' by which he meant the
particularist version. He did favor what he called 'history,' which
recognizes particularity, but not exclusively.

Gunkel's students and admirers, however, followed his path only
to a limited extent. In Hebrew Bible studies, comparative visions
were indeed strongly present, first in works by Jahnow, Baum-
gartner, Wendel, Mowinckel and other Scandinavian scholars and,
later, in writings by Westermann. However, most later scholarship
(including that of von Rad) lacked this dimension.

The more narrowly focused kind of form criticism did recognize
the importance of the community. One can call its outlook 'group-
particularism.' Commonality was recognized only within Israel or
the Christian community. This pattern had an unfortunate political
parallel in National Socialism, which arose from the same general
orientation: a social interest, together with skepticism toward coop-
erative internationalism. To be sure, during the twentieth century

---

3. For the use of the word 'postmodern' for a variety of different
responses to modernity, see *CF*, 6.3, and below, Appendix, with notes.

biblically oriented group-particularists did not engage in violent behavior toward others, as happened previously in Christianity. Thus the parallel with National Socialism was only partial.

In terms of scholarship, Gunkel's followers took a problematic step when—in line with Gunkel in this respect—they attempted to reconstruct oral traditions presumed to lie behind the text on the basis of assumptions that oral forms were shorter and more regular in their use of genres than were written texts. This created the impression that form criticism represents a branch of particularist criticism—one that deals with the oral phase of a text's history. The problem with this interpretation was that reconstruction along this line violated standard procedures of historical criticism, specifically by making those unwarranted assumptions.

During the 1960s the recognition that this kind of form criticism was highly questionable became widespread. Thus there emerged a version of form criticism that focused primarily or even entirely on the synchronic structure of texts, such as in my analysis of the book of Hosea,[4] in a theoretical presentation by Tucker,[5] and in the series, The Forms of the Old Testament Literature. These analyses were not strongly 'historical,' in the sense of 'diachronic'; however, other than my own, they were primarily particularist. That is, although genres were observed—so that individualism was muted—generic patterns were considered only within the boundaries of Israel. It is true, contributors to the series may well have been influenced implicitly by knowledge of other traditions, but there is little explicit acknowledgment of such a perspective.[6]

In fact, at that time many theologians and biblical scholars in the US (especially Protestants) held that the Bible is relevant only for members of specific religious traditions—Jews and Christians—and the studies that followed this group-particularist line often addressed only members of these traditions. What was done in such

4.   I used the term 'synchronic' for this, although without rejecting diachronic views altogether (Martin J. Buss, *The Prophetic Word of Hosea: A Morphological Study* [Berlin: Alfred Töpelmann, 1969], p. 2).

5.   Gene M. Tucker, *Form Criticism of the Old Testament* (GBS; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971).

6.   For instance, Sweeney is quite aware of Buddhism (as the writer knows from conversation); he has even published a comparative study of the rise of kingship in Israel and Japan (Marvin A. Sweeney, *The Origins of Kingship in Israel and Japan: A Comparative Analysis* [Occasional Papers 22; Claremont, CA: The Institute for Antiquity and Christianity, 1995]). However, such knowledge has apparently made no overt impact on his commentary on Isaiah 1–39 (Marvin A. Sweeney, *Isaiah 1–39* [FOTL, 16; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1996]). Will he go further in this direction in the future?

studies—whether they were called 'form-critical' or not—was often helpful as a contribution to scholarship and to religious inspiration. Nevertheless, they failed to deal with many significant issues, not only since they ignored other groups but also since they made limited use of the human sciences, such as psychology and anthropology. A radicalization of nominalism at the end of the twentieth century could support this orientation.

Offered herewith is an alternative; it does not stand in competition with these ways, but represents another path that is little traveled. It can utilize insights reached by particularist procedure, although the detailed problems with which historical criticism deals often do not need to be solved before one can proceed in the way proposed. For instance, it may not be important to know how much of the book of Hosea was produced in the eighth century BCE.

For this alternative, a definition of 'form criticism' can be presented on the basis of Gunkel's characterizations of a genre. Gunkel employed the following three features as criteria for identifying a genre: (1) a certain life situation, (2) a characteristic content (both thoughts and moods), and (3) a typical linguistic form. Gunkel erroneously assumed that these aspects are tightly connected on the oral level. This assumption must be rejected. However, one can define 'form criticism' *as a procedure that gives simultaneous attention to human life processes (social and psychological), to human thoughts and feelings, and to linguistic formulations. It explores how these relate to each other, not rigidly but also not in an altogether arbitrary way.*

In looking for such interrelations, this project is contrary to a so-called 'postliberal' theology, which holds that only verbal form, not experience, is relevant for faith. To be sure, there is no necessary connection between verbal form and thought content or experience. Yet certain associations of linguistic form and human life have the ring of appropriateness.

The procedure thus offered is 'historical' in the sense that it deals with data of the past and in the sense that it recognizes that particular structures of human life vary. But it does not consider particularity to be more important than generality, nor does it examine past phenomena as objects of curiosity. Rather, it looks to those data in order to see what they furnish as a challenge to one's own life. It does so by using scholarly procedures, such as sociology, psychology, and the general history of culture, including religion. It is thus an 'explication of human life.'

The suggested procedure has a certain similarity with informal approaches to the Bible. However, it differs from them in that it uses the scholarly methods mentioned. It uses them in the belief that 'facts' (including the findings of scholarship) are not separate from

'values' (or matters of faith and ethics) but that there is, rather, a reciprocal relation between them.

I will attempt to give an example of form criticism in this key. Since very little has been done along this line, this attempt must be regarded as strictly exploratory. Only when several investigators have put their hands to this—building on and correcting each other—can one speak of a truly disciplinary move. I hope that a project of this sort will become just as much a going concern (which includes contestation!) as, say, the archaeology of the Levant. Just as archaeology involves a number of disciplines, so does the path projected here, although the disciplines are in part different: the history of religions, psychology, sociology, rhetorical/poetic analysis, philosophy, theology. Not everyone needs to be equally engaged with all of them, but when this is a more-or-less cooperative endeavor, the various angles can be explored by different persons. Furthermore, it is not necessary that one always makes a somewhat detailed reference to another religious tradition or a specific psychological or philosophical work that is relevant. The mere fact that one is aware of such matters can make a difference.

Specifically, the focus of the present essay will be on the linguistic form of divine speech. (Incidentally, Gunkel did not think that the linguistic aspect of a genre is its most important one, but he did think that the linguistic side is often the easiest one with which to begin an analysis, presumably since it is the side that is most immediately available in the text.) Expressions placed in the mouth of God constitute a very large part of the Hebrew Bible. It is, then, appropriate to ask why that is so.

A hint concerning the significance of divine speech is given by the fact that the style is highly correlated with a certain kind of content. This correlation can be determined by fairly ordinary literary analysis, in conjunction with reflection.

Thus, one can observe that the content associated with divine speech is one that often deals with ultimate questions, especially with Origin and End. Origin and End are ultimates in a dynamic structure. The Origin covered in the Pentateuch—where divine speech is prominent—concerns the origin of the world as a whole, the origin of Israel and its various subgroups, the origin of the sanctity of certain geographical locations, and the basis of a moral/legal/ritual order. The End is an important theme in prophetic literature, where divine speech is very prominent. When the End is positive, it is always presented as an action of God, not as something humanly deserved or brought about.

In contrast, divine speech is almost entirely absent from wisdom literature (Proverbs, Job, and Qoheleth). Certain exceptions to this rule appear in Prov. 1:20-33; 8:4-36; 9:4-6, 11, where personified wisdom (an aspect of God) speaks in an abstract way (with little or no concrete

direction),[7] and in Job 38–41, where God presents a basically nega-
tive answer, which indicates that human knowledge is limited and that
humanity is not God's only concern. These divine speeches in Proverbs
and Job serve the important purpose of indicating that the content of
wisdom literature is not independent of the ultimate category of crea-
tion. However, the specific instructions and reflections presented in
the wisdom books in the form of human speech all deal with finite
or penultimate matters, such as success in work, family, and poli-
tics. Furthermore, wisdom literature has moderate standards, which
a person might actually fulfill. Thus it can refer to persons who are
'righteous,' who fulfill those standards for the most part. The righteous
can expect good consequences, although, as Job and Qoheleth observed,
they do not always or even regularly obtain them.

To be sure, finite matters appear not only in wisdom literature
but also in the Pentateuch and the Prophets. In fact, in the Hebrew
Bible there is no definite division between ultimate and more
limited issues; on the contrary, they are intertwined. Nevertheless,
the point to be made in the present context is that the literary form
of divine speech is closely associated with ultimacy.

One can now ask, Why should there be this connection? Possible
answers lie in the area of psychology. One answer that suggests
itself is that the form of divine speech expresses, on the human side,
receptivity toward a reality greater than oneself. This receptivity is
not just passivity, simply doing nothing, but 'hearing' (without this,
there would be no need to refer to God's speaking). Hearing involves
a semi-active process, in which one imaginatively takes up the posi-
tion of the speaker to whom one gives attention. That is a kind of
self-transcendence.

Indeed, a major feature of human life is to take up imaginatively
a position outside one's own specific location. Piaget called this
'decentering.' He did not intend that term to refer to the absence
of any center but, rather, to the process in which some imaginary
center that lies outside of oneself is chosen, such as when one
considers a physical object and imagines how it appears from a posi-
tion where one is not standing now. When this process refers back to
one's own actual being, it is called 'reflexivity.' That is what creates
selfhood. Only if one can look at oneself—something that one can
only do if one adopts a stance outside of oneself—can one be said to
have a 'self.' In other words, selfhood and self-transcendence belong
together.

7.   A certain specificity does appear in Prov. 8:13 (which refers to pride,
arrogance, and perverted speech), as well as in 9:7-9, 12, if these items are
indeed part of the speech of personified wisdom, and not (as appears to be
the case) an application of it.

One aspect of self-transcendence is being absorbed by a reality outside of oneself for its own sake. This form is ecstatic, deeply enjoyable—at least at the moment when it occurs (sometimes it leads to an action that later gives one physical pain). It is thus not self-abnegating in the sense of being directly hurtful to oneself. At the same time, there are reasons to think that selfhood, which includes self-transcendence, is made possible only in a social context, in which one has received the look of another person with whom one in some way identifies. Selfhood is then inherently social.

Human beings are not merely reflexive; they are also reflective. They realize that, for a 'true' view of things (if there is one), one needs to identify with a reference point beyond oneself. In biblical religion, such a reference point is called 'God.'

Philosophers have dealt with this issue, so that one can attempt to make contact with their efforts. It is commonly said in philosophy that it is impossible to take up a 'God's eye view,' since it is too comprehensive. Although this statement is correct, it fails to make a distinction between what one can actually do and what one can do imaginatively, as an approximation. Actually taking up God's position is impossible. One can ask, however, How might this appear to God (or, in other words, in a large view)? Such a question is crucial for biblically based religions, as well as for others. Indeed, a question of this sort—which can be worded non-theistically—is important for overcoming self-centeredness. (Even acknowledgment of one's own location is a form of self-transcendence, if it indicates readiness to consider other perspectives.)

A serious problem, to be sure, arises when one thinks that the imaginative identification is also an actual identification, that one really knows God's point of view. This problem leads some philosophers (and others) to say that one should not adopt a religious position at all. Human beings, however, probably always take up some sort of ultimate position—such as Marxism, Nietzscheanism, or agnosticism—even if they do not call that position 'divine.' In fact, from my reading it appears that Marxists and many others seem to be even more self-assured and critical of others than the average religious person. If that is true, the reason may be that they have no good way to distinguish their own position from a more comprehensive one, which is beyond their ken. (The book of Job furnishes an example of such a distinction within the Hebrew Bible.) But perhaps religious and non-religious persons are equal in their self-assurance. In any case, the desire to see things from a comprehensive point of view does not in itself imply dogmatism.

In biblically based religions, God has usually been thought of as maximally knowledgeable. A view along this line may already have been present in the Hebrew Bible. It is true, omniscience (which is, in

any case, a problematic concept) is not attributed to God, but God is thought to have greater knowledge than any human individual. One practical implication of this view is that ethics should take account of maximal knowledge, that is, of as much knowledge as is possible under any given circumstance.[8] A single person's knowledge will be highly limited, but the total knowledge available to those to whom one looks for guidance (such as academic, religious, or political figures) should ideally be as full as possible. To put this in practical terms: no reasonably complex position can be 'true' in an absolute sense, but 'truth'—including 'moral truth'—can be increasingly approximated as one adds relevant information and approaches the matter from as many angles as possible. (Even Nietzsche said this.[9]) One aspect of the significance of divine speech, which expresses a perspective larger than that of any human individual, then lies in a call to be open to maximal knowledge.

For this purpose, it is necessary to explicate what can be meant by 'knowledge.' In my experience—is this not true for everyone?—when I encounter another being, I often have the sense that this other lays a claim on me, in other words, 'speaks' to me. Levinas eloquently expressed this sense when he spoke of the 'face' of the other, looking at one or (as he preferred to say) 'speaking' to one.[10] Before him, Buber spoke of how even in non-human objects 'we are aware of a breath from the eternal *Thou*.'[11] A 'cold' form of knowledge—as is standard for nominalism—does not include such sensitivity, of course, but that restriction is due to a deliberate decision to draw a line between knowledge and ethics. In contrast, scientific knowledge that includes listening has been set forth more recently; one version has been described as feminist, although not as limited to women.[12]

Does the Hebrew Bible support the kind of knowledge that involves sympathetic hearing? The answer appears to be, yes, but one has to make an important qualification. The Hebrew Bible describes the 'cry' or 'call' of one who is oppressed, poor, or otherwise suffering, not as a voice that reaches the human hearer directly, but

8.   This is the opposite of John Rawls's position, which favors a political system based on minimal knowledge of specific matters.

9.   Friedrich Nietzsche, *Werke* (ed. G. Colli and M. Montinari; 8 vols.; Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1967–72), VI/II, p. 383.

10.   Emmanuel Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985), p. 87.

11.   Martin Buber, *I and Thou* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937), pp. 6-8, 101.

12.   Evelyn Fox Keller, *Reflections on Gender and Science* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 138, 164, 165.

rather as one that comes to God's hearing (ṡ'q or qr').[13] Someone who listens *with* God will be affected by such a voice. One can regard such a process as being implicit in the biblical care for the poor and the oppressed.

Of course, the question can be raised whether it would not be better if the call of the sufferer would reach the human hearer directly, instead of indirectly via God, but the human world (and, I think, also the non-human one) is full of calls for attention, which would completely overwhelm an individual hearer if they were not mediated somehow.[14] Thus one must differ from Levinas, who held (if I understand him correctly) that an infinite, or at least a superior, call comes directly from the human other. Instead of treating the neighbor's claim as absolute, as Levinas apparently did, it may be appropriate to channel that claim via God, who has a wide view, which means that each individual's claim is relativized. Obviously, one danger in doing so is that attention to God (such as in ritual) becomes a substitute for attention to the other. This is indeed a perennial problem in religion; it underlies the prophetic criticism against the kind of religion in which such a substitution takes place.

These brief reflections point to the association of a linguistic form (divine speech) with a certain context (ultimacy) and with certain structures of human life (self-transcendence and receptivity). One can go further in examining the details of this structure. On the individual level, for instance, one can seek to determine how prophetic ecstasy embodies transcendence or how the claim to be in an ecstatic condition affects a prophet's ability to give direction and express criticism. On the social side, one can show how 'listening to the other' is a very important social operation. One can discuss the ways in which the Israelite community (reified for a moment) made room for certain specialists that handle different aspects of divine speech—especially, priests and prophets. One can also explore how such specialists have taken advantage of their position to the apparent detriment of others and how they have been manipulated by kings for their own purposes—just as nowadays religious and academic professionals pursue their own interests and are open to being manipulated by others. Such examinations will show that life

13.   E.g. Exod. 22:22; Judg. 4:3; Isa. 5:7 (probably not just directed to God); 19:20; Ps. 9:13; 77:2; 120:1; Job 34:28.

14.   Jainism calls on people to be sensitive to all pain, including that of the physical world. Not surprisingly, then, it includes the ultimate ideal of starving to death. This ideal is usually projected for a future incarnation; thus the present response can be moderate.

is complex. Some of these considerations have, in fact, already been pursued by scholars.

However, I want to go on to an important question. Is the self-transcendence that is exhibited in the form of divine speech peculiar to Israel, or has it also operated elsewhere?

A look at Buddhism will quickly show that self-transcendence is not peculiarly Israelite, but it will also indicate that religious traditions are not identical with each other, either in verbal expression or in the human processes they embody.[15] Of course, both the Hebrew Bible and the very far-flung Buddhist literature exhibit significant internal differences. Yet it is possible to point to some of the features characteristic of each.

One of the central tenets of Buddhism is the denial of a substantive 'self.' Buddhism holds that what we think of as a person is actually a collection of constantly changing phenomena and, further, that the constellation that tomorrow will go under a name with the initials, say, 'M.B.' will not be the same as the constellation that goes under that same name now. Aside from the very reasonable observational arguments which Buddhism can present to support this view, one can ask for its motivation. One basic motivation seems to be a desire to undercut self-attachment, which is the basis of most of our worries and strains. If, for instance, the future 'M.B.' is different from the present 'M.B.,' why should the present 'M.B.' be concerned about that entity more than about another being whose initials might be, say, 'R.F.'? This principle would apply also to family members. Why should 'M.B.' be more concerned about 'A.B.,' with the same family name, than about 'A.G.,' who belongs to another family? It should be clear from these questions that the avoidance of suffering that Buddhism seeks through reducing or eliminating worry and disappointment is integrally related to ethics, as is stated in the Four Noble Truths.[16]

What is happening here is a version of self-transcendence (which is connected with reflexivity). It takes place without a personified center, 'God,' with whom one can identify in imagination. Non-religious thinkers believe, of course, that one can operate without

15.   The reference to Jainism made earlier (n. 14) also shows that self-transcendence is not peculiar to Israel.

16.   The Four Noble Truths are, briefly: (1) suffering is pervasive; (2) the cause of suffering is craving; (3) cessation of suffering is possible through abandoning craving; (4) cessation comes specifically through right understanding, right aspiration, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood, right endeavor, right awareness, right consciousness (cf. Sangharakshita, *Vision and Transformation* [Birmingham: Windhorse Publications, 1999]).

such a center; they thus use the term 'decentering' in the sense of one's having no center. Buddhism has taken an interesting intermediate position. In one sense, it denies that there is a solid Reality around which the rest is positioned, for it sees everything as dependently interrelated and relative. Yet 'nirvana,' the very absence of solid reality or a recognition of such absence, becomes a luminous condition, which furnishes an orientation. Just how nirvana is related to everyday reality (with a small 'r') is a question that is answered differently by different Buddhist groups.

It is now possible to ask whether the difference in conception between Israelite and Buddhist thought has a practical effect. One difference may be that Buddhism is less 'active' in some sense, more peaceful, it seems. But one needs to avoid a simple stereotype in this regard.

One can wonder, of course, whether or how Buddhism experiences a call to attention similar to that expressed in the Hebrew Bible. This question has two positive answers. One is on the verbal level. On this level one can observe that Buddhist literature speaks of 'hearing the *dharma* (true orientation).' Thus, Buddhism, too, utilizes the symbol of hearing, although less frequently. The Buddhist term for sympathetic attention is, in English, 'compassion.'

The other relevant answer is on the level of non-verbal experience. Both research and informal experience have shown that a common form of Buddhist meditation heightens receptive attention to phenomena. The reason for this condition is as follows: An active, goal-oriented state of mind reduces attention to phenomena that are not relevant to the goal being pursued; if goal-orientation is reduced in meditation, more phenomena come into one's perception—without one's seeking them. In fact, something like this meditative state, with its receptive attention to other beings, may also take place in biblically based experiences when they are oriented toward divine assurances or promises in such a way that reliance on human exertion is reduced.

There is thus considerable correspondence between the Israelite structure expressed in the linguistic form of divine speech, on the one hand, and the Buddhist theme and experience of nirvana on the other. (Incidentally, on the behavioral level, Buddhism rejects caste distinctions; this may constitute another parallel with biblical literature.) Yet there are also differences, which may even lead to mutual illumination and enrichment.

It should be noted that the structures outlined are rather ideal. In practice, most forms of Buddhism moderate the denial of selfhood through the idea of reincarnation. Specifically, most Buddhists hold that, even though there is no substantive entity that continues in this life and beyond, a given interconnected bundle of properties to

which we assign a certain name is expected to stand in continuity with a future bundle, which survives death through being reincarnated. The progress of such a bundle (which can be enhanced by moral behavior) is a concern for most Buddhists. In fact, from an observer's point of view, it is doubtful that Buddhist society would be able to continue otherwise. After all, a definite amount of self-concern—including concern for one's family—is necessary for human survival. The central problem for society is how to balance such limited self-concern with concern for others. Similarly, in the Hebrew Bible, the 'wisdom' books of Proverbs and Qoheleth are more moderate in their ethics than the major prophets are. Furthermore, in the third division of the Jewish canon there are other books with a strongly humanistic character, including three books in which women play major roles (Ruth, Esther, Song of Songs), so that women were not thought of as especially passive or receptive.

Such considerations raise issues of sociology. In order to function, any society requires a certain amount of pro-social rather than individualistic behavior. On the human level, self-transcendence is one way in which such behavior is supported. That does not mean that selfhood is nothing more than a means toward survival. On the contrary, self-transcendence, like much of culture, sometimes appears to exceed the amount that is needed for group survival in a way that can be welcomed. For instance, it is by no means certain that listening to Bach's music will enhance individual or group survival (although that possibility has been suggested). Similarly, concern for weak members of a society may in many cases not contribute to group survival. However—as is well known in evolutionary theory—for the survival of an entity, it is not necessary that each of its processes contribute to that end as long as the overall pattern is able to continue in some way. In fact, self-transcendence can be explained not just sociologically, but philosophically, by observing that without such a process we would not be talking about reality.[17]

Another sociological issue concerns the factors that led to the almost simultaneous emergence of Israel and Buddhism. I have dealt with this issue elsewhere briefly[18] and will not repeat it here, except to say that when looking for the potential relevance of biblical texts for the present, one must keep in mind differences

---

17.   There are, to be sure, philosophers who deny both self-transcendence and the possibility of speaking about reality.

18.   'Hosea as a Canonical Problem,' in *Prophets and Paradigms* (ed. S. Reid; JSOTSup, 229; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996), pp. 87-88.

in social arrangements between then and now. Both biblically based religions and Buddhism have, in fact, already undergone considerable change, probably in response to social developments. Yet the reflection that one is not the center of the universe seems to be of continuing relevance.

Has this analysis sharpened our understanding of the Hebrew Bible? Perhaps, but probably something more important has happened. Our focus has turned away from looking at the biblical text either as a curiosity or an arbitrary authority and has moved instead toward the clarification of issues that are significant for our own existence, although room has been left for variability. This is an 'explication of human life,' one that involves not only the past but also the present writer and, I hope, the reader. If this explication gives attention to verbal patterns, it can be called 'form criticism.' The example given here is an exploratory effort in this direction.

Part II

1. *Interdisciplinary Movements*

As is shown in the appendix of the present work, various scholarly disciplines have moved in largely parallel ways during the last several hundred years of Western history. This phenomenon can be due to their being shaped by the same cultural ethos at a given time even if they do not interact with each other. Specifically, during the twentieth century most intellectual disciplines were indebted to a relational view of form. This orientation thus needs to be reviewed briefly insofar as it is relevant to the present discussion, which, it is hoped, may be of interest to specialists in different fields.[1]

A major tradition in early European thought had emphasized generality and reasonableness. For instance, Greco-Roman rhetoric was based on the assumption that speech has a rational foundation. Aristotle described three major types of situations: advising (looking toward the future), praising (honoring someone in the present), and judging (evaluating an event in the past). For each of these, he outlined the kinds of content (ideas) that are appropriate for it. The connection between situation and the recommended content of speech was presented not merely as conventional but as reasonable and therefore universally valid; in fact, many of the recommendations are still sound.

The present essay has two aims. One is to indicate the process of interdisciplinary exchange. In particular, it will show that biblical studies is not an isolated field. The second is an elucidation of the notion of *Sitz im Leben*—here translated 'life situation'—as it has been refined by works in many fields. These two aims are not separate. Rather, evidence will be presented that interchanges can be fruitful; in this case, they sharpen understanding of the issue of context.

The following analysis proceeds largely by discipline and cultural circle, but it has a chronological order, since the topic of life situation was not prominent at the same time in all fields. In this process, most of the human sciences are discussed. Addressed to biblical and non-biblical scholars alike, the overview necessarily presents some information that is already known by readers in a specific field.

1. A fuller account, with documentation, appears in *CF*.

In a reaction against such a view, a particularist view commonly called 'nominalism' emerged in the latter half of the Middle Ages, with antecedents in ancient Greece. Nominalism held that reality consists basically of independent particulars and that the arrangements into which small particulars enter are arbitrary; there is no 'reason' for them.[2] A religious base for this view was that it guarded God's freedom. Its social aspect lay in support for individualism and nationalism (nations were seen as medium-sized particulars) and included the belief that traditional patterns can be changed, since they are more-or-less arbitrary.[3] Indeed, nominalism became widespread in 'modern' society, which valued freedom of choice and accepted novelty. The very meaning of the word 'reason' changed; it referred then to independent thinking, free from tradition.

Despite its strengths, however, nominalism was one-sided and created both intellectual and social problems. (In fact, it may have never been held together consistently.) In a partial reaction against nominalism, relational theory was formulated from the end of the nineteenth century on. In this, the particularity of specific objects was recognized, but they were not viewed as being in principle altogether independent of each other. Rather, relations, which are repeatable and potentially reasonable in the sense of non-arbitrary (for instance, 'symmetry' in physics), were also viewed as real. Importantly, it was seen that relationality joins a degree of connectivity with a degree of separateness, for relations require both. The notion of probability became important, since it combines a degree of regularity with an element of unpredictability. The relational conception had a social aspect. For instance, moderate socialism, sometimes known as 'social democracy,' joins the negative freedom of independence with a positive social freedom that enables possibilities.[4]

Parallels in the procedures that were followed by various disciplines can indeed be explained to a large extent by the fact that they all operated in a shared intellectual/social context. However, the following analysis makes clear that the disciplines also interacted directly with each other.

---

2. For instance, most Christian nominalists believed that God (the great Particular) freely furnished physical and moral laws. These laws are not governed by reasons that might restrict God, but they do provide predictability for human beings.

3. The readiness for change appealed perhaps especially to those who were not very religious, for they did not accept divine 'laws' as a basis for their ethics.

4. Strong socialism would be particularist, since it treats society as a large, unified particular.

Just how such impact took place often cannot be determined, especially since one must allow for oral contacts. For instance, my own experience provides an example of a contact that is traceable only through self-report. When I wrote an essay that was published in the US in 1961, I was aware of lectures given by J.L. Austin in England that were not published until 1962. That was possible because Nicholas Fotion, my colleague at Coe College, had heard Austin give a version of these lectures while touring North Carolina in the late 1950s.[5] This shows that it is often not possible to determine just how an idea spreads.

In seeking to establish whether there were connections between two intellectual processes, I am using the following criteria:

1. Is there a strong similarity in ideas? By itself, this consideration is inconclusive. Yet ideas seldom arise independently.[6] If there is indeed no direct connection between two proponents of a very similar position, they usually do have at least a common background.

2. Is there a strong similarity in the verbal forms expressing the idea? Such similarity can be due simply to the nature of the concept that is expressed; however, the use of strikingly similar terminology with a common meaning probably indicates a historical connection.

3. Can physical proximity or knowledge of the other tradition be established? Proximity or knowledge is neither sufficient nor necessary for a conclusion that there has been direct influence, for, on the one hand, persons in close physical contact frequently do not share their ideas, and, on the other hand, they may reach similar positions on the basis of a common background rather than by learning from each other. Nonetheless, proximity or knowledge is an element worthy of consideration in tracing the movement of ideas.

2. *Gunkel's Concept of Sitz im Leben in Biblical Studies*

The term *Sitz im Leben*, which I translate 'life situation,' was created in biblical studies by Hermann Gunkel early in the twentieth century. It referred to the correlation of a type of situation

---

5. Of course, Austin was not the only one who had an impact on what I said in that essay. Rather, Fotion referred me to Austin because he saw similarities between Austin's work and mine. This similarity, in fact, was not coincidental but reflected at least in part a common background, as will be indicated below. My 1961 essay did not mention Austin's lectures, but it did refer to a writer who was indebted to Austin's previous work.

6. See *CF*, chaps. 3 and 7, for various relations between thinkers.

with a type of speech (a genre). Since it involved the notion of 'type,' the term was not one-sidedly particularist. Rather, the notion of generality was built into its idea.

More specifically, Gunkel envisioned that, in Israelite oral speech, genres exhibited standard patterns that connected specific language and specific ideas with specific life situations. He did not consider these patterns to be altogether arbitrary but, rather, recognized reasons for them. For instance, he observed how psalms seek to motivate God.[7]

In Gunkel's view, biblical texts adapted such patterns. Written texts, he thought, moved away from the normal life situation of a genre, although this setting in life remained the genre's ordinary location. In other words, in Gunkel's usage the term *Sitz im Leben*— literally, 'residence in life'—referred to the usual location of a genre, comparable to the way a human being has a 'residence' (or a 'seat') somewhere without being at that place at all times. The first clear statement of Gunkel's conception of the *Sitz im Leben* of a genre, which forms the background of a written use of it, appeared in 1906:

> Whoever wants to understand an ancient genre, has to ask…where it has its *Sitz* in folklife…. The oldest genres, which are based on an active connection with life processes (*die ihren Sitz im Leben haben*) and are oriented toward definite listeners and strive after a definite effect, are for these reasons almost always completely pure.[8] But when writers take charge of a style, deviations and mixtures enter in many ways as they aim for clever, complicated effects (53-54).

Somewhat more specific about a *Sitz* in folklife was another statement in the same year: 'Whoever wishes to understand a genre, must become clear about the whole situation and ask, Who is it that speaks? Who are the listeners? What mood dominates the situation? What effect is sought? Often a genre will be represented by a professional responsible for it' (1913: 33 [1906]).

A final statement of Gunkel's position was given in 1925: Genres should be analyzed according to 'their own nature,' which is shown by '1. a definite group of *thoughts and moods*, 2. by a clear set of *linguistic forms*, in which these are expressed, and 3. a *Sitz im Leben*, on the basis of which content and [linguistic] form can be understood' (109). The phrase 'own nature' and the implication that only one classification of genres can be correct (explicitly stated in other contexts) expressed what can be called an 'essentialist' view, but this joined with a historical orientation that described culture-specific genres. Such a combination of essentialism and historical

---

7. See *BFC*: 70-75, 246-49, 292, 313, 318-20, 349-350, 352, 372, 403-6, for Gunkel's and both earlier and later analyses.

8. Later (in 1909: 1193), the qualification 'almost' was omitted.

orientation was foreshadowed in Aristotle's *Poetics*. Gunkel failed, however, to take account of the way generality is combined with particularity in relational thinking, which joins partial predictability with partial unpredictability; relational theory, to be sure, was only in the early stages of development in Gunkel's time.

Gunkel's approach soon became widely accepted in biblical studies and came to be labeled 'form criticism.'[9] In this term, 'form' refers not just to literary form but to an interrelated whole in which the three aspects of a literary type are seen in connection with each other.

Gunkel's conception was not original in any of its parts but—like most creative insights—represented a synthesis. It was inspired by procedures in Germanics, ancient Near Eastern studies, classics, medieval and folklore studies. Nevertheless, the notion of the three-fold structure of genres was his creation.[10] No earlier occurrences of it are known and in all discussions of this notion, there is evidence that Gunkel's work was known, at least indirectly through his followers. The idea of *Sitz im Leben* was a part of this conception.

Although Gunkel clearly had a broad perspective, his knowledge had limitations. These limitations contributed to what appears to be a major error in his view. Namely, he believed that the connections between language, thought, and life setting were rigid in ancient oral life. This error might not have been serious had he not also conceived of life settings in terms of concretely describable circumstances rather than in terms of functions or operations—for instance, in terms of a physical temple where one can pray rather than of a socio-psychological situation that gives one a reason to pray. Non-biblical analyses that inspired his vision had not been quite so rigid.

Fortunately, even misunderstandings in the process of interaction between disciplines can be fruitful, although they need to be corrected eventually. Although Gunkel's view that pure genres are connected with certain concrete settings was based on an imperfect understanding of some of the sources on which he drew, it had a certain advantage: the very sharpness of his view gave it such power that it constituted a challenge both within and without biblical studies.

In any case, a contextual/pragmatic study of genres was employed at least to some extent in most biblical studies during the twentieth century. Since there were a great many such studies—as thousands of scholars painstakingly examined a fairly limited body of literature—it is likely that the vast majority of such examinations

9. See *BFC*: 286-406.

10. See *BFC*: 227-28, 239-44. Gunkel also knew general literary theory well and learned much from it, but not specifically in regard to the topic of *Sitz im Leben*.

during the twentieth century were carried out in the biblical field. (In fact, earlier versions of them, indebted to traditional rhetoric and poetics, had for almost two thousand years been applied to biblical literature.) The current survey focuses specifically on the notion of *Sitz im Leben*.

As will be seen, some important studies outside of biblical scholarship learned from Gunkel-inspired form criticism. However, they divested his concept of *Sitz im Leben* of most of its problematic assumptions, recognizing that the connection between forms of expression and contexts is probabilistic rather than rigid. They also saw that the context relevant to a type of speech involves roles and processes but not always specific external settings and that the relevant context is subject to interpretation rather than being an objective given.

3. *In Gunkel's Cultural Sphere: Simmel, Bally*

Gunkel lived in Berlin from 1895 to 1906, as he developed his basic ideas. Thus the present survey begins with two persons who were associated with that city and time period: Georg Simmel and Charles Bally.

Simmel, a very important sociologist and philosopher, taught in Berlin from 1885 to 1914. Because of antisemitic prejudice, he was denied a full professorship for most of his career,[11] but he had an electrifying impact on students and others both in Berlin and elsewhere (Coser 1965: 3-5, 38; Worringer 1953: ix). Thus his ideas may have been known to Gunkel, although the analyses most relevant for Gunkel's work were not published until late in Gunkel's career. Like Friedrich Nietzsche, Wilhelm Dilthey, and Henri Bergson, he stressed 'life' as a central category, on the basis of a practical and personally-involved orientation to thought. (He also took account of Anglo-American pragmatism [1918a]). Indeed, the 'philosophy of life,' in one of its many versions (not necessarily Simmel's), may have contributed to Gunkel's formulation of *Sitz im Leben*.

Specifically relevant for a form-critical conception was Simmel's thesis that different 'forms of, and involvements in, life' have different 'truths,' since thinking serves the 'function' of enhancing life (1918b: 55-56). A similar notion had become prominent in the study of genres by Roman Catholic biblical scholars in a tradition that paralleled Gunkel's work; this tradition argued that different

---

11. The prejudice was, of course, not confined to Germany, which at that time may actually have been relatively open toward Jewish participation in academia (cf. Jospe 1971: 1677-78).

kinds of truth are expressed by different genres.[12] Thus it seems that the idea was 'in the air.'

While Simmel may have contributed to Gunkel's thinking in a general way by highlighting 'life' and its functions, an influence moving in the opposite direction is likely for C. Bally. He probably learned from Gunkel.

A Swiss student of Ferdinand de Saussure, Bally developed stylistics as a branch of linguistics, with special attention to the emotional quality of expressive forms (Vendryes 1966). At one point, he said that language is related to 'human and social life.' That is, 'every distinct group and every form of activity tends to create a special type of expression; the creation of these types is due to the particular circumstances and, the majority of the time, to the needs and necessities inherent in these forms of life and thought' (1909, §220). More specifically, a text's *milieu* includes social class, habitual activity and thought, and the relationships of persons involved in an interchange. Although this examination of *milieu* was not quite identical with Gunkel's notion of *Sitz im Leben*, the general formulation of the issue closely resembled Gunkel's in conception and wording.

In fact, Bally had opportunity to become acquainted with Gunkel's conception, which had appeared in a treatment of Israelite literature that was published in an important series addressed to the educated public. Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff—who was probably the director of Bally's dissertation and with whom Gunkel interacted extensively while in Berlin[13]—contributed an overview of Greek literature to this series.

Furthermore, Bally's discussion of life situation was brief and appears to be a secondary addition to the main part of his study, which is not shaped by it. Since major work is usually written over a period of years, it is possible, even likely, that Gunkel's 1906 statement came to Bally's attention at a relatively late stage in the production of his work, which was published in 1909.

Bally's view of literary types, however, was less rigid than Gunkel's. He recognized an intimate connection between expression and social situation only the 'majority of the time' (instead of Gunkel's 'almost always'), and did not emphasize organized settings. In any case, Bally's theoretical formulation came to be quite influential for other works, some of which will be mentioned below.

12. See *BFC*: 177-84, for Roman Catholic examples; the idea also became current in non-Catholic interpretive traditions—in fact, in virtually all biblical scholarship.

13. Bally obtained a doctorate in Berlin in 1889; his thesis was on Euripides' tragedies. Cf. *BFC*: 228, 230.

4. *Key English-Language Analyses of Speech Situations Prior to 1960*

English-language discussions of life situation proceeded in part independently of Gunkel's analysis and in part with an apparent awareness of it. Pragmatism (one of the three major relational streams of the twentieth century)[14] played a role in these discussions.

Charles S. Peirce, a key figure for pragmatism, presented the well-known theory that a sign has three aspects: the signal itself, its referent, and the 'interpretant.' This triadic analysis was to some extent similar to Gunkel's trimodal view of genres. The signal corresponded to Gunkel's 'linguistic form'; the referent, to his 'content'; and the interpretant, to his 'life setting.' However, an important difference lay in the fact that for Peirce the pragmatic aspect forms an endpoint ('interpretant') rather than, as for Gunkel, a background (*Sitz im Leben*).

Victoria, Lady Welby, who corresponded with Peirce—probably because these two recognized a certain affinity between their viewpoints—concerned herself extensively with the 'meaning' of linguistic expressions. According to Welby, 'Meaning includes Intention and End' (1896: 28). She compared the context of an expression with the environment of an organism in terms of both cause and effect and declared that there 'is, strictly speaking, no such thing as the Sense of a word, but only the sense in which it is used—the circumstances, state of mind, reference, "universe of discourse" belonging to it' (1903: 5). Use was thus recognized as important for meaning.

A similar position was taken by Bertrand Russell. Russell knew little of Peirce's work, but he was familiar with the pragmatists William James and F.C.S. Schiller, who propounded a version of pragmatism that was more utilitarian than Peirce's. Stated simply, Peirce's pragmatism emphasized attention to *how* something works—with the implication that ideas are not separate from actions—while the other version considered *whether* it works, as a means to some other end. Since Russell was critical of utilitarian pragmatism, his position was actually close to Peirce's.[15] Citing J.B. Watson's 'behaviorism' in support, Russell declared that 'the use of the word comes first,' before explicit meaning arises. Out of four criteria he presented for recognizing whether one understands

---

14.   See *CF*, 3.3.

15.   On Russell's relation to pragmatism, see Eames 1989: 170-214; on Peirce's objection to utilitarian pragmatism, especially as it was popularized, see his discussion in 1931-58, 5.414-35 (1905).

words, the first three are behavioral, including the following two: 'On suitable occasions you use the word properly,' and, 'When you hear it you act appropriately' (Russell 1921: 197, 199).

These discussions reflected an emerging ethos, but a line of contributions that was indebted in part to Gunkel began a few years before then with Alan Gardiner, an Egyptologist and general theorist of language. Gardiner opposed the still widely current treatment of language as an expression of thought or feeling in these words: 'Language…is a sociological factor inseparable from the environment which gives its impulse, and from the listener who demonstrates, by action or by verbal response, its practical utility' (1919: 5).

The essay in which this statement appeared presented the substance (not actual wording) of a letter that Gardiner had sent a few years earlier to Bronislaw Malinowski, who had begun field work on the Trobriand Islands.[16] The purpose of the letter, as will become clear, was to urge Malinowski to record linguistic materials with consideration for their context. Malinowski subsequently reported Gardiner's reasoning for this recommendation:

> From his point of view as an archaeologist, he naturally saw the enormous possibilities for an Ethnographer of obtaining a similar body of written sources as have been preserved to us from ancient cultures, plus the possibility of illuminating them by personal knowledge of the full life of that culture (1932: 24).

In other words, Gardiner had expressed frustration over the fact that students of ancient literature must guess about its social context and had invited Malinowski to observe literature in its active context. A few years later, he stated in greater detail the need to look at language 'in its setting of real life' (1922: 353).

Gardiner's use of the phrase 'setting of real life' in 1922 (cf. the reference to 'life' in Malinowski's report of the letter) reflected familiarity with Gunkel's term *Sitz im Leben*. Indeed, as a foremost Egyptologist, he was almost bound to know something about biblical studies.[17] He passed Hebrew and Arabic examinations in 1901, and from 1902 to 1912 cooperated in the preparation of an Egyptian dictionary in Berlin, where his stay overlapped with Gunkel's (until 1907). Gunkel, for his part, was at that time interested in Egyptian literature. He received advice from Adolf Erman,

16. Gardiner 1919: 2. Cf. Goldsmith 1988.
17. Gardiner reported 'valuable encouragement' from the Egyptologist Grapow. Grapow co-authored a book on early Christian literature with a New Testament specialist (C. Schmidt and Grapow 1921) and may have learned of Gunkel's procedure that way; he later discussed Egyptian texts with attention to the 'style of several genres' (1936: 20).

the leading Berlin Egyptologist, and presented a paper on Egyptian parallels at a Berlin congress in 1908;[18] thus he may have interacted personally with Gardiner. From about 1912 to 1917, Gardiner was, in fact, a member of the Council of the Society of Biblical Archaeology.

To be sure, Gunkel's approach was not the only factor that led to Gardiner's program. Rather, earlier analyses by scholars of the ancient Near East had contributed to Gunkel's formulation through their interest in social contexts. However, Gunkel furnished an especially sharp formulation of the contextual issue, so that Gardiner had reason to make use of it.[19]

As a matter of fact (whatever other reasons may have impelled him), Malinowski carried out the program Gardiner proposed to him. In line with what Gardiner had said, he described the ethnographer as one who can observe 'the living reality of spoken language' instead of having 'to reconstruct the general situation…from the extant statements,' as the historical philologist must (1923: 307). Both at the beginning and at the end of his *Myth in Primitive Psychology*, Malinowski contrasted the field worker's direct access to the 'social context' or 'setting in actual life' of narratives with the lack of such context in studies of classical texts (1926: 17-18, 90). His expression 'setting in actual life' (1926: 90) was even closer to *Sitz im Leben* than was Gardiner's phrasing 'setting of real life' in 1922 and may have been based on extensive oral conversations between the two of them in regard to linguistic issues.[20]

In carrying out this program, Malinowski paid close attention both to 'subject matter' ('culture') and to social organization,

18.   Gunkel 1904: 258-59; 1907: 851; Baumgartner 1933: 301; 1932: 389; Klatt 1969: 42, 93.

19.   See Buss (1999: 241-42) on the background of Gunkel's idea of *Sitz im Leben* in Assyriology. In Egyptology (Gardiner's specialty), presentations of literature in terms of genres—as was done in biblical form criticism—were common, but the notion of a *Sitz im Leben* was explicitly developed neither by Gardiner's teacher Erman (with whom Gunkel was in contact) nor by other Egyptologists. Gardiner also learned from Wegener, who viewed a discourse's 'situation' as crucial; situation included physical objects in view, memories, individual and corporate inclinations, and technological arrangements (1885: 21-29). Unlike Gunkel, however, Wegener did not deal with types or kinds of situations, nor did he focus more than incidentally on the organization of society.

20.   Gardiner and Malinowski discussed linguistic issues for a number of years (Gardiner 1932, Acknowledgements; Firth 1957: 181; cf. Wayne 1995, I: 33, 42, 136, 148; II: 12, 14, 25, with letters by Malinowski referring to his contacts with Gardiner from 1917-21).

including 'hunting, fishing, tilling the soil,' as well as 'war, play or sport, ceremonial or artistic display such as dancing or singing' (1923: 310; 1935: 51-52). Linguistic form, content, and situation are thus represented together. In *Myth in Primitive Psychology* (1926), he indicated that major narrative types each have their own characteristic content and serve different functions. This work thus represented a close counterpart to what was done in biblical form criticism, although it gave only limited attention to linguistic features. In fact, Malinowski's studies, especially his examination of narratives, furnished probably the most extensive example of form criticism—actually carried out—outside of biblical studies.

On the theoretical level, the program fit in well with Malinowski's philosophical disposition, which, in the train of Ernst Mach and others, was broadly pragmatic and regarded function (as in mathematics) as a central scientific category.[21] Thus, as is often the case, a general ethos and a specific impetus (via Gardiner) worked together.

In fact, in terms of theory, Malinowski presented a formulation that was more abstract and in that way more adequate than notions current among biblical scholars. In 1923, he described speech as a 'mode of action' within 'a context of situation' (306, 312).[22] Initially— apparently as late as 1923—he thought that this theory was applicable only to 'primitive' speech, but later he regarded this limitation to be an 'error' (1935: 58).

One way in which Gardiner's and Malinowski's ideas became known was through a work written jointly by C.K. Ogden, a protégé of Welby, and by I.A. Richards, entitled *The Meaning of Meaning*, which referred to Gardiner's 1922 essay (1923: 198, 230).[23] This work analyzed meanings in terms of 'sign-situations' which 'occur nearly uniformly' (chap. 3). By highlighting 'situation' and the repeated, not merely singular, use of language, this analysis stood somewhat close to Gunkel's view of life situation, but it was concerned primarily with words rather than with sentences

21. Leaf 1979: 180-88; Flis and Gellner in Ellen *et al.* 1988: 119, 175. Malinowski began this interest in Poland. He then obtained an anthropological education in England and eventually obtained British citizenship.

22. According to Malinowski (1932: 24), he was moving in this direction prior to receiving Gardiner's letter, since he had already recorded data in their context. Nevertheless, Gardiner's call probably had an impact on Malinowski's work. (Nerlich and Clarke [1996: 335] probably wrongly imply that Malinowski stimulated Gardiner, but it is true that Malinowski—and others, including Bühler—supported him.)

23. Hardwick 1977: xxxi.

or discourses and gave little attention to social organization.[24] That lack
was remedied by a contribution from Malinowski, which they solicited
(Supplement 1).[25]

J.R. Firth, a younger colleague of Malinowski (in London), influenced
by him, furnished a systematic formulation of types of situations. In
1930, he presented a succinct situational analysis of speech, in which he
acknowledged Bally's contribution. Furthermore, a 1933 public discus-
sion, led by Gardiner, provided an important stimulus for the system-
atic analysis that Firth presented in 1935 (36). In it, Firth argued that
usages and situations can be classified according to 'social roles,' which
'interlock' but are not rigidly connected and can be described separably
(1935: 66-68). He referred to differences between speaking and writing
and between familiar and more formal speech, as well as to the special-
ized languages of school, law, and church. He noticed 'such common situ-
ations' as addresses, greetings, and farewells (1935: 69). Among 'types
of linguistic functions,' he listed 'agreement, encouragement…wishing,
blessing…boasting…appeal…flattery…love-making…praise,' as well
as their opposites (1935: 70). Eventually, he spoke of 'typical repetitive
"events"' (1957: 203 [1951]). The classification of these events was based
not on concrete sets of occurrences but involved 'abstract' categories;
in particular, the 'relevant features of participants' (specifically, their
verbal and non-verbal actions), the 'relevant objects,' and the 'effect of
the verbal action' (1957: 182 [1950]).

Firth's analysis bore remarkable similarity to Gunkel's. However,
Firth's had the advantage of a less rigid and more abstract char-
acter, which allowed for the simultaneous operation of several
factors and for the recognition of complex relationships.

5. *The Bakhtin Circle*

About 1913, the Russian artistic movement called 'futurism' cham-
pioned 'the word as such,' in contrast to observing its historical

---

24.   Related ideas can also be found in French works c. 1900 CE, which
focused largely on particular circumstances and on the context of words
rather than on larger complexes (see Mounin 1966: 1065-66).

25.   A strongly pragmatic view of language was also presented by John
Dewey (1925: 205), influenced in part by Peirce. Grace De Laguna—who
knew the work of both Dewey and Malinowski—expressly accepted 'behav-
iorism' (1927: 123); specifically, she held that 'the meaning of the terms
is dependent on their physical and active setting' and that language 'is
primarily an instrument to be used for the accomplishment of objective
ends' (91, 244). The prominent linguist Leonard Bloomfield, furthermore,
adopted a behaviorist outlook that moved beyond his earlier mentalism. In
this newer outlook, he 'defined the *meaning* of a linguistic form as the situ-
ation in which the speaker utters it and the response which it calls forth

context.[26] Literary critics known as 'formalists' (c. 1914-29) largely supported this vision and laid stress on the aesthetic text, initially without giving major attention to the social function of literature. These two movements shared a revolutionary ethos with Marxism, but they lacked engagement with political reorganization on behalf of the proletariat and so were condemned by a number of Russian leaders (for instance, by Trotsky in 1924). A partial rapprochement between formalists and Marxists soon took place, however. Thus the early-formalist position—expressed in 1923 in a somewhat exaggerated way by Victor Shklovskij's statement that art is 'always free of life'—was modified to include recognition of the relation of literary phenomena to human life.[27]

Significant responses to formalism were made by members of the literary circle which included the important figure Mikhail Bakhtin. Bakhtin's works—unlike those of his friends P.N. Medvedev and V.N. Voloshinov, at least from 1926 on—were neither Marxist in a specific sense nor sharply polemical toward the older movement. In fact, Bakhtin—who remained more religious than his associates—was arrested in 1929 and exiled to Kazakhstan.[28]

In 1928 (English, 1978), Medvedev provided an overview of formalism and outlined his own theory of literature. He placed major emphasis on the role of genres, which formalists had already considered, although with little regard to their social setting. According to Medvedev, every genre ('the typical form of the whole work') 'has its own orientation in life, with reference to its events, problems, etc.' (1978: 129, 131). A genre, in his view, is related both to

in the hearer' (1933: 139). These writers, however, did not focus on general types of utterances and situations, nor did other writers who dealt with the context of language and who are therefore not treated in the present survey. Cf. nn. 19 above and 53 below.

26.   The futurist movement both learned from and reacted against an earlier, spiritually oriented 'Symbolism.'

27.   See, e.g., Erlich 1981: 88-108; and, for Ejkhenbaum, Matejka and Pomorska 1978: 29, 56 (with translations of 'Teoriya "formalnogo metoda,"' 1926, and 'Literaturnyj byt,' 1929 [*byt*, 'way of life,' is rendered 'environment' in this translation and 'mores' in Erlich's citation]). See further, below, n. 39.

28.   There is testimony that Bakhtin wrote much or all of the material contained in two major works by Medvedev (1928) and Voloshinov (1929), but the adequacy of the evidence is in doubt. In any case, even if this testimony should be true, Bakhtin is said to have written in a way that would represent his friends' positions rather than his own. Those works should thus be treated under their published authors' names. See Bocharov 1994 and, for the discussion as a whole, Vice 1997: 7-10 and Emerson 1997: 74. Bakhtin said later that he would have given more attention to the (religious) content of Dostoevsky's writing in his own study if that had been politically possible in 1929 (Bocharov 1994: 1012).

a set of circumstances in space and time and to a special thematics—just as for Gunkel every genre arises in certain occasions and has a certain content. The significance of a 'place in life' was illustrated by the role of literary 'odes' in 'political life' and of 'lyric prayer' in worship or at least in association with religion. The appearance of characteristic themes reflected the fact that each genre can grasp only 'certain aspects of reality' (131). Medvedev believed that there is an unbreakable connection and mutual dependence between the situational and thematic sides of a genre (133). The generic form provides a pattern by which one aspect of reality can be apprehended. Medvedev held that the language characteristic of a genre is not narrowly linguistic since 'we think not in words or sentences' but in 'complete complexes,' which constitute utterances. The fact that a genre is a 'social reality' is very important (135). Since a genre represents the overall shape of a text, literature is not purely or even primarily an individualistic phenomenon.

A little earlier, in a 1926 essay, Voloshinov had connected life with literary form and content. He began by focusing on ordinary speech, arguing that it is 'filled' with 'life' (1983: 10). True, discourse does not simply 'mirror' the extralinguistic setting but rather construes it, 'summing up its value'; interpreted thus, 'the situation enters into the utterance as an essential constituent part of its sense structure' (11-12). A life situation is then not simply an objective condition lying outside language but an interpretive structure, which is an aspect of discourse. Voloshinov applied this analysis to literature as distinct from ordinary discourse. 'Real-life utterances,' he held, provide the 'buds' for literary forms and contents (17), just as Gunkel (following older observations by scholars of Greco-Roman literature) had believed that high literary forms have a basis in the verbal expressions of everyday life.

In 1929 Voloshinov developed his position in greater detail. 'Social psychology,' he said, 'exists primarily in a wide variety of forms of the utterance,' or 'speech genres' (1973: 20). These are correlated with both context (time period and social group) and content (themes) in an 'interlocking organic unity' (20). Primary forms of 'real-life utterance' are 'question, exclamation, command, request' (96). As a next step, when 'social custom and circumstances have fixed and stabilized' (more specific) forms, they appear as additional 'genres of behavioral speech' (96-97). Specifically:

> Village sewing circles, urban carouses, workers' lunchtime chats, etc., will all have their own types. Each situation, fixed and sustained by social custom, commands a particular kind of organization of audience and, hence, a particular repertoire of little behavioral genres (97).

Voloshinov, like Medvedev, presented a moderate Marxism. In 1926, he spoke of 'ideology'—a favorite Marxist term—and connected literature with life; however, he did not view literature strictly as a 'mirror,' in contrast to V.I. Lenin's 'reflection' view of knowledge.[29] In his 1929 work, he devoted full chapters to 'ideology' and to the relation of the 'material basis' to the literary 'superstructure' and placed the interrelation between reported and reporting speech in literature into the context of long-range sociocultural movements (1973: 123). He refrained, however, from relating all linguistic phenomena to questions of 'class.'[30]

Voloshinov apparently continued to have an impact in Russia after 1930, at least to some extent.[31] However, the fact that he only moderately adhered to Marxism resulted in his work, like Medvedev's and Bakhtin's, being to a considerable extent ignored in Russia until after 1950, when recognition of the circle gradually grew.[32] In contrast, the circle's work was warmly appreciated elsewhere, at first in the Prague Linguistic Circle (including J. Mukarovsky, Bogatyrev and Jakobson)[33] and later by many others in the West.[34]

Before 1929, Bakhtin himself stayed largely in the background, but in the early 1920s he wrote in a manuscript that context ('life') and content are both essential dimensions of verbal art (1990: 195, 231, 281-82, 303). In 1929, he declared that 'every literary work is internally

29.   Lenin, expanding on statements by Marx, developed his 'reflection' theory at some length in 1908 (ET 1927) in discussion with Machians (1927: 47 [in this translation, 'reflection' is rendered 'representation'], 217). This theory was important for Lenin in that it was 'materialist': ideas (only) 'reflect' the material world.

30.   In a 1930 essay by Voloshinov, class structure did receive considerably more emphasis, although the view of literature as a 'reflection' (now labeled 'passive') continued to be rejected (1983: 125).

31.   See Matejka and Titunik 1973: 6, 174, 176.

32.   Adequate assessment of the impact of the Bakhtin circle on Russian scholarship is difficult, in part because of a onetime reluctance to cite authors who were out of official favor. Bakhtin, however, influenced a group of scholars centered in Tartu University in a significant way, including especially Lotman (as Lotman emphatically acknowledged in the preface to the 1973 German edition of his 1970 study).

33.   See Matejka and Titunik 1973: 5-6; Matejka and Titunik 1976: 135-36; Matejka 1988: 224. Very close to the view of the Bakhtin circle is the characterization of genres by Červenka (1978: 152 [Czech 1967]), writing after Czechoslovakia came under Communist rule.

34.   Western recognition of the work of the Bakhtin circle was in good part furthered by two Bulgarians who went to France: Tzvetan Todorov and Julia Kristeva.

and immanently sociological. Within it, living forces intersect; each element of its form is permeated with living social evaluations' (*Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, foreword [English, 1984: 276]).

In 1952/53, as he was slowly obtaining recognition in Russia, Bakhtin turned explicitly to the question of speech genres. He characterized genres as 'relatively stable thematic, compositional, and stylistic types of utterances,' which arose from particular functions and conditions of speech (1986: 64). As had been done by others (including classicists and, implicitly, Gunkel), he distinguished between the 'primary' genres governing ordinary interchanges and the 'secondary' genres of artistic literature. Literary criticism, he argued, should give attention both to the 'primary' genres—for thereby the connection between literature and life can be recognized—and to the special character of the 'secondary' types, which constitute literary structures (62-63). While many genres of ordinary speech are quite 'free' (as Gunkel had not recognized), some are highly standardized; these, however, 'can be used with parodic-ironic re-accentuation' or mixed with other types (80). Thus the relation of literature to life is seen as a strong but complex one. The way he indicated that genres vary in 'addressivity'—the nature of the addressee envisioned by the speaker—is suggestive (95-96).

One of the specific sources for the ideas of the Bakhtin circle undoubtedly lies in classics. In his work on Dostoevsky (at least in the second edition of 1963),[35] Bakhtin declared that a

> literary genre, by its very nature, reflects the most stable, 'eternal,' tendencies in literature's development. Always preserved in a genre are undying elements of the *archaic*. True, these archaic elements are preserved in it only thanks to their constant *renewal*, which is to say, their contemporarization (1984: 106).

In this statement, Bakhtin reflected the view of his teacher, Tadeusz Zielinski, a classicist who argued that 'the basic forms of all types of literature were already present in antiquity' (Clark and Holquist 1984: 30-31). In later works, Bakhtin referred to studies of genres by classicists writing around the turn of the century, some of whom (such as Dieterich, who was important for Bakhtin, as he had been for Gunkel)[36] were concerned with the background of literary genres in informal oral usages (1968: 220, 471; 1981: 4, 53, 64 [MSS c. 1940]). He may already have known these works when he wrote

35. The second edition is cited here, since the first edition is still mostly untranslated.

36. Gunkel was indebted to Dieterich and to a number of other scholars of Greco-Roman literature (*BFC*: 228-30, 242-43).

the first edition of *Dostoevsky* (1929), in which documentation is sparing.

Besides his acquaintance with classics, Bakhtin had contact with biblical form criticism. In the first edition of *Dostoevsky* (1929), he referred to 'Job's dialogue and several evangelical dialogues.'[37] In the somewhat fuller second edition, he said: 'The basic narrative genres of ancient Christian literature—"Gospels," "Acts of the Apostles," "Apocalypse," and "Lives of Saints and Martyrs"—are linked with an ancient aretalogy [speech about great persons] which in the first centuries [CE] developed within the orbit of the menippea,' that is, carnivalistic satire (135). This comment appears to reflect knowledge of Richard Reitzenstein's study of Hellenistic miracle stories (1906), which often used the term 'aretalogy' for the narration of miraculous deeds of gods or heroes and also referred to Christian stories about apostles and martyrs. Reitzenstein's works also provided a background for biblical form critics.

Indeed, the writings of the Bakhtin circle were close enough to Gunkel's analysis both in conception and in terminology that a direct connection must be considered likely. Most importantly, perhaps, the circle's works discussed the three aspects of a genre as they were outlined by Gunkel. Furthermore, Medvedev's Russian for 'place in life' appears to translate *Sitz im Leben*,[38] and his reference to religious songs is reminiscent of biblical studies. Voloshinov described the standardization of forms, a topic of special interest to Gunkel.

It is true, some of the circle's observations could have been made without a direct knowledge of Gunkel's work, for the relation of literature to 'life' was a matter of fairly wide debate, with major input from Bally,[39] and a sociological orientation fit moderate Marxism. The affinity of biblical form criticism with these discussions, however, could provide a reason for Medvedev and Voloshinov to become interested in biblical form criticism. That is especially the

37. The relevant passage was omitted from the second edition (1963) but was republished later (1984: 280).

38. Specifically, Medvedev spoke three times of a 'place in life' (in his 1928 work, chap. 3, §§3.2-3 [1978: 131, 133]). The Russian word used for 'place,' *mesto*, can also be translated 'seat' or 'situation' and forms a good translation for *Sitz*.

39. Prior to formalism, context was important for Veselovskij, but he treated the 'life' aspect historically rather than according to domains of life (see Medvedev 1978: 184 and Sokolov 1950: 103, 106). Somewhat similarly, Lafargue spoke in 1926 about the 'mode of life of the popular masses' (Sokolov 1950: 36-37). Bally's work, which spoke of 'life,' was more domain-oriented and thus closer to the Bakhtin circle's analysis; it was actively discussed by Soviet sociolinguists during the 1920s (Girke and Jachnow 1974: 18).

case since for a while they joined religious interests with commitment to the revolution (Clark and Holquist 1984: 112-17).

In fact, acquaintance with Gunkel's analysis by at least some member of the circle is supported by biographical data. M.I. Kagan was an especially close friend of Bakhtin who became active in promoting Jewish culture after studying philosophy with a focus on religion under Hermann Cohen.[40] During the early 1920s, Kagan lectured on 'Biblical Mythology' at Leningrad's Jewish University,[41] where he was associated with scholars who knew some of Gunkel's work.[42] Even if Kagan failed to have a direct acquaintance with Gunkel's work (as would hardly have been academically appropriate, given Gunkel's interest in myth), he had opportunity to learn of it from a letter sent to him in 1923 by circle member Lev Pumpianskij, who had converted from Judaism to Christianity and was closely associated with Medvedev and Voloshinov. This letter expressed interest in Alfred Bertholet's 1920 history of Israelite culture, which gives a report of, and in good part reflects, Gunkel's position.[43] Furthermore, members of the circle studied theology together (including biblical studies?) in 1925/26.[44]

One can then wonder whether one of Gunkel's formulations of the threefold structure of genres, which were presented from 1921 on and were especially accessible in publications of 1924 and 1925, became known to members of the circle.[45] For instance, in the standard German journal for Hebrew Bible studies, Gunkel declared that in a genre 'specific ideas are expressed in a specific [linguistic] form upon a specific [kind of] occasion' (1924a: 183;

40. Bakhtin himself was, like Martin Buber, stimulated by Cohen to move toward the dialogical emphasis for which he later became famous. See *CF*, 3.5 (on Cohen and Bakhtin); Clark and Holquist 1984: 125 (on Kagan).

41. See Clark and Holquist 1984: 125 and Nevel'skaia 1981: 256 (cf. 250-51, 274).

42. The regular faculty at Leningrad's Jewish University included a biblical specialist (according to Dubnow 1937: 229), as well as Dubnow, who taught general Jewish history and referred, for instance, to Gunkel's *Genesis*.

43. On Pumpianskij, see Clark and Holquist 1984: 100, 109, 127, etc.; for the letter, see Nevel'skaia 1981: 265.

44. As mentioned, for instance, by Brandist, Shepherd, and Tihanov (2004).

45. Bakhtin's early writing contained some of the same notions in germinal form. Possibly they were already influenced by biblical form criticism (either directly or through Bally); if not, the similarity in ideas could have facilitated an appropriation of its system. Later, Bakhtin referred to Gardiner (Brandist 2004: 111), but the work of Gardiner, who interacted with Karl Bühler, was, like Bühler's, not close enough in a description of genres to account for the analyses of Medvedev and Voloshinov.

Gunkel's 1925 statement was cited above). In any case, the striking similarity between the analyses of the Bakhtin circle and biblical form criticism probably reflected not only a common background but also some direct contact.

The theoretical statements of the Bakhtin circle can be considered partially superior to Gunkel's. Specifically, Medvedev's interest in the intrinsic connections between the aspects of a genre went beyond Gunkel's brief comments along that line, Voloshinov's analysis made clear that a situation is not purely external but is interpreted by speech—it is interesting that a Marxist, albeit a moderate one, should make this point!—and Bakhtin's awareness that even oral genres exhibit different degrees of fixity provided flexibility in the recognition of forms.

6. *Other East European and Marxist Considerations of Context*

The Prague Circle of linguists was formed in 1926 with the help of Russian émigrés, including Roman Jakobson. Its members took account of Peircean semiotics (Matejka and Titunik 1976: 265) and of Karl Bühler's multifunctional view of speech (with a background in German-language discussions that partially corresponded to English-language pragmatism), as well as of observations by Bally, Gardiner, and the Bakhtin circle (including especially Voloshinov). The Prague group's close attention to linguistic patterns in relation to their functions, in turn, had impact worldwide.

Marxist scholars in Russia stressed the role of class structure in shaping literature, almost unanimously from the late 1920s on. At first, they accepted the conclusion of non-Marxists that many literary works once thought to have arisen from communal production were actually created by individuals, who were often members of the elite. Among revolutionary writers, this conclusion fostered a negative attitude toward past literary productions.

In 1936, however, the negative view began to be condemned as a 'vulgar sociologism,' or 'rigid leftism,' which does not sufficiently appreciate traditional folklore (cf. Sokolov 1950: 145-49, 335; Schlauch 1944: 216, 218).[46] Russian folklorists continued to refer to class issues but now gave more attention to the popular occasions of various genres. Whether an awareness of West-European studies beyond

---

46. For a survey of Russian literary criticism, see, e.g., Brang 1973. The campaign against 'vulgar sociology' was initiated by the 1936 *Pravda* article, 'To Innoculate Students with Love of Classical Literature.' Attitudes fluctuated, but 'vulgar sociology' was also rejected by the East German W. Krauss (1963: 74).

Bally (who was familiar to them)[47] contributed to these analyses is not known and perhaps cannot be known because of the reluctance to cite non-Marxist works favorably. In any case, Sokolov discussed 'Ceremonial Poetry Connected With the Calendar,' 'Wedding Ceremonials and Chants,' and 'Funeral Ceremonies and Laments.'

Marxist criticism also investigated the relations between literature and society in 'high' (nonpopular) writings. The work of György Lukács can serve as an especially sophisticated example.[48] Lukács believed that literary structures and contexts 'reflect' pertinent 'realities of life' (1955, chap. 2, sects. 1, 2 [1937]), but he also held—like Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels and in opposition to 'vulgar sociology'—that great writers can transcend their class orientation to furnish relatively permanent insights (1955, chap. 1, sect. 2). He affirmed 'the necessity of genres, whose forms express relations of humanity to society—and, through this, to nature—which are general and which thus constantly recur [in their main features]'; at the same time, he assigned historical study the task of investigating the major changes that do occur in genres and their social causes (1956: 146).

In regard to medieval literature, which was predominantly non-individualistic in character, Russian Marxists naturally stressed a connection with sociological context. At first, they almost exclusively observed relations with class structure and provided a mechanically causal interpretation. Later, these connections were softened, and differentiations by domains of life or by authors' roles were highlighted, in part since a more positive view could thus be taken of this past literature.[49]

Within the field of sociolinguistics in general, East European scholars observed the effect of both 'status' and 'role.' 'Status' expresses a person's 'place in the social structure of society,' as determined by class membership, occupation, and so on, while an individual's 'role'—such as teacher, parent, spouse, friend—is functional and can vary for the same person from one occasion to another (Švejcer 1986: 74).

A widely-used designation for language forms that are employed for specialized purposes was 'functional styles.' This term was coined in 1932 by Bohuslav Havránek, a member of the Prague Circle (1958: 16), and was treated by Bakhtin in 1952/53 as synonymous with 'generic

47.   See above, n. 39.

48.   Lukács was a Hungarian from a Jewish family, who worked in Moscow from 1933 on after passing through an earlier idealist phase.

49.   See W.-H. Schmidt 1984: 291-310 and Seemann 1987: 248 (on Eremin and Likhachev).

styles for certain spheres of human activity and communication' (1986: 64). Elise Riesel, an East German, was well-known in regard to this topic. She characterized stylistics as the study of the 'functionally proper' or 'appropriate' uses of expressions 'in all acts of communication, in all situations of speech and writing' (1975: 36, 40).[50]

In 1973, the Estonian H. Rätsep formally analyzed 'communicative situations' according to the following elements: source, conveyor (or messenger), person or object spoken about, location, and the relations between these. Furthermore, several levels of situations were identified. Some expressions (such as 'this book') refer to a particular 'concrete action situation.' Other aspects of a discourse reflect a general 'abstract action situation' (such as 'students study at universities'). More abstract still are 'deep situations'; for instance, the verbal form 'to live in...' implies a resident and a place. This analysis, like many others in East Europe at that time, acknowledged an awareness of Western non-Marxist work, and may also have been familiar with Firth's discussion of 'abstract' situations (see above, §4). In any case, the study's notion of different levels of generality is an important one to consider when dealing with the issues of life context.

7. *Wittgenstein*

Wittgenstein was an important figure for the concept of life situation. Thus he receives more detailed attention here than other figures. (His background in disciplines other than biblical studies is treated elsewhere and will be summarized here only briefly).

Wittgenstein's thinking underwent a major change that first appeared publicly in a lecture on ethics in 1929, although the change may have taken place earlier, in a decade during which he did not produce philosophical writings.[51] Before his shift, Wittgenstein

---

50. In her analysis, she refers to major Russian, as well as Czech, predecessors. A survey of (mostly Eastern) sociolinguistics by Švejcer and Nikol'skij (1986: 55 [Russian, 1978]), gives four kinds of 'functional styles' as examples: belles lettres, scientific prose, journalism, and official documents, each with a 'communicative domain.'

51. There are a number of valuable studies dealing with Wittgenstein's development, which cannot here be listed; his background is gradually emerging more clearly, especially as more data become available. For publication data regarding Wittgenstein's works, see, e.g., V. and S. Shanker 1986; Pichler 1994; Kienzler 1997: 324-26; and various web sources. Because of the variety of publications, references will be given by part and section number of Wittgenstein's writing when possible, but usually not according to the page number of a specific reprinting. For unpublished MSS, available microfilms have been used.

asserted in the *Tractatus* (written in 1918, published in 1922) that the meanings of sentences represent possibilities, which form the 'logical space' within which actual reality exists (1.13).[52] That reflected an ideational view of language, according to which speech represents thought (a perspective that had been criticized by Welby). According to this early view, speech has room only for logical and descriptive language; other topics, especially ethics, are placed into mystical silence (6.41, 42, 432; 7 [the number 7 for the final statement is presumably not coincidental]). In partial contrast with this, Wittgenstein came to develop a pragmatic interpretation of language; it had room for various kinds of speech, including ethical language. Except for one brief essay, he never published his newer view, which necessarily must be treated as exploratory.

Wittgenstein's change was not peculiar to him. Rather, it stood within the widespread transition from a primarily ideational view to a functional conception of language that took place during the 1920s and early 1930s, although the functional one also had earlier antecedents.[53] Wittgenstein's connection with that large movement does not deny his creativity. On the contrary, one of the features of creativity (as has already been noted for Gunkel) is an ability to draw on a wide range of available ideas. As will be seen, Wittgenstein's orientation was broad, although he did not often cite works by others.

One of the sources of Wittgenstein's new conception was a philosophical tradition that stood close to pragmatism. In 1929, Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge, where he had studied with Russell during the years 1911-13. The lectures he gave there in the early 1930s (e.g., 1930 lectures, A IV 1, and MS 114: 26 [1932]) illustrated an awareness of Russell's 1921 work, stressing the importance of the practical use of speech (see above). In Cambridge, Wittgenstein had two friends who knew and valued the work of Peirce: F. Ramsey (cf. Sahlin 1990: 102) and Ogden (already mentioned). Ramsey acknowledged Russell as the immediate progenitor of his pragmatic interpretation of language (1931: 155 [1927]); in turn, Wittgenstein recognized Ramsey as one who pointed him in a new direction.[54] Ogden sent Wittgenstein a copy of the study he co-authored with Richards, which contained a contribution by Malinowski (see above).

52.   See *CF*, 3.6.
53.   For this shift, cf. Bühler 1934: 1-30; Malinowski 1935: 59; Barry Smith 1990; Nerlich and Clarke 1996.
54.   In the preface to *Philosophical Investigations* (see 2001 [1936]).

How carefully Wittgenstein perused the study by Ogden and Richards cannot be determined, but Malinowski's contribution to it may lie in the background of Wittgenstein's statement that 'in general the sentences we are tempted to utter occur in practical situations' (1932/33 lectures, §12).[55] That would bring anthropology into the picture of Wittgenstein's background.

Another line contributing to Wittgenstein's later thought originated in the philosophy of mathematics (both his and Ramsey's area of specialty). In 1929/30, Wittgenstein compared mathematics with games, as others before him had done. (The German word *Spiel* can have a broader meaning than the English 'game,' something like 'operation,' although the playful aspect is not lost). This image expressed the view that mathematics includes a variety of systems, each constituted by a specific set of assumptions and procedures.[56] Although Wittgenstein did not immediately reflect on the social roles that mathematical games play, he applied the notion of games to various other kinds of language from the early 1930s on.

These other kinds of language clearly involved different social functions.[57] For instance, around 1931, Wittgenstein argued— against the anthropologist James Frazer—that the characteristic of a ritual act is not a 'view' or 'opinion,' although 'an opinion—a faith—can itself also be ritual in character and belong to a ritual' (1993: 128). He emphasized instead the pragmatic and experiential character of myths in relation to ritual. This aspect of myths had been highlighted by the well-known biblical specialist W.R. Smith, who formulated a version of form criticism prior to Gunkel and deeply influenced anthropology and classics. Perhaps better than Smith—who regarded ritual as prior to myth—Wittgenstein viewed ritual and myth as constituting a single complex.

In addition to his background in philosophy and anthropology, in fact, one must take account of Wittgenstein's religious orientation. In particular, Wittgenstein had a Jewish self-identity together with an interest in (but not acceptance of) Christian faith. He connected

55.   Mays, who heard Wittgenstein, subsequently said that Wittgenstein's discussion of the use of words 'reminded me strongly' of Malinowski (1967: 83). Further echoes of Malinowski are treated by D. Rose (1980). Cf. below, n. 66.

56.   This position was championed especially by 'formalism,' although a version of it can be held within other views of mathematics. (In 1929, Husserl described the formalist theory of mathematics as involving a 'deductive playing (operating) with symbols,' with rules, *Spielregeln* [1950-, XVII: 104]. Wittgenstein said that he learned about this conception from Weyl [see Kienzler 1997: 313]).

57.   For details, see Sedmak 1996 and Kienzler 1997.

religion with a strong ethical commitment, which he exercised early on by giving away a very large inheritance.[58]

Wittgenstein's analysis of religious language began early. In a note dated 11 June 1916, he made literary-functional observations of religious speech by referring to the 'parable of God as a father' and to 'prayer as thinking about the meaning of life.' In the *Tractatus*, the placing of ethics and religion into mystical silence was done, not to downgrade concerns, but to highlight their peculiar character (cf. his letter to von Ficker in 1919).

An important feature of Wittgenstein's conceptual shift was that it became possible for him to conceptualize ethical and religious discourse as linguistic structures, instead of consigning them to silence. The only published indication of this turn appeared in his 1929 lecture on ethics, which analyzed the use of similes in both ethics and theology. The date of this analysis shows that ethical/theological considerations were important at the very beginning of his transition.

Reflections about ethical and religious speech were connected for Wittgenstein with analyses of the difference between first-person and third-person statements. In his view, ethical and religious expressions represent a kind of first-person speech,[59] while reflections about them, such as in philosophy or theology, are part of third-person speech. Specifically, theology analyzes religious speech. Thus, Wittgenstein stated, 'Grammar says what kind of object something is. (Theology as grammar.)' (*Philosophical Investigations* [hereafter PI], 1.371, 373 [1936]). This characterization of theology drew in part on a comment by Johann Hamann—referring to one by Martin Luther—and was very close to reflections by the Catholic thinker Ebner.[60] In fact, there is evidence that Wittgenstein knew Ebner's work, probably from 1920 on (Buss 2006: 80-81).

In observations about first-person speech, Wittgenstein did not refer explicitly to the contexts in which it would be used, but implicit in his analysis was a differentiation between what may be called personal (first- and second-person) and impersonal (third-person) relations.

---

58. See *CF*, 3.6. Furthermore, in the preface to 'Philosophische Bemerkungen' (1964: 7 [1930]), the statement 'this book is written for the glory of God' is equated with 'it is written with a good will,' without *Eitelkeit*, undue pride. On Wittgenstein's theoretical and personal ethics, see L. Goldstein 1999; also Wittgenstein 2004: 59.

59. See Conversation with Waismann, 17 December 1930. Sluga saw that Wittgenstein's analysis of 'I' has a moral ground (1996: 343); this was not fully recognized by Marek (1997).

60. See *CF*, 3.5, 6.

In fact, Wittgenstein's own usage reflected this differentiation in a literally observable way. When he made ethical judgments or used (as distinguished from talking about) the word 'God,' he did so primarily in private notes (repeatedly in code) or in a letter to a friend.[61]

In any case, Wittgenstein gave increasing attention to a broad range of literary or rhetorical genres during the years 1930-36.[62] In his 1932/33 lectures, already mentioned for their description of theology as grammar, he referred to 'all sorts of language games,' giving as examples 'games of orders and commands, of question and answer' (§11). Subsequently, in a reflection that was apparently written in early 1934,[63] he described more fully the 'great variety of games...played with the sentences of our language.' They include:

> Giving and obeying orders; asking questions and answering them; describing an event; telling a fictitious story; telling a joke; describing an immediate experience; making conjectures about events in the physical world; making scientific hypotheses and theories; greeting someone, etc.

These 'games' are not purely verbal, but involve nonverbal behavior, as is clear especially for 'obeying orders.'

61.   See Buss 2006: 81. This use of code did not mean that Wittgenstein thought that it is possible to have purely private speech. Rather, he rejected that possibility, for the very phenomenon of language implies a social process (PI, 244). Like his fellow Austrian Karl Bühler (1927, 1933, 1934), although he did not cite him and may not have known his work, Wittgenstein probably viewed the first, second, and third 'persons' as aspects of speech interaction that can vary in their prominence at any one time. However, Wittgenstein's assessment of 'I' language differed from Bühler's, which emphasized 'expression' as its function; for Wittgenstein, 'I' language has something like a self-commitment function. Still, Wittgenstein did have a place for unshared interiority with a religious dimension. For instance, he referred to God in a dream report in 1922 that was apparently never sent to anyone (2004: 20-21).

62.   Wittgenstein's references to 'language games' in 1932 (1996: 46-56) did not yet refer to *types of speech*, but to the use of *words*. However, in the same MS he did refer to sentence types ('assertions, assumptions, questions,' 94 [1996: 48] and a 'joke,' 96 [1996: 49]) and, before then, to commands. A 'joke' and a 'command' were also mentioned—although not identified as 'games'—in a 1934 MS ('Philosophische Grammatik' [as published in 1969], 1.3, 9).

63.   The item appeared in the 'Blue Book' (1958: 67-68) that was based on notes he dictated to his students in 1933/34. It may, however, represent an interpolation during or possibly after 1934, for (a) there is no other instance of such an extensive list prior to 1936; and (b) the list interrupts the flow of the argument—something that is awkward within an oral presentation, which the MS is said to represent.

Fuller still was his list of genres in the *Philosophical Investigations* (PI), for which the first drafts were produced in 1936. This list included:

> depicting an object in a drawing, reporting the results of an experiment in tables or diagrams, playing in a theatre, singing in a round dance, solving riddles, solving a mathematical problem as a school exercise, translating, requesting, thanking, cursing, praying.[64]

Already in the early drafts, Wittgenstein indicated that recognition of this multiplicity of language operations went beyond what he had said in the *Tractatus*. Near the end of 1936 he started to say that such genres are based on, or are parts of, 'forms of life.'[65]

These analyses were very close to biblical form criticism. It is, then, appropriate to sketch his relation to that line.

It can be useful to look first at a possible indirect connection, namely, through Nicholas Bakhtin, Mikhail's brother. Strongly interested in the theory of language, he was Wittgenstein's friend from about 1930 on. Through him, Wittgenstein could have received an impact from such language theorists as Gardiner and Firth.[66] For instance, Gardiner had listed as sentence types statements, questions, requests, and exclamations (1932: 293-319). The list of genres furnished by Firth in 1935—stimulated by a Gardiner-led discussion in 1933 (see above)—resembled the ones that Wittgenstein presented apparently in 1934[67] and more certainly in 1936, not in their details, but in the fact that an extended list of speech types is given. However, Nicholas himself did not deal with types of speech and may thus not have been a conduit of these analyses, which might conceivably have reached Wittgenstein in another way.

---

64.   According to the final version of PI, 1.23 (written during 1944-46); already close to this were three MSS written during the second half of 1936. (For the 1936 drafts, see Wittgenstein 2001: 74-77.)

65.   MS 115, August 1936, referred to a hypothetical verbal use as 'a language (and that means again a form of life [*Form des Lebens*])'; the word 'again' here seems to allude to earlier references to 'life,' not to earlier uses of the full phrase 'form of life,' and this phrase appears to be used informally here. The use of the phrase was more stabilized at the end of 1936 in MS 142, which stated that 'to imagine a language means to imagine a life form [*Lebensform*]' (p. 13) and, again, that 'the word "language game" is designed to highlight the fact that the speaking of a language is a part of an activity, or of a life form' (p. 18). These two declarations became part of PI, 1.19, 23.

66.   See above. R. Robins noted that Wittgenstein's conception was similar to that of Malinowski and Firth (1966: 549); cf. above n. 55.

67.   For some doubt about this date, see n. 63 above.

Also to be considered is at least some sort of contact with Mikhail Bakhtin and his circle. Nicholas had lost connection with his brother after fleeing Russia, but in 1930 he saw Mikhail's *Dostoevsky* (1929) displayed in a bookstore (Duncan-Jones 1963: 130); this contained a social conception of literature. If Nicholas purchased it, Wittgenstein may have read parts of it, especially since he studied Dostoevsky extensively before going to Russia in 1935 (Pascal 1984: 21). On that trip, he may even have met Mikhail or may otherwise have encountered Medvedev's or Voloshinov's works, whose topics (especially Voloshinov's *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*) were related to his emerging interests.[68] However, if Wittgenstein produced an extended list of genres in 1934, that would have been before his trip to Russia.

These possible points of contact are quite speculative. If one or more of them did play a role, it can be noted that they all had a connection with biblical form criticism. Furthermore, as was pointed out earlier, Gunkel's ideas had, through Gardiner, made an impact on Malinowski, whose approach was probably known to Wittgenstein.

More certain than a possible influence on Wittgenstein through one or more of the routes mentioned, however, is Wittgenstein's own acquaintance with biblical studies. Genre analyses had played a significant role since shortly before 1900, not only in technical scholarship (especially beginning with Gunkel), but also reflectively in theoretical considerations of the nature of religious speech.[69] Wittgenstein's note in 1916 about 'parable' and 'prayer,' cited above, already participated in such reflection. Ebner's analysis, from which he almost certainly learned, stood in the same tradition.

At least some first-hand acquaintance with relevant biblical scholarship is shown by Wittgenstein's 1930 comments on Renan's *Histoire du peuple d'Israël* (1887-93). This work included descriptions of romances, legends, and so on, thus containing a rudimentary analysis of genres (for instance, IV: iii). Furthermore, both before and after 1930, Wittgenstein had at least second-hand knowledge of the later, more elaborate, genre criticism of the Bible. This knowledge was perhaps conveyed in good part by his student Drury, who for some time pursued professional theological studies and who, from 1929 on, often conversed with Wittgenstein concerning religion. In

68. The possibility of a contact has been explored by Fedajewa 2000: 390-417. Medvedev was a full professor in Leningrad (see Brandist, Shepherd, and Tihanov 2004: 25, 268). That Wittgenstein actually met with Mikhail Bakhtin is a possibility, if Nedo (1993: 35) is correct in reporting that he traveled to 'Kazakhstan' (where Bakhtin was in exile), but that city name must be an error for 'Kazan.'

69. See *BFC*: 167-406.

a conversation with Drury in 1929, Wittgenstein said that the Bible contains 'a collection of Hebrew folklore'—Drury agreed on this point—and that the New Testament's importance is not affected by questions of historicity (Drury 1984: 101). He was with Drury in 1936 shortly before beginning to use the phrase 'form of life.'[70] At that time, he appears to have had a special interest in the Bible; his student Redpath (1990: 43) found him repeatedly reading it (see also Monk 1990: 318, 367-72, for the years 1931-37). Notes during 1936 and 1937 (1997: 69-105) reveal an earnest wrestling with theology.

In addition to awareness of broad-gauged reflections about biblical speech, first-hand knowledge of professional Gunkel-inspired publications was readily available to Wittgenstein. In 1934, Otto Eissfeldt's major 'Introduction to the Old Testament' surveyed 'forms of speech' or 'genres' in relation to their *Sitz im Leben* (8-137). Genres covered included prayer, letter, list, law, legend, report, proverb, song, and so forth. In that same year, Albrecht Alt produced the following widely-cited formulation for Hebrew law:

> Genre- or form-historical study rests on the insight that in every individual genre, as long as it lives its own life, specific contents are firmly connected with specific forms of expression…since they corresponded to the special, regularly recurring events and needs of life out of which the genres each individually arose (1934: 11).

If Wittgenstein did not encounter these German-language works in one of his periodic visits to Vienna, he could easily have learned of the New-Testament centered versions of this tradition that received wide attention in England. Among them stood translations of works by Martin Dibelius and Rudolph Bultmann in 1934 and original publications by Vincent Taylor, Joseph Lightfoot, C.H. Dodd, and others from 1934 on.[71] In 1936 Dodd moved to Cambridge, where Wittgenstein was then located.[72]

---

70.   See above, n. 65. During his 1936 visit Wittgenstein spent some time reading in Drury's library, so that he may even have encountered Dibelius (or another work in that tradition) there, although only non-theological works have been mentioned among those read at the time (Drury 1984: 129).

71.   Dibelius, in fact, visited England and gave lectures in London; these were published in 1935. Form critics, with the doubt they threw on the historicity of gospel narratives, were discussed repeatedly in the *Expository Times* during 1933-37.

72.   Furthermore, B.T.D. Smith, who published a form-critical study of Jesus' parables in 1937, was in Cambridge at least by 1936, and the local professor-emeritus, Barnes, issued a critique of the movement in that year (1936).

Indeed, it appears that at least by 1937 Wittgenstein understood the theoretical aspect of the form-critical movement's program very well. This program had two sides: (1) in detailed scholarly investigations, it focused on the relations of literary to social structures; (2) reflectively, it pointed out that literary structures are not just rational-intellectual but also exhibit various operations of life, including the life of faith. The fact that Wittgenstein knew the reflective aspect is indicated by a notation in 1937, which stated that 'there is, in fact' (*das gibt's*) a view that faith is grounded neither in the historical accuracy of the gospels nor in eternal truths of reason.[73] This statement so accurately reports the position held by form critics—including Bultmann and Dodd—that it is virtually certain Wittgenstein had more than a superficial acquaintance with at least one of them, either directly or perhaps through an accurate second-hand report.[74]

It is likely, then, that Wittgenstein's thought was closely indebted to biblical form criticism, especially by the fall of 1936, at which time his formulations came to closely parallel the form-critical program. Even the meaning he assigned to the phrase 'form of life' (*Lebensform*) from 1936 on may have been stimulated by knowledge of that tradition. The phrase 'form of life' as such was not unusual at that time,[75] and Wittgenstein had employed it informally in other contexts; but from 1936 on he associated it with socially operative genres of speech, which represents the central notion of form criticism.

Knowledge of Wittgenstein's background is not merely of historical interest but can shed light on his thought processes. The intellectual context within which he wrote makes clear that the notion of a plurality of 'forms of life' supports relativity—as it does in biblical form criticism—but not skeptical relativism.

In fact, Wittgenstein recognized that the various processes he mentioned are very common in human life, although they have local

73. 8/9 December 1937 (1998: 37-38). For one half of this view, see above, n. 71.

74. See Dodd 1936: 21-22, 38 (his inaugural lecture in Cambridge—did Wittgenstein possibly hear this?), similar to Bultmann 1926: 14 (ET 1935: 10). Later, Wittgenstein knowledgeably criticized the theologian K. Barth, demonstrating a good grasp of theology (1998: 97 [1950]).

75. For instance, Edward Spranger's *Lebensformen*, 1914, outlined six basic 'forms of life': the theoretical, economic, aesthetic, social, power-oriented, and religious. In 1935/36, Husserl outlined a 'life world' not altogether unlike Wittgenstein's 'forms of life' (1950-, VI: 105-193), but this analysis was not concerned with language and was not published and thus could not have had an impact on Wittgenstein; it does, however, reflect a general movement of thought in the culture.

variations.[76] He said that certain basic forms—such as 'commanding, asking, telling a story, chatting'—'belong to our natural history' (PI, 1.25); in other words, they are not peculiar to a limited number of societies.[77] He called certainty and doubt—which occur, of course, in all cultures—'forms of life' ('Ursache und Wirkung,' 21 October 1937 [1993: 396]). Later, he described 'hope' as a form of life that involves language (PI, 2.1). It is because of such commonalities that it is possible to recognize the language games of another culture: 'The [repeatedly] shared human way of acting is the system of relations through which we interpret a foreign language' (PI, 1.206).[78]

More strongly relative to local culture than 'forms of life' as such, however, are specific verbal patterns. For the latter, Wittgenstein usually employed the term 'language game' instead of 'form of life,' although he did not always distinguish between the two phrases.[79] Language games, he said, are not 'given for all time' but arise and pass away (PI, 1.23); they 'change' ('On Certainty,' §§65, 256 [1950]). They can even be ignored or violated (PI, 1.81-85). (He may also have believed that human life, as such, changes, but he did not say so expressly).

How are linguistic patterns related to forms of life? According to Wittgenstein, language games are based on 'rules,' that is, on agreed-upon procedures, which may be called 'conventions.'[80] In 1931 he

76.   Thus, M.-H. Lee 1984, rightly, for Wittgenstein.

77.   Hunter 1968, with what seems some ambiguity, described Wittgenstein's 'forms of life' as 'organic.'

78.   The German *gemeinsam* means neither 'universal' nor 'exclusive,' but simply 'shared'; Eike von Savigny is thus right in her analysis of this text (1996: 92-93), followed by Kober 2000: 26.

79.   Some interpreters have treated 'form of life' and 'language game' as synonymous, but others have not (see Barry 1996: 102-9); there does seem to be at least a relative distinction in their use by Wittgenstein, but he could use the term 'language game' to embrace the whole life process of which it is a part (PI, 1.7).There is a potential ambiguity in the following case: When Wittgenstein asked (according to a listener's report), 'Why shouldn't one form of life culminate in an utterance of belief in the Last Judgment?' ('Lectures on Religious Belief' [c. 1938], I), the term 'form of life' may refer either to 'religion' (as a widespread operation of life) or to Christianity (or Judaism) as a particular faith; the former possibility is favored (contra Emmet 1990: 221) by the fact that the sentence is a question (otherwise, the answer is too obvious). Incidentally, in reference to variations in aesthetics ('Lectures on Aesthetics' [1938], 1.35), Wittgenstein spoke, in English, of 'ways of living,' not 'forms of life,' as the German translation has it; 'ways' can be culture-specific.

80.   'Convention,' an English word often used to translate Wittgenstein, frequently carries the overtone of arbitrariness, as the word 'agreement,' which better translates the German, does not.

said explicitly that 'the rule connects the [linguistic] game with life' and, again, that the 'rule is destined to establish the "connection between sign and life"' (MS 112: 30, 196 [1995: 117, 201]). In fact, the notion of a convention has been important in the mathematical tradition, according to which a concrete sign, a 'numeral,' conventionally refers to a 'number,' a (real or imagined) abstract object. Later he discussed the ambiguity and variability of rules (PI, 1.81-85). A question can be raised whether such rules are arbitrary. Wittgenstein's answer was that they are indeed 'arbitrary' in the sense that language has its own internal structure (*Zettel*, 320; PI, 1.497). Yet he thought that language patterns are not completely without reason (*Zettel*, 358).[81] This dual position is in line with relational theory, which envisions a combination of partial connectivity and partial independence.[82]

Even though a language game is not quite identical with a form of life, Wittgenstein considered that language is closely connected with other aspects of that life; it is 'part of…a form of life' (PI, 1.7, 23). Within the various forms, language serves different functions. In any case, Wittgenstein's view was far from skeptical. His mature view did not even imply a 'limit' to language, as the *Tractatus* had done. On the contrary, it opened up language to its many possibilities.[83] His connection with the form-critical tradition underscores this point.

8. *Other Philosophers*

Various philosophers have drawn attention to aspects of situation that are not purely external, in the spatiotemporal sense. They focused instead on dynamic process as it is recognized by those involved in it.

The notion of 'situation' played such a dynamic role in 'existentialism,' which analyzed the basic categories of human existence. An important exponent of this line was Karl Jaspers, who carefully described 'boundary situations'—that is, the knowledge of death, suffering, struggle, and guilt—and 'communicative situations,' including mastery and service, companionship, and politics

---

81. See, further, Forster 2004: 21, 66.

82. In fact, Wittgenstein's affinity with the Peircean version of pragmatism and with Ebner's thought, as well as at least temporarily with Husserl's thought, places him in the relational tradition, of which the figures mentioned were eminent exponents (see *CF*, 3.3-6).

83. Already in a conversation with Waismann, 17 December 1930, he said that 'language is not a [limiting] cage.' In 1933, he pointed out that language can mislead if it is not seen in the context of life (MS 213: 521).

(1919; 1932, chaps. 3, 7). Martin Heidegger defined 'situation' as an 'existential' category, that is, a fundamental category in which humans become personally involved (1927, §60). Similarly, Jean-Paul Sartre viewed 'situation' as intrinsic to existence, neither purely subjective nor simply objective in character (1943, part 4, chap. 1, sect. 2).

For his 'hermeneutic logic,' Hans Lipps distinguished 'situation' from a merely 'factual constellation' of objects. 'Being on a street,' he explained, represents not just a spatial location but 'life in the modality of traffic, or interaction with movement' (*Verkehr* [1938: 23]). For him, meaning is always 'mine'; it is not only particular, however, for the 'general and typical' is in one's view from the start, so that 'understanding' means grasping 'typical situations' (65, 56). John Dewey observed that a 'situation' involves an 'interaction' between 'objective and internal conditions' (1963: 42).

Wittgenstein had drawn attention to the variety of speech acts without analyzing their functions more specifically. That task was pursued by J.L. Austin. In fact—to judge from oral comments reported by Stanley Cavell (1989: 74)—he consciously intended to move beyond Wittgenstein in this way.[84] Specifially, in June of 1953, during which Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* was (had been?) published, Austin described four different kinds of speech acts: calling (or naming), describing, exemplifying, and classifying (1979: 147). He proposed that differences between these types reside to a large extent in 'the speech-situations envisaged for their respective performances' (151). The most novel of Austin's categories was 'calling,' for, under appropriate conditions, an act of calling creates the situation it describes.

A little later, in lectures given during 1955 (posthumously published in 1962 and, more accurately, in 1975), Austin described calling and some other kinds of speech acts as 'performative.' It should be noted, however, that these lectures presented Austin's intellectual explorations and were not quite consistent internally (he did not edit them himself). At the end of his explanation, Austin concluded that 'performatives' cannot be altogether separated from other sentences, since even descriptions 'perform' an act (150).[85] More innovatively, he dinstinguished between 'illocution,' the pragmatic thrust '*in* a speech act (such as praise),' and 'perlocution,' the

84.   Analyses of different speech acts had already been presented by a number of significant philosophers, including Thomas Reid in the eighteenth century and several in the phenomenological tradition in the early twentieth (Barry Smith 1990), but Austin may very well not have known them.

85.   Thus also in a 1956 lecture on 'Performative Utterances' (1979: 233-52).

response or consequence produced *by* it (italics added). Both aspects are part of the sociopsychological dimension of a verbal expression.

Austin's background for these reflections included a general interest in language (G. Warnock 1969: 16) and, specifically, a familiarity with the works of Ogden and Richards and Gardiner.[86] (In fact, he adopted Gardiner's term 'locution' for the bare meaning of a sentence.)[87] Gardiner had spoken of the 'act of speech' (1932: 62, etc.) and had devoted close attention to different types of sentences, as has been noted.[88]

Like Wittgenstein, Austin had sufficiently radical leanings to motivate him to learn Russian and visit the Soviet Union (Hampshire 1969: 42). Thus the remote possibility exists that Austin encountered some of the work of the Bakhtin circle there.

It is more likely that Austin learned from biblical form criticism, not only indirectly through the linguists mentioned but also directly through interaction with religious scholars at Oxford, for relations between colleagues at the school were close. Although a religious interest is not evident in his published work, Austin is reported to have been 'most deeply impressed' by C.G. Stone, a theistic philosopher who wrote on 'the social contract of the universe' (1930; G. Warnock 1969: 4). Also relevant, if Austin knew of it, was the controversial theological idea that God 'justifies' human beings not on the basis of what human beings do but because God 'calls' a person righteous (e.g. Luther 1883-, LVI: 227).[89] This idea could

86.   See Nerlich and Clarke 1996: 335, 336, for a reference to Gardiner in Austin's draft for *How to Do Things with Words*. (Austin was not satisfied with Gardiner's studies, but dissatisfaction is normal with reference to previous work as one seeks to go beyond it.)

87.   Gardiner had distinguished 'locutional sentence-form…which depends solely upon words' from 'elocutional sentence-form…which depends principally on intonation' (1932: 201). Differently, Austin used 'locution' for the ideational in contrast with the pragmatic aspect of a text.

88.   Kinds of sentences, in fact, had been discussed by both English and German linguists (see Gardiner 1932: 187-88) and before them by others, since the very beginning of linguistic reflections in Greece, such as Protagoras (as quoted by Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1456b) and the Stoics (including Apuleius).

89.   Whether God's declaration of righteousness (saying that a believer is righteous) is descriptive or creative has been an issue in Christian debates. Roman Catholics have tended to see it as descriptive of the result of God's work: God turns somebody into a right-acting person. Somewhat differently, in Luther's mature thought, the divine attribution is creative: God's saying that someone is righteous provides a status (just as an umpire's 'call' determines the status of an event in a game), and the believer, by accepting this status ('believing it'), becomes transformed (cf. *BFC*: 95).

have readily stimulated Austin's discussion of 'calling' as a performative.

Austin pointed out that the force of a speech act depends on its context. In response, Jacques Derrida declared that 'context is never absolutely determinable'; that is, 'its determination is never assured or saturated' (1972: 369). In Derrida's view, all expressions are in a certain sense independent of setting—including the author, addressee, and referent (1967: 105-6; 1972: 372-79)—so that 'writing,' which implies a looseness of connection, becomes symbolic for all discourse.[90] For this looseness, or 'play,' which is 'prior' to both presence and absence (1967: 426; 1972: 10, 21), he used the term *différance*. This hardly represented a significant critique, for Austin had already pointed out that a text can 'misfire' or be 'infelicitous' (1975: 18; 1979: 237-48); for instance, 'I pronounce you husband and wife' has no legal effect unless said by the proper person under appropriate circumstances. A general difficulty with Derrida's observation was that he did not distinguish between a text that is simply a physical object and a text that is meaningful. Without a context (including author/interpreter), a text does not have any meaning at all, not even one of play; in context, it does have meaning, although that meaning may differ from the author's.[91]

Among later theorists, Jürgen Habermas included the notion of 'situation' in his theory of communicative action. This theory envisioned both an 'empirical pragmatics,' which studies speech acts in actual situations, and a more theoretical 'universal pragmatics,' which deals with the 'general structures of possible speech situations' (1971b: 102). According to Habermas, a 'situation' is carved out of a larger 'life world' on the basis of what is considered relevant for the theme under discussion (1984: 590 [1982]). His analyses showed awareness of sociolinguistic studies.

Toward the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first, quite a few other philosophers gave concentrated theoretical attention to the role of context in determining the meaning of speech.[92] In Germany, Günther Abel associated this discussion with the issue of perspectival interpretation (1993). To express the connection of speech (in particular, of first-person speech) with

90.   Since, for Derrida, 'writing' is symbolic of what happens to some extent in all communication, the difference between him and Searle—who, in response to Derrida, took 'writing' literally (1977)—is not as large as it might appear.

91.   In fact, Derrida came to place less emphasis on the distance that was implied in his notion of 'writing.' See *CF*, 7.4.

92.   See Stalnaker (1999: 96-113) for an overview and discussion; later studies include Preyer and Peter, eds., 2005.

'life,' he used the term *Sitz im Leben*, which had by then become somewhat widely known (522-23).

9. *Some Twentieth-Century Theories of Situation in Rhetorical and Literary Theory*

Rhetorical theory deals in large part with speech addressed to particular situations. These fall into types, so that a concern with types of situation, as in the notion of *Sitz im Leben*, is relevant. Somewhat differently, what is usually called 'literature' has in its very thrust a wide-ranging applicability and is thus directly concerned with general situations. In practice, the principles that enter into the two kinds of speech overlap, but they are often treated separately.

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, an interest in describing particular speeches became part of historical study, but instruction in rhetoric was downgraded or, at least, modified, since creativity was valued more highly than following well-established patterns. For instance, the word 'invention' (originally, 'finding'), which had indicated the 'locating' of traditional 'topics'[93] that are appropriate for a certain occasion or purpose, came to refer to the discovery of something new.

In the twentieth century, however, rhetorical theory revived to such an extent that it was sometimes considered to be the most central of all disciplines.[94] In this revival, a concern with types of situations was renewed for purposes of both theory and practical instruction. For instance, Alan Monroe's overview gave primary attention to the speaker's audience and to the 'typical situations' of different kinds of speech (1935).

Kenneth Burke—who was involved for a while in leftist politics—did not distinguish sharply between rhetorical and literary criticism but believed that literature is 'equipment for living' (1941: 293-304). Referring to Malinowski's relevant analysis, he argued that 'every document bequeathed to us by history must be treated as a strategy for encompassing a situation' (109, 111). Literary artists, he said, have dealt with 'typical, recurrent situations,' many of which are 'not peculiar to our own civilization' (301), for human beings share a virtually common 'biological situation' and a similar 'social texture' (2). To the extent that such situations 'overlap' (are at least partially shared), strategies encompassing them have 'universal relevance' (1).

93. 'Locate' comes from a Latin word that translated the Greek for 'topic' in traditional rhetorical theory.
94. See the Appendix.

Burke's wide orientation included a basic knowledge of biblical scholarship.[95] In fact, he believed that, 'in the study of human motives, we should begin with complex theories of transcendence (as in theology and metaphysics) rather than with the terminologies of simplified laboratory experiment' (1961: 5); thus he applied 'logology' (talk about words) to Augustine's writings and to the first three chapters of Genesis.

The rhetorical theorist Edwin Black, who was indebted to Burke, argued that 'there is a limited number of situations' which a speaker encounters and 'a limited number of ways in which a rhetor can and will respond rhetorically to any given situational type' (1965: 133). A critic can therefore identify 'strategies as characteristic of the situation,' although these will not be rigid. Such strategies can in part be identified through an examination of older discourses, for 'the recurrence of a given situational type through history will provide the critic with information on the rhetorical responses available in that situation.'[96] As an example of a situational type, Black said that the 'genre of argumentation' reflects a 'situation of controversy' (1965: 149); this condition is clearly psychosocial rather than just physical or external.

Citing Malinowski (in fact, only him), Lloyd Bitzer described rhetoric as 'situational' or 'pragmatic' (1968: 3). He characterized a rhetorical situation as

> a complex of persons, events, objects and relations presenting an actual or potential exigence which can be completely or partially removed if discourse…can so constrain human decision or action as to bring about the significant modification of the exigence (6).

Thus, the situation to which speech responds involves not simply a constellation of factually describable objects but a problem to be addressed. Since a problem can 'recur,' rhetorical speech is 'a response to a situation of a certain kind' (3, 13). In a later work, Bitzer described a message as 'excellent' insofar as it is a 'fitting response,' that is, 'corrective' of a problem (1980: 36-37, with Burke).

After Bitzer's initial essay, discussion ensued over whether the 'exigence' addressed is objective or a construction of the speaker.

---

95. Burke mentioned 'primitive Christian evangelism' (1941: 422 [1937]) and 'Biblical legends clustered about Isaac, Jacob, Esau, Leah, Rachel and Joseph' (1941: 427 [1934]). His *Rhetoric of Religion* (1961) referred repeatedly to the *Interpreter's Bible*, where form-critical knowledge was assumed.

96. Black criticized Aristotle for being insufficiently concerned with the context of speech. This was a somewhat surprising assertion, since Aristotle had given considerable attention to that aspect.

Richard Vatz said that the utterance itself 'creates' the situation (1973: 159). Bitzer answered—with more balance—that the rhetorical situation *includes* 'principles and motives'; in other words, subjective elements (1980: 24). Somewhat differently, Barbara Biesecker, with a 'deconstructive' orientation following Derrida, said that neither an objective nor a subjective context is determinative for an expression (1989: 121). If she meant that a response is contingent, her reflection is in line with relational thinking, which conceives of connectivity as partial.

In 1997, Donna Gorrell revisited the discussion initiated by Bitzer. Stressing relativity but not in a skeptically relativistic way, she concluded that a rhetorical situation involves an 'interaction of all of its components—rhetor, audience, and reality' (1997: 411). She held that only if these three 'overlap'—that is, if they link up with each other—is a response fitting or successful.

In regard to literature, Friedrich Engels presented the ideal—with a strongly realist character—that literature would furnish 'truth in detail, the truthful reproduction of typical characters under typical circumstances,' even if it exposes unpleasant realities (Letters to Margaret Harkness, 1888). Also emphasizing reality, but with a more subjective orientation, H.A. Korff described the 'general understanding' of a poem

> as a poem for us, for every feeling and educated human being, as though the poet's only intention was to exhibit feelings which arise in each of us not only once but again and again, as we face life and a typical life situation, even though the specific occasions and circumstances are always different (1958: 241).

In twentieth-century literary criticism the view that a work gives shape to a situation was more common than the ideal that a work should faithfully depict typical situations. Taking a moderate stance in this respect, Burke's analysis—directed against both pure objectivism and pure subjectivism—was that although situations are 'real,' literature presents 'strategies' which 'size up the situations' and 'name' them 'in a way that contains an attitude towards them' (1941: 1-2). More strongly constructive, Philip Hobsbaum said that literature 'creates a context' as it 'defines a situation' (1970: 212).

Another kind of situation, besides that depicted in literature, is the relation between author and audience in the reading process. Notably, Mary Pratt described the 'literary speech situation' in such terms. Like Burke, she denied a sharp difference between literature and rhetoric in view of the fact that literature plays a practical social role. Thus she applied Austin's 'speech-act' theory and other general linguistic and rhetorical considerations (1977).

Siegfried Schmidt was similarly interested in the social context of literary production and use. For the social background, he came to use the phrase *'Sitz' im sozialen Leben* (1992: 91). Clearly, the catchy term *Sitz im Leben* had by then gained currency in Germany for indicating a connection between literature and social life.

In sum, rhetorical and literary studies recognized situations that are at least to some degree typical. They were understood to have a subjective element.

10. *Situation in English-Language Sociology and Psychology*

The notion of situation was also utilized in a number of sociological and psychological studies. These did not deal primarily with speech; however, since the issues they discussed are relevant to language-oriented studies, it is useful to look at some of their major observations. Several of the sociologists dealing with 'situations' after c. 1920 were familiar with the work of Malinowski.[97] More importantly, perhaps, they participated in a related sociocultural ethos, so that they do not represent an altogether independent line.

In 1918 the social historian William Thomas (with the cooperation of Florian Znaniecki) published an influential work asserting that 'every concrete activity is the solution of a situation.' Such a situation, however, is not a physical given; rather, what is crucial is the 'definition [characterization] of the situation' by the actor (68). Several decades later, Talcott Parsons constructed a theory of action involving an agent, an end, a situation, and a normative mode of relationship (1937: 44). The 'situation' is 'that part of the external world which means something to the actor' (Parsons *et al.* 1952: 56). Thus, again, the situation was understood to include an interpretive element.[98]

In greater detail, Lowell Carr analyzed and classified 'social situations' (1955: 51-55). For him, what is most important is the 'pattern of relationships' between persons, objects, and ideas that enter into a situation. Here we have a clear recognition that what

97.   Thus, among those to be discussed: Thomas (in works after 1923), Parsons, L. Carr (referring to Ogden and Richards), Sherif.

98.   Thus also Blumer 1969: 86. Even more persistently and perhaps one-sidedly, Schutz and Luckmann (1973) focused on the 'lived' (in a sense, mental) quality of social life; this subjective view is not individualistic, for, according to their understanding, all human experience is 'intersubjective' rather than private (15, 243). 'Social situations' are then 'determined by the formal arrangement of subjective experiences in the social world and by the prescribed, typical meaning-structures of social conduct' (253); similarly, Leiter 1980: 239, in the tradition of the 'ethnomethodology' of Garfinkel.

is especially important is not phenomena as such (places, objects, times) but the relations that obtain between them. Similarly, Muzafer Sherif considered the relevant factors of the 'social situation' to be the characteristics of the participants, the 'task, problem, or activity at hand,' 'the setting and the circumstance' (including material culture and objects), and all the various relations of the participants with each other and with the other factors (1967: 117-22). The consideration that many kinds of relations are relevant implies, of course, that many different kinds of situations are possible, so that a simple classification would be difficult.

Michael Argyle *et al.* asked the question: 'Why do certain regular situations exist in society, and why do they have the features they do have?' (1981: 26). In response to this question, they attempted to furnish a reflective—that is, not merely descriptive—analysis of situations. Much more can probably be done along that line.

In short, sociologists included attention to the psychological or interpretive aspect of a situation. Conversely, psychologists related individual experience to its social and physical context.

Kurt Lewin was an early proponent of the contextual approach to psychology. He viewed behavior as the outcome of the whole 'situation,' including the environment and the person. This situation, which he called 'life space,' is constituted by everything that has an effect on one's activity, whether or not its presence is conscious (1936: 19). He did not claim a one-to-one correspondence between situation and behavior but equated life space with the 'possibilities' created; for instance, being dismissed from a job precludes some actions but opens others, such as snubbing the former boss (1936: 14). Human life, moreover, involves many 'overlapping' situations—such as family, school, church, and friends—which are often in effect simultaneously, although their relative importance varies from one instance to another (1936: 217; 1951: 271).

Roger Barker and Herbert Wright, Lewin's students, produced a well-known study of the 'psychological ecology' of children in a midwestern town (1955). They identified the 'behavior settings' in which activities occur and found that children's actions were strongly influenced by 'standing behavior patterns.' For instance, a child may be aggressive in one setting and quiet in another (7-9). The patterns themselves, such as a worship service or a basketball game, persisted year after year, although the individuals involved changed (7). Most of the patterns were connected with special places, times, and things, so that they had an external aspect.

Participants did not view the connections between behavior and situation as arbitrary. Rather, the children on the whole perceived a 'fittingness' for them; for instance, that it is appropriate to write with a pencil rather than with a shovel or to eat in the cafeteria instead

of the library (8).[99] Of course, recognition of fittingness by either participants or observers does not necessarily imply full approval.

During the last third of the twentieth century, there was interest in how standardized patterns function within the individual's consciousness or brain. Comparing human beings to computers, Marvin Minsky provided a model for representing the knowledge of event patterns. In his words, a 'frame is a data-structure for representing a stereotyped situation,' such as going to a birthday party. This structure is 'a network of nodes and relations,' which incorporates a number of options; for instance, the expectation of a birthday party may include considerable indeterminateness in regard to what precisely may happen (1974: 1).

Situational schemas of this sort were examined jointly by Roger Schank (a specialist in artificial intelligence) and Robert Abelson (a social psychologist) in a study of human behavior as it is represented in narratives. They used the term 'script' to describe the behavior pattern that is characteristic of a given context in the view of one of its participants (1977: 42). Scripts overlap, in that more than one can be relevant on a single occasion. For instance, a script for eating and another for being in a moving train that stops suddenly can be operative simultaneously (57).

The authors observed that scripts are formed in human development not through a generalization from several occurrences but on the basis of an initial assumption that any event encountered represents a script (225), just as objects are perceived from the very beginning according to some pattern. Schemas, just like object patterns, usually become more, rather than less, flexible over time.[100] In other words, it is erroneous to think that general categories are abstractions from the perception of particulars. Indeed, human categories of perception, and also of situations, are not fresh creations by human beings but rather modifications of categories that already operate in other animals (for instance, 'instincts' are set to respond not to specific stimuli but to certain kinds of them and animal 'learning' involves recognition of types of situations).

In many other ways, too, psychological studies were concerned with actual and perceived contexts of behavior (see Magnusson 1981 for an overview). Their concern necessarily involved attention to 'situation types' (15); for instance, to *the kinds of situation* that are reported to arouse fear' (Bowlby 1973: 107). With less attention

99. The concept of 'fitness' in relation to a 'situation' as 'defined' was discussed earlier by Bartlett (1932: 230-32).

100. Scripts, moreover, are only elemental structures. Schank and Abelson saw that soon after becoming ready to verbalize scripts at age three, children move beyond them to conceptualize 'plans,' larger patterns with comprehensive goals and beliefs (1977: 228, 231, 234).

to types, but also in a reflective (not merely externally descriptive) way, Eugene Gendlin said that a 'situation consists of implicit action-possibilities' (1991: 93).

11. *Discourse Analysis and Sociolinguistics after 1950*

In 1952, the eminent linguist Zellig Harris outlined a program for extending the range of linguistic analysis beyond the borders of a sentence, a project that he called 'discourse analysis.'[101] His early specialization had been in Canaanite (including Hebrew) language, and it is clear from his publications that he was acquainted with biblical form criticism.[102] This acquaintance undoubtedly provided an impetus for his project, as both the idea and the wording of the proposal stood close to the form-critical tradition. Specifically, like Gunkel, Harris was interested in the correlation of linguistic features with both 'social situation' and 'subject matter' (1-3, 29) and in 'types' or 'kinds' (not just particular instances) of texts and, by implication, of situations (10 [n. 6a], 29-30). Unlike Gunkel, however, he pointed out that the correspondence between situation and discourse is not strict (3).

In a somewhat similar manner, Kenneth Pike developed, especially from 1954 on, a linguistic theory that gives attention to all levels of language—from the phoneme to large blocks of speech and to all aspects of expression—including the phonetic, semantic, and situational. He described 'classes' of language features in relation to 'functional slots,' including both small ones like the subject of a sentence and relatively large ones, such as a worship service or breakfast scene. His life history and the similarity of his analysis with Gunkel's make it likely that he knew biblical form criticism at least indirectly.[103]

---

101.   Harris was, after Bloomfield, the most important linguist in the US, and one of Chomsky's teachers.

102.   Formal (including generic) perspectives entered into two studies by Harris dealing with Ugaritic literature, both of which refer to biblical phenomena for comparative purposes (Montgomery and Harris 1935; Z. Harris 1938).

103.   Pike received a Bachelor of Theology degree from Gordon College in 1933, with a major in New Testament Greek. He was associated with the Summer Institute of Linguistics, which specializes in Bible translation, and frequently taught college-age Bible classes (E. Pike 1972). Thus he had opportunities to become familiar with biblical studies. However, the work of Gunkel as such in Hebrew Bible studies was not known to him (personal communication, 25 November 1975). He may have been stimulated by Z. Harris, but one gets the impression that Harris was not his only, or even primary, source of inspiration; he knew analyses by Malinowski and Firth, of course.

However, there were important divergences between Pike's analysis and Gunkel's. For instance, Pike expressly observed that units can be described on different levels, depending on one's 'focus' (1954, §3.3, etc.), while Gunkel dealt primarily with small units. Furthermore, he saw that 'utterance types' can be classed according to a large number of criteria, which can be applied in varying order so that different systems of classification are possible (§5.52-53), while Gunkel had insisted that there is only one correct way of classifying each type of speech. More adequately than Gunkel, Pike also acknowledged that 'overlaps' and 'indeterminacy' of many kinds appear in linguistic phenomena.[104]

Eugenio Coseriu's 1956 call for 'text linguistics,' in part indebted to Gardiner and Bally, was comparable to Harris's proposal and Pike's project; together, these three programs stimulated a large number of studies in the US and Europe.[105] Like the biblical studies from which they descended, they frequently manifested interests in text typology[106] and pragmatics, including what is often called the 'communicative situation.' Their procedure readily became incorporated into comprehensive theories of the text that also took account of Wittgenstein, Habermas, and others surveyed above (thus, for instance, S. Schmidt 1973: 121-22).

An important contributor to sociolinguistics from the 1960s on was Joshua Fishman, a professor at Yeshiva University in New York, who was familiar at least to some extent with biblical form criticism.[107] Fishman stressed that the roles played by the participants in relation to one another constitute the crucial factor of a situation (1970: 44-47; 1972: 263). Switches in language can therefore occur within a given physical setting when the speaker's role, topic, or purpose changes (1972: 5).

In part influenced by Harris and Pike but more directly emanating from Firth, a major tradition of sociolinguistic study operated in Great Britain and Australia. One of its important concepts was that of 'register,' or type of style. David Crystal and Derek Davy (1969) analyzed the situation affecting a register in terms of at least eight

---

104.   See the index of his work for the technical terms used. (The second edition of 1967 is virtually identical in paragraph numbering with the first, but contains additional materials.)

105.   Although Harris is generally acknowledged as the prime initiator of this movement as it has mushroomed in recent years (thus, e.g., Dressler 1978: 3), a theoretical basis was also laid by Hjelmslev (1961: 16 [Danish, 1943]) in speaking of 'texts.' The term 'text linguistics' appeared perhaps first in Coseriu 1955: 33.

106.   Cf. the Appendix, §6.

107.   Personal communication, 5 November 1975.

dimensions. These include: medium (speech or writing), province (such as worship or advertising), status (relative social standing), and modality (memorandum, lecture, poetry, etc.) together with historical and individual variables.

M.A.K. Halliday, a prominent member of the neo-Firthian circle, recognized that it is often not possible to predict speech with a high degree of confidence based purely on knowledge of the situation in which it occurs (1973: 62, 92). Yet he noted that the use of a form of language 'appropriate' to the situation is key to 'linguistic success' (1978: 28). In a somewhat similar way, Stephen Levinson (inspired by Wittgenstein's analysis) discussed the role of language in different 'activity types.' He observed that, although linguistic usages appear to be extremely varied, they are 'not unprincipled'; rather, they are 'functionally adapted to achieving…the main purpose of the activity in question' (1979: 393-94).[108]

12. *Speech Contexts in Anthropology, Especially Folklore Studies, after 1960*

A relevant line of anthropological investigation, called 'the ethnography of speaking,' was developed by Dell Hymes. He acknowledged indebtedness to a variety of authors, including Malinowski, Bühler, Firth, Burke, Pike, Jakobson, and Barker and Wright (1962: 17-25). Anthropological, linguistic, rhetorical, literary, and psychological streams of discussion have thus flowed together, so that they can no longer be separated. Hymes also knew of biblical form criticism, at least through second-hand reports.[109]

One of those associated with Hymes was the folklorist Alan Dundes. In 1954 he anthologized William Bascom (1954), who

---

108.   One line of sociolinguistics has dealt with variations in speech according to the speaker's social position, or 'class,' within a society. This line has been quite strong in Europe; a prominent representative was B. Bernstein, who learned both from Marx and his followers and from Malinowski and the tradition emanating from him (1971-75). However, Bernstein and those close to him paid little attention to variations in type other than by class.

109.   Oral communication and letter, 1975. The extent and timing of Hymes's acquaintance with biblical studies is difficult to reconstruct. One major influence was Burke ('himself no stranger in later years to theological topics,' according to Hymes's letter). Perhaps relevant is the fact that Hymes's teacher Voegelin was closely associated with Z. Harris (already discussed), co-authoring several papers with him. Hymes (1963) also referred to six items by Nida, a major authority on Bible translation. His association with Dundes is also probably relevant (cf. S. Murray 1998: 106).

quoted Malinowski's phrase 'setting in actual life' (apparently a translation of *Sitz im Leben*). In 1964, Dundes accurately discussed biblical form criticism (1964a: 33). In another essay that year, he described the three aspects of a speech type that had been high-lighted by Gunkel, using the rubrics 'texture, text, and context.' 'Texture' referred to linguistic features, 'text' to content, and 'context' to observable setting. In contrast to Gunkel, Dundes stated that several different genres can be used in a single organizational setting and that a given genre can be used in a variety of settings, not only as a literary device (1964b: 261, 264).

Not long thereafter, Hymes said that, in order to describe a type of speech, the ethnography of speaking observes its 'form, content, and context,' namely, 'an overt element, semantic values, and rules governing its selection in those values' (1967: 27). Here, a triadic conception of genres appears again, but Hymes characterized each of the three aspects more closely. With respect to context, he made the following refinements: He distinguished between a temporal and physical 'setting' and a psychological and culturally defined 'scene'; the interpretive 'scene' is especially important for speech, although the 'setting' is also relevant. Important for an event are the roles and relationships of those who participate in it and its goal, as well as, to some extent, its instrumental mode (such as oral or written).[110] In a reflective way, Hymes said that attention to different 'types of speech act and speech event' contributes to an 'understanding of human purposes and needs, and their satisfaction,' for in any society human purposes and needs are varied, so that they need different kinds of speech (1967: 21-22, 27-28).

In another work, Hymes observed that the rigid application of a single routine in a single context represents 'minimal' competence, while a person who acquires greater competence in a language and culture is aware of available options and can exercise flexibility (1971: 62). In effect, he contradicted Gunkel's notion that oral speech is rigidly patterned.

The folklorist Kenneth Goldstein noted that social occasions can be classified in different ways; for instance, primary attention can be given either to 'the number and types of participants' or to 'the

110. In 1967, Hymes grouped aspects of a communicative event mnemonically under the letters SPEAKING: Setting and scene, Partici-pants, Ends, Art characteristics (including both message form and topic), Key (tone, manner, or spirit), Instrumentalities, Norms of interaction and interpretation, and Genre (conversation, sales pitch, etc.). He later modi-fied this acronym somewhat and was followed in that by others. Basically the same analysis, without the acronym, appeared in Muriel Saville-Troike 2003: 110.

kinds of behavior involved' (1964: 81). Once more, multidimensionality in classification is recognized.

Within folklore studies, the new interest in the interrelationship of text and context reflected or brought about a union of two major scholarly traditions. One tradition was interested primarily in the literary or rhetorical structure of oral products without much attention to context, while the other was concerned with the ideational content of folklore in relation to its cultural context.[111] Some folklorists had already attempted to bring the two sides together prior to 1960, but no systematic union of the different aspects had been produced.[112] The precise reason why these two traditions joined in the 1960s is unclear. The social development of the time must have contributed to this union, but the availability of a scholarly model, such as in biblical form criticism, would have been an aid. In fact, some folklorists who sought a union of text and context acknowledged that this procedure had been anticipated by form criticism. Among them stood Hermann Bausinger (1968: 62) and Lauri Honko (to be cited below).

Indeed, a number of relevant folklore studies after 1965 connected text with context. Aware of both biblical studies and Dundes's analysis (1964b),[113] Dan Ben-Amos outlined the triple structure of genres as follows: 'each genre is characterized by a set of relations between its formal features, thematic domains, and potential social usages' (1969: 285). His formulation did not focus exclusively—or even primarily—on external settings but rather on the social processes in which oral literature is involved. Heda Jason described the same three factors as the 'formal,' 'contentual,' and 'social' aspects of ethnopoetry (1977: 3).[114] Honko called the three aspects of a genre

---

111. Thus, Zumwalt (1988) for folkloristics in the US. She was, of course, aware of the fact that the separation between the two foci has not always been complete.

112. Prominent among writers that gave conscious attention to interrelationships between these phenomena was von Sydow (cf. 1948: 45 [1934]), who knew at least something about relevant biblical issues (1948: 223-24 [1940]). Functional issues, among others, had been discussed by van Gennep and by members of the Prague School (cf. Fine 1984: 32).

113. Ben-Amos did not cite biblical studies in his 1969 essay, but a later overview of contextual investigations referred to Gunkel, as well as to secondary discussions of Gunkel's view; he noted that Gunkel had been influenced by earlier folklore studies (1977: 48-51). One wonders whether a knowledge of form criticism was mediated by the strong tradition of Semitics at the University of Pennsylvania, in which Z. Harris (discussed above) participated (see Gordon 1986).

114. She listed separately 'the ethnopoetic mode (fabulous, realistic, and symbolic)' as a fourth aspect.

'theme (content),' 'form,' and 'function' (1987: 746-47). 'Function' here meant 'functioning,' specifically the psychological and socio-logical processes that are associated with a phenomenon either as antecedent or as consequence (see Honko 1962: 7, 150-58, using the word *Lebenssituation*).

Johannes Fabian, who was aware of Ben-Amos, examined the speech of an African charismatic Christian movement (1974). He identified four 'genres'—teaching, counseling, testifying, and dream-telling—which constitute four 'classes of communicative events.' Significantly, he specified for each of these the number and nature of the persons involved along with the purpose.

In 1983, Joel Sherzer offered a close study of Native American 'Kuna Ways of Speaking.' He described three rituals and several kinds of everyday speech within their respective social contexts. The major occasions and types of speech were well demarcated, but Sherzer also observed overlaps, especially in that a given kind of speech could also be used in everyday life, such as for learning or pleasure. In 1990 (163-64), he described further how a given story can be told in two different contexts. Each context has a different primary purpose—instruction or entertainment—and each utilizes a different linguistic mode. Thus he again indicated that context, purpose, and language cohere and showed, at the same time, that both serious and playful uses of a text are possible.

A widely noted article by William Hanks presented a theoretical discussion that was based on a number of studies, including those of the Bakhtin circle (1987: 668-92), thus drawing in this tradition as well. He said again that genres are involved in social relations, but are varied rather than fixed. In regard to a specific topic, Joyce Flueckiger (1996) showed how the performance of oral literature interacts with gender roles in India. She pointed out that a genre can be used flexibly outside of its standard context without losing its genre name (78).

There was thus widespread recognition of the fact that there are many close connections between the linguistic form, the content, and the occasions (or functions) of oral types of speech. Yet it was also seen that these associations are not rigid, especially, although not only, in terms of their external circumstances.

13. *Developments in Biblical Form Criticism after about 1965*

A major concern of biblical form criticism after Gunkel was to identify the oral background of biblical literature more concretely than Gunkel had done.[115] This development, which became espe-

---

115.   Thus, rightly, Hayes 1979: 153-54.

cially pronounced as biblical studies disengaged themselves, to a considerable extent, from other disciplines, has been treated elsewhere.[116] In particular, a considerable number of ritual occasions or organizations were reconstructed as backgrounds for various genres or specific texts. However, these reconstructions largely outran available evidence, as became widely recognized soon after 1960.[117]

Attention was then given instead to the fact that not only oral speech but also written productions have close connections with life. Accordingly, explicit extensions of the notion of *Sitz im Leben* to the context of writings were made by Klaus Koch (1964: 43), Heinrich Zimmermann (1967: 173-74), Erhardt Güttgemanns (1970: 88), and Gene Tucker (1971: 8), and in most other discussions of form criticism thereafter. Focus on the situations of written materials implied a reconceptualization of the word '*Sitz*.' The word no longer referred to a 'normal or home location' of genres that lie behind—in the past of—texts but to the life in which a certain type of text is used.[118]

Even with this new focus, the notion of *Sitz im Leben* needed to be distinguished from that of a particular historical context, for the word *Sitz* indicates a normal location and is thus in principle a general term.[119] The question then arises, 'What is the significance of dealing with generality and not just with particularity?' One element of significance is that texts have a social dimension and are not merely expressions of individual opinions and attitudes. This dimension was important for Gunkel, as well as for form critics after him.

Another important aspect of dealing with generality, however, lies in the fact that general terms are reflective in character. Indeed, all concepts involve generality. A long-debated question, then, is whether general forms or categories reflect only a mental

116.   *BFC*: 379-400.

117.   See *BFC*: 311, 380-400. Challengers included Roland de Vaux (1960, II: 350), Hans-Joachim Krauss (1960, I: xli), and Georg Fohrer (1961: 16 [with a reference to Ernst Kutsch in 1958]; 1965: 27).

118.   Differently, in 1960 (162), Alonso Schökel distinguished between *Sitz im Leben* (place in oral life) and *Sitz in der Literatur* (place in a literary work); the latter phrase referred to the context of a small literary piece within a larger one. (Gunkel himself had at one time referred to a *Sitz* in literature in terms of a typical or original location in a literary genre [*BFC*: 235]).

119.   It is true, quite a few writers have used the term *Sitz im Leben* in a particularist sense, but these uses will not be referenced here, for they do not capture the specific contributions of that phrase; also, the expression 'historical context' is already available for referring to a particular spatio-temporal location.

process and impose a pattern upon reality, as is held by nominalists. According to a relational outlook, generality—especially, the generality of relations—is indeed part of reality, but it can be represented in varying ways, as interpreters focus on those relations that are of interest to them.

In any case, a thoughtful approach 'interprets' reality. Since human beings continuously engage in such assessments, their situations are not merely physical but also mental. This recognition entered into philosophical, rhetorical, sociological, and psychological analyses of 'situation,' as already reported.

In biblical studies, the interpretive aspect was recognized by Erhardt Güttgemanns. He said that a *Sitz im Leben* is 'speech-psychological' (1970: 174); that is, the language provides an interpretive structure for the situation in which a word is spoken or written. With attention specifically to thought, Wolfgang Richter included the ideational (*geistesgeschichtliche*) background of a text in the notion of *Sitz im Leben* (1971: 121). Hermann Barth and Odil Hannes Steck spoke more broadly of 'sociocultural conditions' (1971: 61), as did Georg Fohrer *et al.* (1973: 94). Rolf Knierim highlighted the 'mental occupation' that lies behind a genre, following the folklorist André Jolles (1973: 441).

Reflectivity operates not only in ancient speakers or writers who respond to a situation as they interpret it, but also in current readers who try to make sense out of a text. For these, *Sitz im Leben*—as a general term—describes a context 'as' a certain kind of situation. In practice, such a general perspective enters into all discussions of a text, but the term 'life situation' (as a version of *Sitz im Leben*) highlights this reflective aspect. For instance, to say that 'the Book of Lamentations responds to the fall of Jerusalem in 586 BCE' makes a particularist-historical point. In contrast, a reflection that 'this book contains reactions to the destruction of a city by a powerful entity' describes a life situation that is in principle general.[120] Reflectivity has important practical implications, for general forms describe possibilities. They are thus potentially relevant to the lives of interpreters, who may experience a similar situation.

Such a reflective procedure, however, was slow in gaining recognition in biblical studies, probably because most scholars who

---

120. Indeed, in the ancient Near East there was a literary type known as 'city laments.' Instances of city laments in different traditions within that area may well be historically connected with each other, but they also reflect a shared situation and are thus not merely arbitrary (among recent discussions, see Emmendörffer 1998). Possible parallels in other portions of the world have apparently not yet been studied.

stood in the Protestant tradition continued an inclination toward particularism and thus focused primarily on individual texts or on group particularity. Gunkel, as has been mentioned, reacted against the lack of reflectivity associated with an atomistic approach and thus adopted a quasi-Aristotelian position.

Although Gunkel's rigid view of genres became questionable, he had prepared the ground for a relational view of *Sitz im Leben* by referring to speaker, listeners, mood, and desired effect (see above). This description of a *Sitz* was cited by Klaus Koch (1964: 37), Barth and Steck (1971: 62), and Hans-Peter Müller (1983: 273). Müller expressly said, in harmony with speech act theory, that 'the notion of *Sitz im Leben* should be oriented less toward institutions '—that is, societal organizations—'than toward intended effect or function' (1983: 279-80).

Other studies also gradually adopted relational ways of thinking, including elements of both reasonableness and flexibility. In regard to the aspect of reasonableness, it was possible to speak of the 'functions,' the dynamic relations, of literary texts. After anticipations by H.W. Robinson in 1946 and James Muilenberg in 1951,[121] references to function were made by Helmer Ringgren, who like Robinson expressly equated 'function' with 'life situation' (1966: 643), as well as by Richter (1971: 45), Fohrer *et al.* (1973: 85), and others.

At the same time, flexibility was recognized. The fact that there is no precise match between oral speech forms and concrete settings had been mentioned by a number of folklorists from the beginning of the century on.[122] This observation was conveyed briefly to biblical scholars in 1926,[123] but it was largely ignored, apparently since it contradicted a common conception among biblical scholars. In 1976, however, Burke Long reported that folklorists had observed a lack of close match between genres and organized settings.[124] This report was widely noted by biblical specialists.

---

121.   See *BFC*: 401.

122.   For instance, by P. Bogatyrev and R. Jakobson (1929: 911), by Hymes (1971, cited above), and later by Jan Vansina (1985: 95).

123.   See *BFC*: 286.

124.   To be sure, fluidity should not be exaggerated. The several different settings mentioned by Shack and Marcos (cited by Long 1976: 42) were not random but were matched fairly closely with different kinds of rituals. What Long called a 'private party' (42), in a reference to Crapanzano, was apparently a private session with the ethnographer for demonstration; thus the set of three possible settings should be reduced to two. Finnegan (referred to by Long 1976: 39) described one setting (evening time) as primary. Nevertheless, Long was right in saying that connections with settings are often not rigid.

Aware of relational approaches in a variety of disciplines, the present writer set forth an approach that counters both essentialism and nominalism. Against essentialism, this approach deals 'freely with any form of verbal patterns,' including those that exhibit only probabilistic 'tendencies' and 'cut across other aspects of classification' multidimensionally. Against nominalism, it 'consciously relates the element of life situation to a conception of human existence developed in cooperation with other disciplines' and reflects on 'rationale (*raison d'être*), interrelating' linguistic form, content, and life situation 'with each other, to reach "insight" (*Verstehen*)' (1969: 1). The concern for rationale continued an aspect of Gunkel's approach; the writer, however, was not aware of that fact and stated it as a separate point.[125]

With attention to both rationale and contingency ('mere' convention), the interpretive process was described as follows:

> Form criticism, by its recognition of different genres, indicates that life is multifaceted and that not all problems are solved in the same manner. By showing how certain paths relate to certain aspects of life, it can help lead the way....Form criticism includes an irrational aspect in that it deals with conventions, which have only arbitrary values, and with local variations of form, without ultimate significance. But the aim is to discover the meaning of the conventions and their relational significance in such a way as to permit insight and challenge (Buss 1974: 56).

A later essay (reprinted in Part I above) distinguished between the aspect of the situation that is not altogether arbitrary—called 'human process,' 'human situation,' or 'life situation'—and the more purely 'conventional' aspect of a setting (1978: 166-67). The word 'human' here referred not necessarily to what is universally or exclusively human but to what can be called 'dynamic structure,' specifically 'the interplay of the roles of the participants' (168). This distinction was not unlike the one Wittgenstein made, at least informally, by means of the two terms 'form of life' and 'language game' (see above). To be sure, in practice, the purely conventional and the more meaningful ('human') aspects cannot be neatly separated.

A similar analysis had already been made by Claus Westermann in regard to the topic of 'cult.' Taking 'cult' in the sense of organized ritual, he denied that the psalms of the Hebrew Bible have their basic setting in the cult. He held that their primary *Sitz im Leben* is rather in the processes of entreaty and praise, which are general human modes (1954: 112-13). He wished to see the dynamic

---

125.   See above, Part I, essay 2.

pattern of the psalms in the light of psychology and sociology (1974: 28). The fact that he had grown up in Africa as the son of a fairly well-known anthropologist undoubtedly contributed to his broad perspective.

Indeed, interaction with a variety of disciplines was the prime factor that led to modification of form criticism within biblical studies. Part of what happened is that the contributions that biblical form criticism had made in other fields came back to biblical studies in a way that corrected some earlier assumptions.

For instance, Erhardt Güttgemanns made contact with linguistics, philosophy, and other disciplines. He recognized the similarity of text linguistics with form criticism (1970: 221); that was also noted not long thereafter by Koch (1974: 307). Gerd Theissen recognized that Malinowski's procedure paralleled biblical form criticism (1974: 40). He was led by his interdisciplinary involvements away from understanding 'situation' in terms of an externally desirable context and toward a more 'existential' (humanly meaningful) view.

Breadth of knowledge also entered into the work of Walter Brueggemann, who placed biblical phenomena into a general context. 'The faith of Israel, like all human experience,' he observed, 'moved back and forth between the polar modes of, on the one hand, deep…misery, and, on the other hand, profound joy and celebration.' Verbal forms give 'authentic expression to the real experiences of life,' although a given community formulates its own 'typical patterns of speech' (1974: 3, 5). His analysis stood close to Westermann's, but Brueggemann thought that Westermann downplayed the social dimension of texts. He highlighted the social dimension in terms of 'use and function' and then relabeled Westermann's major categories as follows: 'psalms of orientation' (for Westermann: descriptive praise; for others: hymns), 'psalms of disorientation' (for Westermann and others: laments), and 'psalms of reorientation' (for Westermann: 'declarative praise'; for others: 'psalms of thanksgiving') (1980: 3, 6). These labels, which made use of a formulation by the philosopher Paul Ricoeur, attracted widespread attention, probably since they represented a set of theoretically meaningful structures.[126]

126.   Another Hebrew Bible scholar who drew attention to the general-human dimension was John Hayes. In a work on the psalms directed toward a general audience, he referred to 'two basic moods of human sentiment expressed in worship' (1976: 26). Hayes and Carl Holladay, writing together, expressly connected literary forms other than psalms with 'typical occasions of human existence,' not only with occasions in ancient Israel (1982: 78). In a later edition of this work, this perspective appears to have been omitted.

From 1977 on, the prominent New Testament scholar Klaus Berger outlined an approach that combined elements of generality and particularity. Well versed in a variety of disciplines, including philosophy, he rejected the notion that literary genres are tied to organized occasions ('institutions') and held instead that they are connected with 'typical interactions' between human beings. Such forms and processes, he said, are neither simply particular nor universal but exhibit an intermediate generality (1977: 112-14; 1987: 260; 1988: 260). In 1984, accepting the present writer's 1978 distinction between a 'human' (or 'basic') situation and a 'conventional situation,' Berger said that the 'role play' of the participants is crucial for the former (1984: 1042; similarly, 2005: 67).[127]

Berger indicated an interest in the transhistorical significance of texts—'"communicational" truth,' as he termed it (1987: 259; cf. 1988, passim). He accordingly called attention to both sociology and psychology, joined together in social psychology (1990: 443). Although he had a definite Christian inclination, he argued for form criticism that is not 'apologetic-authoritarian' but takes seriously the 'anthropological dimension' of biblical literature, with attention to comparative religion. This kind of form criticism provided for 'conversation in receiving and giving, within and outside the church' (1992: 2-3). In the essay just cited, he compared early Christian with other Hellenistic vision reports; nevertheless, attention to the general history of religion has been largely absent from his work.

In 2005, Berger grouped New Testament genres according to traditional rhetorical categories as analyzed by Aristotle (52, 71, 178, 431). For each genre, Berger often furnished a brief description of the relevant general-human rhetorical process before giving attention to the more specific form of that process in early Christianity. The general and historical aspects were thus interwoven.

Berger labeled his approach 'the new form criticism' (1987: 255; 2005: v, 80). In fact, this label can be used somewhat loosely for much, although not all, that has been produced in biblical studies since about 1965, of which a few examples can be given.

Christof Hardmeier, focusing on the Hebrew Bible, was indebted to Wittgenstein's analysis, speech-act theory, text-linguistics, and Habermas's philosophy of communication. These approaches had been joined by the German literary theorist Siegfried Schmidt in the notion of 'communicative action games.' Hardmeier recognized (with Schmidt) that these games concern not brute reality but reality

---

127. K. Berger did not refer to the present writer's distinction after 1984, perhaps because it cannot be neatly drawn; however, his approach is very similar, even though the comparative perspective is less strongly developed.

as interpreted. However, he continued to use the term *Sitz im Leben* in the sense of an organized social setting, so that he concluded that genres are not correlated with a *Sitz im Leben* (1978: 73-74).[128] More informally, nevertheless, he spoke later in broader terms of 'life,' such as of the 'possibilities of life before God for today's person' (2005: 9, 20).

Erhard Gerstenberger, another important Hebrew Bible scholar with a wide orientation, analyzed the psalms with attention to anthropology, sociology, and social psychology (1980: 1). He defined *Sitz im Leben* as a set of active connections (*Handlungszusammenhang*, 1980: 9) and discussed the dynamics of placing a request, which is basic-human (1980: 17-18). Yet he also went more speculatively beyond such an analysis to a reconstruction of specific settings, especially in a small group, such as in a synagogue (1980, somewhat differently in 1988). In a more recent essay, he has spoken in general human terms of 'life situations of leisure, feasting, juridical procedures, socializing young people (i.e., primary education), higher learning, and so on' as the bases of genres (2003: 98); did that imply a movement in his thinking?

In 1981, after about fifteen years of extensive oral and written exchanges among scholars, Rolf Knierim and Gene Tucker edited the first volume of a series entitled 'The Forms of the Old Testament Literature' (FOTL). Initially, consideration had been given to the possibility of a systematic presentation according to genre, but a decision was made to proceed by focusing on patterns in individual biblical books. Given the variety and interplay of genres in the Hebrew Bible, this arrangement had practical advantages, but the format implied (or even consciously meant) that particularity should be given priority over generality. That was true for both the beginning of the interpretive process and for its endpoint. In regard to its beginning, the editors believed that an analysis of the 'structure' (outline) or 'form' of a particular text would lead to recognition of its genre, setting, and intention. In regard to the endpoint of interpretation, its primary immediate aim was to be an understanding

---

128. In saying this, however, Hardmeier appears not to have gone far enough, for he continued to a large extent the assumption that linguistic forms regularly 'originate' in an organizational setting. Specifically, like many before him—although in a modified way—he held that the interjection *hôy* originated in funeral lamentation and was transferred from there to prophetic speech (1978: 154-388). For an alternative to Hardmeier's view of *hôy* that recognizes the role of *hôy* in invective, see the writer's 1978 essay reprinted above in Part I, essay 4, n. 15, and a similar analysis by J. Roberts (1982); cf. also Hillers 1983.

of the historical text, with its author's intentions, while the broad range of 'issues concerning the meaning of the text' was to be laid aside.[129] In other words, reflectivity is discouraged. Accordingly, in the various contributions to the series, settings and intentions are developed largely in terms of individual or group particularity.

In 1999, an 'updated' form of the editors' foreword included the following observation that highlighted generality more strongly:

> To some, the predominantly sociohistorical focus in form criticism and in FOTL may appear to be at the expense of the essentially theological nature of the texts. But although these commentaries may at times not be explicit in highlighting the 'faith' in the texts or the texts' theology, their approach points to the outreach of that faith and its theology into all spheres of not only Israel's but also of human reality. Many if not most genres were international and certainly not specifically cultic. The glossaries in the volumes provide comprehensive pictures of the depth of Israel's religion in all of life and of the many dimensions of human reality. The rich and diverse discourse in the Bible, elucidated in important ways by form criticism, reveals the believing community's awareness of the footsteps of the deity in this world, not only in the specific settings of Israel's worship and for the 'believers' but in all settings of human life and for all humans (Knierim and Tucker 1999: xiii).

Yet this observation was omitted from the foreword to later volumes in the series. General comments appear in the series from time to time, but Gunkel's worldwide reach and his interest in addressing the reader who is neither an academic nor a religious specialist were only weakly continued, and there was little reflection on reasonable relations between life, ideas, and language. Thus, while some of Gunkel's misconceptions were avoided, the series also lacked the strength of his analyses to a large extent.[130] Nevertheless, in terms of the stated goals of the series and repeatedly also beyond them, the various volumes in the series made useful contributions.[131]

129.   Thus, in the 'Editors' Foreword' to most volumes from 1981 on.

130.   Nevertheless, FOTL's program (even if not all of its analyses) remained largely essentialist, as is pointed out in Part I, essay 9, above, so that it exhibits the 'historical essentialism' described in the Introduction to the present work.

131.   Probably the strongest instances of non-particularist orientations appeared in Roland Murphy's analysis of wisdom literature (1981), in Gerstenberger's discussion of Psalms and Lamentations (1988 and 2001), and in the preface and afterword to Antony Campbell's examination of 2 Samuel (2005). Gerstenberger's discussion reflected his interest in anthropology. The other two scholars mentioned, who are Roman Catholic, may

In 1983, Rolf Rendtorff's introduction to the Hebrew Bible furnished an overview of its literary forms. This overview was very valuable on its own terms, but the notion of *Sitz im Leben* was largely centered on external oral circumstances. Probably as a consequence of this limitation, form criticism played only a subordinate role in Rendtorff's theological assessment of the Hebrew Bible (2001).[132]

During the last several years, several Hebrew Bible specialists have moved more thoroughly toward generality and even universality.[133] Among them, Harry Nasuti said that without recognizing 'universal human situations' such as 'suffering and relief,' the genres that respond to them as they are embodied in texts 'will not be able to continue to function' for persons in the present. He did not, of course, claim uniformity in specifics; he held, however, that past organizational forms (insofar as they can be reconstructed) may be 'sufficiently analogous' to present situations to be relevant (1999: 50-51). Otto Kaiser, with a broad transcultural perspective, characterized a literary motif as 'an expression that emanates from a typical...humanly meaningful situation and is structured in a...partially conventional way' (2000: 45). Clearly he saw standard forms as partially but only partially conventional. With overt attention to reader response, Sue Boorer declared that 'I will use the terminology "life situation" to describe that aspect of form criticism that connects texts to life in its social and psychological dimensions, whether in the form of sociological setting or more general life experience, including the inner life of the individual' (2003: 200). Observing that the 'general dimension' is 'intrinsic to the philosophy

be less strongly dominated by the nominalist tradition than is true for the majority of Protestants. (Campbell, in particular, spoke in a preface and afterword for going beyond an approach that focuses on the past, although he did not show how a form-critical path leads in that direction.)

132. Also primarily particularist is the 'socio-rhetorical' approach of Vernon Robbins (beginning about 1984), which he has classified as a version of form criticism (1992: 844). This approach connects the social involvements of a text with verbal patterns. Somewhat similar is the approach of George Kennedy, a classicist with an interest in New Testament studies. The notion of 'rhetorical situation,' he observed, 'roughly corresponds to the *Sitz im Leben* of form criticism' (1984: 34); it should be noted, however, that the term *Sitz im Leben*—unlike 'rhetorical situation' as a rule—properly refers to a type of situation, not to a particular one. A useful overview of the development of the notion of *Sitz im Leben* in New Testament studies has been furnished by Samuel Byrskog (2007), but it differs from the present survey by focusing on a historical understanding of that notion.

133. In doing so, Nasuti and Boorer in part followed the present writer, who, to be sure, is reserved toward the notion of universality, which can easily be one of particularity writ large (see *CF*, 1.1; 9.2).

of form criticism,' she described her perspective as 'transcultural and transchronic' (202). She did not identify past and present meanings but opened a path for avoiding isolation: 'The perceived world of the text is the life situation of the text. This then interacts with the life situation of the reader' (203).[134]

Finally, Reinhard Achenbach's analysis of the *Sitz im Leben* of prayers and rituals that deal with distress ('laments') in Mesopotamia and ancient Israel (2004) is noteworthy as one that observes both specific circumstances and broader dynamics. The study discusses kinds of problems responded to and the circumstances of occasional and scheduled responses. Similarities and differences between the two major culture areas are described and partially explained. One can hope that such an analysis will be broadened further.

14. *Renewed Concern with Life Situation in European Medieval Studies*

Interaction between biblical and medieval studies is natural in view of the fact that medieval productions are in many ways similar to those of the Hebrew Bible. For instance, Wolf-Heinrich Schmidt characterized European literature of the Middle Ages in a way that also applies to a large extent to biblical literature: (1) it can be reproduced again and again, with variations and without concern for individual authorship; (2) in regard to its content, individuals are of interest not for their own sake but as types; (3) standard generic patterns are dominant; and (4) the preserved literature (whether presented in oral or written form) is clearly related to a society (1975: 1-2). It is also relevant that medieval, like ancient Israelite, literary productions stood to a large extent on the border between orality and writing; only the written forms have survived, of course. The interaction between biblical and medieval European studies will thus receive special notice here.

The idea of social context was current in medieval studies before Gunkel; in fact, that field contributed to his analysis. However, the concept was toned down somewhat in later studies, which

---

134.   Some writers, to be sure, have continued to interpret the phrase *Sitz im Leben* largely in terms of an organizational setting. For instance, Ehud Ben-Zvi said that 'the entire body of the prophetic book is associated primarily with a single setting in life, namely, the reading of prophetic books by those able to read and reread them' (2003: 287). Differently, Uwe Becker seems to limit the term *Sitz im Leben* to an oral situation, although he has also described genres as 'typical life expressions' that employ the same forms in both written and oral contexts (2005: 98).

participated in an ethos that favored attention to literature without much concern for its background (noted above for folklore studies). Nevertheless, with a broad notion of context, Paul Van Tieghem said that 'each emotional taste, each social or religious need is the root of a different genre' (1938: 97).

Attention to the social role of genres strongly reemerged in Germanic studies from 1956 on with Hugo Kuhn, whose brother was a leading specialist in the Jewish background of the New Testament. Like Gunkel, Kuhn called for analysis of genres in terms of form (language, meter, style), content, and situation or sociological context (1959: 41 [1956]; 1969: 20). For the idea of 'situation,' he mentioned the Jewish philosopher Richard Hönigswald (who had a definite religious interest and published a small book on Genesis) and 'situation linguistics' (dependent on Malinowski?). He also found intellectual support in Wittgenstein's concept of 'forms of life' (1969: 350). Kuhn's sociological vision was largely oriented toward social levels or classes and thus had an affinity with Marxism. He concluded, however, that there is no precise coincidence between matter, form, and function; in fact, he held that the proper subject of a history of written literature is literary structure in its autonomy, not in its relation to 'life' (1969: 17, 27; 1980: 59). In contrast, Wilhelm Vosskamp—referring to biblical form criticism—regarded the pragmatic dimension as an intrinsic aspect of literature (1977).

Uda Ebel, a scholar of Romance literature, explicitly acknowledged biblical form criticism as a model in 1965. Responding to her, Matthias Waltz (1970) argued—in part on the basis of evidence furnished by the Hebrew Bible scholar Klaus Koch, but also diverging somewhat from Koch—that 'life' in the phrase *Sitz im Leben* properly refers not to a physical reality but to a symbolic structure (for example, the cult viewed as such rather than as a concrete process). Waltz also asserted that a genre shapes its context and is not merely created by it (for instance, preaching produces the pulpit rather than vice versa).

With knowledge of Ebel and Waltz, as well as of the folklorist Bausinger, the well-known theoretician of literature Hans Jauss highlighted biblical form criticism from 1970 on, demonstrating knowledge of several of its branches.[135] He viewed form criticism as a significant corrective to an approach that attends only to

---

135. A careful survey of biblical form criticism—clearly on the basis of a first-hand reading—was given by Jauss in 1972 (copyright, 1970); an earlier French version, which appeared as an article in *Poétique*, 1970, did not include the discussion of biblical studies but listed several works on biblical form criticism in the bibliography.

the internal structure of texts (1972: 139). He identified *Sitz im Leben* with the psychological and sociological process or function of a text rather than with its physical context (1977, in a chart opposite p. 46).

Biblical studies, furthermore, received repeated notice from 1970 on by the Romance specialist Erich Köhler. He described *Sitz im Leben* as a function that reflects a division of labor in the taking of differential approaches to the same reality by different groups (1977: 7). Although (or precisely because) he was partially Marxist, he rejected 'vulgar Marxism' (1966: 85), which would think only in terms of competing economic classes. In 1973, Henning Krauss, his student, distinguished between the connection of a major genre with a large-scale and relatively transtemporal social situation, which he called *Sitz im Leben,* and the specific concrete circumstances of a relatively temporary subgenre.[136] As an example of a major—not historically restricted—genre, he offered the phenomenon of lamentation at death.

From about 1968 on, awareness of biblical form criticism also reached Slavic specialists in West Berlin, who saw a similarity between form-critical procedure and Soviet medieval studies.[137] This circle observed that genres were not rigid. Lenhoff accordingly judged that Old Russian was ruled not by genres with well-developed structures but by 'protogenres,' that is, by verbal patterns that could be utilized and combined according to specific needs (1987: 264). In regard to the context of genres, the members of the circle saw no precise correspondence between a genre and a milieu and thus favored the newer, flexible version of form criticism which had arisen by then in biblical studies and was known to them through Klaus Berger's 1977 work (W.-H. Schmidt 1987: 29 [with Seemann], 304). Moreover, they did not interpret *Sitz im Leben* in terms of concrete circumstances, to be treated in an externally descriptive manner. They held that the concrete external context of a text is difficult to reconstruct but believed that a *Sitz im Leben* that is viewed in terms of human relations can to a large extent be derived from indications given within the work.[138]

136. The fact that the term *Sitz im Leben* was widely recognized is shown by its use by Ortrun Riha in 1994 without any explanation; in this case it referred to the role of medical texts.

137. See Seemann 1973: 152; Ingham 1987.

138. W.-H. Schmidt and Seemann 1987: 10-11; Ingham 1987: 242; cf. Wörn in W.-H. Schmidt 1984: 334.

15. *New Attention to Life Situation in Classics,*
Especially after 1970

The field of classics shares with biblical studies the fact that it deals with ancient literature produced in the Eastern Mediterranean sphere near the turn of the era. Since it deals with past phenomena, the literature's functions and other contextual relations must be gathered from internal indications or from ancient reports rather than from direct observation of its role in its own time, as Gardiner mentioned in his letter to Malinowski. This limitation can lead to a relatively timeless analysis, especially since the Greco-Roman tradition has, like the biblical, acted as a model or fountainhead for much of Western culture.

Work in the field of classics (like in biblical studies), to be sure, has remained heavily historical. Toward the end of the twentieth century, much of it, in fact, became strongly critical of classical culture (as was true for biblical scholarship in regard to its literature) because of the presence of patriarchy, slavery, and violence (Konstan 1989: 46). Still, the discipline did continue an interest in the usefulness of Greco-Roman literature for the present.[139] A combination view was expressed by Charles Segal: 'It is important to appreciate the otherness that separates us from the past as well as the universal that unites us with it' (1986: 372). Such a transhistorical consideration involves attention to the life processes in which literature is involved.

The fact that popular life constituted a background for Greek and Roman literature was widely recognized before 1900. Gunkel's analysis was influenced by this recognition. The classicist Wolf Aly, in turn, presented a version of Gunkel's triadic view of genres, with its social interest, by speaking of 'style, form of seeing [i.e. conception], and life-form' (1929: 4).[140] However, during the middle of the twentieth century, the primary, although by no means exclusive, focus of classical studies (as in a number of other fields) was on the text itself.

From the 1960s on, a new turn shifted the predominant interest 'from text to context,' as happened also in folklore studies (Segal 1999: 4). Much of the new focus involved issues of class and gender, but it also addressed other human concerns.

---

139.   See, e.g., Edmunds 1989: xix, xxiii; Lefkowitz 2003. Some observers view antiquity as a source for critiquing the present (Jäger 1975: 30).

140.   Aly referred to Gunkel, as Van Seters pointed out (1992: 32); after all, he treated New Testament literature as well as other Greek texts (e.g. 1925: 309-14).

With broad interests, Francis Cairns described 'generic composition in Greek and Roman poetry' largely along contextual lines (1972). In his view, human life contains 'recurrent situations which…call for regular responses'; genres originate from such regular responses in 'real life' (34). Thus, 'every genre has a "function," which is often to convey a communication of a certain character,' such as a farewell or welcome (129). Going beyond information about historical origin or background genres, Cairns analyzed how generic forms relate to situations represented in or by the literature (34). For instance, dramatic form reflects conversation. The 'recurrent human situations' represented are, sometimes, quite 'general,' such as 'arrival at a foreign place' or shipwreck (75, 67, 61). In dealing with genres, Cairns acknowledged natural connections between phenomena without falling into essentialism; namely, he said that the dividing lines between genres are 'natural in that they accord with the divisions human beings make of their experience' and yet, since 'life is a continuum,' the divisions are also 'in a sense, arbitrary,' 'dictated… by convenience' (74, 138). In fact, much of his analysis is devoted to showing how variations in form were possible, even without violating their traditional framework (e.g. 98).

In terms of its scholarly background, Cairns's analysis appears to be related to discussions of recurring situations in linguistics (as by Firth) and rhetoric (as by Burke); his use of the phrase 'real life' continued, coincidentally or not, that of Gardiner (1922: 353). These sources in part reflected input from Gunkel. It should be noted, however, that classics itself had a relevant tradition, set forth by August Boeckh (1877), whose emphases on genres and their functions had influenced Gunkel.[141] A partial English translation of Boeckh's major work in 1968 may have drawn fresh attention to this perspective.

Cairns did not emphasize organizational settings, as distinct from functions, but external settings were treated along with other aspects by a number of writers. Such writers included Mary Lefkowitz, who described the 'form and purpose' of victory odes at Olympic and other games (1976: 1), and Bruno Gentili, who presented a major work on 'poetry and its public in Ancient Greece' (1984; ET 1988). It was generally agreed that a given genre could be used in a variety of external settings, even though a certain kind of setting would be especially appropriate.[142] One reason was that literature could be presented primarily for enjoyment or entertainment, just

---

141.   *BFC*: 227-28, 249-50, 256.

142.   For instance, according to Burkert (1979: 56), myth and ritual were 'close to, but not necessarily dependent upon, each other.'

as Sherzer observed for Kuna culture. Classicists, who had long recognized the entertainment function, continued to do so, further emphasizing the variability of purposes and styles (Stehle 1997: 57; Aloni 1997: 28).

Evidence was presented, further, that even in ancient times—prior to extensive literary adaptations—a given genre was connected with more than one kind of occasion (Clay 1989: 7; Käppel 1992: 19-20). Jenny Clay thus discussed the function of Homeric hymns in terms of the political-religious role they played instead of relating them to specific settings.[143]

Lutz Käppel, discussing the paean, observed the usefulness of biblical form criticism's procedure but indicated that this would need to be taken up in the modified way that had by then been developed in Buss 1978 (reprinted above, Part I, Essay 5), cited in detail, and by Berger (1992: 19-20). Indeed, Käppel was not merely interested in the flexibility of the genre as an externally describable phenomenon but, more so, in an exploration of its communicative function.[144]

An impressive study by Eva Stehle dealt with 'performance and gender' (1997). She dealt carefully with several types of poetry in relation to their occasions (conceived not just externally, although she addressed organizational questions) and with regard to their 'psychological efficacy.' Like Käppel, she made use of the phrase *Sitz im Leben* (21). In fact, the term *Sitz im Leben* came to be used without explanation by other classicists—for instance, by Michael von Albrecht (1992: 13) and, even in an English-language work, by Simon Pulleyn (1997: 156).

Finally, it is worth noting that Jan Stenger identified four concrete occasions (*Sitze im Leben*) for odes celebrating athletic victory, which involved different times, places, and audiences. These variations served three major purposes: to praise the victor, to create a long-term memory of the event, and to depict cultural (including ethical) values (2004: 48-52). Both the locational and the functional aspects of the pragmatics of the genre were thus observed.

16. *Assessment*

Two major kinds of conclusion can be reached on the basis of the present overview. One concerns the possibility of an improved understanding of the notion of life situation; the other concerns the

---

143. In fact, Gregory Nagy identified 'occasion' with the socially structured speech act of a genre—in effect, its role (1994/95: 13).

144. Jäger had described genres very briefly in connection with 'communicative situations' (1975: 140).

reality of interdisciplinary exchanges and the possible contributions such exchanges may make.

a. *Toward a relational conception of Sitz im Leben*

If one takes into account the various contributions that have been made, one can arrive at a conception of *Sitz im Leben* that is in line with relational theory. This concept holds together (1) degrees of both connectivity and a separateness, (2) generality and particularity, and (3) external (material) and internal (mental) views. Specifically, the following observations were reported in the present essay:

1. Speech performs a variety of tasks in reflecting different aspects of life.[145] Truth, in the sense of what is intellectually adequate, comes in different varieties that depend on the issues involved.[146]
2. Social and linguistic relations actually or potentially recur; they are not purely particular. Thus they need to be treated reflectively.[147] Even when only a single instance is presented, it is always perceived 'as' a structure which is in principle not limited to one occurrence.
3. There are connections between linguistic, ideational, and behavioral/experiential phenomena, but these connections are not rigid.[148]
4. Associations between these phenomena have a certain rationale, but not so strict that one speaks of their necessity.[149]
5. The roles of the persons involved and the purpose of the occasion are more important than the external setting.[150]
6. Situations are best treated in a way that highlights how they are interpreted by their participants ('subjective') rather than simply as externally describable ('objective')

145. Thus, most of those discussed.

146. Thus, Simmel, Medvedev, Voloshinov, Wittgenstein (by implication), Austin, Burke, and Hymes.

147. Degrees of reflectivity have varied widely, to be sure, and cannot be assessed without entering into detailed discussions of individual works.

148. Thus, most scholars that have been discussed.

149. Thus (besides Gunkel), Medvedev, Riesel, Argyle, Barker and Wright, Buss (implicitly some other biblical scholars also), Bowlby, Halliday, Levinson, Vosskamp, and Cairns—according to the order in which they are treated in the present essay.

150. See, e.g., Firth, Malinowski, Švejcer, Havránek, Riesel, Soisalen-Soininen, Levinson, Carr, Sherif, Buss, Müller, Fishman, Hymes, Fabian, Sherzer, Köhler, and Lefkowitz.

settings.[151] Connections between situations and speech are closer (both in terms of regularity and in terms of logic) if one gives attention to their interpretational aspects rather than simply to their external aspects.

7. Situations are multidimensional.[152] For instance, a very simple two-dimensional square can be formed by the two processes death and honor and the two relationships spouse and enemy. These factors can be combined in different ways. Death and honor and, similarly, spouse and enemy do not exclude each other, and three or four of these factors may have to be taken into account on a given occasion. One can also deal with situations in terms of different levels of generality.[153] In doing so, one can choose any phenomenon as primary. Thus, in treating the situation of the death of an enemy, one can begin with death as a basic category and then subdivide, or one can begin with enmity and then subcategorize. There is, then, not just one correct ordering.

8. Relations and, accordingly, classifications are often 'fuzzy.' For instance, enmity comes in degrees, not in a simple bifurcation. Consequently, the most important operation is not classification (contra Artistotelian essentialism) but attention to a variety of relations.[154]

Several of these recognitions modify Gunkel's conception, although they were in part inspired by it. Arising in a number of disciplines, they contributed to conceptual changes in biblical form criticism, which were then noted by members of other fields, especially in medieval studies and classics.[155]

b. *Interdisciplinary movements*
The present survey has described an extensive movement of ideas across disciplinary boundaries. What are some theoretical implications of such a movement?

151. Thus, Voloshinov, M. Bakhtin, Jaspers, Heidegger, Sarte, Lipps, Abel, Korff, Burke, Black, Bitzer, Hobsbaum, Thomas, Parsons, Hymes, Ben-Amos, several biblical specialists (including Westermann, H.W. Robinson, Muilenburg, Fohrer, Knierim, Buss, and Boorer), Waltz, Jauss, W.-H. Schmidt, Cairns, Clay, Stehle, and Stenger.
152. Thus, Firth, Švejcer, Lewin, Carr, Sherif, Schank and Abelson, Pike, Crystal and Davy, Fishman, and Sherzer.
153. Thus, Rätsep.
154. Thus, expressly, Pike, Buss, and K. Goldstein. Cf. *CF*, 4.2, for relational logic.
155. Thus, W.-H. Schmidt and Käppel.

A much-debated question in the philosophy of science concerns the degree to which the different disciplines follow similar procedures. Dilthey, among others, argued for a major difference between the humanities and the rest of the sciences, including externally descriptive psychology. A different view was held by Otto Neurath, who pursued scientific unity in the 1920s and 1930s, in close conjunction with the socialist drive to increase unity within society and between nations. He did not envision tight or rigid unity, however. Rather, he decried the idea of 'the' system and was skeptical of logical coherence even within science (Cartwright *et al.* 1996: 187); the 'Encyclopedia of Unified Sciences' that was based on his ideas stressed only connections between the sciences, not their identity.[156] In part misunderstanding Neurath's program, reaction against the idea of unity set in toward the end of the twentieth century.[157]

A position that attracted considerable attention at that time was formulated by Ian Hacking, who stated that 'there is no set of features peculiar to all the sciences and possessed only by the sciences' (1996: 68). The words 'all' and 'only' indicate that what he rejected was an essentialist view, for essentialism holds that a certain complex of features appears in all members of a certain group and only there.[158] Hacking's rejection of essentialism is very appropriate, but it leaves open several alternatives, including atomistic nominalism (no features are shared by any two particular endeavors), monistic particularism or uni-formism (all endeavors follow one path), and relational theory, which recognizes partial continuity.

Of these alternatives, atomistic nominalism is probably not viable, in part for the simple reason that it cannot even be communicated. However, a position approaching uniformism was set forth by Edward Wilson. He argued that 'consilience'—a high degree of commonality—is true for all the sciences, indeed for all mental activities, including ethics and religion (1998). Against this stands the form-critical recognition that different issues require different approaches, so that there are various kinds of truth (Simmel) and different kinds of speech act.

156.   T. Kuhn's work of 1962 appeared in this 'Encyclopedia.' It is well known, ironically, for stressing the discontinuity between scientific paradigms.

157.   Discontinuity ('plurality') was emphasized by Suppes (1984: 118-34). However, his metaphysics was 'probabilistic'; such a conception implies that there is continuity along with discontinuity.

158.   This may also be what Dupré meant when he said that 'there is nothing common to the domain of science' (1993: 263).

More appropriate than either atomism or uniformism, relational theory leads one to predict that there is both continuity and discontinuity between human, including intellectual, pursuits. This prediction, however, leaves unanswered the question of how much continuity or discontinuity applies in any given case.

The most controversial interaction, perhaps, is between theology and other disciplines. Nevertheless, extensive influence of theology on philosophy is well attested,[159] and it is well known that theology has learned from philosophy and other disciplines. In any case, no study—whether officially 'religious' or not—is free of ontological and ethical assumptions. Fortunately, differences in worldview need not prevent positive interaction.

Biblical studies lies in an area of overlap between the religious and the secular, insofar as a distinction can be made. The literature studied is to a large extent religious, but the procedures employed are, or can be, largely secular. In fact, because of the importance of biblical texts to many people, they are examined with great care, probably both more intensely and more extensively than any other body of materials has been treated (at least in the West).

Nevertheless, the fact that religious content and more-or-less secular procedure are combined in biblical studies does not appear to be widely acknowledged. In fact, there is some resistance both outside and inside biblical studies against such an acknowledgment.

On the one hand, biblical study continues to be viewed with reserve in many academic circles, perhaps especially in the US, where (because of a strong separation between state and religion) many academics are not familiar with sophisticated forms of the study of religion. For instance, it is striking that Z. Harris failed to refer to Gunkel's formulation, although it seems clearly to have conditioned his program of discourse linguistics. Perhaps he feared that reference to this background would reduce the persuasiveness of his proposal among secular academics, or perhaps he simply did not expect his readers to be acquainted with biblical form criticism. Still, some scholars in a number of disciplines have acknowledged learning from biblical studies. This is especially true in Germany, perhaps because much of the form-critical program was carried out there.

On the other hand, there has been considerable reluctance in certain theological traditions (especially in Germany) to accept

159.   See, among many other surveys, *CF*, chapters 3 and 7, and Buss 2006.

secular analysis—including structural literary criticism, psychology, sociology, and the general history of religions—for their work. Gunkel, in fact, was unusual in his openness to other disciplines and other cultures. Even Berger, whose theological outlook is more open than many of his German compatriots, has been reserved about the contributions that anthropology and psychology can make to an understanding of texts that deal with faith (1987: 260 [despite the support he stated in 1986: 144]). Maintaining a difference between faith and human 'life,' he limited the scope of the 'life situation' he discussed to the Christian community (1977: 114). Still, in recent years the pendulum has swung toward interaction, especially but not only in the US.

It is important to note that cooperation both in society and in scholarship does not need to smother individuality or eradicate distance. The present survey has focused primarily on the positive side of interaction, that is, on the fact that scholars have learned from fields other than their own. Yet there have also been indications of an absence of connection. Even Gunkel had an imperfect understanding of other fields, which led him to construct a highly rigid view of genres. Fortunately, his misunderstanding had the advantage of leading him to a sharply etched conception, which stimulated further work. Even divergence (in this case, misunderstanding) can contribute to communication, especially to its richness or complexity.

In any case, the interchange that has been described illustrates again that a major advance in one field often takes place when a new idea is introduced from another. Gunkel's program, stimulated by extensive outside contact, provided a powerful impetus for biblical scholars. When his program became known to scholars in other fields, it provided a stimulus for them as well.[160] It is likely

160.   On the basis of the evidence presented, the degrees of probability concerning Gunkel's impact on the work of scholars in other fields can be rated as follows: Such an impact is extremely likely, although not explicitly attested, for Bally, Gardner (and thus Malinowski), the Bakhtin circle, Wittgenstein, Burke, and Z. Harris. Awareness of Gunkel's program is overtly established for the anthropologists Hymes and Dundes, although the degree of direct influence is unclear. For at least one philosopher (Abel), several German medievalists, the classicists Aly, Käppel, Stehle, and Stenger, and the folklorists Ben-Amos, Jason, Bausinger, and Honko, a connection is acknowledged or implied by the use of the term *Sitz im Leben*. A number of the figures mentioned were highly influential for later studies, so that the indirect impact of the form-critical program ranged widely. In no case, of course, was Gunkel's program the only factor in stimulating a given analysis.

that in the future, too, biblical studies can both receive from and contribute to other fields. The same can probably be said for work in most disciplines.

How far can interdisciplinary endeavors be taken? The notion of a 'life situation' for the context of speech is directly applicable only to human phenomena. Thus this notion's flowing back and forth between disciplines shows only that those disciplines that deal with human phenomena—not necessarily all disciplines—are interconnected. Yet it is easy to see analogous conditions in nonhuman organisms in that a given situation leads to one or more typical responses. Nonliving phenomena similarly can be described in terms of how a given set of events has a characteristic outcome. Thus there is no sharp dividing line between the fields.

Concluding Reflections Concerning Relational Form Criticism

Relations both connect and separate and thus involve both generality and particularity. This duality has profound social implications, for it implies a respectful place for individuals and groups (including the still downtrodden and marginalized) with partial connectivity and partial distance between them.[1] In the present volume, however, intellectual implications for biblical studies are emphasized.

Connectivity implies that processes have reasons.[2] While particularist ('nominalist') philosophers hold that an event of one type is regularly succeeded by an event of another type without there being a reason for that succession, relational observations point to at least an element of non-arbitrary connection between all phenomena from the physical to the human.[3] On the human level, connections become conscious, or at least subconscious. Accordingly, one aspect of biblical form criticism is to identify significant (or at least fairly significant) connections between thoughts, linguistic expressions,

1. See *CF* (in which class, gender, and 'race' play important—although not essentialist or rigid—roles) and briefly above, Part I, essay 8.

2. The term 'reasons' (in the singular, 'a reason' or 'the reason') has a meaning quite different from the word 'reason,' which was used in the Enlightenment to refer to critical thinking. In fact, during the Enlightenment—which was largely nominalist in outlook—the rejection of reasons for natural (especially, physical) processes supported empirical science. See *CF*, 1.1; 4.3.

3. Hume even questioned causality, insofar as it goes beyond regularity in sequence, as an unverifiable form of connectivity. In contrast, Roger Penrose argues that 'what is really fundamental are relations of causality' (Lee Smolin, *The Trouble with Physics* [Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2006], p. 244). This position fits a relational outlook if causality is not altogether determinist. See *CF*, 4.3; 5.7, and above, Part II, §1.

and the situations in which utterances are made.[4] Only by recognizing such connections is an utterance really 'understood.'[5]

A personal illustration may be appropriate. When I began teaching, my students repeatedly proposed papers that would investigate 'why' something was the case. Having been trained in the particularist tradition, my response was that we cannot determine 'why,' we can only describe 'what' happened. In a way, this was sound advice for beginning students, for questions of 'why' are much harder to handle than descriptions. Nevertheless, I have come to see that the most important questions are left unaddressed by purely descriptive accounts.[6]

How, then, can 'why' questions be answered? Obviously, one can draw on physics, biology, psychology, and sociology ('he fell because he was struck by a rock,' 'she ate because she needed food,' etc.). All of us have a rudimentary knowledge of such matters, with which we operate on a daily basis. Often, such knowledge can be sharpened by awareness of the discipline that deals with a given area of life.

To be sure, caution is called for in drawing on various disciplines. Disciplinary contributions are largely (although, of course, not entirely) negative; they undermine some widely held opinions ('prejudices') through careful attention to relevant data. That is why they are called 'disciplines.' In fact, it is highly questionable to 'use' uncritically a model that has been developed by someone else. Models exist to be tested and adjusted. Thus proper procedure is not to 'apply' models but to modify or 'construct' forms, which means to 'find' them insofar as they 'fit' the data. Forms identified in this way can then aid other disciplines (both secular and religious) as they encounter comparable phenomena.

Does recognition of reasonableness mean that one should approve of reality as it is? No, for seeing a reason why something is done is not equivalent to declaring it good. For instance, oppressive activities and theft can make practical sense for those who engage in them. Indeed, relations are not always friendly.

Although connectivity—as distinct from mere conjunction—implies a certain rationality, it does not imply rigidity, in part because many relations operate simultaneously. Even local conventions are usually flexible, since flexibility is useful, so that generic

---

4. Even linguistic forms are not completely arbitrary, as is reported below, in the Appendix, §§6, 7, 8.

5. See above, Part I, essays 5, 8, on understanding reasons for something vs. understanding the content of a thought.

6. In the present study, reasons for literary phenomena are illustrated in Part I, essays 2, 6, 7, 8, and 10.

rules should be stated in terms of probability.[7] Furthermore, since there are many kinds of connections, classifications can vary according to one's interest and may exhibit multidimensionality by giving attention to overlapping considerations.[8]

However, connectivity is only one aspect of relations. There are limits to both reasonableness and understanding. This may be especially true for human phenomena. Social rules or conventions appear to be in part reasonable and in part arbitrary, 'mere' conventions. Individual behavior can be unpredictable to a considerable extent. There are then no strict connections between ideas and their life situations and between linguistic and other aspects of a text.[9] Sometimes associations can merely be noted, without being explained. 'Difference'—a kind of relation, for one cannot be 'different' by oneself—is similarly due partly to significant divergence and partly to happenstance.

A combination of reasonableness and lack thereof holds true for the figure of God in the Hebrew Bible. This figure acts in many ways comprehensibly but often also mysteriously. In fact, biblical tradition has contributed to the formulation of relational theory, in which the duality that includes reason and mystery is accepted.[10]

Indeed, partial—but only partial—connectivity appears in many human operations. The various disciplines, including theology, are not altogether separate from each other, although they each consider a special aspect of reality. Differing orientations, religious or otherwise, are not altogether distinct. After all, if something is reasonable, it is likely to recur in different traditions; in part for this reason, it is useful to take account of various cultures.[11] Past and

---

7.   See below, Appendix, §5.

8.   For multidimensionality, see above, Part II, §§2, 5, 6, and below, Appendix, §§4, 5, 7, 8, 11. That genres can be classified differently is now acknowledged by Raymond C. Van Leeuwen and Tremper Longman III in *The Changing Face of Form Criticism for the Twenty-First Century*, eds. M. Sweeney and E. Ben Zvi (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), pp. 66, 183. It is implied also by Carol A. Newsom, 'Spying out the Land: A Report from Genology,' pp. 437-50 in *Seeking Out the Wisdom of the Ancients: Essays Offered in Honor of Michael V. Fox* (Winona Lake, IN, 2005).

9.   See, e.g., below, Appendix, §6.

10.   See Buss, 'The Impact of Faith on Relational Thought,' *Consensus* 31, no. 2 (2006), pp. 75-85, and *CF*, 3.3.

11.   Kenton Sparks acknowledges cross-cultural commonality but does not give attention to rationale; this may be why his theoretical options are limited to 'realism' (in the sense of essentialism) and 'nominalism' (*Ancient Texts for a Study of the Hebrew Bible* [Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2005], pp. 6-9).

present versions of a single tradition naturally exhibit continuities as well as discontinuities. One of the strengths of the relational approach to form criticism is that it transcends such boundaries even while largely respecting them.

Transcendence takes place in part since relations are in principle general and can thus be viewed as possibilities. Although basic relations occur quite frequently, more elaborate sets of relations constituting complex forms may be only possible, that is, without instantiation, or may occur only once.[12] However, in an actual object, what is most interesting about it may be its form as possibility, that is, its applicability in another context, although usually after some adjustment.[13]

A focus on form as a possibility to be considered has important implications for the relationship between religious and non-religious approaches to the Bible.[14] Non-religious readers may find that biblical literature has aesthetically interesting and ethically challenging things to say without relying on religious authority. The biblical theme of support for the downtrodden already has wide appeal. Religious readers, in turn, may find that secular endeavors, such as psychology and sociology, can shed light on the dynamics of the text. If so, faith will not blind, and it will be apparent—to state the matter in biblical phraseology—that 'wisdom' does not negate the revelation that comes in divine speech and that 'redemption' fulfills rather than negates the aim of 'creation.' At the same time, there will be room for critique, for criticism assumes some sort of common ground. Each side can therefore challenge the other instead of merely talking past the other. An approach that deals

---

12.   In fact, 'form' was identified as particular by W. Richter in 1971 (cited repeatedly above). The idea that a 'genre' may have only one example has a long history and appears again in Kenton Sparks, *Ancient Texts*, 10.

13.   See *CF*, 5.3. 'Possibility,' as used here, includes the idealistic version that appears, for instance, in Walter Brueggemann, *The Word that Redescribes the World* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2006), p. 73, but it is not limited to it.

14.   See Helmut Utzschneider ('Was ist alttestamentliche Literatur? Kanon, Quelle und literarische Ästhetik als LesArts alttestamentlicher Literatur,' in *Lesarten der Bible* [ed. H. Utzschneider and E. Blum; Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2006], pp. 65-83), who distinguished between three approaches to a text, using the terminology 'aesthetics,' 'source,' and 'canon.' According to Utzschneider, aesthetics deals with possibility. In saying this, he was indebted to Wolfgang Iser's discussion of the role of imagination in literature; to this should be joined attention to logic, best viewed as the study of possibility, and to science, which deals with what is realistically possible.

with texts in a significant way without accepting their religious or metaphysical assumptions is quite common in anthropology, the general history of religion, and classics.[15] Biblical studies can contribute similarly, not only in methodology (as with the notion of *Sitz im Leben*) but also through the identification of forms that appear.

The program of form criticism as a concern for genres is not novel, for versions of it have been practiced for two millennia,[16] although the overtly relational perspective provides a new angle. Specifically, while 'historical criticism' has a primary orientation toward past particularity and the application of a text relates it to present actuality, form criticism considers the generality of a text, potentially in a reflective way.

A complete form criticism looks at all aspects of literature— verbal, ideational, and pragmatic—together. Such a procedure is in line not only with Gunkel's program but also with Azariah de' Rossi's 1573 formulation: 'The words of the poems must be correct for the voice [content, including especially mood], just as the voice must be appropriate for the required occasion.'[17] In line with traditional theory, de Rossi's formulation still viewed appropriateness in intrinsic terms, while particularist outlooks highlighted more-or-less arbitrary conventionality. The relational view considers both aspects and thus seeks insight while acknowledging free play.

15. For some examples, see above, Part II, §15 (classics), and the Appendix, §3 (anthropology).

16. See above, Part I, essay 9.

17. Cited in Adele Berlin, *Biblical Poetry Through Medieval Jewish Eyes* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), p. 53, and *BFC*, p. 75.

Part III Appendix

Relational Form in Various Disciplines

1. *A Common Pattern*

In *The Concept of Form in the Twentieth Century* (*CF*), I have sketched the development of relational theory in the 'long' twentieth century (from c. 1880 to the present). That work gave only cursory attention to individual disciplines other than philosophy. The following overview gives attention to specific disciplines, especially to developments in the humanities and social sciences.

In the West (that is, much of Europe and the US), disciplines have exhibited a common pattern to a remarkable extent.[1] From the latter part of the Middle Ages on, this pattern involved a move from Aristotelian essentialism to particularism (including an emphasis on history) and thereafter to relational conceptions. What comes after that cannot be predicted, of course, but a desideratum for the future is a better exploration of the relation between existence and value. In any case—lest one overemphasize historical change—it should be noted that relational theory is a newcomer only in the sense that it is a newly explicit version of a long-standing perspective that absorbs some modern insights.

It is true, an 'ultramodernist' view—one version of 'postmodernism' (see *CF*, 6.3)—may be ready to jettison past structures, including relational conceptions (together with their social ideals). In response to such a negative view, however, it can be observed that reality exists to a large extent in layers. Atoms, cells, and so forth remain as forms of organization, even though specific forms of them may disappear; repeatedly, they become parts of a succeeding whole that is more 'complex,' as we commonly use that term. What is more complex is not necessarily 'better' in a moral sense, but human beings do enjoy as much complexity as they can handle and thus tend to strive for it.[2] In fact, it is likely that later developments in a

---

1. The present overview does not attempt to report equally work published in all countries, but the picture would not change greatly if a fuller representation were provided.
2. See *CF*, 6.3; 10.

given discipline cannot be adequately understood without at least a basic knowledge of earlier endeavors. Such a perspective has come to be called 'transmodern'; it learns from the old but also moves into new territory.[3]

2. *Mathematics, Physics, Biology*

In a work on 'the ethics of geometry,' David Lachterman presented evidence that in modern times mathematics moved beyond an older essentialism. Specifically, in the work of Descartes, the subject matter of mathematics transitioned from a pre-'given' 'form' to a dynamic (human) 'formula' or 'construction' (Lachterman 1989: 5, 198).[4] The new approach was called 'analytic' (rather than 'synthetic') and led, for instance, to the development of calculus. The next step, around 1900 CE, was the emergence of relational conceptions (as described in *CF*, 4.2). Thus it appears that Michel Foucault was in error when he judged in 1968 (854) that mathematics lacked a movement parallel to what happened in other disciplines.

One branch of mathematics that arose with vigor at the end of the nineteenth century dealt with assessments of probability, which coheres well with relational thinking, since it gives joint attention to regularity and unpredictability. Probability became a central notion in virtually every discipline, as will be seen.

In 1966 Max Jammer presented the following sketch of the history of physical theory: Aristotelian physics, which was concerned with qualities that are characteristic of objects as a whole, was succeeded by Newtonian physics, which focused on primary qualities thought to be inherent in atomic particles; this conception was in turn replaced by the 'language of interactions.' The second, atomistic, conceptualization was clearly connected with the individualistic outlook of postmedieval culture and society, for atoms were widely envisioned from about 1600 CE on (cf. Lasswitz 1963), even though there was not much evidence for elementary particles at that time. When evidence for small particles did appear at the end of the nineteenth century, physics moved beyond atomism toward an interactional orientation that was prominent in society more generally.

A striking development in twentieth-century physics was the discovery that there is great diversity together with considerable

---

3.   David Clines (1998) described the relational image of a net as 'postmodern,' using a broader term.

4.   The same historical point was made a little earlier by Jean Piaget and Rolando Garcia, who stated that 'the study of the properties of curves was...replaced by that of the algebraic properties of the corresponding equations' (1983, chap. 3, part 2).

unity. On the one hand, there appeared a large variety of particles, waves, and forces. On the other hand, there was a gradual recognition that these various entities and operations are theoretically connected with each other.[5] Energy and mass were found to be mutually convertible; three of the four major forces were seen to be connected; and 'string theory' suggested that particles and forces reflect a common structure. Experiments toward the end of the century indicated that all realities are 'nonlocal,' that is, they are at least partially connected in their very being.[6] At the same time, extensive evidence, and probably social predilection, supported an assumption of contingency.

The history of biology in the West ran parallel to that of mathematics and physics. The first major aim of European biology was description, with a strong interest in classification. Belief in naturally-given species, each with their own essence in Aristotelian terms, culminated in a detailed taxonomy by Carl von Linnaeus in 1735. Soon after this achievement, nominalism became strong enough in biology so that classification could be thought of as dependent on human decision rather than reflective of natural essences (Mayr 1982: 182, 264). This change in the idea of species facilitated theories of biological evolution, which envisioned gradual transitions between species. During the twentieth century, evolutionary conceptions continued, in line with the observation that older insights do not become useless even as new ones are added. Yet, from near the end of the nineteenth century on, a major focus in biology was on 'form' or—more dynamically—'function,' that is, on the relations of the various parts of an organism to the operation of the whole (Coleman 1971: 143; G. Allen 1975: xv, 9).

In the words of Gary Webster and Brian Goodwin (1982: 117), apprehension of the orderly aspect of the biological process

> implies that the organismic domain has a 'form' and is, therefore, intelligible (which does not mean predictable), and that...the diversity of living forms...can be accounted for in terms of a relatively small number of generative 'rules.'

Webster and Goodwin also made clear that order is balanced by chance. After 1948 both information theory (in accordance with which DNA and RNA are conceptualized) and cybernetics (with positive and negative feedback) proved useful for the examination of structures and functions.

---

5.   See Greene 1999 for a history of this development.
6.   See Afriat and Selleri 1999.

3. *Anthropology*

Anthropology is a broad-gauged discipline. It gives attention not only to culture, which some interpreters consider to be its specialty, but also to human biology, psychology, and sociology. In the twentieth century, anthropology often focused on small communities, partly on the grounds that analysis of these should precede examinations of more elaborate societies and partly because smaller groups were on the verge of disappearing as separate entities. Yet, especially from the end of the twentieth century on, larger societies were also studied.

Anthropology underwent a development comparable to that of others fields. Early belief in a universal and stable human nature or essence gave way about 1750 to the notion of human progress and the belief that particular groups each have peculiar characteristics.[7] During the twentieth century, short- and long-range historical perspectives continued to leave their mark, but the concept of 'progress' was sharply modified.[8] Close attention was given instead to structures and functions—in other words, to recurring relationships.[9]

Although structural and functional approaches varied considerably, their basic character can be described. 'Structure' refers to the mutual relations of the parts of a society or culture (customs, ideas, specific organizations, and so on) without regard to their dynamic effects. 'Function' denotes dynamic relations, that is, the consequences of social or cultural processes. Such a definition of 'function' does not limit its use to a view which regards society as a harmonious whole, although A.R. Radcliffe-Brown may well have thought so.[10] Annemarie de Waal Malefijt rightly stated: 'If the study of functions is defined as the study of social consequences, it is important to keep in mind that consequences may be either positive or negative' (1968: 291).

Outstanding examples of structural analysis, with attention also to function, included observations by Radcliffe-Brown on the symbolic and practical interweaving of actions, verbal expressions,

---

7.   See *BFC*: 121.

8.   'Cultural neo-evolutionism' was described by Paul Erickson (1998).

9.   The categories of structure and function were, of course, not completely new; cf., e.g., Lowie 1937: 39-53, for nineteenth-century comparative law, and works by Comte and Spencer (see below for sociology).

10.   Radcliffe-Brown appropriately defined function as 'the contribution which a partial activity makes to the total activity of which it is a part'; but he said, problematically, that this notion implies a 'functional unity,' which he characterized with inadequate precision as a condition 'without… persistent conflicts which can be neither resolved nor regulated [what does 'regulated' mean?]' (1952: 181). Ruth Finnegan (1992: 126) listed a large number of folklore 'functions,' including protest.

and beliefs (1933); by Ruth Benedict on several different 'patterns of culture' (1934); by Gladys Reichard on interrelations within a complex system of ideas, symbolism (including color), and ritual (1950); by Claude Levi-Strauss on marriage and myth patterns (applying communication theory to both)[11]; and by Victor Turner on rituals, which also exhibit periodic 'anti-structure' (1969).[12] Structural analyses, more so than functional ones, typically had an intellectual cast; they showed how human beings have thoughts and use symbols, which together form a more or less coherent pattern. Mary Douglas's interpretation of biblical food laws (1966) was a good example of such a structural view.

Strict coherence or unity was not a necessary image in structural analysis. Thus, Clifford Geertz stated: 'Systems need not be exhaustively interconnected to be systems'; the challenge for analysis is 'as much a matter of determining independencies as interconnections, gulfs as well as bridges' (1973: 407).

Bronislaw Malinowski (1926) presented an analysis of narratives that illustrates some of the central issues of structure and function. He recognized three primary kinds of narratives: myths (including origin stories), sagas (dealing with events that are thought of simply as 'past' rather than as 'original'), and fairy or folk tales (accepted as fictional by hearers). Unlike a number of older theorists, however, he did not place these three narrative types into a chronological sequence with the assumption that one of them constituted the primary form from which the others descended.[13] Rather, he saw that all three types were present even in the relatively small group of the Trobiand Islanders and that the types differed from each other in regard to the kind of circumstances under which they were told and in the roles they played. The three kinds of narration thus reflected three dimensions of life. This synchronic thesis, which Malinowski combined with a view of the evolution of each of these narrative forms, soon won widespread acceptance.[14]

Although an orientation toward function is in some ways different from a historical bent, the two are by no means mutually exclusive. For instance, Marvin Harris, a historically oriented 'cultural materialist,' gave 'functional' explanations for food practices; that

11.   For example, Levi-Strauss 1958-73, I, chaps. 5, 15 (1958); II, chap. 5 (1973).

12.   In the biblical field, cf., e.g., Eichrodt 1933-39 and Hooke 1933.

13.   Sec *BFC*: 233.

14.   More controversial was Malinowski's similar thesis (1925) that magic, religion, and science do not follow an evolutionary sequence but are complementary structures, each with their own function. (This was Malinowski's point—not the idea that the three spheres are neatly distinguishable.)

is, he pointed to the material effects of such practices, such as the ecological advantages of the biblical prohibition of pork (cf. already Rappaport 1968). In fact, because of its dynamic character, a functional approach lends itself to synthesizing structural and historical perspectives and has thus also been widely used by Marxists.

Anthropological investigations showed tremendous variation in cultural phenomena, just as there is a huge multiplicity of biological forms, but functional and structural analyses also showed that culture is not purely arbitrary. The impressive variety of particular phenomena could be related to a smaller number of basic factors, as in biology. An important recognition was that what is 'general' or shared is not constituted so much by specific phenomena as by the relations which they reflect or exhibit. For instance, Jerome Bruner (1981: 258) related a variety of cultural forms to a 'psychological universal' (information-processing capacity) and to a 'universal cultural requirement' (to pass on tradition).

Not only cooperative, but also conflictual, relations were seen as being widely shared. Specifically, James C. Scott described patterns of dominance and resistance that are 'broadly comparable,' although their specific forms are varied (1990: xi). Accordingly, it has been possible to establish near-universals in social organization[15] and—especially—to recognize correlations between phenomena, such as between warfare and male power.[16]

By giving attention to correlations and interpreting them causally, functional considerations provided a basis for ethical judgment. This could mean either defense or criticism of one's own culture or another one, for the fact that certain practices have discernible consequences provides a basis for evaluation. The survival of a group is an important value, but other consequences are also relevant, such as joy or satisfaction for group members. After all, survival—which was one-sidedly emphasized by Robert Merton[17]—is only a minimal standard even for biological evolution.

15.   It is, however, questionable to claim absolute universals, as distinguished from widely shared structures, especially for phenomena as such instead of for relations (in part against Donald E. Brown 1991). Gert Dressel (1996) described both 'basic human experiences' (involving gender, death, food, conflict, etc.) and historical variability.

16.   Universals and correlations have been examined in part with the aid of the 'Human Relations Area Files,' a huge set of analyzed field reports. Correlations, once recognized, need to be assessed in terms of causation. For instance, it is likely that warfare—brought about by competition in situations with limited resources—has furthered male dominance (Dawson 1956: 131-36 [1928]; M. Harris 1987: 194, 341).

17.   Merton (1949: 38-47) noted that an observation of functions readily grounds an evaluation, either positive or negative, but he unduly narrowed

Malinowski spoke of functions in both collective and individual/ biological terms, not only in terms of survival but with a broad range of considerations (e.g. 1944a: 83). The individual/biological aspect of his assessment was criticized at one time, but now it is judged to have been valuable, since it avoided a monolithically social view. With his consequence-oriented functionalism, Malinowski defended subjugated cultures against disruption by colonial masters (which he sometimes sharply criticized)[18] and provided critiques of his own society.[19]

In fact, most anthropological perspectives were not grounded in 'idle curiosity' (an attitude denied by Franz Boas, who opposed racism)[20] but had a pragmatic—in fact, an ethical—basis. Historical orientations had already exhibited a practical concern; they sought to liberate the present from the authority of the past, to support national and individual differences, and to provide justification for the conquest of 'lower' groups.[21] Thus, a practical concern was not new, but structural and functional views were usually more appreciative of other societies, for the special characteristics of these societies could be seen to play a useful role in their own context. Yet functional analysis could also recognize the presence of problems ('dysfunctions').

In relation to their own society, virtually all significant anthropological studies engaged in explicit or implicit 'cultural critique' (G. Marcus and Fischer 1986). Specifically, the examination of cultures was often pursued in order to gain insight into human life in such a way as to move one's own culture to 'be more in keeping with

their focus by defining 'function' in terms of 'adaptation or adjustment' (50, although he gave a report of broader [better?] definitions, 23-24, 47).

18.   See Wendy James 1973 and Stocking 1995: 368, 396, 399; cf. Kuklick 1991 for Evans-Pritchard. It is true that anthropologists have 'often colluded' with imperialism (Fabian 1998: 130), but that was not because they were functionalists rather than evolutionists.

19.   He held (e.g. in 1936) that it is the task of anthropology to shed light on such social questions as war (he advocated a downgrading of the independence of nations); his notion of 'freedom' (1944b) was similar to T.H. Green's (discussed in *CF*, 1.3), providing the basis for a liberal social democracy.

20.   Boas 1940: 638 (1888 lecture). Boas opposed racism on the ground that, while cultures vary, 'in different races, the organization of the mind is on the whole alike' (1901: 11; cf. 1940: 259 [1932]). Kroeber observed that Boas devoted unusually high energy to the issue of race and race prejudice (Darnell 1998: 274); the fact that he was Jewish by descent may have played a role in this commitment.

21.   See *BFC*: 127-30; Stocking 1998: 368.

human needs and human potentialities' (M. Mead).[22] Like others, the anthropologist Ralph Linton (1952: 646) held it to be the job of the 'social scientist'—even when discovering 'common factors'—to 'plan for culture change.' Hardly anyone advocated that one's own group adopt the specific practices of another culture, but there were frequent calls for the creation of analogues in one's society or simply for the realization that one's own traditional practices are not necessarily the best possible. For example, there has been a close look at 'peaceful peoples' (Bonta 1993). Suggestions about what one can learn ran the gamut from the value of certain eating habits (S. Eaton *et al.* 1988) to a more personal kind of knowledge (Goulet 1998: 259).[23]

A major insight in anthropology was the recognition of variety, another general principle with practical implications. One was that variety encourages toleration for, and even delight in, differences among groups, thus expressing respect for the other (cf. Geertz 1983: 16). Another implication was that major variations are also possible for one's own group, so that alternatives can be projected. Also potentially valuable was support for 'local/global linkages, networks and alliances,' which avoid both isolation and a globalization that establishes uniformity (Santos 2007: viii).

There were those who rejected evaluation of any sort, but this view was sharply criticized—especially from the activist 1960s on—on the ground that lack of criticism supports the status quo (Manganaro 1990: 36).[24] Thus, Stanley Barrett explicitly asked for 'moral commitment,' saying that 'the discipline must be built around the investigation of the major consequences of differential power and inequality with the goal of changing and improving society' (1984: 221-22). Similarly, Fredrik Barth, emphasizing that cultures are 'not separable into homogenized and mutually alien cultures,' called for engagement with 'the ideas of other people, not as exemplars of culture, but for their insights into life;' such exchange

---

22.   Thus, in the 1961 preface to her 1928 treatment of Samoan girls, the purpose of which was clear in its subtitle, 'A Psychological Study of Primitive Youth for Western Civilization,' and in its content. Later study suggests that Mead's wish to make a practical contribution led her to make a less than fully accurate report (see Lapsley 1999: 143-47, for a fairly sympathetic assessment of this situation).

23.   A whole range of practical applications was surveyed in Podolefsky and Brown 1989.

24.   For instance, William Sumner (1907), whose major theme was that (local) mores can make anything right, did sometimes show a normative bias in support of present culture (e.g. 169, 266, 525).

includes mutual criticism (1995: 66-67).[25] Practical applications dealt with agriculture, the environment, health, nutrition, resettlement, industry, education, and treatment of the aged (Kedia and van Willigen 2005).

A notable phenomenon toward the end of the century was an interest in 'reflexivity,' that is, in looking at oneself as one interacts with the persons studied and as one writes an ethnographic report. This stance included the recognition of a mutual give-and-take in which the observer is also the observed. Renato Rosaldo calls this kind of knowledge 'relational' (1989: 204). It led to autobiographical modes of writing[26] and supported the recognition that, despite attempts at 'fairness,' there cannot be neutrality.

The term 'postmodern' came to be employed in different ways by a number of writers. Stephen Tyler used the word in a skeptical sense (1987). In contrast, Geoffrey Samuel employed the term in a relational sense (1990: 164 [cf. *CF*, 6.3]), that is, he provided a model in which individuals and social wholes find equal recognition. He described the substance of anthropology as the 'relatedness' of human beings, both with each other and with other beings (12). He included biological aspects of human life in his work and said that anthropology is useful for society precisely when it is a science, which moves beyond 'a straightforward description of the world' to set forth theories (20-24). The 'postmodernism' described by M. Fischer was also relational (1997); among other things, it was concerned with recent developments in communication and international relations.[27]

In these various discussions, the word 'form' was seldom used. However, when Gregory Bateson dealt with the 'ecology of the mind,' he spoke of 'form' in terms of 'relationship' (1972: 154). In his recognition of form, he allowed for random processes, recognizing implicitly that relations involve a degree of separateness and indeterminacy (255).

4. *Sociology*

Sociology can be considered a subdivision of anthropology, sharing with it many basic theoretical issues. During the nineteenth century, Auguste Comte (1830-42) and Herbert Spencer (1876)

---

25. Similarly, for instance, Edgerton 1992; Shore 1996: 286, 380; M. Salmon 1997: 47.

26. Including Clifford and Marcus 1986 and Behar and Gordon 1995.

27. Similarly, in response to extensive criticism of 'postmodernism,' Sherry Ortner described it in relational, rather than in nominalist/skeptical, terms (1999).

provided descriptions of society and culture in such a way as to furnish both a cross-sectional ('static') and an evolutionary view. The evolutionary orientation was relatively new at that time and probably represented the primary interest. After that, there was a shift in emphasis. While the sociology of historical development by no means died,[28] the predominant focus—including for Marxists[29]— was on cross-sectional interaction amongst human beings and thus on 'structure' or 'function.' Of these two categories, 'function' is, of course, the more dynamic one (Firth 1934: 24).

The new approach was closely related to religious/ethical/political commitments. Such commitments often included the desire to achieve social welfare and harmony, in opposition both to *laissez-faire* capitalism and authoritarian Marxism. For instance, Émile Durkheim envisioned society as an ordered whole in which the division of labor creates an 'organic solidarity' (1893) and for which religion expresses the idea of self-transcending generality (1912). As a moderate socialist, he stood close to the French 'solidarist' school of political philosophy. Georg Simmel, another early leader (and fellow Jew), developed a 'formal' sociology focusing on the major kinds of human relations, including both cooperation and conflict (1908, etc.). He, too, favored moderate reform, holding that religion is contrary to competition (1906: 65). Talcott Parsons's structural-functional perspective was linked to support for the welfare state and to the ideals of the '60s.[30] It gave place to religion as an

28.   See Dennis Smith 1991. The present study is itself an instance of the sociology of history.

29.   Among those partly or strongly influenced by Marx, notable were Levi-Strauss (structuralist, moderately indebted to Marx), Althusser, and others who developed a 'structural' Marxism (cf. Ortner 1984: 139). G.A. Cohen, a Marxist, also stressed the importance of 'functional explanation' (1978: 278). For the many different forms of Marxism, see Bhaskar 1989: 115-45.

30.   Gouldner 1970: 317. Parsons was stimulated by the Social Gospel, in which his father had been active together with his mother, who was also a suffragette (Buxton 1985: 280; Treviño 2001: xvi). Parsons supported the full inclusion of different groups (such as 'races') in society and in 1972 actively supported the presidential candidacy of George McGovern, the political standard bearer of the '60s movement in the US (Gerhardt 2001: 180, 183). In the 1950s, Parsons was investigated by the government, since he had defended some leftists (Keen 1993). After having been criticized by sociologists who were more Marxist, he received renewed favorable attention toward the end of the century (see, e.g., Treviño 2001: xv). A partially appreciative view of Parsons from a feminist perspective has been given, e.g., by Miriam Johnson (1989). Parsons, incidentally, took an interest in evolutionary aspects of society (thus, rightly, Baert 1998: 204).

ultimate framework of meaning, undergirding action (1978: 382). In any case, major contributions to sociology frequently had a moral, social-service dimension.[31]

Specifically, the personal commitments of many twentieth-century Western sociologists had religious components, even when these elements were sharply transformed.[32] For instance, Marxism, despite its atheism, was deeply indebted to biblical ethics and was, in fact, quasireligious. Those who revealed explicit religious inter-ests included Peter Berger, Robert Bellah, Andrew Greeley, and Robert Wuthnow, as well as the social theorists Amitai Etzioni (who studied with Buber) and Michael Lerner (who said that 'human beings are fundamentally *in relationship*' [1996: 94]). None of these were 'radical,' in the sense of proposing highly impractical schemes; neither were they, on the whole, 'conservative,' in the sense of failing to support change. Berger's attitude, to be sure, was relatively conservative, in line with his thesis that society is 'constructed,' for a constructivism that considers arrangements to be arbitrary readily supports a conservative outlook, unless it leans toward anarchism. In fact, something close to anarchy was advocated by Sanford Lyman and Marvin Scott, who expressed appreciation for Christianity for standing in tension with social structure (1989: 2-5, 307).[33]

It seems, then, that John Milbank was not accurate in drawing a contrast between Christianity and secular social theory. He said that Christianity espouses 'harmonic peace,' while secular theory is based on an 'ontology of violence' (1993: 1, 4, 5).[34] Not only is this view of Christianity one-sided, but much of twentieth-century social theory emphasized cooperation and care. Nevertheless, it is true that not all work in sociology was identifiably idealistic.

31. Ferdinand Tönnies's interest in 'community' (around 1900) was one such example. According to Donald Levine (1995: 241), major Italian sociologists early in the century had deep ethical concerns (specifically, conservative ones) even while claiming to make no moral judgments. For later views, cf. Haan *et al.* 1983 (especially the essay by Bellah); J. O'Neill 1989: 225; M. Smith 1994 (for the US from 1918 on, although 'objectivists' sold their services especially from the 1940s on); Yeo 1996 (for work from c. 1800 on, including contributions by women); Dosse 1995.

32. Vidich and Lyman 1985 have traced the extensive background of US sociology to different varieties of Christianity, together with transfor-mations and rejections of those traditions.

33. Berger and Thomas Luckmann declared their constructionism to be 'value free' (1966: 173). Perhaps in line with this view, Berger criticized leftist involvements by Christian churches (again, 1992: 206).

34. Among the various secular options, Milbank preferred 'skeptical postmodernism' (1997: 112).

'Functional' approaches in sociology typically pointed to processes that contribute positively to the operation of society. Among these, Parsons listed (a) adaptation to and manipulation of the external environment, (b) personal gratification, and (c) tension management (1956: 19). Hardly anyone doubted that these are imperatives for anything resembling what we know as a social system. More controversial was another of his imperatives: 'latent-receptive meaning integration,' which includes religion.

Functional analyses have been criticized for being excessively optimistic about the contribution of different groups to the welfare of society as a whole. Some of this criticism was justified, for some functionalists were oriented one-sidedly toward harmony, confusing reality with their ideal, which favored cooperative endeavors toward collective welfare. Yet the idea of harmony is not necessarily inherent in the concept of function. Rather, function can be understood neutrally (as it is in mathematics), so that functional analysis answers the question, 'What does this activity effect in interrelation with other activities in some system as a whole?' (Emmet 1972: 107).

One line in sociology (including 'Social Darwinism' and Marxism) valued self-assertion and competition. When pursued moderately, this line was helpful for recognizing existing hostilities, such as between 'classes' and 'races,' and in encouraging certain kinds of conflict instead of passive acquiescence of whatever happens. However, it should be mentioned that heavily conflict-oriented political theories—especially Marxism-Leninism, Nazism, and continuing *laissez-faire* capitalism—wreaked havoc.

With better balance, Simmel treated conflict as one of several kinds of relations (1908, IV). Lewis Coser showed that conflict can have a positive 'function'—that is, a certain advantage—for society (1956).

Closely connected with the issue of value was the question whether it is best to provide an 'external' description, with attention to cause and effect, or to recognize another's 'internal' point of view, with focus on the values and goals that are pursued. Marxists were to a large extent externally oriented, with special attention to economic factors, although many Marxists thought that pure materialism is 'vulgar'—actually bourgeois, fetishizing 'things.'[35]

Max Weber followed primarily the internal line, but he also treated mental factors as social causes and thus as externally active. Given his orientation toward an internal view, it was appropriate that he advocated 'value neutrality,' for an empathetic representation

35.   See, e.g., Ortner 1984: 139.

of another's values involves an imaginative transcendence of one's own preferences or commitments. However, his division between ethics and science reflected a predominantly nominalist outlook.[36] Differently, 'reflexive sociology' establishes, in Alvin Gouldner's words (1970: 495), 'the *relationship*…between being a sociologist and being a person.'

A path that combined external and internal approaches is possible within a relational perspective. Notable along this line was the 'symbolic interactionism[37] of G.H. Mead, a pragmatist, who viewed 'action' as both mental and physical in character. Jürgen Habermas absorbed ideas from both Mead and Karl Marx in his theory of 'communicative action,' which combined internal with external angles.[38] Similar in this regard was Niklas Luhmann's conception of society in terms of communicative processes.[39] As a matter of principle, Alain Touraine argued that sociology needs to affirm itself as 'relational analysis, equally removed from subjectivism and objectivism' (1984: 107).

Whether proceeding on an 'internal' or an 'external' basis, or both, sociology must generalize, insofar as it is a 'science.' What is the status of such theoretical generalizations? General patterns were usually treated neither as transcendent realities (contra Plato) nor as essences (contra Aristotle). Instead, they could be treated as 'ideal types,' that is, useful mental constructions (M. Weber 1951: 191 [1904]), or as 'pure forms,' that is, relations that are examined apart from other relations and without reference to the specific items that are involved in a relation (thus, Simmel 1908: 13).

Simmel's idea of 'pure forms' was similar to the normal procedure in the physical sciences, which treats a given process in a way that isolates a certain dynamic relation, ignoring for the moment other operative factors. For instance, a feather might fly in a straight line if it were not affected by more than one force. Roy Bhaskar, who called such a sociological view 'relational' (1989: 7), explicitly

---

36.   Weber was not a skeptical relativist, for he had definite political commitments based on neo-Kantian philosophy (Ciaffa 1998), but his claims of scholarly impartiality may indeed reflect a profound psychological anxiety; specifically, it may have reflected his ascetic life, with its accompanying repressed feelings (although he had a late emotional breakthrough; cf. V. Erickson 1992: 120).

37.   Herbert Blumer applied this label to G.H. Mead's view (1969).

38.   See *CF*, 5.6.

39.   Luhmann, however, limited communication to human society, excluding physical and organic interactions (e.g. 1997: 13). Communication has been emphasized also by Donald Ellis (1999).

referred to this similarity with physical theory. He said that a small number of basic social processes can account for many varied social phenomena, since the elemental processes interact with each other to create complex patterns (cf. Baert 1998: 192).

In any case, along a relational line, sociology came to operate with a large number of models. These involved not only the rather general conceptions of structure, function, and communication already mentioned but also more specific conceptions like 'system' (including cybernetic models, which are dynamic), 'text,'[40] 'inter-action,' 'dialogue,'[41] 'exchange' (although this was often discussed within a primarily individualistic perspective), 'reciprocity,' 'role,' 'agency,' 'power' (with different varieties),[42] 'oppression,' 'game' (as a model), and so on. Their focus ranged from small-scale interactions to larger, including global, patterns.[43]

On an intermediate level between the very small (the individual) and the very large (society or humanity as a whole), class and gender received extensive attention. Such an intermediate focus is important, but sociological research has also shown that patterns of class and gender are multiple and fluid. Class and gender forms may always have been complex and varied, but they became especially varied during the twentieth century.[44]

The relation between levels of organization came to be of interest, including not only the microsocial (interaction between individuals) and the macrosocial (the operation of society as a whole) but also the biological and inorganic levels. It became apparent that these levels interact and should not be treated as completely independent. In short, an 'Interaction Paradigm' is required (Sawyer 2005: 24, 205).

An interactive approach that became widespread from the middle of the twentieth century on saw society in terms of multiple 'networks,' that is, sets of relationships. Michel Maffesoli described the 'form' of society—especially in the somewhat fluid but not highly individualistic situation current in his time—as a 'network of networks' (1988, chap. 6, §4). An important theoretical feature

40.   Thus, Paul Ricoeur (1971a), R. Brown (see below, n. 79), and Edwina Taborsky (1997, with a non-skeptical, strongly organic, interpretation).

41.   Following Buber and M. Bakhtin (both indebted to H. Cohen); see, e.g., E. Sampson 1993.

42.   Feminists and some others often distinguish between 'power-over,' 'power-with,' 'power-to,' and so on. See *CF*, 8.2.

43.   There is no shortage of recent overviews (including Delanty 2005 and several already cited).

44.   See, e.g., Owen 1997.

of the network model was that it saw human beings as involved in many overlapping networks. High-density relations form 'clusters,' but their boundaries are indistinct and, further, depend on one's observational stance (John Scott 1991: 56-57, 129-30).

The network model not only pointed to connections but also recognized the integrity of the nodes, that is, of the individuals (and clusters of individuals) that enter into relationships. The assumption of integrity allowed for the possibility—in fact, the likelihood—that human beings are not merely passive, but active (thus, Giddens, Bourdieu, and Dorothy Smith).[45] Indeed, as is widely recognized, individuals have a certain independence in society, in part because of their 'physiological interaction with nature' or—otherwise stated—because of their biological constitution, which has antisocial aspects (Archer 1995: 127, 129; Layder 1997: 240).

A degree of individual independence appears to be due not only to biological factors but also, and even especially, to the operation of reflectivity, in which human beings examine their situation critically. This theme appeared in Foucault's late work (see *CF*, 7.4) and in Margaret Archer's 'morphogenetic' approach; the latter expressly presupposed that relational theory envisions a certain independence for the terms of a relation (1995). Referring to orientations that originate from the space 'between divinity and humanity' (129), Archer mentioned specifically the 'hermit,' the 'prophet,' the 'idealist,' and the reactionary 'recidivist' as persons who stand in tension with society.

Given the looseness in connections, a network approach often observed statistical correlations. Indeed, sociological research already employed probabilistic procedures at the beginning of the twentieth century, taking part in what has been called 'the probabilistic revolution' in scientific thought (Goldthorpe 2000, I: 261). Randall Collins has argued, rightly, that the use of such a procedure is of crucial theoretical importance, since probability implies both partial orderliness and partial independence (1988: 499).

The duality of order and indeterminacy had political implications. For instance, Roslyn Bologh advocated an 'interactive, relational perspective' (1990: 288). She acknowledged both conflict and sociability and defined the latter as a mutually enjoyable relation

---

45. According to Anthony Giddens, an 'agent [is one who] "could have acted otherwise"' (1979: 56); his position does not necessarily presuppose, but is compatible with, theoretical indeterminism. Pierre Bourdieu attributed 'indeterminacy' to individual dispositions, without explicitly grounding it in ontology (e.g. 1990: 77). Dorothy E. Smith (1999: 113) opposed '[skeptical] postmodernism's motiveless subject.'

that involves both separation and attachment (213, 236). She accordingly supported a combination of capitalism and socialism (302).[46]

Some late-twentieth-century sociologists who used the term 'postmodern' emphasized multiplicity rather than generality, but they did not take it to the point of skeptical relativism and thus are best described as relational.[47] For instance, Rob Stones outlined a 'reflexive' sociology which he called 'past-modern;' in it, he adhered to a certain realism, without which sociology has 'no critical edge' (1996: 232). Similarly, Myra Ferree *et al.*, dealing with issues of gender, stated that 'deconstructing static categories' does not imply '[skeptical] relativism and disorganized "diversity"' but, rather, invites questions of 'how,' 'what,' and 'why' (1999: xx).

McKim Marriott's work illustrates a well-rounded study standing on the border between sociology and anthropology. Employing a complex, 'relational,' approach for social and cultural studies of India, the study did not observe phenomena in isolation, nor did it view them in terms of rigid monolithic structures (such as 'purity,' static 'castes,' or 'forces of production'). Instead, it joined text with context and was multidimensional and fluid. It was not descriptive simply for its own sake but aimed to make a contribution to the social sciences that will provide general perspectives for a better understanding both of others and of oneself (1990: xii-xiii, 1-16). In showing the theoretical basis for the procedure, it made reference to the significance of relational logic and to similarities with phenomena in physics (17).

5. *Psychology*

According to Kurt Lewin (1936: 8-11; 1951: 57, 239), psychology passed through three stages in Western history; they parallel those of other disciplines. First there was an attempt to 'discover the essence of things;' then followed an outlook that was hostile toward theory and looked for facts; thirdly, the psychology of his own day asked 'questions about the "why," or in other words dynamic questions.' The 'laws' treated in this third stage can, according to Lewin,

---

46. Frank Hearn, with his call for 'solidarity' together with institutional and personal differentiation (1997: 174, 178), was similar in outlook to Bologh.

47. Thus, Richard Brown (1987, with an 'ironic' view; 1991: 7, 220, using the term 'postmodern' in a fairly affirmative sense but with a strong emphasis on 'construction;' 1995: viii, 10-15, supporting 'affirmation,' although leaving much unclear or open; cf. 1998: 19); and Steven Seidman (1998: 347, even defending 'progress').

be stated mathematically by saying that a certain behavior (or mental event) is a 'function' of the whole 'situation,' which includes the environment along with the person involved. This historical sketch of the discipline was, as Lewin admitted, somewhat overly schematic, but it is true that relational perspectives of various kinds dominated twentieth-century psychology.[48]

Early in the century, Gestalt psychology countered associationism, which—as a version of nominalism—held that particular perceptions are primary, becoming only secondarily 'associated' with each other in larger wholes.[49] The rejection of particularism led Gestalt psychologists not only to envision continuity between human and non-human realities but also to oppose the separation of knowledge from ethics. Specifically, they refused to accept 'the dogma that all events are equally unintelligible, irrational, meaningless, purely factual' (Koffka 1935: 684). They held, rather, that 'the cogency of objective relations' will 'give us respect and reverence for the things animate and inanimate around us' (Koffka 1935: 9-10). Thus, reality has an aspect of 'requiredness' with a 'demanding character' (Köhler 1938: 337). Gestalt psychology, however, was in part excessively holistic (cf. Ash 1995: 408) and thus perhaps unduly intuitive and too strongly oriented toward unity.

A more workable approach focused not on wholes as such but on the relationships that enter into a complex. For instance, it was seen that, during perception, the neurons of an organism that is actively scanning its environment are 'excited' by emerging 'relational patterns' (Wigger 1998: 68). John Taylor thus presented a 'relational consciousness model,' according to which perception— which has both a passive and an active aspect—continuously places phenomena in relation to what has previously been perceived (1999: 125, 243, 257). Laura Sewall explained the fact that perception is more than particularist, as follows:

> A relational perspective encompasses both difference and unity as fundamental realities…. To encode a signal, the first neuron… requires the signals from two neighboring receptors, for it is the ratio of their signals that is needed to further encode the input. This…ratio…is both a difference signal…and a unified relationship…. The edge is where one thing becomes the next. The edge is also shared (1999: 132-35).

48. Cf., e.g., Benjafield 1996, for an overview of the history of psychology. The fact that a variety of approaches may be useful can be seen in the fact that associationism has retained at least partial validity; Pavlov's theory of conditioning is a well-known example.

49. See *CF*, 5.5.

From shortly before 1900 on, a notable feature of psychology was that it treated experience not in isolation but in relation to social or biological factors or both.[50] This interactional outlook did not imply rigid determinism. Rather, cross-cultural investigations of psychological phenomena showed widespread similarities, which are apparently based on common human biological and social factors, together with major variations, which probably reflect different 'ecological contexts' as well as cultural contingency (Berry *et al*. 1992: 68, 98, 130).[51] Similarities between human beings and other animals were emphasized strongly enough so that much psychological research focused on non-human animals. This approach undercut both the idea of a human 'essence' that would be different from other animals and the notion that human reality is arbitrarily constructed.

Quite importantly, it was widely known since the beginning of the century that selfhood, in the sense of reflexivity, arises only in a social context.[52] In other words, the very structure of the self was recognized as social. Furthermore, the individual ego was seen as related to other egos. It is true, psychotherapy long had an individualistic slant. However, contributions by both women and men in the psychoanalytic tradition and in other branches of psychology increasingly focused on 'object relations' or 'interpersonal relations,' including 'attachment.'[53]

50.   Analyses of interactions between the individual and culture were surveyed by Bock 1988. Jung's conception had a strong transindividual character but was supportive of personal 'individuation.'

51.   Contingency was stressed by Richard Shweder (1990: 1), but he related culture to a basic human condition that involves a 'search for meaning.'

52.   Thus, G.H. Mead and many others. See Valsinger and van der Veer 2000 for recognitions of the social character of the 'mind' from the end of the nineteenth century on.

53.   See Sayers 1991: 268; Grotstein and Rinsley 1994; St. Clair 1996; Schapiro 1994 (brief but helpful for literary critics); Schwartz 1977: 275 ('every school of psychoanalysis [is now] adopting its own version of a relational paradigm'); W. Collins and Laursen 1999. Women going in a relational direction include Helene Deutsch and Anna Freud and, more clearly, Karen Horney (1945, describing three movements: towards, against, and away from others), Melanie Klein (especially from c. 1950 on), Edith Jacobson, Margaret Mahler, Clara Thompson, Luce Irigaray, Julia Kristeva, and J.B. Miller. Among men, Freud was not without relational (social) perspectives even though he focused on 'drives'; more fully relational in outlook were Harry Stack Sullivan (1940: 10), W.R.D. Fairbairn, John Bowlby, Stephen Mitchell (1988), Robert Stolorow and his associates (1994: ix, 3, 145-49), and members of the French tradition that included Lacan and Girard (E. Webb 1993). A good number of psychological theorists in Europe and the US stressed dialogue (M. Friedman 1992: 59-107).

For these theorists, relations involved conflict and separation as well as connectivity (thus also Fosshage 1992: 30). For instance, Margaret Mahler pointed to the involvement of human beings in an 'eternal struggle against both fusion and isolation' (1972: 338). Ruthellen Josselson described the complex situation as follows:

> To understand relatedness, we must be able to encompass paradox and contradiction. Inner and outer, self and other, love and hate, fantasy and reality, rational and irrational, conscious and unconscious—all exist within the relational frame (1992: 248).

With regard to procedure, there was, as in sociology, a struggle between attention to internal and external relations. Psychoanalysis and 'humanistic' psychologies for the most part followed the internal perspective (how it seems to the individual, even if that impression is unconscious). In contrast, 'behaviorism'—especially as it was pursued by J.B. Watson and largely by B.F. Skinner—favored an external view. External and internal views were combined in Tolman's 'purposive behaviorism,' which described behavior (of both humans and non-humans) as a global structure that is oriented toward one or more ends (1932). Furthermore, one of the striking developments in twentieth-century psychology was recognition of the structure and functioning of the brain to such an extent that it became possible to match specific brain processes (observable by external means) with mental operations that a person describes verbally. In fact, straddling the internal/external divide is characteristic of cognitive psychology, which makes use of verbal reports of perceptions and draws heavily on communication theory.[54] The divide was also crossed by the 'affect revolution' (K. Fischer and Tangney 1995: 3), which focuses on emotions.

One of the important topics of cognitive psychology was the formation and operation of general concepts or patterns. It became apparent from studies of this process that human beings, like other animals, do not begin with particular perceptions which they then generalize, but that they always perceive objects in terms of some sort of category, even if only one object is encountered (e.g. K. Nelson 1986: 232, as proposed earlier by Husserl 1950-, II: 57). Categories are initially due to biological programming and cultural conditioning but are then modified on the basis of individual experience.[55]

54. See Buss 1979: 19-20; H. Gardner 1985; Frijda 1986: 367-68.
55. Discussions (especially by Paul and Patricia Churchland [1998]) that ground categorization in models of self-organizing networks of neurons (cf. Cilliers 1998: 24-27) are interesting but appear to ignore the presence of pre-existing categories; however, analyses are still in progress.

With maturation and experience, an individual becomes more finely discriminating in perception and more ready to select aspects relevant to a given aim, as well as more able to abstract elements in such a way as to constitute a new pattern (Gibson 1969). Fine-grained particularity in perception thus builds on general conceptions instead of preceding them. Fine-graining depends heavily on multidimensionality in sorting, with simultaneous attention to several criteria of differentiation (Cohen and Younger 1983: 212).

Not only is categorization thus varied and relative, but the categories used 'usually do not have clear-cut boundaries' (Rosch 1978: 35). Rather, humans, like other animals, employ fuzzy classifications which aim not at precision but at the formation of reasonably effective responses (Brunswik 1956: 146; E. Smith and Medin 1981: 61). Models for neural interaction called 'connectionism' favor statistical rather than clear-cut patterns (see, e.g., Kashima 2004). Indeed, there is an advantage in working with categories that are 'probabilistic' (Kunda 1999: 52), for efficient operations indeed require some simplicity, but the reality encountered by organisms (including humans) is not neatly ordered, so that flexible patterning is useful (Givón 1995: 13).

A probabilistic approach, of course, fits relational theory, which does not envision rigid connections. In fact, since shortly before 1900 experimental psychology has typically been statistical in character, examining 'correlations' rather than firm associations (Boring 1957: 479).

Like anthropological and sociological studies, psychological studies have as a rule been related to practical questions, so that most of them, including those that are quantitative, have not been 'objective' in the sense of uninterested. They have been concerned with mental and emotional therapy (including several kinds of 'talking cure'),[56] child raising, education (for instance, intelligence testing and principles of teaching), military matters, sales, questions relating to racial or sexual discrimination, and, more generally, with learning how to operate in society, such as in a modern society that values a considerable amount of individuality (see, e.g., E. Herman 1995; N. Rose 1996). Any commonness among human beings that was found naturally supported equal treatment, while observed differences suggested specially tailored programs, which

---

56.   Cf. MacCabe 1981. Jacques Lacan was one psychoanalyst interested in language. Lacan tied language (inappropriately) to masculinity and viewed it as alienating (politically he was quite conservative [Dews 1979: 139]), but he also saw language—even as it constituted a barrier—as making a connection with the true 'other' (1978, chap. 19; thus he overstated the non-referential character of language [cf. Silverman 1983: 164], but he did not altogether deny its contact with the real).

can be designed to overcome handicaps. The usual aim of psychology thus was to serve human happiness or fulfillment, whether of the actors or of those acted upon.

In this way, psychology contributed to several liberationist movements of the twentieth century. (See *CF*, 2.2-3, for these.) First of all, a concern for the liberation of children was deeply intertwined with the psychological study of children's potentialities.

Second to be mentioned is the fact that a number of studies undermined the earlier idea that races differ in inborn intelligence. These studies helped to prepare the way for racial integration in the US from the 1950s on, which thus drew not only on religious and other social motivations but also on the results of intellectual investigations.

Thirdly, a crucial and long-debated issue concerned whether or how women are different from men. An essentialist position would hold that certain psychological characteristics are exhibited by all women and only by them, while other characteristics appear in all men and only in them. Such a position was widely rejected during the twentieth century, although it was also observed (and sometimes valued) that some features are relatively more frequent among women than among men and vice-versa, for whatever reason.[57] (This situation is not contrary to relational theory, which allows for probabilistic phenomena). However, recognition of the intellectual equality of the sexes and of a wide overlap in their emotional characteristics was established prior to the renewed feminism of the 1960s and undoubtedly contributed to it, so that, in this case also, scientific observation interacted with value commitments.

Finally, from the end of the nineteenth century on, a series of investigations showed that homosexual activity is not associated with personality characteristics that would indicate psychological malfunctioning (Minton 2002: 219-35). It also appeared that sexual preference is not readily changeable, although variation in activity is certainly possible. Such observations led to greater acceptance of gays and lesbians.

Toward the end of the century, to be sure, relational notions came under attack in favor of nominalist conceptions that championed a more-or-less arbitrary form of ethics. A notable representative of this outlook was Kenneth Gergen, who called his view 'postmodern' (1991: 242, 252).[58] The use of this term was confusing,

---

57. Some behavioral patterns appear to be differentially influenced by estrogen and testosterone, but quite a few are contextual (such as a response to dependency). For assessments, see Fisher 1999; Kimura 1999; Hales 1999.

58. Although K. Gergen also used the term 'relational,' his view seems to be skeptical-nominalist; his 'constructionism' has been described as 'extreme' by Donald Ellis (1999: 5).

however, for Mary Gergen (1992: 183), Maureen O'Hara (1994), and Judith Teicholz (1999) also described their relational approaches (in M. Gergen's case, expressly contrasted with the other path) as 'postmodern.'[59]

In a critique of the nominalist version of postmodernism, Barbara Held has argued instead for 'situated knowing' (2007). Similarly, with such a discussion in mind, Juan Luis Linares favored a 'relational' path that is neither purely objective nor purely subjective and emphasized the more-than-arbitrary value of 'complex love' in family therapy (2001, 2005).

Some theorists recognized a fragmentation of the self as it enters into a great variety of relations (Lifton 1993: 25). This was not just a late-twentieth-century phenomenon (*pace* K. Gergen 1991: 7). In fact, the realization that a person combines differentiated 'partial selves' with greater or lesser tension within one's 'whole self' (Calkins 1908: 436)[60] was emphasized by William James in 1890, although fragmentation may have increased since then. To counterbalance fragmentation, some clinical theorists sought transpersonal unity (Boorstein 1997: 143). Some theorists linked this idea to the brain as a 'community of cells' (Laughlin *et al.* 1990: 18, 34). Indeed— according to conceptions present at the beginning of the century and later verified in detail—the brain contains both specialized areas (subsystems) and those whose function is integration (Grigsby and Stevens 2000).

Finally, since the late 1960s there has been extensive interest in the psychology of caring, 'altruism' (whatever this may mean exactly), or 'prosocial' behavior. Antecedents of such behavior in other animals were explored. Studies along this line recognized the important role of cooperation and the self-transcending character of selfhood without denying self-concern,[61] in line with the both/and character of relational theory.

---

59.   It may be coincidental that the last three figures mentioned were women, but relational theory was better established among women than men (for whatever reason [see *CF*, chap. 8]); M. Gergen said expressly that, as a feminist, she sought 'a more positive…form of postmodernism' than the 'macho' skeptical kind (1992: 183).

60.   Mary Calkins published an introduction to psychology in 1901 and was the first woman president of the American Psychological Association (in 1905). Some of her work was used by Freud (D. Murray 1995: 178). She subsequently wrote on ethics and philosophy more generally.

61.   See Eisenberg 1992; Colby and Damon 1992; Schroeder *et al.* 1995; Batson 1998; Sober and Wilson 1998; Barber 2004.

6. *Linguistics*

Twentieth-century linguistics exhibited a pattern similar to that of other disciplines. During the nineteenth century, there were dramatic advances in historical linguistics. However, by about 1900, historical work approached the limit of what was theoretically significant. Thus, a number of early-twentieth-century linguists called for attention to non-developmental aspects of language.[62] In particular, there was opposition to the idea of progress in language; some theorists explicitly defended the sophistication and propriety of unwritten languages, whether of 'primitives' or of the 'uneducated' (cf. Newmeyer 1986b: 41-46). Instead of historical change, interrelations between phenomena became the central focal point of the study of language.

Ferdinand de Saussure, who contributed to historical linguistics in his early years, is especially well-known among those who marked that turn. In lectures given in 1907-11 and published (posthumously) in 1916, Saussure distinguished between mutual interaction and historical sequence, calling these two dimensions 'synchronic' and 'diachronic.' (His distinction between the two axes reflected awareness of a similar reconceptualization in economic theory, especially Leon Walras's analysis of mutual relations between economic phenomena.)[63] Furthermore, Saussure outlined what he called 'panchronic' features: general principles that apply to all speech (*langage*). These general principles—to which he devoted his lectures—have no concrete elements but show the *relations* operative in language (part 1, chap. 3, §7).

A linguistic sign, according to Saussure's theoretical analysis, is a combination of a signifier with a thought, which is the signified; the combining of sound and thought 'produces a form' (part 2, chap. 4, §1). A given language system (*langue*) consists of terms in which the value of each results from the coexistence of the others (part 2, chap. 4, §2). From such a system he distinguished the particular instance of speech (*parole*).

Although Saussure made advances toward a relational conception of language, his understanding had major shortcomings. Specifically, he was unaware of the principle that relations require a degree of independence; thus, he overemphasized the coherence

---

62.   Thus (besides Saussure), Boas in the US and Vilém Mathesius in Czechoslovakia, both publishing in 1911 (G. Sampson 1980: 103).

63.   See, e.g., Saussure 1916, part 1, chap. 3, §1. Saussure was stimulated in major ways by Gabelentz (Coseriu 1967), but his express use of relational concepts was relatively new.

of the semantic system and held that every word has an assigned place, without adequately acknowledging overlaps or gaps. At the same time, he gave insufficient attention to the relation of language to the external world, including society; instead, he emphasized that thought is what is conveyed by signs.[64] This misconception led philosophers who were influenced by him towards more or less skeptical positions (see *CF*, chap. 7).

More adequate were many later linguistic theories, which gave close attention to biological, social, and other circumstantial factors (for instance, R. Harris 1995: 22). Nevertheless, Saussure was justified to some extent in treating the language system as a relatively independent unit (Newmeyer 1998), for any reasonably large system (such as a culture) needs to have partially autonomous subsystems in order to function effectively.

Twentieth-century studies of linguistic relations fall into three major groups, which correspond to C.S. Peirce's three aspects of a sign: relations within the linguistic phenomena themselves (including phonemics and syntactics), relations of these phenomena with their meanings or referents (semantics), and relations that involve users and recipients (pragmatics). The first set of relations—those within language—is usually called 'structural'; the other two groups, especially pragmatics, are often called 'functional.'

It is reasonable to argue, as some have done, that the functional or pragmatic framework is broader than and encompasses the structural one (Dik 1997: 3). In any case, pragmatic considerations raise the question of how the various features of language, including phonemics, syntax, and semantics, relate to operations within and between human beings and to their interactions with the world. These relations are not altogether arbitrary.

For instance, for *phonemics*, it has been found that meaningful distinctions between sounds are made by calling into play several axes of discrimination, each with a small number of disjunctive values (usually, only two or three). This process is in accord with the fact that efficient perception, including hearing, attends to multiple dimensions, with only a very few distinctive steps on each axis (Garner 1962: 122-29). Furthermore, the constellation of sounds is necessarily connected with the physical structure of the speaking organism, especially the mouth.

Among features of *syntax*, the universal identification of at least three 'persons' (Hawkins 1988: 11) can be explained by the structure

---

64.   Saussure did recognize the need for a sociopsychological 'semiology' (Introduction, chap. 3, §3, highlighted by Thibault 1997), but the larger context remained external to his analysis.

of communication, which moves from a source (first person) to a recipient (second person), while that to which reference is made constitutes a third realm. The also widespread distinction between nouns and verbs apparently reflects the fact that reality appears to human beings either as a more or less stable object, described by a noun, or as a process or event, described by a verb (thus, Ronald Langacker [1990: 59-100] in his 'cognitive linguistics'). Quite a few syntactic features, such as phrasing, fit human perceptual processes (e.g., Chafe 1994).

In *semantics*, it is true, the coupling between sounds and meanings is to a large extent arbitrary. However, this very looseness in correspondence serves a useful function, in that it permits the formation of a rich set of symbols (Halliday 1994: xviii). Moreover, the vocabulary of human language is in line with standard operational principles. For instance, the length of words accords with information-theoretic analyses of what makes for a good code, namely, one that provides both reasonable efficiency in communication and enough redundancy to protect the message under ordinary circumstances.[65] The content of what is designated is, of course, closely related to cognitive processes.[66]

Accordingly, M.A.K. Halliday believed that grammar, viewed functionally, is 'natural,' for 'everything in it can be explained by reference to how it is used' (1994: xviii), although the variety of languages shows that such explanations are not strictly deterministic. Noam Chomsky, too (although he has not emphasized functionality), said that 'language is surprisingly "perfect"… satisfying in a near-optimal way some rather general conditions imposed at the interface' with biology and society (1996: 30; similarly Smolensky and Legendre 2006).[67] Nevertheless, it is debated whether the 'principles underlying language acquisition are specific to language' (thus, Chomsky) or whether they 'constitute general principles of cognitive structure which apply to a variety of different domains,' not just to language (as reported in Deane 1992: 2 and described again in Tomasello 2003). Perhaps the best view is that both language-specific and general-cognitive factors play a role and that there is

65.   See, e.g., Bertil Malmberg (1967), following Jakobson, Martinet, and others.

66.   See Evans 2007 for an introduction to cognitive linguistics, including contributions to an understanding of symbols and the process of blending conceptualities together.

67.   Chomsky's politics, including his criticism of US policy on a number of issues, is probably not unrelated to his 'realist' and rational outlook, without which a trenchant critique is not readily possible (Neil Smith 1999: 4).

an inborn 'preadaptation' for both language and general cognition, together with more or less random historical development (Boysson-Bardies 1999: 212).

In view of the close connection between linguistic structures and human operations, it is not surprising that a number of generalizations have been made for pragmatics, syntactics, semantics, and even for the history of language.[68] These generalizations do not always involve absolute universals that hold without exception but often indicate only tendencies or conditional occurrences (if one phenomenon appears, then a certain other one does also).[69] Thus, instead of Saussure's term 'panchronic,' one might use the more cautious word 'transchronic' for such linguistic patterns. Even in a single community, language abounds in 'ambiguities, blends, overlaps and "borderline cases"' (Halliday 2003: 427) and the 'statistical ensemble' itself constantly changes somewhat (Bod 1998: 33-39, 145), for individuals are not merely passive consumers of language.

Since the question of universals constitutes a major topic in linguistics, some reflection on this topic is in order. To begin with, one must distinguish between universals of phenomena and universals of processes. Only processes (relations) are likely to be universal, as Saussure saw. Indeed, universals about phenomena as such are not important in any of the sciences (for instance, water does not always move toward the center of the earth, although gravity is a universal process). Furthermore, a conception envisioning strict universals in human language would be group-particularist; that is, it would treat humanity as a rigid group, internally uniform and surrounded by a sharp boundary. Differently, a relational view recognizes a variety of relations, some of which are more or less peculiarly human. An understanding of these relations is aided by a formal logic which explores the possible aspects of language[70] and by theoretical considerations of what is efficient and significant

68.   Universals have been proposed for syntactics within several kinds of linguistic theory (see Edmondson and Burquest 1994: 30, 121, 148, 190, 207). For universals in the semantics of time, cf. Alverson 1994; for 'unidirectionality' (typical historical movements) in grammar and lexicon, Heine 1997: 144-45.

69.   E.g. Talmy Givón (1984: 24), Frits Staal (1988: 41), and Anna Wierzbicka (1991: 10, 454, speaking of 'partial universals'; she also published later works that are relevant).

70.   See, e.g., Rohrer 1971: 18-24 and Newmeyer 1986a: 194-210 for reports. The work of Richard Montague, which included consideration of pragmatic aspects, was very important. Mathematical versions were presented by Uldall 1957 (associated with Hjelmslev) and Z. Harris 1982 (utilizing information theory).

'in any communication system' (Stemberger and Bernhardt 1999: 433). One can then see human speech as being similar to other patterns of interaction and communication, some of which are also sometimes called 'language.'

Although, as has been seen, there are many connections between linguistic phenomena and practical considerations, the correlation between linguistic forms and their functions is not rigid (thus, e.g., Goldberg 1998: 215). Specifically—as Chomsky emphasized— syntax forms a separate 'module' (subsystem) of language, with its own rules, not firmly correlated with other aspects of language. The existence of such relatively independent modules is important for so-called form criticism, which deals with interrelationships between the following three aspects of literary genres: linguistic form, thought content (semantics), and context (pragmatics). There are certain connections between these aspects, but a given grammatical form can be put to more than one pragmatic use. For instance, an indicative statement ('the door is open') can serve as a directive ('please close it'), and the answer to a factual question ('where is …?') may be phrased as an imperative ('turn right').

A special question within the issue of interrelationships is how closely linguistic forms are related to thought. A number of writers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries believed that all thinking is done with signs, so that each national language expresses or determines a peculiar conception of the world (see Formigari 1993: 33, 44, 177). Variations of this viewpoint were also expressed during the twentieth century, but a number of linguists pointed to evidence that language and thought are not strictly matched.

Insofar as there are connections between language forms and thought, a major question has been, Which side is causally prior to the other? Answers to this question have been complex. It has been shown that language patterns affect thought to some extent, especially on the individual level, but that, especially on the communal level, the direction of causation is usually from thought (dealing with a given problem) to language.[71] To give an obvious example:

71. See Lev Vygotsky 1986 (Russian 1934), chap. 7 (thought and language begin independently in animals and young children, but come to interact); Joshua Whatmough 1956: 224 ('life fashions language,' rather than vice versa); Hans Hörmann 1971: 271-328 (with an extensive overview partially critical of Benjamin Whorf, who—like Herder and Humboldt before him—believed in a very close association between language and thought); J.A. Fodor *et al.* 1974: 271-73, 375-77, 384-88 (with reports of experiments showing distinctions between thought and language); Katherine Nelson 1991 (considering language and thought to be interdependent); Rosemary Stevenson 1993 (with an overview showing both a partial independence and

the development of computers brought about new terminology. A more subtle example is the following: There is a correlation between individualism and the relatively high use of first- and second-person pronouns (Kashima 1998); in this correlation, the cultural factor (individualism) is probably primary and the use of pronouns an expression of it. Indeed, language change frequently reflects a change in situation and in accompanying thought (Clark 1996: 341). Thus, when women, African Americans, and others moved toward an improved status in society, they were concerned with language forms that would support appropriate orientations.[72]

The effect of liberation movements on language use underscores the fact that language 'construes' reality but does not 'construct' it altogether by itself, as though human beings are caught in a web that has no contact with outside reality.[73] Better than the skeptical view of reality that thinks of human beings as isolated in the world is the relational idea that the universe contains a rich texture of communication, within which human language plays an important, but not all-important, role.[74] In fact, the very possibility of understanding speech is based on the interactive context in which expressions occur (T. Taylor 1992: 151, 154). Language supports a degree of negative 'freedom from' reality, in that it creates a certain independence from physical and biological determination. Yet also, and especially, language furnishes positive freedom (see *CF*, 1.3), since it enhances possibilities for interaction with both the human and the non-human world.

7. *Rhetoric, or Discourse Analysis*

Rhetoric—in the broad sense, as the study of discourse—is not easily delimited from linguistics; in fact, recent theories have emphasized

the effect of knowledge on language); David Carroll 1994: 389 (reporting evidence for some influence of language on thought); and Alison Gopnik and Andrew Meltzoff 1997 (on early prelinguistic thinking and subsequent 'bidirectional' [193] interaction).

72.   See, e.g., Smitherman-Donaldson and van Dijk 1988; Pauwels 1998 (language change 'lags behind' social change but, with 'a bit of a push,' can be made to help it [83, 85, 92]); and Gibbon 1999 (similarly).

73.   That view was rejected by Evelyn Fox Keller (1992: 33).

74.   Differently, arguing that (social) life is 'constructed' through language, John Shotter thought that it is an error to compare social with natural processes (1993: 74). John Searle's statement that 'language is essentially constitutive of institutional reality' (1995: 59) is not tenable unless one defines institutions as language-dependent, in which case the sentence becomes tautological. William Hanks discussed bodily aspects of communication, such as gestures (1996: 135, 249).

the continuity between these fields. However, rhetoric is normally concerned with units larger than the sentence, the traditional upper limit for linguistics. Furthermore, while linguistics tends to concentrate on language rules that are applicable to all or most of its uses, rhetoric is concerned with specialized applications of language, particularly how such applications are effective and may therefore be desirable.

Prior to c. 1700, rhetorical theory was a very important part of European culture. Several traditions were influential during that long period, but only two of them will be mentioned here.[75] One tradition was represented by Aristotle's rhetoric; it emphasized the 'discovery' (recognition) of content that is appropriate to one's aim, although it also gave attention to style. The other was also old but was carried through consistently by Ramus in the sixteenth century; it dealt only with the manner of speaking, especially style. The Ramist tradition harmonized with nominalism by making a sharp distinction between words and reality. Widespread acceptance of this distinction led to the downgrading of the importance of rhetoric after the Middle Ages.[76]

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, both of these approaches continued to some extent. However, social and philosophical developments resulted in the following changes: (1) a gradual shift toward training in writing rather than in speech; (2) encouragement of personal discovery and expression in student essays; (3) extensive engagement in the 'criticism' (examination) of particular works, as distinct from theory or advice; and (4) on the theoretical level, the thoroughgoing application of nominalist views of form.[77] Rhetoric did not die out, but it declined during these centuries, especially in some countries (Kinneavy in Horner 1990: 187), until a low point was reached near 1900 CE.[78]

Thereafter, the tide turned again, so much so that rhetoric came to stand virtually at the center of disciplines. Specifically, the various spheres of human expression—science, philosophy, economics, literature, politics, and so on—came to be understood as

75.   See, further, *BFC*: 41-46, 62-65, 78-79, 104-8.

76.   Ramus continued an approach by Agricola, who wrote in the fifteenth century (*BFC*: 105). Antecedents went back to ancient Greece.

77.   See N. Johnson 1991: 15-19, 212-18; Horner 1990: 114-85; 1993: 8-10, 34, 180, 183.

78.   For instance, David Potter (1944: 120-23) described the decline of college debating in the US during the nineteenth century, prior to its resurgence shortly before 1900.

constituting different kinds of rhetoric or discourse.[79] Each of them was described as having special criteria for the validity of argumentation (Toulmin 1958: 255). Divergent philosophical viewpoints, such as materialism and idealism, were analyzed as representing one-sided emphases on one or another dimension of discourse.[80] Conversely, various disciplines contributed to the study of texts and discourses, so that rhetorical theory drew upon many endeavors, including theological hermeneutics (van Dijk 1980: 1-17; 1985: xi, 1-10).

It is true, nominalism revived toward the end of the twentieth century. This revival had skeptical implications. Doubts were raised about whether what is said can be understood by a recipient, as well as about whether it makes contact with reality (cf. *CF*, chap. 7). However, the present survey will focus on the relational tradition, which holds that contact with other beings is precarious but nevertheless possible to some extent, in line with the assumption that relations involve both a degree of separateness and a degree of connectivity.

The extensive endeavors of twentieth-century rhetoric included the following: training in the production of speech and written composition; theories of style (overlapping with poetics); studies of communication processes by psychologists and political scientists; text linguistics, also called 'discourse analysis' (beginning with Z. Harris 1952); philosophical speech-act theory (especially, J. Austin 1975 [1955 lectures] and Searle 1969); sociolinguistics, including the anthropological 'ethnography of speaking' (Hymes 1962); and 'conversation analysis' (see Markee 2000). Furthermore, business, politics, entertainment, and religion all had extensive traditions of rhetoric (cf., for instance, Root 1987). 'Communication' was a popular topic and the name of college departments, journals, yearbooks, and other organizational vehicles.

Although most rhetorical works dealt with theory and general instruction, quite a few studies examined particular speeches, texts, and movements. They thus continued the process of 'rhetorical criticism' that had been pursued during the previous two centuries.[81] For instance, Karlyn Campbell (1989) analyzed women's speeches, showing in what way they were confrontational and in what way they adapted to their audience. Bradford Stull reached

---

79.   Cf. McCloskey 1985; R. Brown 1987; Grassi 1987; Woolgar 1988, with references; Gross and Keith 1997.

80.   Burke 1945, part II; similarly, Apel 1974: 287, with regard to each of the aspects of a sign.

81.   See, e.g., Duffy and Ryan 1987; Brock *et al.* 1989; Leeman 1996.

the conclusion that an 'emancipatory' speaker or writer must 'know the language of the dominant culture' but that this 'language must be turned over, around, inside out' (1999: 120).

As is to be expected, no one theory or approach dominated the field of rhetoric, but several notable general features emerged. They drew partly on classical rhetoric and on the modern perspective that stressed variety and change and partly went beyond both.

An exploratory approach toward the content of communication

As was mentioned, Aristotelian rhetoric had emphasized content by surveying themes (or 'topics') that are suitable for different kinds of speech. For instance, if a speaker wants to honor a given person, appropriate themes include the honoree's justice, courage, and liberality toward others (Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1366b). The recognition of such topics was called 'discovery'—in Greek *heuresis*, in Latin *inventio*. In 'modern' times, however, the idea of teaching traditional themes became increasingly unacceptable.[82] The English word 'invention' even came to refer almost exclusively to the creation of something new.

The downplaying of content in Ramist rhetoric (prominent especially in Protestant contexts) provided for increased openness in what can be said, but this created a difficulty. Teachers of speaking and writing found that effectiveness in expression is heavily dependent on thinking and on 'having something to say.' Thus the consideration of content was resumed around 1900 CE, but attention was then given not to teaching traditional topics but to outlining procedures for creatively reaching that which is to be communicated. For such creative procedures, some English-speaking rhetoricians used the term 'heuristics.' This word, derived directly from the Greek *heuresis*, on which the Latin *inventio* was based, acquired the connotation of more or less tentative exploration.[83]

In dealing thus with the issue of what one can say, it became apparent that the content of communication interacts with the process. For instance, it was observed that thought and expression stand in a reciprocal relationship. On the one hand, careful thinking

---

82. The older outlook, to be sure, continued in much of theology (relying on the Bible and tradition for preaching and teaching purposes) and in law (making reference to existing—and thus past—legislation and to precedents).

83. For bibliographical overviews, see Richard Young 1976, 1987. The second half of the nineteenth century witnessed a tug-of-war in English-language rhetorics between excluding and reintroducing content.

aids expression. On the other hand, active formulation frequently clarifies thinking and aids the development of a consciously reflected complex pattern.[84] This interaction was stressed, for instance, by Ann Berthoff; in her work *Forming/Thinking/Writing*, she characterized thinking as 'seeing relations' and writing as 'representing recognitions of sames and differents' (1988, Introduction, 61).

Research programs recognizing general principles and cultural variations

Efforts were made to connect theory with systematic observation in a 'scientific' way. This has two sides: it engages in observation instead of accepting older views as authoritative, and it formulates theories that interact with empirical observation. Accordingly, the analyses of rhetoric by Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian were subjected to processes of confirmation, disconfirmation, or modification, and new kinds of questions were raised. Indeed, one of the aims of the National Association of Academic Teachers of Public Speaking, founded in 1915, was to foster research (Leff and Procario 1985: 5). Many careful investigations examined political speech, ordinary conversation, advertising, and other uses of the various media.[85] The results of such research—too extensive to be summarized here—should be taken into account in subsequent rhetorical studies.

Although some of these studies were merely descriptive, others were set in relation to a theory that indicates the way in which effective communication is grounded in psychological and sociological processes. In support of such reflection, Robert de Beaugrande issued a call for going 'forward to the basics,' that is, for recognizing 'the essential skills of cognition and communication' (1984: 332).

---

84.   See Denney 1896: 4 and references in J. Berlin 1987: 145-46, 153, 165-77, 184, and Richard Young 1987: 3-12, 20-34.

85.   Walter Jens (1977: 444, with bibliography) called this scientifically oriented version the 'new rhetoric.' See, e.g., R. Oliver 1942 (a synthesis based on research and psychological theory); Lasswell *et al.* 1952 (on political symbols); Hovland *et al.* 1953 (on factors predisposing to persuasion); Schramm 1963 (including important essays on 'cognitive dissonance' by L. Festinger, 'semantic space' by C. Osgood, opinion leadership by P. Lazarsfeld, etc.); W. Thompson 1967 (with results of research since 1916 on many aspects of persuasive speech); N. Reiss 1985 (on speech acts); S. North 1987: 133-313 (on written composition); Kinneavy in Horner 1990 (with a general overview of twentieth-century rhetorical research); O'Keefe 1990 (on persuasion); and R. Kellogg 1994 (on writing processes, with attention to motivation and planning). For newer research, cf. bibliographies in the *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* and *Communication Abstracts*.

One of the emerging features of rhetoric, then, was a new interest in general principles. These principles often involved the notion of relationship.[86] Structural relations within a text were recognized in terms of logical and verbal patterns. These included the use of first-, second-, and third-person pronouns. Functional relations were seen in a text's external associations and effects. Desired effects included, above all, modification of individual and group values and thus personal and group formation and transformation, but sheer enjoyment was also recognized.[87]

General principles were in part descriptive and in part prescriptive. Primarily descriptive was John Searle's statement that 'languages, to the extent that they are intertranslatable, can be regarded as different conventional realizations of the same underlying rules' (1969: 39); this formulation clearly recognized relatively general rules together with more or less arbitrary conventions. Openly prescriptive was Habermas's 'universal pragmatics,' which sought to formulate the principles of communication that form the basis of a free and significant human life (1971a). On the border between description and prescription stood H.P. Grice's 'cooperative principle' (1975); this formed the basis for specific maxims concerning quality (truthfulness, evidence), quantity (an appropriate amount of relevant information), and manner (clarity, orderliness, and so on).

In discussions revolving around the universality of rhetorical rules, the term 'convention' was ambiguous. Sometimes the term was used to refer to an arbitrary pattern. Differently, according to a major philosophical work on the topic, 'convention is a regularity in behavior' that provides 'coordination' between actors (D. Lewis 1969: 51, etc.). That definition left open the question to what extent conventions are reasonable and to what extent they are 'merely conventional.' C. Dyke pointed out that conventions are rarely altogether arbitrary (1988: 81-82).

Grice's maxims can serve as an example of the extent to which standards are reasonable (contra a purely particularist interpretation). Good reasons can be given for his cooperative maxims.

---

86. Thus, Deborah Schiffrin (1994). The general text linguistics of Eugenio Coseriu (1980: 53-109) delineated a set of internal and external relations, including those indicated by the pronouns (following Bühler, Jakobson, and others). Ruqaiya Hasan (1985) stressed both logical and verbal relations, including parallelism (3, 7, 30-33). William Mann and Sandra Thompson (1988) developed a 'rhetorical structure theory' based on relations. This was similar to the 'generative rhetoric' of Francis Christensen (1967), as it was applied by Willis Pitkin (1987).

87. See Arnold and Bowers 1984 and Gamble 1999.

Yet different groups of people—or the same people in different situations—may have divergent expectations concerning appropriate 'quality' of evidence, good 'quantity' of speech, degree of 'clarity' or 'orderliness,' and so on. Similarly, Penelope Brown and Stephen Levinson (1987) analyzed universals of politeness but recognized that politeness is at the same time governed by many culture-specific rules.

Thus, generalized theory is balanced by attention to cultural variations. Many differences in speech patterns and strategies have been observed for different classes, ethnic groups, and genders (with variations within all of these groups).[88] According to an analysis by Robert Kaplan (1966: 12), in Arabic and other Semitic languages 'paragraph development is based on a complex series of parallel constructions, both positive and negative,' a means of expression that reflects thought patterns prevalent in their cultures. James Chesebro (1999) showed how a 'spiral' pattern in Puerto Rican speech differs from the linear pattern favored in 'Anglo culture.' In a number of Asian societies, expository writing is more indirect than in the English-speaking traditions (Bhatia 1993: 37). Ancient Chinese rhetorical theory made 'allowances for flexibility and probability' more than did Greek rhetoric (Lu 1998: 301). One study found that students who were citizens of the US favored a 'voice representing individual authority in a dominant, uncontested position,' as they had apparently been instructed to do, while others—in this case, German students—represented 'relational authority responding to multiple, competing others' and 'framed their writing as part of their progress as knowledge-makers in their discourse communities' (Foster 2006: 102, 104, 108).

Nevertheless, comparative rhetoric is still a very open field. For instance, we do not as of yet have a careful extensive study of the rhetoric of the Hebrew Bible utilizing a wide variety of perspectives, although noteworthy beginnings have been made by Jack Lundbom (for instance, in 2001) and some others.

New typologies of speech forms, both flexible and theoretical

A notable feature of twentieth-century rhetoric was the emergence of new typologies of speech forms. They diverged from both classical essentialism and nominalism, while also learning from them. These typologies are of special significance for biblical form criticism.

88.   For different cultures, see, e.g., Purves 1988; Donawerth *et al.* 1994; U. Connor 1996; and below, nn. 108, 113; for social class, see DeGenaro 2007.

As has been indicated, this program participated in, and even encouraged, the revival of a concern for genres, but it remained mired for the most part in essentialism (assuming clear-cut genres) or nominalism (without regard for a theoretical justification), without recognizing the relational reconceptualization present in many disciplines.

During the nineteenth century, the traditional interest in the classification of speech had declined sharply. Classification did continue to some extent, although it did so commonly along nominalist lines, which regarded the perception of particulars as primary. Priority was given to 'description' and 'narration,' which were characterized as representations of particular events, either simultaneously (description) or in succession (narration). The more generalizing procedures of 'exposition' and 'argumentation' were held to be secondary (see D'Angelo 1984).

During the twentieth century, however, broader interest in classification returned.[89] It took account of Aristotle's analyses but rejected his belief that every object has a single typological 'essence' according to which it should be categorized. Specifically, there was recognition of multiple patterns of relationship, some or all of which have only a probable character. Accordingly, the characteristics of the newer typology included (1) the envisioning of multidimensionality, (2) the express recognition of mixtures, and (3) the acceptance of probability instead of firm rules. None of these characteristics was altogether missing in Aristotle's thinking, but now they were highlighted.

Multidimensionality expresses the observation that texts can be classified in many different but interacting ways.[90] For instance, James Moffett (1968) offered two dimensions, one involving the distance between speaker and audience (oral conversation, letter, and so on) and the other the distance between speaker and the subject spoken about (immediate record, narrative report, exposition, and so forth). James Kinneavy (1971, etc.) applied a division according to 'mode' (classification, description, narration, or evaluation), as well

89.   The interest in typology was still somewhat weak in the early decades of the century, but Baugh *et al.* 1924—to cite one example—gave differential advice on how to write an editorial, after-dinner speech, business letter, parody, and so forth.

90.   A two-dimensional classification, not easily summarized, appeared already in C. Morris 1946: 125. Widespread in more recent British linguistics was a threefold differentiation, presented by M.A.K. Halliday (1978: 35) with the following terminology: 'field (type of social action), tenor (role relationship), mode (symbolic organization).' For overviews of classifications, especially by Anglo-American and German authors (usually with several dimensions), cf. Lux 1981 and Dimter 1981. Later arrangements included that of Biber 1988, with six dimensions.

as one based on 'aim,' namely, on whether the center of attention is the speaker (expression), the audience (persuasion), the object (reference), or the speech itself (aesthetics).[91] Searle identified six 'principles of distinction'—including purpose, the relative position of speaker and hearer, the temporal orientation, and a positive or negative relationship to the hearer's interest (1969: 70)—and later (1979: 2-8) presented twelve additional dimensions for a taxonomy of speech acts.[92] Ingo Warnke (1996) identified the following dimensions: spatial, general or specific, temporal, social, formal (e.g. monological), and interpersonal—each with subdivisions.

Further, it was observed that mixtures are frequent. For instance, in terms of aim, a commemorative address may also be a political campaign speech. Each aim would affect the content and manner of the speech (Brigance 1927: 271). It was also noted that styles can be combined or alternated (Burke 1931: 128; Sengle 1967: 36).

In part since many different considerations impinge on any given text and in part since variability is needed for communicating something new ('information'), probability—rather than strict predictability or necessity—came to be a central notion in describing types of discourse. For instance, Nils Enkvist (1964: 29) stated that style involves 'contextual probabilities' (not certainties in a given context), and Halliday (1985: 8-9) called the phenomena of speech 'inherently probabilistic.' Michael Stubbs (1983: 1) observed that an association between situation, style, and content is rigid only in highly ritualized texts.[93] The anthropologist Dell

---

91.   The Prague School, including Roman Jakobson (1960: 357), considered literature to be especially concerned with the verbal phenomenon itself.

92.   See, further, Habermas 1981, I, chap. 3. Since labels for speech types reflect, to a large extent, how people differentiate between discourses, Matthias Dimter (1981) examined about 1600 German terms for discourse types (such as for 'love letter' and 'weather report'). He found that the terms were marked for communicative situation (with eight components: producer, recipient, the time relation between them, channel, etc.), function (three primary types: knowledge, evaluation, will), and content (temporal orientation, singular/generic, factual/fictive). For most of the terms, several of these elements were quite definite; more specifically, for the majority of the terms at least one element from each of the three major aspects (situation, function, content) was indicated, although some terms were more general (e.g. command, letter).

93.   Similarly, Sherzer 1983: 193. Rituals (with 'low information,' i.e., little novelty) include greetings (Saville-Troike 1989: 12). A major function of ritual is maintaining or establishing contact and order (cf. Malinowski's 'phatic communion' [1923, IV]).

Hymes (1986: 65, 88) observed a combination of regularity and variability in speech.

Such a view of genres was also set forth by Charles Briggs and Richard Bauman (1992). They rejected 'mutually exclusive genres,' each of which has 'invariant features.' Instead, they said that genres create 'intertextual relations with other bodies of discourse…in multiple ways; generic framings of texts are thus often missed, blurred, ambiguous, contradictory' (163).

Given the fact that there are at least partial associations between the content, style, and situation of a discourse, how are they to be explained? It was at this point that theoretical considerations of speech types entered into the picture. Twentieth-century typology thus diverged not only from essentialism but also from nominalism, which is unable to present reasons for phenomena. For example, Herbert Simons (1978: 42-43) distinguished between mere classification and—as he preferred—the observing of 'relationships' within 'theoretical frameworks' that explain 'why' a situation or purpose partially determines a generic feature.[94] Already Kinneavy (1971: 37; with others, 1985: 241, etc.) had set forth relevant considerations for specific kinds of speech; he held that logic, organization, and style need to vary according to both aim and mode. John Swales stated that 'the rationale behind a genre establishes constraints' on content and form (1990: 52).

Through attention to multiple relations and probabilities and by engaging in theoretical reflection, speech typologies had an affinity with approaches in other sciences. As Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim (1936: 42, 113, 125-26) observed, the emergence of a multi-dimensional ordering had the effect of breaking down barriers between the humanities and the natural sciences, since this kind of patterning applies to both.

A renewed consideration of types of style

Theories of speech types shade over into theories of types of style, as was already true in ancient Greece.[95] Change in regard to this issue can be sketched briefly as follows (cf. Hough 1969: 3, 6, 26, etc.): Analyses prior to the eighteenth century had stressed that the matter spoken about determines the style. The subsequent historical movement connected style primarily with the author. During the twentieth century there was widespread concern for a style's

94. Similarly, in regard to style, Rudolf Heinz (1986: 94) distinguished between (mere) classification and a 'normative-systematic' view.

95. See *BFC*: 43-47. Style can be defined as a characteristic variation of language.

relation to the recipient. For instance, the Belgian *Groupe mu* (1970: 27) expressed the need for a theoretical 'transrhetoric,' which seeks to explain both the effect of different forms of expression and their value for the recipient.

Contributions to such stylistic theory were made already by Charles Bally (from 1905 on) and, quite comprehensively, by David Rannie, who presented a detailed analysis of the 'fitness' of styles for various classes of poetry and prose (1915). Their reflections resembled traditional concerns with 'aptness.' They differed from classical rhetorical writers in that they gave little attention to social position. In fact, concern with social level had gradually decreased in importance over the centuries—in part under the influence of Christianity, for which the sacred rather than social status determined what was 'high,' and in part because of the decline of the aristocracy, which came about for both religious and non-religious reasons (*BFC*: 64, 106, 108, 139). Furthermore, twentieth-century reflections were not strictly prescriptive. Rather, Rannie (285), like others, noted that different options are available for accomplishing a given purpose, so that there is room for variability.[96]

Special interest was devoted to metaphor. Metaphor was described in ancient Greece as a 'poetic,' not basic rhetorical, form. The use of it in ordinary speech was accepted but with a reserve that extended generally toward other 'schemes and tropes' (such 'poetic' forms were employed in display rhetoric). This reserve became strengthened in some theories of speech developed after the European Middle Ages. Soon after 1900 CE, however, interest in the presence of symbolism within every-day speech became pronounced, with the recognition that references used in expressions are regularly complex and interpretive. The many who discussed symbolism in general and metaphor in particular included Ernst Cassirer, Susanne Langer, Paul Ricoeur, and George Lakoff.[97]

96.   Still relatively rare, however, were cross-cultural comparisons of generic patterns and generic classifications. For instance, Laurie Patton (1995) reported some Vedic typologies that are in part similar to those known in the West, but she made no express comparison between the two traditions. (It is useful to note that this Vedic tradition understood that the types it listed were not rigid or exclusive.)

97.   In fact, older interests were not always considered obsolete; for instance, a list of schemes and tropes—which had been important earlier— appeared in Fernandez 1974, as well as in other studies.

Concern with ethics

Finally, a prominent characteristic of twentieth-century rhetoric was the consideration that speech has an ethical dimension both in content and procedure (cf. LeFevre 1987; Johannesen 1990; Luke 2004). In certain spheres—such as sales (including advertisement) and propaganda (as expressly stated by Hitler [1925, chap. 12, demand 3] and as carried out by many)—rhetorical theory and practice were consciously manipulative, but this attitude could be joined with the belief that manipulation is for the benefit of the recipient ('for your own good') or that it serves a social purpose (such as a lawyer furnishing a defense). In education and journalism, less exploitative theories held sway, although these were often not followed in practice.

Gertrude Buck's interactive approach is worth close attention. In 1900, Buck challenged the 'sophistic' idea that the aim of rhetoric is persuasion, especially insofar as persuasion has a war-like quality. She said that even the adaptation of one's speech to an audience—called for in traditional rhetoric—does not represent true cooperation but often has as its aim the 'subjugation' of the other; it is thus 'anti-social.' She favored, instead, 'a real communication between speaker and hearer, to the equal advantage of both.'[98] In taking this position (which she described as 'social individualism'), Buck was influenced by her teachers John Dewey and Fred Scott, as well as by the latter's sister Harriet Scott—all of whom stressed cooperation—but she also went beyond them.[99] There was a religious element in her approach, for she began (like Dewey and especially like F. Scott) with a liberal, socially-oriented Christianity and then also continued in such an outlook.[100] Philosophically, she broke with nominalism; for instance, in her work on metaphor (1899: 13) she argued, contra 'Locke and his disciples,' that initial perception is of relatively general categories rather than of particulars and that metaphors reflect this generality.[101]

A number of women rhetoricians followed Buck's path. Among them, Sally Gearhart (who held that love is primary in the universe)[102] proposed that the goal of speech is not conquest but the creation or co-creation of an atmosphere for voluntary change (1979). Sonja Foss, Karen Foss, and Robert Trapp illustrated

98.   Reprinted in J. Campbell 1996: 45-51.
99.   J. Campbell 1996: 4, 33, 58.
100.   See F. Scott 1892 and J. Campbell 1996.
101.   Similarly, I.A. Richards stated in his rhetoric (1936: 30) that perception always involves 'a thing of a certain sort.'
102.   See Foss, Foss, and Griffin 1999: 280.

cooperative rhetoric by a typically African process in which public speech is an event that involves public participation (1991: 287-89). In opposition to an atomistic outlook, L. Edna Rogers argued for a 'relational perspective, grounded in an epistemology of form… within the organizing principles of connectedness and interdependency' (1998: 71).

A number of male writers also adopted an interactive outlook. Already James Winans described 'true speech' as 'a dialogue' (1917: 38), and Mikhail Bakhtin emphasized from 1924 on (in MSS published in Russian in 1975 and 1979) that any utterance is part of a dialogue.[103] Influentially, Kenneth Burke's 'new' rhetoric advocated 'identification' with the recipient (1951). Martin Nystrand came to speak of 'reciprocity' not only in oral interchange but also in the relation between writer and reader (1986).[104] Of course, not all dialogue is friendly, even if it is useful. Accordingly, Bakhtin pointed to 'a contradiction-ridden, tension-filled unity' in speech (1981: 272 [1934/35]). According to William Isaacs, the dialogue process includes 'movers,' 'followers,' and 'opposers,' as well as 'bystanders' (1999: 201-2).[105]

In 1958, Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca (a Jewish man and a [non-Jewish?] woman, a philosopher of law and a sociologist, each contributing special expertise) connected the idea of freedom with the ancient Greek idea that rhetoric deals with what is 'probable' rather than what is certain (1).[106] They said that 'only the existence of an argument that is neither compelling nor arbitrary can give meaning to human freedom' (1958, Conclusion). They thus rejected, on the one hand, a purely negative freedom that would presuppose arbitrariness and, on the other hand, compulsion even in the sense of full persuasiveness. In regard to argumentation, they rejected 'dualisms of reason and imagination, of knowledge and opinion, of irrefutable evidence and delusive will, of a universally acknowledged objectivity and an incommunicable

103.   Bakhtin 1990: 274 (1924); 1981: 279 (1934/35); 1986: 94 (1952/53). He found this outlook in Dostoevsky's writings (1929).

104.   The German Josef Kopperschmidt (1973: 87-98) formulated seven rules for successful persuasion; these basically call for appropriate attitudes on both sides, especially mutual respect.

105.   Per Linell (with an overview of some relevant studies) pointed out that dialogue implies 'coordination,' not necessarily cooperation (1998: 13).

106.   Perelman's specialty was philosophy. Olbrechts-Tyteca's expertise lay in rhetoric or discourse theory, also shown in her later work on the 'Comic of Discourse' (1974); see Warnick 1997.

subjectivity, of a reality imposing itself on everybody and values that are purely individual' (676) and recognized only the relative (not 'assured') distinction between statements concerning facts and values (680). They had reached this point of view after empirically analyzing 'hundreds of arguments concerning values' in the hope of reaching a non-arbitrary basis for justice, 'especially after the years of Nazi rule inspired by the [nihilist] "Myth of the 20th Century" and the cult of violence' (Perelman 1980: 57, 149).

In regard to social policy, some theorists emphasized a fairly traditional orientation toward order (R. Weaver 1970) or else reached toward a new-order 'consensus' (Habermas [see *CF*, chap. 5]). Others, with a socially sensitive outlook but less interest in unity, valued open communication and non-authoritarian teaching, including the use of discussion groups and, more generally, cooperation between teacher and students. Many favored this way from the early part of the twentieth century on.[107] Foucault, too, at least in a late interview, rejected 'polemic' in favor of 'dialogue,' in search of truth (see Rabinow 1984: 381).

Three examples from the end of the twentieth century can illustrate socially sensitive interests. In the realm of business, Daniel Yankelovich advocated a genuinely cooperative process for companies that seek not to be exploitative, either internally in relation to their employees or externally in relation to customers or the community at large (1999, with reference to Buber). Nancy Grimm, the head of a writing program, argued for training that encourages flexibility in expression and perspective in view of the high degree of complexity that had emerged in social relations. She said that P is for postmodernity [= the presence of many different views] and possibilities (1999: 1). Similarly, Kay Halasek advocated a 'pedagogy of possibility' on the basis of Bakhtinian dialogism. Her aim was to enhance the number of potentials for discourse, including resistance and acceptance of responsibility (1999: 183-84).

Ethical or ontological considerations were, of course, not peculiar to the recent West, and this fact was recognized, although more work in comparative rhetoric could still be done. For instance, questions of social and intellectual responsibility provided the impetus for reflections on rhetoric by Plato and Aristotle. Robert Oliver (1971: 261) and Molefi Asante (1987: 67, 159-81) pointed out that in China, India, and Africa, discourse was oriented toward harmony

107.   Thus, Fred Scott (1922), A. Craig Baird (1965: 80, 114), Patricia Stock (1995), and others (J. Berlin 1984: 151-58, 176-78).

more than was the case in the 'West.'[108] Chinese tradition, according to Ge Gao and Stella Ting-Toomey (1998: 38), treats talk as the 'joint effort of both the speaker and the listener,' so that the speaker begins tentatively. Further, it was seen that in Asia and Africa the harmony envisioned is not only social but also involves the speaker's closeness to the reality spoken about.[109] Not surprisingly, then, William Kirkwood (1989, following R. Oliver) noted that in ancient India the primary goal of rhetoric was truth, considered to be liberating for both speaker and listener.

Telling the truth (factual or moral), of course, sometimes stands in tension with social peace. Accordingly, account was taken of the fact that Confucianism traditionally rejects flattery, valuing instead respectful but open critique of one's superiors for the sake of the social good, and that a similar attitude has been expressed in Indian tradition (G. Kennedy 1998: 146-47, 182).[110] As is well known, the Hebrew Bible urged reproof of hurtful activity[111] and provided critiques of superiors and of the group as a whole.[112] This biblical phenomenon was discussed by James Darsey (1997) as a background for radical US rhetoric. Furthermore, the rhetorical critic Susan Zaeske observed that the book of Esther contains a 'pragmatic rhetoric of empowerment designed for and embraced by oppressed people throughout time' (2000: 216).

In the European sphere since ancient Greece (G. Kennedy 1998: 211), some viewpoints have supported conflictual speech, even without appeal to the larger good.[113] Is a synthesis of harmony and conflict appropriate? In fact, self-assertion and self-expression need not be destructive; on the assumption that they can be positive in

---

108.   Thus also Xunzi (= Hsün Tzu), although (or precisely because) his view of natural (untrained) human activity was a conflictual one; see Cua 1985. However, Chinese (and other) traditions were not uniform (see, e.g., the careful survey in Lu 1998).

109.   Thus specifically for Chinese thought, M. Garrett in Foss, Foss, and Trapp 1991: 297.

110.   In contrast, directions by the anti-Confucian Hanfeizi (= Han Fei Tzu) call for flattery that is self-interested (G. Kennedy 1998: 164).

111.   See Lev. 19:17; Prov. 9:7-8; 24:25; 25:12.

112.   This is well known to biblical specialists, although in twentieth-century biblical scholarship rhetoric was most frequently thought of either in Aristotelian or Ramist (stylistic) terms.

113.   Jasper Neel (1988: 202-10) championed, at least in part for 'democratic' reasons, the (relatively opportunistic) Sophists that were opposed by Plato. Charles Briggs (1996: 5) reported studies showing that conflictual speech supports identity. Deborah Cameron (2000) also cautioned against pure cooperation.

their effect, Hélène Cixous encouraged women to 'write themselves' on the road to liberation (1975: 180).

Conclusion

In sum, it is clear that relational conceptions predominated in twentieth-century rhetorical theory. Positively, this involved the following features: Theoreticians concerned themselves with the relation of content to forms of expression but dealt with content in an exploratory rather than a traditional way. They engaged in a research program, instead of simply following traditional authorities. They formulated general principles (which focused especially on relationships) but also observed cultural variation. They developed a flexible typology of speech forms and at the same time theoretically reflected on reasons for forms of expression. Not least, they gave serious consideration to the ethics of speech.

Negatively, the development of a relational approach meant the rejection of both essentialism and nominalism, for essentialism would have placed speech phenomena into unduly rigid categories and strict nominalism would have reduced speech to a series of unconnected particular items. Yet the new rhetoric also learned from both of the older traditions, especially by giving attention to content and typologies (as did Aristotelian rhetoric) and to variability and conflict (as did nominalism).

The highlighting of cooperation was relatively new for Western rhetoric. Nevertheless, both in practice and in theory, conflictual and manipulative rhetoric (in advertising, politics, law, education, and daily life) continued, with or without what may be considered adequate justification.

8. *Literary Criticism*

'Literature,' in the sense that I use the term, cannot be clearly separated from other kinds of speech but can be characterized as a form of discourse that is intrinsically enjoyable.[114] Enjoyment, to be sure, does not stand in contrast to personal and social enlightenment. Rather, enlightenment can contribute to enjoyment, while purely instrumental knowledge by definition cannot. Because of the enjoyable nature of literature and the fact that its creation requires special skill or 'inspiration,' a good literary work is usually placed into cultural memory, so that it can be heard or read repeatedly. Thus literature is typically general in interest rather than rele-

---

114. In Jakobson's formulation (1960), one major focus in literature is on the work itself.

vant only for a single point in time.[115] It corresponds to what was traditionally covered under the rubric of 'poetry' rather than of 'rhetoric,' which addresses particular situations.

Prior to the end of the nineteenth century, Western literary theory—then usually known as 'poetics'—passed through two major stages.[116] In the tradition emanating from ancient Greece, poetics or literary analysis was primarily normative, often treating traditional poetry as a model for expression and life. A change occurred c. 1700 CE in certain parts of Europe. Literary analysis became largely interested in examining particular works in the context of their own time and place. In fact, attention to circumstantial elements became so strong that a work could serve in the nineteenth century primarily as a means of shedding light on its background.[117]

This particularist tradition avoided close aesthetic analyses of texts, since it separated reason not only from ethics (see *CF*, 1.1) but also from aesthetics. The appreciation of texts was left to the intuitive emotional reaction of individual readers, who, to be sure, were expected to take factual historical information into account in their reaction. The particularist outlook continued into the early part of the twentieth century. For instance, Leo Spitzer reported that in his graduate schooling shortly before 1910, literary criticism did not look at texts themselves but pursued dates, antecedents, and historical allusions in a 'meaningless industriousness' (1948: 2-4).

Around 1900, however, another major change began to take place in several centers of learning. Criticism moved toward a scholarly analysis of form that included aesthetic appreciation, instead of leaving it to a private reaction.[118] Summarizing this development up to the 1960s, Gérard Genette (1966: 156) referred to Proust, Eliot, Valéry, Russian 'formalism' (which led to Czech 'structuralism'), French 'thematic criticism,' Anglo-American 'new criticism,' the widespread tradition of 'close reading,' Spitzer's 'immanent' study of works, and, after mid-century, French 'structuralism.' Thereafter poststructuralism, feminist criticism, (non-elitist) cultural studies, 'new historicism,' and a strong emphasis on 'theory' (with practical implications) emerged in partially overlapping ways.

---

115.   Such a characterization of literature is old and widespread. For instance, Horace (lines 333-34) said that poets aim to be useful or to delight or both. According to classical Sanskrit theory, literature both yields pleasure and is fictional, that is, representational (see, e.g., Tripp 1981: 214-15).

116.   See *BFC*: 37-41, 46, 102-4, 108-9, 130-31.

117.   H.A. Taine in 1864: 'you study the document only to know the man' (1879, Introduction, I). In 1840 (lecture III), Thomas Carlyle spoke of Shakespeare's works as 'windows' into 'the world that was in him.'

118.   Benedetto Croce (1954: 33 [1905]) reported viewpoints on both sides.

All of these procedures—including most, although not all, of the variations that have been labeled 'postmodern' (see Lucy 2000)—contained elements of a relational view. They differed, however, in the kinds of relations on which they focused. They covered relations between the parts of a work (including irony and other tensions), relations with the depicted world (especially possibility),[119] relations with the historical context (mostly, social), relations with recipients (from 1875 on, including ethics and the author as first observer),[120] and relations between texts (which may be dialogical in nature).[121]

Since so many relations can be considered and since relations involve both connectivity and distance, it must also be said that many analyses were one-sided. Some largely ignored the external relations of a text. Others tied the text very closely, perhaps too closely (such as in the 'new historicism'), to an external context. Some emphasized internal unity very strongly; others primarily envisioned disunity. Some highlighted the transtemporal character of great literature or its orientation toward possibility; others had no such interests. These variations often oscillated, with one side or the other prominent for a decade or two. When these ways are seen together—one might say, in the endeavor as a whole—a relational perspective is realized.

Relations between words, thoughts, and life in genres or general literary forms

Various relations between words, thoughts, and life became entangled with each other in the phenomenon of genres. A genre, as analyzed in the first half of the twentieth century by the biblical specialist Hermann Gunkel, involves special characteristics of style (verbal phenomena), content (thoughts and feelings), and life situation.[122] The first of these (verbal patterns) largely involves relations within a text; the second (especially thought), relations to the world depicted; the third (life), relations to context and recipients. Genre analysis examines the interaction between these relations.

119.   For instance, in Ricoeur's terminology, a 'possible world' stands 'in front of' a text (1971b: 559); it is that which a text (so-to-say) sees. It then opens up possibilities for the reader (1986: 131-32 [1975]).

120.   See René Wellek 1981, for an early phase; cf. Scherer 1888; Woodberry 1914: 48 ('it is not the poet, but the reader, who writes'). Ethics concerned especially sensitivity and consequent transformation. Concerning the role of author: good speakers and writers listen to what they are saying.

121.   For some details, see Part II, §§3, 5, of the present volume.

122.   See *BFC*: 209-62.

There are two major ways of understanding such an interaction. One is theoretical and general; the other, historical. The theoretical procedure gives attention to intrinsic connections. For instance, a certain style may be considered appropriate, or 'apt,' for a certain content. Such a view was dominant in classical Greco-Roman discussions. In contrast, the historical way envisioned more or less arbitrary conventions and pointed out that there may be no reason—other than habit—why one particular style should be used for a given thought.[123] Of course, insofar as generic structures were thought to be arbitrary, interest in a recognition of genres declined.[124] At the end of the nineteenth century, interest in genres revived in quite a few countries.[125] In the US, a theoretical 'types' approach—in part, antievolutionary—flourished from about 1880 on.[126] It was widely accepted because it enabled a broad audience to study literature and to ask not only 'who' and 'when' but also 'why' questions (Ehrenpreis 1945: 3). In France, Ferdinand Brunetière described literature in terms of genres, viewing them in evolutionary (although, contra Hegel, not in optimistic) terms (1890); politically, he supported religious socialism in reaction against individualism (Hocking 1936: 227). In Germany, Ernst Hirt presented an important analysis of 'the law of form' for genres in 1923. His work was preceded and especially succeeded by a large number of relevant studies, many of which combined structural and historical perspectives in what came to be called 'form history,' *Formgeschichte* (thus, Böckmann 1949; Prang 1968). In Italy, Emilio Betti gave a prominent place to several genres in his hermeneutics (1967 [1955]).

To be sure, despite a certain turn in orientation, many studies of genres during the twentieth century were primarily historical. Some theoreticians thought of historical genres as specialized codes in a particular culture that operate in addition to the general linguistic standards of that culture (thus, e.g., Todorov 1976: 162-63; Dubrow 1982: 2).[127] These codes could be thought of as arbitrary in

---

123.   The historical-conventional dimension was treated almost exclusively by Alastair Fowler (1982).

124.   See *BFC*: 138-39, but generic analyses were presented by Goethe and Hegel (truly great thinkers often transcend the limitations or fashions of their time).

125.   See Hernadi 1972 for an overview.

126.   A major contributor to this movement was Moulton, who moved from England to the US in 1892 (*BFC*: 189-92).

127.   It was recognized that certain features of codes are metalinguistic; that is, they draw the recipient's attention to the type of speech in relation to which the text is to be apprehended (e.g. 'once upon a time' for

themselves. Yet they could also be seen as pointing to structures of human life that develop historically, perhaps in a meaningful way. A history of forms could thus provide insight into human existence without regarding it as static (Böckmann 1949: 67). A historical view of genres was of considerable interest to Marxists, who were, of course, oriented toward collective human history according to a certain pattern.[128]

Differently, theoretical reflections dealt with the inner connections of literary phenomena with one another.[129] For example—as Käte Hamburger (1957) showed in detail in her analysis of the 'logic of literature'—poetry, drama, and narrative are connected with orientations toward the first, second, and third person, respectively.[130] To be sure, these associations are not tight or exclusive, as was pointed out (see Fludernik and Margolis 2004: 148-87). For instance, Frederick Ruf conceived of the dynamic patterns of lyric, drama, and narrative, not as patterns that provide orderliness, but as different 'voices' that can be present simultaneously in one work in a mutually challenging way (1997). In any case, as mentioned by Michael Sinding, genres—like other intellectual and behavioral 'schemas'—consist of 'sets of relations' and should thus not be approached primarily in terms of individual data, described seriatim (2002: 195).

Through such theoretical reflections on genres, the notion of 'fitness' was revived. Claudio Guillén, observing this revival, said that an important future task will be intercultural study toward the recognition of universals in literature, similar to those universals that are seen in language (1971: 112, 114). A little earlier, Tzvetan Todorov had spoken of a 'universal grammar' for literature, which would even 'give a definition of humanity' (1969: 15). It is true, the idea of universality is problematic, but the notion of comparability is viable. Masaki Mori thus furnished a 'comparative poetics of the epic,' in which he outlined some 'basic elements' of epic. These are not

---

fairy tales). Such signals function like what N. Fotion (1979) called 'master speech acts.' In a widely followed terminology, Gregory Bateson (1972: 188 [1955]) spoke of the furnishing of a 'frame.' Frame signals, or indications of a genre, can be used with less than exact truthfulness for purposes of deceit or fun (Goffman 1974).

128. See Jameson 1981: 105.

129. Thus, Viëtor 1931: 435; Hempfer 1973: 223; Conte 1994: 106-7 (saying that a genre appears useful only if it establishes a 'nonarbitrary' relation between content and form). Culler, however, thought that literary conventions are 'generally indefensible' (1975: 146).

130. Cf. Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy (1924 [*BFC*: 376]); earlier, E.S. Dallas (1852: 99).

rigid but 'flexible indicators' of the genre; they include 'coping with one's mortality, communal responsibility, and the double extension of time and space' (1997: x). Thomas Pavel mentioned that there are internal norms for genres; these are not 'obligatory' but rather 'just effective recipes' that provide 'good artistic habits' (2003: 209).

It was indeed generally recognized that neither intrinsic relations ('fitness') nor historical conventions are, normally, rigid. Instead, it was said that correlations between features are only probabilistic (e.g. Todorov 1970, I: iii, following Frye). When one describes the characteristics of literary types, one should thus use words like 'often' or 'sometimes' or 'typical' (A. Fowler 1982: 42). Irving Babbitt, who contributed in a major way to the interest in genres, noted that in ancient Greece literary norms and classifications were not rigid (1910: 249). Similarly, Lauri Honko, referring to currently observable folklore, stated that 'pure genres can only exist as ideal types' (1969: 61). David Bordwell accordingly called genre a 'fuzzy category' (1989: 148). As was said earlier, probability allows for both semi-independence and partial regularity. In fact, even transgressions cannot occur without a background of expectations that are violated (Todorov 1978: 45). Thus, Derrida said in discussing the 'law of genre' that 'there is no madness without the law' (1980: 200, 228).

If genres are flexible and thus do not have 'essences,' classification becomes partially downgraded in importance.[131] Northrop Frye held that the 'purpose of criticism by genres is not so much to classify…as to clarify…traditions and affinities, thereby bringing out a large number of literary relationships' (1957: 247). Similarly, Maria Corti avoided strict classification, stating that 'genre serves as the place where the individual work enters into a complex network of relations with other works' (1978: 115).

Most critics saw that assessments of these relations depend in part on the observer. It is true, André Jolles (1930) treated the complexes of nine genres as 'simple forms' distinct from each other in character, without indicating such relativity.[132] However, even the moderately Aristotelian critics who were centered in Chicago rejected the assumption that genres have essences, affirming the 'relativity' of analytical statements to questions and of questions to frameworks

131.   Emil Ermatinger noted that genres, like the phenomena of natural science, are never pure (1930: 371).

132.   It is characteristic of Aristotelian essentialism that it views the essence of a species as constituting an indivisible unity (*Metaphysics*, 1058). In accord with that position, Jolles conceived of elementary genres as unitary forms (1930: 22).

and 'ends' or purposes (thus, Elder Olson[133] and R.S. Crane [1953: 26-27, distinguishing relativity from skeptical relativism]). Moving along a similar line, Paul Hernadi advocated multidimensional, and thus multiperspectival, classification (1972).[134] Accepting relativity but saying that a genre is not to be taken as 'an arbitrary construction of the critic,' Deborah Madsen supported a 'relational' view, one in which text and reader interact (1994: 20).

Some critics (including biblical scholars) have distinguished between 'genres,' 'types,' and other kinds of 'forms.' However, within relational thinking there is no difference in principle between various kinds of patterns. It is true, for certain practical purposes, one might distinguish what one calls 'genres' from other structures, but distinctions of this sort were made variously by different theoreticians.[135] Because of such variability in conception, the term 'genre' was, in fact, largely replaced by the more open term 'form,' as noted by R. Williams (1977: 1-86).[136]

9. *Historiography*

In the words of Traian Stoianovich (1976: 25), there have been 'three main forms of history—exemplar, evolutionary, and functional-structural.' Of these, the exemplar version—which uses the past as a model for the present—predominated before the eighteenth century, and the evolutionary perspective was powerful in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The functional-structural was prominent in the twentieth, although other views continued. Thus the development of historiography exhibited the same major stages that have been noted for Western scholarship in general.[137]

10. *Theology and the Study of Religion*

The major shifts which occurred within most other disciplines can be observed in theology and the study of religion. In regard to theology—already partly covered[138]—I will be quite brief.

---

133. Specifically, Olson 1976: 269 (1949), 199 (1951), 219 (1969).

134. Similarly, Stahl 1980: 87; Morson 1981: vii-viii; Rosmarin 1986.

135. For instance, Gérard Genette, in 1977, called narration a 'mode' and the novel a 'genre,' but Hamburger and Ruf (cited above) treated narrative as a 'genre.'

136. Todorov, too, became reserved toward the use of the term 'genre' in theoretical analyses (1978: 47-49).

137. For some details, see above, Part I, essays 3, 5.

138. Developments prior to the 1980s have been described in Part I, essay 5, of the present volume.

Theology

Relationality continued as a main theme in theology during the 1980s and 1990s. For instance, two important Jewish thinkers formulated 'relational' views that held together particularity and universality (D. Hartman 1985: 15, 304; Borowitz 1991: 183, 283, etc.).[139] John Cobb, Jr., a Protestant, affirmed 'God as interconnected with the whole interconnected creation' (1990: 142).[140] Mark Taylor championed relationality in 1982 (53-56) and again in 2001, with the themes of complexity and networks.[141] The Roman Catholic Hans Waldenfels wondered—following the thinking of the Japanese Kitamori on the sympathetic pain of God—whether God, not being egocentric, should really be called 'absolute' (1983: 39, 42).[142] The Eastern Orthodox John Zizioulas has pointed to relationship as involving communion along with otherness (2006: 112). Women theologians who stressed relationality—of which there are quite a few—included Patricia Wilson-Kastner, who drew on both Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic thought (1983), together with Judith Plaskow, Jewish (1990), and Sallie McFague, Protestant (1982: 110).[143]

During the 1990s, some theologians came to use the word 'postmodern.' However, the term was very vague. McFague employed the term with a relational meaning and emphasized that relations involve both connectivity and disjunction (1997: 22, 52, 98, 105). Some others who claimed the term 'postmodern' were largely antimodern or ultramodern.[144]

In terms of politics, most twentieth-century Jewish and Christian theology had social concerns, and some religious thinkers were highly

---

139.   In 1954, Jacob Agus (also Jewish) argued that a polarity of 'point' and 'field' marks what is real (243-46). Perhaps one-sidedly, he connected God primarily with the second of these two poles (253-54), although he mentioned that fields themselves act as points (246). He more fully expressed the polarity of the two sides (with a tragic element) in 1983 (41-42).

140.   Philosophically explicit in 1993 (however, here as elsewhere, Cobb apparently did not give enough attention to the aspect of separateness, which also is important for relations).

141.   Less so in 1984, with a more nominalist orientation.

142.   Of course, much depends on what is meant by the word 'absolute'; Waldenfels affirmed that an 'absoluteness' of decision is required of human beings (1990: 297 [1970]). Hartshorne described God as simultaneously absolute and relative (1948). Cf. *CF*, 3.1.

143.   See also Heyward 1982 and E. Johnson 1992, cited earlier.

144.   For some antimoderns, see *CF*, 6.3. Ultramoderns included Charles Winquist (1995).

influential in society at large. They included Buber, Mahatma Gandhi, Reinhold Niebuhr, and King (see *CF*, chap. 2). South-American Catholics constituted the base for 'liberation theology,' which was probably the most powerful theological movement during the latter part of the twentieth century. With considerable appreciation of Marx, it sought to enhance the power of the oppressed. Intellectually, at least some liberation theologians employed relational models.[145]

The study of religion

For over a millennium before c. 1700 CE, it was standard to speak of 'religion' in the singular. Furthermore, 'true religion' did not mean one tradition in contrast to others but a genuine and proper commitment to the divine.[146] To a greater or lesser extent, the Catholic tradition held that at least some aspects of true religion are present everywhere. Especially tolerant, although seeking unity, was Nicholas of Cusa, *De pace fidei*, 1453. From the sixteenth century on, the doctrine that 'outside of the church there is no salvation' was expressly modified by extending the church to 'unconscious' believers (see Küng in Swidler 1987: 234).[147]

During the seventeenth century, as thinkers rebelled against church authority and religious strife, the idea emerged that 'natural religion' (often thought of as 'original') is available to rational insight. This form of religion was thought to represent what is true and valid in the competing traditions, to which the plural 'religions' was then applied.[148] Specifically, Herbert of Cherbury, who stood close to Platonism (Byrne 1989: 118), outlined in 1624 five 'Common Notions' that constitute 'catholic' or universal faith. He identified these notions (rather erroneously) as follows: a supreme God, the importance of worship, the priority of virtue, the need for repentance, and reward or punishment after death.

145.   E.g. Clodons Boff (1987: 143-50), in addition to theologians already mentioned.

146.   W.C. Smith 1962: 15-37. It should be noted that Israelites did not reject 'Canaanite religion' as a whole but criticized some practices (and beliefs) of Canaanites and accepted others.

147.   The openness of Catholicism accelerated during the twentieth century, especially in an encyclical by Pius XII in 1943, in Rahner's discussion of 'anonymous Christianity,' and in pronouncements at Vatican II in 1964 (see Waldenfels 1990: 1-101).

148.   Gustav Mensching 1948: 39-48; W.C. Smith 1962: 37-44. A recognition of Chinese thought contributed to this development, since it was fairly rational and associated with a quite well-functioning society. Cf. Söderblom 1916: 325-75.

However, an increasing sense of individuality and change during the eighteenth century (a major part of the 'Enlightenment') created appreciation of different, potentially equally valid, traditions and the expectation of 'true' religion in the future rather than in the past.[149] Different religious communities were thus understood in the way in which it was typical to think of different nations, that is, with the idea that each of them possesses a special character.[150] At the same time, however, evolutionary views took hold. Such views usually favored the writer's own religion (or atheism) and downgraded other traditions.

A step beyond the recognition of differences came in the twentieth century with a 'comparative' approach, which—according to a definition cited by Louis Jordan (1905: 30)—aims 'to study and expound those fundamental laws of relation which, in common, pervade them all.' Later, Raffaele Pettazzoni expressly described the science of religion as one that deals with relations. These come in two kinds: chronological (sequential) and 'formal' (interactive within a structure; 1954: 3). Certainly, one strength of a relational conception is that it includes both of these dimensions; for instance, an important developmental view was presented by Bellah in 1964 (1970: 20-50).

One issue in the comparative study of religion was the question of the relative validity or value of traditions. Jordan insisted that comparison cannot, by itself at least, reach an 'absolute' evaluation (1905: 64). Partly on the basis of comparison and partly because of more theoretical considerations, Georg Wobbermin (like some others),[151] however, believed that Christianity is 'the absolute religion,' while other religions are 'relative' in their validity (1926: 459-503). Differently, R. Panikkar (1964: 136) pointed out that any human expression of God's truth is necessarily limited, so that dialogue aiming toward mutual enlightenment is appropriate (cf. Swidler 1987: 5-50). As a matter of fact, religions gained insight from each other during the twentieth century.

Many comparative studies, to be sure, were not evaluational. Since all understanding involves general categories, comparison is needed for understanding.[152] In fact, it was clear that different

149.   See Gustav Mensching 1948: 50-53 on Lessing and Herder specifically.

150.   See *BFC*: 121 for Dryden, Herder, and others on nationality.

151.   Including Hegel (cf. Troeltsch 1923: 10 [Troeltsch himself held only to a relative advantage of Christianity]). Quite a few German theologians were more negative toward other religions, although an open perspective was developed by Rudolf Otto (1917, etc.).

152.   E.g. F. Max Müller (1873: 12) and W. Brede Kristensen (1960: 7).

religions have many recurring features and patterns, although they also have significant variations. Chantepie de la Saussaye in 1887 presented an overview of the most important phenomena of religion (gods, myths, rituals, and so forth) before going on to a more historical treatment of the data.[153]

Several decades later, G. van der Leeuw, inspired by Husserl, analyzed fundamental religious forms as they 'appear' (are 'phenomena') to an observer. He took such an appearance to be neither strictly objective nor strictly subjective (1933: 634). With Husserl, furthermore, he recognized that structures in themselves are theoretical 'possibilities,' apart from whether they are actualized in history (637). His analysis thus was not essentialist in an Aristotelian sense, although it was readily misunderstood in that way.[154] With regard to the internal relations within these structures, he treated them (with Dilthey) as meaningful 'connections' that are 'understood' (636). His work was thus relational—both in seeing a relation between subject and object and in observing how the parts of a structure relate to each other.

A reflective 'morphology' (form analysis) of the sacred was offered by Mircea Eliade, most systematically in 1949. The forms he described were not just accidental or external but were intended to represent religion's 'own modality' (that is, its character, just as one can see an elephant as an elephant; 1949: 11). According to Eliade, a central feature of the sacred is the 'coincidence of opposites,' especially the insertion of the temporal into the eternal. He identified a number of 'patterns' of the sacred that appear widely.

Eliade's analysis verged on essentialism ('own modality' is not far from 'essence'), but other theorists were careful to avoid an essentialist view in favor of a relational one. Among these stood Kurt Goldammer, who presented a comprehensive view of 'the world of forms' in religion (1960). The forms he described constitute different aspects of religion and are quite widespread, although they come with many variations. He held that the term 'form' is a

153.   More theoretically, C.P. Tiele (Dutch, like Chantepie and van der Leeuw) distinguished between the ever-changing 'morphological' aspect of religion (using a Greek word for 'form' that often denotes external appearance) and its 'ontological' aspect, that is, the permanent within the transitory—'the very nature and essence of religion' (1897-99, I: 27 [1897]; II: 188 [1899]).

154.   The German word *Wesen*, as it was used by van der Leeuw (1933: 643) and Gustav Mensching (1959: 17-19), means not merely 'essence' but more broadly 'nature, character'; thus there is room for ambiguity. However, approximations of essentialism were encouraged by the German usage of such expressions as *die Religion* or *der Kult*, with a definite article.

more appropriate term than 'type,' since it is more flexible (xvii). Somewhat differently, Ninian Smart avoided the notion of 'essence' by treating religions as exhibiting a 'family resemblance' (1973: 9). Paul Knitter specifically advocated a 'relational' view of truth, which affirms both the particularity of religions and their being part of each other (1985: 219).[155]

The works that have been mentioned so far gave attention primarily to patterns internal to religion and less so to relations between religion and other aspects of life. However, works devoted to the sociology and psychology of religion pursued such wider relations.[156] An approach that combines attention to both inner and outer connections was called 'interactionism' by E. Thomas Lawson and Robert McCauley (1990: 22-31).[157]

One notable phenomenon at the end of the twentieth century was heightened reflection on the interplay between scholar and subject matter. This could indicate growth in the writer's perception of self and other. Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty impressively explored how one's own identity is found in the process of dealing with stories by or about others, including persons in another tradition, animals, and gods (1988: 3). R.S. Sugirtharajah held that postcolonial interpretation rejects 'the myth of objective or neutral truth.' Accordingly, he opposed the 'detached' and alienating attitudes of (skeptical) postmodernism (1998: 18, 15), which, as he said a little later, do not 'destabilize' but rather 'shore up' patriarchy and similar traditions (2001: 201).

In short, relational approaches predominated not only in theology but also in the general study of religion. They recognized both commonalities and differences within the phenomena examined and gave attention to the relation of these to an observer.

11. *Conclusion*

It is clear, then, that a relational conceptuality was pervasive during the 'long' twentieth century. It is true, this conceptuality did not operate exclusively, but both essentialism and nominalism were overshadowed for the most part, and classical Platonism was

---

155.   However, Knitter, speaking of 'unitive pluralism,' may not have emphasized particularity enough.

156.   See, e.g., articles in the *Encyclopedia of Religion* and *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*.

157.   Like many linguists, they were interested in 'functional universals' (one can wonder whether 'universals' is too strong a word for religious phenomena).

rare.[158] Skepticism (a tendency in ultramodernism) did not play a large role, perhaps for the simple reason that skepticism does not allow one to do much in scholarship beyond calling opinions into question.

This assessment has a major implication for the history of science. Many recent historians of science have been reticent toward large-scale accounts of scientific development and have focused instead on the details of scientific efforts (Yonay 1998: 6). If it is true, however, that most disciplines underwent parallel developments, as has been shown in the present study, then it is clear that large-scale processes did operate. These involved a change in what Stephen Pepper called 'world hypotheses.'

According to Pepper, world hypotheses are expressed by means of 'root metaphors.' He discussed four such root metaphors. He called them 'formism,' 'mechanism,' 'contextualism,' and 'organicism.' As he described them, *formism* highlights ideal or general forms and types, *mechanism* takes atoms and a void as basic features, *contextualism* emphasizes the relation of an object to something outside it, and *organicism* highlights relations within a phenomenon (integrating them despite contradictions). Pepper noted two versions of 'formism,' the immanent and the transcendent; these two versions reflect, roughly, the difference between Aristotle's and Plato's philosophies. 'Mechanism' represents, of course, the outlook of nominalism. According to Pepper, the other two metaphors have much in common, although 'contextualism' is relatively dispersive and 'organicism' is relatively integrative (1942: 146-47). Together, these two constitute the relational outlook outlined here.[159]

One can ask whether there have been major developments within the relational framework during the twentieth century. Although no clear-cut tendencies hold for the various disciplines in different countries, the following phenomena can be noted. During the middle part of the century, a rather strongly unitive orientation was favored by 'functionalism,' 'structuralism,' and Anglo-American 'New Criticism.' In contrast, from about 1970 on, some writers highlighted disjunction. Taking up a more balanced position, information theory (formulated in 1948) combined divergence with connectivity. Furthermore, toward the end of the century, reflexivity or self-relationship—reflection about what one is doing—became pronounced.

158.   What is called 'platonism' in mathematics may or may not be classically Platonist.

159.   For instance, Dewey's relational position (see *CF*, 2.1; 4.1) was characterized by Pepper as combining contextualism and organicism.

Despite such variations, several relational features of scholarship were prominent throughout most of the century. They appeared in most and perhaps all of the disciplines.

One important feature was a recognition—contra nominalism—that it is possible to give reasons for the forms of actual phenomena, together with seeing their great variety. The physical universe, organisms (including the human brain and processes of perception), human society, language, rhetoric, and even literature could thus be 'understood' to a considerable extent, although not completely.

Nevertheless, despite elements of reasonableness, a partial looseness of connections between phenomena is expressed in the phenomenon of probability, a major theme in all of the disciplines. This phenomenon is theoretically very important, for it indicates not only connectivity (a particular phenomenon has a certain degree of likelihood, given another one) but also disjunction (lack of determinism). The notion of probability thus undercuts both essentialism (which implies regularity) and nominalism (which recognizes only arbitrariness).

With regard to classification, it was widely believed—contra nominalism—that generalizations can capture elements of real commonality. Yet—contra essentialism—it was also held that such sharing is of various kinds, so that different classifications can be made with equal justification. When such different classifications are combined, they constitute a multidimensional array.

Another pervasive feature was the fact that scholarship was devoted for the most part to certain practical ends. A pragmatic concern as such was not new, but the specific ends that were pursued were partially new. Among new interests in the fields of sociology, psychology, and anthropology were the construction of a welfare society, the elimination of group discrimination (especially in regard to race and sex), and an increased appreciation of other cultures. Analyses of rhetoric and literature were often, although not invariably, oriented toward internal or external personal liberation or toward interpersonal cooperation, or both. It is true, a sheer desire to know also played a role in scholarship (there may even be a biological basis for such an interest). Yet this desire could itself be thought of in terms of communication with reality rather than mastery of it.

Thus, regarding both procedure and human goals that were pursued, the relational pattern of scholarship matched a relational model of society, which valued connectivity together with a degree of independence and pursued the ideal of interactive freedom. This survey has not attempted to determine the political orientation of individual scholars, but it is not necessary to do so. What is significant is that there was an ethos in which both society and scholarship participated.

The fact that most scholarship had an ethical thrust has significant implications for the interaction between theology and other disciplines. On the one hand, the ethical thrust of 'secular' disciplines can make theologians feel at home in them, rather than considering them as enemies. On the other hand, members of secular disciplines can see that theologians have aims similar to their own and can perhaps treat them as partners. In fact, as was seen in *CF*, 3.3-6, theological ideas formed an important background for the relational conceptuality.

The survey has shown, further, that the humanities do not stand in sharp contrast to the physical sciences. Human as well as non-human phenomena can be viewed both 'from within' (imaginatively adopting the viewpoint of the other) and 'from the outside' (observing behavior within one's own coordinates). In both realms probabilistic multidimensionality applies. There is, in fact, no reason for the humanities to avoid science if 'science' refers to a systematic procedure in which one's own theories (past and future) interact with what lies outside of oneself. At the same time, one can see that all of the sciences have an intuitive aspect, as is shown by the fact that they reflect, at least partially, a cultural ethos that values a combination of (partial) connectivity and (partial) independence.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abel, Günther. 1993. *Interpretationswelten*. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.

Achenbach, Reinhard. 2004. 'Zum Sitz im Leben mesopotamischer und altisraelitischer Klagegebete.' *ZAW* 116: 364-78, 581-94.

Afriat, Alexander, and Franco Selleri. 1999. *The Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen Paradox*. New York: Plenum Press.

Agus, Jacob B. 1954. *Guideposts in Modern Judaism*. New York: Bloch.

—. 1983. *The Jewish Quest*. New York: Ktav.

Albrecht, Michael von. 1992. *Geschichte der römischen Literatur*, I. Bern: Francke.

Albright, William Foxwell. 1942. *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.

Aletti, J.-N., and J. Trublet. 1983. *Approche poétique et théologique des psaumes: analyses et méthodes*. Paris: Éditions du Cerf.

Allen, Christine Garside. 'On Me Be the Curse, My Son!' Pages 159-72 in Buss 1979.

Allen, Garland E. 1975. *Life Science in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Wiley.

Aloni, Antonio. 1997. 'The Proem of the Simonides Elegy.' Pages 8-28 in *Poet, Public, and Performance in Ancient Greece*, ed. L. Edmunds and R. Wallace. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Alonso-Schökel, Luis. 1960. 'Die stilistische Analyse bei den Propheten.' Pages 1154-64 in *Congress Volume, Oxford, 1959*. VTSup, 7. Leiden: Brill.

—. 1963. *Estudios de poética hebrea*. Barcelona: Juan Flors.

—. 1966. *La palabra inspirada*. Barcelona: Herder. English, 1967.

Alt, Albrecht. 1934. *Die Ursprünge des israelitischen Rechts*. Leipzig: S. Herzl.

Altizer, Thomas J.J. 1977. *The Self-Embodiment of God*. New York: Harper.

Alverson, Hoyt. 1994. *Semantics and Experience*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Aly, Wolf. 1925. *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*. Bielefeld: Velhagen & Klasing.

—. 1929. *Formprobleme der frühen griechischen Prosa*. Leipzig: Dieterich.

Anderson, Barry F. 1975. *Cognitive Psychology*. New York: Academic.

Anscombe, G.E.M. 1957. *Intention*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Apel, Karl-Otto. 1973. *Transformation der Philosophie*, 2 vols. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

—. 1974. 'Zur Idee einer transzendentalen Sprachpragmatik.' Pages 283-326 in *Aspekte und Probleme der Sprachphilosophie*, ed. K. Apel, *et al*. Freiburg: K. Alber.

Archer, Margaret S. 1995. *Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Argyle, Michael, *et al*. 1981. *Social Situations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Arnheim, Rudolf. 1974. *Art and Visual Perception*, 2nd edn. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Arnold, Carroll C., and John Waite Bowers, eds. 1984. *Handbook of Rhetorical and Communication Theory*. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.

Asante, Molefi Kete. 1987. *The Afrocentric Idea*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Ash, Mitchell G. 1995. *Gestalt Psychology in German Culture, 1890-1967: Holism and the Quest for Objectivity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ashby, W. Ross. 1962. 'Principles of the Self-Organizing System.' Pages 255-78 in *Principles of Self Organization*, ed. H. Von Foerster and G. Zopf. Oxford: Pergamon.

Aune, David E. 1987. *The New Testament in its Literary Environment*. Philadelphia: Westminster.

Austin, J.L. 1975. *How to Do Things with Words*, 2nd edn. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1st edn, 1962.

—. 1979. *Philosophical Papers*, 3rd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Babbitt, Irving. 1910. *The New Laokoon*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Baert, Patrick. 1998. *Social Theory in the Twentieth Century*. New York: New York University Press.

Baird, A. Craig. 1965. *Rhetoric*. New York: Ronald Press.

Baird, J. Arthur. 1976. 'Content-Analysis and the Computer.' *JBL* 95: 255-76.

Bakhtin, Mikhail M. 1929. *Problemy tvorchestva Dostoevskogo*. Leningrad: Priboĭ. 2nd edn: *Problemy poetiki Dostoevskogo*, Moscow, 1963. English: *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, ed. C. Emerson, 1984, based on the 2nd edn, but including part of the 1st edn.

—. 1968. *Rabelais and his World*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

—. 1981. *The Dialogic Imagination*. Austin: University of Texas Press. Partial English translation of a Russian edition, 1975.

—. 1986. *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

—. 1990. *Art and Answerability*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Baldermann, I. 1988. *Einführung in die Bibel*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Bally, Charles. 1905. *Précis de stylistique*. Geneva: A. Eggimann.

—. 1909. *Traité de stylistique française*. Heidelberg: Winter.

Barber, Nigel. 2004. *Kindness in a Cruel World*. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.

Barbour, Ian G. 1966. *Issues in Science and Religion*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Bar-Hillel, Yehoshua. 1964. *Language and Information*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Barker, Roger G., and Herbert F. Wright. 1954. *Midwest and its Children*. Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson.

Barnes, William Emery. 1936. *Gospel Criticism and Form Criticism*. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.

Barr, James. 1973. *The Bible in the Modern World*. New York: Harper and Row.

Barrett, Stanley R. 1984. *The Rebirth of Anthropological Theory*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Barry, Donald K. 1996. *Forms of Life and Following Rules*. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

Barth, Fredrik. 1995. 'Other Knowledge and Other Ways of Knowing.' *Journal of Anthropological Research* 51: 65-68.

Barth, Hermann, and Odil Hannes Steck. 1971. *Exegese des Alten Testaments*. Neukirchen–Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag.

Barth, Karl. 1936-58. *Church Dogmatics*. 4 vols. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.

Barthes, Roland. 1971. 'La lutte avec l'ange.' Pages 27-40 in *Analyse Structurale et Exégèse Biblique*, by R. Barthes, *et al*. Neuchâtel: Delachaux Niestlé. English, 1974.

Bartlett, Frederic C. 1932. *Remembering*. New York: Macmillan.

Barton, John. 1984. *Reading the Old Testament: Method in Biblical Study*. London: Darton, Longman and Todd. Rev. edn, 1996.

Bascom, William R. 1954. 'Four Functions of Folklore.' *Journal of American Folklore* 67: 333-49.

Bateson, Gregory. 1972. *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*. New York: Ballantine Books.

Batson, C. Daniel. 1998. 'Altruism and Personal Behavior.' Pages 282-316 in *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, II, ed. D. Gilbert, *et al*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Batson, C. Daniel, *et al*. 1973. *Commitment without Ideology*. Philadelphia: United Church.

Baugh, Albert C., *et al*. 1924. *Writing by Types*. New York: Century.

Baumgartner, Walter. 1932. 'Hermann Gunkel.' *Die Christliche Welt* 46: 389-92.

—. 1933. 'Hermann Gunkel.' *Zeitschrift für Assyriologie und verwandte Gebiete* 41: 300-302.

Bausinger, Hermann. 1968. *Formen der 'Volkspoesie.'* Berlin: E. Schmidt.

Beardslee, William. 1972. *A House for Hope*. Philadelphia: Westminster.

Beardsley, Monroe C. 1966. *Aesthetics from Classical Greece to the Present Time*. New York: Macmillan.

Bearn, Gordon C. F. 1997. *Waking to Wonder: Wittgenstein's Existential Investigations*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Beauchamp, P. 1971. 'L'analyse structurale et l'exégèse biblique.' pp. 113-28 in *Congress Volume (Uppsala 1971)*. VTSup, 22. Leiden: Brill.

Beaugrande, Robert de. 1984. *Text Production: Toward a Science of Composition*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Becker, Uwe. 2005. *Exegese des Alten Testaments*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

Behar, Ruth, and Deborah A. Gordon, eds. 1995. *Women Writing Culture*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Bellah, Robert. 1970. *Beyond Belief*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Ben Zvi, Ehud. 2003. 'The Prophetic Book: A Key Form of Prophetic Literature.' Pages 276-97 in Sweeney and Ben Zvi.

Ben-Amos, D. 1969. 'Analytic Categories and Ethnic Genres.' *Genre* 2: 275-301.

—. 1977. 'The Context of Folklore: Implications and Prospects.' Pages 36-53 in *Frontiers of Folklore*, ed. W. Bascom. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Benedict, Ruth. 1934. *Patterns of Culture*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Benjafield, John G. 1996. *A History of Psychology*. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.

Bentzen, Aage. 1949. *Introduction to the Old Testament*, II. Copenhagen: Gad.

Berger, Klaus. 1977. *Exegese des Neuen Testaments*. Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer.

—. 1984. 'Hellenistische Gattungen im Neuen Testament.' Pages 1031-1432 in *Aufsteig und Niedergang der römischen Welt* 2.25.2., ed. J. Vogt, H. Temporini, W. Haase. Berlin: W. de Gruyter.

—. 1986. *Exegese und Philosophie*. Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk.

—. 1987. *Einführung in die Formgeschichte*. Tübingen: Francke.

—. 1988. *Hermeneutik des Neuen Testaments*. Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn.

—. 1990. 'Form- und Gattungsgeschichte.' pp. 430-45 in *Handbuch religionswissenschaftlicher Grundbegriffe*, II, ed. H. Cancik, B. Gladigow, M. Laubscher. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer.

—. 1992. 'Zur Einführung.' Pages 1-5 in *Studien und Texte zur Formgeschichte*, Klaus Berger, *et al*. Tübingen: Francke.

—. 2005. *Formen und Gattungen im Neuen Testament*. Tübingen: Francke.

Berger, Peter. 1992. *A Far Glory*. New York: Macmillan.

Berger, Peter, and Thomas Luckmann. 1966. *The Social Construction of Reality*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

Berlin, James A. 1901. 'The Mind of Primitive Man.' *Journal of American Folk-Lore* 14: 1-11.

—. 1940. *Race, Language and Culture*. New York: Macmillan.

—. 1984. *Writing Instruction in Nineteenth-Century American Colleges*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.

—. 1987. *Rhetoric and Reality*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.

Berlo, David Kenneth. 1960. *The Process of Communication*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Berlyne, D.E., ed. 1974. *Studies in the New Experimental Aesthetics*. Washington: Hemisphere.

Bernays, Paul. 1958. *Axiomatic Set Theory*. Intro. by A. Fraenkel. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Bernheim, Ernst. 1908. *Lehrbuch der historischen Methode und der Geschichtsphilosophie*, 5th edn. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot.

Bernstein, Basil, *et al*. 1971-75. *Class, Codes and Control*. 3 vols. London: Routledge and K. Paul. 2nd edn of vol. I, 1974.

Berry, John W., *et al*. 1992. *Cross-Cultural Psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Berthoff, Ann E. 1988. *Forming/Thinking/Writing*, 2nd edn. Portsmouth, NH: Boynton/Cook.

Bertholet, Alfred. 1920. *Kulturgeschichte Israels*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Betti, Emilio. 1967. *Allgemeine Auslegungslehre als Methodik der Geisteswissenschaften*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr. Italian, 1955.

Bhaskar, Roy. 1989. *Reclaiming Reality*. London: Verso.

Bhatia, Vijay K. 1993. *Analysing Genre*. London: Longman.

Biber, Douglas. 1988. *Variation Across Speech and Writing*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Biesecker, Barbara A. 1989. 'Rethinking the Rhetorical Situation from Within the Thematic of *Différence*.' *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 22: 110-27.

Bitzer, Lloyd F. 1968. 'The Rhetorical Situation.' *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 1: 1-14.

—. 1980. 'Functional Communication: A Situational Perspective.' Pages 21-38 in *Rhetoric in Transition*, ed. E. White. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Black, Edwin. 1965. *Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method*. New York: Macmillan.

Black, Max. 1962. *Models and Metaphors*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Blau, Peter M. 1974. *On the Nature of Organizations*. New York: Wiley.

Bloch, Ernst. 1959. *Das Prinzip Hoffnung*. 2 vols. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.

Bloomfield, Leonard. 1933. *Language*. New York: H. Holt and Company.

Blumer, Herbert. 1969. *Symbolic Interactionism*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice–Hall.

Bocharov, Sergey. 1994. 'Conversations with Bakhtin.' *PMLA: Publications of the Modern Language Association of America* 109: 1009-24.

Bock, Philip K. 1988. *Rethinking Psychological Anthropology*. New York: W. H. Freeman.

Böckmann, Paul. 1949. *Formgeschichte der deutschen Dichtung*. Hamburg: Hoffman und Campe.

Bod, Rens. 1998. *Beyond Grammar*. Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications.

Boeckh, August. 1877. *Encyklopädie und Methodologie der philologischen Wissenschaften*. Leipzig: B.G. Teubner. Abbreviated English of pp. 1-253, 1968.

Boff, Clodons. 1987. *Theology and Praxis*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books. Portuguese, 1978.

Bogatyrev, P., and R. Jakobson. 1929. 'Die Folklore als eine besondere Form des Schaffens.' Pages 900-13 in *Donum natalicium Schrijnen*. Nijmegen–Utrecht: N.V. Dekker & van de Vegt.

Bohm, David. 1957. *Causality and Chance in Modern Physics*. New York: Harper.

Bologh, Roslyn Wallack. 1990. *Love or Greatness*. London: Unwin Hyman.

Bonhoeffer, Dietrich. 1967. *Letters and Papers from Prison*, rev. edn. New York: Macmillan.

Bonta, Bruce D. 1993. *Peaceful Peoples: An Annotated Bibliography*. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press.

Boorer, Sue. 2003. 'Kaleidoscopic Patterns and the Shaping of Experience.' Pages 199-216 in Sweeney and Ben Zvi.

Boorstein, Seymour. 1997. *Clinical Studies in Transpersonal Psychology*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Bordwell, David. 1989. *Making Meaning*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Boring, Edwin G. 1957. *A History of Experimental Psychology*, 2nd edn. New York: The Century Co.

Borowitz, Eugene B. 1991. *Renewing the Covenant*. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society.

Bosanquet, B. 1912. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*. London: Macmillan.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1990. *In Other Words*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Bowlby, John. 1973. *Separation*. New York: Basic Books.

Boysson-Bardies, Bénédicte de. 1999. *How Language Comes to Children*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. French, 1996.

Bradburn, Norman M. 1969. *The Structure of Psychological Well-Bring*. Chicago: Aldine.

Brandist, Craig. 2004. 'Voloshinov's Dilemma: On the Philosophical Roots of the Dialogical Theory of the Utterance.' Pages 97-124 in Brandist, Shepherd, and Tihanov.

Brandist, Craig, David Shepherd, and Galin Tihanov, eds. 2004. *The Bakhtin Circle*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Brang, Peter. 1973. 'Sociological Methods in Twentieth-Century Russian Criticism.' Pages 209-51 in *Literary Criticism and Sociology*, ed. J. Strelka. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Brentano, Franz. 1874. *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*. 2 vols. Leipzig: Duncker.

Brigance, William Norwood. 1927. *The Spoken Word*. New York: F. S. Crofts.

Briggs, C. 1883. *Biblical Study*. New York: Scribners.

—. 1899. *General Introduction to the Study of Holy Scripture*. New York: Scribners.

Briggs, Charles L., ed. 1996. *Disorderly Discourse*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Briggs, Charles L., and Richard Bauman. 1992. 'Genre, Intertextuality, and Social Power.' *Journal of Linguistic Anthropology* 2: 131-72.

Brillouin, Léon. 1964. *Scientific Uncertainty and Information*. New York: Academic.

Brock, Bernard L., *et al.*, eds. 1989. *Methods of Rhetorical Criticism*, 3rd edn. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.

Brooks, Cleanth. 1947. *The Well-Wrought Urn*. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock.

Brown, Donald E. 1991. *Human Universals*. Philadelphia: Temple University.

Brown, Penelope, and Stephen C. Levinson. 1987. *Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brown, Richard Harvey. 1987. *Society as Text*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

—. 1998. *Toward a Democratic Science*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Brown, Richard Harvey, ed. 1991. *Writing the Social Text*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.

—. 1995. *Postmodern Representations*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Brueggemann, Walter. 1974. 'From Hurt to Joy, From Death to Life.' *Int* 28: 3-19.

—. 1976. *Living Toward a Vision*. Philadelphia: United Church.

—. 1980. 'Psalms and the Life of Faith.' *JSOT* 17: 3-32.

—. 1982. *The Creative Word*. Philadelphia: Fortress.

—. 1984. *The Message of the Psalms: A Theological Commentary*. Minneapolis: Augsburg.

Bruner, Jerome. 1981. 'Review and Prospectus.' Pages 256-62 in *Universals of Human Thought: Some African Evidence*, ed. B. Lloyd and J. Gray. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brunetière, Ferdinand. 1890. *L'évolution des genres dans l'histoire de la literature*. I. *Introduction*. Paris: Hachette. This was the only volume published.

Brunner, Emil. 1940. *The Christian Doctrine of God*. Philadelphia: Westminster.

Brunswik, Egon. 1956. *Perception*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Buber, Martin. 1923. *Ich und Du*. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag. English, 1937.

Buck, Gertrude. 1899. *The Metaphor: A Study in the Psychology of Rhetoric*. Ann Arbor, MI: Inland Press.

Buckley, Walter, ed. 1968. *Modern Systems Research for the Behavioral Scientist*. Chicago: Aldine.

Bühler, Karl. 1927. *Die Krise der Psychologie*. Jena: G. Fischer.

—. 1933. 'Die Axiomatik der Sprachwissenschaften.' *Kant-Studien* 38: 19-90.

—. 1934. *Sprachtheorie*. Jena: G. Fischer.

Bultmann, Rudolf. 1926. *Jesus*. Berlin: Deutsche Bibliothek.

—. 1934. *Jesus and the Word*. New York: Scribner.

—. 1955. *Essays: Philosophical and Theological*. London: SCM.

Burke, Kenneth. 1931. *Counter-Statement*. New York: Harcourt.

—. 1941. *The Philosophy of Literary Form*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

—. 1945. *A Grammar of Motives*. New York: George Braziller.

—. 1951. 'Rhetoric—Old and New.' *Journal of General Education* 5: 202-209.

—. 1959. *Attitudes Toward History*, rev. 2nd edn. Boston: Beacon.

—. 1961. *The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Burkert, Walter. 1979. *Structure and History in Greek Mythology and Ritual*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Buss, Martin J. 1961. 'The Language of the Divine 'I.'' *JBR* 29: 102-107.

—. 1963. 'The Psalms of Asaph and Korah.' *JBL* 83: 382-92.

—. 1965. 'Self-Theory and Theology.' *JR* 45: 46-53.

—. 1967. 'The Meaning of History.' Pages 135-54 in *Theology as History*, ed. James M. Robinson and J. Cobb. New York: Harper and Row.

—. 1969. *The Prophetic Word of Hosea: A Morphological Study*. Berlin: Alfred Töpelmann.

—. 1970. 'Form Criticism: An Assessment.' Discussion paper, distributed at the Form Criticism Seminar of the Society of Biblical Literature. Reprinted in revised form in the present volume.

—. 1974. 'The Study of Forms.' Pages 1-56 in *Old Testament Form Criticism*, ed. John H. Hayes. San Antonio: Trinity.

—. 1977. 'The Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Law in Ancient Israel.' Pages 51-62 in *Proceedings of the Sixth World Congress of Jewish Studies*. Jerusalem: Academic.

—. 1978. 'The Idea of *Sitz im Leben*—History and Critique.' *ZAW* 90: 157-70; pp. 165-70 reprinted in the present volume.

—. 1979. 'Understanding Communication.' Pages 3-44 in Buss, ed., 1979. Reprinted in the present volume.

—. 1999. *Biblical Form Criticism in its Context*. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press.

—. 2006. 'The Impact of Faith on Relational Thought.' *Consensus* 31, No. 2: 75-85.

—. 2008. *The Concept of Form in the Twentieth Century*. Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix.

Buss, Martin J., ed. 1979. *Encounter with the Text*. Philadelphia: Fortress Press.

Buxton, William. 1985. *Talcott Parsons and the Capitalist Nation-State*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Byrne, Peter. 1989. *Natural Religion and the Nature of Religion*. London: Routledge.

Byrskog, Samuel. 2007. 'A Century with the *Sitz im Leben*.' *ZNW* 98: 1-27.

Cairns, Francis. 1972. *Generic Composition in Greek and Roman Poetry*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Calkins, Mary Whiton. 1901. *An Introduction to Psychology*. New York: Macmillan.

—. 1908. *The Persistent Problems of Philosophy*, 2nd edn. New York: Macmillan. 1st edn, 1907; 5th edn, 1925.

Cameron, Deborah. 2000. *Good to Talk?* London: Sage.

Campbell, Antony F. 2005. *2 Samuel*. FOTL, 8. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.

Campbell, JoAnn. 1996. *Toward a Feminist Rhetoric: The Writing of Gertrude Buck*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Campbell, Karlyn Kohrs. 1989. *Man Cannot Speak for Her*. 2 vols. New York: Greenwood Press.

Cantor, Georg. 1895. 'Beiträge zur Begründung der transfiniten Mengenlehre.' *Mathematische Annalen* 46: 481-512.

Carlyle, Thomas. 1840. *On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History*. London: Chapman and Hall. Reprinted in *Works*, V, 1901.

Carney, Thomas F. 1972. *Content Analysis: A Technique for Systematic Inference from Communications*. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press.

Carr, Lowell Juilliard. 1955. *Analytical Sociology*. New York: Harper.

Carroll, David W. 1994. *Psychology of Language*, 2nd edn. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Cartwright, Nancy, *et al*. 1996. *Otto Neurath: Philosophy Between Science and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Casalis, Matthieu. 1976. 'The Dry and the Wet: A Semiological Analysis of Creation and Flood Myths.' *Semiotica* 17, No. 1: 35-67.

Cavell, Stanley. 1989. *This New Yet Unapproachable America: Lectures after Emerson after Wittgenstein*. Albuquerque, NM: Living Batch Press.

Cazelles, H. 1946. *Etudes sur le code de l'alliance*. Paris: Letouzey et Ané.

Červenka, Miroslav. 1978. *Der Bedeutungsaufbau des literarischen Werks*. Munich: Fink.

Chafe, Wallace. 1994. *Discourse, Consciousness, and Time*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Chantepie de la Saussaye, P.D. 1887. *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, I. Freiburg: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

Cherry, Colin. 1957. *On Human Communication*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Chesebro, James W. 1999. 'Multiculturalism and the Burkean System.' Pages 167-88 in *Kenneth Burke and the 21st Century*, ed. B. Brock. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Childs, Brevard S. 1970. *Biblical Theology in Crisis*. Philadelphia: Westminster.

Chomsky, Noam. 1965. *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

—. 1996. *Powers and Prospects*. Boston: South End Press.

Christensen, Francis. 1967. *Notes Toward a New Rhetoric*. New York: Harper & Row.

Churchland, Paul M., and Patricia S. Churchland. 1998. *On the Contrary: Critical Essays, 1987-1997*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Ciaffa, Jay A. 1998. *Max Weber and the Problems of Value-Free Science*. London: Associated University Presses.

Cilliers, Paul. 1998. *Complexity and Postmodernism*. London: Routledge.

Cixous, Hélène. 1975. 'Sorties.' Pages 114-246 in *La jeune née*, ed. H. Cixous and C. Clement. Paris: Union générale d'éditions. English, 1986.

Clark, Herbert H. 1996. 'Communities, Commonalities, and Communication.' Pages 324-55 in *Rethinking Linguistic Relativity*, ed. J. Gumpers and S. Levinson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Clark, Katerina, and Michael Holquist. 1984. *Mikhail Bakhtin*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.

Clay, Jenny Strauss. 1989. *The Politics of Olympus*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Clifford, James, and George Marcus, eds. 1986. *Writing Culture*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Clines, David J.A. 1998. 'The Pyramid and the Net: The Postmodern Adventure in Biblical Studies.' Pages 138-57 in *On the Way to the Postmodern: Old Testament Essays, 1967-1998*, I, by David J.A. Clines. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press.

Coats, George W. 1983. *Genesis*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.

Cobb, John B., Jr. 1990. 'From Individualism to Persons in Community.' Pages 123-42 in *Sacred Interconnections*, ed. D. Griffin. Albany: State University of New York Press.

—. 1993. 'Order out of Chaos.' Pages 71-86 in *Inter-Religious Models and Criteria*, ed. J. Kellenberger. London: Macmillan.

Cohen, G.A. 1978. *Karl Marx's Theory of History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Cohen, Leslie B., and Barbara A. Younger. 1983. 'Perceptual Categorization in the Infant.' Pages 197-220 in *New Trends in Conceptual Representation*, ed. E. Scholnick. Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum.

Colby, Anne, and William Damon. 1992. *Some Do Care*. New York: Macmillan.

Cole, Peter, and Jerry L. Morgan, eds. 1975. *Syntax and Semantics*, III. New York: Academic.

Coleman, William. 1971. *Biology in the Nineteenth Century*. New York: Wiley.

Collingwood, R.G. 1939. *An Autobiography*. London: Oxford.

Collins, Randall. 1988. *Theoretical Sociology*. San Diego: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.

Collins, W. Andrew, and Brett Laursen. 1999. *Relationships as Developmental Context*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Comte, Auguste. 1830-42. *Cours de philosophie positive*. Paris: Rouen.

Connor, Ulla. 1996. *Contrastive Rhetoric*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Conte, Gian Biagio. 1994. *Genres and Readers*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Italian, 1991.

Cooper, J.S. 1975. 'Structure, Humor, and Satire in the Poor Man of Nippur.' *JCS* 27: 163-74.

Corti, Maria. 1978. *An Introduction to Literary Semiotics*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Italian, 1976.

Coser, Lewis A. 1956. *The Functions of Social Conflict*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

—. 1965. *Georg Simmel*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice–Hall.

Coseriu, Eugenio. 1955. 'Determinación y entorno.' *Romanisches Jahrbuch* 7: 29-54.

—. 1967. 'Georg von der Gabelentz et la linguistique synchronique.' *Word* 23: 74-100. Reprinted in *Die Sprachwissenschaft*, ed. von der Gabelentz, 1969 edition; German in later editions of this.

—. 1974. *Synchronie, Diachronie und Geschichte*. Munich: Fink.

—. 1980. *Textlinguistik*. Tübingen: Narr.

Couffignal, Robert. 1977. 'Le songe de Jacob: Approches nouvelles de Genèse 28, 10-22.' *Bib* 58: 342-60.

Crane, R.S. 1953. *The Languages of Criticism and the Structure of Poetry*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Crenshaw, J.L. 1969. 'Method in Determining Wisdom Influence Upon 'Historical' Literature.' *JBL* 83: 129-42.

Croce, Benedetto. 1954. *Problemi di estetica*, 5th edn. Bari: G. Laterza.

Cross, Frank M., Jr. 1973. *Canaanite Myth and Hebrew Epic*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Crystal, David, and Derek Davy. 1969. *Investigating English Style*. Harlow: Longmans.

Cua, A.S. 1985. *Ethical Argumentation*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Culler, Jonathan. 1975. *Structuralist Poetics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Culley, Robert C. 1976. *Studies in the Structure of Hebrew Narrative*. Philadelphia: Fortress.

D'Angelo, Frank J. 1984. 'Nineteenth-Century Forms/Modes of Discourse.' *College Composition and Communication* 35: 31-42.

Dallas, E.S. 1852. *Poetics*. London: Smith, Elder & Co.

Daly, Mary. 1973. *Beyond God the Father*. Boston: Beacon.

Damrosch, D. 1987. *The Narrative Covenant: Transformations of Genre in the Growth of Biblical Literature*. San Francisco: Harper & Row.

Daniélou, J. 1957. 'Les genres littéraires d'après le Pères de l'Eglise.' pp. 275-83 in *Los generos literarios de la Sagrada Escritura*, Congreso de Ciencias Eclesiástica. Barcelona: Juan Flors.

Darnell, Regna. 1998. *And Along Came Boas*. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins.

Darsey, James. 1997. *The Prophetic Tradition and Radical Rhetoric in America*. New York: New York University Press.

Daube, David. 1963. *The Exodus Pattern in the Bible*. London: Faber.

Davitz, Joel E. 1969. *The Language of Emotion*. New York: Academic.

Dawson, Christopher. 1956. *The Dynamics of World History*. New York: Sheed & Ward.

De Laguna, Grace Andrus. 1927. *Speech*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Deane, Paul D. 1992. *Grammar in Mind and Brain*. Berlin: M. de Gruyter.

DeGenaro, William, ed. 2007. *Who Says? Working Class Rhetoric, Class Consciousness, and Community*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Deist, F.E., and W.S. Vorster, eds. 1986. *Words from Afar*. Capetown, South Africa: Tafelberg.

Delanty, Gerard. 2005. *Social Science*, 2nd edn. New York: Open University Press.

Denney, Joseph V. 1896. *Two Problems in Composition-Teaching*. Ann Arbor, MI: The Inland Press.

Derrida, Jacques. 1967. *L'écriture et la difference*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil. English, 1978.

—. 1972. *Marges de la philosophie*. Paris: Editions de Minuit. English, 1982.

—. 1980. 'La loi du genre/The Law of Genre.' *Glyph* 7: 176-232.

Detweiler, Robert. 1978. *Story, Sign, and Self: Phenomenology and Structuralism as Literary Critical Methods*. Philadelphia: Fortress.

Dewey, John. 1925. *Experience and Nature*. Chicago: Open Court.

—. 1934. *Art as Experience*. New York: Minton, Balch.

—. 1963. *Experience and Education*. New York: Macmillan.

Dews, Peter. 1979. 'The *Nouvelle Philosophie* and Foucault.' *Economy and Society* 8: 127-71.

Dibelius, Martin. 1935. *Gospel Criticism and Christology*. London: I. Nicholson & Watson. German in *Botschaft und Geschichte*, I, 1953: 293-358.

—. 1965. *From Tradition to Gospel*. New York: Scribners.

Dijk, Teun A. van. 1971. 'Some Problems of Generative Poetics.' *Poetics* 2: 5-35.

—. 1972. *Some Aspects of Text Grammars*. The Hague: Mouton.

—. 1977. *Text and Context: Explorations in the Semantics and Pragmatics of Discourse*. London: Longman.

—. 1980. *Textwissenschaft*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer. Dutch, 1978.

—. 1985. *Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, I. London: Academic Press.

Dik, Simon C. 1997. *The Theory of Functional Grammar*, Part I, 2nd edn. Berlin: M. de Gruyter.

Dilthey, Wilhelm. 1921. *Gesammelte Schriften*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Dimter, Matthias. 1981. *Textklassenkonzepte heutiger All-tagssprache*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer.

Dockx, Stanislas I., and Paul Bernays. 1965. *Information and Prediction in Science*. New York: Academic.

Dodd, C.H. 1936. *The Present Task in New Testament Studies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Donaworth, Jane, *et al*. 1994. 'An Annotated Bibliography of the History of Non-Western Rhetorical Theory Before 1900.' *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 24, 3/4: 167-80.

Dosse, Françoise. 1995. *L'empire du sens*. Paris: La Découverte.

Douglas, Mary. 1966. *Purity and Danger*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

—. 1975. *Implicit Meanings*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Dressel, Gert. 1996. *Historische Anthropologie*. Vienna: Böhlau.

Dressler, Wolfgang, ed. 1978. *Textlinguistik*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

Droysen, Johann Gustav. 1943. *Historik*, 2nd edn. Ed. Rudolf Hübner. Munich: Oldenbourg.

Drury, M.O'C. 1984. 'Some Notes on Conversations with Wittgenstein' and 'Conversations with Wittgenstein.' Pages 76-171 in *Recollections of Wittgenstein*, ed. R. Rhees. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dubnow, Simon. 1937. *Mein Leben*. Berlin: Jüdische Buchvereinigung.

Dubrow, Heather. 1982. *Genre*. London: Methuen.

Duffy, Bernard K., and Halford R. Ryan, eds. 1987. *American Orators Before 1900*. New York: Greenwood Press.

Duncan-Jones, A. E., *et al*., eds. 1963. *Nicholaĭ Mikhaĭlovich Bakhtin: Lectures and Essays*. Birmingham: University of Birmingham.

Dundes, Alan. 1964a. 'Texture, Text, and Context.' *Southern Folklore Quarterly* 28: 251-65.

—. 1964b. *The Morphology of North American Indian Folktales*. Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia.

Dupré, John. 1993. *The Disorder of Things*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Durkheim, Emile. 1893. *De la division du travail social*. Paris: F. Alcan.

—. 1912. *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*. Paris: F. Alcan.

Dyke, C. 1988. *The Evolutionary Dynamics of Complex Systems*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Eames, Elizabeth Ramsden. 1989. *Bertrand Russell's Dialogue with his Contemporaries*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.

Eaton, S. Boyd, Marjorie Shastak, and Melvin Konner. 1988. *The Paleolithic Prescription*. New York: Harper and Row.

Ebel, Uda. 1965. *Das altromanische Mirakel*. Heidelberg: C. Winter.

Ebeling, Gerhard. 1963. *Word and Faith*. Philadelphia: Fortress.

—. 1975. *Studium der Theologie*. Tübingen: Mohr.

Edgerton, Robert B. 1992. *Sick Societies*. New York: Free Press.

Edmondson, Jerold A., and Donald A. Burquest. 1994. *A Survey of Linguistic Theories*. Dallas: Summer Institute of Linguistics.

Edmunds, Lowell. 1989. 'Introduction.' Pages ix-xxviii in *Classics*, ed. P. Culham and L. Edmunds. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

Ehrenpreis, Irvin. 1945. *The 'Types Approach' to Literature*. New York: King's Crown Press.

Eichhorn, J.G. 1780-83. *Einleitung ins Alte Testament*. Leipzig: Weidmann. English, 1888.

Eichrodt, Walter. 1933-39. *Theologie des Alten Testaments*. 3 vols. Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs. English, 1961-67.

Eisenberg, Nancy. 1992. *The Caring Child*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Eissfeldt, Otto. 1934. *Einleitung in das Alte Testament*. Tübingen: Mohr. English, 1965.

Eister, Allan W., ed. 1974. *Changing Perspectives in the Scientific Study of Religion*. New York: Wiley.

Eliade, Mircea. 1949. *Traité d'histoire des religions*. Paris: Payot. English: *Patterns in Comparative Religion*, 1958.

Eliot, T.S. 1957. *On Poetry and Poets*. London: Faber.

Ellen, Roy, *et al.*, eds. 1988. *Malinowski between Two Worlds*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ellis, Donald G. 1999. *Crafting Society*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Emerson, Caryl. 1997. *The First Hundred Years of Mikhail Bakhtin*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Emmendörffer, Michael. 1998. *Der ferne Gott*. Forschungen zum Alten Testament, 21. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

Emmet, Dorothy. 1972. *Function, Purpose and Powers*, 2nd edn. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Emmett, Kathleen. 1990. 'Forms of Life.' *Philosophical Investigations* 13: 213-31.

Enkvist, Nils Erik. 1964. 'On Defining Style.' Pages 1-56 in *Linguistics and Style*, ed. John Spencer. London: Oxford University Press.

Erickson, Paul A. 1998. *A History of Anthropological Theory*. Ontario: Broadview Press.

Erickson, Victoria Lee. 1992. *Where Silence Speaks*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press.

Erlich, Victor. 1955. *Russian Formalism*. The Hague: Mouton. 3rd edn, 1981.

Ermatinger, Emil. 1930. *Philosophie der Literaturwissenschaft*. Berlin: Junker & Dunnhaupt.

Ernesti, J.A. 1822. *Elements of Interpretation*. Andover: Flagg and Gould.

Evans, Vyvyan. 2007. *A Glossary of Cognitive Linguistics*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Fabian, Johannes. 1974. 'Genres in an Emerging Tradition: An Anthropological Approach to Religious Communication.' Pages 249-72 in *Changing Perspectives in the Scientific Study of Religion*, ed. A. Eister. New York: Wiley.

—. 1998. *Moments of Freedom*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.

Fann, K.T., ed. 1969. *Symposium on J.L. Austin*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Faust, August. 1931. *Der Möglichkeitsgedanke*. 2 vols. Heidelberg: Winter.

Fedajewa, Tatjana. 2000. 'Wittgenstein und Russland.' Pages 365-417 in *Skizzen zur österreichischen Philosophie*, ed. Rudolf Haller. Grazer philosophische Studien, 58/59. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Fernández, Pelayo H. 1974. *Estilística*, 2nd edn. Madrid: J. Porrua Taranzas.

Ferré, Nels. 1951. *The Christian Understanding of God*. New York: Harper.

Ferree, Myra Marx, *et al.*, eds. 1999. *Revisioning Gender*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Feuer, Lewis S. 1974. *Einstein and the Generations of Science*. New York: Basic Books.

Fine, Elizabeth C. 1984. *The Folklore Text*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Finnegan, Ruth. 1992. 'Oral Poetry.' Pages 119-27 in *Folklore, Cultural Performances, and Popular Entertainments*, ed. R. Bauman. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Firth, J.R. 1930. *Speech*. London: Ernest Benn.

—. 1934. 'Linguistics and the Functional Point of View.' *English Studies* 16: 18-24.

—. 1935. 'The Technique of Semantics.' *Transactions of the Philological Society* [no volume number]: 36-72. Reprinted in Firth 1957.

—. 1957. *Papers in Linguistics 1934-1951*. London: Oxford University Press.

Fischer, Kurt W., and June Price Tangney. 1995. 'Self-Conscious Emotions and the Affect Revolution.' Pages 3-22 in *Self-Conscious Emotions*, ed. J. Tangney and K. Fischer. New York: Guilford Press.

Fischer, Michael M.J. 1997. 'Postmodern, postmodernism.' Pages 368-72 in *The Dictionary of Anthropology*, ed. T. Barfield. Oxford: Blackwell.

Fisher, Helen. 1999. *The First Sex*. New York: Random House.

Fisher, R.A. 1935. 'The Logic of Inductive Inference.' *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* 98: 39-54.

Fishman, Joshua A. 1970. *Sociolinguistics*. Rowley, MA: Newbury House.

—. 1972. *Language in Sociocultural Change*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Fiske, Donald W., and Salvatore R. Maddi. 1961. *Functions of Varied Experience*. Homewood, IL: Dorsey.

Fludernik, Monika, and Uri Margolis. 2004. 'Introduction.' *Style* 38: 148-87.

Flueckiger, Joyce Burkhalter. 1996. *Gender and Genre in the Folklore of Middle India*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Fodor, J.A., *et al*. 1974. *The Psychology of Language*. New York: McGraw–Hill.

Fohrer, Georg. 1961. 'Tradition und Interpretation im Alten Testament.' *ZAW* 73: 1-30.

—. 1965. *Einleitung in das Alte Testament*. Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer. English, 1968.

—. 1972. *Theologische Grundstrukturen des Alten Testaments*. Berlin: W. de Gruyter.

Fohrer, Georg, *et al*. 1973. *Exegese des Alten Testaments*. Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer.

Fontaine, Carole R. 1982. *Traditional Sayings in the Old Testament*. Bible and Literature Series, 5. Sheffield: Almond.

Formigari, Lia. 1993. *Signs, Science and Politics*. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins.

Forster, Michael N. 2004. *Wittgenstein on the Arbitrariness of Grammar*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Foss, Karen A., Sonja K. Foss, and Cindy L. Griffin. 1999. *Feminist Rhetorical Theories*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Foss, Sonja K., Karen A. Foss, and Robert Trapp. 1991. *Contemporary Perspectives on Rhetoric*, 2nd edn. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press.

Fosshage, James L. 1992. 'Self-Psychology.' Pages 21-42 in *Relational Perspectives in Psychoanalysis*, ed. N. Skolnick and S. Warshaw. Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press.

Foster, David. 2006. *Writing with Authority: Students' Roles as Writers in Cross-National Perspective*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.

Fotion, N. 1979. 'Speech Act Activity and Language Use.' *Philosophia* 8: 615-38.

Foucault, Michel. 1968. 'Réponse à une question.' *Esprit* 371: 850-74. English: *The Foucault Effect*, 1991: 53-86.

—. 1972. *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. New York: Random House.

Fowler, Alastair. 1982. *Kinds of Literature*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Francke, August Hermann. 1693. *Manductio ad lectionem Scripturea Sacrae*. Hallae: publisher unknown.

Frege, Gottlob. 1967. *Kleine Schriften*. Ed. I. Angelelli. Hildesheim: Olms.

Frei, Hans. 1974. *The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Freud, Sigmund. 1950. *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. New York: Liveright.

Friedman, Maurice. 1992. *Dialogue and the Human Image*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Frijda, Nico H. 1986. *The Emotions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Frye, Northrop. 1957. *Anatomy of Criticism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

—. 1976. *The Secular Scripture*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Fuchs, Ernst. 1968. *Marburger Hermeneutik*. Tübingen: Mohr.

Gabor, D. 1946. 'Theory of Communication.' *Journal of the Institution of Electrical Engineers* 93: 429-41.

Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 1975. *Truth and Method*. New York: Seabury.

Galbiati, Enrico. 1956. *La struttura letteraria dell' Esodo*. Alba: Paoline.

Gamble, Teri Kwal, and Michael Gamble. 1999. *Communication Works*, 6th edn. New York: McGraw–Hill.

Gammie, John G. 'Theological Interpretation by Way of Literary and Tradition Analysis: Genesis 25–36.' Pages 117-34 in Buss 1979.

Gao, Ge, and Stella Ting-Toomey. 1998. *Communicating Effectively with the Chinese*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Gardiner, Alan. 1919. 'Some Thoughts on the Subject of Language.' *Man* 19: 1-6.

—. 1922. 'The Definition of the Word and the Sentence.' *British Journal of Psychology* 12: 352-61.

—. 1932. *The Theory of Speech and Language*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Gardner, Howard. 1985. *The Mind's New Science*. New York: Basic Books.

Garner, Wendell R. 1962. *Uncertainty and Structure as Psychological Concepts*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Gaster, Theodor H. 1969. *Myth, Legend, and Custom in the Old Testament*, I. New York: Harper and Row.

Gearhart, Sally Miller. 1979. 'The Womanizing of Rhetoric.' *Women's Studies International Quarterly* 2: 195-201.

Geertz, Clifford. 1966. 'Religion as a Cultural System.' Pages 1-46 in *Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion*, ed. M. Banton. London: Tavistock.

—. 1973. *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: Basic Books.

—. 1983. *Local Knowledge*. New York: Basic Books.

Gendlin, Eugene T. 1991. 'Thinking beyond Patterns: Body, Language, and Situation.' Pages 21-151 in *The Presence of Feeling in Thought*, ed. B. den Ouden and M. Moen. New York: Peter Lang.

Genette, Gérard. 1966. *Figures I*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.

—. 1977. 'Genres, 'types,' modes.' *Poétique* 32: 389-421.

Gentili, Bruno. 1988. *Poetry and its Public in Ancient Greece*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Italian, 1984.

Gergen, Kenneth J. 1991. *The Saturated Self*. n.p.: Basic Books.

Gergen, Mary. 1992. 'From Modern Masculinity to Post-Modern Macho: A Feminist Re-Play.' Pages 183-93 in *Psychology and Postmodernism*, ed. S. Kvale. London: Sage.

Gerhardt, Uta. 2001. 'Parson's Analysis of the Societal Community.' Pages 177-222 in *Talcott Parsons Today*, ed. A. Treviño. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Gerstenberger, Erhard S. 1980. *Der bittende Mensch*. Neukirchen–Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag.

—. 1988. *Psalms Part 1*. FOTL, 14. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.

—. 2001. *Psalms Part 2 and Lamentations*. FOTL, 15. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.

—. 2003. 'Social Sciences and Form Criticism: Towards the Generative Force of Life-Settings.' Pages 84-99 in *Relating to the Text: Interdisciplinary and Form-Critical Insights on the Bible*, ed. T. Sandoval and C. Mandolfo. London: T. & T. Clark.

Gibbon, Margaret. 1999. *Feminist Perspectives on Language*. London: Longman.

Gibson, Eleanor J. 1969. *Principles of Perceptual Learning and Development*. New York: Appleton–Century–Crofts.

Giddens, Anthony. 1979. *Central Problems in Social Theory*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Gilbert, Katherine, and Kuhn, H. 1939. *A History of Esthetics*. New York: Macmillan.

Girke, Wolfgang, and Helmut Jachnow. 1974. *Sowjetische Soziolinguistik*. Kronberg Ts: Scriptor.

Givón, Talmy. 1984. *Syntax: A Functional-Typological Approach*, I. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins.

—. 1995. *Functionalism and Grammar*. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins.

Goffman, Erving. 1974. *Frame Analysis*. New York: Harper & Row.

Goldammer, Kurt. 1960. *Die Formenwelt des Religiösen*. Stuttgart: A. Kroner.

Goldberg, Adele E. 1998. 'Patterns of Experience in Patterns of Language.' Pages 203-19 in *The New Psychology of Language*, ed. M. Tomasello. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Goldman, Lucien. 1970. 'Structure: Human Reality and Methodological Concept.' Pages 98-110 in *The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man*, ed. R. Macksey and E. Donato. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.

Goldsmith, Michael. 1988. 'Malinowski and Gardiner: The Egyptian Connection.' *History of Anthropology Newsletter* 15, No. 2: 5-11.

Goldstein, Kenneth S. 1964. *A Guide for Field Workers in Folklore*. Hatboro, PA: Folklore Associates.

Goldstein, Laurence. 1999. *Clear and Queer Thinking*. London: Duckworth.

Goldthorpe, John H. 2000. *On Sociology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Good, Edwin M. 1965. *Irony in the Old Testament*. Philadelphia: Westminster.

Goodman, Nelson. 1973. *Fact, Fiction, and Forecast*, 3rd edn. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

Gopnik, Alison, and Andrew N. Meltzoff. 1997. *Words, Thoughts, and Theories*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Gordon, Cyrus H. 1986. *The Pennsylvania Tradition of Semitics*. Atlanta: Scholars Press.

Gorrell, Donna. 1997. 'The Rhetorical Situation Again: Linked Components in a Venn Diagram.' *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 30: 395-412.

Gouldner, Alvin W. 1970. *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology*. New York: Basic Books.

Goulet, Jean-Guy. 1998. *Ways of Knowing*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Grapow, Hermann. 1936. *Sprachliche und schriftliche Formung ägyptischer Texte*. Glückstadt: J.J. Augustin.

Grant, Fredrick C. 1968. 'Psychological Study of the Bible.' Pages 107-24 in *Religions in Antiquity: Essays in Memory of Erwin Ramsdell Goodenough*, ed. J. Neusner. Leiden: Brill.

Grassi, Ernesto. 1987. 'Why Rhetoric is Philosophy.' *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 20: 68-78.

Grayson, A.K. 1975. *Babylonian Historical-Literary Texts*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Greene, Brian. 1999. *The Elegant Universe*. New York: Norton.

Grice, H.P. 1975. 'Logic and Conversation.' Pages 41-58 in *Syntax and Semantics*. III. *Speech Acts*, ed. P. Cole and J. Morgan. New York: Academic Press.

Grigsby, Jim, and David Stevens. 2000. *Neurodynamics of Personality*. New York: Guilford Press.

Grimm, Nancy Maloney. 1999. *Good Intentions*. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.

Gros Louis, Kenneth R.R., *et al*. 1974. *Literary Interpretations of Biblical Narratives*. Nashville: Abingdon.

Grosch, Hermann, ed. 1971. *Religion in der Grundschule*. Frankfurt: Diesterweg.

Gross, Alan G., and William M. Keith, eds. 1997. *Rhetorical Hermeneutics: Invention and Interpretation in the Age of Science*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Grotstein, James S., and Donald B. Rinsley, eds. 1994. *Fairbairn and the Origins of Object Relations*. London: Free Association Books.

Groupe mu [J. Dubois, *et al*.]. 1970. *Rhétorique générale*. Paris: Larousse.

Guillen, Claudio. 1971. *Literature as a System*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Gülich, Elisabeth, and Wolfgang Raible, eds. 1972. *Textsorten: Differenzierungskriterien in linguistischer Sicht*. Frankfurt a.M.: Athenäum.

Gunkel, Hermann. 1904. *Ausgewählte Psalmen*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

—. 1906. 'Die israelitische Literatur.' Pages 51-102 in *Kultur der Gegenwart*, I/VII, ed. P. Hinneberg. Berlin: B.G. Teubner.

—. 1907. Review of *Geschichte der althebräischen Literatur*, by Karl Budde, 1906. *Classical World* 21: 850-51.

—. 1909. 'Bibelwissenschaft: Literaturgeschichte Israels.' *RGG*, I: 1189-94.

—. 1910. *Genesis*, 3rd edn. HKAT, 1/1. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. English, 1997.

—. 1913. *Reden und Aufsätze*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

—. 1917. *Die Propheten*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

—. 1924a. 'Jesaia 33, eine prophetische Liturgie.' *ZAW* 42: 177-208.

—. 1924b. 'Der Micha–Schluss.' *ZS* 2: 145-78. English in Gunkel 1928, pp. 115-49.

—. 1925. 'Die israelitische Literatur.' Pages 53-112 in *Kultur der Gegenwart*, I/VII, ed. P. Hinneberg, 2nd edn. Berlin: B.G. Teubner. Pages 53-104 Gunkel 1906 (except that page numbers are higher by two); reprinted separately, 1963.

—. 1926. *Die Psalmen*. HKAT, 24. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

—. 1928. *What Remains of the Old Testament and Other Essays*. London: Allen & Unwin.

Gunkel, Hermann, with J. Begrich. 1933. *Einleitung in die Psalmen: Die Gattungen der religiösen Lyrik Israels*. GHAT, 2. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Gunneweg, A.H.J. 1977. *Vom Verstehen des Alten Testaments: Eine Hermeneutik*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Gusdorf, Georges. 1965. *Speaking (La Parole)*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Güttgemanns, Erhardt. 1970. *Offene Fragen zur Formgeschichte des Evangeliums*. Munich: Kaiser.

—. 1971. *Studia linguistica neotestamentica*. Munich: Kaiser.

—. 1978. *Einführung in die Linguistik für Textwissenschaftler*, I. *Kommunikations- und informationstheoretische Modelle*. Bonn: Linguistica Biblica.

Haan, Norma, *et al*. 1983. *Social Sciences as Moral Inquiry*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1971a. *Knowledge and Human Interests*. Boston: Beacon.

—. 1971b. 'Vorbereitende Bemerkungen zu einer Theorie der kommunikativen Kompetenz.' Pages 101-41 in *Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie*, J. Habermas and N. Luhmann. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.

—. 1981. *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*. 2 vols. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. English, 1984-87.

—. 1984. *Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.

Hacking, Ian. 1996. 'The Disunities of the Sciences.' Pages 37-74 in *The Disunity of Science*, ed. P. Galison and D. Stump. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Hahn, H. 1954. *Old Testament in Modern Research*. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg.

Halasek, Kay. 1999. *A Pedagogy of Possibility*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.

Hales, Dianne. 1999. *Just Like a Woman*. New York: Bantam Books.

Halliday, M.A.K. 1973. *Explorations in the Functions of Language*. London: Edward Arnold.

—. 1978. *Language as Social Semiotic*. London: Edward Arnold.

—. 1985. 'Systemic Background.' Pages 1-15 in *Systematic Perspectives on Discourse*, I, ed. J. Benson and W. Greaves. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

—. 1994. *An Introduction to Functional Grammar*, 2nd edn. London: Edward Arnold. 1st edn. 1985.

—. 2003. *On Language and Linguistics*. London: Continuum.

Hamburger, Käte. 1957. *Die Logik der Dichtung*. Stuttgart: E. Klett. 2nd edn. 1968; English, 1973, 1993.

Hampshire, Stuart. 1969. 'J.L. Austin, 1911-1960.' Pages 22-23 in K. Fann.

Hanks, William F. 1987. 'Discourse Genres in a Theory of Practice.' *American Ethnologist* 14: 668-92. Reprinted in Hanks, *Intertexts*, 2000.

—. 1996. *Language and Communicative Practices*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Hanson, Paul D. 1975. *The Dawn of Apocalyptic*. Philadelphia: Fortress.

Hardmeier, Christof. 1978. *Texttheorie und biblische exegese*. München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag.

—. 2005. *Erzähldiskurs und Redepragmatik im Alten Testament*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

Hardwick, Charles S. 1977. *Semiotic and Significs*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Harper, W.R., ed. 1893. *The Biblical World* 1: 243-47.

Harrah, David. 1963. *Communication: A Logical Model*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Harris, Marvin. 1987. *Cultural Anthropology*, 2nd edn. New York: Harper & Row. 1st edn. 1983.

Harris, Roy. 1995. *Signs of Writing*. London: Routledge.

Harris, Zellig. 1938. 'Ras Shamra: Canaanite Civilization and Language.' Pages 479-502 in *Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institute* for 1937. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office.

—. 1952. 'Discourse Analysis.' *Language* 28: 1-30. Reprinted in Harris, *Papers*, 1970.

—. 1982. *A Grammar of English on Mathematical Principles*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Hartley, R.V.L. 1928. 'Transmission of Information.' *Bell System Technical Journal* 7: 535-63.

Hartman, David. 1985. *A Living Covenant*. New York: Free Press.

Hartmann, Peter. 1963. *Theorie der Grammatik*. The Hague: Mouton.

Hartshorne, Charles. 1941. *Man's Vision of God*. New York: Harper.

—. 1948. *The Divine Relativity*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Hasan, Rulqaiya. 1985. *Linguistics, Language and Verbal Art*. Waurn Ponds, Victoria: Deakin University.

Hasel, Gerhard. 1972. *The Remnant*. Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Press.

Havránek, Bohuslav. 1958. 'The Functional Differentiation of the Standard Language.' Pages 1-18 in *A Prague School Reader*, 2nd edn, ed. P. Garvin. Washington: American University Language Center. Czech, 1932.

Hawkins, John A., ed. 1988. *Explaining Language Universals*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Hayes, John H. 1976. *Understanding the Psalms*. Valley Forge, PA: Judson Press.

—. 1979. *An Introduction to Old Testament Study*. Nashville: Abingdon.

Hayes, John H., ed. 1974. *Old Testament Form Criticism*. San Antonio, TX: Trinity University Press.

Hayes, John H., and Carl R. Holladay. 1982. *Biblical Exegesis: A Beginner's Handbook*. Atlanta: John Knox.

Hearn, Frank. 1997. *Moral Order and Social Disorder*. New York: W. de Gruyter.

Hegel, Georg W.F. 1832-87. *Werke*. 19 vols. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.

Heidegger, Martin. 1927. *Sein und Zeit*. Halle: M. Niemeyer. 6th edn, 1949. Reprinted in Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe*, II, 1976-.

Heine, Bernd. 1997. *Cognitive Foundations of Grammar*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Heinrici, G. 1899. 'Hermeneutik, biblische.' *RE*, 3rd edn, VII: 718-50.

Heinz, Rudolf. 1986. *Stil als geisteswissenschaftliche Kategorie*. Würzburg: Konigshausen & Neumann.

Held, Barbara S. 2007. *Psychology's Interpretive Turn*. Washington: American Psychological Association.

Hempel, Carl. 1965. *Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science*. New York: Free Press.

Hempel, Carl G., and Paul Oppenheim. 1936. *Der Typusbegriff im Lichte der neuen Logik*. Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff's uitgeversmaatschappij n.v.

Hempfer, Klaus W. 1973. *Gattungstheorie*. Munich: W. Fink.

Herberg, Will. 1976. *Faith Enacted as History*. Ed. Bernhard W. Anderson. Philadelphia: Westminster.

Herbert of Cherbury. 1937. *De veritate*. Bristol: Arrowsmith. Originally published, 1624.

Herdan, Gustav. 1966. *The Advanced Theory of Language as Choice and Chance*. New York: Springer.

Herder, J.G. 1782-83. *Vom Geist der ebräischen Poesie*. 2 vols. Dessau: Auf Kosten der Verlags-Kasse, und zu finden in der Buchhandlung der Gelehrten. English, 1833.

Herman, Ellen. 1995. *The Romance of American Psychology*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hermann, Rudolf. 1971. *Bibel und Hermeneutik*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Hernadi, Paul. 1972. *Beyond Genre*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Heschel, Abraham. 1936. *Die Prophetie*. Krakow: Polish Academy of Sciences and Letters. English, 1962.

—. 1973. *A Passion for Truth*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Heyward, Isabel Carter. 1982. *The Redemption of God*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

Hillers, Delbert R. 1983. 'Hôy and Hôy-Oracles: A Neglected Syntactic Aspect.' Pages 185-88 in *The Word of the Lord Shall Go Forth*, ed. C. Meyers and M. O'Connor. Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns.

Hintikka, Jaakko, and Patrick Suppes, eds. 1970. *Information and Inference*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Hirsch, E.D., Jr. 1976. *The Aims of Interpretation*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hirt, Ernst. 1923. *Das Formgesetz der epischen, dramatischen und lyrischen Dichtung*. Leipzig: B.G. Teubner.

Hitler, Adolf. 1925. *Mein Kampf*, I. Munich: Zentralverlag der NSDAP, F. Eher Nachf.

Hjelmslev, Louis. 1961. *Prolegomena to a Theory of Language*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Danish, 1943.

Hobsbaum, Philip. 1970. *Theory of Criticism*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Hocking, Elton. 1936. *Ferdinand Brunetière*. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison.

Holland, Norman N. 1968. *The Dynamics of Literary Response*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Holsti, Ole R. 1969. *Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Honko, Lauri. 1962. *Geisterglaube in Ingermanland*. Helsinki: Suamalainen Tiedeakatemia.

—. 1969. 'Genre Analysis in Folkloristics and Comparative Religion.' *Temenos* 3: 48-66.

—. 1987. 'Gattungsprobleme.' Pages 744-69 in *Enzyklopädie des Märchen*. Berlin: W. de Gruyter.

Hooke, S. H., ed. 1933. *Myth and Ritual: Essays on the Myth and Ritual of the Hebrews in Relation to the Cultic Pattern of the Ancient East*. London: Oxford University Press.

Horkheimer, Max, and Theodor W. Adorno. 1972. *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. New York: Herder.

Hörmann, Hans. 1971. *Psycholinguistics*. Berlin: Springer.

Horner, Winifred Bryan. 1990. *The Present State of Scholarship in Historical and Contemporary Rhetoric*, rev. edn. Columbia: University of Missouri Press.

—. 1993. *Nineteenth-Century Scottish Rhetoric: The American Connection*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.

Horney, Karen. 1945. *Our Inner Conflicts*. New York: W.W. Norton.

Hough, Graham. 1969. *Style and Stylistics*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Hovland, Carl I., *et al*. 1953. *Communication and Persuasion*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Howe, Günther. 1970. *Die Christenheit im Atomzeitalter*. Stuttgart: Klett.

Hunter, J.F.M. 1968. '"Forms of Life" in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*.' *American Philosophical Quarterly* 5: 233-43.

Husserl, Edmund. 1950-. *Husserliana*. The Hague: Nijhoft.

Hutchison, John A. 1963. *Language and Faith*. Philadelphia: Westminster.

Hymes, Dell. 1962. 'The Ethnography of Speaking.' Pages 15-53 in *Anthropology and Human Behavior*. Washington: Anthropological Society of Washington.

—. 1963. 'Objectives and Concepts of Linguistic Anthropology.' Pages 275-302 in *The Teaching of Anthropology*, ed. D. Mandelbaum, *et al*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

—. 1967. 'Models of Interaction of Language and Social Setting.' *Journal of Social Issues* 23, No. 2: 8-28.

—. 1971. 'On Linguistic Competence, Communicative Competence, and the Education of Disadvantaged Children.' Pages 51-66 in *Anthropological Perspectives on Education*, ed. M. Wax, *et al*. New York: Basic Books.

—. 1986. 'Discourse: Scope Without Depth.' *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 57: 49-90.

Ingarden, Roman. 1960. *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, 2nd edn. Tübingen: Niemeyer.

Ingham, Norman W. 1987. 'Genre-Theory and Old Russian Literature.' *Slavic and East European Journal* 31: 234-45.

Isaacs, William. 1999. *Dialogue and the Art of Thinking Together*. New York: Doubleday.

Iser, Wolfgang. 1974. *The Implied Reader: Patterns of Communication in Prose Fiction from Bunyan to Beckett*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.

Izard, Carroll E. 1977. *Human Emotions*. New York: Plenum.

Jäger, Gerhard. 1975. *Einfürung in die klassische Philologie*. Munich: Beck.

Jahnow, H. 1923. *Das hebräische Leichenlied im Rahmen der Völkerdichtung.* BZAW, 36. Giessen: A. Töpelmann.

Jakobson, Roman. 1960. 'Linguistics and Poetics.' Pages 350-77 in *Style in Language*, ed. T. Sebeok. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

James, Wendy. 1973. 'The Anthropologist as Reluctant Imperialist.' Pages 41-69 in *Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter*, ed. T. Asad. New York: Humanities Press.

James, William. 1890. *The Principles of Psychology*, I. New York: H. Holt & Company.

Jameson, Fredric. 1981. *The Political Unconscious*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Jammer, Max. 1966. *The Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Jaroš, Karl. 1974. *Die Stellung des Elohisten zur kanaanäischen Religion*. Freiburg/Schweiz: Universitätsverlag.

Jason, Heda. 1969. 'A Multidimensional Approach to Oral Literature.' *Current Anthropology* 10: 413-26.

—. 1977. *Ethnopoetry: Form, Content, Function*. Bonn: Linguistica Biblica.

Jaspers, Karl. 1919. *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*. Berlin: Springer.

—. 1931. *Philosophie*. Berlin: Springer. English, 1969.

—. 1932. *Philosophie,* II: *Existenzerhellung*. Berlin: Springer. English, 1970.

—. 1948. *Der philosophische Glaube*. Munich: R. Piper.

Jauss, Hans Robert. 1972. 'Theorie der Gattungen und der Literatur des Mittelalters.' Pages 107-38 in *Grundriss der romanischen Literaturen des Mittelalters*. Heidelberg: C. Winter. Reprinted in Jauss, *Alterität und Modernität*, 1977. English, *Toward an Aesthetic of Reception*, 1982.

Jens, Walter. 1977. 'Rhetorik.' Pages 432-56 in *Reallexikon der deutschen Literaturgeschichte*, 2nd edn, III, ed. P. Merker and W. Stammler. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Johannesen, Richard L. 1990. *Ethics in Human Communication,* 3rd edn. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press.

Johnson, Elizabeth A. 1992. *She Who Is*. New York: Crossroad.

Johnson, Miriam M. 1989. 'Feminism and the Theories of Talcott Parsons.' Pages 101-18 in *Feminism and Sociological Theory*, ed. R. Wallace. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Johnson, Nan. 1991. *Nineteenth-Century Rhetoric in North America*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.

Jolles, André. 1930. *Einfache Formen*. Halle: Max Niemeyer.

Jónsson, Jakob. 1965. *Humor and Irony in the New Testament: Illustrated by Parallels in Talmud and Midrash*. Reykjavik: Bókaútgáfa Menningarsjóds.

Jordan, Louis H. 1905. *Comparative Religion*. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark

Jospe, Alfred. 1971. 'Universities.' *EncJud*, XV: 1674-83. New York: Macmillan.

Josselson, Ruthellen. 1992. *The Space between Us*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Jung, C.G. 1954. *Answer to Job*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Kaiser, Otto. 2000. 'Die alttestamentliche Exegese.' Pages 11-70 in *Einführung in die exegetische Methoden*, ed. G. Adam *et al*. Gütersloh: Kaiser.

Kaiser, Walter, Jr. 1981. *Toward an Exegetical Theology*. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker.

Kapelrud, Arvid S. 1975. *The Message of the Prophet Zephaniah*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Kaplan, Robert B. 1966. 'Cultural Thought Patterns in Intercultural Education.' *Language Learning* 16: 1-20.

Käppel, Lutz. 1992. *Paian*. Berlin: W. de Gruyter.

Kashima, Emiko S., and Yoshihisa Kashima. 1998. 'Culture and Language.' *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 29: 461-86.

Kashima, Yoshihisa. 2004. 'Connectionism.' Pages 461-77 in *Encyclopedia of Applied Psychology*, ed. Charles Spiegelberger. Oxford: Elsevier.

Kaufmann, Yehezkel. 1960. *The Religion of Israel*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kedia, Satish, and John van Willigen, eds. 2005. *Applied Anthropology*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Keel, Othmar. 1969. *Feinde und Gottesleugner*. Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk.

Keen, Mike F. 1993. 'No One above Suspicion.' *The American Sociologist* 24, No. 3: 37-54.

Keenan, Edward L. 1975. *Formal Semantics of Natural Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Keller, Evelyn Fox. 1992. *Secrets of Life, Secrets of Death*. London: Routledge.

Kellogg, Ronald T. 1994. *The Psychology of Writing*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kennedy, George A. 1984. *New Testament Interpretation through Rhetorical Criticism*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

—. 1998. *Comparative Rhetoric*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kienzler, Wolfgang. 1997. *Wittgensteins Wende zu seiner Spätphilosophie 1930-1932*. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.

Kimura, Doreen. 1999. *Sex and Cognition*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

King, Martin Luther, Jr. 1963. *Strength to Love*. New York: Harper & Row.

Kinneavy, James L. 1971. *A Theory of Discourse*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice–Hall.

—. 1990. 'Contemporary Rhetoric.' Pages 225-46 in Horner 1990.

Kinneavy, James L., *et al*. 1985. *Writing in the Liberal Arts Tradition*. New York: Harper & Row.

Kirkwood, William G. 1989. 'Truthfulness as a Standard for Speech in Ancient India.' *The Southern Communication Journal* 54: 213-34.

Kirschenmann, Peter Paul. 1970. *Information and Reflection*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Klatt, Werner. 1969. *Hermann Gunkel*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht.

Knierim, Rolf. 1973. 'Old Testament Form Criticism Reconsidered.' *Int* 27: 435-68.

Knierim, Rolf, and Gene M. Tucker. 1999. 'Editors' Updated Foreword.' Pages ix-xiv in *Exodus 1-18*, ed. George W. Coats. FOTL, IIA. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.

Knitter, Paul F. 1985. *No Other Name?* Maryknoll, NY: Orbis.

Kober, Michael. 2000. 'Was es heißt, einem Anderen zu verstehen.' Pages 12-35 in *Globales Ethos: Wittgensteins Sprachspiele interkultureller Moral und Religion*, ed. W. Lütterfelds and T. Mohrs. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.

Koch, Klaus. 1964. *Was ist Formgeschichte?* Neukirchen–Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag. English, 1969.

Koffka, K. 1935. *Principles of Gestalt Psychology*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company.

Köhler, Erich. 1966. *Espirit und akademische Freiheit*. Frankfurt a.M.: Athenäum.

—. 1977. 'Gattungssystem und Gesellschaftssystem.' *Romantische Zeitschrift für Literaturgeschichte* 1: 7-22. Heidelberg: C. Winter.

Köhler, Wolfgang. 1938. *The Place of Value in a World of Facts*. New York: Liveright.

Kolakowski, Lesrek. 1968. *The Alienation of Reason*. New York: Doubleday.

Kolmogorov, A. 1967. 'Logical Basis for Information Theory and Probability Theory.' *IEEE Transactions on Information Theory*, IT-14: 662-64.

Konstan, David. 1989. 'What is New in the Approaches to Classical Literature.' Pages 45-49 in *Classics*, ed. P. Culham and L. Edmunds. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

Kopperschmidt, Josef. 1973. *Allgemeine Rhetorik*. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer.

Korff, H.A. 1958. *Goethe*, I. Hanau/M: W. Dausein.

Kraus, Hans-Joachim. 1959. *Dichtung und Welt im Mittelalter*. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler.

—. 1960. *Psalmen*. Neukirchen–Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag. English, 1988-89.

—. 1963. *Begegnung mit dem Judentum*. Hamburg: Furche.

Krauss, Henning. 1973. 'Gattungssystem und Sitz im Leben.' *LiLi* 2, No. 11: 27-70.

Kristensen, W. Brede. 1960. *The Meaning of Religion*. The Hague: M. Nijhoff.

Kubát, Libor, and Jirí Zeman, eds. 1975. *Entropy and Information in Science and Philosophy*. New York: Elsevier.

Kuhn, Hugo. 1959. *Dichtung und Welt im Mittelalter*. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler.

—. 1969. *Text und Theorie*. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler.

—. 1980. *Entwürfe zu einer Literatursystematik des Spätmittelalters*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer.

Kuhn, Thomas S. 1962. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kuklick, Henrika. 1991. *The Savage Within*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kunda, Ziva. 1999. *Social Cognition*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Lacan, Jacques. 1978. *Le séminaire*, II. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.

Lachterman, David Rapport. 1989. *The Ethics of Geometry: The Genealogy of Modernity*. London: Routledge.

Lagrange, M.-J. 1896. 'L'inspiration et les exigences de la critique,' *RB* 5: 496-518.

Langacker, Ronald W. 1990. *Concept, Image, and Symbol.* Berlin: W. de Gruyter.

Lapide, C.A. 1625. *Commentaria in Duodecim minores prophetas*. Antverpiae: Martinum Nutium.

Lapsley, Hilary. 1999. *Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict.* Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.

Lasswell, Harold D., *et al*. 1952. *The Comparative Study of Symbols*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Lasswitz, Kurd. 1963. *Geschichte der Atomistik vom Mittelalter bis Newton*. 2 vols. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

Laughlin, Charles D., *et al*. 1990. *Brain, Symbol and Experience*. Boston: Shambhala.

Lawall, Sarah N. 1968. *Critics of Consciousness: The Existential Structure of Literature*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Lawson, E. Thomas, and Robert N. McCauley. 1990. *Rethinking Religion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Layder, Derek. 1997. *Modern Social Theory*. London: UCL Press.

Leach, Edmund. 1969. *Genesis as Myth and Other Essays.* London: Jonathan Cape.

Leaf, Murray J. 1979. *Man, Mind, and Science*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Leary, Timothy. 1957. *Interpersonal Diagnosis of Personality*. New York: Ronald.

Lee, Myung-Hyun. 1984. 'Two Aspects of Form of Life.' Pages 254-57 in *Aesthetics: Proceedings of the 8th International Wittgenstein Symposium*, ed. R. Haller. Vienna: Hölder–Pichler–Tempsky.

Leeman, Richard W., ed. 1996. *African-American Orators*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Leeuw, G. van der. 1933. *Phänomenologie der Religion.* Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

LeFevre, Karen Burke. 1987. *Invention as a Social Act*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.

Leff, Michael, and Margaret Organ Procario. 1985. 'Rhetorical Theory in Speech Communication.' Pages 3-27 in *Speech Communication in the Twentieth Century*, ed. T. Benson. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.

Lefkowitz, Mary R. 1976. *The Victory Ode*. Park Ridge, NJ: Noyes Press.

—. 2003. *Greek Gods, Human Lives: What We Can Learn from Myths*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. 1969. *Philosophical Papers and Letters*, 2nd edn. Ed. Leroy E. Loemker. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Leiter, Kenneth. 1980. *A Primer on Ethnomethodology*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Lenhoff, Gail. 1987. 'Categories of Early Russian Writing.' *Slavic and East European Journal* 31: 259-71.

Lenin, V.I. 1927. *Materialism and Emperico-Criticism*. New York: International Publishers. 1st Russian edn, 1908.

Leont'ev, A.A. 1971. *Sprache-Sprechen-Sprechtätigkeit*, trans. from Russian by C. Heeschen and W. Stölting. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.

Lerner, Michael. 1996. *The Politics of Meaning*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Lesser, Simon O. 1957. *Fiction and the Unconscious*. New York: Vintage.

Levine, Donald N. 1995. *Visions of the Sociological Tradition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Levinson, Stephen C. 1979. 'Activity Types and Language.' *Linguistics* 17: 365-99.

Lévi-Strauss, Claude. 1958-73. *Anthropologie structurale*. 2 vols. Paris: Plon. English, 1963-76.

—. 1966. *The Savage Mind*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lewin, Kurt. 1936. *Principles of Topological Psychology*. New York: McGraw Hill.

—. 1951. *Field Theory in Social Science*. New York: Harper.

Lewis, David K. 1969. *Convention*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Lieberman, Josefa N. 1977. *Playfulness: Its Relationship to Imagination and Creativity*. New York: Academic.

Lifton, Robert Jay. 1993. *The Protean Self*. New York: Basic Books.

Linares, Juan Luis. 2001. 'Does History End with Postmodernism?' *Family Process* 40: 401-12.

—. 2005. 'Complex Love as Relational Nurturing.' *Family Process* 45: 101-15.

Lindsay, Peter H., and Donald A. Norman. 1972. *Human Information Processing*. New York: Academic.

Linell, Per. 1998. *Approaching Dialogue*. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins.

Linnaeus, Carl von. 1735. *Systema naturae*. London: Theodore Haak.

Linton, Ralph. 1952. 'Universal Ethical Principles: An Anthropological View.' Pages 645-60 in *Moral Principles of Action*, ed. R. Anshen. New York: Harper.

Lipps, Hans. 1938. *Untersuchungen zu einer hermeneutishen Logik*. Frankfurt a.M.: V. Klostermann.

Lonergan, B. 1970. *Insight*, 3rd edn. New York: Philosophical Library.

Long, Burke. 1976. 'Recent Field Studies in Oral Literature and the Question of *Sitz im Leben*.' *Semeia* 5: 35-49.

Lotman, Jurij M. 1972. *Die Struktur literarischer Texte*, trans. from Russian by R.-D. Keil. Munich: Fink.

—. 1973. *Die Struktur des künstlerischen Textes*. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. Russian, 1970; English, 1977.

Lowie, Robert H. 1937. *The History of Ethnological Theory*. New York: Farrar & Rinehart.

Lowry, S. 1977. *The Principles of Samaritan Bible Exegesis*. Leiden: Brill.

Lu, Xing. 1998. *Rhetoric in Ancient China Fifth to Third Century B.C.E.: A Comparison with Classical Greek Rhetoric*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

Lucy, Niall, ed. 2000. *Postmodern Literary Theory*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Luhmann, Niklas. 1975. *Macht*. Stuttgart: Enke.

—. 1997. *Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft*. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.

Lukács, György. 1954. *Die Zerstörung der Vernunft*. Berlin: Aufban-Verlag.

—. 1955. *Der historische Roman*. Berlin: Aufbau. Russian, 1937. English translation of the German, 1962.

—. 1956. 'Das Besondere als zentrale Kategorie der Ästhetik.' *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 4: 133-47.

Luke, Allan. 2004. 'Notes on the Future of Critical Discourse Studies.' *Critical Discourse Studies* 1: 149-52.

Lundbom, Jack R. 2001. 'Hebrew Rhetoric.' Pages 325-28 in *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric*, ed. T. Sloane. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Luther, Martin. 1883—. *Werke*. Weimar: Herman Böhlau.

Lux, Friedmann. 1981. *Text, Situation, Textsorte*. Tübingen: Narr.

Lyman, Sanford M., and Marvin B. Scott. 1989. *A Sociology of the Absurd*, 2nd edn. New York: General Hall. 1st edn, 1970.

Lyons, John. 1968. *Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

MacCabe, Colin. 1981. *The Talking Cure: Essays in Psychoanalysis and Language*. New York: St. Martin's.

Mach, Ernst. 1975. *Knowledge and Error*. Ed. Brian McGinness. Dordrecht: Reidel.

MacKay, Donald M. 1969. *Information, Mechanism, and Meaning*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Madsen, Deborah L. 1994. *Rereading Allegory: A Narrative Approach to Genre*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Maffesoli, Michel. 1988. *Le temps des tribus*. n.p.: Meridiens Klincksieck.

Magnusson, David, ed. 1981. *Toward a Psychology of Situation*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Mahler, Margaret S. 1972. 'On the First Three Subphases of the Separation-Individuation Process.' *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 53: 333-38.

Malinowski, Bronislaw. 1923. 'The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages.' Pages 296-336 in *The Meaning of Meaning*, by C. Ogden and I. Richards. London: K. Paul, Trench, Trübner.

—. 1925. 'Magic Science and Religion.' Pages 19-84 in *Science Religion and Reality*, ed. J. Needham. London: Sheldon.

—. 1926. *Myth in Primitive Psychology*. London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner.

—. 1932. *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*. London: Routledge.

—. 1935. *Coral Gardens and their Magic*, II. London: G. Allen & Unwin.

—. 1936. 'The Deadly Issue.' *Atlantic Monthly* 158: 659-69.

—. 1944a. *The Scientific Theory of Culture*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

—. 1944b. *Freedom and Civilization*. New York: Roy Publishers.

Mally, Ernst. 1971. *Logische Schriften*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Malmberg, Bertil. 1967. *Structural Linguistics and Human Communication*, 2nd edn. Berlin: Springer.

Mandler, George. 1975. *Mind and Emotion*. New York: Wiley.

Manganaro, Marc. 1990. *Modernist Anthropology*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Mann, William C., and Sandra A. Thompson. 1988. 'Rhetorical Structure Theory: Toward a Functional Theory of Text Organization.' *Text* 8: 243-81.

Marcus, George E., and Michael M.J. Fischer. 1986. *Anthropology as Cultural Critique*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Marek, Johann Christian. 1997. 'Haller on the First Person.' Pages 71-85 in *Austrian Philosophy Past and Present*, ed. K. Lehrer and J. Marek. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Maritain, Jacques, and Raissa Maritain. 1955. *The Situation of Poetry*. New York: Philosophical Library.

Markee, Numa. 2000. *Conversation Analysis*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Marriott, McKim, ed. 1990. *India through Hindu Categories*. New Delhi: Sage.

Martin, Richard M. 1958. *Truth and Denotation*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Martinet, André. 1970. 'Structure and Language.' Pages 1-9 in *Structuralism*, ed. J. Ehrmann. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books.

Marx, Karl. 1963. *Early Writings*. London: Watts.

Maslow, Abraham H. 1971. *The Farther Reaches of Human Nature*. New York: Viking.

Matejka, Ladislav. 1988. 'The Sociological Concerns of the Prague School.' Pages 219-26 in *The Prague School and its Legacy*, ed. Y. Tobin. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins.

Matejka, Ladislav, and I.R. Titunik. 1973. 'Translator's Introduction.' Pages 1-6 in *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*, by V. Voloshinov. New York: Seminar Press. See Voloshinov 1929.

Matejka, Ladislav, and I. R. Titunik, eds. 1976. *Semiotics of Art*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Matejka, Ladislav, and Krystyna Pomorska, eds. 1978. *Readings in Russian Poetics*. Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic Publications.

Mathews, Shailer, *et al*. 1924. *Contributions of Science to Religion*. New York: Appleton.

May, Rollo. 1969. *Love and Will*. New York: Norton.

Mayr, Ernst. 1982. *The Growth of Biological Thought*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.

Mays, Wolfe. 1967. 'Recollections of Wittgenstein.' Pages 79-88 in *Ludwig Wittenstein*, ed. K. Fann. New York: Dell.

McCloskey, Deirdre N. 1985. *The Rhetoric of Economics*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

McFague, Sallie. 1982. *Metaphorical Theology*. Philadelphia: Fortress Press.

—. 1997. *Super, Natural Christians: How We Should Love Nature*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press.

McLuhan, M. 1962. *The Gutenberg Galaxy*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Mead, George Herbert. 1934. *Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Mead, Margaret. 1961. *Coming of Age in Samoa*. New York: Morrow. 1st edn, without preface, 1928.

Medvedev, P.N. 1928. *Formal'nyi metod v literaturovedenii*. Leningrad: Priboĭ. German, 1976. English in Medvedev/Bakhtin 1978.

Medvedev, P.N./ M.M. Bakhtin. 1978. *The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Reprinted,

adding a Foreword by W. Godzich and listing Bakhtin's name first, Cambridge, MA, 1985.

Mehan, Hugh, and Huston Wood. 1975. *The Reality of Ethnomethodology*. New York: Wiley.

Mehrabian, Albert. 1976. *Public Places and Private Spaces*. New York: Basic Books.

Mehta, Ved. 1971. 'Onward and Upward With the Arts (Linguistics).' *The New Yorker* 47 (May 8): 44-87.

Mencken, H.L. 1946. *Treatise on the Gods*, 2nd edn. New York: Knopf.

Mendenhall, G.E. 1954a. 'Ancient Oriental and Biblical Law,' *BA* 17: 24-46.

—. 1954b. 'Covenant Forms in Israelite Tradition,' *BA* 17: 49-76.

Menges, Günther, ed. 1974. *Information, Inference, and Decision*. Boston: Reidel.

Mensching, Gustav. 1948. *Geschichte der Religionswissenschaft*. Bonn: Universitäts Verlag.

—. 1959. *Die Religion*. Munich: W. Goldmann. English, 1993.

Merton, Robert K. 1949. *Social Theory and Social Structure*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

Meyer, Leonard B. 1956. *Emotion and Meaning in Music*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

—. 1973. *Explaining Music*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Meyer zu Utrup, Klaus. 1966. *Die Bedeutung des Alten Testaments für eine Transformation der Kirche heute*. Munich: Kaiser.

Milbank, John. 1993. *Theology and Social Theory*. Oxford: Blackwell.

—. 1997. *The Word Made Strange*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Miller, George A. 1956. 'The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information.' *Psychological Review* 63: 81-97.

Minsky, Marvin. 1974. *A Framework for Representing Knowledge*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Minton, Henry L. 2002. *Departing from Deviance*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Mitchell, Stephen A. 1988. *Relational Concepts in Psychoanalysis*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Moffett, James. 1968. *Teaching the Universe of Discourse*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Moles, Abraham. 1966. *Information Theory and Esthetic Perception*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. French, 1958.

Moltmann, Jürgen. 1968. *Perspektiven der Theologie*. Munich: Kaiser.

Monk, Ray. 1990. *Ludwig Wittgenstein*. New York: Free Press.

Monroe, Alan H. 1935. *Principles and Types of Speech*. New York: Scott, Foresman. 3rd edn, 1949.

Montague, Richard. 1974. *Formal Philosophy*. Ed. R. Thomason. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Montgomery, James A., and Zellig S. Harris. 1935. *The Ras Shamra Mythological Texts*. Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society.

Mori, Masaki. 1997. *Epic Grandeur: Toward a Comparative Poetics of the Epic*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Morris, Charles. 1946. *Signs, Language and Behavior*. New York: Prentice–Hall.

Morson, Gary Saul. 1981. *The Boundaries of Genre*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Mounin, Georges. 1966. 'La notion de situation en linguistique et la poesie.' *Les temps modernes* 22: 1065-84.

Mowinckel, S. 1962. *The Psalms in Israel's Worship*. 2 vols. New York: Abingdon. Norwegian, 1951.

Mucchielli, Roger. 1970. *Introduction to Structural Psychology*. New York: Funk and Wagnalls. French, 1966.

Mukařovský, Jan. 1978. *Structure, Sign, and Function*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Müller, F. Max. 1873. *Introduction to the Science of Religion*. London: Longmans, Green.

Müller, Hans-Peter. 1983. 'Formgeschichte/Formenkritik I. Altes Testament.' Pages 271-85 in *TRE*, II. Berlin: W. de Gruyter.

Murphy, Roland E. 1981. *Wisdom Literature*. FOTL, 13. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.

—. 1983. *Wisdom Literature and Psalms*. IBT. Nashville: Abingdon.

Murray, David J. 1995. *Gestalt Psychology and the Cognitive Revolution*. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Murray, Stephen O. 1998. *American Sociolinguistics*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Nagel, Ernest. 1961. *The Structure of Science*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World.

Nagy, Gregory. 1994/95. 'Genre and Occasion.' *Metis* 9-10: 11-25.

Nake, Frieder. 1974. *Ästhetik als Informationsverarbeitung*. Vienna: Springer.

Narasimhan, Chakravarthi V. 1965. *The Mahābhārata*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Nasuti, Harry P. 1999. *Defining the Sacred Songs: Genre, Tradition and the Post-Critical Interpretation of the Psalms*. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press.

Nauta, Doede. 1972. *The Meaning of Information*. The Hague: Mouton.

Nedo, Michael. 1993. *Ludwig Wittgenstein, Wiener Ausgabe, Einführung— Introduction*. Vienna: Springer.

Neel, Jasper. 1988. *Plato, Derrida, and Writing*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.

Nelson, Katherine. 1986. 'Event Knowledge and Cognitive Devleopment.' Pages 231-47 in *Event Knowledge*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

—. 1991. 'The Matter of Time: Interdependencies Between Language and Thought in Development.' Pages 278-318 in *Perspectives on Language and Thought*, ed. S. Gelman and J. Byrnes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nerlich, Brigitte, and David D. Clarke. 1996. *Language, Action, and Context*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Nevel'skaia, K. 1981. 'M.M. Bakhtin i M.I. Kagan (po materialem semejnogo arkhiva).' *Pamiat'* 4: 249-81.

Newmeyer, Frederick J. 1986a. *Linguistic Theory in America*, 2nd edn. Orlando, FL: Academic Press.

—. 1986b. *The Politics of Linguistics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

—. 1998. *Language Form and Language Function*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Nida, Eugene A. 1960. *Message and Mission*. New York: Harper.

Niditch, S. 1983. *The Symbolic Vision in Biblical Tradition*. HSM, 30. Missoula, MT: Scholars Press for the Harvard Semitic Museum.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1912. *Werke*, XVIII. Leipzig: Kröner.

Nöldeke, Theodor. 1869. *Untersuchungen zur Kritik des Alten Testaments*. Kiel: Schwers.

North, Robert C., *et al*. 1963. *Content Analysis*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

North, Stephen M. 1987. *The Making of Knowledge in Composition*. Upper Montclair, NJ: Boynton/Cook.

Nowell-Smith, P.H. 1957. *Ethics*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Nystrand, Martin. 1986. *The Structure of Written Communication*. Orlando, FL: Academic Press.

O'Flaherty, Wendy Doniger. 1988. *Other People's Myths*. New York: Macmillan.

O'Hara, Maureen. 1994. 'Relational Humanism: A Psychology for a Pluralistic World.' Pages 322-29 in *The Humanistic Movement*, ed. F. Wertz. Lake Worth, FL: Gardner.

O'Keefe, Daniel J. 1990. *Persuasion: Theory and Research*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

O'Neill, John. 1989. *The Communicative Body*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

Ogden, C.K., and I.A. Richards. 1923. *The Meaning of Meaning*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. 8th edn, 1946.

Olbrechts-Tyteca, Lucie. 1974. *Le comique du discours*. Brussels: Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles.

Oliver, Robert T. 1942. *The Psychology of Persuasive Speech*. New York: Longmans, Green and Co. 2nd edn, 1957.

—. 1971. *Communication and Culture in Ancient India and China*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

Olson, Elder. 1976. *On Value Judgments in the Arts and Other Essays*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Olsson, Birger. 1974. *Structure and Meaning in the Fourth Gospel: A Text-Linguistic-Analysis of John 2: 1-11 and 4: 1-42*. Lund: Gleerup.

Oomen, Ursula. 1971. 'New Models and Methods in Text Analysis.' *Georgetown Monograph Series on Language and Linguistics* 24: 211-22.

Ortner, Sherry B. 1984. 'Theory in Anthropology since the Sixties.' *Comparative Studies in Sociology and History* 26: 126-66.

—. 1999. 'Some Futures of Anthropology.' *American Ethnologist* 26: 984-91.

Osborne, G. 1983. 'Genre Criticism—Sensus Literalis,' *TJ* 4/2: 1-27.

Osgood, Charles, *et al*. 1957. *The Measurement of Meaning*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Otto, Rudolf. 1917. *Das Heilige*. Gotha: Leopold Klotz. English, 1923.

Owen, David, ed. 1997. *Sociology After Postmodernism*. London: Sage.

Panikkar, R. 1964. 'Die Begründung des hermeneutischen Pluralismus im Hinduismus.' Pages 119-36 in *Kerygma und Mythos*, VI/II, ed. H.W. Bartsch, *et al.* Hamburg-Bergstedt: Reich.

Pannenberg, Wolfhart. 1976. *Theology and the Philosophy of Science*. Philadelphia: Westminster.

Parsegian, V.L. 1973. 'Biological Trends Within Cosmic Processes.' *Zygon* 1: 221-43.

Parsons, I.R.M. 1972. 'Suffering in the Psalms.' *AusBR* 20: 49-53.

Parsons, Talcott. 1937. *The Structure of Social Action*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

—. 1956. *Economy and Society*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

—. 1966. *Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

—. 1978. *Action Theory and the Human Condition*. New York: Free Press.

Parsons, Talcott, *et al.* 1952. *Toward a General Theory of Action*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Parsons, Talcott, and Edward A. Shils, eds. 1952. *Toward a General Theory of Action*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Pascal, Fania. 1984. 'Wittgenstein.' Pages 12-49 in *Recollections of Wittgenstein*, ed. R. Rhees. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Patrick, Dale. 1976. 'The Moral Logic of Election.' *Encounter* 37: 198-210.

Patton, Laurie L. 1995. 'Speech Acts and Kings' Edicts.' *History of Religions* 34: 329-50.

Pauwels, Anne. 1998. *Women Changing Language*. London: Longman.

Pavel, Thomas. 2003. 'Literary Genres as Norms and Good Habits.' *New Literary History* 34: 201-10.

Peacocke, Arthur R. 1971. *Science and the Christian Experiment*. London: Oxford.

Peirce, Charles S. 1931-58. *Collected Papers*. 8 vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Pepper, Stephen C. 1942. *World Hypotheses*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Perelman, Chaïm. 1980. *Justice, Law, and Argument*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Perelman, Chaïm, and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca. 1958. *Traité de l'argumentation: La nouvelle rhétorique*, I. Paris: Presses universitaires de France. English, 1971.

Peterfreund, Emanuel. 1971. *Information, Systems, and Psychoanalysis*. Psychological Issues VII, 1/2. New York: International Universities Press.

Pettazzoni, Raffaele. 1954. 'Aperçu introductif.' *Numen* 1: 1-7.

Peukert, Helmut. 1976. *Wissenschaftstheorie—Handlungstheorie—Fundamentale Theologie*. Düsseldorf: Patmos.

Piaget, Jean. 1977. *The Development of Thought*. New York: Viking.

Piaget, Jean, and Rolando Garcia. 1983. *Psychogenèse et histoire des sciences*. Paris: Flammarion. English, 1989.

Pichler, Alois. 1994. *Untersuchungen zu Wittgensteins Nachlass*. Bergen: Wittgensteinarkivet ved Universitetet.

Pierce, J.R. 1961. *Symbols, Signals and Noise: The Nature and Process of Communication*. New York: Harper.

Pike, Eunice V. 1972. 'Pike—A Biographical Sketch.' Pages 321-24 in *Selected Writings*, by K. Pike. The Hague: Mouton.

Pike, Kenneth L. 1954. *Language in Relation to a Unified Theory of the Structure of Human Behavior*. Glendale, CA: Summer Institute of Linguistics. 2nd edn, 1967.

Pinnock, Clark. 1984. *The Scripture Principle*. San Francisco: Harper & Row.

Pitkin, Willis L., Jr. 1987. *Generating Prose: Relations, Patterns, Structures*. New York: Macmillan.

Pitt-Rivers, Julian. 1977. *The Fate of Shechem and the Politics of Sex*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Plaskow, Judith. 1990. *Standing Again at Sinai*. San Francisco: Harper & Row.

Platt, Michael. 1975. 'Interpretation.' *Interpretation: A Journal for Political Philosophy* 5: 109-30.

Podolefsky, Aaron, and Peter J. Brown, eds. 1989. *Applying Anthropology*. Mountain View, CA: Mayfield.

Polanyi, Michael. 1959. *The Study of Man*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Polzin, Robert. 1977. *Biblical Structuralism: Method and Subjectivity in the Study of Ancient Texts*. Philadelphia: Fortress.

Pool, Ithiel de Sola, ed. 1959. *Trends in Content Analysis*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Potter, David. 1944. *Debating in the Colonial Chartered Colleges*. New York: Teachers College, Columbia University.

Powers, William T. 1973. *Behavior: The Control of Perception*. Chicago: Aldine.

Prang, Helmut. 1968. *Formgeschichte der Dichtkunst*. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.

Pratt, Mary Louise. 1977. *Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Preyer, Gerhard, and Georg Peter, eds. 2005. *Contextualism in Philosophy*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Pride, J.B., and Janet Holmes, eds. 1972. *Sociolinguistics*. Baltimore: Penguin.

Prior, A.N. 1971. *Objects of Thought*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Propp, Vladimir. 1968. *Morphology of the Folk Tale*, 2nd edn. Austin: University of Texas Press. Russian, 1928.

Pulleyn, Simon. 1997. *Prayer in Greek Religion*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Purves, Alan C., ed. 1988. *Writing Across Languages and Cultures*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Pury, Albert de. 1975. *Promesse divine et légende cultuelle dans le cycle de Jacob*. 2 vols. Paris: Gabalda.

Quine, W.V. 1970. *Philosophy of Logic*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Rabinow, Paul, ed. 1984. *The Foucault Reader*. New York: Pantheon.

Rad, G. von. 1957. *Theologie des Alten Testaments*. 2 vols. München: C. Kaiser. English, 1962.

—. 1966. *The Problem of the Hexateuch and Other Essays*. New York: McGraw Hill. German, 1938.

—. 1974. *Gottes Wirken in Israel: Vorträge zum Alten Testament*. Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag.

Radcliffe-Brown, A. R. 1933. *The Andaman Islanders*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

—. 1952. *Structure and Function in Primitive Society*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

—. 1958. *Method in Social Anthropology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Radday, Yehuda. 1973. *The Unity of Isaiah in the Light of Statistical Linguistics*. Hildesheim: Gerstenberg.

Radin, Paul. 1956. *The Trickster*. New York: Philosophical Library.

Ramsey, Frank Plumpton. 1931. *The Foundations of Mathematics*. London: K. Paul & Trübner.

Rannie, David Watson. 1915. *The Elements of Style*. London: J.M. Dent & Sons.

Rapp, Hans. 1967. *Gott, Mensch und Zahl*. Hamburg: Furche.

Rappaport, Roy A. 1968. *Pigs for the Ancestors*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2nd edn, with 'Epilogue,' 1984.

Rätsep H. 1973. 'On Deep Situations and Sentence Patterns.' Pages 105-22 in *Trends in Soviet Theoretical Linguistics*, ed. F. Kiefer. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Redpath, Theodore. 1990. *Ludwig Wittgenstein*. London: Duckworth.

Reichard, Gladys. 1950. *Navaho Religion*. 2 vols. New York: Pantheon.

Reid, Stephen Breck. 'Violence and Vengeance: Ingredients for Tragedy.' Pages 153-58 in Buss 1979.

Reiss, Nira. 1985. *Speech Act Taxonomy as a Tool for Ethnographic Description*. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins.

Reitzenstein, Richard. 1906. *Hellenistische Wundererzählungen*. Leipzig: B.G. Teubner.

Renan, Ernest. 1887-93. *Histoire du peuple d'Israël*. Paris: C. Levy. English, 1889.

Rendtorff, Rolf. 1983. *Das Alte Testament: Eine Einführung*. Neukirchen–Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag. English, 1986.

—. 2001. *Theologie des Alten Testaments*. Neukirchen–Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag. English, 2005.

Rescher, Nicholas. 1975. *A Theory of Possibility*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Richards, I.A. 1936. *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Richter, Wolfgang. 1971. *Exegese als Literaturwissenschaft*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Ricoeur, Paul. 1967. *The Symbolism of Evil*. Boston: Beacon.

—. 1971a. 'The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text.' *Social Research* 38: 529-62.

—. 1971b. 'What is a Text?' Pages 135-50 in *Mythic-Symbolic Language and Philosophical Anthropology*, ed. D. Rasmussen. The Hague: M. Nijhoff.

—. 1986. *Du texte à l'action*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil. English, 1991.

Ridderbos, Nic. H. 1972. *Die Psalmen: Stilistische Verfahren und Aufbau*. BZAW, 117. Berlin: W. de Gruyter.

Riesel, Elise. 1975. 'Grundsatzfragen der Funktionalstilistik.' Pages 36-53 in *Linguistische Probleme der Textanalyse*. Düsseldorf: Padagogischer Verlag Schwann.

Riha, Ortrun. 1994. 'Handlungswissen oder Bildungswissen?' *Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum und deutsche Literatur* 123: 1-18.

Ringgren, Helmer. 1966. 'Literarkritik, Formgeschichte, Überlieferungsgeschichte.' *TLZ* 91: 641-50.

Robbins, Vernon K. 1992. 'Form Criticism: New Testament.' Pages 841-44 in *ABD*, II. New York: Doubleday.

Robert, A. 1957. 'Littéraires (genres),' *DBSup* 5: 405-21.

Roberts, J.J.M. 1982. 'Form, Syntax, and Redaction in Isaiah 1:20.' *PSB* 3: 233-306.

Robertson, David. 1977. *The Old Testament and the Literary Critic*. Philadelphia: Fortress.

Robins, R.H. 1966. 'John Rupert Firth (1890-1960).' Pages 543-54 in *Portraits of Linguists*, II, ed. T. Sebeok. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Robinson, James Harvey. 1912. *The New History*. New York: Macmillan.

Robinson, R.B. 1988. *Roman Catholic Exegesis since 'Divino Afflante Spiritu'*. Atlanta: Scholars.

Rofé, Alexander. 1970. 'The Classification of the Prophetic Stories.' *JBL* 89: 427-40.

—. 1988. *The Prophetical Stories: The Narratives about the Prophets in the Hebrew Bible, their Literary Types and History*. Jerusalem: Magnes. Hebrew, 1982.

Rogers, L. Edna. 1998. 'The Meaning of Relationship in Relational Communication.' Pages 69-82 in *The Meaning of 'Relationship' in Interpersonal Communication*, ed. R. Conville and L. Rogers. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Rohrer, Christian. 1971. *Funktionelle Sprachwissenschaft und transformationelle Grammatik*. Munich: W. Fink.

Root, Robert L., Jr. 1987. *The Rhetorics of Popular Culture*. New York: Greenwood Press.

Rosaldo, Renato. 1989. *Culture and Truth*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Rosch, Eleanor. 1978. 'Principles of Categorization.' Pages 27-48 in *Cognition and Categorization*, ed. E. Rosch and B. Lloyd. Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum.

Rose, Dan. 1980. 'Malinowski's Influence on Wittgenstein on the Matter of *Use* in Language.' *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 16: 145-49.

Rose, Nikolas. 1996. *Inventing Our/Selves*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rosemarin, Adena. 1986. *The Power of Genre*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Rosenberg, Alfred. 1937. *Der Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts*, 105th edn. Munich: Hoheneichenverlag. Copyright, 1930.

Rosenstock-Huessy, Eugen. 1924. *Angewandte Seelenkunde*. Darmstadt: Roetherverlag.

Rosenzweig, Franz. 1972. *The Star of Redemption*. Boston: Beacon. German, 1921.

Rotter, Julian B. 1954. *Social Learning and Clinical Psychology*. New York: Prentice-Hall.

Royce, Josiah. 1968. *The Problem of Christianity*. Ed. John E. Smith. New York: Macmillan. Original, 1913.

Ruesch, Jurgen, and Gregory Bateson. 1951. *Communication: The Social Matrix of Psychiatry*. New York: Norton.

Ruf, Frederick J. 1997. *Entangled Voices*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Russell, Bertrand. 1921. *The Analysis of Mind*. London: G. Allen & Unwin.

—. 1948. *Human Knowledge*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Russell, Letty M. 1974. *Human Liberation in a Feminist Perspective— A Theology*. Philadelphia: Westminster.

Rust, Eric. 1953. *Nature and Man in Biblical Thought*. London: Lutterworth.

Ryken, Leland. 1984. *How to Read the Bible as Literature*. Grand Rapids: Academic Books.

Sahlin, Nils-Eric. 1990. *The Philosophy of F.P. Ramsey*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Salmon, Merrilee H. 1997. 'Ethical Considerations in Anthropology and Archaeology, or Relativism and Justice for All.' *Journal of Philosophical Research* 53: 47-64.

Sampson, Edward E. 1993. *Celebrating the Other*. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Sampson, Geoffrey. 1980. *Schools of Linguistics*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

—. 1990. *Mind, Body and Culture*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sanders, J.A. 1976. 'Hermeneutics.' *IDBSup*: 402-407.

Sandmel, Samuel. 1972. *The Enjoyment of Scripture*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Santos, Boaventura de Sousa. 2007. *Another Knowledge is Possible*. New York: Verso.

Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1943. *L'être et le néant*. Paris: Gallimard. English, 1956.

Saussure, Ferdinand de. 1916. *Cours de linguistique générale*. Paris: Payot. English, 1966. Critical edn of French, ed. Rudolf Engler, 1967.

Savage, Leonard J. 1954. *The Foundation of Statistics*. New York: Wiley.

Savigny, Eike von. 1996. *Der Mensch als Mitmensch: Wittgensteins 'Philosophische Untersuchungen.'* Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag.

Saville-Troike, Muriel. 1989. *The Ethnography of Communication*, 2nd edn. Oxford: Blackwell. 3rd edn, 2003.

Sawyer, John F.A. 1972. *Semantics in Biblical Research*. Naperville, IL: Allenson.

Sawyer, R. Keith. 2005. *Social Emergence: Societies as Complex Systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sayers, Janet. 1991. *Mothers of Psychoanalysis*. New York: W.W. Norton.

Schank, Roger C., and Robert P. Abelson. 1977. *Scripts, Plans, Goal and Understanding*. Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum.

Schapiro, Barbara Ann. 1994. *Literature and the Relational Self*. New York: New York University Press.

Schelling, F.W.J. von. 1927-59. *Werke*. Munich: Beck.

Scherer, Wilhelm. 1888. *Poetik*. Berlin: Weidmann.

Schiffrin, Deborah. 1994. *Approaches to Discourse*. Oxford: Basic Blackwell.

Schillebeeckx, Edward. 1967. *Revelation and Theology*, I. New York: Sheed and Ward.

Schilling, Harold. 1973. *The New Consciousness in Science and Religion*. Philadelphia: United Church.

Schlauch, Margaret. 1944. 'Folklore in the Soviet Union.' *Science and Society* 8: 205-22.

Schleiermacher, Friedrich E.D. 1959. *Hermeneutik*. Ed. H. Kimmerle. Heidelberg: Winter.

Schmid, H.H. 1966. *Wesen und Geschichte der Weisheit: Eine Untersuchung zur altorientalischen und israelitischen Weisheitsliteratur*. Berlin: A. Töpelmann.

Schmidt, Carl, and Hermann Grapow. 1921. *Der Benanbrief*. Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs.

Schmidt, Siegfried J. 1973. *Textheorie*. Munich: Fink.

—. 1975. *Literaturwissenschaft als argumentierende Wissenschaft*. Munich: Fink.

—. 1992. *Der Kopf, die Welt, die Kunst*. Vienna: Böhlau.

Schmidt, Wolf-Heinrich. 1975. *Gattungstheoretische Untersuchungen zur altrussischen Kriegserzählung*. Berlin: Osteuropa-Institut an der Freien Universität Berlin.

Schmidt, Wolf-Heinrich, ed. 1984. *Gattungsprobleme der älteren slavischen Literaturen*. Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz.

Schmidt, Wolf-Heinrich, and Klaus-Dieter Seemann. 1987. 'Erzählen in den älteren slavischen Literaturen.' Pages 1-25 in *Gattung und Narration in den älteren slavischen Literaturen*, ed. K.-D. Seemann. Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz.

Schramm, Wilbur, ed. 1963. *The Science of Human Communication*. New York: Basic Books.

Schroeder, David A., *et al.* 1995. *The Psychology of Helping and Altruism*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Schutz, Alfred, and Thomas Luckmann. 1973. *The Structures of the Life-World*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

Schwartz, Stephen P., ed. 1977. *Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Scott, Fred N. 1892. *Christianity and the Newspaper*. Publisher unknown.

—. 1922. 'English Composition as a Mode of Behavior.' *English Journal* 11: 463-73.

Scott, James C. 1990. *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Scott, John. 1991. *Social Network Analysis*. London: Sage.

Searle, John R. 1969. *Speech Acts*. London: Cambridge University Press.

—. 1977. 'Reiterating the Differences.' *Glyph* 1: 198-208. Cf. the summary and surrounding discussion in Derrida, *Limited Inc.*, 1988.

—. 1979. *Expression and Meaning*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

—. 1995. *The Construction of Social Reality*. New York: Free Press.

Sebeök, Thomas, ed. 1960. *Style in Language*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Sedmak, Clemens. 1996. *Kalkül und Kultur*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Seebass, Horst. 1974. *Biblische Hermeneutik*. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.

Seemann, Klaus-Dieter. 1973. 'Autoreferat: Die altrussische Wallfahrtsliteratur.' *Russia mediaevalis* 1: 152-55.

—. 1987. 'Genres and the Alterity of Old Russian Literature.' *Slavic and East European Journal* 31: 246-58.

Segal, Charles. 1986. *Interpreting Greek Tragedy*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

—. 1999. 'Introduction.' Pages 1-15 in *Contextualizing Classics*, ed. T. Falkner, *et al*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Seidman, Steven. 1998. *Contested Knowledge: Social Theory in the Postmodern Era*, 2nd edn. Oxford: Blackwell.

Sengle, Friedrich. 1967. *Die literarische Formenlehre*. Stuttgart: Metzler.

Sewall, Laura. 1999. *Sight and Sensibility*. New York: Putnam.

Sewell, Elizabeth. 1964. *The Human Metaphor*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Shanker, V.A., and S.G. Shanker, eds. 1986. *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Critical Assessments*. 5: *A Wittgenstein Bibliography*. London: Croom Helm.

Shannon, Claude E. 1948. 'The Mathematical Theory of Communication.' *Bell System Technical Journal* 27: 379-423, 623-656. Reprinted in Shannon and Weaver.

Shannon, Claude E., and Warren Weaver. 1949. *The Mathematical Theory of Communication*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Sherif, Muzafer. 1967. *Social Interaction*. Chicago: Aldine.

Sherzer, Joel. 1983. *Kuna Ways of Speaking*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

—. 1990. *Verbal Art in San Blas*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Shore, Bradd. 1996. *Culture in Mind*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Shotter, John. 1993. *Conversational Realities*. London: Sage.

Shweder, Richard A., *et al*. 1990. *Cultural Psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Silverman, Kaja. 1983. *The Subject of Semiotics*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Silverstein, Albert, ed. 1974. *Human Communication: Theoretical Explorations*. Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum.

Simmel, Georg. 1906. *Die Religion*. Frankfurt a.M.: Rutten & Leoning.

—. 1908. *Soziologie*. Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot.

—. 1918a. *Der Konflikt der modernen Kultur*. Munich: Duncker & Humblot. English, 1968.

—. 1918b. *Lebensanschauung*. Munich: Duncker & Humblot.

Simons, Herbert W. 1978. 'Genre-alizing about Rhetoric: A Scientific Approach.' Pages 33-50 in *Form and Genre*, ed. K. Campbell and K. Jamieson. Falls Church, VA: Speech Communication Association.

Sinding, Michael. 2002. 'After Definitions: Genre, Categories, and Cognitive Science.' *Genre* 35: 181-220.

Slama-Cazacu, Tatiana. 1961. *Langage et contexte*. The Hague: Mouton.

Sluga, Hans. 1996. "Whose House is That?' Wittgenstein on the Self.' Pages 320-53 in *The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein*, ed. H. Sluga and D. Stern. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Smart, Ninian. 1973. *The Science of Religion and the Sociology of Knowledge*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Smith, Alfred G. 1966. *Communication and Culture*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Smith, B.T.D. 1937. *The Parables of the Synoptic Gospels*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, Barry. 1990. 'Towards a History of Speech Act Theory.' Pages 29-61 in *Speech Acts, Meanings and Intentions*, ed. A. Burkhardt. Berlin: W. de Gruyter.

Smith, Dennis. 1991. *The Rise of Historical Sociology*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Smith, Dorothy E. 1999. *Writing the Social*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Smith, Edward E., and Douglas L. Medin. 1981. *Categories and Concepts*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Smith, Mark C. 1994. *Social Science in the Crucible*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Smith, Neil. 1999. *Chomsky: Ideas and Ideals*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, Wilfred Cantwell. 1962. *The Meaning and End of Religion*. San Francisco: Harper & Row.

Smitherman-Donaldson, Geneva, and Teun A. van Dijk, eds. 1988. *Discourse and Discrimination*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.

Smolensky, Paul, and Géraldine Legendre. 2006. *The Harmonic Mind: From Neural Computation to Optimality-Theoretic Grammar*. 2 vols. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Sober, Elliott, and David Sloan Wilson. 1998. *Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Söderblom, Nathan. 1916. *Das Werden des Gottesglaubens*. Ed. R. Stübe. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs.

Sokolov, Y.M. 1950. *Russian Folklore*. New York: Macmillan. Russian, 1941.

Spencer, Herbert. 1862. *First Principles*. London: Williams and Norgate.

—. 1876. *The Principles of Sociology*. 3 vols. London: Williams & Norgate.

Spiegel, Yorick. 1972. *Psychoanalytische Interpretationen biblischer Texte*. Munich: Kaiser.

Spitzer, Leo. 1948. *Linguistics and Literary History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Spranger, Eduard. 1914. *Lebensformen*. Halle a.S.: publisher unknown.

St Clair, Michael. 1996. *Object Relations and Self Psychology*, 2nd edn. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Staal, Frits. 1988. *Universals: Studies in Indian Logic and Linguistics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Stachiowiak, Herbert. 1969. *Denken und Erkennen im kybernetischen Modell*. Vienna: Springer.

Stahl, Sandra K.D. 1980. 'Narrative Genres.' *Fabula* 21: 82-87.

Staiger, Emil. 1955. *Die Kunst der Interpretation*. Zurich: Atlantis.

Stalnaker, Robert C. 1999. *Context and Content*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Stehle, Eva. 1997. *Performance and Gender in Ancient Greece*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Stein, Edith. 1964. *On the Problem of Empathy*. The Hague: Nijhoff. German, 1917.

Steinberg, Danny D., and Leon A. Jakobovitz, eds. 1971. *Semantics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Stemberger, Joseph Paul, and Barbara Handford Bernhardt. 1999. 'The Emergence of Faithfulness.' Pages 417-46 in *The Emergence of Language*, ed. B. MacWhinney. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Stenger, Jan. 2004. *Poetische Argumentation: Die Funktion der Gnomik in den Epinikien des Bakchylides*. Berlin: W. de Gruyter.

Stevenson, Rosemary J. 1993. *Language, Thought and Representation*. Chichester, UK: J. Wiley & Sons.

Stock, Patricia Lambert. 1995. *The Dialogic Curriculum*. Portsmouth, NH: Boynton/Cook.

Stocking, George W., Jr. 1995. *After Tylor*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Stoianovich, Traian. 1976. *French Historical Method*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Stolorow, Robert D., *et al.*, eds. 1994. *The Intersubjective Perspective*. Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson.

Stolz, Fritz. 1970. *Strukturen und Figuren im Kult von Jerusalem*. BZAW, 118. Berlin: W. de Gruyter.

Stone, C.G. 1930. *The Social Contract of the Universe*. London: Methuen & Co.

Stones, Rob. 1996. *Sociological Reasoning*. London: Macmillan.

Strelka, Joseph P., ed. 1976. *Literary Criticism and Psychology*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Stubbs, Michael. 1983. *Discourse Analysis*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Stull, Bradford T. 1999. *Amid the Fall, Dreaming of Eden: Du Bois, King, Malcolm X, and Emancipatory Composition*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.

Sugirtharajah, R.S. 1998. *Asian Biblical Hermeneutics and Postcolonialism*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis.

—. 2001. 'Son(s) Behaving Badly: The Prodigal in Foreign Hands.' Pages 195-206 in *Postmodern Interpretations of the Bible*, ed. A. Adam. St. Louis, MO: Chalice Press.

Sullivan, Harry Stack. 1940. *Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry*. New York: Norton.

Sumner, William Graham. 1907. *Folkways*. Boston: Ginn & Company.

Suppes, Patrick. 1984. *Probabilistic Metaphysics*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Švejcer, A.D. 1986. *Contemporary Sociolinguistics*. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins. Russian, 1976.

Švejcer, A.D., and L.B. Nikol'skij. 1986. *Introduction to Sociolinguistics*. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins. Russian, 1978.

Swales, John M. 1990. *Genre Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sweeney, Marvin A., and Ehud Ben Zvi, eds. 2003. *The Changing Face of Form Criticism for the Twenty-First Century*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.

Swidler, Leonard, ed. 1987. *Toward a Universal Theology of Religion*. Mary-
    knoll, NY: Orbis.
Sydow, C.W. v. 1948. *Selected Papers on Folklore*. Copenhagen: Rosenkilde
    and Bagger.
Taborsky, Edwina. 1997. *The Textual Society*. Toronto: University of
    Toronto Press.
Taine, H.A. 1863-64. *Histoire de la literature anglaise*. Paris: L. Hachette.
    English, 1879.
Tart, Charles, ed. 1969. *Altered States of Consciousness*. New York: Wiley.
Taylor, Irving A., and J.W. Getzels. 1975. *Perspectives in Creativity*.
    Chicago: Aldine.
Taylor, John G. 1999. *The Race for Consciousness*. Cambridge, MA: MIT
    Press.
Taylor, Mark C. 1982. *Deconstructing Theology*. New York: Crossroad.
—. 1984. *Erring: A Postmodern A/theology*. Chicago: University of Chicago
    Press.
—. 2001. *The Moment of Complexity: Emerging Network Culture*. Chicago:
    Univeristy of Chicago Press.
Taylor, Talbot J. 1992. *Mutual Misunderstanding*. Durham, NC: Duke
    University Press.
Teicholz, Judith Guss. 1999. *Kohut, Loewald, and the Postmoderns*. Hills-
    dale, NJ: Analytic Press.
Teilhard de Chardin, Pierre. 1959. *The Phenomenon of Man*. New York:
    Harper.
TeSelle, Eugene. 1975. *Christ in Context*. Philadelphia: Fortress.
Thayer, H.S. 1968. *Meaning and Action: A Critical History of Pragmatism*.
    Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
Theissen, Gerd. 1974. *Urchristliche Wundergeschichten*. Gütersloh: Gerd
    Mohn. English, 1983.
Thibault, Paul J. 1997. *Re-reading Saussure*. London: Routledge.
Thomas, William I., and Florian Znaniecki. 1918. *The Polish Peasant in
    Europe and America*, I. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Thomas Aquinas, Saint. 1949. *On Being and Essence*. Toronto: Pontifical
    Institute of Mediaeval Studies.
Thompson, Wayne N. 1967. *Quantitative Research in Public Address and
    Communication*. New York: Random House.
Tiele, C.P. 1897-99. *Elements of the Science of Religion*. 2 vols. New York:
    AMS Press.
Tillich, Paul. 1951-63. *Systematic Theology*. 3 vols. Chicago: University of
    Chicago Press.
Todorov, Tzvetan. 1969. *Grammaire du Décameron*. The Hague: Mouton.
—. 1970. *Introduction à la litterature fantastique*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.
—. 1973. *The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to Literary Genre*. Cleve-
    land, OH: Case Western Reserve University Press.
—. 1976. 'The Origins of Genres.' *New Literary History* 8: 159-70.
—. 1978. *Les genres du discours*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil. English, 1990.
Tolman, Edward Chace. 1932. *Purposive Behavior in Animals and Men*.
    New York: The Century Co.

Tomasello, Michael, ed. 2003. *The New Psychology of Language*, II. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Toulmin, Stephen. 1958. *The Uses of Argument*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

—. 1972. *Human Understanding*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Touraine, Alain. 1984. *Le retour de l'acteur*. [Paris]: Fayard. English, 1988.

Treviño, A. Javier. 2001. 'Introduction.' Pages xv-lviii in *Talcott Parsons Today*, ed. A. Treviño. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

Tripp, Susan. 1981. 'The Genres of Classical Sanscrit Literature.' *Poetics* 10: 213-30.

Troeltsch, Ernst. 1923. *Christian Thought*. London: University of London Press.

—. 1924. *Der Historismus und seine Probleme. Gesammelte Shriften*, III. Tübingen: Mohr.

Trotsky, Leon. 1925. *Literature and Revolution*. New York: International Publishers. Russian, 1924.

Tucker, Gene M. 1971. *Form Criticism of the Old Testament*. Philadelphia: Fortress.

Turner, Frederick. 1999. 'The Inner Meaning of Poetic Form.' Pages 199-203 in *After New Formalism*, ed. A. Finch. Ashland, OR: Story Line Press.

Turner, Victor W. 1969. *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure*. Chicago: Aldine.

—. 1974. *Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Tyler, Stephen A. 1987. *The Unspeakable*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Uldall, H.J. 1957. *Outline of Glossematics*, I. Copenhagen: Nordisk Sprog- og Kulturforlag.

Ullmann, Stephen. 1962. *Semantics*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Uttal, William R. 1975. *An Autocorrelation Theory of Form Detection*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Valsinger, Jaan, and René van der Veer. 2000. *The Social Mind*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Van Seters, J. 1983. *In Search of History: Historiography in the Ancient World and Origins of Biblical History*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

—. 1992. *Prologue to History*. Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox.

Van Tieghem, Paul. 1938. 'La question des genres littéraires.' *Hélicon* 1: 95-101.

Vansina, Jan. 1985. *Oral Tradition as History*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Vatz, Richard E. 1973. 'The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation.' *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 6: 154-61.

Vaux, Roland de. 1960. *Les institutions de l'Ancien Testament*, II. Paris: Editions du Cerf. English, 1961.

Vendryes, J. 1966. 'L'oevre linguistique de Charles Bally.' Pages 189-201 in *Portraits of Linguists*, II, ed. T. Sebeok. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Reprinted from *Cahiers Ferdinand de Saussure*, VI [1946-47]: 47-62.

Verner, David. 1976. 'Jacob and Esau: A Content-Analytic Approach to the Study of the Jacob Cycle.' MS, used by permission.

Via, Dan O., Jr. 1967. *The Parables: Their Literary and Existential Dimension*. Philadelphia: Fortress.

Vice, Sue. 1997. *Introducing Bakhtin*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Vidich, Arthur J., and Sanford M. Lyman. 1985. *American Sociology*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Viëtor, Karl. 1931. 'Probleme der literarischen Gattungsgeschichte.' *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte* 9: 425-47.

Voloshinov, V.N. 1926. 'Slovo v zhizn i slovo v poesii.' *Zvezda* 6: 244-67. English, pp. 5-29 in *Bakhtin School Papers*, ed. A. Shukman, 1983; an earlier English translation appeared as an appendix to the English version of Voloshinov, *Freudianism*, 1976.

—. 1929. *Marksizm i filosofija jazyka*. Leningrad: publisher unknown. English: *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*, 1973, based on the slightly revised 2nd edn, 1930.

—. 1983. 'Literary Stylistics.' Pages 93-152 in *Bakhtin School Papers*, ed. A. Shukman. Oxford: RPT Publications.

Voss, Gerhard. and Helmut Harsch. 1972. *Versuche mehrdimensionaler Schriftauslegung: Bericht über ein Gespräch*. Stuttgart: KBW Verlag.

Vosskamp, Wilhelm. 1977. 'Gattungen als literarisch-soziale Institutionen.' Pages 27-42 in *Textsortenlehre—Gattungsgeschichte*, ed. W. Hinck. Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer.

Vygotsky, Lev. 1986. *Thought and Language*, 2nd edn. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Russian, 1934; another translation in *Collected Works*, I, 1987.

Waal Malefijt, Annemarie de. 1968. *Religion and Culture*. New York: Macmillan.

Wagner, Norman E. 1976/77. 'General system theory, cybernetics, and Old Testament tradition.' *SR* 6: 597-605.

Waldenfels, Hans. 1983. 'Gott—Mensch—Welt.' Pages 13-43 in *Christliche Grundlagen des Dialogs mit den Weltreligionen*, ed. W. Strolz and H. Waldenfels. Freiburg: Herder.

—. 1990. *Begegnung der Religionen*. Bonn: Borengasser.

Waltz, Matthias. 1970. 'Zum Problem der Gattungsgeschichte im Mittelalter.' *Zeitschrift für romanische Philologie* 86: 22-39.

Walzel, Oskar. 1923. *Gehalt und Gestalt*. Berlin-Neubabelsberg: Athenaion.

Warnick, Barbara. 1997. 'Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca's Contribution to *The New Rhetoric*.' Pages 69-85 in *Listening to Their Voices*, ed. M. Wertheimer. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

Warnke, Ingo. 1996. 'Historische Dimensionen pragmatischer Textorganisation.' Pages 131-63 in *Text—Konstitution, Verarbeitung, Topik*, ed. S. Michaelis and D. Tophinke. Munich: Lincom Europa.

Warnock, G.J. 1969. 'John Langshaw Austin, A Biographical Sketch.' Pages 3-21 in K. Fann.

Waxman, Meyer. 1933. *A History of Jewish Literature*, II. New York: Bloch.

Wayne, Helena, ed. 1995. *The Story of a Marriage: The Letters of Bronislaw Malinowski and Elsie Masson*. 2 vols. London: Routledge.

Weaver, Richard M. 1970. *Language is Sermonic*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

Webb, Eugene. 1993. *The Self Between: From Freud to the New Social Psychology of France*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Weber, Max. 1951. *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wirtschaftslehre*, 2nd edn. Tübingen: Mohr.

Webster, Gary, and Brian Goodwin. 1982. 'History and Structure in Biology.' Pages 103-19 in *Towards a Liberatory Biology*, ed. S. Rose. London: Allison & Busby.

Wegener, Philipp. 1885. *Untersuchungen ueber die Grundfragen des Sprachlebens*. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins.

Weiser, Artur. 1931. *Glaube und Geschichte im Alten Testament*. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.

Weiss, Meir. 1971. 'Die Methode der 'Total-Interpretation.'' Pages 88-112 in *Congress Volume (Uppsala 1971)*. VTSup, 22. Leiden: Brill.

Weiss, Paul. 1958. *Modes of Being*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.

Weizsäcker, Carl Friedrich von. 1971. *Die Einheit der Natur*. Munich: Hanser.

—. 1974. 'Evolution und Entropiewachstum.' Pages 200-21 in *Offene Systeme*, I. Ed. Ernst von Weizsäcker. Stuttgart: Klett.

Welby, Victoria, Lady. 1896. 'Sense, Meaning and Interpretation.' *Mind* 5: 24-37, 186-202.

—. 1903. *What is Meaning?* Amsterdam: J. Benjamins.

Wellek, René. 1981. 'Literary Criticism.' Pages 297-321 in *What is Criticism?*, ed. P. Hernadi. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Wellek, René, and Austin Warren. 1956. *Theory of Literature*, 2nd edn. New York: Harcourt.

Welsh, Clement. 1974. *Preaching in a New Key*. Philadelphia: United Church.

Wendland, Paul. 1900. 'Adolf Harnacks Geschichte der Akademie der Wissenschaften.' Pages 229-43 in *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum, Geschichte und deutsche Literatur und für Pädagogik*. Leipzig: Teubner.

Westermann, C. 1954. *Das Loben Gottes in den Psalmen*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. English, 1965; another trans. included in 1981.

—. 1960. *Grundformen prophetischer Rede*. BBET, 31. München: C. Kaiser. English, 1967.

—. 1974. 'The Role of the Lament in the Theology of the Old Testament.' *Int* 28: 20-38.

—. 1981. *Praise and Lament in the Psalms*. Atlanta: John Knox.

—. 1984. *Vergleiche und Gleichnisse im Alten und Neuen Testament*. Stuttgart: Calwer. English: *The Parables of Jesus in the Light of the Old Testament*, 1990.

Westermann, Claus, ed. 1960. *Probleme alttestamentlicher Hermeneutik*. Munich: Kaiser.

Whatmough, Joshua. 1956. *Language*. London: Secker & Warburg.

White, Hayden. 1973. *Metahistory*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.

Whitehead, Alfred North. 1925. *Science and the Modern World*. New York: Macmillan.

—. 1929. *Process and Reality*. New York: Free Press.

—. 1933. *Adventures of Ideas*. New York: Macmillan.

—. 1941. *The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead*. Ed. P. Schilpp. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

Wieman, Henry Nelson. 1975. *Seeking a Faith for a New Age*. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow.

Wiener, Norbert. 1948. *Cybernetics*. New York: Wiley.

Wierzbicka, Anna. 1991. *Cross-Cultural Pragmatics*. Berlin: M. de Gruyter.

Wigger, J. Bradley. 1998. *The Texture of Mystery*. Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press.

Williams, Frederick. 1968. *Reasoning With Statistics: Simplified Examples in Communication Research*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Williams, Raymond. 1977. *Marxism and Literature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wilson, Edward O. 1998. *Consilience*. New York: Knopf.

Wilson-Kastner, Patricia. 1983. *Faith, Feminism, and the Christ*. Philadelphia: Fortress Press.

Winans, James Albert. 1917. *Public Speaking*, 2nd edn. New York: The Century Co.

Wink, Walter. 1973. *The Bible in Human Transformation*. Philadelphia: Fortress.

Winquist, Charles E. 1995. *Desiring Theology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1922. *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*. New York: Harcourt, Brace.

—. 1953. *Philosophical Investigations*. Oxford: Blackwell.

—. 1958. *Preliminary Studies for the 'Philosophical Investigations,' Generally Known as the Blue and Brown Books*. New York: Harper & Row.

—. 1964. *Philosophische Bemerkungen*. Oxford: Blackwell.

—. 1969. *Philosophische Grammatik*. Oxford: Blackwell.

—. 1977. *Bermerkungen über die Farmen, Remarks on Color*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

—. 1993. *Philosophical Occasions, 1912-1951*. Ed. J. Klagge and A. Nordmann. Indianapolis: Hackett.

—. 1995. *Wiener Ausgabe*, IV. Vienna: Springer.

—. 1996. *Wiener Ausgabe*, V. Vienna: Springer.

—. 1997. *Denkbewegungen*. Ed. I. Somovilla. Innsbruck: Haymon. English, 2003, ed. J. Klagge and A. Nordmann.

—. 1998. *Vermischte Bemerkungen/Culture and Value*, 2nd edn. Oxford: Blackwell.

—. 2001. *Philosophische Untersuchungen*. Ed. Joachim Schulte. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.

—. 2004. *Licht und Schatten: Ein nächtliches (Traum-)Erlebnis und ein Brief-Fragment*. Ed. I. Somavilla. Innsbruck: Haymon.

Wobbermin, Georg. 1926. *Wesen und Wahrheit des Christentums*, 2nd edn. Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs.

Wood, Pearle. 1973. *Evolution, Psychology and the Biblical Ideal of Love*. New York: Exposition.

Woodberry, George Edward. 1914. *Two Phases of Criticism*. Boston: Merrymount Press.

Woolgar, Steve, ed. 1988. *Knowledge and Reflexivity*. London: Sage.

Worringer, Wilhelm. 1953. *Abstraction and Empathy*. New York: International Universities Press.

Wright, G.H. von. 1974. *Causality and Determinism*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Yankelovich, Daniel. 1999. *The Magic of Dialogue*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Yeo, Eileen Janes. 1996. *The Contest for Social Science*. London: Rivers Oram Press.

Yonay, Yuval P. 1998. *The Struggle over the Soul of Economics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Young, Richard. 1976. 'Invention: A Topographical Survey.' Pages 1-43 in *Teaching Composition*, ed. G. Tate. Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press.

—. 1987. 'Recent Developments in Rhetorical Invention.' Pages 1-38 in *Teaching Composition*, 2nd edn, ed. G. Tate. Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press.

Zaeske, Susan. 2000. 'Unveiling Esther as a Pragmatic Radical Rhetoric.' *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 33: 193-220.

Zimmerli, W. 1963. *Gottes Offenbarung; gesammelte Aufsätze zum Alten Testament*. München : C. Kaiser. English: *I Am Yahweh*, 1982.

—. 1976. *The Old Testament and the World*. Atlanta: John Knox.

Zimmermann, Heinrich. 1967. *Neutestamentliche Methodenlehre*. Stuttgart: Verlag Kathoisches Bibelwerk.

Zipf, George K. 1949. *Human Behavior and the Principle of Least Effort*. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Zizioulas, John D. 2006. *Communion and Otherness*. London: T. & T. Clark.

Zumwalt, Rosemary Lévy. 1988. *American Folklore Scholarship*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

INDEX OF AUTHORS

Index of Biblical Passages