

CONSTRUCTING THE OTHER IN ANCIENT ISRAEL

AND THE USA



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CONSTRUCTING THE OTHER IN ANCIENT ISRAEL
AND THE USA

Johnny Miles



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For those deprived a voice,

A VOICE

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Rarely, if ever, can a study on stereotyping and inter-ethnic group dynamics fully escape critiques of misrepresentation, gross overstatements, or caricaturism, much less avoid falling prey to the very reductionism decried; mine will no doubt prove to be no exception. Yet, that is a risk I am willing to undertake for a study sorely needed for understanding a theologically sanctioned re-presentation process that asserts the superiority of Israel over its neighbours in an ancient colonization context juxtaposed with a group typologically identifying itself as 'Israel' and superior to its neighbours in a modern colonization context.

Several years back many lengthy conversations with colleague and friend Hjamil Martínez-Vázquez expanded the orbit of my scholarship with an awareness of colonization and postcolonialism, their concerns, objectives, and relevancy for modern (biblical) scholarship. Hjamil helped me to see the vantage point of the 'other' as integral to any understanding of the nature of constructing identities. For his invaluable input to my scholastic repertoire, I am deeply indebted because this work would never have reached fruition otherwise. In addition, I want to express appreciation to my colleague Darren Middleton for his friendship foremost and our discussions on postcolonialism that helped to augment my perspectives. I also wish to acknowledge my colleagues at Texas Christian University whose genuine support of me in general and my work on this project in specific I have found to be emotionally reassuring.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAAPSS	<i>Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science</i>
AAHS	African American History Series
AB	Anchor Bible
ABRL	Anchor Bible Reference Library
ADAJ	<i>Annual of the Department of Antiquities of Jordan</i>
AHR	<i>American Historical Review</i>
AHS	The American History Series
AJ	<i>Amerasia Journal</i>
AJS	<i>American Journal of Sociology</i>
ANES	<i>Ancient Near Eastern Studies</i>
ANET	<i>Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament.</i> Edited by J.B. Pritchard. 3rd ed. Princeton, 1969.
AQR	<i>The American Quarterly Review</i>
AUSS	<i>Andrews University Seminary Studies</i>
BA	<i>Biblical Archaeologist</i>
BAR	<i>Biblical Archaeology Review</i>
BASOR	<i>Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research</i>
BJS	<i>The British Journal of Sociology</i>
BMW	The Bible in the Modern World
BN	<i>Biblische Notizen</i>
BP	The Bible and Postcolonialism
BQR	<i>Brownson's Quarterly Review</i>
BRev	<i>Bible Review</i>
BSem	Bible Seminar
BSHC	The Bedford Series in History and Culture
BTB	<i>Biblical Theology Bulletin</i>
CASWJ	<i>Child and Adolescent Social Work Journal</i>
CBQ	<i>Catholic Biblical Quarterly</i>
CI	<i>Critical Inquiry</i>
CMI	Culture, Media, and Identities

COS	<i>The Context of Scripture</i> . Edited by W.W. Hallo. 3 vols. Leiden, 1997-
CS	<i>Cultural Studies</i>
CurBS	<i>Currents in Research: Biblical Studies</i>
DMOA	<i>Documenta et Monumenta Orientis Antiqui</i>
HIntJP/P	<i>Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics</i>
HSM	<i>Harvard Semitic Monographs</i>
HUCA	<i>Hebrew Union College Annual</i>
IEJ	<i>Israel Exploration Journal</i>
IH	<i>Indian Historian</i>
IJSL	<i>International Journal of Social Languages</i>
JAEH	<i>Journal of American Ethnic History</i>
JAF	<i>The Journal of American Folklore</i>
JANESCU	<i>Journal of the Ancient Near Eastern Society of Columbia University</i>
JASP	<i>Journal of Applied Social Psychology</i>
JBL	<i>Journal of Biblical Literature</i>
JD	<i>Jian Dao</i>
JEA	<i>Journal of Egyptian Archaeology</i>
JESHO	<i>Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient</i>
JQ	<i>Journalism Quarterly</i>
JSOT	<i>Journal for the Study of the Old Testament</i>
JSOTSup	<i>Journal for the Study of the Old Testament: Supplement Series</i>
JQR	<i>Jewish Quarterly Review</i>
JSS	<i>Journal of Semitic Studies</i>
JYA	<i>Journal of Youth and Adolescence</i>
LSTS	<i>Library of Second Temple Studies</i>
MLS	<i>Modern Language Studies</i>
OBS	<i>Oxford Bible Series</i>
OLitRev	<i>Oxford Literary Review</i>
OR	<i>Oxford Readers</i>
OTL	<i>Old Testament Library</i>
OTR	<i>Old Testament Readings</i>
OtSt	<i>Oudtestamentische Studiën</i>
PEQ	<i>Palestine Exploration Quarterly</i>
PHR	<i>Pacific Historical Review</i>
Proof	<i>Prooftexts: A Journal of Jewish Literary History</i>
QualSoc	<i>Qualitative Sociology</i>
RB	<i>Revue biblique</i>
RCT	<i>Routledge Critical Thinkers</i>
SAM	<i>Sheffield Archaeological Monographs</i>

SBLABS	Society of Biblical Literature Archaeology and Biblical Studies
SBLDS	Society of Biblical Literature Dissertation Series
SBLSP	<i>Society of Biblical Literature Seminar Papers</i>
SCL	Sather Classical Lectures
SCQ	<i>Southern California Quarterly</i>
SCWH	Studies in Comparative World History
SemeiaSt	Semeia Studies
SFSHJ	South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism
SHANE	Studies in the History of the Ancient Near East
SHCANE	Studies in the History and Culture of the Ancient Near East
SJOT	<i>Scandinavian Journal of the Old Testament</i>
SocT	<i>Social Text</i>
SPSH	Scholars Press Studies in the Humanities
SR	<i>Studies in Religion</i>
SwHQ	<i>Southwestern Historical Quarterly</i>
TA	<i>Tel Aviv</i>
TAD	<i>The Elephantine Papyri in English</i> . Edited by B. Porten et al. Leiden, 1996.
<i>Transeu</i>	<i>Transeuphratène</i>
VT	<i>Vetus Testamentum</i>
VTSup	Vetus Testamentum Supplements
WBC	Word Biblical Commentary
WHQ	<i>Western Historical Quarterly</i>
ZDPV	<i>Zeitschrift des deutschen Palästina Vereins</i>

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PROLOGUE

While hireling scribblers prostitute their pen,
Creating virtues for abandon'd men,
Ascribing merit to the vicious great,
And barely flatter whom they ought to hate—
Be mine the just, the grateful task to scan
Th' effulgent virtues of a *sable* man...

—Phyllis Wheatley

In a sermon delivered at Montgomery, Alabama's Holt Street Baptist Church on 5 December 1955, Martin Luther King Jr. (1958, ix) stated, 'When the history books are written in the future, somebody will have to say, "There lived a race of people, a black people...a people who had the moral courage to stand up for their rights. And thereby they injected a new meaning into the veins of history and of civilization"'. Little did King know just how prophetic his words would prove to be. Several histories on African Americans, such as Lerone Bennett's *Before the Mayflower* and John Hope Franklin's *From Slavery to Freedom*, have emerged in addition to the very few histories that include the perspective of the people (e.g. Native Americans, Latin Americans, Asian Americans, in addition to African Americans) in its narration of US history, the most notable being Howard Zinn's *A People's History of the United States* (1980) and *Voices of a People's History of the United States* (2004). The attitude toward the in/exclusion of the minority perspective as 'no big deal' within the mainstream US only signals the importance of US histories to narrate the lost voices of the 'other' as does the following incident involving US Congressman Norman Mineta (Zia (2000: 24). In 1984 Congressman Mineta, a second-generation Japanese American (*nisei*) who had served 10 terms in the US House of Representatives, was invited to be the guest speaker at an automobile plant opening near San Jose in his district. After the ceremonies, a senior vice president of General Motors and general manager of Chevrolet said to Congressman Mineta, 'My, you speak English well. How long have you been in this country?'

The root-problem with such biased perspectives of 'natural' Americans and relative disinterest in non-Euro-Americans, much less their contributions, lay in 'Exodus politics', a concept addressed within Michael Walzer's

Exodus and Revolution (1985). Walzer sought to retell the Exodus story as it figured in political history touching on matters of revolutionary politics and biblical interpretation. But for all his claims of the Exodus as linear and the 'original form of progressive history', his arguments avoid a central concern...history. Never does he explore how the ideological text of Exodus has been appropriated (the history of the text); and never does he consider the problematic relation of such a text to actual events (the history of that text's interpretation). Granted, the Exodus story has provided a beacon of hope for many struggling against injustice (e.g. African Americans and Latin Americans), but a preoccupation with the exodus motif alone overlooks its twin complement, conquest. One accompanies the other as does the perception of Yhwh; Yhwh the deliverer also becomes Yhwh the conqueror. And that conquered has a name, a face, in short, an identity often ignored by these stories and their interpreters. The observations reached by Walzer reflect what may be found in many biblical studies' publications, namely a latent disregard with the effects of biblical literature (especially the complementary motifs of exodus-conquest) upon the colonized. Exodus politics and its central concepts of chosen people, covenant, redemption, and Promised Land explicitly exclude Canaanites—and Moabites, and Ammonites, and Edomites ad infinitum—'from the world of moral concern' (Said 1988: 167). The realm of Western politics, including that of the discourse of biblical studies, has always preoccupied itself with Israel, ancient or present, with limited concern for the 'others' and what they may illumine about Israelite history. Even Gösta Ahlström's *The History of Ancient Palestine* (1993), while entertaining historical insights of Israel's neighbours, did so in service of a fuller understanding of Israel. The 'other' was simply a means to an end. But what if readers made the 'other' the centre as suggested by Robert Warrior (1996: 98-99)? To do so would maximize the potential to read *all* the Bible (not just those parts that inspire), and to take seriously the violence and injustice to the natives and their human rights. To do so would take seriously the terror and violation to innocent peoples' rights to land and self-determination engendered by these texts since, as Walter Benjamin once noted, 'there is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism'.

Keith Whitelam's book *The Invention of Ancient Israel* (1996) began a shift in the conversation within biblical studies by responding to the silencing of Palestinian history. He contended that the discourse of biblical studies must clear out a space for the voices of indigenous cultures of Palestine separate from that of biblical studies, which has, in the politics of re-presentation, represented these cultures as incapable of unified action or a national consciousness. Whitelam's study strikes at the heart of ancient Israel as the taproot of Western civilization and accomplishes what so few commentators

have, namely give due attention to the ideological aftermath of colonialism in the post-colonization era of the West. What began initially for a group identifying itself as 'Israel' with a 'primary history', a term coined by David Noel Freedman for the literary corpus of Genesis–2 Kings, continued into the modern era with other groups typologically identifying themselves as 'Israel'. As we will see more concretely in later chapters, Euro-Americans who appropriated the exodus motif and identified themselves as 'Israel' also appropriated the ideas and attitudes of the conquest motif into their own US consciousness and ideology. With each instance over the course of this history's consumption in the modern era, 'Israel' became synonymous with colonialism and all other displaced and dispossessed ethnic groups as 'Canaan'. Therefore, if you happened not to qualify for membership, then you were, like the Canaanites, excluded from moral concern. This study brings a postcolonial optic to the consumption (including effects) of the primary history of the Hebrew Bible within the colonial contexts of fifth-century BCE Yehud and nineteenth-century CE US since liminality is neither spatially nor temporally constrained. Those consumptive effects would specifically concern how one ethnic group appropriated a national myth with its embedded ideological motifs of conquest and occupation in a process that (1) constructed ethnic identities of 'self' as 'Israel' and 'other' as 'Canaan' typologically despite the presence of ethnic heterogeneity within, (2) asserted the superiority of the group constructing identities to the exclusion of 'others' from their world of moral concern, and (3) employed ethno-typing strategies such as stereotypes (re-presentation) that helped actualize the preceding initiatives. This study, which intends to advance the work of many of its theoretical antecedents, places its focus upon the 'others' of both spatio-temporal contexts with those of the nineteenth-century US perhaps having especial relevance for contemporary concerns.¹

The identity of Euro-Americans interpreted typologically as 'Israel' was deeply imprinted within the US national consciousness to form the US as a 'biblical nation' (Noll 1982).² Throughout the eighteenth and

1. According to recent census figures (US Census Bureau 2007), non-whites now constitute one-third (100 million) of the US population, no longer a demographic obscurity or minorities relegated to the margins of silence. Though presently numerous literary and cultural media provide opportunities for these ethnicities to voice their perspectives and to articulate their stories, they nonetheless do not occupy a place in the mainstream where various discriminatory tactics (witness recent legislative ordinances targeting Hispanics in Hazelton, Pennsylvania; Riverside, New Jersey; and Farmers Branch, Texas) would expunge their presence—out-of-sight, out-of-mind.

2. On the type–antitype construct of typological interpretation in America, see both Bercovitch and Davis (1972: 3–8 and 11–45, respectively).

nineteenth centuries, the Bible was a ubiquitous presence in the development of American nationalism. From the union of biblical typology and American nationalism came the image of the US as a biblical nation. 'The Bible', remarks Mark Noll (1982: 45), 'was woven into the warp and woof of American culture'. Families widely engaged in the practice of naming children after biblical characters; Bible societies emerged to provide a copy of the Scriptures to every citizen; and politicians and national leaders, along with ministers, utilized biblical images and texts of Scripture. In 1776 Benjamin Franklin suggested that the Continental Congress make the image of Moses leading Israel to safety through the Red Sea as the national seal, and Thomas Jefferson proposed the image of Israel led by a pillar of fire and cloud through the wilderness. Those who did not come to the aid of the colonies during the Revolutionary War received the Curse of Meroz (Judg. 5.23). At George Washington's death in December 1799 ministers likened him to the Old Testament figures Moses, Joshua, Othniel, Samuel, Elijah, David, Cyrus, and Daniel, to name but a few. Eulogies mourned Washington's death with David's lament for Abner in 2 Samuel 3.38: 'Know ye not that there is a prince and a great man fallen this day in Israel'? But it was Ezra Stiles's sermon entitled 'The United States Elevated in Glory and Honour' (7 May 1783) that may have been the clearest statement of the typological identification of Old Testament Israel with modern America though such sentiments were naturally embraced in the previous century. The long English tradition of reading Scripture typologically gained a foothold via Puritanism in the typological Promised Land of Canaan where God's 'Israel' exerted its influence. No doubt exists about the pervasiveness of biblical images, stories, and characters as a part of the public discourse in US society throughout the nineteenth century as attested by the numerous political and editorial cartoons in *Harper's Weekly*, *Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper*, *Puck*, and *Judge*, all of which traded on this wellspring of knowledge, attest.

Along with the Bible woven into the warp and woof of the US were the latent attitudes and perceptions of those ethnic groups *not* typologically regarded as 'Israel'. Their voices, their histories, their cultures, albeit silenced from mainstream consciousness, were nonetheless a part of US culture. And though the biblical literacy assumed within the visual templates of cartoons and illustrations noticeably waned beyond the nineteenth century, attitudes toward other non-white ethnic groups persisted, reinforcing and being reinforced by cultural perceptions within these illustrations, to sear their re-presentation on the US consciousness even into the twenty first century. Prevailing attitudes of who can belong and whose voice counts as attested by the epigraphs prefacing each chapter simply underscore the extent of colonization in the US.

Only a miniscule percentage of the general public, and scholarship for that matter, has any orientation to post-colonialism, much less a working knowledge. And here, perhaps, a personal caveat may be in order as my own heritage might, from the perspective of some, betray me as the least likely of persons to engage in postcolonial critique. After all, I am white, Anglo-(and probably Saxon somewhere back there), and Protestant—but definitely neither a WASP nor WASP-ish. As a consequence, I have never been part of an ethnic group the object of hate crimes and violence, denigrated, and marginalized because of its ethnicity or colour by either other ethnic groups or the power structures within society, in other words the colonized; rather, some would probably be likely to place me in the camp of colonizer. So the natural question that follows is, Can only those of marginalized ethnicities write about post-colonialism? Or can others? And if so, just who can engage in postcolonial critique? Postcolonial critics would quickly deny membership in a particular ethnic group experiencing the effects of colonization as a necessary qualification since examples abound of the colonized collaborating in the colonization process. Of course, the insight derived from such an experience would bear on nuanced arguments or perspectives to no doubt prove invaluable in a postcolonial critique. Nevertheless, knowing or living with that feeling of being on the periphery resonating deep within; the feeling of being isolated when surrounded by others not quite like you—for example, a white person in a room where the majority of people are not white; the feeling of always being spoken for; the feeling of when speaking with others of never really being heard; a sensitivity to the injustice and oppression where an imbalance of power within social structures naturally excludes the contributions and perspectives of certain ethnic voices from the tapestry of the historical narrative while privileging, and never questioning, the dominant voice—these and other possible scenarios place an individual in the position to apperceive something of what life is really like for those who live on the margins, thus enabling a mindset or critique known as post-colonialism. Uriah Kim (2005: 25) adds further that ‘anyone can practice postcolonial criticism if he or she acknowledges that there is an intimate connection between colonialism and its cultural texts, and that this connection continues to exploit and oppress those who are considered the Other from the West’s perspective’.

Postcolonial critiques do not eschew history, but rather they advocate a different way of looking at history. It commits itself to a history of those voices marginalized, subjugated, neglected, or lost, namely ‘a history of their own’. It re-vision history. For biblical studies, what this means ultimately is a perspective other than that from the West. No master narrative represents *the* history of ancient Palestine though the Hebrew Bible was written from the vantage point of the west (of the Jordan River), and the Bible in

general has often been construed as one by the West. As narrative, this 'history' of ancient Palestine 'will always be *someone's* history' with 'more inclusive narratives and less inclusive ones, but that is all' (Davies 1997: 48-49). Nonetheless, these texts possess invaluable traces of other histories and memories in the land. The Hebrew Bible especially sheds valuable insight into the identities of other ethnic groups within Palestine and the Transjordanian region who are important to an understanding of the process of constructing identities of both 'self' and 'other', but it does so in a manner of representation that essentially negates the histories of these peoples, a point that Baruch Levine and Abraham Malamat (1996: 286) fail to appreciate fully in their review of Whitelam's book when they conclude that 'the Hebrew Bible does not deny the existence or identities of those other peoples'. Ulrich Hübner's (1992: 283-326) chapter 'Images of Neighbours in the East: Barbarians, Bastards, and Brothers?' demonstrates the reality that ancient Near Eastern societies, including Israel, generally, and often, depicted hostile images of their neighbouring cultures as enemies, 'barbarians', and heathens. This knowledge about the representation of ethnic groups by others within literature is not news to Hebrew Bible scholarship. But what Hebrew Bible scholarship has not given due attention to is the full implications of such re-presentations in a context where the West perceived its identity and development as an imperial power in relation to 'Israel' (biblical? historical? see discussion in Chapter 2) and the perception of their ethnic neighbours as 'other'. In the postcolonial reclamation of a 'history of their own', recovering the identity of the 'other' from the 'official' documents of the biblical texts demands a conscious strategy for reading these texts since the history of the 'other' has been incorporated into the history of Israel as its own history. Such a reading has for its objective 'not simply...the biases of the elite' but 'to get at the various ways in which elite modes of thought represented the refractory figure of the subaltern and their practices', thereby giving legitimation to the 'other' denied by 'us' (Chakraborty 2005: 479).

Informing the postcolonial optic of this book's explorations is the illustrated triadic model of the colonization process below (see Fig. 1). The model diagrams those components integral to the cyclical process of identity construction within colonization contexts. Despite the limitations of the one-dimensional nature of this diagram, each component of the diagram *in realia* bears a mutually reciprocating relation to each other with more multi-directionality than the diagram may indicate. For re-presentation and the ethnic identity construct have as much of an impact on shaping the nuances of social context as social context has on shaping the politics of re-presentation and the construction of ethnic identity. In a postcolonial critique, social location cannot be overlooked since it becomes the staging




Figure 1. Triadic Model.

ground wherein the entire process plays itself out. Hence this study foregrounds its analyses in the temporal liminalities of fifth-century BCE Yehud and nineteenth-century CE US with attention to the ideological aftermath in the current era.

But why these seemingly disparate social contexts? What could they possibly have in common?

Part of the answer lies with the fact that post-colonialism is much more concerned about the modern era, including the effects of colonial discursive literature, than simply that of the past.

With the politics of re-presentation, perhaps no other medium plays as deleterious a role in construing the identity of those ethnicities on the margins as does stereotyping. Stereotyping, a form of re-presentation, especially within sacred literature, warrants concern over its effects since the mutual consumption of such literature can never be harmless no matter how innocuous its re-presentations of other ethnic groups may appear or whether such groups still exist. Hence the centrality of the Bible to the colonization process as reflected by the diagram. And by Bible, I do not simply mean the entire collection of literature bound in one volume; rather, for my purposes, it signifies either select biblical texts or ideological perspectives reflected

within such texts that un/consciously influence the social dynamic of ethnic interactions as one group attempts to assert its authority over others. No doubt exists over the role of the Bible in the initial European colonization of North America. In this context especially, no little proof-texting occurred to demonstrate the ethnic superiority of Anglos over Indians, Latinos, Asians, and Africans. Nonetheless, the *Nachleben* of the typological identification by the forebears of these colonizers as 'Israel' along with the attitudes that inhered in the biblical ideology of conquest/settlement (aka Monroe Doctrine in the nineteenth century) certainly underpinned their neo-colonizing agenda while simultaneously informing their re-presentation of non-Anglo ethnic identity via stereotypes. Ultimately, this mutuality between identity construct and stereotyping established both a strategy of developing markers integral to a form of cultural ethno-typing (analogous to the scientific process of DNA-typing) and an assumed superiority on the part of Anglos.

Bringing postcolonial theory to bear on the discussion of ethnic identity and re-presentation yields several accomplishments. First, this theoretical interconnection challenges us to think beyond the simple binarisms of fixed identifications. Engaging with discourses on ethnicity as well as the concept of 'hybridity' by Homi Bhabha are helpful in this regard. We learn of the complexity of the ethnic identities of the 'other', but also of 'self'. Analyses in later chapters will further underscore that the greater the literary intent to emphasize *difference* ironically deconstruct to illumine points of *sameness*. Second, the interconnection of postcoloniality and stereotyping helps consolidate explorations into the power/knowledge base between those doing the stereotyping and those being stereotyped. A mutual relationship exists between the two parties with one certainly reaping the benefits. Sometimes, the benefit of power derives in part from the unwitting collusion of those being stereotyped who embrace the identity of their stereotypic re-presentation. Finally, the mutual collaboration of postcoloniality and stereotyping decolonizes the historical imagination. In other words, it makes real and viable the narratives and contributions of other ethnic groups in the larger national myth that had been excluded. In the case of the national myth of the US, it exposes the illusion of the story of the US as bound up inextricably with Euro-Americans. It reveals what the illusion conceals, namely the seedy underside to a story that has bequeathed certain inalienable privileges to just one ethnic group over its history though the tapestry of that history was woven with the rich traditions of many ethnic groups.

Two parts divide the contents of this book. Part 1 establishes a theoretical and contextual place from which to read. Chapter 1 introduces the reader to the theory of post-colonialism, its interface with biblical studies,

and its relation to the politics of re-presentation. It also illumines those jargonistic terms like post-colonialism, hybridity, mimicry, and 'self'/'other', that subsequent chapters in part two will utilize in their analyses. Chapter 2 posits an ideal social location where the re-presentation of 'others' by 'Israel' through textualization could take place by identifying certain requisite conditions. The point of this chapter is *not* to argue for a specific historical context for the production of the primary history based solely on historical critical grounds.

Part 2 comprises four chapters, discrete, though conceptually related, presenting a reading from each place with marginalized ethnic groups across the temporal span of liminality paired together by their stereotyped identity. With each chapter, the 'other(s)' of Hebrew literature—the Edomites, Moabites, Ammonites, and Samari(t)ans—occupy centre stage to have a voice (through their subaltern pairing from the modern era) squelched in an ancient context of colonization. The 'others' must have their voice since the ethnic identity of 'Israel' (1) is shaped in part over against the identity construction of the 'other' and (2) shares a cultural relationship to that of its other, ethnic kin. Not to provide them a voice only perpetuates a power dynamic wherein certain ethnic groups naturally enjoy certain rights and privileges surreptitiously withheld from others on the basis of their re-presentation. Each chapter begins by introducing the Palestinian 'others' of fifth-century BCE Yehud by means of a composite portrait, including a brief history and literary representation within the primary history. Admittedly, mapping out a composite portrait of each group is not without its limitations. First, we have no extant literature from the Edomites, Moabites, Ammonites, or Samari(t)ans of that era to shed considerable insight into their culture, social life, or self-identity. Thus we have to make use of the data mediated through the literary evidence of the surrounding cultures, including that of the biblical texts. A truly historical portrait of either of these groups thus becomes impossible even for ideological reasons, but to no dismay since this study's ultimate focus is on their re-presentation. Second, the paucity of data we do have on each of these groups inevitably results in some significant gaps within and, therefore, an incompleteness of their portrait. Third, even though we must use the biblical texts in the creation of the composite portrait of each of these groups (an acknowledged risk given the questionable historical reliability of these texts), the information gleaned ultimately concerns the re-presentation of these groups (not the historicity of events described) therein since these texts shape and, in turn, are shaped by perceptions of the 'other'. The cultural interactions between ethnic groups in a colonization context of conflict would especially be most acute. The exploration into the literary representation of each ethnicity within the primary history relies on

the collection of texts comprising what I call the ethnic myth. It is within the ethnic myth of each group that perceptions, biases, and, especially, stereotypes become most palpable. Finally, each chapter inquires into the temporal liminality of a particular group vis-à-vis their stereotypic representations, including analysis of a select conquest/occupation text (part of the ethnic myth) from the book of Judges with the notable exception of 1 Kings 11-14 for the Samari(t)ans.

Chapter 3 explores the 'savage' stereotype in Judges 1 as an ethno-typing strategy in the colonization of Edomites and Native Americans. Under the guise of order and civilization the modern colonizer 'Israel' appropriates land that ancient 'Israel' can only rhetorically claim. The burden assumed by the colonizer to establish civilization, specifically *their* civilization, simultaneously disregards the means to its alternative objective, namely to exterminate savagism. Re-membering the colonizer's 'forgotten' history reveals its uncivilized nature shared in common with the colonized, though the emphasis should not be placed on the savagism-civilization binary but rather *different* civilizations.

Chapter 4 analyzes the ethnocentric humour of Judges 3 and the 'stupid' stereotype directed at Moabites, and later Mexicans. Again, land rights assumed by 'Israel' factor into the interethnic dynamic. In both ancient and modern contexts 'Israel' assumes its own indigenization within the land, and it assumes an authority over said land by projecting its undesirable traits onto the natives to demonstrate their innate superiority over the inferior natives too incompetent to govern. Projection only displaces, never eliminates, as reinforced by the gaze of the colonized who, as the alter identity of the colonizer, reflects back that stereotype. The struggle for the 'other(s)' in reality rests with forging its own distinctive identity contra the stereotyped identity imposed upon them from without.

Chapter 5 focuses on the liminal nature of symbolic *Gam Saan* ('Gold Mountain') where the potential reward offered there outweighed the un/seen perils that 'pulled' Chinese and 'Israel' alike. Close examination of the 'deceitful opportunist' stereotype in the Jephthah narrative of Judges will reveal differences between Ammon and 'Israel' as *constructed* with the latter's aggressive, land-grabbing, opportunism projected onto the 'other'. The 'deceitful opportunist' stereotype facilitates the intent of these *constructed* differences to distinguish Ammonite and Chinese from 'Israel'. Though both colonizer and colonized felt the 'push/pull' effect of economic rewards in their own 'Gam Saan', only the life-experiences of the Chinese dogged by un/seen perils of social discrimination, physical violence, and cultural representations left the ideal of *Gam Saan* as somewhat less than.

Chapter 6 traces the resistance efforts by Samari(t)ans (akin to geo-political Israel) and African Americans, both of whom shared in the

religious tradition of and ethno-typed as 'rebellious' by their colonizers. Dangers to society, both groups are subjugated within a neo-colonizing institution of slavery that dehumanized them to an identity of mere physical labour. Their value for what they could contribute culturally extended only as far as the economic benefits derived from their labour. The means to resist within such a system were limited, circumscribed by a system itself that tagged such efforts as 'rebellious' all the while diverting attention from the dangers and violence inculcated by such a system. Nevertheless, African Americans creatively employed the religious texts used against them to sanction their marginalized identity and status as a means of resistance in a manner perhaps not unlike that of the Samari(t)ans whose resistance is never fully articulated. In an ironic twist of the typology, the oppressed 'other' yearned for its own Exodus from the 'Promised Land' of 'Egypt' and the tyrannical pharaohs of 'Israel'.

What's past may be prologue but never stays there, and neither shall we. Now to the task of broadening our sphere of concern to allow the 'other' a voice denied in their own identity construct and to decolonize their (mis)re-presentation in history.

Part I

A PLACE FROM WHICH TO READ

POSTCOLONIALISM AND THE POLITICS OF RE-PRESENTATION

They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented.

—Karl Marx

Post-liberal, post-conservative. Post-nuclear, post-holocaust. Post-nuptial, post-mortem. Post-partum, post-menopausal. Post-industrial, post-capitalist. Post-traumatic (stress disorder), post-op(erative). Post-natal, post-nasal. Post-baccalaureate, post-graduate. Post-cold war, post-national. Post-civil rights, post-racial. Post-age, post-al. Post-millennial, post-apocalyptic. Post-critical, post-modern. We live in a *post-* world. Add to the list 'post-colonial', which has yet to enter the functional discourse of mainstream American society with any appreciative value. In fact, mention the terms 'colonial' or 'colonialism' and your average American knows exactly what those mean. 'Oh, yeah, 1776...George Washington...Paul Revere...13 colonies...pilgrims...American Revolution (maybe)...Declaration of Independence...' Of course, such a response reflects little about the insidious nature of colonization/colonialism and much about a particular nostalgic perspective of American history. Two interrelated aspects, or sides of the same coin if you will, surface with such a response: (1) lack of knowledge of the other side of colonialism repressed in favor of (2) a knowledge of certain nostalgic aspects. Together, both work toward the erasure of narratives of the 'other' ethnic groups and their contributions to the American story where only that of the distinctly white, Eurocentric perspective predominates. Never will one hear of the contributions of the Indians, Mexicans, Asians, or Africans when asked to recount the American story, hence their absence. The American story as constructed represses these voices as 'other' just as does that of 'Israel' though the presence in absence of the Edomites, Ammonites, Moabites, and Samari(t)ans contributes as much to the identity of 'Israel' as does that of the Mexicans, Indians, Asians, and Africans to the identity of American, however white-(washed). In the modern world past imperialism and present globalization has victimized the ethnic and racial minorities of Native Americans, Hispanic Americans, Asian Americans, and African Americans in the US. As a byproduct of this victimization, these groups were never allowed to represent themselves; hence, they must

be represented. And they were represented by the dominant First World element of Eurocentrism. Postcolonialism seeks to restore these repressed voices and narratives of the 'other'. It redresses the imbalance of power relations by exploring how one ethnic group comes to wield power within the infrastructure of a society such that it seems natural. Does this particular ethnic group come to this position of power by means of innate superiority? Military might? Economic sanctions? And just how does the attitude of entitlement and authority gain a foothold such that it spans the socio-economic stratum of a dominant ethnic group from its elite members to its lower classes? A number of factors converge within the process of colonization, not least of which would be the seemingly innocuous politics of re-presentation facilitating the process. The politics of re-presentation assumes various modes but each with the same telos—the displacement of 'other' ethnic groups by one particular ethnic group with aspirations to power and authority. Before exploring the politics of re-presentation, this Chapter foregrounds 'postcolonialism' (its history, concerns, and strategies), the various concepts integral to it, and its interface with biblical studies, most especially the Deuteronomic History (DH). The second section discusses the politics of representation, itself a feature of the colonization process, the functions of stereotypes as a mode of re-presentation, and their role in defining ethnicity, most especially, again, within the DH.

Postcolonial Theory

Orientation to Postcolonialism

What is 'postcolonialism?' Any discussion of just what 'postcolonialism' is and, relatedly, what constitutes postcolonial theory—its concerns, focus, strategies, etc.—should begin with the beginning. An entirely ambiguous statement, I know—but which beginning? How should we define 'postcolonialism'? As a critical theory? A disciplinary study? I wish to begin with social location since 'postcolonialism' as a mode of inquiry has cultural contexts for its focal concern (for a critical synthesis and treatment of postcolonial studies, see Moore-Gilbert 1997 and Young 1990). The postcolonial condition, and hence 'postcolonialism', is rooted within the onset of colonial occupation, an act not simply modern but transcends the space of modernity. Nonetheless, colonization basically divided the modern world between West and the East. The expansion of European empires in the nineteenth century which resulted in nine-tenths of the entire land surface of the globe being controlled by 'European, or European-derived powers' made this broad division fairly obvious. To legitimize colonial and imperial rule, the European powers concocted anthropological theories that 'increasingly

portrayed the peoples of the colonized world as inferior, childlike, or feminine, incapable of looking after themselves...and requiring the paternal rule of the west for their own best interests' (Young 2003: 2), and they had their Bible. For the colonized what resulted (and still does to this day) from colonization besides the obvious denial of self-government and their continual re-presentation as inferior was an inequitable and disproportionate distribution of material goods that benefited the colonizer alone. Here within such a cultural location lay the roots of postcolonialism.

As a discourse of resistance postcolonialism emerged in the former colonies of Western empires and well preceded postcolonialism as a critical practice or a disciplinary study. The writings of the Trinidadian C.L.R. James, the Martiniquan Aimé Césaire, Amílcar Cabral, the Sri Lankan Ananda Coomaraswamy, the Martiniquan Frantz Fanon, and the Tunisian Albert Memmi were blatantly anti-colonial. Their writings emerged from outside the academy but received acceptance by the academy later as postcolonialism began to gain momentum.¹ *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961) by Frantz Fanon became 'the bible of decolonization' that would inspire 'many different kinds of struggle against domination and oppression across the world' (Young 2003: 123). Though postcolonial thinking had been going on for decades, the publication of *Orientalism* (1978) by Edward Said paved the way for postcolonialism as a discipline of study within the US academy, and often gets credited as the origin of postcolonialism.² What

1. R.S. Sugirtharajah's (2001: 248-50) survey of postcolonial thought identifies three strands of postcolonial resistance in these writings: invasion and control, recovery of the cultural soul, and mutual interdependence and transformation. The first strand, reflected in the works of James, Césaire, and Coomaraswamy, sought to expose colonial control and domination for the purpose of independence. The second strand concerns the recovery of the cultural soul from the grip of the master and generally takes two directions: recouping the essence of the native soul (e.g. the work of Coomaraswamy) and exposing the speciousness of the master's claims to superiority (e.g. the works of Fanon and Memmi). The third strand, reflected in the work of Homi Bhabha, emphasizes the construction of identity based on the intertwined histories of the colonizer and the colonized. In contrast to Edward Said, who concentrates almost entirely on the colonizer, and Fanon, who concentrates almost entirely on the colonized, Bhabha regards the relationship between colonizer and colonized as more complex, nuanced, and politically fraught (Moore-Gilbert 1997: 116).

2. In spite of the recognition heaped upon Said, his monumental work *Orientalism* has not escaped its fair share of criticism. Michael Pickering (2001: 152-54) shares his own concerns including, first, Said's apparent assumption of a single, homogeneous colonial discourse despite his awareness of the flexibility and diversity of Orientalist strategy and, second, Said's presentation of Western discourse about the Orient as historically unified and seamless. Even Robert Young (1995: 127) observes Said 'repeating the very structures that he censures'.

Said had accomplished that his predecessors had not was to demonstrate the relation between the production of academic knowledge and colonialism. The term 'Orientalism', which he coined, had a variety of referents, not least of which were a field of specialization or academic pursuit of the Orient and conceivable means of representing the non-Western world by the Westerner. But Said (1978, 3) principally used the term as a Western way of 'dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient'. As Leela Gandhi (1998: 76) describes it, 'Orientalism' refers to an 'enormous system or inter-textual network of rules and procedures which regulate anything that may be thought, written or imagined about the Orient'. The work of Said came to be a source of inspiration for two other theorists Gayatri C. Spivak³ and Homi Bhabha who had never set out to be postcolonial in their writings and rarely engaged the work of the other in any detailed manner (see a full comparison of the emphases of these two in Moore–Gilbert 2005: 451–66). Yet, they were nonetheless exalted by the academy to the status of founders of postcolonialism constituting, along with Said, 'the Holy Trinity' of postcolonial critics (Young 1995: 163).

That the term 'postcolonialism', or any of its variants ('postcolonial', 'postcoloniality'), enshrouded in vagueness (it did after all emerge from the ranks of postmodernism), should become the center of dispute, especially within the US academy, comes as no surprise. The first volume of *Postcolonial Studies: Culture, Politics, Economy* (1998: 8) described postcolonialism as 'undeniably and necessarily vague, a gesture rather than a demarcation, [and] points not towards a new knowledge, but rather towards an examination and critique of knowledges'. Basically, dispute over the term boils down to whether or not the term should be used with a hyphen, though admittedly it concerns more than just a matter of simple grammar. It does have to do with how one perceives postcolonial criticism to take place and under what circumstances. Some critics contend that the term should be used with a hyphen, 'post-colonialism', thus indicating a decisive temporal marker denoting a historical period after colonialism. The usage of the term in the early 1970s in political theory denoted the status of nations after having thrown off the yoke of European empires after World War II. Obviously, the assumed linear view of history (pre-colonialism → colonialism → post-colonialism) with this proposal raises numerous questions in its wake. In

3. Spivak's focus upon the subaltern in her article "Can the Subaltern Speak?" (1988a: 66–111) had the most impact upon postcolonial studies. She responds to her question by concluding with a resounding 'No!'—not quite the hopeful response anticipated for a postcolonial critic. She contends that there is 'no space' (103) from which subalterns can 'speak'. Her concern with this seemingly short-circuiting response, however, has to do with the agency of the subaltern, a matter to be discussed shortly.

what sense is colonialism to be understood as over? What about the colonial is over, and for whom? Perhaps the most vociferous criticism of this hyphenated form comes from Anne McClintock (1992: 85) who sees in the usage of this term ‘a widespread, epochal crisis in the idea of linear, historical “progress”’. Not only does the term fail to adequately account for all experiences of the colonized, it also fails to theorize the dynamics of ‘US power around the globe’ (90). Other critics contend that the term ‘postcolonialism’ should be unbroken to signify sensitivity to the long history and ongoing consequences of colonialism. Additionally, it signifies ‘a reactive resistance discourse of the colonized who critically interrogate dominant knowledge systems in order to recover the past from the Western slander and misinformation of the colonial period, and who also continue to interrogate neo-colonizing tendencies after the declaration of independence’ (Sugirtharajah 2002a: 13).

This issue of how to understand the term ‘postcolonialism’ (with or without the hyphen) and its concerns are not simply a matter relegated to the Third World with no relation whatsoever to the US. Edited volumes by C. Richard King (*Post-colonial America*, 2000) and Amritjit Singh and Peter Schmidt (*Postcolonial Theory and the United States*, 2000) are but a representative sampling of a growing number of recent studies exploring ‘postcolonialism’ and the US and the question, Is the US ‘postcolonial’?⁴ Answers to that question diverge and, perhaps unsurprisingly, in direct proportion to understanding the term ‘postcolonialism’. Jenny Sharpe (2000) finds the term ‘postcolonial’ applicable only to the experience of internal colonization of ethnic minorities in the nineteenth century. The postcolonial condition as racial exclusion explains the past history of internal colonization but fails to account for the present status of the US as a neocolonial power. She instead proposes an understanding of postcolonial as the intersection of internal social relations ‘with global capitalism and the international division of labor’ (106). Jon Stratton (2000) engages the discussion to affirm the US as postcolonial, but along the lines as defined by Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin (1989: 2)—‘all the culture affected by the imperial process from the moment of colonization to the present day’. The key to that which divides the respondents to the question ‘Is the US postcolonial?’ between those with a resounding ‘No!’ (e.g. McClintock and Aijaz Ahmad) from those with a resounding ‘Yes!’ (e.g. Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin) lies in

4. McClintock’s eye opening, barrage of facts attests to some connection of the US with this larger discussion of colonialism. Less angry in tenor, Ruth Frankenberg and Lata Mani’s (1993: 292-310) inquisitive exploration demurs the possible location of the US as ‘postcolonial’ opting instead for the term ‘post-Civil Rights’ as informed by their nationalist perspective guiding the discussion.

the object of their interest. For the naysayers, the concern is more with 'economic structures and effects and those institutions, power effects, and systems of domination associated with them' (Stratton 2000: 54), or, in other words, the ending of colonial rule, hence their objection to the term 'post-colonial'. The other group, however, employs the term to cover all the culture affected by the imperial process. In some respects, both camps essentially argue both sides of the same coin in that neither would consider the effects of colonialism within the US over though the specificities of their arguments lay in their view of the *terminus a quo* of the term 'post-colonialism'.⁵ In addition, those who eschew the term 'post-colonialism' (with hyphen) tend too much toward a minimalist perspective. By broadening the perspective on 'postcolonialism' (without hyphen) beyond that of simple nationalism and the hang-up elicited by the hyphen, which we must do, we can then begin to explore the consequences of colonialism in the US along racial and ethnic lines. Throughout this study I will be using the unbroken term 'postcolonialism' because it best suits the nature of inquiry into the effects of colonialism within the particular historical periods under investigation though they may not themselves be understood narrowly as 'post-colonial'.

Before attending to the focus and strategies of postcolonial critique, a few terms relative to colonialism/postcolonialism need brief clarification (for a thorough description, consult Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 2000: 45-51, 122-27, 162-63). *Colonialism*, or *colonization*, refers to the direct appropriation and settlement of territory. Said (1993: 8) defines it as the 'implanting of settlements on distant territory', but it also implies the control and 'civilization' of indigenous peoples including the exploitation of the resources and labor of the colonized. Colonization is usually a consequence of *imperialism*, which means the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan centre ruling a distant territory' (Sugirtharajah 2002a: 24). Implying 'empire', imperialism indicates the exercise of control of one nation-state over another for the benefit of the imperial government. It is

5. Both Ahmad and McClintock assert the periodization of the postcolonial in the US relative to the effects of post-World War II global capitalism on the independence of those countries previously colonized. McClintock (1992: 87) criticizes Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin for deciding 'that the term 'postcolonialism' should not be understood as everything that has happened *since* European colonialism, but rather everything that has happened from the very beginning of colonialism, which means turning back the clocks and unrolling the maps of "postcolonialism" to 1492, and earlier'. Her critique, notes Stratton (2000: 52-53), rests on two points: (1) the independence of those countries colonized should be the historical referent for the term *postcolonial*; and (2) the tendency of homogenizing the complexities and divergences in the economic and cultural practices within post-independence contexts under one rubric.

this kind of colonization that netted Victorian Britain and other European powers control over 85 percent of the earth in the nineteenth century. *Internal colonization* is a matter where the ruling part of a country treats another part of the country, region, or ethnic groups as they might a foreign colony. *Neocolonialism*, literally 'new colonialism', generally refers to forms of control over ex-colonies. In some instances, neocolonialism may materialize in the form of new elites in power, trained by and representing the colonialist powers as their agents or it may be a matter of ex-colonial powers or emerging superpowers exercising some control over the economic market of the recently independent colony. More difficult to detect and resist, neocolonialism is much more insidious than covert colonialism.

So, just what is postcolonial theory about? In the first place, some critics would object to the term 'theory' claiming 'postcolonial theory is not in fact a theory in the scientific sense'.⁶ And it is not; it is essentially a style of inquiry that follows no 'coherently elaborated set of principles' (Young 2003: 6; see also Sugirtharajah 2002a: 13-14 who prefers the term 'criticism'). The critical procedure of postcolonialism bears no homogeneity but rather is an amalgam of interdisciplinary procedures ranging from the unfashionable form criticism to radical socialism, feminism, and environmentalism. By exploring the relations of harmony and conflict between peoples and cultures, postcolonialism seeks to produce new knowledge to unsettle firmly entrenched positions and to change the way people think and behave. It probes injustices seeking to effect equitable relations between different peoples and to improve the lives of the marginalized since it regards the same material and cultural well being as the right of all people on this earth. 'It dwells upon the ambivalences of meaning and dissonances of identification...it writes back against the grain of colonial discourse, in order to articulate alternative identities amidst the legacies of the imperialist past' (Pickering 2001: 169). What colonialism has done (produced difference with a world of inequality), postcolonialism seeks to undo.

6. A divide does exist within the discipline of postcolonial studies between a preference for either postcolonial criticism or postcolonial theory. Bart Moore-Gilbert addresses this divide with almost one-third of his book *Postcolonial Theory* (1997). His principal focus with the divide is to engage arguments adduced against postcolonial theory by, namely Ahmad in his *In Theory* (1992). Moore-Gilbert identifies five principal arguments as grist for his lengthy riposte. Those arguments against postcolonial theory, which I will only list here, are: (1) its complicity in 'the disposition and operations of the current, neo-colonial world order' (1997: 152-56); (2) its 'exclusive attention to colonial discourse as the privileged object of analysis', thus reinscribing Western cultural authority (156-58); (3) its 'modes of cultural analysis on which it draws are deeply Eurocentric' (158-66); (4) its style and language (166-68); and (5) its 'insufficient engagement with questions of class and gender' (168-69).

As a mode of inquiry, postcolonialism has as one of its objects history. Why? Because the dominant culture decides the history—e.g. what events get in/excluded, how it will be interpreted, who is the victor. In addition to the violence of institutional uses of force and coercion, colonialism also instituted the violence of history with its hierarchies of subjects and knowledges (e.g. colonizer/colonized, Occident/Orient, ‘us’/‘them’) that attempt to negate or erase the cultural value of the non-West. The critique of history by postcolonialism becomes ‘a theoretical resistance to the mystifying amnesia of the colonial aftermath’ (Gandhi 1998: 4). It revisits, remembers, and interrogates the colonial past. As a disciplinary project, postcolonialism raises numerous questions, some of which Gloria Anzaldúa asks:

Who has the voice? Who says these are rules? Who makes the law?
And if you're not part of making the laws and rules and the theories,
what part do you play?...What reality does this disciplinary field, or
this government, or this system try to crush? What reality is it trying
to erase? What reality is it trying to suppress? (Lunsford 1999: 62)

The critical inquiry of history jogs the memory, which bridges colonialism and the question of cultural identity (Gandhi 1998: 6). Commenting on this critical act of remembering, Bhabha (1994: 90) describes it as ‘a painful re-membering, a putting together of the dismembered past to make sense of the trauma of the present’. Hence postcolonialism’s retrieval of the colonial past can also possess a therapeutic benefit (see further discussion in Gandhi 1998: 5).

Perhaps it is only fitting that postcolonialism as a disciplinary study within academia should take place within academia since academia, the ‘institutional knowledge corporation’ (Young 2003: 18), has perpetuated and sanctioned the system of knowledge in the West constructed by writing. If engaged in properly, such critical inquiry can be an effective means of the academy policing its own colonial tendencies. Be that as it may, we must consider the after-effects of colonialism when these written texts, which concretize ‘official’ history, gain the status of sacredness and get consumed by colonized/r alike. As we shall see in later analyses, the colonialists with Bible in hand found divine justification in their entitlements to colonization. Said (1983: 4) calls to mind, however, a point worthy of consideration even with regard to texts deemed sacred: ‘texts are worldly, to some degree they are events, and, even when they appear to deny it, they are nevertheless a part of the social world, human life, and of course the historical moments in which they are located and interpreted’. Said develops this point much further later in *Culture and Imperialism* (1993) where he argues that great texts or ‘masterpieces’, which would include

the Bible, encode the greatest pressures and preoccupations of the world around them. The growing convergence of postcolonial and biblical studies progressively discloses awareness of the Bible as a reflection of the colonial spirit linking culture and imperialism. Thus texts become the space within which the postcolonial struggle to give voice to subaltern narrative histories takes place.

Texts must become the space for this struggle since the narration of 'official' history representing the interests of the ruling classes has, in part, decided the battle over land, who owns it and controls it, who has the right to settle it and work on it (Said 1993: xii-xiii). 'Landlessness' marks a significant issue experienced every day by ordinary people in colonized countries and, as a concept, 'implies a person who has become landless, exiled from their land' (Young 2003: 51). The conflict over ownership and possession of land extends beyond just that of peoples to that of epistemologies/ideologies. For example, the Europeans certainly had a much different notion of their relationship to land and its possession than did the Native Americans. In addition, the experience of dispossession and landlessness also brings with it a crisis of identity since, for many peoples, ethnicity is inextricably bound up with land. Though many today still feel the effects of colonialism living in an 'impoverished landless limbo' due to the appropriation of land, typical of settler colonialism, from their ancestors to create vast farms and estates, the problem of landlessness temporally and spatially connect the marginalized. Whether African American or Samari(t)ans, Native American or Edomite, Latin American or Moabite, or Asian American or Ammonite, those who were once victims of imperialism/colonization and now currently victims of globalization, postcolonial theory offers a space for these subaltern groups always represented in modernity by the dominant First World (Sugirtharajah 2001: 247, 250). Landlessness, textuality, and history intertwine as postcoloniality engages 'the erasure of certain histories, the erasure of ideas, the erasure of voices, the erasure of languages, the erasure of books' (Lunsford 1999: 62) and, I would add, the erasure of ethnic identity to protest the major knowledge system of the West in behalf of the deterritorialized. As an iconic symbol merging landlessness, textuality, and history, the Bible played (and still plays) a complicit role in the process of deterritorialization, including the erasure of ethnic identity, with its neo-colonizing tendencies continuing to exert influence. Texts become the mode of re-presentation reifying the partial presence of 'self' and 'other' constructed by colonial discourse. Before discussing the interdisciplinarity of postcolonialism and biblical studies and how the Bible facilitate(s) colonialism, however, it will be important to explain a few postcolonial concepts integral to analyses in later Chapters.

*Postcolonial Concepts**Decolonization*

The ultimate goal of all postcolonial activity, including that of this study, decolonization is a process that reveals and dismantles colonialist power in all its forms. That would necessarily include any covert aspects of those institutional and cultural forces that ensured colonialist power and that remained well after the achievement of political independence for a colony. Contrary to popular assumptions, political independence does not entail immediate liberation of the colonized from all colonialist values deeply ingrained within the political, economic, and cultural structures of the colony. Colonial influence lingers, hence the process of decolonization as a complex and continual one.

The program of decolonization can assume a variety of forms, the most extreme being nativism—the return of pre-colonial cultures to their pristine form. Most programs of decolonization, however, are much less extreme in that they advocate ‘a return to indigenous language use’ in an effort ‘to democratize culture and a programme of cultural recuperation and re-evaluation’ (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 2000: 65). Such efforts clearly stand over and against the ongoing influence of Eurocentrism that had privileged anything and everything colonial over that of the indigenous from language to writing.

Subaltern

Coined by Antonio Gramsci, the term ‘subaltern’, meaning ‘of inferior rank’, refers to those subordinated social classes subject to the hegemony of the ruling classes. Anyone denied access to hegemonic power comprised the subaltern class diverse in makeup. Gramsci focused his concern with the subaltern class on their history, which was just as complex as that of the ruling classes though tending to be episodic and fragmentary in nature. Because the history of the ruling classes was realized in the state, theirs became the ‘official history’. Denied access to power, the subaltern class additionally had less access to the means whereby to control their own representation.

In the early 1980s a group of historians formed the Subaltern Studies group with subalterneity their focus. They sought to redress the imbalance created by the focus of academia on the elites and elite cultures whose historiography naturally omitted the perspectives of the subaltern groups. In their five published volumes of *Subaltern Studies*, they used the term ‘subaltern’ ‘as a name for the general attribute of subordination in South Asian society whether this is expressed in terms of class, caste, age, gender

and office or in any other way' (Guha 1982: vii). The group's assumptions received criticism initially with the question, *Can the Subaltern Speak?* by Spivak (Gandhi 1998: 59-60). Can postcolonialism be ethically professed only from within allegedly 'postcolonial' locations? But then who decides what counts as a legitimate 'postcolonial' location, and on what basis? Is it possible to disseminate marginalized knowledges without monumentalizing the condition(s) of marginality? Can one speak about that which lies beyond their realm of experience?⁷ Can a white intellectual profess a valid interest in non-white communities? Such questions reflect an interpretation of the conclusion by Spivak that 'the subaltern cannot speak' at face value. Spivak has sometimes been taken to mean that oppressed or politically marginalized groups cannot voice their resistance, or that the subaltern has only the language or voice of the dominant classes in which to be heard. Her point, however, was that 'no act of dissent or resistance occurs on behalf of an essential subaltern subject entirely separate from the dominant discourse that provides the language and the conceptual categories with which the subaltern voice speaks' (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 2000: 219). In other words, the subaltern voice cannot be isolated from the contextualized discourses and institutions giving it its voice. In postcolonial discourse the dominant voice gets appropriated so that the voice of the marginalized can be heard. The subaltern will always have a sympathetic friend in postcolonialism. Eschewing the high culture of the elite, postcolonialism regards subaltern cultures and knowledges as 'rich repositories of culture and counter-knowledge'. Postcolonial analysis begins with the subaltern perspective 'where its priorities always remain' (Young 2003: 114).⁸

Other/other

Generally speaking, the 'other' is that which is separate from and not 'self'. 'To exist is to be called into being in relation to an Otherness' (Bhabha 1994: 63). The identity of self depends on the existence of its binary opposite 'other'. Only in contradistinction to the difference of the 'other' can self construct its own identity. In addition, the presence of the 'other' enables the definition of just what constitutes normalcy. But who decides what is

7. Gandhi (1998: 61) notes that when such a perspective is taken to the extreme, 'the unilateral privileging of experience over theory...works to disqualify or debar the social validity of almost all intellectual activity'.

8. Young's *Postcolonialism* (2003) reflects a unique approach to the discussion unlike so many other books on the subject. Rather than elaborating on the theory in abstract terms, he begins with a 'from-below' perspective exploring a politics of the subaltern and from there developing ideas on postcolonialism.

normal? The perspective on cultural normalcy always gets refracted through the lenses of the ruling centre, which, in the colonial context, always represents the colonized subject, or subaltern groups, as 'other'.

The definition of the 'other' in postcolonial theory derives most notably from the work of the psychoanalyst and cultural theorist Jacques Lacan who, furthermore, draws a distinction between 'Other' and 'other'. Only Spivak remains faithful to this Lacanian distinction in her analyses. The 'other' refers to the excluded, mastered subject created and maintained by the discourse of power that may make use of, but is certainly not limited to, the re-presentational language of stereotypes. It designates the other who resembles the self much as when a child (self) looking in a mirror discovers and becomes aware of its semblance (other). The identity of the colonized as 'other' rests on their difference from the identity of the colonizer as self. But otherness is a relativistic category drawn between 'near neighbors', or the 'proximate other'. Rarely ever has the 'other' been an object of indifference. Rather, the difference of otherness, an object of desire as well as an object of repulsion, justifies a variety of ideological positions including xenophobia and exoticism, military conquest and colonialism (Smith 1985: 15-16). In classical ethnography, the 'other', the barbarian who speaks unintelligibly, does not speak as we will see in the ethnic myths of the biblical texts in later Chapters.

The Other (with capital-o) designates the symbolic focus of desire or power in relation to which the subject is created. Not a real interlocutor but perhaps embodied in subjects, the Other becomes absolutely essential for the subject who gains its identity in the gaze of the Other. When compared to imperial or colonial discourse, the Other provides the language whereby the colonized subject gains a sense of his/her identity as 'other', and it becomes the ideological framework wherein the colonized subject may come to understand the world. Nonetheless, that identification is essentially 'the production of an image of identity and the transformation of the subject in assuming that image' (Bhabha 1994: 64). The construction of the dominant imperial *Other* occurs in the same dialectical process, termed as 'othering' by Spivak (see detailed treatment of the dialectical process of 'othering' as well as the distinctions between Other and 'other' in Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 2000: 169-73), by which the colonial *others* come into existence.

The constructed difference of otherness keeps the gaze of the colonizer fixed upon the problem of alterity. But the real problematic emerges when the 'other' is 'TOO-MUCH-LIKE-US, or when he claims to BE-US' (Smith 1985: 47). In the same vein as Bhabha's notion of constructed difference, Anzaldúa calls for a disruption of the binary oppositions of *nos/otras*—subject/other, dominance/subordination, us/them—claiming that the other

does not exist ‘out there’, but is rather within (Lunsford 1999: 51-52). The real problem of the ‘other’ is similarity, sometimes even of identity. Thus, ‘a “theory of the other” is but another way of phrasing a “theory of the self”’ (Smith 1985: 47).

Hybridity

Probably no other concept in postcolonial theory gets as much circulation and receives as much criticism as does ‘hybridity’,⁹ known alternatively as syncreticity, synergy, or transculturation (a term invented in Cuba). Theorists borrowed the term from horticulture where it refers to the crossbreeding of two species by grafting or cross-pollination to form a third ‘hybrid’ species. The term is most generally associated with the work of Bhabha for whom it refers to the creation of a cultural identity within the ‘in-between’ space, the liminal, the border, the threshold, or the contact zone created by colonization. Hybridity can occur in a variety of settings—‘post-colonial societies as a result of conscious moments of cultural suppression’, settler-invaders dispossessing indigenous peoples and forcing them to assimilate to new social patterns, or ‘patterns of immigration from metropolitan societies’ that ‘continue to produce complex cultural palimpsests with the post-colonized world’ (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 2007: 137)—and can assume a variety of forms (e.g. linguistic, cultural, political, racial).

The emphasis upon hybridity by Bhabha is upon the cultural form. On one level, the hybridity of cultures refers to the mixedness or ‘impurity’ of cultures.¹⁰ Miscegenation (Latin American *mestizaje*), the racial form of

9. One critique maintains that the assumed mutuality between the colonizer/d by Bhabha in the process of colonization downplays oppositionality which hybridity presumes (Parry 1987). But Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin (2000: 119) counter that nothing about the idea of hybridity suggests that mutuality in colonialism ‘negates the hierarchical nature of the imperial process or that it involves the idea of an *equal exchange*’. A second critique contends that the shared postcolonial condition of hybridity, viewed as part of a discourse analysis that tends to de-historicize and de-locate cultures from their temporal, spatial, geographical and linguistic contexts, ‘leads to an abstract, globalized concept of the textual that obscures the specificities of particular cultural situations’ (119-20).

10. Nineteenth-century racial theories regarded racial hybridization, a form of cultural fusion, as a process of degeneration. It threatened to undo the whole progressive paradigm of Western civilization. While the diasporic narrative of the Indo-European family became a means to invest European imperial expansion with the status of natural law, its simultaneous story of linguistic and racial in-mixing ‘also implicitly foretold the corruption, decadence and degeneration of European imperial civilization’ (Young 1995: 178).

hybridity, results in a double consciousness. On another level, the hybridity of cultures refers to the fact that cultures are always in contact with each other, which leads to a cultural mixedness, a reality further facilitated by globalization. No culture is a discrete phenomenon. The power of national narratives lies in the presumption of fixing the identity of the people. The idea of a unified nation of pure origins is appealing, but the reality of hybridity belies claims to a hierarchical 'purity' of cultures as untenable (Bhabha 1994: 37-38). Post-colonialism reflects the heterogeneous identity of a nation with colonizer and colonized alike possessing a hybrid identity. Cultural meaning takes place within the 'liminal' space of settled cultural forms or identities—like self and other.¹¹

The significance of hybridity in postcolonial studies is not simply to reverse cultural values of self and other, or to demonstrate the colonizer as actually being morally inferior. Such a simple task that virtually exchanges one set of problems for another would not effect any real change in circumstances. Rather, the concept of hybridity helps us to look at modernity through the eyes of the colonized (Huddart 2006: 8). We begin to see the connections between the past and contemporary cultural discourse. Sameness and difference are not quite as tidy as our self-assured definitions of 'self' and 'other' would leave us believe. Young (1995: 26) puts it this way, 'Hybridity thus makes difference into sameness, and sameness into difference, but in a way that makes the same no longer the same, the different no longer simply different'. Without noticing the differences within the past, we become unaware of how much that otherness both formed and continues to secretly inform our present. Awareness of the double consciousness within can, moreover, enable 'conversation between parties who respect the differences that separate them, because they acknowledge stubborn differences that fissure their own identities' (Sommer 2005: 176).

Ambivalence/Mimicry

Taken from psychoanalytic theory, the concept 'ambivalence' describes a constant, but simultaneous, vacillation between a simultaneous attraction to something yet repulsion by it. Ambivalence captures the complexity of the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized in colonial discourse theory. The colonized does not simply or completely stand in opposition to the colonizer; rather the colonized may be both complicit and

11. Although the position of Bhabha tends to get dismissed as idealistic and unrealistic because he tends to focus on signification rather than physical locations, he does also speak of the location of culture, which is both spatial and temporal (Huddart 2006: 6-7).

resistant. But how is the colonized subject complicit? Something about the colonizer always appeals to the colonized. Fanon (1961: 30) illustrates, 'When their glances meet he [the settler] ascertains bitterly, always on the defensive, 'They want to take our place'. It is true for there is no native who does not dream at least once a day of setting himself up in the settler's place'.

In this relationship between the colonizer and colonized, ambivalence extends to discourse (note the subtitle 'The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse' to Bhabha's essay 'Of Mimicry and Man' in 1994: 121-31) in that the nature of how the colonizer relates to the colonized can be both genial and exploitative, or, as was the case with the interchange between white Europeans and Native Americans, overtly representing friendship while implementing exterminationist policies. For the colonizer, ambivalence manifests itself in the aggressive expression of dominance over the other with statements of superiority and evidence of a narcissistic anxiety about 'self'. And why the anxiety? Because in the place of identification marked by ambivalence stands 'the tension between the illusion of difference and the reality of sameness' (Huddart 2006: 6). While the power of colonial discourse may rely on particular constructions of image as identity for the colonized—namely 'other'—it cannot escape that 'to be different from those that are different makes you the same' (Bhabha 1994: 64). Colonial discourse would like its subjects totally compliant and to completely assimilate the culture of the colonizer—its values, habits, ideology, to name a few—in other words, mimic the colonizer. Were the relationship of the colonizer/d simply one epitomized by compliance, mimicry would work perfectly. But it does not. And therein lies the rub, as ambivalence becomes a disruption to the authority of colonial dominance.¹²

'Colonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a *subject of difference that is almost the same, but not quite*. Which is to say, that the discourse of mimicry is constructed around an *ambivalence*' (italics Bhabha 1994: 122). Though colonial discourse may want the colonized to be extremely like the colonizer, that by no means implies being identical. Such a prospect is too threatening and terrifying for the colonizer. On the one hand, the ideologies justifying colonial rule require the assumption of non-equivalence, a split between superior and inferior, in order to operate (Huddart 2006: 59). On the other hand, were the colonized subject able

12. Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin (2000: 13) raise the possible critique of this concept as 'a controversial proposition' generating within it the seeds of its own destruction. Regardless of the actions of the colonized, whether of rebellion or resistance, 'the colonial relationship is going to be disrupted'. But Bhabha only contends that colonial discourse is *compelled* to be ambivalent.

somehow to fully assimilate to the dominant culture and escape the 'blurring of cultural boundaries, inside and outside, an otherness within', the subject could never attain the fantasy or, as Young (2003: 23) states it, 'you never quite can become white enough'. Almost the same, but not quite (white). The mimicry of the colonizer is not a matter of slavish imitation, but rather an exaggeration or 'blurred copy' (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 2000: 139). It is a repetition with difference as indicated by Bhabha (1994: 122): 'to be effective, mimicry must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its difference'. That difference simultaneously contains within it the 'menace' of mimicry 'so that mimicry is at once resemblance and menace' (123).

Perhaps Lord Macaulay's *Minute to Parliament* (1835) and V.S. Naipaul's novel *The Mimic Men* (1967) best exemplify mimicry as resemblance. Macaulay (1835: 49) derided Oriental learning in favor of English education in India proposing 'a class of interpreters between us and the million whom we govern—a class of persons Indian in blood and colour, but English in tastes, opinions, in morals, and in intellect'. Basically, Macaulay suggested a hybridized class to facilitate a process of mimicry that would reproduce a colonized 'almost the same, but not quite'. The success of the program, however, hit too close to home discomfiting and unsettling the British colonizer. Huddart (2006: 61) comments, 'The British created a class of educated Indians, but the creation made the British themselves anxious'. The mimic man Ralph R.K. Singh (changed from Ranjit Kripalsingh) of V.S. Naipaul describes the apostasy of mimicry. 'We pretended to be real, to be learning, to be preparing ourselves for life, we mimic men of the New World, one unknown corner of it, with all its reminders of the corruption that came so quickly to the new' (1967: 146). Earlier in the narrative, Singh describes the complexity of mimicry with its attendant ambivalence.

I paid Mr Shylock three guineas a week for a tall, multi-mirrored, book-shaped room with a coffin-like wardrobe. And for Mr Shylock, the recipient each week of fifteen times three guineas, the possessor of a mistress and of suits made of cloth so fine I felt I could eat it, I had nothing but admiration...I thought Mr Shylock looked distinguished, like a lawyer or businessman or politician. He had the habit of stroking the lobe of his ear inclining his head to listen. I thought the gesture was attractive; I copied it. I knew of recent events in Europe; they tormented me; and although I was trying to live on seven pounds a week I offered Mr Shylock my fullest, silent compassion (7).

Within mimicry as resemblance lay mimicry as menace, hence mimicry as 'the sign of a double articulation' (Bhabha 1994: 122). Though

the colonial process continually encourages the mimicry of the colonizer, that mimicry never conceals a presence or identity behind its mask. Rather, as 'the metonymy of presence', mimicry 'rearticulates presence in terms of its "otherness"', thus creating a 'partial' presence that fixes the colonial subject as both 'incomplete' and 'virtual' (129-30, 123). In other words, this representation of difference disavows reality for a product of desire rearticulated as mimicry. This 'splitting' of colonial discourse with contradictory articulations of reality and desire recurs as well in racist stereotypes, slurs, and jokes. The result of this partial representation/recognition of the colonial object is a double vision, which not only discloses the ambivalence of colonial discourse but also disrupts its authority (126). How so? First, the colonized returns the gaze of the colonizer. That gaze, which mediates the partiality of presence obscured to the colonizer, reminds the colonizer 'that the colonized is a subject as well as an object' (Huddart 2006: 66-67). Second, mimicry exploits the flaw in the certainty of colonial dominance in the emergence of postcolonial literature and in an inappropriate colonized subject. By 'inappropriate' is meant the reproduction of a colonized subject whose behaviour, according to Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin (2000: 140-41), 'may ultimately be beyond the control of colonial authority'. In essence, the ambivalent nature of the relationship between colonizer and colonized unsettles colonial dominance fluctuating between the poles of mimicry and mockery since mimicry is never far from mockery. In the ambivalent world of 'not quite'/'not white', Bhabha (1994: 131) asserts 'colonial authority repeatedly turns from mimicry—a difference that is almost nothing but not quite—to menace—a difference that is almost total but not quite'.

Ethnicity

The term 'ethnic' derives from the Greek 'ethnos', which, ironically, was not used exclusively for a group of people sharing a common culture, origin, or language. Early in Greek culture and throughout history, groups of people employed the term along the lines of 'us' and 'them': the Greeks used 'genos' for themselves but 'ethnos' for non-Greeks; early Christians used 'ethnos' for non-Christians and non-Jews; the Latin Church throughout the Middle Ages rendered 'ethnos' as 'gentilis' ('gentile'); in the Ottoman period Muslims regarded the Orthodox Christians as 'millet', the Turkish translation of 'ethnos', the religious 'other'. This dichotomy of non-ethnic 'us' and ethnic 'them' persists even into the present with the US tendency of reserving the term 'nation' for itself and 'ethnic' for non-white immigrant groups.

How should we define ethnicity? Undoubtedly, how we perceive ethnicity will greatly affect our definitions of it.¹³ Ethnicity generally gets defined in terms of nationalism and/or race. In some instances, but certainly not all, the definition of ethnicity as nationalism works (e.g. Romanians).¹⁴ But as for its association with race, a distinction is necessary. The term 'ethnicity' concerns a sense of kinship, common culture, and group solidarity whereas the term 'race' bears assumptions made about humankind being divided hierarchically into fixed, genetically determined biological types (see further discussion on the interrelationship of ethnicity and race in Hutchinson and Smith 1996). Unlike the term 'ethnicity' wherein certain groups can construct their own identity in their own terms rather than by those used to (af)fix their marginalized status, the term 'race' denotes a process of labeling with the identity of a group, by and large, being imposed on them from without by another group who bases its sense of difference on their self-arrogated superiority. Obviously, any facile identification of 'ethnicity' with either nationalism or race will simply not suffice for all scenarios. The classic definition of Max Weber (1968: 389) broadly defined ethnic groups as 'human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization or migration; this belief must be important for the propagation of group formation; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists'. Richard Schermerhorn (1970: 12) developed a more elaborate definition that encompasses the variety and complexity of social and cultural features of ethnic groups.

An ethnic group is defined here as a collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their peoplehood. Examples of such symbolic elements are: kinship patterns, physical contiguity (as in localism or sectionalism), religious affiliation, language or dialect forms, tribal affiliation, nationality, phenotypical features, or any

13. A 1974 study of 27 definitions of ethnicity in the US alone revealed the breakdown of common traits as follows: 1 included 'immigrant group'; 12 included 'common national or geographic origin'; 11 included 'same culture or customs'; 10 included 'religion'; and 9 included 'race or physical characteristics' (Isajaw 1974).

14. Even when the nation has ceased to exist, some ethnic groups still understand themselves by the name of the originating nation (e.g. Armenians). But in such a case, 'ethnicity' generally only gains a wide currency when these groups find themselves to be minorities within a larger national grouping exemplified in the aftermath of colonization with either immigration to settled colonies (e.g. US, Canada, and Australia) or the migration of colonized peoples to the colonizing centre (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 2000: 81).

combination of these. A necessary accompaniment is some consciousness of kind among members of the group.

Real or perceived, common ancestry becomes crucial in the construction of group identity, both from the definitions of outsiders and from the self-definition of the ethnic group itself.

On the basis of the definition by Schermerhorn, John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith (1996: 6-7) distilled six features habitually demonstrated by ethnic groups (for further discussion of these common traits of *ethnies*, see Smith 1986: 23-48) that may also serve as boundary markers for the group: (1) a shared, common, collective name; (2) a myth of common ancestry to help make sense of their experiences; (3) shared historical memories that provide them a sense of common history uniting successive generations; (4) distinctive cultural traits in common (the greater this number of unique cultural traits, the more intense the sense of separate ethnicity.); (5) a shared link with a homeland (perhaps a symbolic geographical center and not necessarily physical possession); and (6) a sense of solidarity for no lesser reason than to resist perceived threats. In agrarian societies *ethnies* emphasize the bond uniting them against the 'enemy' by means of sharp boundaries—e.g. ban on religious syncretism, cultural assimilation, and miscegenation. These boundary mechanisms, or 'cultural markers of difference', differentiate one ethnic group from another (see Frederik Barth's influential work *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (1969) within the field of ethnicity). In addition to certain cultural, index features of group differentiation like kinship, commensality, a common cult, and secondary markers such as dress, language, and physical features (Nash 1989: 10-13), the mimicry of stereotyping itself helps mark the boundaries between ethnic groups. In times of conflict where an *ethnie* may find itself threatened by another, these markers delimiting the boundaries of in/exclusion within the group receive heightened emphasis with the effect of reifying group boundaries and ethnic identity.

Ethnicity provides a group with a positive self-perception offering certain advantages to its members. But how does ethnic identity persist if traditional cultures do not, for example, in a context of colonization? Ethnic identity may revolve about select 'symbolic elements', or criteria, as identified by Schermerhorn. In other words, an individual may only actually experience but a few of the defining criteria and still be considered a member of an ethnic group, hence ethnic identity persists though the traditional culture may not. No ethnic group experiences complete agreement about its own ethnicity for each may debate and even change, over time, the nature and importance of the defining criteria for membership.

Postcolonialism and Biblical Studies

By all accounts, postcolonial criticism or theory is a relative newcomer to the discipline of biblical studies. When applied to biblical studies, only the object of its analysis changes; its aim does not. Postcolonial biblical criticism uses the tools of biblical studies to decolonize, in effect, by exposing the effects of colonialism both on the text and on its interpreters. R.S. Sugirtharajah (2002a: 25) identifies its greatest single aim as 'to situate colonialism at the centre of the Bible and biblical interpretation'. As for the objectives of postcolonial criticism when applied to biblical studies, no uniformity exists. The objectives of postcolonial biblical interpretation are as heterogeneous as its application. By extrapolating from the postcolonial interrogations by Anzaldúa, Sugirtharajah (2001: 259) raises the kinds of broad questions that postcolonial biblical criticism would raise.

Who has the power to interpret or tell stories? To whom do the stories/texts belong? Who controls their meaning? Who decides what texts we choose? Against whom are these stories or interpretations aimed? What is their ethical effect? Who has power to access data?

I will simply summarize a few of the objectives of postcolonial biblical criticism as noted by Sugirtharajah (2001: 251-58) but with more pointed questions (see also the tidy checklist of questions by Kim (2007: 167-69) categorized according to three levels of questions—that of the biblical text, modern biblical scholarship, and contemporary interpreters¹⁵) relevant to the Hebrew texts. Finally, I will engage one example of postcolonial analysis because of its focus upon the Deuteronomistic History.

Postcolonial Biblical Criticism

Postcolonial biblical interpretation probes the biblical documents for their colonial traces. Every biblical text emerged within some colonial context: Assyrian, Babylonian, Persian, or Hellenistic colonization for the Hebrew texts; Roman colonization for the Christian texts. The shadowy presence of empire looming in the background is necessarily assumed. But what must be explored is how colonization, whether in an imperial or neocolonial form, its intentions and assumptions, informed and influenced textual production and consumption.

15. The three levels by Kim correspond to the three levels of 'texts' by Fernando Segovia (2000: 11-34): (1) the level of the biblical texts written in varying imperial/colonial contexts; (2) the level of 'modern texts', namely the cache of textual analyses and interpretations of the Bible in modern, Western biblical scholarship; and (3) the level of the 'flesh-and-blood' readers of the Bible from around the world.

Postcolonial biblical interpretation results in reconstructive readings of biblical texts. It can reflect upon such postcolonial concerns as race, nation, mission, textuality, hybridity, deterritorialization, fragmentation, and ethnicity and representation, the foci of this study. It takes the condition and experience of the marginalized subaltern, which could include the feminine, within the text as its beginning point. But it juxtaposes the condition of the colonized in the modern era with that of the condition of the colonized in the ancient era in an effort to expose colonialism in all its ugly manifestations, not least of which is the violence of lost voices distorted or silenced by the canonized text. Here we might ask the following questions: Who are the non-Israelites in this text? What assumptions about them might we find underlying the text? Are there any stereotypes present? Do the non-Israelites get to speak? Is their point of view given expression? What voices in the text are suppressed or neglected? How does the text construct difference? Is there an 'other' in the text?

Postcolonial biblical interpretation also explores the role of the Bible and its interpreters in the process of colonization. Just as colonial ideologies would have played some role in the production of biblical texts, so those effects wield their inescapable control over the interpreters of the text who may virtually (re)inscribe colonial ideologies. Colonialism has equally shaped the contours of biblical scholarship, not just the Bible.¹⁶ Thus, the critique of commentaries becomes crucial for reasons identified in a moment. Questions such as the following help: What are the concerns of the scholar? What is the perspective of the interpretation of this text? How does interpretation portray the non-Israelites? For whom do scholars speak? Whose interests do they represent? Whose interests benefit from their interpretation—the colonizer or the colonized, the West or the 'other'?

The role of the Bible as integral in colonial discourse does not lack in examples. A case in point is the theological debates at Valladolid (1550-1551) between the Dominican friar Bartolomé de Las Casas (1487-1566) and the formidable philosopher and theologian Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (for a detailed treatment of the protracted debate with its convoluted arguments, see Hanke 1959 and 1974). Both theologians held to the

16. Sugirtharajah (2002: 25-26) calls attention to the unwillingness of biblical scholarship to admit to the influences of imperialism shaping its contours described concretely by Kwok Pui-Lan (2005: 63): 'the political interests of Europe determined the questions to be asked, the gathering of data, the framework of interpretation, and the final outcome'. Perhaps the enmeshment of biblical studies 'within the labyrinth of textuality' and its 'obsession with professionalism and specialization', hypothesizes Sugirtharajah, account for its denial. Nevertheless, two great dangers face the discipline: (1) an uncritical acceptance of its principal tenets, and (2) a failure to relate to the society within which its work is done.

opinion that the natives in the Americas were pagans in need of conversion to the true faith, and that their territory should come under Spanish jurisdiction. In other words, both advocated colonization but differed with regard to the process: Sepúlveda advocated all-out war, whereas Las Casas encouraged gentle persuasion. Sepúlveda basically argued that anyone not superior to the civilized European was inferior. Citing Deuteronomy 7 and the Book of Joshua, texts where God advocated the extermination of nations in the Promised Land, Sepúlveda claimed justification for war against the indigenous population who, like the Canaanites in the Promised Land, committed evil deeds—e.g. oppression of the innocent, human sacrifice, and cannibalism. Las Casas countered that ‘the examples of the Old Testament are to be admired but not always imitated’ (as quoted in Sugirtharajah 2002: 47). Despite the dissident reading perspective of Las Casas (other examples of dissident readings highlighted by Sugirtharajah (2001: 110-39; 2002: 50-51) include two missionaries, John Colenso (1814-1883) in South Africa and James Long (1814-1887) in India), the position advocated by Sepúlveda carried the day as the dominant bias underlying Western colonization sanctioned by religion à la the Bible. Noticeably conspicuous by their absence in this colonial debate about them were, of course, the natives.

In an effort to underscore the collusion of the Bible and Western imperialism, Segovia (2000: 127-28) correlates three phases of Western imperialism with two waves of Western missionary movement. The first phase of early imperialism ran from the 15th-late nineteenth century including the early modern states of England and France. The second phase of high imperialism ran from the late nineteenth-mid-twentieth century concerned with monopoly capitalism. The third phase of late imperialism runs from the mid-twentieth century to the present concerned with the impact of imperial culture in the world, with the US as a perfect example. Accompanying these empire-building phases were two prominent Western missionary movements—the first, primarily Catholic in nature, with the massive evangelization of the Americas (ca. 1492-1792) as the focal target; and the second, primarily Protestant in nature, with the massive evangelization of Africa and Asia as the focal target. Whether Catholic or Protestant in nature ultimately matters not since the Bible for both was central to and drove their missionary activities. The reality of empire possessed a strong socio-religious component. Segovia notes, ‘The political, economic, and cultural center also functions as a religious center: that is to say, the practices and beliefs of the center are invariably grounded on, sanctioned, and accompanied by a set of religious beliefs and practices’. Consequently, if the margins, the binomial opposite to the center in structural terms, were to be subordinated politically, economically, and culturally, to the center, then the same would hold true religiously. There can be no doubt to the role of the Bible in

facilitating the exploitation and control of the colonized. Colonizers justified their claims to land, their genocide of natives and cultures, and their colonization of both mind and soul of the colonized by appeals to the Bible. Postcolonial biblical criticism does not look to the Bible as an alternative for a better world in an effort to cope with the effects of colonialism; rather, it attempts to liberate the Bible from its colonial complicity in the hegemony of the West and 'to help reposition it in relation to its oriental roots and Eastern heritage' (Sugirtharajah 2001: 257-58).

Finally, some may have reservations about raking up the past. Is the purpose simply to blame previous generations while making their present successors feel guilty for the misdeeds of their forebears? Is the purpose simply to make the victims out to be innocent? The answer is an unequivocal 'No'. To find fault and lay blame would require no effort and would simply reverse the present effects of the colonial aftermath with no real resolution. Rather, the issue concerns who benefits from the past with any and all attendant privileges (Sugirtharajah 2002: 36). Postcolonial biblical criticism renders biblical interpretation relevant to the problems of the contemporary world, and thus effectual, by engaging and challenging the status quo.

Perhaps no one has been more instrumental in introducing and disseminating postcolonial criticism to biblical studies than R.S. Sugirtharajah. His prolific literature—*Voices from the Margin* (1991; now in its third edition, 2006), *The Postcolonial Bible* (1998), *Asian Biblical Hermeneutics and Postcolonialism* (1999), *The Bible and the Third World* (2001), *Postcolonial Criticism and Biblical Interpretation* (2002), *Postcolonial Reconfigurations* (2003), *The Bible and Empire* (2005), and *The Postcolonial Biblical Reader* (2006)—represent but a sampling that integrates postcolonial criticism and biblical interpretation. Kwok Pui-Lan's *Discovering the Bible in the Non-Biblical World* (1995) and *Postcolonial Imagination and Feminist Theology* (2005), and Fernando Segovia's *Reading from This Place, I and II* (1994 and 1995), *Interpreting beyond Borders* (2000), and *Decolonizing Biblical Studies* (2000) have also proven invaluable. Other key works contributing to the introduction of postcolonial criticism to biblical studies include Laura Donaldson's edited *Postcolonialism and Scriptural Reading* (1996) and Keith Whitelam's *The Invention of Ancient Israel* (1996). A smattering of essays and articles dot the landscape of biblical studies, some related to studies of the Hebrew Bible more narrowly (e.g. see articles by Chia (1997), Gruber (2001), and Warrior (1996); essays by Brett (2005), Donaldson (1999), Dube (2003), Horsley (2006), Mosala (2006), and Rowlett (2000); and dissertations by Davidson (2005), Lo (2003), and Nzimande (2005). Some notable publications relative to Hebrew Bible studies include Roland Boer's *Last Stop before Antarctica* (2001), Uriah Kim's *Decolonizing Josiah* (2005), Judith McKinlay's *Reframing Her* (2004), and Erin Runions's *Changing*

Subjects (2002). To ensure a growing voice for postcolonial analysis within biblical studies, two publishing houses have provided suitable outlets for such voices to be heard—The Bible in the Modern World series by Sheffield Phoenix Press and The Bible and Postcolonialism series by T. & T. Clark.

Postcolonial Criticism and the Deuteronomistic History

Uriah Kim masterfully brings the study of Josiah and the DH into postcolonial focus with his book *Decolonizing Josiah* (2005). From the outset, he expresses concern over the DH as itself a likeness of modern Western history and the kingdom of Josiah as a nation in the likeness of the modern nation-state. And his intercontextual reading of the story of Josiah with the Asian Americans from the space of liminality opens up vistas for exploring an Asian American hermeneutic. In his effort to decolonize Josiah, Kim demonstrates the DH not as a history in the likeness of that of the West but rather as ‘a history of their own’, namely Judah. Kim elucidates the Assyrian context as that of colonization during the time of Josiah. In relation to this context is the problematic of the Samerina province assumed in the view of the DH as empty due to the power vacuum created by Assyrian withdrawal, an assumption Kim takes to task quite deftly. He concludes that Josiah was unable to expand into Samerina; Egypt was not powerful enough to occupy and control the inland political powers; and no conclusive evidence exists of a disruption in Samerina during the Josianic period (177). Ultimately, the story of Josiah reflects an attempt by Judah ‘to write a history of their own by refusing to be framed within the political/ideological landscape shaped by the imperial powers’ (222). He goes on to suggest that this act of writing history enabled them to recover ‘overwritten or forgotten “inscriptions” of their past’, to remember ‘what went wrong in the past’, and to reinvent their own culture. In other words, the DH becomes a dissident reading to Assyrian hegemony. Kim indeed provides a history for Judah, but is Judah truly ‘other’, at least in the Josianic context?

Can an *ethnie* be entirely ‘other’ when it experiences no political subjugation and yet can somehow entertain designs (whether ultimately realized or not) of colonization of another territory and its citizens? Granted, the dynamic of relations among ethnic groups in a colonial context can be quite complex with ethnic group A as colonized to an imperial power but perhaps as colonizer to ethnic group B. And here, I think, Kim needed to focus on one specific dynamic of colonial relations. By focusing on Judea and the ‘history of their own’, he gives the stage to the colonizer, in effect, since their own history overwrites that of the ‘foreigners’ and ‘immigrants’ of Samerina, and since their selective memory becomes the representational experience of colonizer in Western history. His analysis also raises the

question, Is the 'history of their own' meant more as resistance to Assyrian hegemony or as justification for the deterritorialization of Samerina under the political subjugation of Judah? The answer to this question determines the relative position of Judah as colonized or colonizer. Even the analysis of Kim betrays conflictedness sympathizing with Israel yet never providing them a voice. Kim missed, I believe, a great opportunity to liberate the truly subaltern group in this context of colonization who still remains in the space of liminality with no 'history of their own'.

Kim begins with the idea of Judah as subaltern but only in its relation to Assyria, thus assuming an Assyrian colonial context for the story. He also assents to the embedment of the Josianic story within the DH redacted during the Josianic period (according to Frank Moore Cross), which he quickly passes over in his introduction. For all his critique of modernist biblical scholarship on DH, one wonders if Kim doth protest too much. How can he critique modernist biblical scholarship for its 'business as usual' approach and limited imagination (112) when he cannot think any more creatively himself about a social location of power relations beyond the Josianic era? This may account for the 'yawn' by Niels Peter Lemche (2005: 303) over a book that hardly impresses (him) and 'may induce European and North-American scholarship to ignore the very necessary reorientation towards a different reading of a non-European document'. In the end, Kim basically reaffirms the modernist biblical scholarship on the DH rather than offering an alternative perspective for a colonial context influencing its production and consumption.

The Politics of Ethnic Re-presentation

The effects of individuals and ethnic groups becoming the objects of representation defy simple explanation since representations engage a whole array of emotions and attitudes. Everyday examples of physical assaults brought about by slurs bear this point out. Moreover, representations within media, including texts, mobilize fears and anxieties within the reader at very deep levels. As implied, the word *re-presentation* suggests a re-presence due to the lack of a deliverable presence, especially within literature. Those who cannot (or who are disallowed to) represent themselves get re-presented, and generally by those in the majority. Those individuals, 'them' not 'us', significantly different from the majority tend to fall prey to a form of re-presentation known as binarism. They are represented through sharply opposed, polarized, binary extremes, for example, good/bad, civilized/savage, ugly/beautiful, white/black. The binarism and its attendant categorization of individuals or groups as 'other' obviously rely on the concept of difference. Stuart Hall (1997: 234-38) briefly describes four

theoretical approaches to difference helpful in establishing its foundational role in any representational activity. First, the linguistic model associated with Ferdinand de Saussure assumes meaning as relational. Each term in the polarity requires its other to have meaning. Jacques Derrida argued that since very few, neutral binary oppositions actually exist, one pole of the binarism would dominate in a relation of power within discourse. Second, another linguistic model associated with Mikhail Bakhtin emphasizes the dialogical aspect to meaning. Difference is necessary just as the interaction and interplay with another person is required in the construction of meaning. Third, the anthropological model associated with Stuart Hall and other cultural critics affirms difference as that element requisite in that symbolic order we call culture. Things have meaning within a particular culture only because they have been assigned a certain position. The presence of dirt in a bed, for example, is completely unacceptable in comparison to its presence on the floor. Marking difference enables the establishment of symbolic boundaries. Fourth, the psychoanalytic model associated with Jacques Lacan stresses the fundamental presence of the Other to the constitution of the self. Difference in and of itself is not the problem; rather, we must consider the mode of representation of otherness—Who is it that re-presents? Who controls and defines that re-presented? Whose interest does the re-presentation serve?—in short, power relations within a society in the re-presentation of the ‘other’.

Re-presentations within the fixed form and closed world of literature often take on a spurious value. Representations are nothing more than just that, re-presentations. They are ‘deformations’, according to Roland Barthes, and certainly not to be accorded truth-value regardless of their circulation within any culture as ‘truth’. Imperialist fiction certainly does not have the truth-value of its representations as a benchmark criterion (JanMohamed 1985: 63). The object of re-presentation is never consulted about the accuracy or veracity and rarely, if ever, has access to such texts. Colonialist discourse commodifies the native subject. Said (1978: 58) articulates this concern over power and re-presentation with regard to the long history of Western encroachments upon the East (Orient).

Altogether an internally structured archive is built up from the literature that belongs to these experiences. Out of this comes a restricted number of typical encapsulations: the journey, the history, the fable, the stereotype, the polemical confrontation. These are the lenses through which the Orient is experienced, and they shape the language, perception, and form of the encounter between East and West.

Regardless of the facts, representation contributes to the archive of knowledge taken as ‘fact’. To illustrate the point, British knowledge of Egypt

in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries *was* Egypt for Britain. In his 13 June 1910 speech to the House of Commons, Arthur James Balfour commented, 'We know the civilization of Egypt better than we know the civilization of any other country. We know it further back; we know it more intimately; we know more about it' (as quoted in Said 1978: 32). To have such knowledge, furthermore, means to dominate it and to have authority over it.

Western nations as soon as they emerge into history show the beginnings of those capacities for self-government... You may look through the whole history of the Orientals in what is called, broadly speaking, the East, and you never find traces of self-government... Conqueror has succeeded conqueror; one domination has followed another; but never in all the revolutions of fate and fortune have you seen one of those nations of its own motion establish what we, from a Western point of view, call self-government. That is the fact.... Is it a good thing for these great nations... that this absolute government should be exercised by us? I think it is a good thing. I think that experience shows that they have got under it far better government than in the whole history of the world they ever had before, and which not only is a benefit to them, but is undoubtedly a benefit to the whole of the civilised West.... We are in Egypt not merely for the sake of the Egyptians, though we are there for their sake; we are there also for the sake of Europe at large (Said 1978: 32-33).

Change the wording of the latter statement to read 'for the sake of democracy' and the statement rings eerily of *imperialism redivivus* with US presence in Iraq. The point I wish to demonstrate here, however, is that re-presentation, especially within a colonial context, ultimately becomes a means of erasing the ethnic identity of the colonized. Egypt for Britain was not Egypt itself but rather its knowledge, its representation of Egypt taken for 'fact'. The power to re-present disavows the true identity of the 'other' in favor of a distorted reality, but also disavows the 'other' to govern self (namely that of both subject and object).

With what follows, I want to center on one particular form of re-presentation that contributes to the archive of knowledge about and power over 'others', namely the stereotype. After discussing its functions in general, I will continue the discussion relative to postcolonial theory before narrowing my focus to the process of stereotyping in the construction of ethnic identity. Finally, I will close this section with even narrower consideration of the treatment of ethnic identity construction vis-à-vis the Deuteronomic History.

Stereotyping and Its Functions

A unilinear mode of re-presentation, stereotypes fix the labels we attach to separate 'other' from 'self'. No one *ethnie* has a corner on the market of stereotyping. It has been in existence within the life of every civilization from which we have records. Everyone creates stereotypes. They range from that which we wish to lionize to that which we wish to vilify. In fact, Sander Gilman (1985: 16) goes as far to suggest that 'we cannot function in the world without them'. Contrary to perceptions, stereotypes can be positive despite the bad publicity received by their negative forms.

Walter Lippmann first coined the term 'stereotype' though with no intentional pejorative connotation.

A pattern of stereotypes is not neutral. It is not merely a way of substituting order for the great blooming, buzzing confusion of reality. It is not merely a short cut. It is all these things and something more. It is the guarantee of our self-respect; it is the projection upon the world of our own sense of our own value, our own position and our own rights. The stereotypes are, therefore, highly charged with the feelings that are attached to them. They are the fortress of our tradition, and behind its defenses we can continue to feel ourselves safe in the position we occupy (as quoted in Dyer 1993: 11).

Stereotypes play a necessary role in the human process of making sense of, ordering, and controlling the world about them. Inescapable and necessary, stereotyping is a part of the way in which societies make sense of themselves, including making and reproducing themselves. From a psychological standpoint, stereotypes help us deal with 'the instabilities of our perception of the world' and, as a coping strategy, the resultant 'anxieties engendered by our inability to control the world' (Gilman 1985: 18, 12). At this point, it is necessary that we make the distinction (not always made) between stereotyping and categorization or typification (see Pickering 2001: 2-3, 2004: 98; Gilman (1985: 18) refers to the distinction as one between pathological stereotyping and that engaged in to preserve the illusion of control over self and the world). Although a form of categorization, stereotyping carries with it a much more malignant potential than the benign categorization. On the one hand, categorization or typification enables us to process the inchoate data received on a daily basis. Categories help us to organize the world in our minds, to create mental maps of how we view the world, and to negotiate our way through the world in our everyday social interactions. Categories become a means of making cognitive distinctions and connections—for example, desserts from hors d'oeuvres though both are types of foods. Categories are also flexible and can change with the times. On the other hand, stereotypes as a generalized form of re-presentation lack

particularity. They neither refer to a particular person nor connect back from category to individual. When we use a stereotype to describe or designate an individual or group, we immediately eclipse the particularity of that individual or group. According to Pickering (2001: 162), 'Otherness entails an erasure of distinctiveness and particularity of self precisely because it is always placed over on the other side from selfhood'. As a form of categorization, stereotyping presents the illusion of order and precision by defining and evaluating other people. Their portrayal of individuals and groups as homogeneous betrays their inaccuracy. Unlike categorization, stereotyping is more rigid and inflexible when thinking in terms of categories, and the evaluative ordering produced by stereotyping comes at a cost for those stereotyped who 'are then fixed into a marginal position or subordinate status and judged accordingly'. Though often found to be erroneous, simplistic, and rigid, stereotypes nonetheless perform their damage discriminating on the basis of stunted features characterizing them, and they 'form the basis for negative or hostile judgments, the rationale for exploitative, unjust treatment, or the justification for aggressive behaviour' (Pickering 2001: 5, 10). Finally, an adequate critique of stereotypes must inform itself with a historical understanding of their target, the despised object. Only when social tensions between different *ethnies* arise do stereotypes grow more pronounced and hostile. Thus, the subaltern groupings within each of my Chapters in Part II will attend to the history of the Edomites, Moabites, Ammonites, and Samari(t)ans disallowed the opportunity to represent themselves.

How does a stereotype work? Basically, a stereotype fixates on a few, simple, essential characteristics (behaviour, disposition, physical qualities) and reduces people to those characteristics. These characteristics are taken out of context and attributed to everyone associated with that characteristic—e.g. women with blonde hair as dumb. Blanket generalizations then maintain for all individuals possessing that characteristic. Those essential characteristics are represented as fixed by Nature as to be unquestionably obvious. In short, '*stereotyping reduces, essentializes, naturalizes and fixes "difference"*' (Hall 1997: 258). Empirical realities rarely if ever govern the logic of those stereotyping; rather, that 'logic' is motivated more by 'a battery of desires, repressions, investments, and projections' (Said 1978: 8). The stereotype becomes, in effect, the reverse image of the one stereotyping. For the deficiency within that one hates, or for the fear of becoming that which one mocks, or for the desire for that which one cannot but would like to attain, the projection lies latent within the stereotype. The stereotype will always reflect a bias though the precise rationale for the projection might require disentanglement. Such a process where projection fuels the stereotype that reduces, essentializes, naturalizes, and fixes does serve several functions, not least of which are to establish identity and boundaries.

From a psychological perspective, humankind engages in the strategy of splitting intrinsic to the process of constructing identities of self/other from early childhood. We learn 'good' from 'bad', which we externalize to split the world into 'good' and 'bad', and which we internalize to split the self into 'good' and 'bad'. We, furthermore, construct our sense of self and the world on the illusion of 'us' and 'them'. Since no real line actually exists between self and the Other, it must be drawn. When our sense of control and order undergoes stress, the stereotype emerges as we project that anxiety upon the Other. Gilman (1985: 20) explains further:

The Other is thus stereotyped, labeled with a set of signs paralleling (or mirroring) our loss of control. The Other is invested with all of the qualities of the 'bad' or the 'good'. The 'bad' self, with its repressed sadistic impulses, becomes the 'bad' Other; the 'good' self/object, with its infallible correctness, becomes the antithesis to the flawed image of the self, the self out of control. The 'bad' Other becomes the negative stereotype; the 'good' Other becomes the positive stereotype.

What Gilman alludes to but never makes explicitly clear is that the Other, however categorized and/or stereotyped, will always bear the 'self' within.¹⁷ Nonetheless, the stereotype functions to ward off any perceived threats of disruption to 'us'. And yet, the circulation of the stereotype deconstructs its intended function by denying a secure point of identification due to its 'lack', defined in terms of what it is not.

The concept of the Other, when conjoined with the stereotype, complements the stereotype thus rendering it more complex. Identity construction and boundary maintenance converge in the process of constructing the stereotypical Other. Differences between 'us' and 'them', necessary for the process, become naturalized. 'They' as Other are always objectified being constructed by and for the benefit of the subject to achieve masterful self-definition. Stereotyping the Other becomes a means to knowing oneself, to have a certain legitimacy by the symbolic exclusion of the Other. This is 'us' here; that is 'them' there. By naming and defining the characteristics of the Other, the dominant self denies 'others' their right to name and define themselves. Derogatory terms (e.g. coons, bimbos, wetbacks, spics) accompany the process that denies humanity because it 'divests them of their social and cultural identities by diminishing them to their stereotyped characteristics' (Pickering 2001: 73). Obviously, the ability to construct

17. Pickering (2001: 38-41) objects to the perspectives of Gilman for advocating a form of 'infantile determinism' that fails to take into account how, as adults, we can be tolerant, caring, or compassionate. His Manichean theorizing furthermore 'renders the process of stereotypical "othering" intractable'.

identity and define boundaries is always implicated in relations of power understood in terms of inequality. Stereotyping becomes a component of the power/knowledge relations producing 'truths' of the Other. Those who do the 'othering' occupy a privileged space whereby to define themselves in contrast to the Others designated as different. Understanding stereotypes requires an investigation into the interests of those stereotyping and their construction of self-identity by looking at what is projected, displaced, and transposed onto the Other. It is within the contact zone especially 'where disparate cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in highly asymmetrical relations of domination and subordination' that the construction of the Other takes place (Pratt 1992: 4) within colonial discourse. It is to this relationship between stereotyping and the issues of power/knowledge reflected in colonialism that I now turn.

Stereotyping and Postcolonial Theory

The nineteenth-century French writer Ernest Renan observed, 'Forgetting is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation' (as quoted in Bhabha 1990: 11). And where else does this act of 'forgetting', or conscious amnesia, in the formation of a nation figure as significantly than in the creation of a national narrative? Who decides the content of the narrative? Its shape and telos? Its heroes and villains? Probing questions such as these (that even biblical scholars should dare not neglect asking of biblical texts) betray an assumed selectivity process that entails some necessary exclusion, even in the act of re-presentation. Here, re-presentation within national mythology concerns the identity construction of whole ethnic groups (that of subject and object), their places in the national mythology, and their status within the larger social structure. And what happens when literature plays a complicit role in this process of 'forgetting' by helping construct a national mythology that disseminates a colonialist ideology across temporal and spatial boundaries à la the biblical texts within Yehudian and US colonial contexts? Postcolonialism therefore becomes an invaluable tool whereby to analyze the effects of this colonialist discursive nature of biblical texts and their representations of the 'other'.

The stereotype as a mode of re-presentation meshes well with colonial discourse because of its reliance on the concept of 'fixity'. Stereotypes 'fix' knowledge of their object—e.g. the duplicity of the Asiatic—in the ideological construction of whole ethnic groups as 'other'. Colonial discourse desires the colonized as a fixed reality, simultaneously 'other' and yet entirely visible and knowable. Literature crystallizes the fixed image taken as 'real' by its consumers. We all know that literature, much like the seemingly dismissible phenomenon of joking, has certain effects; we just tend to ignore them.

Ethnic joking and racist stereotypes within literature have that effect of splitting colonial discourse enabling, on the one hand, a process of mimicry and that process enabling, on the other hand, the transformation of joking as a form of resistance.¹⁸ The sign of double articulation, mimicry simultaneously functions as resemblance and menace by re-presenting presence in terms of its 'otherness'. Mimicry must be understood from the dual perspectives of subject mimicking (whether colonizer of colonized or colonized of colonizer) and object mimicked (whether colonized by colonizer or colonizer by colonized). With regard to colonized mimicking colonizer, mimicry functions as a defense 'exactly like the technique of camouflage practiced in human warfare' (as quoted from Lacan in Bhabha 1994: 172). In order to rearticulate presence, the splitting of colonial discourse depends on the disavowal of reality and 'replaces it by a product of desire that repeats, rearticulates "reality"' (130). If we bring into the mix the identity of an ethnic group, colonial discourse disavows their reality in order to construct a hybrid identity. Consider the statement by Fanon (1967: 176): 'There is a quest for the Negro, the Negro is a demand, one cannot get along without him, he is needed, but only if he is made palatable in a certain way. Unfortunately, the Negro knocks down the system and breaks the treaties'. The presence of the Negro disrupts the articulation of desire. The effects of this strategy of desire (or fantasy or fetish) that disavows reality thereby producing a hybrid identity can be seen in the contradictory articulations of reality and desire known as stereotypes, statements, jokes, and myths. The repetitive circulation of these effects within a colonized culture reveals both the site of fantasy and the effects from identity marking. Scenes from the life of Fanon in *Black Skins, White Masks* (1952: 111-14) vividly illustrates the point.

"Look, a Negro!"... "Look, a Negro!"... "Look, a Negro!"... "Mama, see the Negro! I'm frightened!"...

What else could it be for me but an amputation, an excision, a hemorrhage that spattered my whole body with black blood?... All I wanted was to be a man among other men...

My body was given back to me sprawled out, distorted, recolored, clad in mourning in that white winter day. The Negro is an animal, the Negro is bad, the Negro is mean, the Negro is ugly; look, a nigger, it's cold, the nigger is shivering, the nigger is shivering because he is cold, the little boy is trembling because he is afraid of the nigger, the

18. See the practical examples of 'gallows humour' as an index of strength or morale on the part of the Czechs facing Nazi oppression (Obrdlik 1942: 709-716), and that of Negro humour (Boskin 1966: 31, 84, 86, 88, 90, 92; Arnez and Anthony 1968: 339-346).

nigger is shivering with cold, that cold that goes through your bones, the handsome little boy is trembling because he thinks that the nigger is quivering with rage, the little white boy throws himself into his mother's arms: Mama, the nigger's going to eat me up.

The fetishized hybrid identity 'Negro' becomes substitute and shadow—substitute for the real identity of Fanon and shadow of the colonizer in terms of psychology and race. The fantasy produced in lieu of a disavowed reality only presents half the story. 'The other half lies in *what is not being said, but is being fantasized, what is implied but cannot be shown*' (Hall 1997: 263). Obviously, the stereotype is a simplification, not because it is a false representation (though it is that) of a given reality, but because 'it is an arrested, fixated form of representation' (Bhabha 1983: 27).¹⁹ And try as one might, that fixed identity will always be inescapable, an observation revealed by Fanon (1952: 173): '*Wherever he goes, the Negro remains a Negro*' (italics his).

Stereotypes enable colonial authority by construing 'the colonized as a population of degenerate types' and by providing the justification necessary for the colonizer to rule the colonized by virtue of their *presumed* innate superiority (Bhabha 1983: 23; Huddart 2006: 55). But stereotypical knowledges also contribute to the establishment of the 'power/knowledge' system by establishing systems of administration. They become a means of practical control, achieved in part by assimilation, facilitated by their currency. One of the major points Said sought to convey in his book *Orientalism* was that the stereotypes of the Orient emerged as a means of control. Through a unifying fixity of image, Europeans pigeonholed Africans and Asians into a largely European construct that suited European needs. The force of ambivalence within the stereotype 'ensures its repeatability in changing historical and discursive conjunctures; informs its strategies of individuation and marginalization; produces that effect of probabilistic truth and predictability, which, for the stereotype, must always be in excess of what can be empirically proved or logically construed' (Bhabha 1983: 18). What is supposedly 'already known' lacks a secure establishment, hence its endless reconfirmation via repetition. Through the perpetuity of ethnic stereotypes in public discourse, national mythology privileges one ethnic group by overpowering the narrative(s) of other ethnic groups thereby consciously suppressing that nation's own origin(s) and the voices of the 'other'. In short, 'forgetting' results in dis-membering.

19. The stereotyped Other is not a false representation of an already existing reality because there is no real Other out there somewhere. Only in language does the Other reside, and only through language do we find the mediation and representation of self/other.

If, as Derrida (1984: 116) once remarked, 'every culture is haunted by its other', then stereotypical re-presentations betray the anxiety within the colonizer's sense of self-identity, haunting the colonizer and undermining identity. How does it undermine identity? Because the stereotype requires the colonizer to identify 'self' in terms of what it is not, as 'other'. Thus, the identity of the colonizer hinges partly on a relationship with a potentially hostile Other for its constitution, hence the troubled anxiety within the gaze of colonial authority. Regardless of how much the colonizer might desire the assimilation of the colonized, the mimicry of the colonizer by the colonized inevitably 'spooks' the colonizer who 'fantasizes endless monstrous stereotypes that can only lead to anxiety rather than the desired certainty'—namely, the fixed identity of the colonized (Huddart 2006: 61). To return to the earlier example of Lord Macaulay, Bhabha (1994: 61) noted as an example of the anxiety of the British colonizer. The British had created a class of educated Indians who made them anxious in that the resemblance of colonized to colonizer reminded of the shaky foundations of racial stereotypes. For the colonized disavowed by the mimicry of stereotypes, their hybrid identity leaves them with two options of resistance to the colonizer: they can return the gaze of the colonizer or they can refuse to return the gaze of the colonizer.²⁰ In the case of the former, mimicry as an effect of hybridity becomes 'the name for the strategic reversal of the process of domination...that turns the gaze of the discriminated back upon the eye of power' (Bhabha 1994: 159-60). Through mimicry, the colonized reflects back the colonizer's gaze to remind the colonizer that the colonized, too, is subject and that both have shared experiences more than the colonizer would care to acknowledge.

To say that stereotypes assume a life of their own once constructed may seem a bit of an overstatement. They generally arise in a context of gross power inequalities. The ability of a dominant group to name, to classify, and to construct the identity of the excluded as Other according to

20. Though Bhabha describes these forms of resistance as 'transitive' or 'intransitive', active or passive, the problematic of these terms raised by Bart Moore-Gilbert's (1997: 132-35) critique rests in the 'equivocal definition of his [Bhabha] terms'. Moore-Gilbert especially questions whether the various kinds of 'intransitive' resistance, including psychological guerrilla warfare, promulgated by Bhabha ever debilitated colonial control or destabilized the colonizer. The root of his concept of passive resistance derives from his recourse to Lacan for whom resistance inscribed in mimicry was understood as unconscious. Moore-Gilbert (133) concludes, 'If the resistance inscribed in mimicry is unconscious for the colonized...it cannot function for the colonized as the grounds on which to construct a considered counter-discourse, let alone as a means of mobilizing a strategic programme of material and "public" forms of political action from within the oppressed culture'.

a certain norm becomes a form of power/knowledge. Stereotyping is a symbolic form of violence with its power targeted toward a subordinate group. The effectiveness of stereotyping seems to reside in the way that they invoke a consensus shared about a group as if that agreement preexisted independently of the stereotype (Dyer 1993: 14). In and of themselves, stereotypes are not wrong. But language never exists in isolation; rather, it exists within a dynamic of inter-ethnic relations in a given social location. A historical product, stereotypes as a form of discursive representation are consequentially enmeshed within the power relations of that particular social context where employed. When considered from a postcolonial perspective, Hall (1997: 260) sums up the point nicely by way of the Foucauldian power/knowledge argument: '*a discourse produces, through different practices of representation (scholarship, exhibition, literature, painting, etc.), a form of racialized knowledge of the Other (Orientalism) deeply implicated in the operations of power (imperialism)*'. The stereotype establishes the connection between representation, difference, and power while facilitating the colonization process for the advantage of one *ethnie* to the disadvantage of the 'others'.

Stereotyping and Ethnic Identity

When we extrapolate from the observations thus made on stereotyping in general and stereotyping within a colonial context in specific to the construction of ethnic identity, the same principles apply. To claim an ethnic identity is to distinguish self from others. By defining others, we implicitly define ourselves, and generally through binary oppositions. For example, if 'they' are 'evil', then 'we' must be 'good'; if 'they' are 'lazy', then 'we' must be 'industrious'; ad infinitum. Keep in mind, however, that if a bit of the 'self' is present in the 'other' within individual identity constructions, the same principle will apply in constructing ethnic group identity, as the following example will illustrate. Throughout the 18th and much of the nineteenth centuries, the English regarded the Irish as a distinctly inferior race though of the same colour. A Cambridge University historian of the period writes of his visit to Ireland. 'I believe there are not only many more of them than of old, but they are happier, better, more comfortably fed and lodged under our rule than they ever were. But to see white chimpanzees is dreadful; if they were black, one would not feel it so much, but their skins except where tanned by exposure, are as white as ours' (as quoted in Cornell and Hartmann 2007: 33).

Ethnic identity often has its source in the labels used by outsiders. In the early 1970s American films tended to re-present African Americans according to five stereotypes: toms, coons, mulattoes, mammies, and bucks

(Bogle 2001). The point of the images was to establish a value whereby to construct a particular identity. But the ethnic group targeted, in this case African Americans, does not have to accept the value attached to their identity. They may reject it and posit their own different self-conscious understanding. As Stephen Cornell and Douglas Hartmann emphasize, ethnic groups do not come to the process of identity construction empty-handed.²¹ With regard to internal differentiation (2007: 218-28), groups organize according to differences and similarities. We tend to think that 'they' are both different from 'us' yet very much like one another. How many times have we heard the stereotypic designation 'They all look alike'? We also tend to think that 'we' are different from 'them' in important ways but only from each other in less important ways. The claims we wish to make about 'them' and how different 'they' are from 'us' lay at the heart of racial identification as noted in the example above concerning the Irish.

If claiming an ethnic identity involves making a distinction from others, then it also means drawing boundaries between 'us' and 'them' by virtue of the same act. 'We' share something that 'they' do not. That perceived sharing, among other things, constitutes membership in a certain group; it includes while it simultaneously excludes. The stereotype maintains these sharp, boundary limits by defining who is clearly in and who is clearly out. As Pickering (2001: 49) describes it, 'Stereotyping is a boundary-maintaining move inward'. Boundary maintenance concerns membership within the ranks of a group. By employing stereotypical rhetoric, a group can constitute and ensure normality within its boundaries whereby to scapegoat and expel individuals from the social body who deviate from the norm. What motivates the exclusion or restriction may simply boil down to pure economics, a means of protecting access to scarce resources while restricting access by another group to the same resources. Weber (1968: 32) comments, 'Usually one group of competitors takes some externally identifiable characteristic of another group of (actual or potential) competitors—race, language, religion, local or social origin, descent, residence, etc.—as a pretext for attempting their exclusion'. Stereotyping helps to maintain the symbolic boundaries between 'us' and the 'them' of other social or ethnic categories in order to ensure our own sense of identity, security, and legitimacy. It represents cultural difference in terms which, according to Pickering (2004: 97), 'diverge from what is taken to be central, safe, normal and

21. Aside from internal differentiation, Cornell and Hartmann (2007: 211-46) also cite preexisting identities, population size, social capital, human capital, and symbolic repertoires as certain assets ethnic groups contribute to the process of identity construction.

conventional.... It is a collective process of judgment which feeds upon and reinforces powerful social and national myths'. The reification of cultural difference as foreignness can act to define national identity for an *ethnie* whose shared common (putative) history and destiny, common land and language reaffirm their sense of belonging. This feeling of national belonging or nationalism, which can exist without the existence of a nation-state, becomes a way for an ethnic group to imagine a relative sense of 'us' over against 'them'.

The boundaries between ethnic groups are often most clearly drawn and subtly but effectively reinforced (by the aid of stereotyping) within the construction site of daily experience. Cornell and Hartmann cite an example of violence perpetrated against a Chinese American mistaken for being Vietnamese. In July 1989 two white men pistol-whipped Jim Loo in a North Carolina pool hall. He died two days later from severe head injuries. While the reasons behind this and a number of other such incidents in the 1980s vary (resentments over the lost Vietnam War; perceived economic threats from Japan; legacy of White American prejudice against Asians; 2007: 200), the message was nonetheless strong: there is a significant boundary between Whites and Asians. Since 9/11 the same scenario has replayed itself with the object of attack being Arab Americans. American Muslims, and especially Arab Americans in the Detroit, Michigan region, became the object of hate crimes fueled by stereotypic notions though many had neither been to the Middle East nor spoke Arabic (see the FBI data of 2002 on hate crimes in Serrano 2002, and the 2004 University of Michigan study in Selvin 2004).

The boundaries between ethnic groups may even find reinforcement with laws. In the early colonial US, the first anti-miscegenation laws prohibiting White marriage with Africans or Indians occurred in Maryland in 1661. Eventually, 38 states came to adopt similar laws against interracial marriages. Such legislation accomplishes several things according to Cornell and Hartmann (2007: 188-89). First, it designates 'categories of *eligibles* and *ineligibles*' by delineating boundaries between the population groups. Second, it ascribes values by indicating that not only are 'they' different, but 'they' are also unworthy. Third, it encourages endogamous practices to safeguard against the dilution of group identity. Research has indicated a substantial correlation between this contextual factor of miscegenation and population size vis-à-vis boundary enforcement. Despite exceptions, the rule, at least with regard to populations of European descent in the US, seems to be that the larger the group, the greater the likelihood that women would marry within the group. But does the same rule hold true for men? And what if the social location is of a migratory nature and the

migrating group has a gender imbalance?²² I shall return to these germane issues in the next Chapter when discussing the social location of the ethnic group interaction and identity construction between 'Israel' and her neighbors.

Ethnic Identity and the Deuteronomistic History

There is perhaps no more seemingly innocuous yet deleterious locus where discourse, representation, and power converge than texts, including but not limited to literature. Since the origin of the term 'stereotype' derives from the manufacture of texts,²³ they obviously become the ideal means whereby to examine representations of the world. After all, stereotypes are simply just 'a crude set of mental representations of the world' (Gilman 1985: 17). The creation of the text fixes a closed world of language where the representations of the 'other' embedded within take on a life of their own and are taken for fact. As Said (1978: 94) notes, 'a text purporting to contain knowledge about something actual...can *create* not only knowledge but also the very reality they appear to describe'. And what happens when such texts get sucked into the vortex of power relations? You have the very phenomenon of that surrounding the Bible, virtually a Western text co-opted in the European colonialist and imperialist enterprises initially resulting in the subjugation of 85 percent of the globe but with ongoing effects still felt even today. The problem with biblical texts and their embedded

22. The experience of Chinese males migrating to the US in the nineteenth century serves as example. Although many planned to return to their homeland to marry once they had made enough money and had established a life in the US, they never did. As a result, they crossed the ethnic or racial boundary in order to marry, thus undermining that boundary. Such was the case when the time and success of many twentieth-century Chinese businessmen in the Mississippi Delta resulted in their marriage to African American women and establishment of roots in the Delta. Over time, however, they would engage in a racial makeover of sorts by altering their behavior to fit White models more closely. Part of that makeover included absolving social relationships with African Americans. Those who did not terminate their relationships (either of a co-habitive or marital nature) faced ostracism. See further the case study in Cornell and Hartmann 2007: 119-26.

23. In the late eighteenth century 'stereotyping' referred to a process, namely the casting of papier-mâché copies of printing type from a papier-mâché mould. The Scottish inventor William Ged patented stereotyping in 1725 but Firmin Didot improved the process, naming it and extending its use. The 'stereotype' was a printing plate (made by metal cast in a mould) from which printing was done. Prior to the process of stereotyping, second printings required the printing type to be reset. Cylinder presses, used in the traditional process of printing newspapers, had curved stereotype plates to fit the cylinders. Now the term has largely been replaced by 'electrotype'.

re-presentations of the 'other' coincides with that of stereotypes of the 'other' in the modern context. Who controls the re-presentations? Who defines 'them?' Whose interests are being served? Who benefits in the power relations of a given social context?

Very few scholars have engaged in any detailed and concentrated explorations into ethnicity and the DH, and none with consideration of stereotyping in the process of ethnic identity formation. I will address the contributions of two scholars, but not because of their reading perspective (definitely not postcolonial). While Uriah Kim engages both E. Theodore Mullen and Kenton Sparks on the issue of ethnicity, his concern is not with the issue of ethnic identity formation much less how that takes place. Instead, his concern is only to make the case for an Assyrian colonial context contra Sparks, who posits a Hellenistic context for understanding the ethnically charged landscape within the Josiah story. But the same argument could be made for another period (later than an Assyrian context) against Kim.

In *Narrative History and Ethnic Boundaries* (1993) Mullen contends that the DH functioned to respond to a crisis of assimilation and dissolution by a community whose identity as an ethnic group was threatened by the exile. The DH provided a means to form ethnic group identity beginning, first, with a 'common myth of descent' that all members of the group could share and thus solidify the group (10). The book of Deuteronomy tied the identity of this group to the land of Canaan. The deliverance of Israel, their choice by Yhwh as his own possession from all the nations of the earth, and the essence of their identity—and, I would add, the typecasting of the indigenes and other *ethnies* throughout—are inextricably bound up in their possession of the land (57-62). The books of Joshua and Judges enable the exilic community to 'bond' with the community of the 'past' thereby objectifying the conquest of the homeland presented as 'a ritualized ideal' in the former book (126-38).

The approach of Mullen does reflect a point of departure from the typical focus on the meaning and composition of the DH. And while he does use terms like 'ethnicity' and 'identity formation', his analysis really does not deal with ethnicity. Never does he explore the role of ethnicity in identity formation. Kenton Sparks critiques Mullen on this point. 'Mullen's work tends to focus much more on the definition of the Israelite community than on the place and function of ethnic sentiments with that definition. Because of this, although Mullen provides a careful analysis of religious identity in Deuteronomy, one will notice his rather thin treatment of some important issues that are integrally related to ethnicity' (1998: 272). Moreover, Mullen never elaborates on just what the crisis of assimilation was (Kim 2005: 199). Kim critiques Mullen for beginning the investigation

of the DH in the exilic period when the argument for the formation of ethnic identity could easily be made during the Josianic period. Nonetheless, what Mullen does contribute of importance to DH scholarship is the following: 'DH as history writing that functioned to help form ethnic group identity' (Kim 2005: 200). In spite of the criticism levied against Mullen and to his credit, he has since published *Ethnic Myths and Pentateuchal Foundations* (1997) with a concentrated focus on ethnicity—the components involved in the construction of an ethnic identity, group boundaries created within shared histories, and distinctive cultural characteristics (12-71)—albeit with a different corpus of literature than the DH.

Unlike Mullen, Kenton Sparks does provide a more extensive treatment of ethnicity in relation to the formation of group identity vis-à-vis the DH in his *Ethnicity and Identity in Ancient Israel* (1998). He employs six principles in his exploration into the relationship between ethnicity and identity formation in ancient Israel (18-22).

- (1) Ethnicity is one of the many varieties of human behavior and is perceptible only in certain cultural contexts.
- (2) Ethnicity is a phenomenon of genetic perception.
- (3) Ethnic sentiments do not arise in a vacuum but arise most intensively in the context of multicultural contact.
- (4) Phenotypical characteristics play an important role as ethnic *indicia*.
- (5) Ethnicity must be considered in its political, socio-structural, and economic setting.
- (6) Ethnic identities are highly fluid.

With these principles guiding his investigation, Sparks, like Mullen, affirms the centrality of the book of Deuteronomy in defining the religious identity of ancient Israel. Limiting his focus on the book of Deuteronomy, Sparks concludes that Deuteronomy (1) is supportive of foreign 'sojourners' (perhaps a means of protecting refugees/immigrants from the former northern kingdom); (2) establishes the primary criterion for community membership as a religious commitment to Yhwh; and (3) provides no clear and useful *indicia* for drawing boundaries between insiders and outsiders. These conclusions support his thesis: 'Deuteronomy's ethnic concern was much more the establishing of a sense of ethnic kinship among Israelites and Judeans than it was the excluding of foreigners from participation within the community' (283).

The points of continuity between Mullen and Sparks surpass any discontinuities. First, both scholars have Israel as their target focus for their investigations into ethnicity. Needless to say, the ethnic identity formation of the subaltern neighbours of Israel receives no attention by either scholar. This lack of attention by Western scholarship on the DH only further entrenches

a privileged position imputed to a history and people eclipsing that of the 'other'. Moreover, neither Mullen nor Sparks are explicitly clear about what they understand by the term 'Israel'. Do they have in mind biblical Israel? Historical Israel? Or ancient Israel?²⁴ Second, both affirm the 'what?' question relative to the ethnic group formation of Israel but never address the 'how?' question in any detail. In other words, neither scholar gives attention to the issue of re-presentation and the mode of stereotyping the 'other' essential to the 'self'-definition of 'Israel'. In addressing the 'how?' question, however, we must attend to the matter of social location most conducive wherein the literary re-presentation of 'Israel', or 'self', conjointly occurs with that of its ethnic neighbours as subaltern, or 'other'. We shall now turn our attention to the matter of social location where the re-presentation of the subaltern in a colonial context shaping identities plays itself out.

24. Philip Davies (1992) differentiates between three 'Israels': (1) biblical Israel—an ideological construction of biblical literature; (2) historical Israel—a group of peoples inhabiting the northern Palestinian highlands who left their imprint on Palestinian soil for several centuries; and (3) ancient Israel—a construct from an amalgamation of the other two. 'Ancient Israel', claims Davies (17), 'is both literary, in that it takes its point of departure from biblical Israel, and historical, in that scholars treat of its interaction with other states...But it is a mixture of two different sorts of entities'. To complicate an already circular process, scholars assume 'ancient Israel' to be the creator of the biblical literature and, hence, biblical Israel.

CONTEXTUALIZING A POLITICS OF RE-PRESENTATION

Exploring a re-presentation of the past—its characters, its purposes, by whom, and for what purposes—poses its own difficulties, not simply because of the potential paucity of data but rather because any construction of history is itself a political act. If nations are narrations as Bhabha contends, then any narration of the past becomes integrally linked with the realities of the present excluding other possible representations (Whitelam 1996: 124). Stories of the past become in actuality reflections of the present. Edmund Leach (1983) made the observation that stories are more a reflection of the world of the storytellers than of the reality narrated. Controlling the re-presentation of the past through narration simultaneously bears within the struggle for power and control in the present (present understood as the time of textual production). As Frederic Jameson (1981: 79) puts it in his description of the text ‘as a socially symbolic act’, the text becomes an ‘imaginary resolution’ of a ‘real (i.e. social) contradiction’ that never disappears;¹ rather, it ‘is merely papered over’ with its traces or figurations present within the text. Hence the construction of the past is a political act. Though the concern by Jameson with the text has to do solely with its production, my concern focuses on textual consumption, itself a form of the ongoing process of production since each act of the appropriation of a text by a given community in a given location essentially re-writes or re-textualizes the text. The social location where the re-presentation of ‘others’ via the primary history of the Hebrew Bible and its consumption ushering forth a cultural ethno-typing deserves our attention at this point.

1. Although in direct terms we can never know what History is, the prevalence of ideology allows us to know what it is not. Explaining the view of narrative by Jameson, William Dowling (1984: 98-99) comments that ‘every narrative simultaneously presents and represents a world’ and that ‘narrative seems at once to reveal or illuminate a world and to hide or distort it’. The literary text emerges within a particular history and produces an ideology revealing something about its relationship to that history while, as a strategy of containment, concealing the truth about the power struggles in that history—i.e. an absence (Jameson 1981: 76-79; Eagleton 1990: 72). Such ‘representation’ through historical writing prior to the Enlightenment characteristically ‘used historical knowledge for party or polemical purposes’ (White 1973: 51).

What concerns factor into the conflict ‘merely papered over’ between the ethnic group understanding itself as ‘Israel’ and its neighbors? What is at stake? What kind of an infrastructure must be present to facilitate such a literary re-presentation? Who especially within ‘Israel’ would benefit from this literary re-presentation? What benefits derive from the consumption of a history with its concurrent stereotype of ‘others’ and a conquest-settlement ideology? What social location best suits the convergence of all these issues? Answers to these and other questions will emerge as I make the case for the Yehud province during the Persian colonization era as the social location wherein to understand best the interplay of the re-presentation of and conflict with the ‘others’ in the initial *Nachleben* of this literary corpus.

I concur with Keith Whitelam (1989) that the conflicts within the biblical traditions including that of the primary history reflect the competing factional disputes over issues of control, land, and economic resources between the immigrants from Babylonia and the indigenous population of Yehud and its surrounding environs within the Persian period. No other book than the book of Judges best reflects this inter-ethnic struggle for control and power by a group claiming (consuming) and reshaping a past as its own (Whitelam 1996: 33), which is why I have chosen select ethnic myths from this book (with the exception of that of the Samari(t)ans) in part two to treat the stereotypic re-presentations of other ethnic groups. While the exploration of re-presentation in this Chapter will necessarily illumine the location and nature of the group calling itself ‘Israel’, the ultimate goal with this study intends to free the silenced voices of Palestinian history from the tyranny of the discourse of biblical studies though I readily acknowledge what may seem the unlikeliest of places from which to do so, namely a context (biblical studies) culpable for a ‘retrojective imperialism’, to use a phrase by Philip Davies, suppressing these subaltern voices in the first place. Whole volumes have been dedicated to the issue of the Persian Yehud context as that for the production of much of the Hebrew literature so I will not cover in great detail ground traversed by more competent scholars on the subject. Rather, I will only recapitulate those salient points relevant for the case I which to make discussing first a politics of ‘exile’, Persian administrative structures next, and, finally, the society of Persian Yehud.

A Politics of ‘Exile’

Nobody really questions the legitimacy of the Babylonian deportations of elite Judean citizens as historical fact. Instead, a growing number of scholars now question what originated as theory—namely, the Babylonian exile for the social milieu of the production of the texts of Genesis–2 Kings—that

has long since crystallized into fact within biblical scholarship. Would it make a difference in the discussion were we to take a close, hard look at the politics of deportation—what that implied, not only for those deported but also for the issue of textual production? And what kind of difference would it make for the present state of biblical scholarship? Does it make a difference if we make a distinction between the terms ‘deportation’ and ‘exile’ to characterize the experience of the elite Judean citizens?

At the risk of overstating the obvious, deportations were not enjoyable experiences that people in the ancient world looked forward to as an opportunity to experience a new culture and broaden their cultural horizons with the realization that you will someday return home. Deportations as an aspect of foreign imperial policies in the ancient Near Eastern world were intended to destroy nationality and, regardless of protocol, always an effort to suppress the possibilities of any potential revolt. Those deported were subjugated or, to use the language of postcolonialism, colonized, and those provinces annexed to the imperial administrative system as colonies. Any leisurely activities of the colonized were dictated by the needs of the empire. Moreover, were we to assume, for the sake of argument, the theory-turned-fact, we are left with this puzzling question, how did the scribal elites deported to Babylonia have access to all the literary traditions, fragmentary or complete, whereby to compose the large corpus of Genesis–2 Kings? Here, I find the observations by Davies (1992: 41) on the scenario requisite for this literary production to occur as assumed by biblical scholarship particularly illuminating.

If we set aside for a moment the ‘exile’, and reflect on what we may reasonably surmise about deportations, we find ourselves somewhat incredulous about the plausibility not so much of the contradictory biblical picture, but of the scholarly reconstruction that obliges us to picture deportees carrying much of their (presumed) traditional literature with them, presumably in scrolls. Now, the point of deportation, whether as punishment or as resource management (as it frequently was) is to break a link between deportees and their homeland, and the idea of exiled priests (or administrators) carrying bundles of scrolls is a curious one. Again, the deported culture is depicted as having been deliberately settled in such a way as to reconstitute their native culture on foreign soil.

Given the point of deportation to alienate people from their homelands and everything associated with the ideology of their homeland, it seems completely inconceivable that the Judean deportees would have had access to the biblical documents or literary traditions or that they would have likely been allowed to take any scrolls (assuming any existed) with them privately. What literary archives existed would have likely stayed behind in

Judah. As Davies (1992: 77) aptly notes, 'it is biblical scholarship which has painted an entirely fanciful portrait of religious fervor and furious literary creativity among Judeans in Babylonia. There is little biblical evidence for any such activity and it goes against everything that we know or can infer about deported populations'.

In the face of the intention of deportations to destroy nationality, the ideology of exile would appear to be a means of preserving nationality. Rife with connotations, the ideology of exile works in tandem with the myth of the empty land. The 'empty land' myth (for detailed treatment of this concept, see further Carroll 1992; Barstad 1996; and Oded 2003), originating with 2 Chronicles 36.17-21 and perpetuated by much of biblical scholarship, basically maintains that those who happened to escape the Babylonian army with their lives were deported and the land was desolate, evaluated as a 'sabbath rest'. In other words, the land lay fallow with no population to work it. Recent surveys, however, have underscored this myth as just that. Despite the generous estimate of the population of mid-sixth-century BCE Yehud at 200,000 by Joel Weinberg (1972; 1992), current demographic studies place the population of Persian Yehud at 30,000 or less with the population of Jerusalem itself being no more than 3,000, based on the usual percentage of the ten percent or less sustainable by the productive agricultural base in traditional agrarian economies (see Carter 1999: 199-201, 246, 249, 288; and Lipschits 2003). The ideologies of exile and the empty land assert an inalienable 'control over' and 'rights to' a land polluted and contaminated by its inhabitants. Lying empty of people and having been purified by paying off its Sabbath debts, the land awaits its possession by its rightful owner(s) from whom it has only been temporarily denied. The reality, however, of an occupied land poses a threat to the returnees both in terms of opposition and pollution (Carroll 1992). I will discuss these later. The immigration (Heb. *'aliyya*) to the imagined homeland best reflects the circumstances surrounding an ideological construction of the Second Temple period wherein the myths of the national history of Genesis–2 Kings not only fuel a sense of nationalism, but also recapitulate the claimed legitimacy by a particular group to the land and facilitates their construction of identity as 'Israel' vis-à-vis the 'others'. Davies (1992: 41) concludes on the matter of the 'exile':

All that the biblical ideology of exile proves is that the rulers and writers of the Persian province of Yehud who came (in large measure, at least) from Babylonia claimed that they were the legitimate judges of what was right—that they could rule, legislate, and be priests, because they had brought the ancient law and preserved the authentic priesthood. Underlying these rights, of course, is the fundamental right to interpret history!

What makes the difference between preferring the term 'exile' over 'deportation'? Perhaps only the small matter of power (I speak with heavy tongue-in-cheek) manifested in Western colonizing and imperializing tendencies, including the discipline of biblical studies whose unquestioning of the ideological claims of 'exile' within the Bible unwittingly collaborate in the perpetuation of power structures in the modern period that have relied on just such ideologies, that have resulted in the maligning re-presentation of 'other' ethnic groups by those identifying themselves as 'Israel'.

We should not overlook the fact that the ruling elite of Judea were not alone among the large groups of deportees taken away into Babylon. Other local kingdoms of southern Palestine and the Transjordan—Edom, Ammon, Moab, Samaria, to name a few—suffered as well from the damages inflicted by Nebuchadrezzar and the Babylonian army. By annexing this vast territory under the Babylonian provincial system, Nebuchadrezzar basically created a buffer zone between Babylon and Egypt. But Nebuchadrezzar wasted no efforts toward the economic revitalization of this devastated and diminished region. Instead, resources and manpower were invested in rebuilding those parts of Babylonia most affected by the long years of war with the Assyrians. In other words, shoring up the economy of Babylonia proper became first priority, and the deported elite classes were put to this work. The greatest needs for the Babylonian empire in the late sixth century BCE were government and food. As was the case with typical imperial tendencies, the acquisition of labor forces would have been transported into areas of greatest need. Therefore, in the urban areas some of the Judean elite with governmental experience deported to Babylonia would have worked within the Babylonian palace system. That one of the last kings of Judah, Jehoiachin, sat at the table of the Babylonian emperor may indicate his capacity as a state advisor of some sort rather than simply as a place of honor (Berquist 1995: 16). Scribes and priests, too, would have found similar lines of work available within the palace or the temple to fill an imperial need though their employer and focus would be different. Not all of the elite, however, would have ended up filling an imperial need in the urban areas. Some would have been subjugated to the rural areas to ensure the increase of food production. The Nippur region of the alluvial plain especially required redevelopment—digging and dredging canals, working the land. Babylonia had turned away from a dependence on outside food sources to intensify its own core agriculture. The land area between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers required extensive irrigation. It is quite possible that deportees along with Ezekiel, near the Chebar canal in the Nippur region (Ezek. 1, 3), were subjugated to farm labour as a part of this Babylonian intensification process. One point requires stress: whether co-opted to develop the economy in the urban or the rural areas of Babylon, these deportees were not slaves.

Meanwhile, back in Palestine, the Babylonians certainly would not have created a settlement vacuum, which would have been counterproductive, threatening to undermine stability and control in the region. Judah would still need to pay taxes, and there would need to be some form of government in place to coordinate the collection of taxes and to ensure Babylonian interests in this newly annexed province. The social structure included some hierarchy if only a thin overlay of imperial bureaucracy at the top. That hierarchy included an imperial appointed governor, Gedaliah (2 Kgs 25. 23-26). And occupying the bottom of the social stratum would have been the Jewish peasants along with numerous immigrants from the outlying provinces of Samaria, Moab, Ammon, and Edom (Jer. 40.11-12). Rural settlements especially were needed to provide the wine, olive oil, grain, and other agricultural produce as taxes (Lipschits 2006: 23-24). This did not cease with the transfer of power to the Achaemenids, who also valued the rural settlements within the hill country as an important source of agricultural goods. Thus, the deportations of Judea did not leave the land empty contra the 'empty land' myth. We must instead counterbalance the textual base of the 'empty land' myth with those texts of 2 Kings 24-25 and Jeremiah 39 and 52 where, clearly, other classes of people, including 'the poorest people of the land' remained. Thus not only was the land not made completely empty by the deportations, but all of the upper classes were not deported. Only those deported were considered Judah, and those Judeans left behind, along with the imperial-appointed governor Gedaliah, regarded as *persona non grata*. In conclusion, the concerns of Babylonian domestic interests with its deportees, the ideologies of 'exile' and 'empty land' in the primary history, the rhetorical bias toward those deported within said history, and the lack of any inter-ethnic conflict as part of the process of identity formation in Babylonia altogether would rule out the social location of Babylonian exile as that for the production, much less consumption, of the primary history of Genesis–2 Kings.

Persian Administrative Infrastructure

With the takeover of the Babylonian empire and its provinces by Persia in 539 BCE, the administrative system virtually remained unchanged. The territories of Neo-Babylonia, namely that of Babylonia proper and all those 'Beyond/Across the River' (Akk. *Ebir nari*, Aram. '*abar nahara*, Heb. '*eber hannahar*') (e.g. Samaria, Syria, Ammon, Moab), were regarded as one satrapy ruled by Governor Gubaru. Not until the accession of Darius I (522/21 BCE) did the Persians establish the subdistrict 'Beyond the River' by name. Like Babylonia, Eber Nari had its own governor, the most noted one being Tattenai (518-502), who was subordinate to the 'governor of

Babylonia and Eber Nari'. The two provinces of Babylonia and Eber Nari continued to function as one unit even with Ustani (Ushtanu) succeeding Gubaru as governor in 520. Only after the suppression of the Babylonian revolt in 482 by Xerxes did the subdistrict of Eber Nari become a separate province (Aram. and Heb. *medinah*) given independent and equal status known as the fifth satrapy.

Imperial Policies

Officials of each satrapy within the Persian administration were never locals but rather appointees sent by the king or his agent to each satrapy to administer it. Each satrapy was further subdivided administratively into provinces (e.g. Megiddo, Samaria, Yehud, Ashdod, and possibly Idumaea), autonomous cities (e.g. Tyre and Sidon), or tribal areas (e.g. the Arab tribes of the Negev and southern Transjordan), and imposed a tax (for further discussion of each of these administrative polities, see Ephal 1988). In fact, the imperial administration imposed six different classes of taxes whereby to extract revenues from the provinces: (1) the tribute tax, or king's tax, taken on the agricultural produce; (2) the poll tax, based on the ability of a person to work; (3) the land tax, virtually a property tax; (4) the sales tax, generally applied to slave sales; (5) taxes on other products of the land, such as mineral wealth; and (6) other resources (Grabbe 2004: 195). The tribute tax of Eber Nari was 350 silver talents per annum extracted ostensibly from the provinces since neither the Phoenician city-states nor the Arabs were required to pay a tax though Herodotus does mention 'gifts' in the form of 1,000 talents of frankincense delivered annually from the king of the Arabs to the Persian royal treasury. These 'gifts', fixed in quantity and in payment time, were most likely customs duty of spices imported along the Mediterranean coast from Gaza to Ienysus controlled by the king of the Arabs.

The Persians would have naturally claimed the land of Judah as imperial domain after the fall of Babylon. As a strategy to reorganize the empire, the Persian restoration of the province of Yehud would have included the resettlement of peoples, the foundation of new settlements, the restoration/creation of temples, and sometimes the establishment of lawcodes (Davies 1992: 82). The central government promoted the codification and implementation of local traditional law. In a manner reminiscent to the mission of Ezra, Darius I sent Udjahorresnet, an Egyptian priest, back to Egypt to reorganize the priestly 'houses of life', and Darius had the traditional Egyptian law codified and written up in Aramaic and Demotic Egyptian. Each province, including that of Yehud, had its own governor in spite of the specious theory originated by Albrecht Alt that Yehud remained under the

administrative authority of the governor of Samaria until Nehemiah. The imperial regime appointed governors to ensure the *pax persica* throughout the empire, and the control and supervision of Yehud would have been no exception. Though governors like Zerubbabel (a Babylonian name) and Nehemiah, and the imperial envoy Ezra, may have had ties with the deported elite of Jerusalem, they were nevertheless appointed by and took their marching orders from the Persian imperial regime. What this means, according to Davies (1992: 78), is that these satrapal officials may not have necessarily been Judean 'exiles' returning home, 'beneficiaries of an enlightened policy of repatriation of wronged exiles, but subjects of transportation, moved to under-developed or sensitive regions for reasons of imperial economic and political policy'. Whether or not these returnees were originally from Judah ultimately matters not; they believed themselves to be and claimed themselves to be indigenous.

Temple-State Yehud

Contrary to assumptions within biblical studies, Yehud was not an autonomous temple-state. Persian governors represented the interests of the empire. Instances during the tenure of Nehemiah as governor bear out the intrusion of Persian imperial rule within Yehud. First, the emperor deployed imperial military forces, the 'King's Men', with Nehemiah on his mission to Jerusalem (Neh. 2.9). Second, Nehemiah fortified the city of Jerusalem and appointed his brother Hanani as garrison commander (Neh. 7.1-2). Finally, Nehemiah used forced labour from among the people. In addition, Achaemenid rule made its presence felt throughout the hill country with the establishment of administrative centers and garrisoned forts at strategic points along the main roads. Aside from maintaining control of the local populations, the governor also had the responsibility of overseeing the collection of the 'tribute tax' (Aram. *middah*, Neh. 5.4; Ezz. 4.20; 6.8; or *mindah*, Ezz. 4.13; 7.24) from the citizens. Within the province of Yehud, the citizens were equally responsible for the poll tax (*belo*; Ezz. 4.13, 20; 7.24) and land tax (*halak*, Ezz. 4.13, 20; 7.24). Whether or how much of these latter two taxes levied by satrapal authorities went to the king remains uncertain. But it is highly probable that members of the satrapal administration benefited from this income. It would have been the function of the imperial appointed bureaucrats within the administration of the governor to collect all three of these taxes for the emperor. As Muhammad A. Dandamaev (2006: 394) notes,

The governors of all levels...had at their disposal various officials, as well as scribes, messengers, and sometimes even merchants. They

were obliged to keep order and carry out justice, as well as supervising the economics of their districts and their local civil servants, and overseeing the receipt of state taxes and tolls and the fulfillment of duties.

When paying their taxes, the citizens of Yehud had the responsibility of rendering quality produce to the governor and his staff. They were also responsible for providing payments for the maintenance of each governor and his retinue (Neh. 5.14-19), obliged to provide *corvée* labour (Neh. 3), and provide for the royal court whenever it moved about the empire. If these obligatory demands were not oppressive enough upon the Yehudim, they were also levied with a religious, or temple tax (Heb. *terumah*; Neh. 10.40; 12.44; 13.5). They supplied economic support to the Temple, the priesthood, and all of its royal-appointed functionaries. The temple tax, along with all of the other taxes, was paid to the temple functionaries with the agricultural contributions of grain, wine, and oil stored in the chambers of the temple, along with any precious metals that had been melted down and cast into convenient form at the foundries.² Clearly, two separate taxation systems were operative at the Jerusalem temple in the Persian Yehud province—a Persian system organized at the satrapal level and a local system based on the religious tax (Schaper 1995: 538-39).

In appropriating the Neo-Babylonian provincial system intact, the Achaemenids also retained the temple-state system. The propagandistic declaration of goodwill by Cyrus that enabled the repatriation of homelands by deportees also patronized the restoration of temples in these homelands though not for religious reasons as much as for economic reasons (Grabbe [2004: 209-16] vigorously argues against the oft-exaggerated 'Persian religious policy' that asserts Persian financial subsidizing of local cults contra Blenkinsopp [1991: 26]). The evidence from Babylonia and Egypt indicate special exceptions to Persian policy in general in that the Achaemenid kings took care to rebuild the local cult centres. During the reign of Cyrus, the Enunmakh and Enanna temples in Uruk were restored. Darius I is credited with restoring and building temples in Egypt leading to his posthumous deification. During the tenure of Artaxerxes I (or II?), a Persian satrap in Lydia promoted the cult of a local Zeus and discouraged aberrant religious practices (see Blenkinsopp 1991: 24-25).

2. The foundries became integral to the establishment of temples throughout the Achaemenid empire. According to Joachim Schaper (1995), they were 'crucial instruments of the Achaemenid fiscal administration. They served as collectors of the tax income of both the temple and the state'. As early as 1936, C. C. Torrey had highlighted the significance of foundries for the Jerusalem temple administration though he failed to see beyond the 'founder' as mere craftsman.

Temples in Achaemenid Babylonia, but also throughout other areas of the Persian empire, functioned as branches of the fiscal administration of the central government. The temple-state worked as a religiously based political-economic system. Temples were the city treasury with their income generated by the tithe, or temple tax. In Mesopotamia, the temple owned and administered a great deal of land while utilizing a large amount of slave labour. How much, if any, parcels of land constituted the property holdings of the Yehud temple-state remains a matter of speculation. Nonetheless, the religious tax exacted as a part of the Babylonian temple-state bears relevance for the fiscal administration of the Yehud temple-state. Dandamaev and Lukonin (1989: 361-62) comment:

Judging by documents from Babylonia, the tithe was paid in the majority of cases in barley and dates, but not infrequently also in silver, emmer, sesame, wool, clothing, small livestock, cattle, poultry, fish, etc.... It was necessary to pay [the tithe] from the land which was the property of individual persons, and also from income which tenants had received from temple and other lands which they had rented. It was apparently paid by all the inhabitants of the country, with each person paying it from his own income to that temple near which he had land or other sources of income.

The most important of royal officials stationed in temples, the *sa-res sarri*, tax inspectors or comptrollers, if you will, supervised the payments of the tithe and the performance of state duties by the temples (Dandamaev 2006: 374). This royal official would divert part of the temple tax via the 'king's chest' to the king. The royal commissioner or comptroller had an assistant (*gitepatu* or *yoser*) who was in charge of the temple foundry but also acted as an assayer of precious metals. Assaying, casting, and storing precious metal; rationalizing, systematizing, and centralizing the collection of taxes in silver and in kind were tasks beyond the abilities of one man, thus prompting Schaper (1995: 533) to suggest that there had to have been a department devoted just to this aspect of temple economy. That department would have included scribes and accountants at the disposal of the *sa-res sarri*.

The Scribal Class(es)

Nobody seriously questions the presence of scribes and their connection with literacy in the ancient Near Eastern world (see the thorough cataloguing of sources pertaining to scribes throughout the Second Temple period, including the Roman era, in Schams 1998). Even the Hebrew Bible mentions numerous scribes (*sopherim*) by name: Jonathan, David's 'uncle' (1 Chr. 27.32); Shemaiah, son of Nathanel the Levite (24.6); Seraiah (2 Sam. 8.17; Sheva in 2 Sam. 20.25; Shavsha in 1 Chr 8.16; Shisha in 1 Kgs

4.3); Seraiah's sons Elihoreph and Ahiyah (1 Kgs 4.3); Jeiel (2 Chr 26.11); Shebna (2 Kgs 18.18, 37; 19.2 = Isa 36.3, 22; 37.2); Shaphan, son of Azaliah son of Meshullam (2 Kgs 22.3, 8-10, 12 = 2 Chr 34.15, 18, 20); Elishama (Jer 36.12, 20-21); Baruch, son of Neriah (Jer. 36.26, 32); Jonathan (Jer. 37.15, 20); Ezra (Ezra 7.6, 11; Neh. 8.1, 4, 9, 13); and Zadok (Neh. 13.13). We even find two additional, unnamed scribes—*sepher hammelek* (2 Kgs 12.11 = 2 Chr 24.11) and *hasepher sar hatseba*, 'the scribe of the army commander', (2 Kgs 25.19 = Jer. 52.25)—along with references to groups or families of scribes—the Kenite scribal families at Jabez (1 Chr 2.55; here contrast 'Siphrites', residents of Qiriath-sepher, or 'Sopherim' as a family name, Fox 2000, 97 n. 62); Levite scribes (2 Chr 34.13); and the royal scribes of Ahasuerus (Est. 3.12; 8.9). Of course, how much of what we read in the biblical texts concerning the governmental administration of Judah, especially with regard to the Davidic monarchy, as a projection from the social milieu of a much later time period remains a point of debate. Nonetheless, scribes performed an indispensable role to the vital function of any imperial administration, particularly any as expansive as that of Persia. What we lack absolute certainty on is the different types and functions of scribes within the Persian Yehud temple-state. By our careful consideration of this matter, we may also shed light on an appropriate social location where the type of complex infrastructural administration and type of literacy requisite for the production of such a massive literary corpus as Genesis–2 Kings could occur, and where the consumption of said literature could serve an ideological function benefiting a certain class of people.

Scribal Functions

Who were the scribes and what did they do? Jonathan Z. Smith (1978: 70) provides the following descript dossier.

The scribes were an elite group of learned, literate men, an intellectual aristocracy which played an invaluable role in the administration of their people in both religious and political affairs. They were dedicated to a variety of roles: guardians of their cultural heritage, intellectual innovators, world travelers..., lawyers, doctors, astrologers, diviners, magicians, scientists, court functionaries, linguists, exegetes, etc. Their greatest love was the story of themselves and they guarded and transmitted their teaching...They speculated about hidden heavenly tablets,...about the beginning and end and thereby claimed to possess the secrets of creation. Above all, they talked, they memorized and remembered, they wrote.

Among descriptors of scribes as 'intellectuals' (R. Norman Whybray, *The Intellectual Tradition of the Old Testament*, 1974), 'sages' (John G. Gammie

and Leo G. Perdue, eds., *The Sage in Israel and the Ancient Near East*, 1990), and 'the wise' (Moshe Weinfeld, *Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomistic School*, 1972), Weinfeld (1972: 177-78) succinctly profiles them as 'persons who had at their command a vast reservoir of literary material, who had developed and were capable of developing a literary technique of their own, those experienced in literary composition, and skilled with the pen and the book: these authors must consequently have been the *soferim-hakamim*'. Before considering the issue of scribes and literacy, however, we must keep in mind that scribal functions were as diverse as scribal types; just as there were 'king's scribes', palace/court scribes, administrative scribes, and temple scribes (just to name a known few) ranging the gamut from higher to middle to lower levels in the imperial administration across the satrapies and provinces within the satrapies so scribal functions were much more diversified beyond simply literary composition.

It seems completely inconceivable that the Achaemenids in annexing the Babylonian provincial system intact within its own administrative system would have completely overhauled the scribal functions. In fact, no evidence suggests they did so. Therefore, many of the scribal functions within the Babylonian imperial administration would have naturally continued with the transition to the Achaemenid system.³ Scribes in Mesopotamia served a variety of capacities, and many likely performed more than one function though they may have had a specialization in only one particular function. Here are but a sampling of the numerous scribal functions in Mesopotamia (the same held true for Egyptian scribes too) summarized from *Scribes, Visionaries, and the Politics of Second Temple Judea* by Richard Horsley (2007: 72). With regard to administrative capacities, some scribes were 'mere recorders of goods received as payment tithes and tribute by the temples and/or royal storehouses and the disbursement of goods to workers on state building projects'. At higher administrative levels, some scribes would have been 'sages' and served as 'secretaries', advisors, and high-ranking officers in the imperial court. Some scribes would have cultivated collections of official laws; composed, cultivated, and copied a range of official statements, ritual texts, and other texts. Some scribes would have composed royal pronouncements, messages or formulas to be inscribed on monuments, founding inscriptions for the erection of temples and palaces, and official correspondence. Some scribes would have provided hymns to the king, royal mythic epics for court entertainment, edification,

3. The study of scribal activity in Mesopotamia by Leo Oppenheim (1975: 34-46) distinguished three particular roles for the scribal class: bureaucrat, poet, and scholar. As a bureaucrat, the scribes would have kept archives, wrote annals, composed diplomatic correspondences, and liturgical pieces.

and self-justification. Some Mesopotamian scribes were quite adept at divination. In short, 'scribes preserved the cultural legacy'.

In a similar manner, scribes would naturally have been employed on all levels of the Achaemenid administration of Yehud. In fact, no evidence attests of independent scribes outside the Achaemenid and Temple administrations. At the higher levels certain scribes would have been knowledgeable of national as well as Persian laws; reputable as wise scholars and intellectuals; familiar with books, laws, and frequently the sciences (Schams 1998: 284-86); involved in official correspondence, diplomacy, and councils of state (Fox 2000: 96-105). Ezra was such a high imperial official. At the middle and lower levels certain scribes would have performed various administrative functions such as accounting and other financial matters; all kinds of records, including but not limited to census and taxation (Schams 1998: 46-71, 290); and building projects. Sometimes the functions of administrative personnel overlapped with those of Temple personnel (e.g. when the high priest functioned as governor or in the sphere of tax collection). According to Christine Schams (1998: 311), 'The only securely attested function for a scribe at this level during the early postexilic period is the supervision of the distribution of tithes to the priests and Levites'. Nevertheless, she identifies other possible functions of the Temple scribes as 'writing and checking of genealogical lists and other records'; 'the copying of books containing songs, the national history and laws'; and perhaps even teaching reading and/or writing on a limited scale to priests and Levites. Not all scribes were Levites, but of those that were, some functioned as 'literate officials' (*shoterim*) and as judges (*shophetim*) for outside matters (1 Chr 23.1-6; 26.29-32).⁴ Unlike their Mesopotamian counterparts, Yehudian scribes did not seem to possess the specialization of magic or divination.

Aside from royal appointment, scribes came to their position by a variety of means including transferring allegiances when one imperial administration subsumed that of another, by formal training in a school, and by a family tradition. Sons in Yehud seemed to follow their fathers in the scribal profession, at least in the high-level positions. Mentioned previously were the 'families of the scribes at Jabez', sons of Caleb (1 Chr 2.42-55). Shaphan, the scribe, had three sons—Ahikam, Elasa, and Gemariah—the latter of which must have been literate, had some supervisory capacity in the Temple

4. Interestingly, the Septuagint translates *shoter* and *shophet* with *grammateus* ('scribe'). Schams (1998: 83) notes that the *grammateis* in various Septuagintal passages function in a variety of ways: 'leadership positions with unspecified functions; high royal officials with representative, administrative and financial responsibilities, and with reading expertise; professional writing; advisory and public functions as wise and educated men; an association with the law; and...an army official'.

because he had a chamber, and is counted among all the officials (*sarim*, Jer. 26.24; 29.3; 36.10-12). The grandson of Shaphan, Gedaliah ben Ahikam, was later appointed as governor of the province of Yehud by the Babylonian king (2 Kgs 25.22-25; Jer. 40). Alongside Gemariah, the book of Jeremiah also mentions Elishama as occupying the office of 'the scribe' (Jer. 36.12, 20-21), which would seem to raise several points. First, the Judean king (or perhaps the Babylonian king) could easily replace Shaphan or one of his sons with Elishama 'the scribe' in the last days of Judah. Second, more than one prominent scribe and scribal family among the professional scribes at the highest administrative levels coexisted, though probably not peacefully if the anti-Babylonian faction of the Judean population led by Ishmael, the grandson of Elishama, who assassinated Gedaliah, leader of the pro-Babylonian element, is any indication (2 Kgs 25.25; Jer. 41). Rivalry and conflicts obviously existed among the highly placed scribes and scribal families during the neo-Babylonian era that persisted into Persian Yehud.

Scribes and Literacy

When approaching the topic of literacy and literature in the ancient world, we tend to allow our imaginations to run unbridled with uncritical assumptions—e.g. our experience as naturally that of the ancient world (largely a literate society where everyone can read and write and the children went to school) or a retrojected knowledge of Graeco-Roman education upon the pre-Hellenistic era. The question of literacy and the problematic of schools vis-à-vis ancient Israelite society has not gone without due attention by scholarship in formal presentations, journal articles, or whole volumes. And my concern at this point is certainly not to revivify the debate. Rather, I wish to concentrate my thoughts on the production of literature and the scribal class.

André Lemaire made the strong case for widespread literacy and, more pointedly, an extensive school system in monarchic Judah on the basis of epigraphic evidence.⁵ Despite the attractiveness of this proposal, it has not gone without criticism. For example, Davies (1998: 82), just one of many who have taken this enthusiastic proposal by Lemaire to task, raises two objections with regard to this entire issue of literacy and literary composition. First, an ancient agrarian society would require the need for the spread of literacy. It would hardly spread automatically. Second, the supply for the

5. The evidence identified by Lemaire included abecedaries (writing exercises of the alphabet), scriptural evidence, and comparative evidence (school education in Egypt and Mesopotamia). While his proposal of widespread literacy and a comprehensive school system in Israel and Judah has attracted a number of scholars, the evidence he adduces could either make the case for scribal schools or none at all.

spread of literacy in an ancient agrarian society seems highly implausible. The monarchy would not be inclined to promote literacy since keeping literacy under their control would be but one means to govern. And it seems highly unlikely that the scribes would willingly relinquish their monopoly on writing.

Here, a distinction of the term 'literacy' by Menahem Haran (1988) might prove helpful. If we mean by 'literacy' the ability to read signs, to scratch out a name, or to have a personal seal, then perhaps literacy could have extended beyond the elite classes. But if we mean by 'literacy' the ability to compose literature, then, No, literacy did not extend beyond the elite classes. To be able to compose literature requires a level of literacy beyond simply that of scratching out abecedaries. Writing literature in the ancient world constituted a capacity, motivation, and opportunity to compose literature. In addition, the activity of writing also required economic support in addition to a specialized knowledge. It required 'a professional class with time, resources, and motivation to write' and, in some cases, 'access to official archives' (Davies 1992: 102). Within modern societies with a 90 percent literacy rate, less than 1 percent writes books. The widespread literacy but with a small-scale literati in modern societies reveals the sobering reality of the certain limitations upon literary endeavors to a select few even in the ancient world. Only a certain segment of society produced literature in the ancient world. David Jamieson-Drake employs an anthropological approach in *Scribes and School in Monarchic Judah* (1991) whereby to understand the complexity of state administration requisite for scribal activity. He concludes the likelihood of literacy beyond the small percentage of the elite class as minimal. Writing literature in the ancient world was a scribal activity 'confined to less than five per cent of any ancient agrarian society' (1992, 19). Writing the literature of Genesis–2 Kings was neither the product of a total ancient agrarian society (95 percent of it illiterate) nor of isolated individuals, but rather of a particular elite class.

With this literature being the product of a certain socio-economic stratum, it naturally reflects the individual, group, or class interests helping produce it. The creation of the biblical literature by the scribal class, an elite class of intelligentsia even within the upper echelons of society, would certainly reflect their own class-consciousness. Specific socio-economic and political conditions gave rise to the production of literature in the ancient world with that literature bearing within the figurations of those conditions. Produced by a select literate group, the biblical literature would have been intended for a select literate group. Reading literature in the ancient world was not a leisurely activity; rather, this literature was written principally for self-consumption, perhaps either for education or consulting or copying (Davies 1992: 85, 104). There is no doubt that scribal duties encompassed

a wide variety of functions, but it was the literary activities of the scribes that carried the greatest weight of ideological control—from archiving (an activity to possess and control the present) to historiography (an activity to possess and control the past) to didactic writing (an activity to maintain social values among the elite class) to predictive writing (an activity to possess and control the future) (Davies 1998: 74-75).

From what we know of the Persian imperial administrative infrastructure, the functions of the scribes, and the literacy and social conditions requisite for the production of a massive literary corpus such as Genesis–2 Kings, Persian Yehud best fits the social location for understanding the representations of the ‘other’ amidst the inter-ethnic conflicts. And if the elaborate administrative system as described in 1 Chronicles 23-27 reflects any social milieu with the centrality of the temple in the entire administration and the assignment of financial and legal matters to temple staff, such as the Levites, it reflects best that of Persian Yehud administrative operations (Davies 1998: 78-79). As a part of the governing bureaucracy, the scribe, employed either by the temple or the palace, would have served the interests of the Persian king or satrap ultimately but also that of the ruling elite whom the Persians had installed to administer the province of Yehud. The royal archives in Jerusalem that would have survived the demise of the monarchy would have been accessible to these scribes. Finally, the statement from 2 Maccabees 2.13-14 deserves consideration.

The same things are reported in the records and in the memoirs of Nehemiah, and also that he founded a library and collected the chronicles of the kings, the writings of prophets, and the works of David, and royal letters about sacred offerings. In the same way Judas also collected all the books that had been lost on account of the war that had come upon us, and they are in our possession.

However much credibility we can assign to this statement, at the very least it indicates the existence of a library of books thought to have been in existence in Persian Yehud during the time of Nehemiah. Wherever we find an archival collection, there must essentially be the presence of scribes (an archival collection also points to the beginning processes of canonization, a concern lying well beyond the purview of this study, but see Davies 1998 and David Carr’s *Writing on the Tablet of the Heart* [2005]).

An exploration of the biblical literature for the figurations of the socio-economic and political conditions giving rise to its production and consumption may further illumine the social location for Genesis–2 Kings. The premier concern of the book of Deuteronomy, for instance, has to do with the construction of an ideal society constituted as a group of immigrants wedded to a central sanctuary and its monotheistic cult. This ideal society/nation

of immigrants furthermore lives among other (indigenous) nations whom the deity has dispossessed. As Davies (1998: 96) notes, 'the brooding presence of an inimical population and a recommendation to remove them make little sense in a monarchic state'. To condone and initiate such a pogrom of civil war would completely undermine the stability of the monarchy. Nor would such inter-ethnic issues with nothing at stake be of concern for a group of deportees saddled with Babylonian economically motivated domestic concerns. The kind of ethnic identity envisioned by the rhetoric of this literature is the creation of a society within a society as well as a society untainted by exogamous marriages.⁶ The concern of intermarriage vis-à-vis the endogamy/exogamy motif resounds in the book of Judges (1.11-15/3.1-5) to bespeak the concern of an immigrant group with self-identity amidst claims of divine right to land ('to Judah', Judg. 1.1-2; reaffirmed in 20.18), which would be of especial relevance for an in-group trying to establish its political authority contested in a land not theirs—i.e. a context of immigration. Despite the tendentiousness of the books of Ezra and Nehemiah as historical sources, they nonetheless remain our principal insight into how a particular group construed its own identity in a mid-to-late fifth century (or perhaps later)⁷ Yehud context, regardless of whether it was actually the case or not. This group re-presented their collective identity according to the programmatic script as 'Israel' coming from exile, hence as 'returnees' or immigrants.

The complete depiction of an absence of royal function, indeed monarchic impotence, by the book of Deuteronomy, and the ultimate failure of the monarchy within the primary history does not bespeak a realistic construction for a monarchic state. The final arbiter in all matters, including legal, is not the king but the priest.

If a judicial decision is too difficult for you to make between one kind of bloodshed and another, one kind of legal right and another,

6. On the issue of intermarriage within the Persian community of Yehud, see the view of Smith-Christopher (1994: 260-64) whose argument that the intermarriages reflect the effort by a disadvantaged group to rise in social status to survive as a group stands in tension with the required breakup of foreign marriages by the books of Ezra-Nehemiah. By contrast, Kenneth Hoglund (1992: 27, 226, 238-39, 244) regards the prohibitions of Ezra and Nehemiah as reflective of motives consistent with their roles as imperial officials. Their opposition to intermarriages connects with imperial strategies of displacing populations and defining them in ethnic terms for land management.

7. Davies connects the Nehemiah material to events in the late fourth century on the basis of Josephus mentioning a marriage between the family of a Jewish high priest and a Samaritan Sanballat (III) at issue (*Ant.* 11.7.2-8.6 §§302-345). And he regards Ezra, unmentioned in sources even as late as the second century, as a reflection of scribal interests in that era (1998: 100-102; cf. Garbini 1988: 151-69).

or one kind of assault and another—any such matters of dispute in your towns—then you shall immediately go up to the place that the LORD your God will choose, where you shall consult with the levitical priests and the judge who is in office in those days...

When you have come into the land that the LORD your God is giving you, and have taken possession of it and settled in it, and you say, "I will set a king over me, like all the nations that are around me", you may indeed set over you a king whom the LORD your God will choose. One of your own community you may set as king over you; you are not permitted to have a foreigner over you, who is not of your own community. Even so, he must not acquire many horses for himself, or return the people to Egypt in order to acquire more horses, since the LORD has said to you, "You must never return that way again". And he must not acquire many wives for himself, or else his heart will turn away; also silver and gold he must not acquire in great quantity for himself. When he has taken the throne of his kingdom, he shall have a copy of this law written for him in the presence of the levitical priests. It shall remain with him and he shall read in it all the days of his life, so that he may learn to fear the LORD his God, diligently observing all the words of this law and these statutes, neither exalting himself above other members of the community nor turning aside from the commandment, either to the right or to the left, so that he and his descendants may reign long over his kingdom in Israel. (Deut. 17.8-9, 14-20)

The throne constitutes a power vacuum within the ideal society envisioned within Deuteronomy for the king does not govern in the manner of his contemporaries, but rather spends his time reading scrolls, an activity of the scribes. Though the monarchy may remain the theoretical political structure of Deuteronomy, 'the reality is colonial'. 'The Deuteronomic king', observes Davies (1998: 98), 'is a displaced but also considerably weakened colonial governor, subject to the authority of the priesthood' with the true allocation of power resting between the elite classes of elders and priests. If we look at the end of the historical narrative introduced by Deuteronomy, we find that it ends with the exile because '*that is all that needed explaining*' (1998: 114; italics Davies). The class of scribes generating this history already knew what had happened since. For them, according to Davies, the problem became a matter of explaining why, if they were the true 'Israel', they were exiled. The literature of the national history of Genesis–2 Kings provided the answer: they were seduced by and intermarried with the indigenous population (books of Joshua and Judges); and they were betrayed by kings and misled by false prophets (books of Samuel and Kings).

By aligning itself with traditions of revolution, to the heroes and martyrs of the past, and to a 'people's past', the elite class of scribes in Yehud did what most ethnic groups have done throughout history in establishing its

own traditions.⁸ It is only the naturalization of these invented traditions that has obscured from view the assumed antiquity to the self-asserted and 'invented' connection of the elites with the past taken as a given. Only the scribes, the guardians of cultural legacy, possessed the literacy, motivation, opportunity, and economic support to accomplish such a feat within the administrative infrastructure of Persian Yehud.

Social Life in Persian Yehud

Social Organization of the Yehud Province

Several models have been proposed to describe the social organization of Yehud but none has perhaps been more ambitious than that of Joel Weinberg. Certainly influential in the discussion of Persian Yehud, the *Bürger-Tempel-Gemeinde* ('citizen-temple-community') model virtually posits a society within a society to account for the social and economic function of the temple in Persian Yehud. This citizen community was a privileged group with restricted membership not coextensive with the wider population of the Yehud province. Following the list of Ezra 2//Nehemiah 7, Weinberg (1992: 132) proposed the population of the returnees at about 42,000, roughly 13-15 percent of the total population of Yehud prior to 458/457 BCE. During this time Yehud was under Samaritan administration. Not until 458/457 BCE with the edict of Artaxerxes did the *Bürger-Tempel-Gemeinde* officially come into existence. Nehemiah was only the leader of this community, not the governor of the province. Under his leadership, the community experienced a population growth due to new immigration and favourable socio-economic conditions, swelling to about 150,000, with anywhere of 50-70 percent of the total population comprising the citizen community. The temple had no land holdings and engaged in no commercial activity. Land possession centred on the extended family (*bet avot*) with communal ownership retaining the inalienable family inheritance.

After critique of the *Bürger-Tempel-Gemeinde* model by Weinberg, Joseph Blenkinsopp (1991: 44-53) offers his own modified version. Like Weinberg, he assumes the basic premise of the *golah* community in control of the temple and society. And this temple community excluded those Jews descended from those who had remained in the land. Not given to the speculation on Yehudian demographics, Blenkinsopp (1991: 45 n. 2) finds himself at a loss to account for the demographic expansion of this temple community

8. Control of the represented past becomes the justification for revolutionary movements, a fact underscored by Eric Hobsbawm (1993) who cites as examples the Saxons versus the Normans, and the Gauls against the Franks.

between the Persian and Roman periods with the pervasiveness of separation from outsiders and its exclusion of recalcitrant insiders (e.g. Ezra 10.8; Neh. 13.3). The imperial government of Persia had recruited this group of politically and economically dominant elites from the Babylonian Jewish community, and had mandated and financed the reconstruction of the temple. When in Palestine, these immigrants retained the social organization developed in Mesopotamia, setting up an assembly organized by ancestral houses with land-owning citizens and temple personnel.

However appealing these two models of Weinberg and Blenkinsopp may appear, they are not beyond critique (see especially Grabbe 2004: 144-45; Blenkinsopp 1991; and Carter 1999: 294-307). First, the population assumptions of Yehud by Weinberg are grossly exaggerated. Most current demographic studies place the population of Yehud at no more than about 30,000 (Grabbe 2004: 201). Second, Yehud was clearly an independent province within the Eber-nari satrapy at the beginning of Persian rule separate from Samarian administration. Third, evidence elsewhere beyond the literature of Ezra and Nehemiah underscores *peha* as meaning governor of the province. Thus, as early as Zerubbabel, the province of Yehud had governors. Fourth, the claim by Weinberg that the citizen community was tax-exempt belies what we know of Persian imperial policy and the taxation of provinces. Fifth, little evidence can be garnered in support of Persian financial subsidies for local temple constructions as general policy. Finally, Grabbe (2004: 144-45) points out that the lack of land-holdings and commercial activity of the temple à la Weinberg would undermine the ability of the *Bürger-Tempel-Gemeinde* 'to control the society or the economy', but then critiques Blenkinsopp for his thinly supported suggestion that the temple may have owned land and engaged in commercial activity.

Dynamics of Conflict in the Province of Yehud

Given the import of the temple as an economic, cultic, and literary center, its control meant power. Whoever could exert its control over the temple wielded power within the province of Yehud, not just economically, religiously, and ideologically, but they would also define the ethnic identity of 'Israel' and establish the criterion for group in/exclusion. The number of groups vying for control and definition of the identity 'Israel' to which they would have assumed some entitlement could have only exacerbated the natural tensions within the social life of Persian Yehud, including but not limited to the inter-ethnic conflicts precipitated by a pervasive miscegenation (Ezra 9.1-2; Neh. 13.23-24). Persian Yehud was embroiled in numerous conflicts surpassing the general assumption of a class struggle between

'exiles' and those who remained in the land over land rights. By contrast, Morton Smith (1987: 75-112) advances a nuanced proposal of the general class struggle: two groups of returnees—members of the 'Yahweh-alone' party and descendants of the former Jerusalem priesthood—were in opposition to the resident population, the 'people of the land'. But it was Nehemiah who secured control of the temple and society for the 'Yahweh alone' party. This proposal by Smith intuitively captures the complex dynamic of conflict that maintained Persian Yehud society thus helping scholarship to see the rich, social mosaic of Yehudian life though barely moving beyond its own simplistic construct. Numerous tensions that evolved within a newly constructed society had fully developed by fifth-century BCE Persian Yehud—indigenous versus immigrant, homogeneous versus heterogeneous, urban versus rural. Among those who would have felt a sense of entitlement to the name 'Israel' would have been (1) those individuals remaining in Samaria and its surrounding territories—i.e. the literal remnant of historical Israel; (2) those forcibly immigrated into the territory of the kingdom Israel; (3) those who remained in Judah after each deportation; (4) those possibly imported into the Judean population by either Assyrians or Babylonians; (5) those Jewish refugees returning to the territory of Judah during the governorship of Gedaliah (Jer. 40); (6) Israelite and Judean deportees and refugees in Assyria, Syria, Babylonia, and Egypt; and, finally (7) the *golah* group returning to Persian Yehud from Babylonia (Davies 1992: 74). Within this diverse and complex dynamic of conflict characterizing the social conditions of Persian Yehud, the politics of representation plays itself out in the construction of ethnic identities of 'self' and 'other'. I will briefly summarize only four conflict scenarios, intra- and inter-ethnic in nature (for a more comprehensive treatment of each, see Horsley 2007: 22-31): the social conflict between the 'people of the land' and the *golah* elite class; the economic conflict between the village peasants and the Jerusalem aristocracy; the religious conflict between priestly factions overlapping that of immigrants and indigenous; and the political conflict among local power magnates and Persian governors.

Social Conflict: 'People of the Land' versus 'Golah' Elites

Significantly downplayed within the literature is the alternate reality of this conflict, namely that of indigenous ('people of the land') and immigrants (*golah* elites). Imbued with a newfound power and privilege by their Persian overlords, the *golah* class returning from Babylonia naturally asserted their exclusive claims to the land. The Persians would have wanted these immigrants to accept the land as their own just as would have the immigrants since the land would be theirs. Successive waves of immigrant elites,

perhaps descended from those Judeans deported by Babylon in the early sixth century BCE, embraced Persian ideology and promoted their identity as 'true Jews' perhaps because the Persians told them so and they may have believed it to be so (Davies 1992: 112). By entrusting the imperial order and revenues of Yehud to these immigrants, the Persians were also imposing a group of quasi-foreigners on the indigenous Yehudim. According to Davies (1992: 112), a fundamental contradiction characterizes the *golah* community: 'its elite is aware of its alien origin and culture, but its *raison d'être* implies indigenization'. This new society generated its own identity via the production of a history with the name 'Israel' bound together by a law and covenant, and distinguished from other groups by religion and ethnic descent. Because the elite who generated this history are immigrants, 'their "Israel" will also originate as immigrants'. Excerpts within the book of Ezekiel shed insight into this conflict on the ground between the *golahs* and the 'people of the land' over land rights while ideologically bolstering the exclusive claims to the land by the former party.

Then the word of the LORD came to me: Mortal, your kinsfolk, your own kin, your fellow exiles, the whole house of Israel, all of them, are those of whom the inhabitants of Jerusalem have said, "They have gone far from the LORD; to us this land is given for a possession". Therefore say: Thus says the LORD God: Though I removed them far away among the nations, and though I scattered them among the countries, yet I have been a sanctuary to them to some extent in the countries where they have gone. Therefore say: Thus says the LORD God: I will gather you from the peoples, and assemble you out of the countries where you have been scattered, and I will give you the land of Israel (11.14-17)...

The word of the LORD came to me: Mortal, the inhabitants of these waste places in the land of Israel keep saying, "Abraham was only one man, yet he got possession of the land; but we are many; the land is surely given us to possess". Therefore say to them, Thus says the LORD God: You eat flesh with the blood, and lift up your eyes to your idols, and shed blood; shall you then possess the land? You depend on your swords, you commit abominations, and each of you defiles his neighbor's wife; shall you then possess the land? (33.23-26)

Not only do these texts deny the land claims of the 'people of the land', they, furthermore, assert the polluted state of the land caused by the 'people of the land'. Like people, like land. Yhwh will cleanse the land of its uncleanness, including its residents. This ideological representation of the land as destroyed and emptied of people awaiting the return of the only survivors, the only significant people (see 2 Chron. 36.17-21; Lev. 26.27-39), as well as the obsessive emphasis on genealogy in the book of Ezra only serves to justify the land claims of the immigrants. Heavy emphasis on the imperial initiative

of Ezra and extensive citations of imperial edicts and other official documents reveal the need for self-legitimation by these immigrants (compare the edict of Cyrus [ANET 315-16] with that quoted in Ezra 1.2-4). Successive waves of immigrants would have only intensified the more palpable conflict on the ground in the mid-fifth century. No doubt, the asserted dominance of the *golahs* would not have gone unchallenged. Those who had remained behind in the land would have developed functional village communities and indigenous traditions with local leaders even emerging in the interim. The indigenes put up a stiff resistance to the temple project (Ezra 4.1-5) as well as an apparent resistance to pay the tithe after the temple had been built (Mal. 3.10).

The scribal class of the *golah* community in Yehud would have been that to create an identity appropriating the name 'Israel' vis-à-vis the large-scale composition of a primary history. In addition, the *golah* community naturally drew boundaries for group in/exclusion since they regarded themselves as the only true Yehudim. Inter-marriage was strictly forbidden and became a significant boundary marker for group in/exclusion. Exogamous marriages in the 75-100 years prior to Nehemiah complicated the lines of conflict between the *golah* community and that of the 'people of the land'. To marry outside the in-group was tantamount to marrying a foreigner, despite the fact that some of the 'people of the land' were, ironically, ethnic Jews and Yhwh devotees. The immigrant group assumed the power of naming those belonging to the *golah* community, or 'self', and those belonging to the disenfranchised, or 'other'.

By referring to the local non-*golah* Judaeans as "peoples of the land(s)", the returning exiles effectively classified their Judaeans rivals, together with the neighboring non-Judaeans peoples (Ammonites, Moabites, Edomites, residents of Samaria, etc.) as alien to Israel (Washington 1994: 232-233).

Amalekite, Ammonite, Moabite mattered not; anyone not part of the in-group was just an(other) typ(ological) Canaanite. Anyone who had married someone not of the *golah* community was forced to divorce their 'foreign' wives under threat of excommunication and/or property forfeiture (Ezra 10.1-17). Clearly, one motive for the prohibition, observes Horsley (2007: 24), was 'to keep the landed property in the control of the "assembly of the [returned] exiles"'. Such a maneuver reflects the imperial agenda carried out by the *golah* elites, namely that conquered land belonged to the empire. As imperial agents Ezra and Nehemiah acted in accordance with imperial interests to ensure its security and revenues. By banning inter-marriage, which had implications for property transferral, these neo-colonizers could maintain control over the *golah* community and revenues within Yehud.

Economic Conflict: Village Peasants versus Jerusalem Aristocracy

To some degree this particular conflict between the wealthy and powerful elite in Jerusalem and those peasants subsisting in the village communities most likely overlapped with the previous conflict. Payment of the tribute tax as well as the religious tax to the temple and the priesthood would have left the rural peasantry vulnerable to a heavy indebtedness and exploitation, a constant problem in agrarian societies.

Now there was a great outcry of the people and of their wives against their fellow Yehudim. For there were those who said, "With our sons and our daughters, we are many; we must get grain, so that we may eat and stay alive". There were also those who said, "We are having to pledge our fields, our vineyards, and our houses in order to get grain during the famine". And there were those who said, "We are having to borrow money on our fields and vineyards to pay the king's tax. Now our flesh is the same as that of our kindred; our children are the same as their children; and yet we are forcing our sons and daughters to be slaves, and some of our daughters have been ravished; we are powerless, and our fields and vineyards now belong to others" (Neh. 5.1-5).

Unable to subsist even, peasants found all the produce from their hard labours siphoned off to meet their obligations of indebtedness. For many, land that had perhaps been in the family for years and other property of value were put up for collateral only, in the end, to default on the loans and lose their securities. And when no more available security to put up for collateral remained, the labour force of children became surety only, in the end, to lose them to slavery.

In both dire circumstances, debtors leveraged their lands and children in a risky venture to procure food only to lose everything of value to their wealthy creditors. The nobles and Temple officials from whom these desperate, powerless peasants would have secured loans were not members of the village communities. As Horsley (2007: 25) remarks, 'by taking interest on these loans, they could expand the wealth of their own households'.

Though typically in agrarian societies the peasantry provided a 'surplus' of their generated produce to support the wealthy and powerful, the rapacious business activities of the wealthy families jeopardized the viability of the peasant class, the economic base for both the temple-state of Yehud and the empire. Hence, governor Nehemiah intervened to strong-arm the nobility whose exploitative measures threatened the economic base of Yehud.

I brought charges against the nobles and the officials; I said to them, "You are all taking interest from your own people...Let us stop this taking of interest [from your own people]. Restore to them, this very day, their fields, their vineyards, their olive orchards, and their houses, and the interest on goods, grain, wine, and oil that you have been exacting from them"...And I called the priests, and made them take an oath to do as they had promised (Neh. 5.7-13).

The intervention of a 'higher authority' like Nehemiah in economic affairs to ensure productive viability was not a historically unprecedented act. Nonetheless, his speech echoes the prohibition of interest (Exod. 22.25) and other mechanisms, such as the seventh year cancellation of debts, found within the Israelite traditions, thus prompting Horsley to suggest that the traditional Israelite (Mosaic) covenantal principles informed the speech of Nehemiah. In cross-cultural analyses (as example, see Scott 1976), traditional village communities maintained a 'moral economy'. These mechanisms guided local social-economic interaction whereby to keep each household component economically viable. The cancellation of debts and release of debt-slaves every seven years would exemplify the 'moral economy' in Israelite tradition.

Religious Conflict: Priestly Factions versus Priestly Factions

In discussing the religious conflict among priestly factions, we would be more accurate to say sets of conflicts since there was no one conflict. The texts of Ezekiel 40-48 affirm the Zadokites as the only priests qualified to serve at the altar, and form the basic assumption of the Zadokites as the dominant priesthood in Second Temple times. Other texts from the same era (e.g. Pentateuch and Chronicles) represent the priests serving at the altar as the 'sons of Aaron' while those of the DH and the Prophets barely mention Aaron. Three particular conflicts between priests seemed to have been present in Yehud: (1) that between the priests left behind in the land and those who came to dominate during the Persian regime; (2) that between the Aaronide priesthood and the Levites; and (3) that between the emerging priestly aristocracy and other priestly lineages.

First, though the Babylonians deported members of the Zadokite priesthood (and perhaps other priestly families?), part of the upper class of Judean society, not all priests were taken away. Some members of the priestly groups of the Aaronides, Levites, and sons of Abiathar would have remained behind. Religious life certainly continued in Judah despite the destruction of the Jerusalem Temple by the Babylonians. We have evidence of other sacred sites—e.g. Bethel, Mizpah, Arad—with perhaps the former two serving as central sanctuaries with the Aaronide priesthood attending (2 Kgs

17.24-28; see Blenkinsopp 1998: 25-43).⁹ The Aaronide priests, Levites, and the priests of the Abiathar lineage (in Anathoth) would eventually be displaced from their prominent positions of power by the immigrant priestly families in the Yehud temple-state. Perhaps these displaced priests offered up resistance, claiming the immigrant priests as impure, to which the prophecy of Zechariah 3.1-10 perhaps responds declaring the divine purification of the high priest Joshua and his colleagues as the legitimate priesthood.

Second, the conflict between the Aaronide priests and Levites may have involved other groups serving in the Temple—the singers, the temple servants, and the gatekeepers (Ezra 8.15-36; Neh. 3.26, 31; 7:1, 43-46; 11.19-22). In Nehemiah the Levites bear the responsibility of collecting the religious tax (tithes) and bringing them to the storage chambers within the Temple (Neh. 10.35-39). The responsibility and status of the Levites, while apparently greater than that of the gatekeepers and singers, did not surpass that of the Aaronide priests. In fact, the Aaronide priests supervised the Levites—‘The priest, the descendant of Aaron, shall be with the Levites when they receive the tithes’ (10.38)—thus exerting some control over the collection, storage, and, most likely, distribution of Temple revenues to the Levites.¹⁰

Finally, several indications point to the emergence of a priestly aristocracy closely associated with the high priest. The genealogies of Ezra and 1 Chronicles seem to function more generally, according to Gary Knoppers (2003: 109-34), as authorizing lineages of priestly families or branches of priestly families of special rank, qualifying them for high office. Late in the Persian period about 408 BCE, a petition by Judean military colonists at Elephantine mentions ‘our Lord Yehohanan the high priest and his colleagues the priests who are in Jerusalem’ (as quoted in Horsley 2007: 27). ‘Colleagues the priests’ most likely refers to a small elite group with other priestly families settling into lesser prominent roles.

9. Blenkinsopp contends that after the destruction of Jerusalem, Mizpah became the administrative center of the province with Gedaliah as governor (Jer. 40-41). If the capital of the province under Babylonian rule, it is highly plausible to posit a sanctuary as part of the administrative complex of buildings there. Both Mizpah and Bethel figure as prominent religious centers in the texts of Judges and Samuel (Judg. 20.1, 18; 21.5, 8; 1 Sam. 7.5-6, 9-10; 10.17). Even the Persian period prophetic text of Zechariah 7.1-3 indicates King Darius seeking the favor of Yhwh at Bethel.

10. Over the course of the Second Temple period, the Levites gradually lost status (Nurmela 1998). They were banished from service at the altar because of their apostasy (Ezek. 44) while the faithful Zadokites ran the sanctuary. Indications from passages within the books of Chronicles reveal just how much the Levites had fell in status with there being no discernible distinction between Levites and other Temple functionaries, i.e. singers, gatekeepers, and other low-ranking temple officials (1 Chron. 9.26, 33; 23.3-5; 25.1-7; 26.1-11).

Political Conflict: Local Power Magnates versus Persian Officials

Repeated struggles for power, position, and wealth within the ranks of the elite classes seem to have characterized the far from stable conditions that a strong, monarchical priesthood might have been able to achieve. Priestly families struggled for prominence against Persian-appointed officials. They would have likely depicted their positions of privilege and power as independent though they certainly would have known that their power and privilege hinged directly on imperial favour. Rebuilding the Temple required the need for Persian authorization and that of the Persian governors. The visions within the prophetic book of Zechariah present a social scenario that downplays the political role of the governor Zerubbabel (4.8; 6.9-13) to that of the high priest Joshua (cf. 3.1-10; 6.9-13). Though Zerubbabel, a Davidic descendant, is commissioned to lead the Temple rebuilding project, he acts simply as an administrator whereas Joshua stands before Yhwh clothed in festal apparel, a turban, and a crown invested with charge over the Temple. Of course, the reality that the high priests and priestly aristocrats would have participated alongside ordinary Judeans in the mundane work projects of the Temple and city walls supervised by the Persian governor and his military officials never surfaces in the representation.

Conflict between local magnates who had been appointed by the Persian imperial regime would have also contributed to the social disharmony within Yehud. These individuals were powerful figures in the adjacent provinces of the Eber-nari satrapy with their own interests and influences within Yehud to the detriment of other Yehud temple-state officials, including that of Nehemiah. For example, the rebuilding projects of the Temple fortress and city walls met with fierce opposition by three magnates in particular—Sanballat the Horonite (possibly Moabite ethnically?), the Persian governor of the province of Samaria to the north; Tobiah the Ammonite, likely a Persian-appointed governor of Ammon to the east; and Geshem the Arab (Neh. 2.10, 19; 6.1-9; cf. 3.33-4.17)—who had successfully gained hereditary local power. Through intermarriage, the local magnates Tobiah and Sanballat effectively exercised their spheres of influence within Yehud. Such exogamous practices enhanced the political and economic power of these magnates while also cementing the interrelationships between these high-ranking officials. Tobiah exerted his influence among the Yehud aristocracy by conducting his enterprises directly out of the Temple precincts where he had a large room (previously used as a storage room), for the temple vessels and taxes, given him by his relative Eliashib, the priest in charge of the storage chambers within the Temple, in spite of his Ammonite ethnicity and presumably barred entrance into ‘the assembly’ (Neh. 13.4-9). Influence of the Sanballat family affected the Yehud priesthood when Manasseh, son of the high priest Jehoiada (or Jaddua), grandson of Eliashib,

married into the family of Sanballat, the governor of Samaria. When the Jerusalem elders gave Manasseh an ultimatum to divorce his wife Nikaso or relinquish his priestly duties, Sanballat offered to build a temple on Gerizim and appoint his son-in-law, a Yehud priest, as high priest.¹¹

Lisbeth Fried (2006: 123-45) makes the compelling argument that these Persian satrapal officials, not the poor and disenfranchised descendants of those who remained in the land, comprised the '*am ha'ares* in Ezra 4.4-5.¹² It was these well-connected, powerful, Persian-appointed officials who bribed officials and wrote accusing letters.

In Xerxes' reign, in his accession year, they wrote an accusation against the inhabitants of Judah and Jerusalem. And in the days of Artaxerxes, Mithradates, Tabeel, and the rest of their associates wrote in peace to Artaxerxes (the letter was written in Aramaic and translated.) [The following is] Aramaic: (Rehum the Chancellor and Shimshai the Secretary wrote a letter regarding Jerusalem to Artaxerxes the king, as follows): [From] Rehum the Chancellor, Shimshai the Secretary, and the rest of their associates—the judges, the investigators, the Persian officials, the people of Erech, that is, the Babylonians, and the people of Susa, that is, the Elamites (Ezr. 4.6-9).

Moreover, Sanballat, along with his army, Tobiah, and Geshem were willing to kill to thwart the reconstruction efforts of Nehemiah.

When Sanballat heard that we were building the wall he became furious and greatly enraged and he mocked the Jews. And he said before his colleagues and the Samaritan army, "What are these pathetic Jews doing"? And Tobiah the Ammonite was with him. So when Sanballat and Tobiah [and the Arabs, the Ammonites, and the Ashdodites] heard that the restoration of the wall of Jerusalem was progressing and that the breach was beginning to be closed,

11. The full story occurs in Josephus (*Ant.* 11.7.2-8.6 §§302-45), who places it late in the fourth century BCE during the reign of Darius III. His version appears to be a reflex of Nehemiah 13.28 where the son (unnamed) of the high priest Joiada (Grabbe (2004: 158) suggests Jaddua as an 'inter-Greek development') is the son of Sanballat III. Historians conclude that Josephus assumes the misdating of the Samaritan temple though he may simply just be engaging in an act of recontextualization to render the Samaritan temple as illegitimate. Be that as it may, recent publications according to Grabbe (2004: 32) claim that a temple did exist at Gerizim from the late fifth or early fourth century BCE.

12. Fried traces occurrences of the expression '*am ha'ares* throughout the biblical corpus noting that within pre-exilic and exilic texts, the '*am ha'ares* constitute the class of free, landowning, full citizens who sometimes owned others not belonging to this class. The same signification continued into the postexilic era for the powerful landed aristocracy participating in the Persian government administration.

they became very angry. All of them conspired together to come to fight against Jerusalem and create a disturbance (Neh. 4.7-13 [1-7 Eng.]).

The local magnates of Sanballat, Tobiah, and Geshem became 'the model for the *'am ha'ares*' who were powerful, influential, wealthy—and foreign (Fried 2006: 136), much the same as the Yehudite magnates, also Persian-appointed officials within the Eber-nari satrapy.

These numerous conflicts, intra- and inter-ethnic in nature, spanning political, religious, and economic dimensions marked the social conditions within Yehud as members of a minority elite class of immigrants jockeyed, first, with 'others' (indigenes and other ethnicities) and, second, with 'self' (priests versus priests, priests versus governors) for positions of power, privilege, wealth, and status in their claims of political control and authority over the land. And yet, their struggle for power was not an act independent of the auspices of the Persian imperial regime. In effect, the subservience of this immigrant elite with aspirations to power to the empire reflects the conditions of neo-colonization with this group acting as agents of the colonizer, though itself colonized.

Conclusion

Throughout this Chapter I have sought to demonstrate fifth-century BCE Persian Yehud as the ideal social location for the consumption of the Genesis–2 Kings national myth. Granted, the critical lines of inquiry undergirding my pursuit were not without certain a priori assumptions—e.g. a particular historical milieu requisite for such a large literary corpus to have been produced prior to its consumption. How can a text that does not exist serve the ideological purposes of anyone, much less those in power? Moreover, this literary corpus bears within it the traces of conflict contributing to its production. Who would produce such a massive corpus in the ancient Near Eastern context but those with the power, knowledge, capabilities, and financial subsidy? And why produce such literature if not in a social location of conflict? The conquest/settlement ethnic myths within the book of Judges advancing claims of divine right to land intimates a social milieu of an immigrant elite class asserting its political authority contested in a land not theirs. Even the issue of intermarriage expressed via the endogamy/exogamy motif within Judges reflects a concern on the part of this immigrant group struggling with miscegenation to construct its identity. This group controls the identity of 'Israel' through the ideology of national myth by defining the boundary markers (e.g. prohibition on exogamous intermarriages) of who is in, who is out. As the rest of society accepted the presumed, and shared, history of 'Israel' as its own, accepted

its constitution, beliefs, and habits as its own, then it began to incarnate that identity (Davies 1992: 89). The struggle to wrest political control of a land by displacing its indigenes amidst concerns of self-identity altogether presuppose (1) a context for the re-presentation of this national myth's ideology by a Jewish group in a significant manner and (2) a context of mobility for this Jewish group with imperial sponsorship in the ancient Near East. The Persian colonial context best satisfies both the requisite imperial administrative conditions for the literary consumption of this national myth with its ethno-typing strategies and the social turmoil of multiple intra- and inter-ethnic conflicts on various levels where such texts could contribute ideologically to the fray for the benefit of a particular in-group. In such a context of religious isolationism where the ebb and flow of diverse ethnic group populations and the influential power of local magnates of diverse ethnicities could create an economic and social strain in Jerusalem Yehud, the consumption of this 'history' (1) justifies the ideological symbol of the Temple cultus, (2) provides the *raison d'être* of the elitists implying indigenization, (3) provides psychological motivation for their political control of the land (Lemche 1995: 189), (4) establishes the typological identities of their ethnic neighbours as 'other' via stereotypic representations (e.g. the Moabites as 'stupid') in order to delegitimize them (Davies 1992: 117-18), and (5) establishes their typological identity as 'true Israel' over against other groups with rightful claims to that name (e.g. denying the Samaritans usage of 'the name of Israel'; Anderson and Giles 2005: 171).¹³

The collaboration of the immigrant elites with Persian authority imbues this primary history with a colonial function that casts a certain nuance to their relationship with their ethnic neighbours. It reflects a quasi-typological (in the normative sense) re-presentation of the relationship between these immigrants and their contemporary Edomite, Moabite, Ammonite, and Samaritan neighbours. Typcasting the neighbor(s) as 'other' enables their psychological defeat when physical defeat may not be possible. The colonial discourse of this history affirms the right of the descendants of Abraham (i.e. immigrant Yehudites) to the land denied that to the descendants of Lot, but does so by suppressing their own immigrant status and experiences of displacement reenacted in their brutal displacement of the indigenous

13. Even the Samaritan literature *Kitab al-Tarikh* regards this context as that wherein the Jews denied the Samaritans (also called 'Kutheans' by Jews though the Samaritans always regarded themselves as the 'Keepers') the name of Israel (Anderson and Giles 2005: 171). And the Jews were able to do this because of the favor showed them by King Darius who gave imperial support to the Jerusalem cultus after a dispute between Zerubbabel and Sanballat over the legitimate place of worship—Jerusalem or Gerizim? (from the *Samaritan Joshua* in Anderson and Giles 2005: 130-31).

population. The representations of other ethnic groups result in a form of ethno-typing. Re-presentation focuses on one particular trait to establish an archetype of each ethnic group too illegitimate to control the land and the antitype to the only group with a divine legitimacy utilizing the national myth of Genesis–2 Kings, in general, and the conquest/settlement ethnic myths of the book of Judges, in particular, to establish the in-group's identity as superior. The postcolonial analyses to follow, however, reveal the weak underbelly to this impervious façade: (1) such ethno-typing strategies misdirect attention from the history of the in-group as immigrants and social status as colonized; and (2) any ethnic slurs only reflect the dissatisfaction of certain undesirable traits present within the in-group projected onto (the) 'others' in an effort to devalue and dehumanize them. In Part II, my concern will not be upon the neo-colonizer per se; rather, each Chapter will focus on the re-presentation of the subaltern 'other' stereotyped by 'Israel', both in fifth-century BCE Yehud and in nineteenth century CE US, as a matter of ideological superiority resulting in their social, political, and economic hegemony.

Part II

READING FROM EACH PLACE

THE 'SAVAGE' STEREOTYPE: CIVILIZATION—EASTWARD, HO!

'Your invention of the alphabet is worth more to your people than two bags full of gold in the hands of every Cherokee'.

—*Sam Houston*

'By peace our condition has been improved in the pursuit of civilized life'.

—*John Ross (1843)*

'The white man made us many promises, but he kept only one. He promised to take our land, and he took it'.

—*Red Cloud (1882)*

'Westward, ho!' Everyone who grew up in the southwest US knows the context of this expression. Right? Men (all white, though as a kid I don't think I really noticed that) on horseback, some responsible for driving the cattle, some accompanying the wagons with the women, children and supplies, some guarding the rear, and always someone directing the entire settlers' movement into the frontier. Such a command charge evokes a romanticist sentiment that idealizes a new move into unknown territory. The entire western genre of movies and television shows helped shape the ethos of southwest Americana into which I was thoroughly enculturated. I remember as a child watching television shows like *Gunsmoke*, *High Chapparal*, *Bonanza*, *The Big Valley*, *Have Gun, Will Travel*!, *The Virginian*, *Rawhide*, and *Daniel Boone* with my grandparents; *The Lone Ranger* was my personal favorite. Who the good guys were and who the bad guys were was never in doubt though it did pose some problems when me and my friends played together since nobody ever wanted to be the bad guy, sometimes the 'Indians' (Christopher Columbus first introduced this term as an all-embracing term for the Natives of the 'New World', Berkhofer 1978: 6-7). In adolescence, I really enjoyed the Billy Jack series, partly because of a sense of justice perceived but mainly, to be honest, because of the martial arts. Of course, only later have we come to realize that 'Westward, ho!' signified a colonialist agenda (though never explicitly put in such terms)

and that the re-presentations of the Euro-American as settler and Native American as savage, red man within the pop culture media subtly ingrained stereotypical perceptions that fostered racial attitudes and feelings of superiority affecting real life interracial relations.

In the public conscious of the southwest US, and perhaps beyond, the media of pop culture severely restricted the re-presentation of the Native American (hereafter I will simply use 'Natives' for simplicity of expression), in both non-'Indian' and 'Indian' minds alike, in terms of people (the plains tribes) and time of existence (roughly 1825-1880). Of all the films depicting the Natives, perhaps the film *A Man Called Horse* best exemplifies the amalgamation of stereotyping effects that conflates divergent identities of the various tribes with no concern to distinguish between them. For example, this film depicts a people

whose language is Lakota, whose hairstyles vary from Assinboine through Nemenah, whose tipi design is Absaroke, whose Sun Dance ceremony and the lodge in which it is staged are both typically Mandan, and who are referred to throughout the film as simply "Sioux" (Brule? Oglala? Santee? Yanktonai? Hunkpapa?) (Churchill 1992b: 231-41).

Evidence of such an identity debacle occurred even within the Billy Jack series where the Indians depicted resembled a vague confluence of Pueblo, Navajo, Hopi, Zuni, and occasionally, Lakota (Churchill 1992b). Such misrepresentation reflects the perspective of the colonizer whose only concern is to tell the story from its perspective. Indians were never permitted to speak for themselves or, if they have, their voices have been overlooked.¹ My own experience of reflecting upon my enculturation reflects the observation made by Said (1993: 195).

Only recently have Westerners become aware that what they have to say about the history and the cultures of "subordinate" peoples is challengeable by the people themselves, people who a few years back were simply incorporated, culture, land, history, and all into the great Western empires, and their disciplining discourses.

1. As a part of the colonization process, non-Indians both defined the identity of the Native for the public consciousness and isolated the alien Other. Though earlier literature did attempt to articulate individual expressions of Native culture by Natives, they were forcibly done via the white man's language. And even those autobiographies were by Christianized Indians who had learned English and adopted white ways since the colonization processes of deracination and enculturation suppressed and sought to eradicate storytelling, other oral transmissions, and the language of the Natives. Only recently has a resurgence of Native 'autohistories' and individuated voices in the arts and literature attempted to defuse 'Indian' stereotypes in a fight for cultural autonomy (Vickers 1998: 107, 126-27).

But what if the story were told from the vantage point of the Other? How might the perspective of their culture, lands, and identity differ? How might Other reflect Self, or Self Other?

The conquest/settlement ideology of biblical texts that undergirded the Euro-American colonization of the Natives and control of their land actually preceded God's American 'Israel' by some two and a half millennia. Told from the perspective of an ethnic group identifying itself as 'Israel' with a westward vision, the mythic history of Genesis–2 Kings occludes the voices of its eastern neighbours by ascribing to them an ethnic identity as subaltern. The literature serves the end-goal of colonization with ethno-typing strategies of neighbouring ethnic groups over whom 'Israel' regards itself as superior. Understood broadly, the experience of both Natives and Edomites as colonized parallel. The Edomites never receive a voice to speak and to share their perspective. When they, and other subaltern ethnicities for that matter, do get to speak, the narrator co-opts their voice for a perspective benefiting the westward vision of 'Israel'. So how to provide a voice for the voiceless Edomites such that they can emerge from the shadows of marginalization? Here the colonized Natives of nineteenth-century America can help by illuminating the Edomite experience. In both cases, we will explore how the stereotype of the colonized as 'red savage' and 'evil' contributes to the colonization process but also how such stereotypes, ideologically, equally fit their colonizer whose view of ethnic superiority enables and reinforces the stereotypic projection. But first, let us turn our attention to an understanding of the subaltern ethnicity known as 'Edomite'. With that in mind, Eastward, ho!

A Composite Portrait of the Edomites

Were we to rely solely on the primary sources of Edomites to learn about their social, economic, religious, and political culture, we would remain as clueless about such matters as about the existence of an ethnic group known as 'Edomite' since no Edomite records exist. As it is, we must rely principally on the extant literature of other ethnic groups, including that of 'Israel', which, though yielding some knowledge about the Edomites, is by no means complete. It seems apparent that the writers of the Hebrew Bible especially had very little first-hand knowledge of the topography and cities of Edom (aside from Elath, a Judean possession, Seir and Bozrah were known to be important, see Bartlett 1989: 53, 101). What information about the Edomites the writers relay simply derive from biased perceptions based on minimal interactions. Answers to questions like, How did this group of people understand themselves ethnically? Did they do so with the term 'Edomites'? When did they form a political state? Why should an Edomite

state have ever formed? When did their state come to an end? Only recently have some answers about Edomite culture surfaced with significant finds in the twentieth century from excavations in Edomite territory yielding more information than before about this group.² Perhaps no other source integrates all this information into a coherent perspective than that of John Bartlett's *Edom and the Edomites* (1989) (but see also Diana Edelman's *You Shall Not Abhor an Edomite for He Is Your Brother* [1995]). Nonetheless, our information still remains quite sketchy in certain historical periods. In what follows, I want to develop a composite portrait of the Edomites that draws on a variety of sources than just the biblical texts in order to understand them from a geographical, historical, and ethnical perspective.³

Geography

To begin, knowing something about the region often associated with these peoples will prove more than mere tangential to the end-goal of my analyses since issues like control over land and management of its resources are integral to postcolonial concerns. These issues feed into and fuel ethnic conflicts, which, in turn, contribute to the construction of ethnic identity.

The term 'Edom' occurs in the biblical texts for land (2 Sam. 8.14; 1 Kgs 11.5; 22.47; Jer. 40.11), for an ethnic group (Gen. 36.1, 8, 19; Num. 20.18, 20-21; 2 Kgs 8.20, 22; Amos 1.11), and comprehensively for both land and people (Ps. 60.8; Ezek. 25.12-14). When used geographically, the term refers to an elongated landmass south and east of the Jordan River and just south of the lands of Ammon and Moab that stretches as far south as the Gulf of 'Aqabah (modern Red Sea). Edomite territory basically comprises three parts—(1) the highlands (that which most scholars assume as Edom proper), (2) the lowlands, and (3) that area west of the Arabah known as the Negev—the first two directly southeast of the Dead Sea for the most part and the third just west of the Wadi Arabah. The heartland of Edom lay in the mountainous plateau region (i.e. highlands) averaging some 4,000 ft above sea level. Here one finds such notable sites as Petra. Covered with rich, reddish-brown soil, this plateau region averages 200-600 mm (about 8-24 inches) of annual rainfall, ideal for dry farming.

2. See John Bartlett's (1989: 28-32) treatment of the exploratory surveys of northern Edom by Nelson Glueck in 1933 and the excavations at Umm el-Biyara, Tawilan, and Buseira by Crystal M. Bennett in the 1960s and 1970s.

3. The Edomite myth comprises the following texts of the DH: Gen. 25.30; 32.3; 36.1, 8-9, 16-17, 19, 21, 31-32, 43; Exod. 15.15; Num. 20.14, 18, 20-21, 23; 21.4; 24.18; 33.37; 34.3; Deut. 23.7; Josh. 15.1, 21; Judg. 5.4; 11.17-18; 1 Sam. 14.47; 21.7; 22.9, 18, 22; 2 Sam. 8.12-14; 1 Kgs 9.26; 11.1, 14-17; 22.47; 2 Kgs 3.8-9, 12, 20, 26; 8.20-22; 14.7, 10; 16.6.

The geography, topography, climate, and vegetation change drastically from the plateau region to the lowlands. As the high plateaus slope downward, the elevation drops more than 1,600 meters (5,000 feet) to below sea level. Major wadis cut through this region as they flow westward to the Wadi Arabah. The average annual rainfall drops to 200-300 mm (8-12 inches). In contradistinction to the highlands' rich agricultural land, the lowlands contained one of the richest sources of a natural mineral in the eastern Mediterranean—copper ore—mined in the Feinan district. To gain an image of the extensive mining productions, excavatory work at Khirbat en-Nahas, where massive black mounds of slag lay nearby, revealed thirteen Iron Age copper mines with some galleries extending 65 meters (200 feet) into the hillside with air ducts dug more than 8 meters (25 feet) from the surface (Levy and Najjar 2006: 24-35, 70). In addition, Levy and Najjar also excavated a large fortress at Khirbat en-Nahas but intimated prematurely the possibility of Edomite statehood in the early Iron Age on the basis of scant evidence for a complex society in one area alone. The most prominent towns of the lowlands are Bozrah (modern Buseirah), Elath (modern Tell el-Kheleifeh), Sela, Tawilan, Umm el-Biyara, and Ezion-geber (modern 'Aqaba).⁴

Moving westward from the lowlands, the topography and climate change drastically yet again. The Arabah valley and the Negev region due west of the Wadi Arabah grow more arid with an average annual rainfall reaching a much lower 25-150 mm (1-6 inches). From the eighth to the sixth centuries BCE, an influx of Edomite settlers into the Negev locale became the occasion for Jewish–Edomite ethnic conflicts that perhaps intensified if indeed Edomites controlled this region. But I will address this prospect later.

History

Political

Though using the biblical text to aid in developing a portrait of the 'other' because of its biases, possible historical retrojections, and limited perspectives, is problematic, it is nonetheless valuable to take into consideration because perceptions inform history and yet texts encode these perceptions, which, in turn, reinforce historical perspectives. The Torah narrates Israel's earliest encounters with Edom, associated arbitrarily with its eponymous ancestor Esau, fraternal twin to Israel's eponymous

4. Admittedly, question marks remain about the identification of certain excavation sites with biblical place names like Ezion-geber, Elath, and Sela because of settlement patterns and/or evidence of destruction. For a complete synopsis of biblical place names in Edom and their modern corollaries, see Bartlett 1989: 44-54.

ancestor Jacob. From birth, both brothers struggled for primacy with agricultural prosperity and political dominion for Israel and the yoke of vassaldom for Edom. Later, the biblical text indicates the presence of an Edomite state replete with 'kings' (perhaps 'chieftains'; Gen. 36.31-39) long before the existence of any kings in Israel. Unfortunately, few additional sources presently exist that help corroborate such a picture of Edom in the Bronze Age save Egyptian records of the 18th-20th dynasties that simply mention the *shasu*, a nomadic, bedouin people—the 'nomads (*shasu*) of Edom' and the 'nomads (*shasu*) of Seir'—within territory we tend to regard as Edomite. Though the *shasu* of this region evidently became a source of open conflict with the Egyptians, we cannot extrapolate from this an Edomite state or nation.

Contact between Israel and Edom grew more palpable in the monarchic period of the Late Bronze Age. Saul, Israel's first king, waged war against the Edomites (1 Sam. 14.47-48), though no narration of this war occurs. David's reign marks a period of subjugation and direct Israelite control of Edom with established garrisons throughout its territory (2 Sam. 8.13-14). Why David made incursions into Edomite territory remains open for speculation since Edom posed no threat to his kingdom. To secure the southeastern borders of Judah since Edomite settlements during this period close to the Judean hill country were on the rise? To secure control of the profitable copper mining industry? To control the trade route north from the Gulf of 'Aqaba? At any rate, Judean subjugation may have sparked the development of an Edomite national consciousness that would not fully manifest itself for another century and a half (Bartlett 1989: 106). In addition, the six-month massacre campaign of 18,000 Edomites (MT '*rm*'), most likely hyperbolic, by Joab in the Valley of Salt, that region lying at the southern end of the Dead Sea, could only have reinforced, if not initiated, the animus between these two groups.⁵

We have no indications of a state administration in Edom during this period; thus it is probable that David had established a governor or some other official in Edom to ensure payment of the annual tribute. No evidence belies any contraindication to this state of affairs during the Solomonic regime, which, furthermore, established Israelite participation in, if not control of, maritime activity at Ezion-geber (1 Kgs 9.26). Any threat that Hadad the Edomite might have posed to Solomon must have been minimal since Edom would still have been recovering from the massacres

5. Bartlett (1995: 14, 20) asserts the monarchic period as a *terminus post quem* for understanding the national awareness of Israel and the neighbouring peoples as political enemies. The archetypal hostility of Edom coupled with that of the monarchic period enabled the biblical writers to attribute hostile behaviour to Edom in 587/86 BCE.

of Joab,⁶ and there's no hint of Edomite activity disrupting Israel's seaport ventures. From the beginning of the tenth century BCE until Edom's revolt in the mid-ninth century BCE, Edom remained quietly under the thumb of Judah.

The ninth century BCE saw both Moabites and Edomites growing stronger. Despite the lack of a national state and monarch in Edom during King Jehoshaphat's reign (870-46), a new start for Edom emerged with their successful rebellion against Jehoshaphat's successor Jehoram/Joram. Their independence from Judah (between 852 and 842 BCE) enabled them to establish a king of their own (2 Kgs 8.20, 22). Conflict between the two erupted again during the reign of King Amaziah (c. 801-787) who 'defeated 10,000 Edomites in the Valley of Salt', captured Sela and renamed it Jokthe-el, and rebuilt the port city of Elath (2 Kgs 14.7, 22). Amaziah's success in restoring Judean control over Edom may have been only temporary if Edom's tribute payment to the Assyrian king Adad-Nirari III indicates Assyrian diplomatic support of Edom. Edom, however, was able to extricate itself from Judean control for good during the reign of King Ahaz by reclaiming control over the maritime traffic of the Red Sea (2 Kgs 16.6). And so it remained for the next 150 years.

Shrewd and cautious diplomacy enabled the Edomites to retain their geographical integrity while escaping the aggressive onslaught of the military campaigns of the ancient Near Eastern superpowers Assyria and Babylon. From the victory inscriptions of Assyrian rulers mentioning Edom, we gain some insight into Edomite statehood (the following partially summarizes Beit-Arieh 1988: 34-35). The Assyrian ruler Adad-nirari III (810-783) first mentions Edom in the Nimrud (or Calah) slab (ANET, 281). Tiglath-pileser III (744-727) campaigned in Syria-Palestine and subdued several rulers who paid him tribute, including Qaus-malaku, king of Edom (ANET, 282).⁷ Sargon II (721-705) battled a coalition of states that

6. Assumptions abound concerning the presence of a hereditary monarchy in Edom during the time of the Davidic monarchy in Israel and that Judah lost Edom in Solomon's reign through Hadad's revolt (1 Kgs 11.14-17). No evidence indicates that Hadad's father was king of Edom. While Hadad fled to the Egyptian court for sanctuary, received a house, land, food allowance, and later married into the royal house of Egypt (his wife the sister of Queen Tahpanes), the Egyptians would not have compromised their alliance with Solomon by supporting Hadad against Solomon (see Bartlett's thorough discussion of this narrative [1989: 107-11]).

7. The theophoric element in the names of some Edomite kings bears witness to the Edomite deity *Qaus* (Sem. *qws*; Arab. *qaus*, meaning 'bow') as well as the religion of the Edomite royal line(s). *Qaus* may have been conceived of as a storm god and perhaps identical to the god Hadad of the Aramaeans (e.g. Edomites with the name Hadad—a king of Edom [Gen. 36.35; 1 Chron. 1.46]; and Hadad from a presumed Edomite royal

included Edom in 712 BCE (ANET, 287). After Sennacherib's (704-681) campaign against Judah in 701, King Aiaramu of Edom paid him tribute (ANET, 287-88). King Qaus-gabri of Edom was one of 12 kings of the region who donated labour and materials toward the construction of King Esarhaddon's (680-69) royal palace in Nineveh about 673 (ANET, 291). This same king's name also appears in relation to Esarhaddon's successor Ashurbanipal (668-32), for whom he participated in a military campaign about 667 (ANET, 294), and in a seal impression ('Belonging to Qosg[br] King of E[dom]') found at Umm el-Biyara. Edom remained loyal to Assyria throughout her vassalage. In return, Assyria never put Edom under direct rule (Millard 1992: 37).⁸ Indirect rule was far more profitable (fewer expenses, higher returns) for the Assyrians on their less-developed periphery. Ironically, Edom flourished during its period of vassalage to Assyria in the eighth and seventh centuries BCE. For example, settlements all over Edom intensified as attested by the excavation of sites at Buseirah, Tawilan, Umm el-Biyara, Tell el-Kheleifeh, and Ghrareh. Edomite statehood, however, would be short-lived.

The Edomite kingdom would survive the Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar's Palestinian campaign but not the direct-rule approach of the Neo-Babylonian king Nabonidus (555-39 BCE). The failure of Nabonidus to run the profitable Arabian trade became the success of North Arabian bedouin sheikhs. Ironically, Nabonidus's attempts to annex Edom in 552 BCE as a Babylonian province proved catastrophic for Babylonia as well, and not just for Edom (see the Nabonidus Chronicle in ANET, 305-07). Despite Crystal Bennett's arguments that Buseirah was destroyed and abandoned in the sixth century BCE, new evidence, claims Piotr Bienkowski (2001: 200), 'proves beyond doubt that settlement at the site continued into the Persian period' and may have remained a 'centre for any Persian administration'

line [1 Kgs 11.14-22]). Bartlett (1989: 201-02) provides a concise discussion of these complex linguistic connections.

When Qaus became the national god of Edom remains uncertain. Michael Rose (1977: 28-34) raises the scenario that a cult of Yhwh was known in Edom before that of Qaus, who emerged no earlier than the eighth century BCE. Andrew Dearman (1995: 127) and other scholars (e.g. Bartlett 1989: 198-99) find it more plausible that Yhwh, along with Qaus, would have been among the deities worshipped in Edom. Only with the expansion of a national identity did this mountain deity perhaps rise to prominence and assimilate characteristics of one or more of the following deities: Hadad, Baal, 'El, Yhwh.

8. As support, administrative and legal archives of Assyrian cities lack any Edomite personal names with the theophoric element, an indication that Assyria did not deport Edomites in any number and did not involve itself directly in Edomite affairs (Oded 1979).

(Bartlett 1989: 166). In fact, Bienkowski (2001: 213) boldly states further that, given the presence of Attic pottery dating to the late fourth century BCE at Buseirah, the capital, the presence of Greek pottery and Aramaic ostraca dating to the fifth-fourth centuries BCE at Tell el-Kheleifeh, a major trading center on the Red Sea, and the presence of a cuneiform tablet dating to either 423 BCE (accession of Darius II) or 335 BCE (Darius III) at Tawilan, 'it cannot be excluded that some sort of political entity called Edom also survived throughout the whole of the Persian period'.

Despite the prevailing view of the collapse of a political entity known as Edom with Nabonidus' campaign, Edomite tribes survived maintaining their ethnic identity and tribal structure in settlements west of Wadi 'Arabah, just south of the province of Yehud yet part of the Persian Eber-Nari ('Beyond the River') satrapy. Edomite settlements in this region flourished during the Persian period despite the overt absence of 'Edom' in the Ezra-Nehemiah literature.⁹ This region between Yehud and the brook of Egypt became the Idumaeon hyparchy though doubt remains over this region as a known province, ruled by a governor, in the Eber-Nari satrapy before the Hellenistic era. That evidence does exist attesting to Edomite settlements west of the Wadi 'Arabah and that the Edomite name became that of a new province implies the presence of a significant Edomite population with individuals of a former Edomite state who still saw themselves as Edomites even after the demise of that state.¹⁰ The major enemies of Yehud at this time were clearly Samaritans (Sanballat), Ammonites (Tobiah), and Arabians (Geshem). No explicit Edomite official is named, no doubt because Edom as a viable political entity had ceased to exist. Nonetheless, the real concern for Ezra and his colleagues over exogamous marriages by Yehudians with the 'people of the land' would have had in mind Edomites regardless of whether or not the MT's reading of 'Amorites' conceals an original 'Edomites' in 1 Esdras 8.69. Moreover, scholarship has generally regarded Geshem 'as the *de facto* ruler

9. Epigraphic finds in Tell el-Kheleifeh, Aramaic ostraca with Edomite names from Arad, and Beer-sheba ostraca with Edomite names, and Edomite-style pottery at Idumaeon and Negev sites of Tel Arad, Horvat 'Uza, Kadesh Barnea, and Horvat Qitmit, to name a few, reveal a healthy Edomite presence contiguous to Persian Yehud (see Grabbe 2004: 52).

10. Knauf (1992: 52) suggests that while the Edomite state eventually created a nation, that state was secondary because those who founded it had a model to emulate and it needed another economy to back it up. When that economy withdrew, then so did the financing necessary for state maintenance. In addition, Edom as a statehood belied general presuppositions in that it only produced urbanization to a limited extent (e.g. the urban centre of Bozrah, open villages and farmsteads rather than houses) and that tribalism coexisted with statehood, perhaps even in tension with one another. 'Edom was not only a secondary state, but also a secondary civilization' (Ibid: 48).

in Edom in the mid-fifth century BCE' (Bartlett 1989: 171). Jacob Myers (1971: 386) states, 'By the time of Nehemiah, Geshem was in control of both Edom proper and the Edomite territory seized from Judah'. In addition, many have identified this Geshem with Gasmu (a clearly possible if not absolutely certain identification according to Bartlett 1989: 171), king of Qedar, an Arabian people, whose name appears on a silver bowl (dated c. 400 BCE) found at Tell el-Maskhuta near Ismailia in the eastern delta region of Egypt. Linking the Edomites with the Arabs has its precedence in the Jewish consciousness as is indicated by the genealogical linkage of Esau with both the Nebaioth, the most important of the Arab tribes (cf. Gen. 25.13 and 1 Chron. 1.29), and the Qedarites.¹¹

In the Hellenistic era, the Edomites came to be known as Idumaeans and lent their name to the known province of Idumaea (the Greek equivalent to 'Edom'). With the advent of the Hellenistic era came a social, economic, and political revivification of Edom unknown since the period of Assyrian suzerainty. The Edomites reached a sense of delegitimation when, during the Hasmonaean Dynasty, according to Josephus, John Hyrcanus I (c. 125) forcibly annexed Idumaea to the Judean state and forcibly made Idumaeans adopt normative Jewish customs (*Ant.* 13:9:1 §§257-58).

Cultural

Prior to statehood, Edom was a territory populated, though not densely, with bands of tent-dwelling agriculturalists and pastoralists. These tribal bands coexisted at the zenith of Edomite nationalism but produced little surplus and barely moved beyond the level of a subsistence economy even after the seventh century. The economy never really developed beyond a pastoral nomadism since goat breeding was the only low-rainfall insurance available in antiquity. Knauf-Belleri (1995: 99) comments, 'The vast majority of the people living on the Edomite plateau and in its adjacent regions prior to 500 BCE were neither specialized pastoralists nor specialized agriculturalists; most probably, they were compelled to practice some mixed economy'.

11. The temptation of identifying the Nebaioth with a later Arab group known as the Nabataeans has been too attractive for some scholars. First, the names are reasonably similar. Second, both are identified in the historical sources as Arabs. Yet there are some real obstacles in the easy, collective identification of these groups with one another (see Bartlett's discussion, 1989: 172-73) despite the fact that Jewish literature makes no real distinction between these ethnic groups for they all—Nebaioth, Edomite, Qedarite, Idumaeans, Nabataean—get lumped together as a part of the Arab world. Perhaps only the historical period dictated the descriptor to be used in reference to individuals of this ethnic group.

From the Early Bronze Age, evidence reveals an extensive copper mining and smelting operations in the Wadi Feinan region. As a result, the Edomite population must have consisted of skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled workers based, in part, on the pottery recovered from Feinan. The pottery comprised two types: 'Edomite palace ware', reflecting the workmanship of a specialized potter in his/her workshop; and 'peasant's ware', reflecting an absence of specialized workmanship. In addition, since the Feinan labour force would need to be fed, another segment of the population nearby that really did not participate in any kind of market economy would have been responsible for an agricultural surplus addressing this need. The Feinan copper works reached their zenith of productivity in the seventh century. Though the organization of labour at Feinan has yet to be reconstructed, there can be no question that the Feinan copper mining would have been a major asset providing the necessary capital for Edomite development into statehood.

Another important asset for Edom that became a major area of income were the trade routes, both land and sea. Control over the principal north-south artery known as the King's Highway, a major trade route that cut through the heartland of Edom through the Transjordan regions of Moab and Ammon and into Syria, brought with it an increase of capital. Control over the seaport at the Gulf of 'Aqabah and the maritime operations there especially brought much wealth. The seaports of Elath and Ezion-geber continually lay at the center of struggle for control signifying relations between Israel and Edom. Through there flowed all kinds of luxury goods beyond just that of frankincense. These goods would have included those 'that combined a high price in the area of their destination (the Mediterranean) with a low price in their area of origin, and, like any goods forwarded by caravan trade, a high volume of capital with a low volume in space and weight' (Knauf 1992: 50-51). Traded goods of precious stones such as emeralds, coral, rubies; precious metals such as copper and iron; textile goods like purple embroidered work, fine linen, and saddlecloths came through Edom proper (Ezek. 27.16, 20). Exotic items, comparable to those listed in the joint sea ventures of Solomon and Hiram of Tyre (1 Kgs 9.26; 10.11-12), such as the best of all spices, almug wood, precious stones, ivory, and gold (from Sheba and Ophir in Arabia; 1 Kgs 10.10-11) were imported to Palestine via the seaport of Elath. These examples only touch the surface of known luxury goods imported from neighboring regions and do not even consider those exotic wares imported from even more distant markets in Africa and India. According to Bartlett (1989: 127-28), the control of Elath was an important economic and political development for Edom because 'they could control the southern region of the Wadi 'Arabah and they could derive the benefit of trade passing between Arabia and Damascus through the Gulf of 'Aqabah'.

Under Assyrian suzerainty, Edom reached the apex of its political, cultural, and economic development. It is during this rise to a conscious nationalism that the indigenous deity Qaus became the national god. In addition to the natural resources providing a major source of income for Edom, they also benefited from the influx of external capital provided them by the Assyrian-dominated world economy. The Assyrians treated the Edomites well, obviously not wanting to jeopardize the cow for its milk. Contrary to assumptions about a voluntary vassalage to Assyria, Edom flourished: Bozrah from the eighth-sixth centuries, and Tawilan in the 8th and seventh centuries.¹² Its prosperity is evidenced by the presence of Edomite pottery and inscriptions in the eastern Negev region. Babylonian interference in the Arabian trade in the sixth century occasioned the collapse of the Edomite economy and state. With no more need for Edom's copper and with revenues from the caravan trade being harvested by another agency, Edom's ruling class lost its financial base resulting in the abandonment of the major urban areas in Edom and returning it to its pre-monarchic state of pastoral nomadism.

The presence of Edomite pottery and inscriptions in the Negev region also reveals the westward expansion of Edomite presence into assumed Judean territory with an Edomite, though minority, settlement (if not conquest of) in a dominant Judean population during the seventh century and early sixth centuries. An inscription from a Judean fortress at Arad mentions an 'evil' done by Edom in the eastern Negev, suggested by Kenneth Hoglund (1994: 340) as 'possibly the forcible seizure of Judean lands'. Ostraca from an Arad stratum dated toward the end of the Judean monarchy appeals for reinforcements because of an anticipated attack by the Edomites ('lest the Edomites come'). Excavations at Horvat Qitmit in the general vicinity, however, provide the most glaring evidence (e.g. a cultic center, cult stands, human figurines, and a three-horned goddess figurine) for Edomite occupation/conquest of Judean territory (for detailed description of the Edomite shrine at Horvat Qitmit and the finds there, see Beit-Arieh 1991: 93-116).

Edomite presence in this region was not purely military, if at all. Changing economic and social conditions no doubt precipitated the fluctuating settlement of Edomites west of the Wadi 'Arabah over several centuries. Settlement on the southern fringes of Judah perhaps became a more attractive prospect because of the derived economic benefits than from

12. Edomite statehood depended on outside support, which unfortunately for Edom, kept their economy in a constant state of precariousness. Assyrian interest in Edom had little more to do than with their copper. And even then their interest arose out of strained Assyrian-Phoenician relations making Assyrian access to Cypriot copper difficult (Knauf-Belleri 1995: 111-13).

farming in the higher, mountainous regions of Edom. In addition, individual Edomites' movement among and intermarriage with various tribal groups (e.g. Kenites, Kenizzites, and Jerahmeelites) within this region would have facilitated their easy integration into this region's culture given their shared ethnicity. Bartlett (1989: 143) notes,

Just how sharply the boundary line was drawn between land that was distinctively Judahite and land that was distinctively Edomite is not clear. There was probably no sharply defined border line, but rather a border zone in which the population might be somewhat fixed.

It is just such an occasion of ethnic conflict within a 'contact zone'¹³ up for grabs coupled with a concern over exogamous marriages that the Edomite ethnic myth of the primary history performs its colonial discursive function that additionally seared prejudices toward Edomites on the Israelite consciousness. On the one hand, no doubt exists within biblical commentary that Edom's infamy is its co-participation with Babylon in the destruction of Jerusalem and the Temple though no evidence can support such a perception.¹⁴ On the other hand, growing Edomite presence in the Negev region at this time is clear from their acceptance of Jewish refugees (Jer. 40.11-12). Their non-responsiveness to Judean annihilation coupled with their occupation of traditionally assumed Judean territory entrenched feelings of enmity and hatred toward the Edomites. Myers (1971: 377) states, '[Judah's] hatred for Edom could hardly have been so intense before the events leading to the collapse of the state, because for the most part throughout her history she had the upper hand'. I shall discuss this issue of ethnic construal vis-à-vis borderland concerns further in subsequent sections.

13. Kwok (2005: 82) elaborates on this post-colonial term as descriptive of a land where 'people of different geographical and historical backgrounds are brought into contact with each other, usually shaped by inequality and conflictual relations'.

14. Such a specific accusation first appears in the Hellenistic era where the writer of 1 Esdras 4.42-46 attributes the destruction of the Temple to the Edomites, a more present reality than the Babylonians for the writer and the border wars and land control issues of his time period. The texts of 1 Maccabees (4.15, 61; 5.68) and 2 Maccabees (12.38) clearly indicate the border of Yehud and Idumaea running between Bethzur and Hebron. And 1 Esdras 4.50 depicts the Persian king Darius I (521-456) giving orders that 'the Idumeans should give up the villages of the Jews which they held'. Despite the pro-Persian stance toward the postexilic *golah* community present in this text, Hoglund (343 n. 28) contends that this narrative 'reflects more the circumstances of the second century than the Persian period itself'.

Ethnicity

Origins

When used ethnically, the term 'Edom' refers to what must have been two adjacent, but distinct, groups of peoples at one time as indicated from the Egyptian records. We had previously noted the 'nomads (*shasu*) of Edom' and the 'nomads (*shasu*) of Seir' within territory we tend to regard as Edomite.

It is significant that practically all the references to the Shasu in Egyptian records are in a military context. They fight with or against Egyptian armies in Syria or Palestine, or appear as robber bands operating on their own (Ward 1972: 52).

Apparently distinct early on, these *shasu* groups were indistinguishable by the time of the Israelite monarchy, at least in the eyes of the biblical writers.

From the biblical perspective, the Edomites derive from Esau (but only through the contrived 'red' motif; see Bartlett 1989: 87-88), who, like his brother Jacob, is Aramaean. When Abraham sought a wife for his son Isaac, he sent servants to his family in the region Aram-Naharaim to the city of Nahor (the city Nahor?, the residence of his brother Nahor?; Gen. 24.10). When Rebekah sought a wife for Jacob, she sent him to her family in Paddan-Aram (Gen. 28.5). The dramatic events that revolve about Jacob and his divine election that unfold in the Jacob cycle unfortunately eclipse the fact that Esau and Jacob share a common ethnic kinship—Aramaean.

Esau's genealogy primarily connects him with the Seirites through his marriage to Oholibamah, the (great?) granddaughter of Seir (Gen. 36.20-21, 24-25). Caution, however, is in order when working through the marital lists of Esau (Gen. 26.34; 28.9; 36.1-3). Genesis 36 identifies Esau's wife Basemath (Mahalath in the Samaritan Pentateuch) as 'Ishmaelite' in contrast to 'Hittite' (26.34) and never mentions Mahalath identified earlier as 'Ishmaelite' (28.9; Basemath in the Syriac). Are these alternate names for the same individual with 'Basemath' perhaps being Hittite? When Esau marries Mahalath, the narrator leaves the impression that an Ishmaelite is ethnically distinct from a Canaanite given his former Canaanite wives (Judith and Basemath) being so displeasing to his parents. But if Basemath is Ishmaelite, how can she then also be Hittite, and hence Canaanite by inference? In addition, his marriage to Mahalath(?)/Basemath(?) makes him kin to such Arabian groups as the Nebaioth, Qedarites, and Qedemites (brothers of Mahalath, Gen. 28.9; 25.13-15). And how must his marriage to Mahalath set with his parents since it was neither matrilineal nor strictly patrilineal (Mahalath was the granddaughter of Abraham through Ishmael)? The narrator also identifies Esau's wife Oholibamah as 'Hivite' in addition

to 'Seirite/Horite' (36.2). His marriage to Adah, a Hittite, connects him to the Kenizzites and Amalekites as grandfather (36.10-12).¹⁵ What can we conclude about the confusion present in the Esavide genealogy? The narrator's failure to harmonize these marriage lists raises serious concerns over narrative credibility articulated by Christopher Heard's (2001: 135) pointed query: 'Can this narrator—who cannot get the facts straight about a matter so simple as the names of Esau's wives, the names of their fathers, and their ethnicities—be trusted to get other, more momentous facts straight'? Clearly, Esau's wives, much less their ethnicity, matter little. Genealogically, the narrator has Esau all over the ethnic map in a literary effort where the only careful ethnic distinction drawn is between Israel and Edom for, lest we forget, these stories are really about two ethnic groups. From the narrator's perspective, the re-presentation of the ethnicity of the 'other' really does not matter. Edomite = Aramaean = Seirite/Horite = Hivite = Hittite/Ishmaelite = (non)Canaanite (?). That Edomites through any of Esau's lineages shared kin with, settled among, and intermarried with tribal groups such as the Kenites, Kenizzites, and possible Israelites/Judeans in the Negev region on the southern fringes of Yehud no doubt would have factored into their loose re-presentation in a narrative unconcerned with the 'other'.

Perceptions

When reading through the primary history and the larger literary tradition of the Jewish community, the love-hate relation between Israel and Edom is unmistakable. The animus between the two originates, from a literary perspective, with the Jacob cycle in the primary history. Struggling for primacy even before their birth as nations, the prophetic tone 'the elder shall serve the younger' (Gen. 25.23) coupled with incidences of Israel besting Edom (albeit through trickery and deceit) in this cycle establishes the ideological claims to land control and the divine right to dominate Edom latent within the primary history.

Buttressing such an ideological air of superiority is an ethno-typing strategy of characterization through stereotypes. At the outset, the narrator inserts the 'red' motif when describing the physical characteristics of

15. The Amalekites in Jewish tradition were the well-known inhabitants of the Negev hostile to the Israelites (Exod. 17.8-16; 1 Sam. 30; 2 Sam. 1.8, 13). Whether true or not matters little for the narrative re-presentation that the arch-enemy Edomites are known by the company they keep or, in this case, the kin to which they relate, willingly or not. This literary sleight-of-hand, however, only convinces if we glance away for a moment from an important point—Israel, too, has kin relations with the Amalekites by virtue of their relationship with Edom.

Esau, thus infusing the issue of race within this ethnic conflict. Hermann Gunkel (1997: 290) suggests that 'the reddish-brown skin of the Edomites was amusing' to the Israelites who would have been 'yellowish'. If so, such a position must come to grips with the fact that the narration of David's 'redness' as an attractive quality seems intended to elicit admiration and praise rather than ridicule. We may never know exactly the relation of colour to Israelite attitudes toward Edomites. It may simply be nothing more than a literary device whereby the narrative can link Esau with Edom. Maybe. While colour may contribute to the ethnic divide between Israel and Edom, and I believe it does but not in the racial manner accustomed to in the US, it does not do so by itself.

The motif emerges again when Esau, unable to call the stew Jacob has been cooking by name, calls it 'the red, that red' (25.30). Traditionally, commentators have identified this as illustrative of Esau as boorish and stupid. But a variety of options present themselves to the reader as explanation for why Esau refers to this dish as he does, not least of which would be exhaustion. After all, he had been out in the field hunting and was famished (v. 29).

In the episode concerning the birthright, Esau's statement, 'I am about to die; of what use is a birthright to me?' (v. 32), for most readers reflects his shortsightedness. Esau seems more concerned about immediate gratification than with the long-term benefits that possession of the birthright would bring. But what those benefits are remain uncertain within the narrative. If Esau indeed is about to die from starvation, then of what use would a birthright have been to him? If he retains the birthright by not selling it, he dies and subsequently loses the birthright anyway; if he sells it, he at least gets to live. Either way, he loses the birthright as designed by the narrator.

Finally, Esau/Edom hears his father consign him to a lifestyle of warfare, raids, and servitude (to his brother of course, Gen. 27.39-40). Heard's (2001: 116) observation that 'sword' may simply indicate a depiction of Esau commensurate with that of an outdoorsman or hunter bears no connection to his subjugation. Engaging in warfare as an act of throwing off the yoke of dominion seems more consistent with Isaac's mitigated pronouncement that Edom will stay in servitude until it is ready for it to end. Moreover, this perception of Edom as hostile and aggressive accounts for the angst of Israel when he found out that a contingent of 400 men were coming with Edom to meet him (32.6-7; 33.1-2). Why else divide your retinue into two companies with yourself at the back unless you anticipate hostile reprisals? And who would blame Edom, if, at everywhere he turned, he found himself maligned because of orchestrated machinations and deceit behind his back? Jacob expected armed conflict but instead received a gracious embrace. Israel's fear of Edom and perceptions of them as hostile and bellicose proved unfounded, if not projected. And what should we make

of Edom's characterization? If actions unaccompanied by any mitigating factors can be trusted, and there is no reason not to, then Edom comes away depicted as gracious and forgiving. While I concur with Heard that interpretative conclusions concerning Esau's characterization indeed largely reflect the option chosen by individual interpreters (a point stressed throughout his deconstructive analyses of Genesis 12-36), narrative impulses in the Jacob cycle (e.g. the prophetic tone coupled with Isaac's blessing emphasizing Esavide servitude; a physical description of Esau alone; the [designed] loss of his birthright; the narrative stress upon his exogamous marriages; and unfounded aggressive behaviour), when taken as a whole, nonetheless subtly influence attitudes toward the Edomites as part of the text's ideological function.

Ideological perspectives on Edomite inferiority and the related characterization of them as hostile and aggressive extend further beyond the Genesis narrative. Though the two brothers reconcile (Gen. 34), the abhorrence toward Edom in Israelite consciousness made the divine command, 'You shall not abhor an Edomite for he is your brother' (Deut. 23.7) necessary. Israelite antagonism toward Edom within the Torah originates from Edom's refusal to allow Israel passage through their territory on to Canaan after liberation from Egyptian bondage (Num. 20.14-21).¹⁶ Moses sent messengers from Kadesh to the king of Edom inquiring, 'Let us pass through your land. We will not pass through field or vineyard, or drink water from any well; we will go along the King's Highway, not turning aside to right hand or to the left until we have passed through your territory' (20.17). The king replied, 'You shall not pass through, or we will come out with the sword against you', and then followed that statement up with a show of a large, heavily armed force (20.18, 20). Thus, Israel was forced to take a more circuitous route. This depiction of the Edomites as hostile and aggressive squares with Egyptian perceptions of the *shasu* people of Edom and Seir as bellicose in nature.

Despite the Torah's predominant portrayal of the Edomites as full of animus, hostile and antagonistic, there is also another portrait, though eclipsed. Deuteronomy 2.1-8 underscores the kinship relation between these two brothers by avoiding any references to the 'hated' Edomites. While Israel was in Egypt, Yhwh had given the Edomite territory to them as a possession (cf. Josh. 24.4); it was denied to Israel as a possession. 'I will not give

16. From a strictly historical perspective, this text raises several concerns. First, how accurate can this story be? Does it accurately portray a time period when Edom's northernmost boundaries stretched to the Dead Sea region? Second, how much of this story reflects a later audience's concern with Edomite encroachments into Judean territory, hence the antagonistic portrayal of the Edomites?

you even so much as a foot's length of their land, since I have given Mount Seir to Esau as a possession' (Deut. 2.5). While Numbers 20 explicitly states that the Israelites could not and did not traverse Edom, Deuteronomy 2 implies that they did: "You are about to pass through the territory of your kindred, the descendants of Esau, who live in Seir"...So we passed by our kin, the descendants of Esau who live in Seir leaving behind the route of the Arabah, and leaving behind Elath and Ezion-geber' (2.4, 8). In addition, the children of Edom were afraid of Israel and posed no threat to them. Intermarriages with the Edomites were even acceptable with members of the third generation being admitted into the presence of Yhwh. The same did not hold true for the Moabites and Ammonites, also kin but not as close.

These texts reveal Israelite encroachment upon admitted Edomite territory. Together, both ethnic groups resided, most likely contentiously, with each other in Gerar (Gen. 26.17) and Beer-sheba (Gen. 26.23), towns in the Negev region. To get to Canaan, Israel passed through Edomite territory regardless of whether one accepts the Numbers' account that has them travel from Kadesh-barnea to Mount Hor near Arad, a 12-13 km journey on a northwest line, or the Deuteronomy account that has them travel through the Arabah region. Conquest texts like Josh. 15.13-19/Judg. 1.10-15 reflect Israelite aggressive incursions from the north into Negev towns like Hebron, Debir, and Hormah near Arad with known Edomite groups for the express purpose of establishing Yehudite control. These texts that reveal Israelite encroachment upon admittedly Edomite territory bear the traces or figurations of a context of ethnic antagonism in a social context wherein one ethnic group identifying itself as 'Israel' asserts its divine claims to a border zone occupied by heterogeneous ethnicities.

Balaam's oracle fuels the ideological contention of Israelite superiority–Edomite servitude with the proclamation that 'a star shall come out of Jacob/and a scepter shall rise out of Israel/...Edom will become a possession/Seir, its enemies, a possession' (Num. 24.17-18). And we would be remiss if we forgot the bloody military campaigns by David into Edom, the expansion of Israelite borders that erased Edomite borders by Solomon, and the continual subjugation of Edomite territory throughout the Israelite monarchy till the ninth century BCE. Now, which ethnic group has demonstrated hostile and aggressive behaviour? And who has made incursions into whose territory often with the purpose of violent displacement and political domination?

To venture beyond the primary history but still remaining within the Jewish religious tradition for a moment, the postexilic literature may hold the key. Within this literature, the perspective of 'Damn-Edom' theology that deemed Edomite prosperity at Judean misfortune as morally reprehensible,

the most virulent attitudes toward Edom in all sacred literature find their expression.¹⁷ Psalm 137 excoriates Edom in relation to the fall of Jerusalem. Obadiah, playing upon the kinship motif, cites Edomite exploitation of Judeans following the destruction of Jerusalem (vv. 12-14). Their actual participation, however, is up for debate since the poet claims that they 'were like one of them'—namely like those individuals directly responsible for the destruction and exploitation of Jerusalem (v. 11). Only in a later text does Jewish consciousness explicitly attribute the destruction of the Temple to Edom (1 Esd. 4.45). Isaiah 34 subsumes the final and total destruction of Israel's enemies under the code word 'Edom'.¹⁸ Finally, and of direct relevance to my concern with the appropriation of texts in a context of ethnic conflicts, the imagery of Isaiah 63.1-3 depicting Yhwh with blood having dyed his clothes after trampling Edom became the inspiration for Julia Ward Howe's 'Battle Hymn of the Republic' celebrating the Union victory in the nineteenth-century US Civil War bloodbath.

The reality that Judah did not escape Babylonian destruction while the Edomites remained unscathed, took in Judean refugees in what was assumed to be Judean territory, and populated the contact zone south of Judah naturally elicited bitterness toward their co-religionists based perhaps on the principle of 'whoever is not for us is against us'. Literary tensions within the primary history where one element receives emphasis to the de-emphasis of the other ideologically draws 'first blood' by inducing the colonizing efforts of an ethnic group re-presenting itself as 'Israel', by projecting the 'possession of the land by conquest' motif upon Edom, and by typecasting them as hostile and antagonistic when such ethno-typing strategies bear no legitimacy. Furthermore, the literary re-presentation of 'Israel's' conquests of Edom ignores the divine decrees within the Torah and tacitly encourages Edomite encroachments upon loosely governed Judean territory in the Negev.

17. The anti-Edomite bias present in the 'Damn-Edom' theology (Cresson 1972: 125-48) of post-exilic literature (e.g. Obad.; Ps. 137; Mal. 1.2-5; Isa. 34; 63.1-6; Ezek. 25.12-14; 35.1-15) cannot simply be attributed to the fiery-hearted nationalism of certain writers/editors. Rather, it must reflect the general attitude latent within the Jewish consciousness where Edom becomes a symbol for 'the enemy'. In general, this literature stops short of explicitly identifying any specific accusation for the condemnation of Edom save mention of Edomite possession of Judean territory at the time of the exile (Ezek. 25.12-14; 35.1-15).

18. This facile association becomes more obvious when, in later times, Jewish post-biblical literature used 'Edom' as a designation for its enemy Rome (e.g. Midrash Rabbah Genesis 83-84 identified the Roman emperor Diocletian with the penultimate Edomite chief Magdiel (Gen. 36.43) and Leviticus Rabbah 13.5 compared Rome, identified as Edom, with a boar. See further Cresson 1972: 139).

Conclusion

Before moving forward to my analyses of select Edomite ethnic myths, I wish to draw some pointed conclusions germane to my analyses. First, a kinship exists between Israel and Edom extending beyond ethnic ties (both Aramaean) to include linguistic and religious ties. Like that of the Hebrews, the Edomite language was a Canaanite language as well (Beit-Arieh and Cresson 1985). Hebrew literature even avows a religious kinship between the two as tradition acknowledges a mutual connection with Yhwh (Judg. 5.4-5) somewhere in the shared history of these two groups.

Second, two biases toward Edom stand in tension with one another in the primary history. (1) Edom is afraid of Israel who cannot be hostile and assume possession of Edomite territory for itself since Yhwh had allotted it to them (Deut. 2.1-8; 23.8). (2) Edom is antagonistic and hostile toward Israel (Gen. 25.33; Num. 20.14-21) who regards Edomite territory as its possession since Yhwh had allotted it to them (see Exod. 15.15; Balaam's oracle, Num. 24.18; the story of Esau/Jacob, Gen. 25.23; 27.27-29, 39-40; monarchic activities literarily represented; and editorial assumptions, 2 Kgs 8.20-22; 16.6). The latter perception of the Edomites has dominated within the collective (un)conscious of Judaism and in the interpretative history of these texts. But it is not the only perception of the Edomites; another remains embedded within the primary history despite its eclipse by tradition.

Third, the eclipse of one bias in favor of another makes it easy to ignore the 'other' as real people. Ethnic distinctions between Edomites, on the one hand, and Arabians, on the other hand, collapse as everyone gets lumped together—Nebaioth, Qedarites, Edomites, Ishmaelites, Arabs. In addition, the 'other' becomes the negative reflection of 'self' bearing the stereotyped attitudes of animus, hostility, antagonism, and aggressiveness projected upon it.

Fourth, the ethno-typing strategies of these texts borne up by a group of people facilitate and sanction their colonizing efforts. Such texts bear within them the traces/figurations of conflict between Yehudians and Edomites due to Edomite presence in assumed Judean territory though literarily depicted as being Edomite (immigrant Israelites at Kadesh-barnea [Num. 20.14-21] moving toward Mt Hor [Num. 20.22-29]). Judah's downfall in the Persian period became Edom's prosperity. This downturn of economic affairs for Judah could only have had a negative psychological impact on a group of people attempting to establish its primacy in a context of colonization over, what must have been viewed as, an interloping kin whose tangible presence only reinforced Edomite successes contemporaneous with Judean failures. At stake in the control over Edomite territory (by Arabians) were the land trade routes including the primary route of the King's Highway, the seaport at the Gulf of 'Aqabah, and natural resources like copper and iron absent

within Palestine proper. But control over such territory entailed ignoring one obscure divine decree in the Torah.

(E)razing Civilizations¹⁹

Civilizations, like kingdoms, within the annals of human history have come and gone, sometimes quite violently. How many cultures have been erased by the savage razing of one civilization deemed uncivilized by another 'civilized' civilization! The full import of a cultural heritage lost by such activity became a nascent reality after the 2003 invasion of Iraq that witnessed the partial destruction as well as looting of that country's museum and its artifacts. The civilization that once referred to itself as 'Israel' responsible for this attempted (e)razure has as a part of its cultural heritage and identity a predisposition for conquering and settling non-indigenous territory. Its predisposition, informed by another group referring to itself as 'Israel', was shaped and moulded in the process of forming a national identity within a context of colonization. In discussing the interstices of ethno-typing and conquest-settlement ideology, I will explore two colonization enterprises wherein one civilization regards itself as superior and, through the use of stereotypes to dehumanize another ethnic group, gives itself permission to eradicate that group. If Genesis 25-36 ideologically affirms a group identified as 'Israel' as ethnically superior to Edom, and that 'Israel' is divinely fated to dominate Edom buttressed by ethno-typing strategies and character perceptions of Edom as hostile, aggressive and evil, then the Othniel complex (Judg. 1.10-15; 3.7-11) actualizes such an ideology via the conquest-settlement motif. Of course, the narrative reinforces Edomite perceptions by ascribing the conquest activity to an ethnic Edomite. Some two and a half millennia later, the *Nachleben* of such a biblical ideology resurfaced on the shores of a different land across the globe to spread its horror by attempting to completely (e)raze the divergent civilizations of an ethnic group known as Native Americans. Re-presentation becomes reality as the experience of the Edomites becomes that of Native Americans.²⁰

19. My heading draws its inspiration from Danna Nolan Fewell (2007: 115-37). The wordplay captures both the action of extermination (razing/erasure) and the dual means of the action (through the s/word) against, in this case, more than one civilization. As a sign, (e)razure signifies the remaining trace.

20. Admittedly, I could have taken the colonized pairing in the direction of Canaanites-Native Americans on the basis of land dispossession and annihilation by a foreign invader. The observations of Robert Warrior (1996: 93-100) have much to commend in a decolonizing reading along those lines. I chose my colonized pairing, however, on the basis of what I perceive to be paralleling ethno-typing strategies utilized in the process to achieve colonization.

Edom, Aram...Whatever

At the outset, let me first make clear that my concern with the texts of Judges 1.10-15; 3.7-11 is not with the historicity of events and characters within the time period as narrated. Rather, my concern focuses on the representation within this narrative for a colonizing context wherein such a text would have had a discursive function ideologically. Second, I am taking these texts together because they concern the conquest activity of the same individual within the same general geographic region. Finally, my analysis will demonstrate the confluence of 'Edom' and 'Aram' within Jewish consciousness as reflected by its literary traditions.

The first narrative (Judg. 1.10-15), a literary parallel to Joshua 15.13-19,²¹ focuses on an ideal judge named Othniel. Immediately questions surface. What exactly is his relation to Caleb? Is he his brother or his nephew? And what connection do he and Caleb, whether brother or uncle matters not ultimately, have to the tribe of Judah since they are Kenizzites? The Kenizzites, by the way, were a tribal clan descended from Esau (Gen. 36.10-11), thus Edomites. But yet, the narrative associates them with the conquest activity of the tribe of Judah who not only has the green light to lead the charge but who also has divine justification for control of the land (1.2). Preceding activity within the story, ideology affirms not only the what? (land conquest) but also the who? (Judah) with regard to political control of and authority over a land mass and its natural resources. Should we naturally assume Othniel as a proselyte though ethnically Edomite by descent and though never having made a Yahwistic statement of faith, hence explaining his connection with the tribe of Judah's conquest activity? Fewell (2007: 131) raises the question more directly: 'Are Caleb, Achsah, and Othniel Israelites, or are they foreigners?'

Othniel's narrative association with Judah takes place in connection with the latter's land seizure of the Negev region (note the geographical framing within this narrative of the thrice-mentioned 'Negev'; 1.9, 15-16). Towns such as Kiriath Arba (or Hebron, 1.10), Kiriath Sepher (or Debir, 1.11), Hormah (1.17), and Arad (1.16) become strategic targets in a military campaign. But why these particular places? From the narrative description, this region seems to offer very little in the way of hot commodities much less natural resources since Achsah has to prompt her father Caleb to augment her 'dry' (Negev) marriage dowry with a reliable water source in order to survive in a region which barely seems able to support an agrarian economy. The answer to our question lies partly in our understanding of this region's inhabitants.

21. See the detailed parallels drawn by Younger (2002: 60 n. 2).

In the beginning of the narrative, we find that the military operation has as its target populace to displace and to dispossess all Canaanites. But when we read further, we encounter not simply Canaanites but rather disparate, if not sub-, ethnicities, shall we say, like the Perizzites, Amalekites, Hittites, Amorites, Kenites, and Edomites.²² Thus, 'Canaanite' seems to be a generic, not ethnic specific, designation to encompass all inhabitants, regardless of their ethnicity, living within the land of Canaan.

Names bear meaning, as evidenced with Achsah's request (using the term 'Negev'), but also, in this case, reveal something about the inhabitants under inquiry. Case in point: Debir. Debir was not always known as Debir but rather was known as Kiriath Sepher (literally 'the city of writing', or 'the city of books'), or as Kiriath Sannah (literally 'the city of instruction'; Josh. 15.49). Only after its conquest does this town get renamed Debir. To the colonizer not only go the spoils but also the power to rename. By s/word, means of control, the Israelites erase and write over a city of writing. From modern perceptions, what Israel did was to (e)raze a civilization since a civilization is generally understood as a culture with literary capabilities. Fewell (2007: 126) adds:

The traces in Kiriath-sepher glimpse the loss of human life; for there to be a city of books, there must be a city of scribes. For there to be a center of learning, there must be a city of learners. But the text focuses its rhetoric elsewhere. The citizens of Kiriath-sepher are granted but one sign. Only once are "inhabitants" mentioned. Then they are simply erased. For these inhabitants, this is no longer a place of words. Nor is this a place where bodies are allowed to be their own signs. No bodies in this story. Only the city and the land stand as subjects of value.

And just what replaces a culture of learning where records are kept and texts are produced? A culture 'with an ambiguous lot of stuff' (Fewell 2007: 126). Ironically, that writing captures Israelite victory in order that generations can remember that such an incident can render it susceptible to the same erasure.

Before returning to the aforementioned question, I want to briefly explore the second narrative of the Othniel complex in Judges 3.7-11. Completely in narrative voice, there is certainly no depth to this story, which upon closer examination bears a strong formulaic quality to it.

22. Reading 1.36 thusly in place of the MT 'Amorites' with textual attestation from LXX and Syriac Hexapla. Moreover, no historical evidence corroborates the extent of territory for the Amorites from the Negev region southeastward to Sela, a known Edomite place-name in known Edomite territory. Soggin (1981: 25) suggests the MT reading as 'the product of textual corruption (*resh* for *dalet*) and a metathesis'.

The characters never interact, never reveal any emotions, thoughts or flaws, and never engage in dialogue; in short, they are extremely flat even by narrative standards. King Cushan-rishathaim neither says a word nor receives any description. Narrative peculiarities such as odd-sounding names (even by ancient Near Eastern conventions), an unlikely ethnic Edomite as hero but somehow understood to be Judean, geographic improbabilities, and the literary convention of an end-rhyme in Hebrew elicit a number of questions, some interrelated but none perhaps no more important than the other in significance. Who is Cushan-rishathaim? Where is Aram-naharaim? Do these names bear any significance? Why would Judah, a southern tribe, be engaged in conflict with Aramaeans to the north? Why is an end-rhyme, a rather unusual convention in Hebrew, present with Aram-naharaim and Cushan-rishathaim? Does this stylistic device indicate something about the story's function?

Scholarly inquiries into the name Cushan-rishathaim and its referent, an obvious curiosity, have resulted in no confident identification.²³ Understanding this name, however, need not end here if we consider that a name reveals more than what our modern penchant for a historical referent would desire. This same sign *kushan* appears elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible in Habakkuk 3.7 in parallelism with 'the country of Midian', a region topographically closer to Judah and the Negev region, as does the evidence of names in *-an* (*-on*) associated with the Edomites (cf. Gen. 36.20-30). The meaning of the sign *rishathaim* as 'doubly wicked, evil' suggests the name Cushan-rishathaim as a parody or caricature (see Soggin 1981: 46). And who within the Jewish consciousness during Persian colonization would have been considered as 'evil' as revealed within its literary tradition? Who surrounded the 'Israelites', as suggested by the envelope construction of this narrative with Cushan-rishathaim occurring four times, in the Negev region during this era but—yes, the Edomites? And lest we forget, the text affirms Edomite control over a border zone perceived by 'Israel' as theirs as a divine gift.

Following the MT reading generally leads readers to conclude the place-name Aram-naharaim as a referent to northern Mesopotamia and eastern Syria. But threats to the Israelites as narrated in the period of the judges do not come from afar; rather, they come from nearby ethnic groups. Some

23. Younger (2002: 106-107) catalogues the various proposals of scholars: (1) Irsu from Egypt, a Semitic usurper described as a Syrian; (2) an otherwise unknown Cushan from Edom (see Boling 1975: 81-82); (3) Tushratta, a king of Mitanni; (4) Artatama II, a Mitannian monarch; (5) Sharri Kushkh, a Hittite ruler of Carchemish; and (6) the ruler of a group of displaced Hurrians seeking a new homeland. Current scholarly literature generally accepts the second proposal.

scholars have emended 'Aram' to read 'Edom'. While I concur with the end conclusion, I do not find textual emendation necessary to arrive there. Neither does Boling (1975: 81) whose claim that the MT reading is 'a result of misdivision in an unpointed text (originally 'rmn hrym, "Fortress of the Mountains")' naturally raises the obvious question that he never broaches, 'What is the Fortress of the Mountains?' An allusion to Sela? Bozrah? Logic and historical-topographical arguments would certainly favor an Edomite adversary directly south and to the east of the Yehud province.

Additionally, examples within the primary history reveal narrative confusion, if not outright equivalence, of the phonemically and phonetically contiguous אַרַם (Aram) with אֶדֹם (Edom). First, in 2 Samuel 8.12-13 English versions follow the LXX, Syriac, and other manuscripts over the MT by having David initiate a pogrom exterminating 18,000 Edomites, rather than Aramaeans. Moreover, the context favors the reading of 'Edomites' since the Valley of Salt, where the massacre took place, was considered Edomite territory and since David established garrisons in Edomite territory. Second, in 2 Kings 16.6 the English versions again follow the *qere* form אֶדֹם (Edom) within the LXX, Targum, and Vulgate over the MT by having the Edomites reclaim their own port-city of Elath so that they, not the Aramaeans, could inhabit and control it. In both instances, the primary history's own carelessness to distinguish between Aramaeans and Edomites as distinct ethnic groups does not preclude the reader from presuming that the same perceptions inhere in Judges 3 as well. Edom, Aram...whatever. Since the Esavide tribal clans are of Aramaean descent within the genealogical literary traditions of the Jews, and since the *qere* form 'Edom' (אֶדֹם), not 'Aram' (אַרַם), would have been all that the typical Jew would've heard, then the Jewish consciousness most likely also made no identifiable ethnic distinctions between these groups much akin to Anglo stereotypical perceptions of Native Americans embodied in the aphorism: 'You've seen one Indian, you've seen 'em all'.

When we consider altogether the formulaic nature of this narration, the signification of the enemy's name and designated country, the adoption of a 'Judean' hero, and the geographical improbabilities, we can safely conclude, as has the majority of scholarship, that this story 'was not meant as history in the sense of a narration of *the past*' (Brettler 2002: 27). Rather, it is allegorical (Brettler), exemplary (Boling 1975: 82), or simply a deuteronomistic construction (Soggin 1981: 46-47) with the concrete nature of its function varying: (1) an allegory for the ability of the paradigmatic, ideal Judean leadership, represented by Othniel, to defeat the wicked enemy (Brettler 2002: 27); (2) an allegory for the clash between the institution of kingship (represented by Cushan-rishathaim), which brings punishment, and judgeship (represented by Othniel), which brings deliverance (see Webb

1987: 128); (3) a literary foil to the other judge cycles, especially the climactic Samson cycle (Younger 2002: 100-01). Another intriguing possibility for consideration derives from J. Clinton McCann (2002: 23) who, building on Adrian Janis Bledstein's proposal of the book of Judges as a satirical narrative by women, suggests the humorous name Cushan-rishathaim as but one example of humour in the rest of the book of Judges functioning as a means of resistance. Of course, McCann has in mind the origin point of these stories as a context of oppression within the Canaanite city-state system. But these stories go beyond mere resistance to an oppressor to advocate an act of domination decried in the first place. Satiric humour can also fulfill a role beyond that of resistance by also fostering attitudes of superiority that help galvanize and sanction an ethnic group's colonizing agenda. And when taken within the larger corpus of the primary history, the Othniel cycle is but part of the larger whole of a colonialist, discursive function.

We can now return to answer our original question, why these particular places in the Negev region to be targeted and the inhabitants of these places? Within a colonial context where the patronization for the production of such a massive literary corpus could occur, we know of Edomite settlements within the Negev region contiguous with Persian Yehud. Some debate exists among historians over whether the Negev region to the immediate south of Yehud was a formal province under the Persian administration but not so to testimony to a strong enough presence of peoples considering themselves Edomite in order to lend their name to the province by 400 BCE. At Arad, Beersheba, Horvat Qitmit, historical evidence corroborates Edomite presence in the Negev; Kenizzites and Kenites ('smiths' or 'metal workers', perhaps having migrated from the Feinan copper region) in Kiriath Sepher and Arad respectively (1.12-13, 16); references to the goddess Asherah (the object of Israelite religious devotion, Judg. 3.7) in inscriptions from Kuntillet 'Ajrud and Khirbet el-Qom within the Negev; and the settlement of several Negev sites including Kiriath Arba by immigrant Jews (see Neh. 11.25-30) during the Persian colonization era altogether re-present a context of ethnic conflict in a contact zone where Edomite presence must be forcibly removed as 'Israel' occupies the land (Gen. 15.19).

No clear lines of ethnicity are drawn in these narratives in that there is no 'true' Edomite or 'true' Israelite. Edom, Aram...whatever. Othniel, Caleb, and Achsah remain at best ethnically ambiguous in an ethnocentric history that has no concern for ethnic distinctions between Edomites, Kenizzites, Kenites, Midianites, Jerahmeelites, Ishmaelites *ad infinitum*. Such a portrayal simply reflects the narrator's predisposition to paint the Other with rather broad strokes since, from an Israelite perspective, these ethnic groups are interchangeable. The Judges' narratives especially represents the Other, whether Aramaean/Edomite, Moabite, or

Ammonite as the adversary or 'enemy' (2.14, 18; 3.28; 5.31; 8.34; 11.36) who, though coinhabiting the contact zone, were 'to be eliminated or at least put under control, and definitely not to be intermingled with' (Kim 2007: 173). To not do so would compromise the 'natural', blood relations of 'Israel'.

It would seem that the Othniel complex subverts the colonialist ideology affirming divine sanction of 'Israelite' superiority by lauding the exploits of an ethnic Edomite (following Gunn's and Fewell's (1993: 162-63) observations, Younger (2002: 69) remarks that Yhwh's grace is bestowed, ironically, on non-Israelites: Othniel, Caleb, Achsah). And yet, one can equally make the case that this literary complex reinforces the primary history's ideological discourse by co-opting an Israelite sympathizer in the form of an Edomite in its service. In short, perceptions of the function of the story will affect how one regards the ethnicity of its characters just as ethnicity will affect perceptions of the story's function: if Israelite, then the story applauds the Israelites in their 'divine right' to assume control of the land; if foreigners, then perhaps the story undermines Judean superiority. With the ethnically ambiguous characters and the erasure of a center of culture, I am inclined to agree with Fewell (2007: 132) that the us/them ideology driving the conquest deconstructs. Established settlements of the Esavide line in the Negev region become the target of a dispossession policy by immigrant Judeans who, by their own history, share an Aramaean heritage with their Edomite kin. Furthermore, these rogue, bedouin settlers fall far short of demonstrating the propensity for savagery; instead, they are a cultured civilization. Who knows what literature was lost with the razing of Kiriath Sepher? Edomite myths? Royal annals? In order to justify the conflagration, the colonizer must first project the stereotypes of hostility, aggressiveness, and evil onto the Edomite Other. But the Edomites do not evince the aggressive hostility marked by the 'ban' of 'Israel' who wields terror and fear with their swords in order to feed an appetite for destruction. While Kenizzites like Caleb and Othniel may indeed launch an attack against Kiriath Arba and Kiriath Sepher, regardless of whether they submitted both towns to the 'ban' or not, we must nonetheless construe their actions not as a true reflection of Edomite animus but rather as actions internalized from the colonizer as a result of their presence.

Nevertheless, constructing the Edomite as Other and as adversary who would deny Israel's ownership of the land as a strategy in 'anti-conquest' ideology within the colonial discourse of the primary history justifies the conquest and ownership of the land simultaneously making it acceptable 'to dispossess, depopulate, resettle, enslave, or annihilate those who are supposedly less deserving' (Dube 2000: 66). Musa Dube (2000: 66, 60) comments, 'Basically, the narrative casts the people of the targeted land

negatively in order to validate the annihilation of all the inhabitants' while 'securing Edomite [colonizer's] innocence'.²⁴

You've Seen One Indian, You've Seen 'em All

If 'histories' as linguistic constructs contribute to the notion of ethnic identity,²⁵ then whoever authors the history assumes the power of establishing identity and the role of arbiter of authenticity. In the American colonization context, Christianity, the guiding mythos of colonial white America, in collusion with the political imperatives of colonialism overwrote Native histories in an attempt to 'whiten' their identity by voiding their own sense of identity, culture, mythology and individualism, i.e. invalidating their authenticity.²⁶ And how was this accomplished? Through the creation of numerous self-perpetuating stereotypes in the literature of the colonial period and beyond that became the effective weapon in an imperial process resulting in the colonization and genocide of Native Americans.²⁷ David Beer (1969: 48) notes:

24. Kim (2007: 175) notes that the following elements within the primary history—(1) a God-promised land to Israel; (2) a land described as 'flowing with milk and honey' and its inhabitants constructed negatively; and (3) conquest of the land by Israel as divinely authorized—function collectively to establish the superiority of the colonizer over the colonized.

25. Language plays a pivotal role 'as bearer and creator of all histories' by which individuals and groups establish their own identity. In short, we might say that ethnic identity itself can be regarded as a linguistic construct of sorts. Of course, being a linguistic construct renders itself vulnerable to other intruding, influential histories and identities.

26. A symbiotic relationship occurred in the US between truly fictional writing and factual material. The early colonial literature preoccupied itself with fixing as 'fact' Native realities through fictive modes. Nineteenth century writing, however, preoccupied itself with the factual. This fusion of fact and fiction into an intentionally homogeneous whole results in mythology, which, ironically, American literature pundits who deem as *fact* are unwilling to acknowledge. None of this literature, however, bore the remotest relationship to the realities of Native culture(s) portrayed (Churchill 1992a: 18-19, 25).

27. Some would perhaps balk at the use of a strong word as 'genocide'. After all, not all Natives were exterminated the rejoinder might follow. But genocide does not necessarily mean the complete eradication of a gene pool. Raphaël Lemkin (1944: 79), who coined the term, defined genocide as 'the immediate destruction of a nation' accomplished by 'a disintegration of political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups'. Downplaying the term 'genocide' to describe the colonization of Native Americans, of course, plays into the stereotyping effects since a systematic extermination of cultures as self-defense becomes more palatable to the general public if they perceive the Natives as 'mindless, intrinsically warlike savages devoid of true culture and humanity' (Churchill 1992b: 239).

From the initial poorly-informed reports on the Red Man emerged the bigoted and ethnocentric literary attitudes of pious but land-hungry Puritans. Soon were to follow the commercial and greatly fictional captivity narratives (e.g. Williams 1795), and then the turn of the century "histories" of the Indian Wars [never the "White", or "Settlers' or Colonists'" wars].

In addition to the perceptions and stereotypes of Native Americans as a strategy of colonization, I will also explore the underlying rationale and critiques from within the colonialist agenda through the Revolutionary and Expansion periods. Finally, I will excerpt two events from Native Americana whereby to decolonize the effects of the stereotype Native as savage.

Colonization of Natives through the Revolutionary Period

Robert Jensen (2005: 30-33) identifies the extermination of Native Americans by European colonists as one of the three racist holocausts in US history, the other two being African slavery (33-35) and U.S. imperialist attacks in the Third World continuing into the present (35-38). How many Natives the colonists exterminated depends, in part, on population estimates. Population estimates vary widely placing the population of the entire Western hemisphere upwards of over 100 million people at the time of Columbus's arrival to the 'new World' with the indigenous Natives of the Americas north of the Rio Grande river at about 12.5 million (2 million according to the Smithsonian Institute, see Churchill 1997a: 131), 10 in the continental US alone.²⁸ By the 1900 Census toward the close of the 'Indian' Wars, only an estimated 237,000 Natives remained, a 95-99 percent reduction in the indigenous population. No matter how one would choose to rationalize the figures, they indicate an almost completely successful campaign of extermination making the term 'genocide' apropos even by the popularist definition.

Colonial power within North America took on various identities with their own strategies though each followed the same exterminatory impulse (Churchill 1997a: 188-202). The French preferred to subvert indigenous societies by co-opting them as their surrogates. They would play Natives off against one another and against competing European powers while maintaining an air of innocence about themselves. The Dutch were more straightforward in their exterminationist policy than France. They utilized trade incentives and intricate diplomacy to achieve their goals. The Spanish preferred to missionize the Natives. They wore them down through

28. Henry Dobyns (1983: 42) who provided these original estimates has since revised them to an estimated 18.5 million inhabiting pre-invasion North America with a hemispheric population reaching 112 million.

disease, malnutrition, and *de facto* slave labour ultimately replacing them with African chattel. The English were overtly genocidal. They relied on great numbers of settlers, troops, and missionaries in their colonization efforts to replace the Natives on their own land. Along the way, certain Natives proved to be lucrative trading partners, pawns in the military conflicts with its European rivals, and/or a useful pool of expendable slave labour.

England and Spain had the biggest impact on colonization in North America with both transplanting their own cultures and launching independent wars on separate fronts.²⁹ Spanish colonists in Central America employed an innovation called 'dogging'. Vicious mastiffs and wolfhounds were raised on a diet of human flesh and trained to disembowel upon command. They would be turned upon hapless Natives 'either in a betting situation, or as a form of "hunting", or in conjunction with pacification efforts, or some combination of the three' (Churchill 1997b: 105; for the effects of colonization on South America and Central America, see Churchill 1997b: 110-13 and 114-16, respectively). When Columbus and his crew (and other colonists for that matter) arrived in North America, little were they aware that they were carrying pathogens to which the Natives had no immunity.³⁰ Nonetheless, some correlation between the arrival of settlers, explorers, and military expeditions and massive die-offs of the Natives had been made by 1550. The Spanish missions in Florida, Texas, California, Arizona, and New Mexico from 1690-1845 became slave labour systems that escalated death among the Natives from disease. Presumably devoted to the Natives' physical well being as well as their spiritual/moral enlightenment, these institutions became in actuality death mills. The Natives were segregated by sex and allotted a 7' x 2' living space, forced to perform arduous agricultural labour from morning to night six days a week, and with no more than 1,400 calories per day (contrasted with 4,200 calories per day for African slaves; cf. Churchill 1997a: 140-43).

If the Spanish unwittingly spread disease among the Natives contributing to their genocide, then its spread by the English was more malicious. To what extent Old World experimentations in biological warfare existed among Europeans prior to 1492 remains debatable. But if the known ancient practice in Tamerlane (Timur) c. 1385 of catapulting corpses of plague

29. Both colonizing efforts differed in that the English ordered agents to 'conquer, occupy, and possess' the lands of the 'heathens and infidels' with no concern for the inhabitants, whereas the Spanish unified colonization and conversion by Christianizing the Natives whose land they had taken (Gonzalez 2000: 13-18).

30. For example, Columbus's voyage set off type A influenza in Española among the Tainos in 1531 and Hernán Cortés's expedition brought measles and smallpox to Tenochtitlán in 1532 (Churchill 1997a: 138).

victims and carcasses of diseased animals into besieged cities is any indication, then military leadership must have possessed a knowledge of rudimentary epidemiology. The Narragansetts at Massachusetts Colony believed that Captain John Oldham infected them with smallpox in 1633 probably by dispensing contaminated 'gifts'. Positive proof that the English engaged in biological warfare emerged with a stalemate in the last of the 'French and Indian Wars' on the Ohio River. In 1763 Lord Jeffrey Amherst, the English commander-in-chief, wrote a letter to a subordinate Colonel Henry Bouquet advising him to convene a peace parley and distribute contaminated gifts. The disease took 100,000 lives. The contaminated 'gifts' ploy resurfaced later, when on 20 June 1837, the US Army dispensed 'trade blankets' (taken from a military infirmary in St. Louis quarantined for smallpox) to Mandans and other Natives gathered at Fort Clark on the Missouri river in present-day North Dakota (Churchill 1997a: 151-57).

In addition to introducing disease among the Natives, the English initiated a systematic process of dislocating indigenous peoples and/or destroying the economic basis for their survival. The effects of this colonization strategy were much more pervasive. Such a pattern of 'Indian' policy finds expression early on with the presumed 'right of Warre' entitling the English of the Jamestown Colony in 1610 to 'invade the Country and destroy them...whereby wee shall enjoy their cultivated places [and] their cleared grounds in all their villages (which are situate in the fruitfullest places of the land) shall be inhabited by us' (as quoted from Edmund Waterhouse's *A Declaration of the State of the Colony and Affaires in Virginia* (1622) in Stannard 1992: 106). To accomplish this, however, the colonists had to lull the natives into a false sense of security through a treaty of 'peace and friendship' so that the colonists might 'have the better advantage both to surprise them, and cutt down theire Corne' (as quoted in Churchill 1997a: 147). After the annihilation of the Pequots, the General Assembly of Connecticut declared the name 'Pequot' extinct and the village known as Pequot became New London, hence an example of the colonizer denying the authenticity of the culture of the colonized, in this case the Pequots.

Regardless of Spanish or English, *all* European colonists justified Indian conquest and genocide as the will of God with the Conquest-Settlement motif marshaled in the Anglos' 'natural' and 'civil right' to the land.³¹ England and France treated the Natives and their lands as ultimately under

31. Prior to colonizing the Natives, the Spanish read the *Requerimiento* (c. 1512), an extension of the doctrine of just war against infidels to the Americas by Spanish policymakers, in order to gain tacit, if not actual, agreement of the Natives to surrender their lands.

...wherefore, as best we can, we ask and require that you consider what we have said to you, and that you take the time that shall

the control of the crown. If land was vacant of any human occupancy, then a nation could claim both land title and political jurisdiction on the grounds of *vacuum domicilium*. The Puritans and Pilgrims both settled unoccupied land claiming title on this basis. Before leaving England, John Winthrop (1628) answered objections to planting in New England:

As for the Natives in New England, they inclose noe Land, neither have any settled habytation, nor any tame Cattle to improve the Land by, and soe have noe other but a Naturall Right to those Countries. Soe as if we leave them sufficient for their use, we may lawfully take the rest, there being more then enough for them and us.

Obviously, both colonizer and colonized had distinctive notions about land ownership. For the Natives, landownership was based on usufruct privileges—i.e. landownership shifted with land use—and belonged to all. Justification of land cession was expounded as early as 1636 in Peter Heylyn's *Microcosmus*.

He that travelleth in any Part of America not inhabited by the Europeans shall find a world very like to that we lived in, in or near

be necessary to understand and deliberate upon it, and that you acknowledge the Church as the ruler and superior of the whole world, and the high priest called Pope, and in his name the king and queen Doña Juana our lords, in his place, as superiors and lords and kings of these islands....

If you do so you will do well, and that which you are obliged to do to their highnesses, and we in their name shall receive you in all love and charity, and shall leave you your wives and your children and your lands free without servitude, that you may do with them and with yourselves freely what you like and think best....

But if you do not do this or if you maliciously delay in doing it, I certify to you that with the help of God we shall forcefully enter into your country and shall make war against you in all ways and manners that we can, and shall subject you to the yoke and obedience of the Church and of their highnesses; we shall take you and your wives and your children and shall make slaves of them, and as such shall sell and dispose of them as their highnesses may command, and we shall take away your goods and shall do to you all the harm and damage that we can...and we protest that the deaths and losses which shall accrue from this are your fault, and not that of their highnesses, or ours, or of these soldiers who come with us (as quoted in Gibson 1968: 59-60).

These selections from the *Requerimiento* (abolished in 1556) reveal it as clearly a legal-political maneuver designed to exempt the Spaniards from culpability of their brutal warfare and oppression of Natives who might resist Spanish exploitation of their bodies and lands (Berkhofer 1978: 123-24).

the time of Abraham the Patriarch about three hundred years after the flood. The lands lie in common to all Natives and all Comers, though some few parcels are sown, yet the Tiller claims no right in them when he has reaped his crop once. Their Petty Kings do indeed frequently sell their kingdoms, but that in effect is only taking Money for withdrawing and going further up the Country, for he is sure never to want land for his subjects because the Country is vastly bigger than the Inhabitants, who are very few in proportion to its greatness and fertility... Sometimes whole Nations change their Seats, and go at once to very distant places, Hunting as they go for a Subsistence, and they that have come after the first discoverers have found these places desolate which the other found full of inhabitants. This will show that we have done them no Injury by settling amongst them; we rather than being the prime occupants, and they only Sojourners in the land: we have bought however of them the most part of the lands we have, and have purchased little with our Swords, but when they made war upon us (as quoted in Berkhofer 1978: 131).

Often times, land cession through purchase entailed cajolery and coercion in the negotiations process. When land was purchased from Natives illegally, the General Assembly Court (1672: 74-75) of Massachusetts Bay Colony, for example, decreed that 'such land so bought shall be forfeited to the Country'. Should Natives challenge White ownership of lands, White laws, courts, and customs ensured title to the colonists. According to Jean O'Brien (1997: 26), 'England rejected full Indian sovereignty over their lands by subsuming Indian transactions within English legal procedures'. Though no European government ever openly denied the Natives' claims to any of their lands, they did deny the sort of title and political jurisdiction over said lands under national and natural law (Berkhofer 1978: 121).

In addition to crown grants, England also assumed their land rights emanated from the biblical directive to 'subdue the earth and multiply'. European colonists co-opted the ethnocentric literature of biblical texts sanctioning claims of superiority over the indigenous Natives. 'From the earliest days of colonization', comments historian Albert J. Raboteau (1994: 9), 'white Christians had represented their journey across the Atlantic to America as the exodus of a New Israel from the bondage of Egypt into the Promised Land of milk and honey'.³² Immigrant Europeans transformed this re-presentation of experience into their own by justifying their possession of the new 'promised land' (the Americas) and the extermination of the

32. Ironically, by the eighteenth century European colonists were invoking the Exodus theme in support of their status as an oppressed, but rebellious people (see further discussion on the divergent appropriations of the Exodus theme by ethnic groups in US culture in Langston 2006: 141-151).

new Canaanites by 'God's American Israel' (as quoted in Cherry 1998: 83). Governor John Winthrop, the Puritan's 'great Joshua', called for the razing of Merry Mount, home of Thomas Morton, 'because the habitation of the wicked should no more appeare in Israell' (as quoted in Drinnon 1997: 10). Like all the other European settlers who shared in such typologism, Thomas Morton (1637: 93) described the new 'promised land' as 'a lande that flowes with Milke and Hony' in his *New English Canaan* (1637).³³ His book re-presents to the reader the first Promised Land and the heathen Canaanites who lived happily therein till driven off or exterminated by the Israelites. Continuing the same typology, the Reverend Timothy Dwight of Greenfield Hill wrote America's first epic poem *The Conquest of Canaan* (1785), wherein he explicitly identifies the causes of ancient Israel with the new US. His poetic recitation of conquest activity in the book of Judges explicitly names Othniel (Book X, ll. 71-78) and, describing the grandeur of America, extols, 'From Edom's realms, what mighty form ascends' (Book X, l. 315)! America was the sole heir apparent of Israel's mission: 'To found an empire, and to rule a world' (Book I, l. 698). The nexus of destiny under God and biblical motifs of conquest-settlement permeated immigrant thought in the New World. In Captain John Mason's (1736: vii) account of the Pequot War at Mistick, Connecticut in 1637 (published posthumously as *A Brief History of the Pequot War* [1736] by his son), he comments 'the Lord was as it were pleased to say unto us, The Land of Canaan will I give unto thee though but few and Strangers in it'. Similarly, John Rolfe wrote of the migration to Virginia as a venture of 'a peculiar people, marked and chosen by the finger of God' to possess the land (Cherry 1998: 26). The uniform harshness and dreadful tragedies enacted against the 'curst Amalekites' ruled by Satan (Wigglesworth 1662: 42) were compared to those on the shores of the Red Sea and the fertile plains of Palestine by a people who, stated Peter Oliver, 'deemed themselves commissioned like Joshua of old, to a work of blood' (1856: 101-102). Robert Johnson's *Nova Britannia* (1609: 10) further attests to the biblical examples of Joshua and Caleb appealed to as courage for potential settlers to occupy the new land of Canaan.

Colonist hopes for the exploitation of the Natives and their lands shaped their perceptions of Native Americans during this era. The earliest

33. The complete antithesis in tone to William Bradford's *Of Plymouth Plantation* (1642), Morton's book was more sympathetic to the Natives and may have been the first attempt to understand the Natives and their culture from their own perspective. The Puritans, not simply planters but colonizers, took exception to Morton's book as a threat not simply to their expansion but to their very existence. That Morton was arrested several times by various authorities and his home Merry Mount destroyed does not surprise (for further discussion of Morton and events surrounding his life, see Drinnon 1997: 10-19).

description of the Natives, including both good and bad, comes from the pen of Christopher Columbus.

The people of this island and of all the other islands which I have found and of which I have information, all go naked, men and women, as their mothers bore them, although some of the women cover a single place with the leaf of a plant or with a net of cotton which they make for the purpose. They have no iron or steel or weapons, nor are they fitted to use them. This is not because they are not well built and of handsome stature, but because they are very marvelously timorous... They refuse nothing that they possess, if it be asked of them; on the contrary, they invite anyone to share it and display as much love as if they would give their hearts. They are content with whatever trifle of whatever kind that may be given to them, whether it be of value or valueless....

In all these islands, it seems to me that all men are content with one woman...

In these islands I have so far found no human monstrosities, as many expected, but on the contrary the whole population is very well formed... Thus I have found no monsters, nor had a report of any, except in an island 'Carib', which is the second at the coming into the Indies, and which is inhabited by a people who are regarded in all the islands as very fierce and who eat human flesh... (as quoted in Vigneras 1960: 194-200).

Spanish colonists, whose prejudices were based on fantastic folk ideas and theological rationalizations by Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, regarded the Indians as naturally rude, brutal, inferior, and thus natural slaves.³⁴ The Dominican friar Domingo de Betanzos referred to them as *bestias* (later recanted on his deathbed, 1549), and the Laws of Burgos (1512) impugned them as 'dogs' (*perro*) (Hanke 1959: 15).

English colonial perspectives were no different. William Cunningham (1559) wrote: 'They be filthy at meate, and in all secrete acts of nature, comparable to brute beastes' (as quoted in Hanke 1959: 99). Michael Wigglesworth (1662: 42) regarded Indians as 'fierce and barbarous/heathen folk, hellish fiends, and brutish men'. Consider other descriptions from within the colonies. Robert Johnson (1609: 11) wrote that Virginia

is inhabited with mild and savage people, that live and lie up and downe in troupes like herds of Deere in a Forrest; they have no

34. Bartolomé de Las Casas defended the Indians against Sepúlveda in the great theological debate at Valladolid (1550-51). Sepúlveda championed the Aristotelian doctrine of natural slavery arguing that the Indians' nature justified war (and forcible Christianization) against them as both expedient and lawful contra Las Casas who contended for the conversion of the Indians by peaceful means whereby they would be loyal subjects to Spain (Hanke 1959).

law but nature, their apparel skinnes of beasts, but must goe naked: the better sort have houses, but poore ones, they have no Arts nor Science, yet they live under superior command such as it is, they are generally very loving and gentle, and do entertain and relieve our people with great kindnesse: they are easy to be brought to good, and would fayne embrace a better condition.

Alexander Whitaker (1613: 32-33), the minister at Henrico, remarked that the Natives

...are a very understanding generation, quick of apprehension, suddaine in their dispatches, subtile in their dealings, exquisite in their inventions, and industrious in their labour...Finally there is a civill government amongst them which they strictly observe...for they have a rude Kinde of Common-wealth, and rough government, wherein they both honor and obey Kings, Parents, and Governours, both greater and lesse, they observe the limits of their owne possessions, and incroach not upon their neighbours dwellings. Murther is a capitall crime scarce heard among them: adultery is most severely punished, and so are their other offences.

Rather than a course of violence, Robert Johnson (1609: 18-19) advised a different course of action in engaging the Natives: 'In steed of Iron and steele you must have patience and humanitie to manage their crooked nature to your form of civilitie...'

Stereotypes of Native Americans basically fall into two distinct categories, 'positive' (the Noble Savage) and 'negative' (the Ignoble Savage). Within each category lie various conditions (gleaned from Vickers 1998: 4-5): (1) 'positive'—they represent a lost human species worthy of nostalgia and glamorization; they are harmless and childlike in need of education and civilization; they are subservient yet of honorable character; and they are capable of assisting the dominant culture attain its destiny; and (2) 'negative'—they lack motivation for their actions; they lack emotional content, coherent thought processes, humor, or soul; they are 'murderous', 'rapacious', 'primitive', 'heathenish', 'devilish'; they are less than human, animalistic; they have exaggerated skin colour or racial features; and they are 'a child of the devil' and a hostile Other. Despite assumptions of a common brotherhood,³⁵ a motif that the ideological architects of America would later employ in

35. As reflected in Whitaker's (1613: 32) observation: 'Our God created us, they have reasonable soules and intellectual faculties as well as wee; we all have *Adam* for our common parent: yea, by nature the condition of us both is all one, the servants of sinne and slaves of the divell'. Speculation about the origin of the Native Americans abounded with the Tartars, Persians, and others posited as ancestors. The more popular of the monogenetic theories, however, assumed a Hebraic origin for the Natives. James Adair, a trader among the Cherokees, was the first to demonstrate a grand parallel

the expansion westward resulting in removal policies, clearly the colonists perceived the Natives as uncivilized and as savages. The following discussion will reveal that (1) what gets emphasized, positive or negative, is entirely relative to the preconceptions and needs of the dominant Anglo culture, and (2) these stereotypes are projections from the outside that contribute to the dehumanization and deracination of the Natives whose distinct identity gets assimilated into the creation of a homogeneous, static 'Indian' entity.

Re-presentation of the Natives as uncivilized relates most directly to an underlying agrarian idealism that stood in open contrast to the perceived hunter status of the Natives. The assumption that 'Indians' were not farmers incited plans to 'civilize' them, i.e. get them to be farmers (Pearce 1967: 70). These European settlers held the belief that men, having a natural right to their land by occupation and labour, achieved status and dignity by exercising that right and becoming free-holding farmers.³⁶ Though this agrarian idealism had land title implications, it also had religious implications. Thomas Jefferson (Lipscomb and Burgh 1903-1904, II: 229) wrote, 'Those who labor in the earth are the chosen people of God, if ever He had a chosen people', and felt that agrarianism would benefit the Natives by bringing 'civilization' and an improvement over their 'savage' way of life (18 February 1803; Lipscomb and Burgh 1903-1904, X: 360-65). Of course, what the colonists' stereotype conceals is that it was this homogeneous, static 'Indian' character that taught the first settlers in Plymouth Colony how to farm the soil in the 'New World' in order that they could survive. In other words, it is the colonists, not the Natives, who lack civilization (in the New World),³⁷

between Native and ancient Hebrew life to prove Hebraic origin in his *History of the American Indians* (1775). Even Natives—e.g. Elias Boudinot, *A Star in the West* (1816); William Apess, *A Son of the Forest* (1829); and Mordecai Noah, *Discourse on the Evidence of the American Indians Being the Descendants of the Lost Tribes of Israel* (1837)—joined in to find a place for the Natives in a civilized, Christian world. Most theorized that the Natives, as descendants of the lost Ten Tribes and further back to Noah, had come to the northern parts of Asia, with perhaps the exception of the Eskimos who had come from Scandinavia. Even though descended from the lost Ten Tribes, their relationship to the rest of humanity was one of separation and isolation. Since they originated as wanderers, they lived as wanderers (Pearce 1967: 81).

36. This perspective reflects a part of Lockean theory. Virtually all Americans were Lockeans in a general sense. Basically, the theory, as it relates to agrarian idealism, asserts that man achieves his highest humanity by taking something out of nature and converting it with his own labour into a part of himself (see discussion in Pearce 1967: 67-68).

37. The lengthy description of the flora and fauna, weather patterns, topography, and animal life, in the early literature of Robert Johnson's *Nova Britannia* and Thomas Morton's *New English Canaan* underscore attempts to acculturate prospective settlers to the new land—in other words, civilize them in a manner of speaking.

an undesirable trait projected onto the Other by means of a colonizing ideology. Nevertheless, the notion of ethnic superiority, natural and divine, with the stereotype of civilization and its underlying assumption of agrarian idealism becomes part and parcel of the rationale of colonization moving westward in the Expansion era of the nineteenth century.

Of the two stereotypes, none is perhaps more pervasive in American culture than that of the Natives as savages. Both the French and the English used the term *savage* for Native Americans prior to the seventeenth century. The term connotes the 'wild man' image in Germany. According to medieval legend, the 'wild man' was a hairy, naked, club-wielding child of nature. Viewed as predatory, brutish, warlike, and bloodthirsty, 'Indians', at least the White man version, burned and pillaged white settlements, tortured captives, dashed children's brains out against tree trunks, and raped and scalped white colonists. But how much of this relates to authentic Native American culture and how much reflects actions borne out of interaction with an invading culture? War does not seem to have been a way of life for Natives in North America prior to the European invasion; instead, wars were infrequent, short, and mild. Henry Spelman, who lived among the Powhatans, commented that 'they might fight seven yeares and not kill seven men' (as quoted in Sale 1990: 318-19). Francis Jennings (1975: 293-94) observed,

The armed conquest in New England [and Virginia]...closely resembled the procedures followed by the English in Ireland in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In these lands, the English...held the simple view that the natives were outside the law of moral obligation. On this assumption, they fought by means that would have been dishonorable, even in that day, in war between civilized peoples.

Moreover, pre-invasion Natives never pursued warfare strategies that included killing their opponents' women, children, and elders.

A prime signifier of the stereotype Native as 'savage' was the warfare practices of scalping and body mutilation. While scalping was certainly known among the Natives, the practice did not originate with them.³⁸ Rather, they seemed to have learned the practice, part of the exterminatory techniques of the English in Ireland, from their European invaders. Note the comments from Sir Humphrey Gilbert (as quoted in Churchill 1997a: 180), English commander in Ireland during the late sixteenth century.

38. With such barbarism as part of the Euro-American vicious drive to extermination, argues Churchill (1997a: 188), 'North America's indigenous peoples internalized much of their exterminators' bloodlust, engaging in large-scale killing, scalping, and mutilating...to forestall their own looming eradication'. Not all Natives engaged in scalping (e.g. the 'bloodthirsty' Chiricahua and other Apache groups) because they considered the practice an affront to their dignity as human beings (1997a: 268 n. 286).

The heddes of all those (of what sort soever thei were) which were killed in the dai, would be cutte off their bodies, and brought to the place where he incamped at night, and should there bee laied on the ground by eche side of the waie ledying into his owne tente so that none could come into his tente for any cause but commonly he muste passe through a lane of heddes which he used *ad terrorum*.

The practice of scalping mutated when transplanted to North America where the English would offer bounties for scalps ranging from £20 to £100 payable upon receipt of the slain 'Enemy's' scalp, a practice attested from 1694 to 1704.³⁹ Killing Indians soon came to be a lucrative enterprise as freebooters realized early on that there was no practical means for the paymaster to distinguish between the scalp of a 'friendly' and that of a foe. By the end of the Revolutionary era, scalping had devolved into mutilation. Scalping became more sadistic and macabre when in the Sullivan campaign of 1779 against the Senecas, soldiers of the Continental Army skinned their foes from the hips down in order to make leggings from the tanned 'hides'. This same mutilating type behaviour continued on the frontier in the nineteenth century.

So, who exactly were the savages? The question finds its echoes back through the centuries. Morton (1637: 113-14) wrote, 'I have found the Massachusetts Indian[s] more full of humanity then the Christians; and have had much better quarter with them...the Saints demanded of every newcomer full acceptance of "the new creede" that "the Salvages are a dangerous people, subtill, secreat and mischievous"'. Morton (28-31, 33) further affirmed that this 'uncivilized nation' could teach the English, a civilized nation, how to make use of the land's resources in order to survive—e.g. skinning deer and other animals into very good 'lether'—as well as something about respecting the elderly. Even Benjamin Franklin (*A Narrative of the Late Massacres in Lancaster County*, 1764) decried the inhumanity and barbarousness of Pennsylvanian frontiersmen who butchered simple-minded, peace-loving Christian Natives. He later admitted in a letter to the governor of Georgia (1787) of some injustices of the Whites toward the Indians over the course of his long experience in Indian affairs (Pearce 1967: 137). Even the 'Noble Savage' image lent its critique of colonial

39. The French, too, offered bounties for scalps, and may have been the first to do so in North America. In 1638 they offered payment for scalps of the Penobscots (in what is now Maine) at the beginning of the 'Beaver Wars'. In 1641 Willem Kieft, the second governor of New Netherlands, offered a reward for the heads of certain Raritan on Staten Island. By 1688 such practices were commonplace in Québec with the governor offering 10 beaver skins to anyone bringing him the scalp of any 'enemy of France, Christian or Indian' (Churchill 1997a: 181).

society in eighteenth-century literary periodicals. In a 'Letter from an Indian Chief to his Friend in the state of New York' (1789), the chief concluded, 'Cease then, while these practices continue among you, to call yourselves christians, lest you publish to the world your hypocrisy. Cease to call other nations savage, while you are tenfold more the children of cruelty, than they' (as quoted from the *American Museum* VI, 1789: 226-27, in Pearce 1967: 137). Much of the horrors of White-'Indian' warfare derive not from the 'red devils' but rather from the white savages. The Native as 'red devil' stands in antithesis to the white man's image of himself yet, paradoxically, emerges from within himself. Ascribing that which is regarded as reprehensible within oneself to the 'other' enables one to 'author' that 'someone else'. Vickers (1998: 32) argues, 'one can see this process written into the (white) history of Indians: they, not we, are the bloodthirsty savages; they, not we, are the rapacious, land-hungry manipulators; theirs, not ours, is the primitive, superstitious religion; they, not we, are the incarnation of evil: and so on'. Echoing Frantz Fanon's concept of projection, Berkhofer (1978: 27) contends that 'If the Puritans, for example, could project their own sins upon people they called savages, then the extermination of the Indian became a cleansing of those sins from their own midst as well as the destruction of a feared enemy'. 'Indian' and its concomitant images became a means of ethno-typing in order to posit White superiority over the worst fears of their own depravity. Though whites would never have conceived of themselves as Anglo-Saxons, Gauls, or Teutons, their perceptions of the Native American remained unchanged. Nor would they since the Constitution (1787), which reified the sacred myth of the US and a social structure with legal, economic, and political mechanisms ensuring privileges for those at the centre denied to most on the margins (De La Torre 2005: 59),⁴⁰ seared racist attitudes on the Euro-American conscience for centuries to come by its depersonalization of nonwhites 'as three-fifths of a person' (Art. 1, Sec. 2.3).

Colonization of Natives in the Expansion Period

If land played an important role during the Revolutionary period as Euro-Americans sought to expand their territorial acquisitions and jurisdiction over the Natives, its significance certainly played no lesser role in the

40. Jensen (2005: 3-4) terms this structure as a 'white supremacist society' meaning that its foundation is 'an ideology of the inherent superiority of white Europeans over non-whites'. In such a culture, whiteness conveys certain unearned privileges denied other ethnic groups. While numbers may not always tell the entire story, they do reveal certain advantages that whites, on average, have over members of other racial/ethnic minorities in the US (to be discussed further in Chapter 6).

nineteenth century. Extending White settlements, however, belied an ideal expressed by the first federal Congress.

The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their lands and property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their property, rights and liberty, they never shall be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity shall from time to time be made, for preventing wrongs being done to them, and for preserving peace and friendship with them (as quoted in Berkhofer, 1978: 148).

Yet the British apperceived US intentions 'to exterminate the Indians and take the lands'.

British perceptions did not lack in credibility as the duplicity of Thomas Jefferson manifested itself in his correspondences. Concerning land acquisition, he wrote Handsome Lake, the great Seneca prophet, 'We, indeed, are always ready to buy land; but we will never ask but when you wish to sell' (3 November 1802; Lipscomb and Burgh 1903-1904, XVI: 393-96). Yet less than two months after his assurances to Handsome Lake, a working paper 'Hints on the Subject of Indian Boundaries' (29 December 1802; Lipscomb and Burgh 1903-1904, XVII: 373-77) by Jefferson revealed his covert suggestions for extinguishing title to lands the Natives would not sell.⁴¹ He basically drew up a plan of psychological warfare that would encourage Natives to adopt white techniques of tillage, stock raising, and domestic manufactures, and entrapping leaders to run up debts at government trading posts so they would have to sell their lands in order to pay their debts (Drinnon 1997: 86). Similarly, he revealed to Governor William Henry Harrison of the Indiana Territory his idea to make the Natives dependent upon the market economy.

To promote this disposition to exchange lands, which they have to spare and we want, for necessities, which we have to spare and they want, we shall push our trading uses, and be glad to see the good and influential individuals among them run in debt, because we observe that when these debts get beyond what the individuals can pay, they become willing to lop them off by a cession of lands (27 February 1803; Lipscomb and Burgh 1903-1904, X: 368-73).

Within the short span of less than two decades, 'white America had acquired through purchase and otherwise 109,884,000 acres of Indian land' (Drinnon 1997: 82).

41. Jefferson kept his ideas on how to undermine the Natives into ceding their lands private until he shared them with Congress on 18 January 1803. Even then, the plan was kept strictly confidential between the two houses of Congress in order to avoid suspicions that might derail it (Lipscomb and Burgh 1903-1904, III: 489-92).

In addition to Jefferson's economic strategy of inducing the Natives to cede their lands, he also contemplated the idea of a removal policy, a benign form of genocide, prior to the Louisiana Purchase.⁴² In the same letter to Governor Harrison, he wrote: 'Our settlements will gradually circumscribe and approach the Indians, and they will in time either incorporate with us as citizens of the U.S., or *remove beyond the Mississippi*,...in the whole course of this, it is essential to cultivate their love' (Lipscomb and Burgh 1903-1904, X: 370). Jefferson's agenda to colonize beyond the Mississippi appears some five months earlier in a note to Colonel Benjamin Hawkins, the Creek agent: 'Incorporating themselves within us as citizens of the U.S., this is what the natural progress of things will, of course, bring on, and it will be better to promote than to retard it' (18 February 1803; Lipscomb and Burgh 1903-1904, X: 363). Never mind in the face of these colonization plans his affirmations to members of the Miami, Potawatami, and Wea nations—'Made by the same Great Spirit, and living in the same land with *our brothers* (italics mine), the red man, we consider ourselves as of the same family; we wish to live as one people and to cherish their interests as our own' (7 January 1802; Lipscomb and Burgh 1903-1904, XVI: 390)—and to General Chastellux that the Indian was 'in body and mind, equal to the white man'. 'Brothers', hmmm! Drinnon (1997: 96) concludes, 'The Indian was not Jefferson's brother...Just beneath Jefferson's philanthropy was an ominous will to exterminate'.

As expressed in the letter to Governor Harrison, the assimilation of the Natives into American culture via civilization became the objective, at least ostensibly, in order to achieve territorial expansion with honor. US expansion was contingent upon 'Indian' consent. It naturally assumed that what was good for the White American was also good for the Native American.⁴³ After all, the Natives could withdraw westward easily and resume their migratory ways. There was one logistical flaw with Jefferson's policy of removal that would later become an act of legislation known as the Indian Removal Act (1830): it only transferred the problem of an increasing rate of White settlement east of the Mississippi to the trans-Mississippi West after the 1830s. Later land acquisitions of the Oregon Territory (15 June 1846)

42. In July 1803 Jefferson drafted a constitutional amendment to validate the Louisiana Purchase that would provide for the removal of Eastern tribes to upper Louisiana. This was the first formal advocacy of colonizing Natives across the Mississippi.

43. The policy of expansion also assumed that the Natives would cede their lands because they would die of disease or other natural causes with an approaching White society or they would become 'civilized', and thus disappear by assimilation (Berkhofer 1978: 152-53).

and northern Mexico (1848)—i.e. California, Arizona, Nevada, Utah, New Mexico, and southern Colorado—made real the possibility of White settlement of the American West from the west. In a manner similar to a military flanking maneuver, the Natives removed westward would ultimately find themselves, to use the 'prophetic' word of Jefferson, 'circumscribed'. The encroachment upon and settlement of Native lands by white settlers, in many cases illegally, in these territories kept Natives and Euro-Americans in close contact rather than the desired segregation with the Indian Removal Act (Churchill 1997a: 218-22).

What propelled the expansion objectives westward was none other than the ideology of 'Manifest Destiny'. Coined by John L. O'Sullivan in 1845, the term centred on the idea of destiny, the widely accepted belief that Providence had destined the US to continued growth with expansion as a civilizing process. Though this process was based on moral progress rather than military might, 'the "natural right" of expansion, however, unquestionably lay in the power to conquer' (Owsley and Smith 1997: 10). Just in case any doubt existed that American identity is inextricably bound up with conquest, historian Frederick Jackson Turner remarked in an 1893 presentation that 'American history has been in a large degree the history of the colonization of the Great West' (1921: 1). Only the absence of a powerful neighbour to check the progress of expansion made it a possible and apparently inevitable phenomenon (see Graebner 1989: 276-87). Jeffersonian expansionism established a covert operation known as filibustering that basically encouraged Anglo illegal immigration into and saturation of other territories, internally revolt against that territory's government, and invite the protection of the US (see Owsley and Smith 1997: 9).⁴⁴ Despite the late formalization of this doctrine, its attitude and assumptions were prevalent since Euro-American contact in the seventeenth century and the westward expansion into the early nineteenth century at Native Americans' expense. The fierce animus toward Natives accompanying colonization in the preceding century did so in the nineteenth century as well. For example, Thaddaeus Williams addressed a letter to President Abraham Lincoln, dated 22 November 1862. Williams openly criticized Lincoln for commuting the death sentence of 262 Sioux, referred to as 'heathen Amelkites' and 'savage Canaanites'. What the formalization of the nineteenth-century code phrase Manifest Destiny did achieve, however, was to politicize racial supremacy and to popularize the ethnic bias of white colonists.

The usage of 'Indian' stereotypes in US political history can be seen in the 'official language' of the national leadership in the form of one government

44. Detailed examples of filibustering expeditions into the Republic of Mexico to annex territory known now as Texas will be discussed in the next Chapter.

agency, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).⁴⁵ BIA commissioners initially operated under the assumption that 'Indians often did not know what was best for themselves' (Vickers 1998: 15), which, of course, veiled a superior smugness that regarded the 'Indians' as too incompetent to rule over their own land. In what follows, I will simply spotlight the stereotypical attitudes prevalent with certain of the commissioners throughout the nineteenth century (for a fuller treatment of all the commissioners in this era and into the twentieth century, see Vickers 1998: 15-25). Elbert Herring (1831-36), during the Jacksonian era, 'exemplified the ethnocentrism that characterized Jacksonian Indian policy' and oversaw the removal of Indians east of the Mississippi to 'reservations' in the West under the IRA. Commissioner William Madill (1845-49) assumed Indians to be 'ignorant, degraded, lazy, and [in possession of] no worthwhile cultural traits' (as quoted in Vickers 1998: 17). Luke Lea (1850-53) 'believed the Indian to be a barbarian'.⁴⁶ These anti-Indian sentiments reached the level of national policy by 1865. Dennis Nelson Cooley (1865-66) 'clearly saw the elimination of Indian culture as a laudable objective' (as quoted in Vickers 1998: 17). And finally, John Q. Smith (1875-77) supposed the nature of 'Indians' to compose chiefly of 'ignorance, degradation, indolence, savagery, and superstition' (as quoted in Vickers 1998: 18).⁴⁷

The BIA policy of 'whitening the red man' was but one reflection of the ethnic and racial superiority characterizing the ethos of the general Euro-American public. Perceptions of the 'Indian' as savage and uncivilized persisted, in part, because of the conflict between agrarian and hunter ideals and, in part, because of the view of the human race as divided into superior (Christian and 'civil') and inferior (heathen and 'savage') categories (see further discussion in Vickers 1998: 19-20). Subtypes on the negative stereotype of 'savage' can be found: (1) the 'reservation Indian'—indolent, usually drunk, generally incompetent; (2) the 'Mission Indian'—squalid, pathetic, cowardly; (3) the 'statesman Indian'—crafty, deceitful, treacherous; and (4) the 'stupid Indian'—full of gibberish, irascible, childlike (Vickers 1998: 36). Mark Twain's *Roughing It* (1872: 98) provides further example of the

45. Founded on 12 March 1824, the BIA's purpose was to formulate Indian policy regarding the 'Indian problem' and to decide the fate of remaining Indians preceding the last of the great 'Indian Wars' (Vickers 1998: 15).

46. Lea's perceptions were no doubt a reflection of the 'troubles'—Apache skirmishes in the Texas territory, Indian resistance to White onslaught in California prompted by the Gold Rush, and the beginnings of the great Sioux Wars on the Plains—during his administration.

47. Smith's administration saw the realization of the beginning of the end of Indian military resistance to white colonization during the War for the Black Hills, or Sitting Bull's and Crazy Horse's War, in 1876-77.

negative racial stereotyping among the public as he describes the Gosiute of the Great Basin.

Such of the Goshoots as we saw, along the road and hanging about the stations, were small, lean, scrawny creatures; in complexion a dull black like the ordinary African negro;...a silent, sneaking, treacherous-looking race;...indolent, everlastingly patient and tireless, like all other Indians; prideless beggars...; hungry, always hungry, and yet never refusing anything that a hog would decline;...savages who, when asked if they have the common Indian belief in a Great Spirit, show something which almost amounts to emotion, thinking whiskey is referred to.⁴⁸

Echoing the 'savage' stereotype, Henry Rowe Schoolcraft commented, 'Man was created, not a savage, a hunter, or warrior, but a horticulturist and a raiser of grain, and a keeper of cattle—a smith, a musician' (1851-57, VI: 27). As long as the 'red man' remained in the hunter status, there was no hope for his civilization (Pearce 1967: 132). In an effort to justify the subjugation of 'Indian' groups, George Armstrong Custer reassured his wife about the reservations.

I pity the poor redskin with all of my heart. He is the unfortunate victim of circumstances. I don't blame the present-day Indians for not wanting to go onto the reservations to take up the white man's way of life. Their existence has been free and to them very pleasant. But it is a way that cannot go on. Savagery cannot be allowed to block civilization...The progress of civilization is more important than the native's wild way of life (as quoted in Garst 1944: 120).

The disregard for Natives and their culture facilitated the perpetuity of stereotypes and the simulation of the 'Indian'.

In spite of Euro-American re-presentations of Natives, there was much about Native America to associate it with 'Israel' of the Hebrew Bible on much stronger theological grounds than that of Euro-America. Steve Charleston's essay 'The Old Testament of Native America' (1996: 76-77) enumerates some of the comparisons. Like Israel, Native America affirmed the oneness of God; God is the creator of all existence; God is active and alive in human history; God is a God of all time and space; God creates a covenant relationship with his people, and entrusts the people with land of which they are stewards; God provides his people a law or way of life; God raises up prophets and speaks through dreams and visions; and God can become incarnate on earth. And like Israel, Native American heritage

48. Of course, what Twain did not reveal is that his description reflects the pitiful state in which rampant white colonization had left the once-thriving Great Basin Indians (Vickers 1998: 37).

'embodies the collective memory of an encounter with God', a memory transmitted 'through stories, histories, poetry, music, sacraments, liturgies, prophecies, proverbs, visions, and laws'. Euro-American dismissal of Native America's religious association with the Old Testament that denied access to that religious legacy directly connects to the New Testament Christian identity of Euro-Americans. After all, the Old Testament was just that, *old*. Because the missionary system of the Christian church, a central agent in the colonization of this hemisphere, was 'colonialism in the name of Christ' (Baldrige 1996: 85), Natives were subjected to a spiritual amnesia made to forget their own story and reduced to silent contentment with another people's story.⁴⁹

Not all Natives who had converted to Christianity as a part of the neo-colonizing tactic of assimilation remained oblivious to the glaring incongruity between the Christian message and Euro-American behaviour. Observations by Dr. Charles Alexander Eastman, a Santee Sioux physician, and William Apess, a Pequot from New England and ordained Methodist minister, articulate the Native American voice as response. Eastman remained a sharp critic of the hypocrisies of white religion though Christian himself. In his first book *The Soul of the Indian* (1911) Eastman diagnosed the colonial myopia, cultural narcissism, and religious arrogance of white America that envisioned Indians as vanishing Americans, as primitive savages, and as devil-worshipping pagans, respectively. The prescription Eastman offers as remedy seems too simple—human empathy and respect—though the fact that his book remains in print over 8 decades later may be testament to his clarity. His reflections on American Christianity in *From the Deep Woods to Civilization* (1916) led him to state:

From the time I first accepted the Christ ideal it has grown upon me steadily, but I also see more and more plainly our modern divergence from that ideal. I confess I have wondered much that Christianity is not practiced by the very people who vouch for that wonderful conception of exemplary living. It appears that they are anxious to pass on their religion to all races of men, but keep very little of it themselves. I not yet seen the meek inherit the earth, or the peace-makers receive high honor (as quoted in Treat 1996: 4).

49. As a result of Native colonization, Native Christian theologians now find it difficult to construct a Native American Christian theology. The brainwashing activity of colonization left theologians bereft of their 'old' testament whereby to engage in a constructive theology, hence Charleston's (1996: 74) contention that 'you cannot have a "new" testament if you do not have an "old" testament'. In addition, Baldrige (1996: 85) argues that Natives reclaiming their own history as part of constructing theology impinges on establishing their own self-determination rather than allowing definitions of the colonizer to dictate who they are.

In specific, Eastman cites the national bad faith of broken treaties contra pledges made by Washington emissaries, some ministers of the gospel and even bishops. From his experiences Eastman concluded, 'It is my personal belief, after thirty-five years of experience of it, that there is no such thing as "Christian civilization." I believe that Christianity and modern civilization are opposed and irreconcilable, and that the spirit of Christianity and of our ancient religion is essentially the same' (as quoted in Treat 1996: 6).

William Apess's *A Son of the Forest* (1829) recounts his Christian pilgrimage and early confusion over identity. Accepting Christianity, according to Apess, did not entail adopting white ways 'but to claim one of her rights as a human being'. Like Eastman, Apess condemned the hypocrisies of white religion that preached universal salvation, on the one hand, while practicing an exclusionary racism, on the other hand. His experiences prompted his wonderment 'how much better it would be if the whites would act like a civilized people' (as quoted in Treat 1996: 8). Both Eastman's and Apess's observations naturally elicit questions addressed by two episodes of Euro- and Native American interaction. Were the Natives as savage and uncivilized as the surrounding Euro-American culture made them out to be? And were the Euro-Americans as civilized as they made themselves out to be?

Trail of Tears

The formal removal of the Cherokees from their lands east of the Mississippi River initiated in 1838 along 'the Trail Where We Cried', or 'the Trail of Tears', culminated a long process of federal government interaction with the Cherokees that ostensibly centred around their civilization, or more appropriately assimilation. By late in the 1700s the Cherokees had set out to prove to the white man that they could be just as 'civilized' as whites. Federal funds by Congress in 1792 allotted federal agents the task of acculturating them to the white man's knowledge of cultivation and the arts. They learned to use factory-made farm implements. They learned how to plant cotton, and how to use looms and spinning wheels. Nonetheless, Andrew Jackson, who would push the Indian Removal Act of 1830 through to its legislation, remained convinced that 'Indians' could not become civilized. Civilization—i.e. adopting the white man's ways—was a ruse for the acquisition of more land. And the Cherokees knew this early on as whites, who had settled land sold to them by the Cherokees and who had settled unsold land, had become a greater threat to them than other tribes.⁵⁰

50. The threat especially grew acute when, after a rumor of gold in July 1829, miners came to Georgia in droves. The invasion persisted into the autumn of the same year with streams and banks ravished, followed by thefts and deals, lies and purchases (Ehle 1988: 222-23).

The Cherokees had 18 schools, 22,000 cattle, 7,600 horses, 2,500 sheep, 46,000 swine, 2,488 spinning wheels, 762 looms, 2,943 plows, 172 wagons, 10 sawmills, 31 gristmills, 62 blacksmith shops, 8 cotton machines, 18 ferries, many miles of year-round roads, and churches—a rather rich economy. As another example, Major John Ridge had 250 acres of cleared land for crops of corn, tobacco, indigo, potatoes and oats. His orchard had 1,141 peach trees, 418 apple trees, and a number of plums. He also had a ferry and a store, both of which were prosperous. Prospects of the Cherokees progressive state of improvement were encouraging. In addition to some working the blacksmith's trade, others made their own clothes from the cotton produced in their own fields. Numerous instances of Cherokees engaged in very laborious, long, and continued industry dispelled notions of Indians as lazy.

The Cherokee Nation also demonstrated itself capable of self-government. In addition to establishing a new capital at New Echota, Georgia in 1825, they also divided the nation into 8 districts, each with a court, judge, and marshal (Ehle 1988: 174). They passed tax laws (e.g. 50 cents a year on every head of household and single person under the age of sixty) and miscegenation laws (e.g. a white man marrying a Cherokee woman could not dispose of her property). John Ridge had marked out lots for buildings for the Cherokee Supreme Court and for Cherokee administrative officers, council houses for two legislative bodies, a library, and a Cherokee museum in the new capital. In July 1827 the Cherokee Nation drew up its own Constitution.

We, the Representatives of the people of the Cherokee Nation, in Convention assembled, in order to establish justice, ensure tranquility, promote our common welfare, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of liberty; acknowledging with humility and gratitude the goodness of the sovereign Ruler of the Universe, in offering us an opportunity so favorable to the design, and imploring His aid and direction in its accomplishment, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the Government of the Cherokee Nation (as quoted in Starr 1967 [1921]: 55-56).

In order to draw up a Constitution, of course, the Cherokees needed a writing system. By this point in time, they had already been relying on the syllabary developed by Sequoyah (aka George Gist) in 1821 so that the Cherokees would have a language enabling them to write and read their spoken language.⁵¹ The Cherokee Nation bought a printing press, cast the type in the Cherokee

51. Admittedly, by the time that the Treaty of New Echota was signed 29 December 1835, only 20 percent of the Cherokee population was literate in either the Cherokee or English language. Most Cherokees subsisted on small farms, and clung to their ancient traditions and memories of the old ways. Signs of progress and change did exist, but principally among the half-breeds. Nonetheless, the low percentage of literacy among the populace does not disavow the potential of Native Americans becoming 'civilized'.

language using Sequoyah's syllabary characters (see Fig. 2), and inaugurated its own newspaper *The Cherokee Phoenix* in 1828 with Buck Oowatie (Elias Boudinot) as editor. The newspaper was printed in both English and Cherokee so that paid subscribers could read the news in either or both language(s).

Yet, the Georgians looked upon the Cherokees with disdain denying that they were even human beings. The State of Georgia passed a resolution in December 1828 that basically extended their sovereignty over the lands and peoples, 'be they white, red, or black' (as quoted in Ehle 1988: 218), who resided within her limits. All the while President-elect Andrew Jackson incited tension between state representatives and the Cherokees as evidenced by his message to Georgia congressmen: 'Build a fire under them. When it gets hot enough, they'll move' (as quoted in Carter 1976: 83).⁵² Cherokee representatives ably navigated the waters of diplomacy by legal representation. In an effort to retain their lands against the legislative actions of the State of Georgia, legal counsel for the Cherokees brought their appeal to the Supreme Court (*The Cherokee Nation v. The State of Georgia*, 1831) claiming,

Through a long course of years they have followed our counsel with the docility of children. *Our* wish has been *their* law. We asked them to become civilized, and they became so. They assumed our dress, copied our names, pursued our course of education, adopted our form of government, embraced our religion, and have been proud to imitate us in every thing in their power... They have even adopted our resentments; and in our war with the Seminole tribes, they voluntarily joined our arms (as quoted in Ehle 1988: 241).

Unfortunately, on 18 July 1831 Chief Justice John Marshall rendered a decision that denied 'Indian' autonomy and sovereignty because they were at best 'a domestic, dependent nation' that remained 'under the sovereignty and dominion of the United States' (as quoted in Berkhofer 1978: 166). Had the Supreme Court chosen a decision that would not have tacitly sidestepped the Jacksonian policy of removal, they could have affirmed the authenticity of Cherokee civilization. In a surprising turnabout, the Supreme Court in the case of *Worcester v. Georgia* (1832) the following year maintained that

52. Jackson's intense hatred of Indians would not be mitigated even by the fact of Cherokee volunteers in his campaign against the Red Sticks. In numerous conversations between Cavalryman Charles Hicks and the Cherokees about Christianity and other religious matters, the significance of the Old Testament became very apparent—to authorize warfare as God's mission. Years earlier in 1798, Chief Arcowee sensed something about the Bible, the source of the white man's wisdom and power, that gave the whites an advantage over the Cherokee (Ehle 1998: 58-59, 119).

CHEROKEE ALPHABET.					
CHARACTERS SYSTEMATICALLY ARRANGED WITH THE SOUNDS.					
D a	R e	T i	o	u	i v
ga ka	ge	gi	go	gu	gv
ha	he	hi	ho	hu	hv
la	le	li	lo	lu	lv
ma	me	mi	mo	mu	
na t hna g nah	ne	ni	no	nu	nv
qua	que	qui	quo	qu	quv
s u sa	se	si	so	su	sv
da w ta	de te	di ti	do to	du	dv
dla t tla	tle	tli	tlo	tlu	tlv
t sa	tse	tsi	tso	tsu	tsv
wa	we	wi	wo	wu	wv
ya	ye	yi	yo	yu	yv
SOUNDS REPRESENTED BY VOWELS.					
a as a in <i>father</i> , or short as a in <i>rival</i> ,					
e as a in <i>hate</i> , or short as e in <i>met</i> ,					
i as i in <i>pique</i> , or short as i in <i>pin</i> ,					
o as o in <i>note</i> , but as approaching to aw in <i>law</i> ,					
u as oo in <i>moon</i> , or short as u in <i>pull</i> ,					
v as u in <i>but</i> , nasalized.					
CONSONANT SOUNDS.					
g is sounded hard, approaching to k; sometimes before e, i, o, u and v, its sound is k. d has a sound between the English d and t; sometimes, before o, u and v, its sound is t, when written before l and s the same analogy prevails.					
All other letters as in English.					
Syllables beginning with g, except ga, have sometimes the power of k; syllables written with tl, except tla, sometimes vary to dl.					

Figure 2. Cherokee Syllabary. Courtesy of Hargrett Rare Book and Manuscript Library/University of Georgia Libraries.

the Cherokees constituted a nation and held distinct sovereign powers. The decision read, 'The Cherokee Nation then is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves or in conformity with treaties and the acts of Congress' (as quoted in Ehle 1988: 255). Too little too late though as the Court stood powerless to enforce its

decision amidst the constant harassment of Georgia regional officials (at the encouragement of Jackson) who gave away the Cherokees' homes, their developed lands, and their public buildings in illegal state lotteries (Stedman 1982: 185). Jackson would later send a message to Congress in 1835 stating, 'All preceding experiments for the improvement of the Indians have failed. It now seems to be an established fact that they cannot live in contact with a civilized community and prosper' (as quoted in Stedman 1982: 185). The removal went forward. The forced march at bayonet-point for hundreds of miles without the provisions of adequate food, shelter, or medical support resulted in severe attrition—for the Choctaws, 15 percent of their population; for the Creeks and Seminoles, about 50 percent of their population; and for the Cherokees, about 55 percent of their population (Churchill 1997a: 143-44).⁵³ If anything, the experience of the Cherokees of New Echota in Georgia suggests that no accomplishment on their part, civilization or no, could have turned the tide of Manifest Destiny in the nineteenth century.

Sand Creek Massacre⁵⁴

On 29 November 1864 Colonel John M. Chivington led a force of more than 700 men, including his Third Colorado Regiment, a volunteer cavalry otherwise known as the 'Bloody Third', into the Cheyenne camp of Black Kettle at Sand Creek at sunrise. The Colorado Volunteers, all poorly trained raiders, comprised Civil War draft-dodging Coloradoans who would rather have served in uniform against a few poorly armed Natives rather than against the Confederates farther east (their enlistment was to last only 100 days). Though Washington officials permitted their existence for the sole purpose of protecting frontiersmen against hostile 'Indians' since

53. Other forced government internments resulted in the extermination of other Natives. After a military defeat to Colonel 'Kit' Carson in 1864, the Diné (Navajos) were interned at Fort Defiance, Arizona, where they lost half of their population. And the Northern Cheyennes lost about half their population while interned at Fort Sill, Oklahoma from 1876-78 (Churchill 1997a: 144-46).

54. Treatment of this incident within scholarship reveals how the event was handled with rewriting and justification taking place. Stan Hoig's *The Sand Creek Massacre* (1961) remains the most meticulously researched volume on the subject. Two other volumes emerged in 1989 and 1990 after a hiatus within scholarship from the mid-1970s: David Svaldi's *Sand Creek and the Rhetoric of Extermination* and Duane Schultz's *Month of the Freezing Moon*, respectively. Schultz's treatment virtually justifies the Sand Creek massacre with unsubstantiated descriptions of Indian character and behaviour consonant with the 'savage' stereotype. Svaldi's treatment quickly dispels claims of the incident as an 'aberration' of Euro-American genocidal tendencies. For a thorough engagement with these sources, cf. Churchill 1992c: 111-20, and Churchill 1997b: 228-38.

President Lincoln had no regulars to spare, their actions and the words of Colonel Chivington and Governor John Evans of the Colorado Territory reveal a different purpose. In describing the volunteer unit, Governor Evans claimed, 'They have been raised to kill Indians, and they must kill Indians'. Early on, Chivington made no secret about his agenda, 'My intention is to kill all Indians I may come across' (US War Dept. 1880-1901: 237-38). And not long before the massacre, he had advocated the killing and scalping of all Indians, even infants, in a public speech made in Denver. 'Nits make lice!' he declared.⁵⁵ At his arrival at Fort Lyon on November 27, Chivington spoke of 'collecting scalps' and 'wading in gore' (as quoted in Churchill 1997a: 229). Clearly, a unit created to 'protect' the citizenry was nothing more than a rogue, vigilante force.

Ironically, the 'Bloody Third' had difficulties finding Natives to kill and by early November had become a laughingstock, derisively referred to by Coloradans as the 'Bloodless Third'. Unable to provoke the Cheyennes and Arapahos into an armed provocation that would justify reprisal, Chivington's well-planned massacre of an encampment of non-hostile 'Indians' beat the enlistment deadline. Chivington instructed his troops to 'use any means under God's heaven to kill [the] Indians' and to be sure to 'kill and scalp all, little and big' (as quoted in Hoig 1961: 142, 147). Robert Bent, who guided Chivington's contingency from Fort Lyon to Sand Creek, would describe the scene later before a congressional hearing as they approached the camp.

I saw the American flag waving and heard Black Kettle tell the Indians to stand around the flag, and there they were huddled—men, women, and children. This was when we were within fifty yards of the Indians. I also saw a white flag raised. These flags were in so conspicuous a position that they must have been seen (US Congress, Senate 1867: 96).

As the soldiers raced through camp, Black Kettle called for his people not to be afraid. The soldiers would not hurt them so long as the large garrison flag given to Black Kettle by Colonel Greenwood flew above his tepee as promised. In the months and years preceding the Sand Creek Massacre, Black Kettle and other tribal leaders sought peaceful relations with whites

55. The imagery, which echoes the view of H.L. Hall, a notorious mass-murderer of Indians in northern California, articulates the idea that native babies should be killed without exception because 'a nit would make a louse' and traces as far back in North America as King Philip's War. Some 80 years later, the motif would emerge in another context of genocide when the SS Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler would refer to his extermination of Gypsies, Jews, Slavs, and others as being 'the same as delousing' (see Churchill 1997a: 229 n.).

but they would have none of it. On September 28, the day of the long-awaited council with Governor Evans, Colonel Chivington had received a telegraph from General Samuel R. Curtis at Fort Leavenworth: 'I want no peace till the Indians suffer more' (US War Dept. 1880-1901: 462).

Not only did details concerning the plans for the massacre later surface in congressional hearings, the official testimony of officers and men of the First Colorado Cavalry disclosed various atrocities at Sand Creek. A little girl about 6 years of age came out of a hole for protection with a white flag on a stick and was shot and killed within the space of a few steps. Dead squaws were scalped with one, according to Bent, 'cut open with an unborn child, as I thought, lying by her side'. Testimony would reveal a more disturbing array of mutilations beyond just scalping.⁵⁶ The soldiers mutilated the body of White Antelope of the Cheyennes cutting off his genitals with one soldier bragging that he would make a tobacco pouch out of them. Lieutenant James Connor corroborated Bent's testimony of such atrocities.

In going over the battleground the next day I did not see a body of man, woman, or child but was scalped, and in many instances their bodies were mutilated in the most horrible manner—men, women, and children's privates cut out, &c; I heard one man say that he had cut out a woman's private parts and had them for exhibition on a stick; I heard another man say that he had cut the fingers off an Indian to get the rings on the hand...I also heard of numerous instances in which men had cut out the private parts of females and stretched them over the saddle-bows and wore them over their hats while riding in the ranks (US Congress, Senate 1867: 53).

Casualties from the massacre numbered 105 women and children and 28 men in contrast to the exaggerated claim of between 400 and 500 warriors in Chivington's official report (Brown 2001: 91). Given the testimony, the federal government made a confession of war guilt followed by an indemnity to 'Indian' widows and orphans.⁵⁷

56. The body mutilating behaviour at Sand Creek certainly had its precursors, some of which occurred much earlier in the Revolutionary period, in the slaughter of the Muskogee Red Sticks at the Battle of Horseshoe Bend on the Tallapoosa River in Alabama on 27 March 1814. In that slaughter, Andrew Jackson, the notorious Indian-fighter, supervised the mutilation of 800 or more Creek Indian corpses, including cutting off their noses in order to preserve a record of the dead and slicing long strips of flesh from their bodies in order to tan and to turn into bridle reins (Stannard 1992: 121).

57. Though initially applauded as heroes by the Coloradoans, applause turned to national outrage as the shocking horrors of what took place at Sand Creek were publicly revealed. Chivington escaped court-martial only because his enlistment had expired (Stedman 1982: 221-22).

Colonization of Natives through the Modern Era

By the twentieth century efforts to colonize the Natives had taken on a more overtly 'humanitarian' approach through the process of assimilation. In the first years of the twentieth century government officials like Indian Commissioner Francis Leupp declared the government's objective as 'kill the Indian, spare the man' (as quoted in Churchill 1997a: 245). The government program carried on assimilationist tactics such as the legal prohibition of indigenous practices and traditions that would prove counter-productive for the Natives' assimilation. Children were forcibly removed from their communities at an early age and sent to remote boarding schools where they were systematically de-culturated. They were prohibited from practicing their religion, speaking their languages, dressing or wearing their hair in the customary manner, and having only cursory contact with friends and families. Simultaneously, they were indoctrinated with Christian and Western values and taught rudimentary skills that would yield them low-income jobs, like that of labourers. Even presently, Natives have by far the lowest annual and lifetime income of any ethnicity on the continent, and the highest rates of unemployment. In addition, high infant mortality rates, death by malnutrition, exposure, and plague by disease contribute to the high levels of stress, anxiety, and depression within the Native American population. The endemic despair over the socio-economic plight of Native Americans, especially those on the reservations, has, in turn, generated unhealthy coping strategies like chronic alcoholism and other forms of substance abuse (see Churchill 1997a: 246-247, 287 n. 599).

In many examples, the 'humanitarian' approach of the government reverted to draconian forms reminiscent of those of its predecessors. Efforts to gain control of certain land resources that would yield a tidy profit concurrent with government attempts to curb, if not completely eradicate, the population of the Inuit in the oil-rich North Slopes of Alaska scream a relationship beyond mere coincidence. During the early-to-mid 1950s, as disclosed in a 1995 *60 Minutes* television segment, the Department of Defense had secretly fed doses of refined uranium to the Inuit in order to study the long-term effects of such nuclear contamination on the human organism. In the mid-to-late 1980s government officials forced Inuit children in the same region to be guinea pigs in the 'field testing' of hepatitis vaccines banned by the World Health Organization (WHO). When the Alaskan Natives learned of the WHO report, testing shifted southward to reservation children in the lower 48 (Churchill 1997a: 249). This one example represents but a sampling of the many incidences that illumine the experience of Natives in one form or another and at one time or another—always subject to the 'humanitarian' objectives of the white man while having their resources wrested from them. Unfortunately the poorest of ethnic groups

in the US, Native Americans, especially those on reservations, ironically occupy perhaps the most mineral-rich lands in the US but cannot reap the material benefits from such resources controlled under a colonial 'trust' authority by the US and funneled into the settler's economy (an example of internal colonization that has, in addition to genocide, also resulted in ecocide as persuasively presented in Ward Churchill's *Struggle for the Land* [2002]).

Today, Native Americans have founded numerous organizations, such as the American Indian Movement, Alaska Federation of Natives, National Congress of American Indians, Native American Rights Fund, American Indians Against Desecration, and other political, educational, and legal organizations, to preserve their culture and rights and to combat stereotypes and their deleterious effects. Despite their resistance to stereotypic myths about them, perceptions about their savage, treacherous, inferior nature still persist. They have their own sophisticated system of government; the Great Law of Peace (Kaianerekowa) of the Iroquois Confederacy influenced the US Constitution framers who adopted its concepts of checks and balances, impeachment, equal representation, and democracy. They have their own community organizations, economy, arts, gender roles, religious ceremonies and rituals, language system, and diverse clothing and hairstyles. Who could forget the Aztec civilization with its pyramid-shaped temples, canals, bridges, intricate urban-designed homes with courtyards and gardens, and Montezuma's palace with fountains, gardens and a private zoo? Or the preceding Mayan civilization with its fabulous pyramids, calendrical and mathematical systems? They augmented the Euro-American diet in the New World contributing corn, white and sweet potatoes, squashes, pumpkins, tomatoes, strawberries, raspberries, avocados, cacao (chocolate), a variety of beans, and chile peppers, to name a few. They contributed to modern medicine with cures for amoebic dysentery, scurvy, constipation, intestinal worms, headaches, flesh wounds, and other diseases. They taught the Euro-Americans in the New World survival skills, traded with them, served as scouts for their armies, showed them routes through "uncharted" territories, mined gold, silver, and copper for them at the expense of life and limb, and ceded lands and resources. They have contributed place names of states, towns, rivers, mountains, automobiles, and sports teams. They have produced paintings and sculptures, basketry and pottery, music and dance, and literature (Miheusuh 1996: 37-38, 54-57).

Native Americans allied with Euro-Americans in the colonial wars, and have fought in every single war of the US since. That they did so by no means appeals to any base 'savage' or 'treacherous' nature. Granted, they knew war throughout their history: the Pequot War (1637), King Philip's War (1675), the Tuscarora War (1711), Natchez Revolt (1739), Pontiac's

Rebellion (1763), Little Turtle's War (1790-94), the Creek Wars (1813-14), the War for the Bozeman Trail and the Snake War (1866-68), the Southern Plains War (1868-69), the Modoc War (1872-73), the Red River War (1874-75), the Sioux War (1876-77), the Battle of the Little Big Horn (1876), the Bannock War (1878), the Ute War (1879), the Apache Wars (1861-86), and the Battle of Wounded Knee (1890). Each war had its common denominator, the white man. Despite the stereotype of the Native as 'savage' and 'treacherous' perpetuated by naming these wars after various tribes, they instead mark Native's resistance, sometimes staunch (e.g. Seminoles in Florida Everglades, Apaches in Arizona, and Navajos in New Mexico), to Euro-American encroachment onto their lands and cultures. Proponents of Native American stereotypes construe the Natives' failed resistance as indication of their inferiority. Numerous other factors need consideration to understand the Natives' failure to withstand the Euro-American onslaught. First, Natives isolated in the New World for millennia lacked immunity to diseases (brought by Euro-Americans) like smallpox, measles, mumps, whooping cough, typhoid fever, and influenza to which they succumbed immediately after exposure. Between 1520 and 1600, 31 epidemics swept across North America with the Native American population cut drastically from 7 to 3 million. Second, the small tribes lacking in weaponry were no match for the sheer numbers of invaders with horses, cannons, muskets, and 'divide and conquer' strategies. Third, many tribes lost their lands due to treacherous tactics like the systematic destruction of food supplies (e.g. the extinction status of the bison), and the unscrupulous measures of bribery, intoxication, and physical intimidation for treaty signings. Finally, the Dawes Act of 1887 attempted to assimilate Natives by dividing tribal lands into 160-acre plots and turning Natives into Euro-American farmers. In addition to surplus lands (millions of acres) auctioned off to Euro-Americans, many Native allottees who did not understand English lost lands through 'guardian' decisions and will endorsements. All in all, Natives lost 90 of the original 138 million acres in 1887 as a result of the allotment process (Miheus 1996: 29-31, 48).

Contemporary impressions that Natives 'sponge off' the US government fuel myths of them as 'lazy'. First, any monies from the US government received by some, not all, Native Americans are the direct result of treaty agreements. Some tribes ceded land (often by force) 'in exchange for government protection of the remaining tribal land, health and educational aid, among other things'. Those who receive checks from the US government usually do so as a form of payment for their land (that the US government holds in trust) that has been leased. Some reservation Indians who live in terrifying squalor do avail themselves of government services, but they are no different than any other US citizen, including whites, in this

regard. While some tribes have started up businesses on tribal lands, the endeavour has been painstaking due to the lack of collateral to acquire loans. Gambling casinos, the result of compacts between federally recognized tribes and states through the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (1988), have generated the most revenue for tribes, \$4 for every \$10 wagered. In addition to revenue, tribal gaming brought improvements to reservations, such as building schools and improving infrastructure, though it also became a target of corruption (note the Jack Abramoff Indian lobbying scandal of January 2006 that bribed members of Congress and overcharged Indian clients to the tune of \$90 million). Contrary to the opinion of some, Native Americans do not enjoy 'special rights' but only that as mandated by hundreds of treaties requiring the US government to protect tribal lands (Mihesuah 1996: 87-89).

As a general rule, Native Americans do not eat, sleep, and breathe war, in contrast to their re-representation in film media. While some did enjoy fighting, they did not do so all the time. By and large, however, Native Americans have their own culture and civilization atypical of savagism. Only the word *different*, not inferior, distinguishes their civilization from that of Euro-Americans.

Conclusion

The colonialist discursive function of literature does more than simply legitimate the extermination of a people and the expropriation of its land and resources by a colonizing force. Its long-term strategic consideration must make the object of settlement for a less doctrinaire population segment attractive enough for the task of settling. The colonizers must deem the enterprise worth their while to uproot and begin an acculturation process in a strange and already inhabited place where they will clearly be the outsiders. Thus, we must view literature serving a colonialist agenda, like colonization itself, much more broadly than just simply about conquest. But how to actuate and justify immigrant infiltration? And how to do so while giving the presence of not being alien, or 'other', despite the fact of *being* alien?

Re-representation of ethnic groups in colonizing literature creates a national identity for the colonizer that usurps the identity of any indigenous ethnic group leaving the colonized with no available alternative practically beyond that of assimilation or separation. The colonized can abandon their unique ethnic identity in order to assimilate the identity of the colonizing ethnic group or they can maintain their own ethnic identity (separatism). Either way, their fate remains the same—extermination, whether physical or cultural ultimately matters not. National myth fixes the identity of the

colonized as 'other' with a certain image via the usage of stereotypes. In other words, re-presentation facilitates the projection of the antithesis of the colonizer's identity and that which it fears/dislikes about itself onto the colonized in the construction of its identity—i.e. the negative to its positive, a photographic analogy if you will. Thus the imagery of the indigenous, whether Native Americans or Edomites, as savage, nomadic hunters devoid of civilization becomes the antithesis to how 'Israel' views itself, as civil, settled pastoralists. Throw into the mix an ideology of divine right, or Manifest Destiny (mere semantics), and what results is an alien group who views (it)Self as en-'titled' to land. Ultimately, such a process marks the erasure of the indigenes by the colonizing agent 'Israel' as justifiable. But traces of that which would have been completely overwritten by that which is written remain to reveal not just another group of people, but rather a civilization typecast as the savage 'other'.

The narratives of Judges bearing the imprint of the conquest/settlement motif never explicitly mention Edom but provide enough allusions that, taken as part of the larger national myth, the aural reader would have made the connections to Edom. The confluence of 'rm with 'dm, the ethnic ties of Kenizzites and Kenites to Edom, and the actions of Othniel the Kenizzite in this narrative complex along with a social context of conflict within and over a contact zone inhabited predominantly by Edomites altogether would have elicited the stereotype of Edomites as savage despite the trace of civilization with Kiriath-Sepher written over. During the period of US expansion in the nineteenth century, literature perpetuated an image that sanctioned the conquest of the Natives 'for the Indians own good', for their civilization. But efforts to adapt to Euro-American culture really did not matter. Conversion to Christianity did not matter. Acculturation ultimately did not matter, for either the Native or Othniel. Assimilation of the colonizer identity ultimately did not matter, for either the Native or Othniel. What progress Edomite civilization had made, or that it existed for that matter, and what propensities the Natives could demonstrate toward 'civilization' ultimately did not matter. What ultimately mattered for the colonizer was ethnicity. No matter how fully acculturated to 'Israelite' identity, the colonized would never be *fully* 'Israelite' but rather always either Edomite or Cherokee or Kenizzite or Sioux or Kenite (or...well, you get the idea), and as uncivilized savage, in the national myth of 'Israel'. The roots of racism sink deep into the Bible, a literature with ethno-typing strategies that deracinate and dehumanize, byproducts of colonization.

Whether in Persian Yehud or North America, 'Israel' knows that *it* is alien, 'other'. Coming from outside, 'Israel' knows that the Negev and Arabah are Edomite and that North America is Indian. Yet the need for authentication induces the stereotypic imagery that, in turn, also drives the

need for authenticity. Commenting on this reciprocal relationship within white consciousness, Vine Deloria (1980: xvi) observes that the white man 'will never let go of the Indian image because he thinks that by some clever manipulation he can achieve an authenticity which can never be his'. Such an authenticity though relies on the projection of a stereotype that betrays something about the colonizer who remains oblivious to or represses that something. But as the colonized assimilates the cultural identity of the colonizer, the colonized 'spooks' the colonizer who comes face-to-face with a mirror image of itself.⁵⁸ The savage look civilized, the civilized look savage. As difficult as it may be to face, 'the world does not need white people to civilize others. The real White People's Burden is to civilize ourselves' (Jensen 2005: 96).

58. The mimicry of colonial discourse that encourages assimilation of the colonizer's culture by the colonized haunts the colonizer who 'fantasizes endless monstrous stereotypes that can only lead to anxiety rather than the desired certainty'—namely, the fixed identity of the colonized (Huddart 2006: 61). Stereotypical re-presentations, which betray the anxiety inherent within the colonizer's sense of self-identity, virtually undermine identity.

THE 'STUPID' STEREOTYPE: MOABITES, MEXICANS
AND THE BORDERLANDS

'My object, the sole and only desire of my ambitions since I first saw Texas, was to redeem it from the wilderness—to settle it with an intelligent honorable and interprising [*sic*] people'.

—Stephen F. Austin (1831)

'The justice and benevolence of God, will forbid that the delightful region of Texas should again become a howling wilderness, trod only by savages, or that it should be permanently benighted by the ignorance and superstition, the anarchy and rapine of Mexican misrule. The Anglo-American race are destined to be forever the proprietors of this land of *promise* and *fulfilment*'.

—William H. Wharton (1836)

Immigrants flood the borders in waves on what must seem to the locals like a daily basis with no seemingly effective deterrents in sight. The full effects of this steady influx of immigrants that has shifted the demographics of this region are certainly not lost upon the locals. One town reports that the immigrants have dominated the population 200 to 10. In another area, population estimates place the ratio at 10:1.

Opinions are certainly diverse on the issue. Many have expressed concern over immigrants assuming certain rights and property, and isolating themselves from the culture rather than assimilating into it. But not everyone has taken such a dim view of these foreigners. One local individual stated that the foreigners 'are about to overrun us, of which I am very glad, for the country needs immigration in order to make progress'. And yet another person spoke about immigration's positive benefits, not least of which would include enhanced trade and commerce. 'I cannot help seeing advantages which to my way of thinking would result if we admitted honest, hard-working people regardless of what country they came from...even hell itself'. Nonetheless, some locals look upon the diligent work ethic of the immigrants with suspicion, questioning their motives, in spite of the positive economic impact to the region by their contributions. The drastic cultural differences between the two ethnic groups, some claim, are so intrinsic to make mingling between them completely incompatible.

*Emotions run high as fear and distrust give way to racial prejudice expressed in slurs that only proliferate with increased concerns over immigration. Each group stereotypes the other as uneducated and stupid, which, in turn, only reinforces attitudes of superiority. Sentiments such as 'Go back home where you came from' abound to betray ignorance by both groups of the other in the borderlands.*¹

What sounds like a story that could easily be heard on any evening television newscast or reads like a news story ripped from the headlines of any newspaper throughout the Southwest US actually reflects the socio-cultural milieu of nineteenth-century CE life in the Mexican province of Tejas with echoes perhaps of Yehud during the era of Persian colonization. The current imbroglio over Latino immigration inflamed by racial stereotypes is nothing new but simply revisits the long history of cultural conflict between US and Mexico in the form of a (re)new(ed) border conflict.² Stereotypes bear the bloodstains of that cultural conflict (Nericcio 2007: 143).

The most indelible cultural re-presentations of Mexicans left upon me in my youth were the Frito Lay's Mexican Bandito ('Ayy, ayy, ayy, ayy/I am the Fritos Bandito/I love Fritos Corn Chips/I love them I do/I love Fritos Corn Chips/I steal them from you'; amazing I still remember that jingle) and Speedy Gonzales characters. While certainly not the most virulent or insidious form of anti-Latina/o racism in the US, Speedy Gonzales, who always donned the garb of the Mexican port city Veracruz visited regularly by US military in 1846 and 1914, likely marked a crowning achievement in the mainstream US ethno-typing of Mexicans. Speedy's animated short films reveal a reliance upon/reinforcement of certain Mexican stereotypes: *Tabasco Road* (1957)—Mexicans as lazy; *Tortilla Flaps* (1958)—Mexicans as sexual rogues; *Here Today, Gone Tamale* (1959)—Mexicans as filthy and dirty, associated with the *cucharacha*, or cockroach; and *Cannery Woe* (1961)—Mexicans as dirty, not far from trashy, poor, politically illiterate, thieves out for free food and booze. But 'Gonzales is not Mexican; he and

1. This fictionalized account is based on a loose adaptation of numerous historical sources (Weber 1973: 80-82, 84, 101, 104, 108; 1988a: 105-15; 1988b: 153-67) to reflect the socio-cultural situation of a colonial context of ethnic antipathy amidst immigration.

2. Heated arguments in the present immigration debate only polarize. On the one side, opponents contend that the 'illegals' are uneducated drug-smuggling criminals who speak no English, take jobs from US citizens, and increase social welfare costs for education and healthcare. On the other side, proponents point out that the 'illegals' pay billions of dollars in sales and income taxes and to 'false' social security accounts, bring rich cultural values and a strong morality, and do hard, dirty, dangerous jobs that most Americans do not want to do and at very low wages with minimal protections

his rowdy charges are “Mexicans” as *imagined* by Americans’, Nericcio reminds us (2007: 129-32, 142; *italics mine*), lest we forget.

The nineteenth-century French writer Ernest Renan observed, ‘Forgetting is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation’ (as quoted in Bhabha 1990: 11). Stereotypes help the cultural amnesia process along with their *physical* and *figural* violence, not to mention the emotional violence wrought against the butt of a stereotype or its joke. Speedy Gonzales, for example, originated from a dirty joke about a Mexican man suffering from chronic premature ejaculation (that certainly adds a sexual connotation to Speedy’s mantra *arriba, arriba*). But nobody perhaps best emblemized the *physical*, *figural*, and *emotional* violence than did Marguerita Carmen Cansino, her name anglicized as Rita Hayworth. Born Latina and American, Marguerita suffered violence to name and identity initially being de-Americanized by her incestuous sex-molesting father to appear more Mexican in their Tijuana nightclub acts, and later de-Mexicanized by Columbia Pictures mogul Harry Cohn to appear more American by being subjected to hair electrolysis treatments (Nericcio 2007: 86-109). Writ large on the national stage, these episodes exemplify the effect of ethnic stereotypes in the public discourse, namely to privilege one ethnic group by denying the ‘other’ its identity, suppressing its voice and, simultaneously, that nation’s own origins. In short, forgetting results in dis-membering.

As mentioned previously, we all know that literature, much like the seemingly dismissible phenomenon of joking, has certain effects. Ethnic joking and racist stereotypes within literature have the effect of splitting colonial discourse enabling, on the one hand, a process of mimicry and that process enabling, on the other hand, the transformation of joking as a form of resistance. Through mimicry, the colonized reflects back the colonizer’s gaze to remind the colonizer that the colonized is a subject too (Bhabha 1994: 126) and that both have shared experiences more than the colonizer would care to acknowledge. To help the colonized reflect back the gaze of the colonizer, this Chapter re-members for ‘Israel’ its borderlands experience with, first, Moab in an ancient colonization context and with, second, Mexico in a modern colonization context. After a brief introduction

and benefits (Hernandez 2006: 170-71). Radical, conservative politics only exacerbate the issue by inciting xenophobic notions thus revealing racial biases. For example, Pat Buchanan ran on an anti-immigration platform in the 1992 Republican primary. In the same anti-immigration vein, Peter Brimelow’s much-ballyhooed book *Alien Nation* (1995) speaks of the subversion of our ‘white nation’. Even the federal government revealed this nation’s intrinsic racial bias when in July 1954 it unleashed ‘Operation Wetback’ (Gonzalez 2000: 203).

to the history and culture of the Moabites and their ethnicity as constructed within the national myth of 'Israel', the analysis of what is left unsaid in Judges 3.12-30 explores the problematic of ethnic slurs within sacred literature. These explorations will reveal the sociological function of such ethnic humour as the projection of the 'stupid' stereotype by one ethnic group onto the colonized 'other'³ in the construal of its identity as superior to that of Moab as inferior. Finally, the postcolonial optic of 'borderlands' becomes the lens through which to view Mexican concerns about Anglo immigration with an eye toward present Anglo concerns about Mexican immigration. Present concerns simply signal the acute anxiety of the colonizer's self-identity. The shared borderlands experience of colonizer/d perhaps exemplifies the point by Bhabha (1994: 64) of differences between ethnic groups as essentially *constructed* differences: 'To be different from those that are different makes you the same'. Ideologically, therefore, 'us' looks more like 'them', 'Israelites' more like Moabites, Anglo-Americans more like Mexicans.

A Composite Portrait of the Moabites

Another neighbour relegated to a borderlands identity during Persian colonization, the subaltern Moabites were all but erased from existence within Western consciousness. Who the Moabites were will probably forever remain an enigma, and our knowledge of them only nebulous. For the longest time, the territory known as Moab, much like all of eastern Palestine, virtually remained, according to William F. Albright, *terra incognita*. Nobody studied the east because there was no interest in the east. During the nineteenth century, only a few individuals braved the east to publish their surveys of the Moabite plateau dominated by Bedouin tribes (for an overview of the nineteenth-twentieth-century surface surveys and archaeological investigations, see Miller 1989: 3-5). Even after Nelson Glueck's pioneering efforts of the 1930s, the Moabite plateau still did not receive the historical and archaeological inquiry that it deserved until most recently. Nevertheless, our knowledge of Moabite history and culture still remains quite incomplete and for a variety of reasons: (1) there is no extant Moabite literature, (2) inscriptional data only shed limited historical insight (the Mesha Inscription and the Kerak

3. The construction of the 'other' always precedes that of 'self' since the latter only acquires its meaning in terms of and in relation to what is not 'self'. But Otherness does not exist apart from 'self'; rather, 'other' exists within 'self' and reflects back the anxiety of 'self'. Uncanniness marks the relationship between 'self' and 'other', those who belong and those who do not belong. As Julia Kristeva (1991: 192) notes, 'foreignness is within us...we are all foreigners'.

inscription only provided knowledge about Moabite history of the ninth century BCE), (3) Assyrian royal annals provide limited knowledge of Moabite 'statehood', and (4) the biased presentation of Israelite–Moabite relations within the primary history of the Hebrew Bible.⁴ Recent investigations of Moabite territory have gone far in providing a reconstruction of Moabite history and culture with J. Andrew Dearman's *Studies in the Mesha Inscription and Moab* (1989) and Piotr Bienkowski's *Early Edom and Moab* (1992) perhaps being the most comprehensive treatments.⁵ The following attention to this marginalized group will draw on a variety of sources, not limited to the primary history of the Hebrew Bible, to provide a composite portrait of the Moabites via a synopsis of Moabite geography, history, and ethnicity in order to gain a better understanding of this 'other' group from a *terra incognita*.

Geography

The term 'Moab' refers geographically to that part of the Transjordanian plateau region locked in from the west by the Dead Sea Valley and from the east by the Arabian desert with its southern boundary fixed by the Wadi el-Hesa (biblical Zered Brook). Its northern boundary became the point of contention in antiquity regarded by Israel as the Wadi el-Mujib (biblical Arnon River) and by Moab as the 'tableland of Madaba' further north. The area immediately northeast of the Dead Sea, between the Jordan River and the western slopes of the 'tableland', is referred to as the 'Plains of Moab'. Notable Moabite towns in the Plains of Moab were Tell el-Hammam (biblical Abel-Shittim or Shittim; Num. 25.1; Josh. 2.1; 3.1) and Tell 'Azeimeh (biblical Beth-Jeshimoth). Who assumed political control of the Northern Plateau region and the Plains of Moab at the escarpment of the Dead Sea hinged on the particular time period and the national strength of Moab. If Moab was strong, then they assumed control of the region; if not, then they relinquished that control to other groups.

4. Those texts of the DH comprising the Moabite myth are Gen. 19.37; 36.35; Exod. 15.15; Num. 21.11, 13, 15, 20, 26, 28-29; 22.1, 3-4, 7-8, 10, 14, 21; 23.6-7, 17; 24.17; 25.1; 26.3, 63; 31.12; 33.44, 48-50; 35.1; 36.13; Deut. 1.5; 2.8-9, 11, 18, 29; 23.3; 29.1; 32.49; 34.1, 5-6, 8; Josh. 13.32; 24.9; Judg. 3.12, 14-15, 17, 28-30; 10.6; 11.15, 17-18, 25; Ruth; 1 Sam. 12.9; 14.47; 22.3-4; 2 Sam. 8.2, 12; 23.20; 1 Kgs 11.1, 7; 33; 2 Kgs 1.1; 3.4-5, 7, 10, 13, 18, 21-26; 13.20; 23.13; 24.2.

5. Until the past decade and a half, A.H. van Zyl's *The Moabites* (1960) had been the standard source on all things Moabite. Though now outdated, it is still a valuable source in a study of the Moabites. Other publications that prove invaluable for their own unique contributions to an understanding of the Moabites are Stefan Timm's *Moab zwischen den Mächten* (1989), J. Maxwell Miller's *Archaeological Survey of the Kerak Plateau* (1991), and the December 1997 issue of *Biblical Archaeologist*.

The Wadi el-Mujib formed the natural dividing line between southern and northern Moab. Northern Moab corresponded to the 'tableland' or 'tableland of Madaba' with an open country occupied by diverse ethnic groups who likely had mixed loyalties. Its openness also made it more vulnerable to encroachment (Miller 1989: 2-3). In addition, it is this region with which the biblical writers would have been most familiar. Prominent towns of note in northern Moab were Tell Hesban (biblical Heshbon), Madaba (Medeba), 'Ara'ir (Aroer), and Dhiban (Dibon). From time to time, political subjugation of northern Moab changed hands, not least of which included Israelite claims to this valuable tableland (cf. Num. 21.21-31; 32; Deut. 2.26-37; Judg. 11.12-28).

The geographical barrier of the Wadi el-Mujib with its steep canyon walls isolated southern Moab from the tableland. At a bare minimum, Moab Proper, the Central Plateau or southern Moab, covered an area approximately 90 km (60 miles) from north to south by 25 km (15 miles) from east to west. Much of this area is virtually rolling plateau averaging about 1,000 m (3,000 feet) elevation or 1,300 m (4,300 feet) above the Dead Sea (Miller 1989: 2-3). Numerous wadis run through this region cutting deep canyon walls, especially with the Mujib and Hesa, rendering them virtually inaccessible. Well watered by the winter rains, the Central Plateau had a soil porous enough to retain 'this moisture for cereal crops and pasturage for sheep and goats'. Annual precipitation averaged about 14 inches. Places with deeper soil and available springs produced fruit trees and vineyards. Moreover, the climate and soil allowed for wheat, barley, and a variety of other crops (Mattingly 1994: 320). Not surprisingly, southern Moab provided the favourable agricultural land cultivable by a sedentary population as attested by settlement ruins. Because of the agricultural areas of the plains, Moab became the breadbasket to Palestine much like Sicily and later Egypt and Syria were to Rome. The biblical story of Ruth that has Naomi and her family migrating to Moab because of the famine in Judah presumes the agricultural wealth of Moab. Moab's economy found itself in the same position as that of Edom in that its fate had very little to do with what it decided to implement or not. As Knauf (1992: 48) puts it, 'it was more or less wholly dependent on economic developments and political decisions made somewhere else'. Various trade routes, the most famous of which was the so-called King's Highway,⁶ traversed this plateau region allowing Moab

6. Miller (1989: 12-13) questions the identification of *derek hammelek* (דֶּרֶךְ הַמֶּלֶךְ) in Num. 20.17 and 21.22 with the proper noun, 'The King's Highway', an identification originally proposed by Glueck. First, such a Hebrew construction would generally translate as a common, appellative noun—'the royal road'. Second, the context of Num. 20.17 seems to be that of the Negev rather than the Transjordan.

the opportunity to profit from the transnational commerce passing through her territory. Prominent towns of note in southern Moab were Kerak (biblical Kir = Kir-hereseth?), Horonaim, and Ar.

History

Political

The Egyptian Execration texts from the nineteenth or eighteenth centuries BCE may provide the earliest dated written sources providing any reference to the land of Moab and its inhabitants though without specifically naming Moab (for a fuller treatment of the evidence connecting Egypt with the central and southern regions of the Transjordan, see Kitchen 1992: 21-34). Instead, the texts mention 'rulers of Shutu', along with the Shasu, as being among Egypt's Asiatic enemies. The connection between the Shutu and Moab relies heavily on the proposed etymological connection between 'Shutu' and 'sons of Sheth', which Num. 24.17-18 parallels with 'Moab'.

I see him, but not now;
I behold him, but not nigh:
A star shall come forth out of Jacob,
And a scepter shall rise out of Israel;
It shall crush the forehead of Moab,
And break down all the sons of Sheth.
Edom shall be dispossessed,
Seir also, his enemies, shall be dispossessed,
While Israel does valiantly.

Moreover, a conjectural proposal that never really gained wide acceptance connects Moab with one of the named princes of 'Upper Shutu', *Shemu-'abu(m)*.⁷

Egypt maintained a strong presence in Syria-Palestine even during the reign of Thutmose III (c. 1482-1450).⁸ The so-called 'Palestinian List' (or 'Megiddo List') from his reign indicates that on one of his military campaigns

7. E.D. Grohman's 1958 dissertation proposed *Shemu-'abu(m)* as a dynastic name applied to the region east of the Dead Sea and that region's inhabitants. Except for the initial *sin*, which would have dropped out along the way, the consonants of *Shemu-'abu(m)* correspond to those of Moab (see discussion in Miller 1989: 1).

8. The Balu'a stela discovered at Khirbet el-Balu'a attests to Egyptian influence. On this relief are three figures, apparently a king or prince flanked by a god (left) and a goddess (right). The god wears the double crown of upper and lower Egypt while the goddess wears a crown similar to that of Osiris, and the king wears a headdress of the sort worn by Shasu in Egyptian reliefs (Miller 1992: 78). On the Shasu in general, see Ward 1972: 35-60.

through the region he apparently passed through the Moabite plateau moving from Dhiban to the Wadi Mujib to, eventually, Kerak (see Miller 1992: 77-78).

Inscriptions from the reign of Ramesses II (c. 1304-1237) provide the earliest references to 'Moab' by that name. The first is found on a statue of Ramesses II standing before the northern pylon of the Luxor temple. The second, actually a grouping of three texts, is on the outer face of the east wall of the Court of Ramesses of the Luxor temple and was reconstructed to read as follows by K.A. Kitchen (1964: 47-70).

Town which the mighty arm of Pharaoh, L.P.H., plundered
in (the) land of Moab: *b(w)trt*.
Town which the mighty arm of Pharaoh, L.P.H., plundered:
yn(?)d..., in the mountain of *mrn*.
The t[own which] the mighty arm of Pharaoh, L.P.H.,
[plundere]d, of *tbniw*.

Bwtrt remains unidentifiable while Kitchen identified *tbniw* with Dhiban.

Obviously by the time the Hebrews had migrated to this region, some history over land claims by the inhabitants of Moab had transpired. An Amorite king named Sihon had wrested the lands of Northern Moab along with the Plains from the control of the Moabite king. And the Moabites had gained control of this territory occupied in former times by a race of giants known as the Emim, or Emites (Deut. 2.10-11), defeated by Chedorlaomer and his military coalition (Gen. 14.5). Biblical traditions depict the Emim as a sedentary people. Ramesses' campaign would have weakened their cities. Egyptian sponsorship, claims U. F. Worschech (1990: 99-101, 124-26), enabled the Moabite displacement of the Emim and the emergence of the Moabite state. After defeating Sihon, the Israelites gained possession of original Moabite land claims and assigned them to the tribes of Reuben and Gad (Num. 21.10-35; chaps. 31-36). Failed attempts by Moab to reclaim its lands occur in the Balak/Balaam episode (Num. 22-24).⁹ On three separate occasions, King Balak of Moab persuades the prophet Balaam to utter a curse against Israel who has encamped in the 'Plains of Moab'. On each occasion, however, Balaam pronounces a blessing thus foiling Moabite efforts at land reclamation. Israel encamped at the 'Plains of Moab' until Moses died and just prior to their entrance into Canaan. Within Moab's own backyard, if you will, 'Israel' drafts its colonization plans of conquest and land allotment.

9. Fragmentary texts (c. 700 BCE) discovered at Tell Deir 'Alla' just north of the 'Plains of Moab' reference Balaam and identify him as a seer. Evidently, Transjordanian cultic traditions regarded the prophet Balaam as an important figure. Numerous scholarly studies have focused on the Tell Deir 'Alla' texts to which I will simply refer the reader to Mattingly 1994: 326 n. 24, and Miller 1989: 19 n. 52.

Israelite footprints are all over Moabite territory despite its claims to the contrary that it never took possession of Moabite lands much less set foot in Moabite territory acknowledged by the Deuteronomist as Moabite and as allotted to them by Yhwh. Israel was never to harass Moab or engage them in warfare. To emphasize the point of Israelite non-encroachment on Moabite territory, portions of the primary history actually portray Israel detouring around the eastern, desert side of Moab (Num. 21.10-30). Jephthah's exchange with the Ammonite king makes the matter more explicit (Judg. 11.12-28). In response to the Ammonite king's claim that Israel had taken land from the Arnon River to the Jabbok River, Jephthah responds that they had taken the land from the Amorite king Sihon, not from Ammon or Moab. Though neither party had legitimate claims to the parcel of land in dispute, Jephthah clearly refuses to acknowledge prior Moabite title. Furthermore, he claims that they traveled on the eastern side of Moab and did not pass through Moabite territory (southern Moab specifically) because the Arnon River was its boundary (v. 18). Two other passages relating the Israelite itinerary suggest something completely different. Numbers 33.5-49 and Deuteronomy 2 presuppose a march right through the heart of southern Moab. Clearly, land conflict lay at the center of Israelite-Moabite relations.

The Judges-2 Kings corpus presents further information on Israelite-Moabite relations narrated, in part, by the episode of Ehud and Eglon (Judg. 3.12-30). Eglon, the Moabite chieftain/king, allies himself with the Ammonites and Amalekites to defeat Israel and take possession of 'the city of Palms'. In all likelihood, this town may have been Eglon's only conquest and may have served as both a residency and a base to collect tribute from surrounding villages (Miller 1989: 33-34). After the establishment of the monarchy, Saul is reported to have fought against, among others, Moab with success (1 Sam. 14.47), though we have no information on any battle. King David bears an odd relationship with the Moabites. Earlier in his life when as a fugitive from Saul, he left his parents with the Moabite king for safekeeping (1 Sam. 22.3-4). But then after he ascended the throne, he subjugated the Moabites who paid him annual tribute with silver and gold (2 Sam. 8.2, 12). Toward the end of his reign, he took a census, which would seem to have included only the 'Plains of Moab' and northern Moab since the narrative explicitly identifies the Arnon as the southern limit to his realm in the Transjordan (2 Sam. 24.5-7).¹⁰ David's son Solomon accommodated his Moabite wife (as he did with all of his wives) by erecting a religious shrine devoted to Kemosh, the Moabite god (1 Kgs 11.7, 33).

10. In consideration of David's exercise of direct control over only northern Moab, Miller (1989: 34) lists as other factors (1) the military logistical nightmare of maintaining permanent control over southern Moab and (2) the list of Levitical cities (Josh. 21.1-42//1 Chron. 6.54) beyond the region of southern Moab.

With the Mesha Inscription (hereafter MI; see the image with Fig. 3 and the translation with Fig. 4),¹¹ dated c. 830 BCE, and the Kerak inscription (also nineteenth century), we come to know more about the political state of affairs of Moab in the ninth century BCE from Moab's perspective, and we know more about King Mesha than we ever learn about any other Moabite figure. Most scholars believe the Moabite state most likely began with Mesha. The 34-line MI identifies both Mesha and his father Kemosh-yat(ti) (corroborated by the Kerak inscription), and sheds some light on Israelite-Moabite relations (Miller 1992: 78). Mesha identifies himself ethnically as *Dayboni*, which may imply that while Moab had developed into the name of a state, it had not yet done so as a nation (Miller 1992: 50). King Omri of Israel had subjected Moab to Israelite control and required annual tribute, even from Mesha. 'Now Mesha king of Moab was a sheep breeder; and he had to deliver annually to the king of Israel a hundred thousand lambs, and the wool of a hundred thousand rams. But when Ahab died, the king of Moab rebelled against the king of Israel' (2 Kgs 3.4-5). The MI corroborates Israelite domination of Moab but articulates its liberation in a manner mirroring that of the Deuteronomistic perspective: 'Omri was king of Israel, and he oppressed Moab for many days because Kemosh was angry with his country. His son succeeded him, and he also said, "I will oppress Moab"'. Of course, the Deuteronomist relates the success of Moabite liberation to Jehu's Yahwist revival. After the rebellion,¹² Mesha expended considerable energy restoring the royal city Dhiban. He also engaged in road-building activities and built a water reservoir (Yunker 1997: 240). Mention of the 40-year period of Omride occupation would seem to suggest a form of annal-keeping commensurate with administration and statehood. Mesha identifies himself as Moab's king having performed the requisite tasks for an ancient Near Eastern king. Miller (1992: 50) comments that 'he had increased order and security by his building programme, he had decreased disorder by repelling Israel's aggression...and he had been a faithful servant of his god in both ministries'.

11. Since its discovery in 1868, the Mesha Inscription has been studied and interpreted repeatedly. For a full bibliography on this inscription, see Dearman 1989.

12. When the rebellion took place hinges on the dating of the MI and the context presupposed within the Kings' narratives. For the longest time, scholarship regarded the MI as a victory inscription commemorating Mesha's successful rebellion against Israel. But Miller's form-critical analysis of the MI led him to conclude the MI as a memorial inscription rather than a victory inscription (1974: 9-18). Read as such, Mesha's rebellion would have occurred toward the end of his reign thus ameliorating certain chronological difficulties of many of the deeds reported by Mesha in connection with the struggle with Israel. Therefore, the inscription contrasts the success and prosperity of Mesha's reign with the deplorable situation prior to his accession to the throne (Miller 1989: 36-40).




Figure 3. The Mesha Inscription, alternatively known as the Moabite Stone discovered in 1868 at Dhiban.

Translation of Mesha Inscription

I am Mesha' son of Kemosh[yat], king of Moab, the Daibonite. My father ruled over Moab thirty years, and I ruled after my father. I made this high place for Kemosh in Qarhoh. BM[S] because he delivered me from all the kings, and because he let me prevail over all my enemies. Omri was king of Israel, and he oppressed Moab for many days because Kemosh was angry with his country. His son succeeded him, and he also said, "I will oppress Moab." In my days he said th[is]. But I prevailed over him and over his house, and Israel utterly perished forever. Now Omri had taken possession of a[ll the lan]d of Mehadaba. He lived in it during his days and half of the days of his son(s)—forty years; but Kemosh returned it in my days. I built Ba'lma'on and made the reservoir in it; and I buil[t] Qiryaten. Now the Gadites had lived in the land of 'Atarot forever, and the king of Israel had rebuilt 'Atarot for himself. But I fought against the city and took it, and I killed the entire population of the city—a satiation for Kemosh and for Moab. I brought back from there the altar hearth of its DWD and [dr]aggd it before Kemosh in Qiryat. I settled in it the Sharonites and the Maharatites. Now Kemosh said to me, "Go seize Nebo from Israel." So I went at night and fought against it from the break of dawn until noon. I seized it and killed everyone of [it]—seven thousand native men, foreign men, native women, for[eign] women, and concubines—for I devoted it to 'Ashtar-Kemosh. I took from there th[e ves]-sels of Yahweh and dragged them before Kemosh. Now the king of Israel had built Yahas, and he occupied it while he was fighting against me. But Kemosh drove him out from before me. I took from Moab two hundred men, its entire unit. I took it up against Yahas and captured it to annex (it) to Daibon. I built Qarhoh: walls of the parks and the walls of the acropolis. I rebuilt its gates, and I rebuilt its towers. I built the palace and made the retaining walls of the reservoi[r for the spr]ing insi[de]

the city. Now there was no cistern inside the city—in Qarhoh—so
 I said
 to all the people, “Make your
 selves each a cistern in his house.” I dug the ditches for Qarhoh with
 Israelite cap-
 tives. I built ‘Aro’er and made the highway at the Arnon, [and]
 I rebuilt Beth Bamot because it had been torn down. I built Beser—
 because [it] was in ruins—
 with fifty Daibonites; for all Daibon was obedient. I rule[d
 over] hundreds in the cities which I had annexed to the country. I built
 [Mehada]ba, Bet Diblaten, and Bet Ba’lma’on, and I took up there
 the []
]S’N of the land. And Hawronen lived in it B[] WQ[]]S[
 And] Kemosh said to me, “Go down, fight against Hawronen.” So I
 went down[]
 and] Kemosh [retur]ned it in my days, and ‘L[] DH from
 there ‘S[]
]ST SDQ. And I[]

Figure 4. Translation from Jackson 1989: 97-98.

Information concerning other Moabite royal figures derives from Assyrian sources, which identify four Moabite kings by name though with no exact dates for their regnancy. The first named Moabite king according to a clay tablet found at Nimrud, Salamanu was one of a long list of kings to pay tribute to Tiglath-pileser III shortly after 734 BCE (ANET 282). The prism of Sargon II (721-05) mentions Moab among certain Palestinian kingdoms implicated in an anti-Assyrian revolt led by Ashdod in 713 (ANET 287). Two letters, dated approximately to the time of Tiglath-pileser and Sargon, mention Moab. The first reveals that Moabite officials delivered horses, presumably as tribute, to Calah. The second reports a raid on Moabite territory by men of Gidir-land. In 701 BCE Kammusunadbi, the second named Moabite king, pledged his loyalty to Sennacherib bringing him presents (ANET 287). Another text, either from the reign of Sennacherib or his successor Esarhaddon, indicates a tribute payment of one mina of gold from the Moabites (ANET 301). During the reign of Esarhaddon, King Musuri, the third named Moabite king and contemporary to Manasseh of Judah, transported building materials to Nineveh (ANET 291) and later delivered presents to Ashurbanipal and provided military service for his wars against Egypt (ANET 294). In addition to Moab demonstrating itself as a loyal Assyrian vassal, these texts also reveal that they were due

Assyrian protection, which they needed from the Qedarites in Arabia (ANET 297-98). In a different text, Ashurbanipal takes the credit for the defeat of Ammuladi, king of Qedar, although Kamashaltu, the fourth named Moabite king, seems to have been the actual victor. 'With the help of Ashur, Sin, Shamash, Adad, Bel, Nebo, the Ishtar of Nineveh...and by pronouncing my name which Ashur has made powerful, Kamashaltu, king of Moab, a servant belonging to me, inflicted a defeat in an open battle upon Ammuladi, king of Qedar' (ANET 298).

From the sixth century on, we are heavily reliant, unfortunately, on Josephus, the only available non-biblical source about Moab. Moab's conflicts with surrounding neighbours, including several raids west of the Jordan in Judah's latter years (2 Kgs 13.20-21; 24.2), came to an abrupt end with the Babylonian invasion and subsequent destruction of the Moabite kingdom in 582 BCE (*Ant.* 10:9:7 §§180-82).¹³ Some Moabites were taken into exile (cf. Jer. 48.7), some found homes in Judah, and others escaped to Egypt, leaving a population vacuum that new arrivals from the desert would fill (van Zyl 1960: 157). The Moabite kingdom never reemerged. That territory recognized as Moabite would later come under Persian control. That does not mean, however, that 'Israel' in Persian Yehud did not have their problems on the ground with those of Moabite descent amidst an elite group's control for power. The Ezra–Nehemiah literature never mentions any specific Moabites by name unless we consider Sanballat 'the Horonite', taking 'Horonite' as a designation for Horonaim in Moab (cf. Isa. 15.5; Jer. 48.3). Though not the prominent proposal,¹⁴ H.G.M. Williamson's (1992: 973) only compelling critique is that this identification fails to explain why Sanballat was not simply called 'the Moabite'. The rejoinder is simply twofold: (1) the Moabite kingdom had ceased to exist by this point in time such that this national identification would not have been used for Sanballat, and (2) Sanballat was never referred to as 'governor of Samaria' either though the preponderance of evidence suggests otherwise. This matter notwithstanding, the community of 'Israel' in Persian Yehud did have concerns about miscegenation with those outside its community, including those of Moabite descent. Moabite territory during Persian colonization

13. On the relationship between the Mesopotamian empires and the Transjordan, see Weippert 1987.

14. The main proposals for understanding the designation 'Horonite' are (1) upper or lower Beth-Horon (Josh. 16.3, 5), some five miles north of Jerusalem; (2) Horonaim in Moab, since Sanballat was of foreign origin (Neh. 13.28); and (3) Harran in Mesopotamia, a center for the worship of the god Sin—Sanballat means 'Sin (the moon-god) gives life' (see fuller discussion of each with mitigating critiques in Williamson 1992: 973).

witnessed a growing settlement of Arab peoples such that, by the fourth century, Nabataean Arabs were the dominant occupants of this region (see Mattingly 1990: 309-35). Nonetheless, the name 'Moab' would survive the kingdom's demise as attested by the names of two of the chief cities in this region during the Roman period, 'Rabbath Moab' and 'Karak Moab' (Miller 1989: 27).

Cultural

On the basis of the two Ramesses II inscriptions, we do know of the existence of a 'land of Moab' by the thirteenth century BCE. The population at this time was basically semi-nomadic though some permanent settlements had begun to emerge. What we do not know is the socio-political organization of this 'land of Moab'. It has been described variously as 'pastoral', 'tribal', a 'state', a 'territorial state', a 'simple political state', a 'monarchy', a 'kingdom', a 'tribal kingdom', and a 'nation' (Bienkowski 1992). Informing the description of Moab as a kingdom no doubt derives in part from the Moabite source underlying the Edomite king list of Genesis 36.31-39. The names of Bela, the son of Beor, whose city was Dinhabah; Hadad, the son of Bedad, whose city was Avith; and Hadar, whose city was Pau, are Moabite names, not Edomite (Bartlett 1973: 233). Scholars have yet to reach a consensus on the social structure of Moab.¹⁵ Some claim Moab to have been a 'simple political state' as early as the Late Bronze II Age and a 'nation-state' by Iron I (Kitchen 1992); some contend that Moab didn't reach the status of statehood until late in Iron I or into Iron II, at which time it may have reached 'nation' status (Knauf 1992); and still some would question whether Moab ever reached 'state' status even by early Iron II (Miller 1992). Those who would posit the existence of a state in Moab in the Bronze and Iron Ages generally do so on the basis of an assumed presence of certain archaeological 'traits'. In other words, if the artifactual and cultural data bear out the presence of fortifications, road systems, cities, water control systems, monumental art, inscriptions, and buildings, as did Moab, then it must be a state. But Younker (1997: 240-42) dispels such assumptions by citing numerous examples of such 'traits' within societies that anthropologists would not even consider at state-level.

15. Younker (1997: 237-42) discusses what he suggests as three problems contributing to this lack of consensus: (1) appropriate terminology, (2) types of social structure, and (3) appropriation of outdated theories from other disciplines as models for ancient social processes.

Whether, when, and to what extent Moab ever reached statehood, much less nation-status, remains uncertain at this point. But what does seem highly probable is the persistence of 'tribalism' in Moab even when, or if, it became a state. Younker (1997) sets forth a strong case for the presence of tribalism in Moab by pointing to literary traditions, pillared houses, mortuary practices, and material cultural homogeneity. I will confine my comments to the first trait. The Mesha and Kerak inscriptions, often appealed to as evidence of Moab as a state society, bear hints of Moabite tribalism as hinted at by Dearman and Miller. Both provide evidence of Moab as an ethnically diverse society divided into a number of 'territories' during the Iron I/II transition (Dearman 1992; Miller 1992). The MI designates certain regions within Moab as 'the land of X or Y'. Each settlement's identity bears the identical name of the region occupied (e.g. Madaba, 'Atarot, Dhiban). As example, the people whom Mesha resettles in 'Atarot after repossessing it from Israel are named according to their home territorial/city designations. For example, Mesha identified himself as a *Dayboni* ('Dibonite'), indicating his residence. Dibon was apparently one among several territories within Moab. Though Mesha also claimed to be 'king of Moab', Miller (1992) suggests that this expression does not include *all* Moab; rather, Mesha only controlled certain areas north of the Wadi el-Mujib, perhaps only the land of Dibon.

I had previously made mention of the rich, agricultural land of Moab. Its fame, however, may have been as a land of sheep and rams. This perception was certainly present in the Hebrew mindset. In describing the fear struck in the hearts of all Israel's neighbours by Yhwh's acts against Egypt, the Song of Moses refers to the "*elim* of Moab', equating Moabite political leadership with sheep (a note of derision?). And what does Mesha provide king Ahab of Israel with in the form of tribute but sheep and rams (2 Kgs 3.4), and plenty of them. Another probable source of income for Moab would have been the King's Highway. Moab's ability to control the trade along this route in her territory afforded the prospect of wealth, which may help to explain why they and Edom were conquered so much. Although Moab's ability to extract wealth from diverse sources probably placed it higher than Edom on the socio-economic ladder, nonetheless it remained poorer than Judah and Israel in spite of its wealth gained from sheep-rearing and the rich, agricultural land to the north of the Arnon River (Bartlett 1973: 249).

If we can trust what we know about literacy in the ancient Near Eastern world, it would not be implausible to assume the same with Moab, namely that only approximately 10 percent (a generous estimate) of the population was literate. Cultural ill/literacy, however, cannot account for the scarcity of written sources within Moab, especially when considering that the same

percentages of illiteracy apply to Hebrew society. And look how much literature we have from them. Rather, the socio-political organization of Moabite society would seem to be the key to understanding cultural illiteracy in Moab. Moab's socio-political organization does not seem to have been such to support, or desire to engage in, the production of literature. Comparison of the Moabite script from extant sources with that of their neighbours the Edomites, Hebrews, and Ammonites reveals few differences in form and even fewer differences in style (see Fig. 5). By the seventh-sixth centuries, the Moabite language witnessed an intrusion of Aramaic elements. Do we attribute this shift to the growing influence of Damascus in the ninth century? Or did the Assyrian use of Aramaic for diplomatic purposes in the eighth-seventh centuries prompt this shift? No definitive reason presents itself. But were it not for the sparse sources of a textual and archaeological nature—e.g. the Balu'ah stele (c. twelfth-eleventh centuries BCE), the Mesha Inscription (ninth century), the Kerak inscription (ninth century), the *Rujm al 'Abd* Stela (or Shihan Warrior Stele; date ranging from as early as 2000 BCE and as late as the eighth century), a fragment inscription from Dibon (ninth century), some seals and coins—available to us, information about Moabite religion and culture would remain largely unknown.

The pervasiveness of the deity Kemosh within Moabite society as attested by the MI and the Hebrew Bible is unmistakable so much so that scholars have long regarded Kemosh as the national deity of Moab.¹⁶ Moabites are sometimes referred to as the sons and daughters of Kemosh (Jer. 48.46). Kemosh appears as a theophoric element in personal names (e.g. Kemosh[yat], the father of Mesha; king Kammusunadbi). And booty and captives were devoted to Kemosh. While Kemosh was certainly important to the Moabites, this deity was honoured by other ancient peoples predating the Moabite kingdom(?). In addition, the presence of *Kamish* (an archaic form of Kemosh¹⁷) in the Ebla tablets (c. 2600-2250 BCE) as

16. In some respects, the status of Kemosh in Moab relates to perspectives of the social structure of Moab and Moabite theology. To claim Kemosh as the national deity betrays an assumption about Moabite society (i.e. nation) but may also intimate a monotheistic view. But ancient Moab most likely practiced henotheism throughout their history. In other words, they would have worshipped Kemosh as their leading deity while acknowledging the existence of other deities. In addition, we cannot rule out the real possibility of Moab being openly polytheistic at various periods (see further discussion in Mattingly 1989: 216).

17. Of the eight occurrences of Kemosh in the Hebrew Bible, Jer. 48.7 contains the variant spelling *Kamish* (*kmys*). The presence of this archaic spelling in the Ebla tablets helps account for the misspelling in Jeremiah 48.7 thus rendering textual critics' eagerness to emend its spelling unnecessary (Mattingly 1989: 217).

	א ב ג ד ה ו ז ח ט י כ ל מ נ ס ע פ צ ק ר ש ת
Ammonite	𐤀 𐤁 𐤂 𐤃 𐤄 𐤅 𐤆 𐤇 𐤈 𐤉 𐤊 𐤋 𐤌 𐤍 𐤎 𐤏 𐤐 𐤑 𐤒 𐤓 𐤔 𐤕
Aramaic	𐤀 𐤁 𐤂 𐤃 𐤄 𐤅 𐤆 𐤇 𐤈 𐤉 𐤊 𐤋 𐤌 𐤍 𐤎 𐤏 𐤐 𐤑 𐤒 𐤓 𐤔 𐤕
Edomite	𐤀 𐤁 𐤂 𐤃 𐤄 𐤅 𐤆 𐤇 𐤈 𐤉 𐤊 𐤋 𐤌 𐤍 𐤎 𐤏 𐤐 𐤑 𐤒 𐤓 𐤔 𐤕
Hebrew	א ב ג ד ה ו ז ח ט י כ ל מ נ ס ע פ צ ק ר ש ת
Moabite	𐤀 𐤁 𐤂 𐤃 𐤄 𐤅 𐤆 𐤇 𐤈 𐤉 𐤊 𐤋 𐤌 𐤍 𐤎 𐤏 𐤐 𐤑 𐤒 𐤓 𐤔 𐤕
Phoenician	𐤀 𐤁 𐤂 𐤃 𐤄 𐤅 𐤆 𐤇 𐤈 𐤉 𐤊 𐤋 𐤌 𐤍 𐤎 𐤏 𐤐 𐤑 𐤒 𐤓 𐤔 𐤕

Figure 5. Semitic Script Chart (from Herr 1997: 158). *Permission from ASOR Publications.*

one of the named deities, a temple built in honour of Kamish at Ebla, and occurrences of his name in a month, in personal names, and in the place-name *kar-kamish* (Carchemish) altogether indicate (1) the acknowledgment of Kamish by Eblaïtes as one of their many deities, (2) their regard for this deity as one of the principal gods of the city, and (3) that this deity was not a late addition to the catalogue of Semitic deities. Mattingly (1989: 217-18) concludes, 'these ancient and widespread references to names similar to Kemosh indicate that Kemosh, the leading Moabite deity, was part of an older Semitic pantheon with which a number of Near Eastern peoples were acquainted'. A third-century BCE inscription found on an altar stone at Kerak mentions Kemosh, thus proving that, though any political entity known as Moab ceased to exist beyond the Persian period, if not much earlier, the worship of Kemosh continued well into the Hellenistic period (Mattingly 1989: 220-21).

Regarding the Moabite cultus, sanctuaries were built for Kemosh. A fragmentary inscription at Dhiban reveals a Kemosh sanctuary ('temple of Kemosh') in ancient Dibon (Mattingly 1989: 222). In addition, Mesha constructed the *bamat* ('high place'), a functional altar, at the cultic center of Dibon (MI, ll. 3-4) at Qarhoh, suggested by Mattingly (1989: 227) as perhaps the royal court or acropolis area of Dibon. Another inscription at Kerak suggests the possibility of a Kemosh sanctuary there as well. Even Solomon constructed a high place to Kemosh in Jerusalem that would remain for some two centuries (1 Kgs 11.7-8; 2 Kgs 23.13). As a demonstration of devotion to Kemosh, Moabites offered sacrifices and burned incense at the 'high places' (Jer. 48.35). King Balak made sacrificial offerings

of oxen, bulls, sheep, and rams. The existence of religious sanctuaries and a sacrificial system (Num. 22.40-23.30; 25.1-5; 2 Kgs 3.27; Jer. 48.35) would seem to imply the presence of priests. The prophet Jeremiah makes a reference, the only one, to priests in Moab (Jer. 48.7). But priests were not absolutely necessary since kings could exercise such a priestly authority. The most unusual feature of Moabite religion that most Western Christians associate with Moab is the human sacrificial offering of the firstborn son of King Mesha (2 Kgs 3.27) for divine assistance. Seers and diviners were also known and used by the Moabites. The Balak-Balaam episode reveals the practice of seeking divine revelation through consulting seers/prophets. And the recurring phrase in the MI, 'Kemosh said to me', may hint at the presence of prophets and/or oracles in King Mesha's court.

Ethnicity

Origins

The term 'Moabite' generally designates a people who inhabited a small land-area from c. 1200-600 BCE. But just exactly who the Moabites were in terms of origin remains open to conjecture.¹⁸ Their designation as 'the sons of Sheth' (Num. 24.17) provides no help whatsoever. Neither does the Hebrews' narrative presentation in Genesis 19 that straightforwardly traces their lineage to Lot but with no additional genealogical information. At best, we can conclude that the Hebrews at least perceived a very close kinship between the Moabites and their Ammonite neighbours to the north (cf. Deut. 23.3; Neh. 13.1) and only a distant kinship between themselves and the Moabites, but a kinship nevertheless. The Moabites called their predecessors Emim (Deut. 2.10-11; cf. Gen. 14.5), otherwise known as the Rephaim by the Hebrews, thus implying that the land known as 'Moab' was already occupied at some point in time prior to Moabite emergence. Beyond this, we can really assert no more with any degree of confidence. As Bartlett (1973: 230-31) states, 'Unfortunately we are as yet unable to learn much about the arrival of the Moabites...and their effect on any previous inhabitants, from archaeological evidence, for not enough sites have been dug'.

Nevertheless, numerous scholars have proposed various theories regarding Moabite origins. Van Zyl (1960: 109-12) unhesitatingly filled in the admittedly many gaps in the story of Moab to speculate about the descent and settlement of the Moabites.

Perhaps they originally came from a circle of nomadic tribes who inhabited the Syrian-Arabian desert. Thence they could have

18. On Moabite origins, see the essays in *Early Edom and Moab* (1992) by Dearman (65-75), Miller (77-92), and Mattingly (55-64).

moved south-west towards the land of Moab. Initially they could only have come to graze their flocks, but subsequently they occupied the country during the 14th or early in the thirteenth century BC.... These new settlers, who assimilated with the nomadic tribes that had formerly grazed their flocks on the land left uncultivated by the Emites, eventually constituted the majority of the population... By mutual collaboration the Moabite tribes were able to subjugate the Emites...At the end of the thirteenth century BC the Moabite Kingdom had already been established.

This standard 'model' soon gave way to what came to be the more common theory of Moabite origins. Martin Noth initially posited the 'Aramaeans migration', advanced more recently by George Mendenhall (1973: 108-09, 149, 157-73) and Gösta Ahlström (1986: 83-85), which links Moabite emergence with the incursions of Aramaeans who migrated from Syria as a result of the upheaval before and during the Late Bronze-Iron I Age transition. A different theory by Robert Boling (1988: 21-22) advances the 'Aramaeans migration' hypothesis arguing that, in addition to the migration of groups from areas far north of Moab, the early Moabite population also included refugees from the Jordan Valley and points beyond. Both theories reflect the operative principle of most modern biblical scholars to attribute the rise of Transjordan's Iron Age kingdoms in terms of some external stimuli, namely the chaos at the end of the Bronze Age (Mattingly 1992: 62).

Perceptions

The primary history re-presents Moab to its readers by rooting Moabite origins in sexually scandalous behaviour. The son of Lot by his eldest daughter, Moab ('from the father') is a child of incest. Using the term 'incest' does not necessarily imply any value judgment against Lot and either of his daughters. That assessment remains for the reader interacting with the narrative's features. Nonetheless the larger literary context does play a role in prejudicing its readers. The presentation of this act on the heels of the rape in Sodom, where Lot's family had been living, predisposes readers to look upon the origin of Moab with suspicion censuring the daughters for sexual immorality. So strong has this predisposition been that centuries of reading have associated Moab with incest and sexual immorality within both Jewish and Christian traditions.

But this is not your typical example of father-daughter incest. Lot does not initiate the sexual encounter and abuse his position of power; rather, the daughters initiate the encounter by getting their father drunk. This would seem to imply that they knew that their father, were he completely conscious and rational, would not have willingly consented to such an

unnatural act. Instead, Lot was completely unconscious on both occasions unaware when either daughter lay down or rose up.

The question of motive naturally follows. Why do these daughters engage in this unnatural behaviour? Are they simply sexual deviants, a product of their environment (upbringing in Sodom)? Or do they suppose their new lifestyle to offer no opportunities for marriage? Theories abound concerning the motive of these daughters, but the narrative unequivocally imputes no bad motive to them. Daughter M (Moab's mother) does not initially concoct such a plan out of revenge or anger at her father's willingness to throw her and her sister out to the mercy of the voracious Sodomites. Rather, she states, 'Our father is old, and there is no man on earth to come to us in the way of all the earth. Come, let's make our father drink wine, and let's lie with him, and let's cause offspring to live from our father' (Gen. 19.31-32). With the conflagration of Sodom, Gomorrah, and the surrounding region, the daughters naturally assume for themselves the antithesis to the idyllic only-human-alive-on-a-deserted-island scenario, i.e. a bleak human existence in a post-apocalyptic world (similarly Gunkel 1997: 217).

The concern of daughter M, as she persuasively convinces her sister, has less to do with their progeny and, by extension, social status, but more to do with their father's posterity, which he now lacks. The preservation of a man's lineage was of paramount importance in the ancient Near Eastern world. Lot's sons-in-law were gone and only the daughters, who have not had sexual relations with anyone, could ensure their father's posterity. Moreover, their actions provide for the double continuation of the Terah line (Lot, the nephew of Abraham, was a grandson of Terah) and, according to Tikva Frymer-Kensky (2002: 259), 'a noble lineage'. Just as with the ancestry of Israel, the fourth generation of Terah's line (Lot's daughters || Rivka) mates with the third generation (Lot || Isaac) resulting, in the end, with Moab as doubly the seed of Lot. 'Incest among the progenitors of a people indicates the purest of lineage' (2002: 260). Despite modern moralistic sensitivities, the acts of Lot's daughters in a context of hopelessness and isolation may reflect a spirit of selflessness described by Frymer-Kensky (2002: 263) as even a 'heroic act' of love and faithfulness to their father.

Though principally located on the eastern side of the Jordan, the Moabites never remained isolated from the Israelite community; rather, they always seem connected. The Torah condemns the Moabites principally because they sought to impede the Hebrews' entrance into Canaan. In contrast to the narrative in Numbers 22-25 that has King Balak of Moab acting alone, the Deuteronomist asserts that the plan to have the prophet Balaam curse Israel was an act of complicity with Ammon (Deut. 23.3). The plan to have Balaam curse Israel comes off more farcical than the depiction of Balak as a comical figure. Only after a second trip by more distinguished envoys does

Balaam even deign a journey to Moab. Consistently, Balaam consults and abides by the word of God. Despite everything going against Balak's plan, he persists. On three separate occasions, Balak seeks to entice the curse sought with divination fees from Balaam by taking him up to three different high places, each with a vantage point of the Israelites in the 'Plains of Moab', and offering sacrifices. Each time Balaam remains faithful to God, not Balak, and utters a blessing, not a curse. Is Balak simply stubborn? Or persistent? However we may respond, the audacity that Balak believed the manipulation of God to his own favour and the bribery of God's prophet as possible despite all signs to the contrary bespeaks a level of gullibility and naivety on his part. Only the characterization of a later Moabite king named Eglon surpasses Balak as stupid.

The Moabite women especially demonstrate a desired connection with 'Israel', to which the Israelite men reciprocate. Moabite women invited Israelite men at Shittim to attend a religious feast. They also had sexual relations with the women resulting in the calamitous relationship between Israel and Baal-Peor (Num. 25.1-3). During Persian colonization, 'Israelite' males took Moabite women for wives (Ezr. 9.1-2; Neh. 13.23-24), and they had children who grew up non-conversant with the Hebrew language. And then there's Ruth, whose story reads like the Lot episode *redux*. In both, the female initiates the sexual encounter but only after the male has become inebriated to the point of unconsciousness. Ruth's action, though not incestuous, ritually reenacts the drama of the Moabite myth wherein she plays the role of the paradigmatic heroine. Frymer-Kensky's (2002: 263) observations of the parallels between Ruth and her foremother are worthy of consideration:

Like her foremother, Ruth does not consider herself bound by conventional mores when an important issue is at stake. Both women are faced with the problem of begetting children when they have no husbands, and both opt to search for a solution within the family, so that the house to which they are attached would survive. Ruth's story is like a less intense echo of the Moab story. Her situation is not as dire, and her act is not as drastic, but she and the daughters of Lot share a common thrust. When the posterity of their house is in peril, these women act unconventionally, even contra-conventionally, to preserve it. Subverting one cultural norm, conventional sexual mores, they reinforce and support an even more primal principle, paternal lineage.

But Ruth does not reenact the narrative ritual without some prodding. Her mother-in-law Naomi stands behind the scenes orchestrating Ruth's every movement, sometimes into potentially dangerous situations with Ruth seemingly oblivious to this fact. For example, Naomi sends Ruth into

the harvest field, where an unattached young foreign woman could easily become the victim of molestation, without advice or warning (chap. 2). Later, Naomi directs Ruth to make herself attractive and directs her to go down to the threshing floor at night regardless of the real potential of her becoming a victim of molestation by men who have been drinking (chap. 3). Unswerving loyalty and devotion? Or gullible naivety?¹⁹

Ruth has always been looked upon as the model of faithfulness and loyal devotion in both Jewish and Christian traditions. But the Jewish/Christian tradition also looked askance at Ruth because of her sexually suspicious behaviour (note her presence with only three other morally suspect women—Tamar, Rahab, and Bathsheba—in Jesus' genealogy; Matt. 1). And in spite of her well-known 'where you go, I will go' speech claiming not only devotion to Naomi's god Yhwh but also, and perhaps more importantly, to Naomi herself, the narrator will not let go of her ethnic identification. Repeatedly, either through the voices of characters or through narratorial intrusions, the ethnic identification and national affiliation of Ruth becomes central to the story. Nationalism eclipses religious conviction. Ethnicity matters more than Yahwistic faith. With the centrality of ethnicity to the story, the mute characterization of Ruth as easily manipulatable and Ruth's actions echoing that of her foremother, the narrator subtly reinforces 'feelings of moral superiority, a righteous chauvinism' (Fewell and Gunn 1988: 103) within the minds of readers.

Admittedly, an interpretative ambivalence maintains with regard to the motives of Lot's daughters and the narrative elements of the story of Ruth. And that ambivalence extends to the function of these stories comprising the Moabite ethnic myth within the larger national myth. Perhaps originally a reflection of national pride in Moabite folklore, the Lot episode became a means of anti-Moabite polemic within the national myth of Israel (Gunkel 1997: 216-17). Early modern biblical interpreters considered the story as an ethnic slur on Moabites. Whether the story actually intends to be an ethnic slur on the Moabites matters not. What does matter is how the narrative re-presentation of Moabites within the national myth of Genesis–2 Kings influences a community's perceptions of the 'other' and factor into a colonialist agenda. Clearly, the ethnic myth affirms a national superiority with the dispute over land boundaries predominating. The narrator in Num. 22.36 stresses the Arnon as the farthest point (north) of Moabite territory. Thus, Northern Moab along with the Plains of Moab become

19. Much more could be said regarding the relations between the characters in this story beyond just that of Naomi's view of Ruth. But see the fine, thorough literary analysis in Danna Nolan Fewell's and David Gunn's book *Compromising Redemption* (1990).

the land-claim in question as this national myth justifies the legitimacy of 'Israel's' claim to this territory over an easily manipulatable group. The argument for this land-claim that simultaneously concedes that 'Israel's' ancestors did not take the land from either the Moabites or the Ammonites (Miller 1992: 84) intends to convince Israelites, certainly not Moabites, easily persuaded by a rhetoric that slyly occludes tacit admission of former Moabite lands.

Stupid Is as Stupid Does

'Sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will never hurt me'. Oh, the many times we have all said this little childhood limerick growing up as kids. And always in response to what someone had called us as a means to ward off their words' ill effects, a means to reverse the 'curse', if you will. That we said the incantation only underscores the truth that we all know—words can and do hurt sometimes. In fact, the ill after-effects of years of verbal taunting and name-calling can do much psychological harm. And yet, as much as we did not like being called names, we still found ourselves calling others names, like 'stupid'. The 1994 Oscar-winning movie *Forrest Gump* reinforced one of the many axioms that I was taught as a child. Forrest is watching an episode of *Gomer Pyle, USM.C.* Private Dallas from Phoenix chides Forrest saying, 'Gump, how can you watch that stupid shit? Turn it off'. Forrest responds, 'Stupid is as stupid does'. The same truth maintains even in inter-ethnic group dynamics regardless of how superior one ethnic group may perceive itself to another.

But what if a text, ethnocentric in perspective, not only constructs the identity of 'self' (namely, in this case 'Israel') but also constructs the identity of the 'other' (in this case Moab) by means of stereotypes, a highly stylized form of name-calling and verbal taunting? The selected biblical text (Judg. 3.12-30) for analysis does just this through satire. Most of us think of satire as funny. True, but satire can also be biting and attacking, especially if it's about an enemy 'other' couched within a nationalistic corpus. This kind of satire targets a victim through re-presentation and attacks via the element of play (e.g. stereotypes), narcotizing readers into a toleration of its 'entertaining' depersonalization. Concerns with an ethnocentric satire's *Nachleben* enable what traditional suppositions of satire (i.e. intrinsically moral/didactic in function) cannot—namely, an amelioration of its effects by taking note of the possible functions of ethnic humour. The mutual consumption of ethnocentric literature can never be harmless. Charles Knight (2004: 25) comments, 'The act of consuming is self-consciously represented by the object we consume, and by eating it we transform the image into

reality...the process of reading transforms the satiric representation of experience into the personal experience of those who read it'. In a vividly real manner, two ethnic groups identifying themselves as 'Israel', separated only by time but certainly not by ideology, appropriating the national myth of Genesis–2 Kings formed stereotypical perceptions of certain ethnic groups that justified and reinforced the colonization (or conquest) of first Moab and second Mexico, too stupid and incapable of self-rule. De-colonizing Moab and Mexico will hopefully result in the simultaneous decolonization of 'Israel'.

Moab De-colonized

With the Ehud narrative in the book of Judges we move away from the formulaic character of the preceding Othniel complex to a more vivid stylistic quality. If the former was 'mildly humorous', then this story is 'virtually slapstick comedy' (McCann 2002: 43). Instead of an enigmatic figure Cushan-rishathaim, we have the massive bodily presence of King Eglon of Moab. Puns, sarcasm, and irony make the satiric humour of this story quite obvious. Despite the divergent analyses by scholars to understand this story as literature,²⁰ they all concede the presence of humour in this story though not on its centrality or efficacy,²¹ much less its function in Israelite society as humour. In the following analyses, I will focus on this narrative's motifs of sacrifice, sexuality, feminization, and scatology central to its satiric humour contributing to the cultural ethno-typing of the Moabites.

Consistent with the literary frame of the episodic Judges' narratives, God subjects the Israelites to foreign domination. Yet some differences, perhaps subtle, at the outset of this story mark it as distinct from the preceding narrative. First, whereas other conquerors need only have Yhwh 'sell' or 'deliver' the Israelites into their power because of their strength (e.g. *mkr* in 3.8; 4.2; and 10.7 but *ntn* in 6.1 and 13.1), Yhwh must first strengthen (*hʒq*) the weak king Eglon of Moab. Even that does not suffice since the divinely empowered Eglon requires Ammonite *and* Amalekite assistance in

20. The most notable foci on the Bible as literature with this story as subject may be the works of Meir Sternberg (1985: 328-37), who uses the story to illustrate 'the art of the proleptic epithet', and Robert Alter (1981: 38-41), whose influential piece emphasizes this story's mimetic nature with consideration of puns, allusions, and symbolism.

21. A number of studies have noted the comic and ironic twists within this episode (Good 1965: 33-34; Alter 1981: 37-41; Webb 1987: 129-131; Klein 1988: 37-39; and Hübner 1987: 132-133) contra Radday (1990: 59) who insists that there are no 'jokes' in the Hebrew Bible.

order to capture a single city.²² Where other oppressors could, by their own power, subject an entire nation to their will, the Moabites cannot simply conquer anyone by themselves. In all the biblical literature, the Moabites are consistently portrayed as requiring the assistance of others to aid their conquests of other nations.

Second, the spirit of Yhwh does not come upon Ehud as it did Othniel; rather, the narrator indicates that Yhwh 'raised up' Ehud to deliver Israel. Is this difference the narrator's way of distancing Yhwh from the trickster Ehud who resorts to deception and violence to effect justice? Or is Yhwh present providentially directing and guaranteeing Ehud's deceptions?²³ How to approach this theological tension has far-reaching implications beyond just that of a view of God to include how an ethnic group appropriates such a text to divinely legitimize its agenda, colonial or otherwise.

Third, Ehud does not judge as Othniel does. Rather, the narrator emphasizes his capacity as deliverer introducing him as a 'left-handed' man. As in our society, antiquity generally regarded left-handedness as peculiar and unnatural, but went further with connotations of inferior, unclean, a disability, the marginal, and the symbolic dark side (as indicated by ritual preferences, see Exod. 29.20, 22; Lev. 7.32; 8.23, 25), all of which range beyond mere physical qualities. Nevertheless, interpreters tend to take the left-handed motif casually as simply a physical attribute that has raised its own interpretative queries. Does this phrase refer to physical deformity, i.e. 'bound' or 'impeded' in his right hand (Klein 1988: 37; Webb 1987: 131), or to physical ambidexterity? If the former, then Ehud can hardly surprise Eglon with the use of his left hand if his right hand is non-functional. And

22. Throughout the history of the Jewish people, Amalek has always been regarded as the apogee of evil. Not only has Amalek functioned as the primary 'other', they have also become the archetype applied by rabbis and laymen alike projected onto other nations or groups (e.g. Adolf Hitler and Yassir Arafat) as a perceived threat to the existence of the Jewish people. Cromer (2001: 191-202) explores the sociological process of this second othering in Jewish history, which included external enemies (the gentile other), co-religionists (the Jewish other), and the evil within (the other self). In all cases, the objective remains the same—'to stigmatize existing foes by comparing them to the archenemy of the Jewish people'.

23. The apparent absence/silence of Yhwh creates a tension between characters/actions of the judge and Yhwh's involvement with no easy resolution. Two lines of interpretation basically emerge with one affirming that God, while not condoning Ehud's methods, uses human agency to accomplish deliverance (Klein 1988: 38). The other line argues the absence/silence as intended to allow for reader inference of Yhwh's part in the narrative plot (Webb 1987: 132; Amit 1989: 120). Though the discussion fundamentally reflects a difference in reading strategies, it also points out the importance of engaging a text's effects on its audience. As is, Yhwh's complicity in Ehud's violence

we would have to imagine the comical absurdity of physical deformity as an organizing principle for a Benjaminite force (Halpern 1988: 41) that musters 700 men who 'could sling a stone at a hair and not miss' (the same phrase 'their right hands restricted' occurs also in 20.16). In order for Ehud's plot to work, he must appear normal to the Moabites; and it explains how he can smuggle in his dagger.

The stock characterization (i.e. 'stupid' and 'clever/canny' character) central to this story's humour portrays Eglon as 'stupid' and Ehud as 'canny'. Ehud demonstrates planning, trickery, and cleverness (i.e. the 'word of (the) god(s)' pun) that easily manipulates Eglon who, unsuspecting the meaning to the pun, becomes the stupid foil to Ehud's brilliance. Sacrificial motifs contribute to the stock characterization as well.²⁴ The name 'Eglon' (*glwn*), which puns both 'calf' (*gl*) and 'round, rotund' (*gl*), together suggest Eglon as a 'young, fatted calf, bull'. In narrating the offered tribute to Eglon, vv. 17-18 utilize animal sacrifice terminology (*wyqrb 't hmnhh*, Amit 1999: 184 n. 19). Sacrificial overtones permeate this story where, ironically, the 'implicit etymologizing' of Eglon underscores this king as an unwitting sacrificial 'offering' (Alter 1981: 39). The depiction of the sacrificial knife and the partial disembowelment of this 'fatted calf' in graphic detail further reinforce the sacrificial motif.

Sexual imagery weaves an element of the erotic in with the motif of slaughter. The confluence of 'sex and slaughter' appears in non-Israelite epic contexts as well (see Vermeule 1979: 101-02, 157). Usage of the sexual metaphors 'to open' and 'locked' (cf. Song 5.2; 4.12) in a disproportionate space for opening and closing doors (vv. 23-25) develop the sexual motif of this story. Ehud's short, straight sword (v. 16) functions as a phallic symbol when we realize that the sword of that era had one curved side. Moreover, Ehud wore the sword on the thigh, the male erogenous zone and seat of male fertility (Gen. 46.26; Exod. 1.5; Niditch 2008: 58). Furthermore, the

and deception becomes justifiable in effecting justice. Violence 'in the service of the establishment of God's purposes' as a means to reverse the evil of oppression amounts to nothing more than violence responding to violence, which only cheapens a 'justice grounded in God's justice'. If this perspective espoused by McCann (2002: 45-46) reflects a suggested approach to talking about the theological and ethical implications posed by this text, then maybe it should not be talked about at all in church. Not distinguishing Yhwh from a 'means justifies the end' human philosophy results in a God co-opted in a colonization process, with all that that entails, that makes a mockery of justice and only dehumanizes.

24. Both Alter (1981) and Amit (1989) comment on the sacrificial overtones in Eglon's name within this story. Brettler (1995: 81-82) presses further to strengthen their observation with additional contextual evidence.

expression 'come to' (v. 20), in reference to Ehud's approach to Eglon, occurs elsewhere in Hebrew literature for sexual intercourse.²⁵ And finally, the story's formulaic ending departs from the norm with the inclusion of 'hand' (v. 30; cf. Judg. 8.28), a euphemism for the penis elsewhere. This sexual reading, not to be viewed simply as 'the product of post-Freudian sensibilities', has its echoes in an explicitly sexual medieval poem of Todros Abulafia that ends, 'Oh how I wish—may she come to me and the hilt will penetrate after the blade' (as quoted in Brettler 2002: 32).

Such sexual imagery constructs the metaphor of feminization. Just as the image of the fat closed around the blade is strongly vaginal, so is the term used for Ehud's ample belly the same as that for the womb. As Vermeule (1979: 101) discusses, war imagery in antiquity depicted the defeated soldier as one knocked down, raped, and made the conquered woman. The enemy is unmanned or feminized. In this instance, 'the person of power is caught or imagined "with his pants down"' (Niditch 2008: 58). The narrative function of depicting 'the grotesque feminization' (Alter 1981: 39) of Eglon and the domination of the Moabites in strikingly sexual terms serves the end-goal of an ethnic humour mocking the enemy 'other'.

If anything, scatology revels in the mocking humiliation of one's enemy. What would be more humorous to an oppressed group than that the royal figure of its oppressors be made to lie in his own excrement? King Eglon gets the shit kicked out of him, quite literally and figuratively, to put it in the vernacular. The story reduces its corpulent victim to a vast pile of manure reminiscent of John Dryden's satire of Tom Shadwell in 'MacFlecknoe' (ll. 98-103).

No Persian carpets spread the imperial way,
But scattered limbs of mangled poets lay;
From dusty shops neglected authors come,
Martyrs of pies, and relics of the bum.
Much Heywood, Shirley, Ogilby there lay,
But loads of Sh—almost choked the way.

Literature that makes use of the element of scatology as a part of its humour is known as 'toilet joke' or, more technically, 'comic dirt'.²⁶ Moreover, the presence of the animal imagery along with the sexual and scatological motifs with Eglon as their object of attack marks this story as satire (see Clark 1974: 43-58; Buchen 1975: 64-77; and Bloom and Bloom 1979: 218-21).

25. Alter assumes this expression as sexual, an insight shared by Brettler (1991: 294-95) whose criticism of Alter rests on his unsubstantiated observations because of an omission of stylistic criteria.

26. Note the scatological humour of early satirical works, e.g. Aristophanes' *The Clouds*, Horace's *Satire*, and Petronius's *Satyricon*.

Stupid and fat, the same characteristics defining Eglon extend to the Moabites. First, the clever exit strategy of Ehud (vv. 23-24) contrasts vividly with silly Moabite inaction. One wonders if these Moabite guards have much going for them when they think nothing amiss about their king going to the toilet with a messenger in attendance. They should have had some kind of clue. The point strengthens in this 'comic dirt' as the guards recognize the smell of feces but fail to comprehend; instead, they 'waste' time talking about the king's 'activity' to the point of embarrassment only to find their lord dead once they eventually open the doors (vv. 24-25). Halpern (1988: 29) puts it this way:

We may imagine them whiling away their time with quips on quotidian reality—inferior Israelites, cuisine at the court, the king's constipation. As moments mounted into embarrassing minutes, the delicate matter of disturbing their liege pressed ever more on their minds.

Like their rulers, these hapless courtiers reflect the 'stupid' stereotype for their credulity in this satirical humour.

Second, the joke's climax arrives with the mobilization of the Moabite army, also portrayed as 'fat' and stupid. The corpulence and fate of Eglon portends that of the Moabites; like king, like people. The stupidity of the Moabites attains to an even more ridiculous level as the story ends with the mighty Moabite army having been slain by the Israelites who had controlled access to the fords of the Jordan River (vv. 28-29). How stupid must an army be to suffer 100 percent fatalities in the battlefield? Such clear hyperbole marks the crescendo of the narrative re-presentation of stupid Moabites bested by superior Israelites described by Lowell Handy (1992: 241) as 'one dumb Moabite, two dumb Moabites, ten thousand dumb Moabites'.

This stock characterization of the Moabites and the Israelites consistently appears throughout the Hebrew Bible with Israelite perception of their neighbours as nothing but derogatory (see above).²⁷ Even the prophets have nothing kind to say about the Moabites (e.g. Isa. 15-16; Jer. 48;

27. Any positive relations between the Israelites and the Moabites are limited to David leaving his parents with the king of Moab for safekeeping (1 Sam. 22.3-4) and the story of Ruth. No consensus exists on the view of Ruth vis-à-vis Israelite-Moabite relations. While arguing the Moabites as the negative stereotype in the Hebrew Bible, Levenson (1985: 251) regards the presentation of Ruth, 'a paragon of good faith', as providing a new perspective on the group. By contrast, Fewell and Gunn (1988: 103, 105-106) contend that the ethnicity of Ruth becomes central to the story. Naomi is able to maneuver Ruth into situations fraught with danger for the Moabite while leaving herself relatively safe. Thus, Handy (1992: 239-40 n. 21) extends this observation into the pattern of the canny Israelites and manipulatable Moabites.

Ezek. 25.8-11; Amos 2.1-3; Zeph. 2.9). Consistently and clearly, biblical literature disparages the Moabites as contemptible and 'stupid'. Nevertheless, Barry Webb (1987: 130) attempts to salvage Moabite reputation when stating that 'the point is not that Eglon, his courtiers, and his troops were all blundering incompetents'. After all, his argument continues, the Moabites had ruled over Israel for 18 years. They must have done something right. Point taken. But we must also consider that the narrator attributes that 18 years of Moabite rule, to which Webb appeals, not to Moabite shrewdness but to Yhwh's strength. Even if the Moabites were not stupid, and I do not believe they were anymore than are any other ethnic group, then why characterize this particular ethnic group *only* as 'stupid' and in a manner consistent with that elsewhere in Hebrew literature? Handy's (1992: 242 n. 24) response to Webb that 'the point is that the whole cast of Moabites are blundering incompetents' at least begins to anticipate the ramifications of ethnic slurs within sacred literature.

Despite Marc Brettler's claim that this story 'was appreciated as humorous in antiquity' (1995: 85), such humour falls shy of pure entertainment with it ethnocentrism positioning the Moabites as the butt of its joke. By poking fun at Eglon and the Moabites, this story fits Northrop Frye's (1957: 224) classic definition of satire as 'wit or humor founded on fantasy or a sense of the grotesque or absurd [and]...an object of attack' though it may not technically classify in the satire genre (over against this story's characterization as satire by Alter 1981 and Webb 1987, see Kugel 1981). That this satire has as its object a royal figure of another nation at once makes it political and nationalist. In addition, ethnic markers linked with stock stereotypes differentiating the 'in-group' from the 'out-group' with the 'in-group' asserting its political authority contra competing claims by the 'other' imbue this satire with a definite colonialist dimension.²⁸ Positive and negative modes of national feeling—namely the celebration of characteristics of one's nation and the mockery of those of others—bear a cyclical connection: mockery intensifies celebration; celebration motivates mockery. The literary contextual placement of the satirist's nation among other nations reinforces an exalted sense of nationhood in a social-historical setting while validating its identity by re-presenting distorted images of the other, satirized nation. The *real* Moabites by writer and reader alike were the enemies of 'Israel'.

28. The descriptor 'in-group' indicates the spatial demarcation between those 'inside' from those 'outside'. 'Inside', or the 'in-group', can be a family, village, nation, or any kind of group, most notably an ethnic group. And the boundaries constituting the 'in-group' are flexible and may enlarge or shrink relative to the location of the 'other' (Befu 1999: 22).

Before leaving too quickly to explore the sociological functions for depicting Moab alone as the 'stupid' ethnic group of 'Israel's' neighbours, ideological perspectives on nationalistic satire deserve our serious consideration for the invaluable insight they shed on the construction of the 'other' within a colonization context. Though nationalistic satire certainly stresses a distinction of the writer's own country from others through stereotyping re-presentations, it does so by different means than typical satire. Sometimes, simple satiric nationalism enables a nation to look critically at itself in the guise of another. For example, Jonathan Swift's ostensible attack on the Dutch in Book III of *Gulliver's Travels* simultaneously attacks English merchant activity. How does this work? To begin, guilt is never admitted but rather projected onto the enemy. The goal of satiric nationalism is to 'see the satirist's own country as if it, in turn, were the Other' (Knight 2004: 52). Satiric nationalism attacks its country's values by projecting them onto another country and pretending to attack foreign values. According to Knight (2004: 63), 'the presence of national stereotypes is the manifestation of national shortcomings'. To extrapolate these insights onto the ethnic satire under discussion, we must look beyond the surface-level re-presentation of 'canny' 'Israel' and 'stupid' Moab. The stupidity attacked is not that of Moab but rather that of 'Israel'. Honestly, one must wonder how shrewd and canny a group of people can be who keep acting in a manner that results in their own political subjugation? Sounds a little—well—stupid. Stupid is as stupid does. Moreover, the ideological association of 'Israel' with peculiarity, inferiority, and darkness via their iconic hero contributes to their necessary decolonization despite their attempts at colonization while demeaning the 'other'. And what sociological functions might such literature serve that ostensibly depicts Moab alone as the 'stupid', ethnic group? To this question, we now turn our attention.

Excursus: Sociological Functions of Ethnic Humour

Before exploring potential sociological functions for such ethnic humour, let me readily acknowledge that no one potential function can or should account for the diversity existing within the relationship dynamic where ethnic humour occurs.²⁹ While the diverse research on ethnic humour

29. Mahadev Apte (1985: 145) offers detailed comments on the problematic of functional theories, which I will only summarize here. For further consideration of psychological perspectives on humour, see Goldstein and McGhee 1972, and the bibliographic work of Roeckelein 2002.

(1) Psychological functional theories rely on unconscious motivation with little, supportable, empirical research.

within the social sciences has its own distinct foci,³⁰ functional theories of ethnic humour are, admittedly, merely hypotheses that cannot be tested. The immeasurable effectiveness of such humour poses 'a significant drawback especially to psychological explanations', remarks Apte (1985: 62), 'none of which has been validated by systematic experimentation', nor can be I would add. Nonetheless, some of the conclusions drawn from research on ethnic humour within certain social contexts vis-à-vis the canny/stupid stereotype are germane for understanding the potential sociological function(s) of the ethnic humour of Judges 3.

Ethnic jokes, especially those of the canny/stupid type, enjoy enormous popularity in most western countries. Christie Davies' cross-cultural research notes the integral role language plays in determining the jokers from the butts of the jokes and defining their relationship to one another. The joke-tellers are almost always a culturally and linguistically *dominant* group in contrast to a 'transitional people' (i.e. those with an uncertain and fuzzy linguistic and/or national identity) whose errors in usage of the joke-teller's language marks their identity as the butt of the jokes. For example, an error in understanding results in the apparent miscommunication between Ehud and Eglon. The pun concerning 'the word of (the) god(s)' has success because Eglon construes the expression differently than intended by Ehud. The joke-tellers regard the speech of the groups who are the butts of their jokes as a distorted version of their own. Nonetheless, the mocked group

(2) Different psychological functions of ethnic humour are associated with different types of ethnic groups.

(3) A particular ethnic joke may serve several functions.

(4) Psychological and sociological functions of ethnic humour relevant to a particular ethnic group may change over a period of time if its social position vis-à-vis other ethnic groups changes.

(5) Psychological and sociological functions are presented with the assumption that ethnic groups are homogeneous.

(6) Groups are reified and treated as concrete wholes rather than as abstractions in the discussion of functions of ethnic humour.

(7) People who propose many theories of ethnic humour often ignore the fact that humour in general serves the purpose of entertainment and pleasure, not necessarily making individuals aggressive and hostile.

30. Psychologists, for instance, are interested in developing theoretical models that motivate individuals to engage in ethnic humour or the variables that determine their differential responses to it. Sociologists, anthropologists, and folklorists are concerned with textual analyses and with typologies of themes extracted from ethnic jokes (see e.g. Hertzler 1970). Apte (1985: 34, 62, 109) notes that while research has placed much emphasis on the relational aspect of the joking relationship, more attention needs to be given to the phenomenon of joking itself.

is not alien to the joke-tellers; rather, they are a part of the same linguistic and cultural family, albeit on the periphery.³¹ The close linguistic relation between 'Israel' and Moab perhaps contributes to the strong demarcation in this narrative between 'us' and 'them' (Niditch 2008: 57). Rarely are ethnic jokes about stupidity told about groups totally different or alien to the joke-tellers.

In addition, stereotypic traits like 'stupid', 'lazy', and 'dirty' that evoke negative reactions tend to be assigned to the group ridiculed or mocked. Theorists debate whether stereotypes rationalize selfish behaviour and hostility felt by individuals toward a group, verbally express prejudice, or serve to rationalize or project prejudice. Reality, however, most likely bears out the validity of each effect of stereotypes dependent upon the contexts wherein the relationship dynamic of ethnic humour plays itself out. Nevertheless, stereotypes like 'stupid' are crucial to ethnic humour, which requires ready-made and popular conceptualizations of the target group regardless of their veracity, and, as a result, do foster prejudice and negative attitudes (Apte 1985: 113-14, 127-32). Witness, for instance, jokes in modern western cultures about the Belgians in France or the Netherlands, the Irish in Britain, and the Polish, Italian, Puerto Ricans, and Mexicans in the US. Similarly, Moab, a close neighbour with linguistic and cultural relations though on the Palestinian periphery, becomes the 'stupid' people in Israelite perception. 'They' get depicted as a 'stupid' likeness of 'us', a distorted version of the joke-teller's own self-image (Davies 1987: 39-42; 1990: 44).

One potential function of this ethnic joke about 'stupid' Moabites is the establishment of boundaries. According to Davies (1982: 384), all ethnic groups have two important sets of boundaries.

The first are the social and geographical boundaries of the group that define who is a member and who is not. The second are the moral boundaries of the group which define what is acceptable and characteristic behaviour of the members, and what is unacceptable behaviour characteristic of outsiders.

Ethnic jokes about stupidity define the social boundaries where values conflict by isolating groups perceived as failures (from mere joke to total paranoia, such humour can result in the extreme persecution of an ethnic

31. Davies provides a descriptive categorization of relationships between the canny and stupid regarding the language and ethnic jokes about stupidity (see the tables in 1987: 40-41 and 1990: 42). Cultural dominance by the in-group at the center establishes the group that is the local butt of jokes about stupidity as deviations from the cultural pattern. Even if an ethnic group on the periphery should secede or form a separate state, the established pattern of cultural dominance would still maintain (Davies 1990: 44). Nonetheless, language marks the dividing line between 'them' and 'us'.

minority; Davies 1990: 390, 401 n. 22). Gerald Cromer (2001: 191) points out, 'The other is always the medium by which a society demarcates its own cultural space and boundaries'. By telling such jokes about stupidity, the in-group reassures its members that such a path is reserved for 'them', the *other* people living on the periphery, and not for 'us' (Davies 1990: 386-87).

A second function of ethnic humour is that of superiority. Any group may use ethnic humour as a means to malign, downgrade, and ridicule other groups thereby gaining ascendancy or advantage over them in its own eyes. After analyzing the function of satire in both East and West, Leon Feinberg noted its importance in making the satirist's audience feel superior to those satirized. 'For many people this feeling of superiority, illusory though it may be, offers one of the few sources of delight they are likely to experience. Humor...is often unkind, but by providing a release from psychic tensions it serves a useful purpose' (Feinberg 1972: 60). Ethnic humour provides both a form of entertainment for the group celebrated and an outlet to express their feelings of superiority. William Martineau (1972: 118-119) similarly suggested that ethnic humour 'increase(s) the morale and solidify(ies) the ingroup [and]...introduce(s) or foster(s) a hostile disposition toward that outgroup'.³² In the same vein, Apte (1985: 142) notes the effects on a group's self-image as a result of treating or thinking of other cultures and peoples as inferior: 'Prejudice reinforces ethnocentrism, just as negation of the cultural values of other peoples nurtures self-esteem and feelings of superiority'.

Such a portrayal may reflect what Julia Kristeva (1991: 20) refers to as 'the hidden face of our identity' in a process of demonizing the other,³³ which, according to Harumi Befu (1999: 26), demonstrates 'human infallibility...and the inability to be morally strong and to deal honestly with one's own weaknesses'. An unwillingness to acknowledge unacceptable traits among the joke-teller's own ethnic group enables the tellers to project such traits that they wish to remain on the moral periphery of their culture onto groups who inhabit the social or geographical periphery of their culture. At best, this process of demonizing the 'other' provides us with excellent

32. In fairness to Martineau's research, his conclusions concern that type of humour in a relationship where humour for the oppressed 'becomes a compensatory device making the fear and tragedy of the moment seem only temporary' (1972: 104). For instance, jokes shared by the Czechs (in-group) sustained group cohesion and helped coalesce resistance to the Nazis (out-group) in order to gain some reprieve from their victimization (see Obrdlik 1942).

33. Cross-cultural analyses reveal that the process of demonizing humans preys on ethnocentrism whereby to transfer any moral weaknesses, to ascribe evil and immoral attributes, to reduce to subhuman or nonhuman status, and to punish or destroy the victim with moral justification (Befu 1999: 26).

indices of the nature of the group laughing. But what happens when this process of demonizing the 'other' via ethnic humour gets encoded in literature and appropriated by a group believing its colonialist agenda to be divinely sanctioned? Colonization perpetua.

Tejas De-colonized

As early as 1800, Tejas (Texas) was one of several provinces within the Provincias Internas (Interior Provinces) of New Spain. When the Provincias Internas was divided geographically along east-west lines in 1813, Tejas, along with its sister provinces Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Nuevo Santander (now Tamaulipas), became a province in the Provincias Internas de Oriente (Eastern Interior Provinces). The Tejas province had its own governor at San Antonio de Béxar with prominent mission forts at Béxar, La Bahía (Goliad), and Nacogdoches, which was virtually nonexistent as a viable community by 1821. Within a year after Mexican independence from Spanish imperial control in 1821, Tejas's population in the Republic of Mexico numbered no more than 2,516 in 1822, down from the recorded 3,103 of the 1777 census (Sons of Dewitt Colony 1997-2003, 'Nueva España').³⁴ The ethnically diverse population of Tejas principally comprised *gachupines* (European Spaniards), *criollos* (American-born Spaniards), *mestiza/os* (mixed Spanish and Indian blood), Indians, Mexicans (first offspring of the *mestiza/os*), *tejana/os* (native Texans of Mexican descent), African slaves, and Anglo-Americans. For much of its history in the nineteenth century, Tejas became a border zone ensconced in political conflict over land-claims between the US and New Spain, first, and the US and the Republic of Mexico, later.

Colonization and Tejas

That a nation existed in the Spanish borderlands of Tejas mattered little to the Jeffersonian administration (i.e. Presidents Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe). The Jeffersonian administration actively supported covert operations and filibustering expeditions that increased illegal Anglo immigration in Tejas, encouraged colonists' disaffection with Spanish rule, and promoted territorial expansion while perpetuating racially superior attitudes. American filibusters (armed intrusions by US adventurers into countries of

34. Governor Don Antonio Martínez's estimation likely applies to the Hispanic population placed at about 2,500 by Andrés Tijerina (1994: 12, 20). That population estimate breaks down to about 1,330 in Béxar, 570 in Goliad, and 576 in Nacogdoches, with perhaps another 500 for Victoria and other isolated settlements.

peace) became a practical means for Anglos to exploit their perceptions of superiority over Mexicans. As early as 1804,³⁵ President Jefferson's designs on Tejas became transparent when he secured congressional appropriation in the amount of US\$5,000 in 1805 for the 'grand excursion' to the Southwest known as the Red River expedition, second in importance only to that of Lewis and Clark. General James Wilkinson, seeking personal gain, sought to provoke an international confrontation between the US and New Spain by leaking American designs on the Red River to Spanish officials. Though a Spanish army did turn the expedition back at Spanish Bluff in 1806, Wilkinson's plan did not achieve the desired result. Moreover, the Red River expedition became a point of political embarrassment for the Jefferson administration (Flores 2001).

The Hidalgo Revolution (1810) in New Spain, which began the first phase of Mexican independence, presented an opportunity for the US to strengthen its claim on Tejas. And the State Department under President Madison made US claims on Tejas most tangible by unofficially providing financial and military assistance to the Gutiérrez-Magee expedition (1812-13). José Bernardo Maximiliano Gutiérrez de Lara was a commissioned lieutenant colonel in the Mexican revolutionary forces sent as Hidalgo's emissary to the US. Then US Secretary of State James Monroe proffered American support of the Mexican Revolution against Spain in exchange for the land cession of Tejas. Although Gutiérrez did not comply, Monroe nonetheless dispensed money, leaders, and arms into Tejas with the hope of breaking the Spanish hold on the area and expanding the western boundary of the US to the Rio Grande River. The insurrectionist movement of the Gutiérrez-Magee expedition employed both American and Mexican recruits. Though initially successful with the capture of Nacogdoches and San Antonio, the expedition ultimately failed (see thorough discussion of details surrounding this incident in Owsley 1997: 42-59).

Political claims of control over the province of Tejas accelerated with the Adams-Onís treaty of 1819 (ratified in 1821). John Quincy Adams, then Secretary of State under US President James Monroe, negotiated the treaty with the Spanish foreign minister Luis de Onís. According to the terms of the treaty, the US paid \$5 million for the territorial rights of Florida and

35. Jefferson's connections with Tejas extend back as early as 1800. Jefferson was to meet with Philip Nolan, who had illegally engaged in three mustang wrangling expeditions in Tejas, about Tejas and its wild horses. Prior to his 4th expedition, Nolan was shot in the head when the frontier had been alerted to his party's 'hostile intentions' (Jackson 2001a and 2001b).

relinquished its claims to parts of Tejas west of the Sabine River and other Spanish areas. Those claims, by the way, were always assumed for the US had felt that the land acquisition of the Louisiana Purchase (1803) extended all the way to the Rio Grande River and the Rocky mountains, thus encompassing much of New Spain's provinces of Tejas and Nuevo Mexico. Though the treaty determined the Sabine River as the western boundary of the US, the Boundary Commission of the Republic of Mexico still needed to define its boundaries. And this purpose in part became the ostensible *raison d'être* of the inspection tour of Tejas in 1828-1829 by General Manuel de Mier y Terán.³⁶ The 'cession' of Tejas to Spain did not set well with many Anglo Americans. In fact, this 'cession' became the occasion for the last major filibustering expedition into Tejas led by Dr Colonel James Long. With financial backing from his wife's uncle, General James Wilkinson, Long raised arms and followers in an effort to connect with Mexican insurgents and establish a Republic of Tejas. Long successfully established a government at Nacogdoches on 23 June 1819, but his intentions of establishing a Republic never materialized with his capture in 1821 after Mexican independence (Sons of Dewitt Colony 1997-2003, 'Nueva España').

Prior to Mexican independence, the Eastern Interior Province entertained contracts for *empresarios* (immigration or colonization agents) who would colonize Tejas. Moses Austin would become the first legal Anglo immigrant to Tejas. Motivated by depression, personal financial loss, and increasingly difficult land policies in Virginia, Arkansas, and Missouri (Austin's legal state of residence), Austin made application 26 December 1820 and was granted his permit 17 January 1821 by Governor Martínez (see Barker 1924: 370; and Martínez 1821). Unfortunately, Moses' untimely death from pneumonia on 10 June kept him from realizing his vision. His son, Stephen F. Austin, continued his father's mission and eventually settled 300 families in Texas. As part of the land grant permission to colonize in Mexican territory, petitioners had to sign an agreement indicating their loyalty to the Republic of Mexico and to the Roman Catholic Church. Through several colonization laws (Imperial Colonization Law of 1823; National Colonization Law of 1824; and the Law of 1830), the Republic of Mexico over time sought to secure Tejas as a buffer zone from US expansion

36. The East Texas Fredonian Rebellion by Hayden Edwards in 1826-27 also prompted Terán's mission into Tejas where he was to 'assess the needs for occupation and defense, the possibility of balancing the rapid settlement by immigrants from the US of the North with European immigrants, and the status of the native Indian population' (Sons of DeWitt 1997-2003, 'Assignment to the Provincias Internas'; for further discussion of the rebellion, see also Morton 1948: 45-47).

and to develop Tejas economically, culturally, and politically through legal and controlled immigration.³⁷

Anglo colonization of the Tejas province in the US of Mexico³⁸ assumed a 'natural right' to the land. Unfortunately, US national history has repressed this fact of Anglo colonization (much of it illegal) of Mexican territory along with its concomitant conquest-settlement ideology and ethno-typing strategies that present polarizing debates over Mexican immigration in Southwest America simply occlude with red herrings like the fear of lost jobs and demographic trends.³⁹ In a letter to the minister of War and Navy dated 14 November 1829, General Terán spoke to the assumed rights of *los norteamericanos* who, like the New England colonists before them, operated 'with their constitution in their pocket, demanding their rights and the authorities and functionaries that [their constitution] provides' (30 June 1828 letter; as quoted in Jackson 2000: 100).

The department of Texas is contiguous to the most avid nation in the world. The North Americans have conquered whatever territory adjoins them. In less than a half a century, they have become masters of extensive colonies which formerly belonged to Spain and France, and of even more spacious territories from which have disappeared the former owners, the Indian tribes. There is no power like that to the north, which by silent means has made conquests of momentous importance...

37. Each law was noted for its own particularities. The Imperial Colonization Law of 1823 stipulated land measurements (e.g. labores = 177 acres; a league or sitio = 4,428 acres; and haciendas = 5 leagues each), tithe and tax payments, and slave regulations (e.g. prohibited slave trading; children born to slaves in Mexican territory were freed at age 14). The National Colonization Law of 1824 denied land grants within 20 leagues of an international boundary and/or within 10 leagues of the coast (see Barker 2001). The Law of 1830 with its noted 11th article forbade further immigration from nations bordering the Republic and suspended all incomplete contracts (for a thorough discussion of the controversies surrounding this law and its interpretation, see Morton 1948: 95-136).

38. Gonzalez (2000: 39) notes how eerily similar the US of Mexico was to the US in territory and population prior to the annexations of Mexican territory between 1836 and 1853. 'In 1824, Mexico comprised 1.7 million square miles and contained 6 million people, while the US stretched for 1.8 million square miles and had 9.6 million people'.

39. If current demographic trends persist, Euro-Americans will cease to be the majority by 2050 (De La Torre 2005: 8). Recent estimates by the US Census Bureau (2004; 2005) reveal Texas, Hawaii, New Mexico, the District of Columbia, and California as 'majority-minority' states where the non-white population has exceeded 50 percent of the states' total population. Of course, these population projections do not take into consideration an estimated total of 11.5 to 12 million undocumented Mexicans comprising only 3-4 percent of the national population as of March 2006 (Passel 2006).

Instead of armies, battles, or invasions—which make a great noise and for the most part are unsuccessful—these men lay hand on means that, if considered one by one, would be rejected as slow, ineffective, and at times palpably absurd. They begin by assuming rights, as in Texas, which it is impossible to sustain in a serious discussion, making ridiculous pretensions based on historical incidents which no one admits... (as quoted in Morton 1948: 99-100).

Moreover, Terán attests to the colonists' fomenting disaffection about 'the efficiency of the existing authority and administration', adventurers with ulterior motives claiming 'that their location has no bearing upon the question of their government's claim or the boundary disputes' (Morton 1948: 100), and the continual influx of illegal Anglo immigrants (30 June 1828 letter in Jackson 2000: 98).

The illegal immigration of arrogant, aggressive Anglos across Tejas's borders signaled a threat looming large on the horizon (i.e. US territorial expansion westward in the 1800s—Florida and the Southeast by 1820; Texas, California and the Southwest by 1855; and Central America and the Caribbean by 1898).⁴⁰ Talk on the Mexican frontier in 1829 centred on the armed invasion of American troops on the border with the prevailing idea that President Andrew Jackson had designs on Tejas. When Jackson assumed office (1829), he authorized an attempted negotiation by Joel R. Poinsett, US Minister to Mexico, to offer US\$5 million for whatever parts of Tejas Mexico would willingly give up.⁴¹ In August of that same year the pro-Jackson press had launched a widespread propaganda in the US that urged and foretold the acquisition of Tejas (Barker 1980: 298).

40. American conquest of the Mexican North can also be explained as Mexico's failure to tie her frontier to the rest of the nation in contrast to that of the smug perceptions of contemporary Anglo-Americans regarding Mexicans as naturally inferior. In the years following Mexican independence from Spain, the frontier experienced weakening ties to Mexico of an economic (failure to integrate the frontier into Mexico's economic system), military (failure to shore up frontier defense and carry out an effective Indian policy), cultural and religious (failure to maintain a vibrant church) nature. American economic colonialism provided the stimulus to economic growth in northern Mexico thus pulling it into the American commercial orbit and supplanting the old, Spanish colonial structure after 1821 (see fuller discussion in Weber 1988a: 107-12).

41. Before Poinsett could present the proposal, however, Jackson recalled Poinsett in July 1829 at the Mexican president's request because of his overt political interference. Jackson's attempt at purchasing Tejas was not the first nor would it be the last with other futile attempts occurring until the time of the revolution. In 1825 US Secretary of State Henry Clay and President John Quincy Adams persuaded Poinsett to attempt to purchase Tejas. Mexico rejected outright every proposal to purchase Tejas, which it never put up for sale (De León 1983: 4).

The Republic of Mexico's Secretary of State Lucas Alamán, however, recognized a more insidious threat posed by the *norteamericanos* that went beyond mere land purchasing: 'Where others send invading armies...[the North Americans] send their colonists' (as quoted in Weber 1982: 158).⁴² As far back as the 1790s, Anglo settlers were illegally immigrating into now East Texas and had, by 1829, outnumbered the Mexicans. In 1828 General Terán's diarist José María Sánchez y Tapia (1926: 260) noted about the Anglo population on their Tejas mission: 'the Americans from the north have taken possession of practically all of the eastern part of Tejas, in most cases without the permission of the authorities'.⁴³ Terán estimated the population of Tejas at '25 thousand savages, eight thousand North Americans with their slaves, and four to five thousand Mexicans' (28 March 1828 letter; as quoted in Jackson 2000: 29).⁴⁴ The ramifications of these illegal Anglo immigrants flooding across the Tejas borders posed grave concerns, namely land 'squatting', commented on by Terán: they 'settle where it suits them, and they take over whatever land they desire without the *alcalde*'s

42. This observation along with Terán's 14 November 1829 letter concerning the North Americans' conquest activities within a half century no doubt became the *raison d'être* for Alamán's clarion call in 1830, 'Texas will be lost for this Republic if adequate measures to save it are not taken' (as quoted in Weber 1982: 170). Terán sounded the same call in numerous of his letters (e.g. 28 March 1828; 24 July 1829; and 14 November 1829 in Jackson 2000: 32; Morton 1948: 81-82; and Howren 1913: 400-402, respectively) with his last correspondence to Secretary Alamán repeatedly (4x) querying, '¿En qué parará Tejas? En lo que Dios quiera' (2 July 1832 letter; as quoted in Morton 1948: 182-83), that is 'What will become of Texas? Whatever God wills' (I am thankful to my colleague Edna Rodríguez-Plate for the translation assistance.).

43. Many emigrated to Tejas for numerous reasons not least of which were cheap land and easy terms of payment, better climate, dissatisfaction over the 'cession' of Tejas to New Spain with the Adams-Onís treaty (1819), and a fresh start for debtors, drifters and fugitives (Weber 1982: 166). The illegal Anglo immigration into now East Texas especially contributed to the population spike in Nacogdoches. James Dill (1822), *alcalde* (a city official, much like a mayor, but with executive, legislative and judicial powers to hold court) and commandant of Nacogdoches, informed Governor Martínez of 'a number of people...settling between this place and the river Sabean on the Ilish bayou...without any kind of leave or purmission'. Other now East Tejas communities settled by illegal immigrants included Sabine, Atascasito, Ais, and Champs d'Asile (near Liberty, TX; Sons of DeWitt 1997-2003, 'Nueva España').

44. Terán's estimate of the Hispanic population of Tejas in 1828, claims Jackson (2000: 206 n. 47), 'was too high'. This would certainly square with conservative estimates placing the population ratio of *norteamericanos* to Mexicans at 6:1. At San Felipe de Austin, Stephen F. Austin's colony, the Anglos outnumbered the Mexicans 200 to 10, a 20:1 ratio (Sánchez 1926: 273-74, 281). Terán noted the ratio of foreigners to Mexicans in Nacogdoches at 10:1 (30 June 1828 letter; as quoted in Jackson 2000: 97).

approval and in defiance of the laws of colonization and of the rights of prior ownership...They rely on their numbers so that eventually they might be recognized as owners of the land they occupy' (7 July 1828 letter; as quoted in Jackson 2000: 104-105). In addition, the Anglo immigrants refused to integrate within Mexican culture, kept to their own religious and political beliefs, insisted on the right to own slaves, and clamoured for Mexican recognition of their ideas about self-government.

Unsurprisingly, colonist antipathy toward Mexicans accompanied the immigration of Anglo Americans into Tejas. After all, the dehumanization of an ethnic group with ethnic slurs like, for example, stereotypes, goes hand-in-hand with colonization efforts. This antipathy, rooted in the Anglo immigrants' colonial forebears' antipathy toward Catholic Spain,⁴⁵ was firmly entrenched within the Euro-American conscience such that the Anglo immigrants in the nineteenth-century Mexican borderlands simply transferred stereotypes of the Spaniards to their North American heirs, the Mexicans (Powell 1971: 118). The dual motifs of civilization and Christianity underlying Anglo stereotypes of and actions toward Native Americans motivated racial attitudes toward Mexicans in the borderlands. Everything beastly—sexuality, vice, nature, and coloured peoples—needed control to maintain order and discipline. The Anglo colonists, cultural heirs to the Elizabethans and Puritans, assumed Mexicans to be an uncivilized lot upon whom Christian order needed to be imposed; otherwise, chaos would reign (De León 1983: 1-2). But what just civilization resorts to justifying ugly manifestations of racism (i.e. violence, subordination, and appropriation of lands) in an effort to bring order to non-civilization?

The Anglo colonists' haughty and racist attitudes emblemized by efforts to 'whiten' Texas certainly did not go unnoticed by Terán: 'It would cause you the same chagrin that it has caused me to see the opinion that is held of our nation by these foreign colonists, since...they know no other Mexicans

45. This anti-Spanish view of New England colonists surfaces in a seventeenth-century missionary tract by Cotton Mather enjoining Spaniards in the New World 'to open their eyes and be converted...away from Satan to God' (as quoted in Weber 1973: 59). The anti-Spanish views of the English colonists (e.g. the Spanish government as authoritarian and corrupt; and Spaniards as bigoted, cruel, greedy and lazy) prompted the Spanish historians' pejorative label 'The Black Legend' with some of its roots 'in the New World where Spanish conquistadors have been viewed as the apotheosis of evil' (Weber 1988b: 159-160). The Black Legend certainly ingrained antipathy of the Mexicans and fueled racist attitudes of Anglo-American superiority. Colour, which symbolized the essence of good and evil, became a basic determinant in Anglo associations of Mexicans with Indians and Africans and connotations of both ethnic groups as dirty (De León 1983: 14-23).

than the inhabitants about here...the most ignorant of negroes and Indians' (as quoted in Weber 1973: 102). On the basis of a few Mexicans living in now East Texas who comprised the 'abject class, the poorest and most ignorant', the colonists stereotyped *all* Mexicans as 'nothing more than blacks and Indians, all of them ignorant' with little to teach or offer them (as quoted in Jackson 2000: 97-98). By and large, Anglo-Americans viewed Mexicans as ignorant, lazy, bigoted, thieving, sinister, cheating, incapable of self-government and cowardly half-breeds.⁴⁶ Noah Smithwick, who settled in Tejas in 1827, commented that 'I looked on the Mexicans as scarce more than apes' (as quoted in Weber 1988b: 154). Even Stephen F. Austin, perhaps the most known of all Tejas colonists and close friend of Terán, remarked upon his 1822-23 visit to Mexico City: 'To be candid the majority of the people of the whole nation as far as I have seen them want nothing but tails to be more brutes than the apes' (as quoted in Weber 1988b: 157). In a later correspondence, Austin (Barker 1924: 2.414, 427, 678) indicated: 'My object, the sole and only desire of my ambitions since I first saw Texas, was to...settle it with an intelligent honorable and enterprising [*sic*] people'. Anglo perceptions of its own unacceptable inner strivings latent in stereotypes of Mexicans provide the fodder projected onto 'them'. The ethnic group stereotyped becomes the alter ego ('them') to 'us', Mexican to Anglo-American.

Observations by both Terán (30 June 1828 letter; in Jackson 2000: 96-101) and his traveling companion Sánchez reveal some remarkable insights into the nature of these foreign immigrants and bear out the point of ethno-typing projections. Terán acknowledges the Anglo immigrants as the ethnic majority within Nacogdoches and was indignant at the large number living in the region without authorization from the government or titles to the lands they occupied. Some were even living near the boundary zone forbidden by the National Colonization Law of 1824. Terán identified the settlers as basically of two classes: (1) fugitives from the neighbouring republic and

46. To be even more specific, the negative stereotypes cut along gender lines. The contempt for Mexicans held by Anglos did not extend to the ladies (De León 1983: 39). Mexican women enjoyed a more positive image among Anglo men who regarded them as more industrious, courteous, generous, warm-hearted, and superior to their male counterparts. In forming this positive stereotype, Weber (1988b: 155) comments, 'American males allowed their hormones to overcome their ethnocentrism'. Despite the perception of Mexicans as defective in morality and libidinous in nature, Anglos offered up a rationalization to excuse their tabooed sexual intercourse with 'mongrels'. The Mexicanas, who lusted for the Anglo men and lured them across the racial line, were the cause of fornication. 'If Mexican women craved their intimacy, it was inevitable that they should yield to the urges of nature' (De León 1983: 43-44).

(2) poor labourers. Many of the former were thieves and scoundrels though some had reformed to spend their lives working on the land. By contrast, the poor labourers, those of Austin's colony, simply wanted to own land. They were 'generally industrious and honorable'. Sánchez (1926: 270-71), however, did not share this opinion of the settlers' work ethic. He regarded them as lazy relying on their slaves to do the work. Moreover, some of the settlers treated their slaves harshly. Terán speaks of such barbarities (e.g. pulling teeth, setting dogs to attack) where even the gentlest of slave-owners would whip a slave until he was flayed. Many of the colonists were given to rebellion and troublemaking. These foreigners knew they were feared and distrusted, and were 'afraid of being seized unawares and thrown off their land' (28 March 1828 letter; as quoted in Jackson 2000: 37). Agitation between the Mexican locals and the foreigners was predominant, especially if either group perceived an advantage of the other to its disadvantage. The locals complained about the better education of the foreigners while the foreigners complained about the locals' discrimination against them (e.g. deprived voting rights and civic government service). Ignorant, lazy, thieving, sinister, disrespectful—traits applied to define the Mexican ethnicity in the nineteenth century tell us equally as much about the foreigners as does descriptions of Mexicans to the contrary.

The Americanization of the Mexican North increased antipathy even between Mexicans on the frontier—the *californios*, *nuevomexicanos*, and *tejanos*—and those of the interior. Sánchez observed of the Mexicans in Nacogdoches in 1828 that, on account of their continued trade with *los norteamericanos*, they had adopted their customs and habits. 'One may truly say that they are not Mexicans except by birth, for they even speak Spanish with marked incorrectness' (1926: 282-83). And the Anglo population spike in Tejas from about 2,500 in 1821 to over 40,000 in 1836 only intensified colonists' attitudes of superiority with stereotypes of Mexicans as stupid and lazy being perpetuated and finally hardened by the US–Mexico War in 1846 (Weber 1982: 177, and 1973: 52). Noted proponents of Manifest Destiny regarded Latin Americans (both Spanish and Mexican, but especially the latter) throughout the nineteenth century as inferior in cultural makeup and fed the national outcry for more Mexican land with the annexation of Texas accomplished in 1846-47.⁴⁷ Though we never hear the words 'Manifest Destiny' any more, the arrogant cultural and political superiority among Anglo colonists of the nineteenth century still exists with the underlying

47. US Senator John Randolph (1825-27) argued that Latin Americans were not equal to Anglo-Americans. Even US newspapers indicated that Mexico deserved to be conquered (Brack 1970: 161-174).

stereotype of the inferior Mexican, stupid and lazy. The stereotype justifies modern 'efforts to "Americanize" Mexicans in the southwestern United States' and has also helped 'rationalize their [Anglo Americans] exploitation and mistreatment of Mexican and Mexican American workers in the fields and factories of the border region' in modern Southwest America (Weber 1988b: 166).

Colonization and Modern Southwest America

In the second half of the nineteenth century, traders, merchants, adventurers and mercenaries preceded settlers along the Rio Grande Valley. Within 6 years of Texas independence (1836), 13 Anglos had amassed 1.3 million acres in 'legal' sales from 358 Mexican landowners (Gonzalez 2000: 99-101).⁴⁸ The signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo (2 February 1848) left 100,000 Mexican citizens on this side of the border only to have their land swindled from them. Anglos stripped Mexicans, and Indians, of their land with their feet still rooted in it. Violence against Mexicans was commonplace with whole communities being uprooted in the towns of Austin, Seguin, and Uvalde. Uprooted, separated from their identity and history, many Mexicans went to Mexico and some protested seeking legal redress. When the courts ignored their pleas, they were left with only one other recourse, armed retaliation. In one particular incident after Mexican-American resisters robbed a train in Brownsville, Texas on 18 October 1915, 'Anglo vigilante groups began lynching Chicanos. Texas Rangers would take them into the brush and shoot them. One hundred Chicanos were killed in a matter of months, whole families lynched' (Anzaldúa 2007: 30).

By the 1920s, Mexicans comprised more than 90 percent of the population in the Rio Grande Valley even though the white minority controlled the land and all the political power. To add insult to injury, Anglo agribusiness corporations exploited Mexican labour in south Texas on lands swindled from them in order to eradicate dry-land farming. But the exploitation of Mexicans did not stop at the US border; it crossed the borders where the partnership of the Mexican government and wealthy growers with American corporations like American Motors, IT&T, and DuPont who own *maquiladores* (factories)

48. Mifflin Kenedy and Richard King, partners in a steamboat cartel, were among those whose control of the herds and the original Spanish land grants in the Rio Grande region yielded vast fortunes, e.g. the Kenedy ranch (*La Para*) spread out over 325,000 acres and the well-known King ranch spread out over 500,000 acres at the time of his death in 1885. Even when Congress declared some of the conquered peoples as US citizens, they enjoyed no legal redress concerning property seizures because the English-speaking courts installed by the settlers upheld such acts (Gonzalez 2000: 30).

has changed Mexican culture.⁴⁹ The *maquiladores* rank second behind oil in the greatest source of US dollars in the Mexican economy. One-fourth of all Mexicans work at *maquiladores* with most being young women. And while they are at work, the children fend for themselves. Many roam the streets and become part of *cholo* gangs. The *peso* has dropped in value, the unemployment rate is about 50 percent; the wage-earning disparity for a job in the US compared to the same in Mexico is at an 8:1 ratio—all indicators of Mexican dependency on the US. And these factors do not even touch on the environmental affects of the *maquiladores* operating well below EPA standards polluting the land and water. Their waste pollution has resulted in numerous documented cases of birth defects among indigent families living in hovels on either side of the border of the Rio Grande River. Anzaldúa (2007: 32) concludes, 'The infusion of the values of the white culture, coupled with the exploitation by that culture, is changing the Mexican way of life', and in more ways than we might be able to identify I would add.

The economic colonization of Mexico has left Mexicans with a choice: stay in Mexico and starve, or move north and survive. What Terán could not accomplish with inducements for Mexicans to move north and settle Tejas in the nineteenth century, American colonization has in the twentieth and twenty first centuries much to its dismay. Mexican labourers in the southwestern US have been recruited to extract mineral (gold and silver—California and Nevada; copper—Arizona) and animal wealth (cattle—Texas; sheep—New Mexico, Colorado, and parts of California) from annexed Mexican lands. Their labour in the extraction of this combination of wealth vastly contributed to the expansion of the electrical, cattle, sheep, mining, and railroad industries and, by extension, to Western prosperity in the twentieth century. The contributions of Mexican immigrants to the American economy are immense. They comprise a large percentage of the workforce in the agricultural, meat-packing, poultry processing, restaurant, hotel/motel, food service, janitorial, general construction, small home repair, landscaping/lawn care, transportation, textile, railroad yards, retail services, and forestry services business sectors, just to name a few. Without a doubt, were it not for the contributions of many Mexican immigrants, the American economy would be severely crippled (Hernandez 2006: 55-57; see also the movie 'Un Día Sin Mexicanos' ['A Day Without a Mexican']).

Despite numerous contributions to the American economy by Latina/os, racist attitudes of superiority still run deep within the Euro-American

49. The collusion between powerful landowners in Mexico and US colonizing companies that has virtually left Mexico and her 8 million citizens dependent on the US market marks what the Mexicans call *la crisis* (Anzaldúa 2007: 32).

conscience as Anglo America continues to perpetuate the stereotype of Mexicans as stupid, lazy, and dirty.⁵⁰ Sentiments like 'go back home where you came from' belie an ignorance of the fact that Mexicans have done just that. Before there was a US, Mexicans lived 'here', hence the establishment of their double consciousness—native-born and immigrant—a cultural schizophrenia alternatively known as hybridity (Bhabha) or 'borderlands' (Anzaldúa). Racist attitudes expressed toward Latin Americans by General William R. Shafter in the Spanish–American war—'Those people are no more fit for self-government than gunpowder is for hell' (as quoted in Gonzalez 2000: 56)—echo rather eerily in a similar comment by President Bush at a 2004 news conference outside the White House though with a different ethnic group in mind.

There's a lot of people in the world who don't believe that people whose skin color may not be the same as ours can be free and self-govern. I reject that. I reject that strongly. I believe that people who practice the Muslim faith can self-govern. I believe that people whose skins aren't necessarily—are a different color than white can self-govern.

Clearly, the skin colour that is 'ours' is 'white'. 'Us' is 'white' with the further implication that being a 'real American' is being white, and that translates into the reality of 'whiteness' as a measure of inclusion with greater privileges of civic enfranchisement.⁵¹

Two centuries later, the effects of colonization come full circle in the insecurity among many Euro-Americans over the current immigration debate wherein racist attitudes of superiority continue to find expression in local and national politics targeting Mexican immigrants. The US Senate passed Senate bill 1335 on 18 May 2006 making English the official language of the US at the behest of President Bush, a man noted ironically for his many malapropisms of the English language and who recently admitted

50. Studies indicate that Mexican illegal immigrants are better educated (3–10 percent illiterate) than those in Mexico (22 percent illiteracy rate; Portes and Rumbaut 1996: 11).

51. In a recent study by the Pew Hispanic Center (2004), Latinos saw 'whiteness' as a reflection of success and inclusion. The study also revealed that 'Hispanics who identified themselves as white...have higher levels of education and income'. Such perceptions reflect the observation that the disenfranchised in American society tend to look at and define themselves through the eyes of the dominant culture via common stereotypes imposed upon them. De La Torre (2005: 28–29) recalls from childhood contrasting stereotypes of images from shows like *Leave It to Beaver* and media images of the Latino male as a 'knife-wielding, oversexed, undereducated gang member'.

'I can barely speak English' when questioned about vacationing in France (12 August 2007). Bush's anti-immigration agenda set off a firestorm of political activity at the local level throughout the US aimed at Mexican immigrants. In August 2006 the mayor and city council of Hazelton, Pennsylvania passed the Illegal Immigration Relief Act as a measure to drive out illegals in their community (Powell and Garcia 2006). That same year the city council in Irving, Texas initiated the Criminal Alien Program as a means of catching undocumented immigrants (Oppenheim 2007). Perhaps no political action has received more publicity for its public backlash, however, than the illegal immigration ordinance of Farmers Branch, Texas proposed by the city council on 13 November 2006. Basically, the legal residency ordinance prohibited apartment owners to rent to non-US citizens. Further investigations into what was driving this city council's legal discrimination revealed an entrenched faction of religious cronies with an economic agenda. There was a barrier to their designs for economic development and the revitalization of retail and neighborhoods in Farmers Branch—illegal immigrants.⁵² The population segment that resonated with such legalized racial prejudice naturally appealed to such myths as crime rates and education and housing values being negatively affected by undocumented immigrants though the city never conducted any formal analysis whatsoever. An independent study conducted by economic professors Bernard Weinstein and Terry Clower of the University of North Texas reported in May 2007 the exact opposite of the popular myths touted. Crime rates were falling, property values were rising, and the quality of public education was improving. They concluded that ordinance 2903 would impair Farmers Branch's ability 'to attract, develop and retain business which, in turn, will reduce the tax base and erode the city's quality-of-life' (Weinstein and Clower 2007: 19).

The American myth's conscious adoption of ethnocentric biblical motifs and typologically justifying its conquest-settlement of the 'promised land' by 'Israel' (un)consciously contributed to dehumanizing stereotypes that has entrenched racial prejudice bearing its fruit in the modern era. America's national narrative consciously repressed the dislocation of communities (both those of the Mexican population of Tejas and of the Anglo

52. Interestingly enough, the concern of illegal immigration never surfaced in any of the meetings of the Branch Revitalization Task Force formed in May 2006. August 2006 was the first mention of any crackdown against illegal immigrants per city councilman Tim O'Hare's proposal, which had caught the focus group comprising about 60 other citizens besides city leaders completely by surprise (Hanley 2007).




Figure 6. Political Cartoon. Permission from Chris Britt, *The State Journal-Register*.

immigrants) and 'forgot' its own diverse immigrant roots and experiences of exile and displacement in its imagi/nation as a homogeneous community in an effort to fix US identity.⁵³ Much to the chagrin of proponents of the national narrative, the reality of other identities, like race, resists displacement. The conscious amnesia of Euro-Americans' origins resulting in the dehumanization and violent displacement of the indigenous population exemplifies Ernest Renan's observation: 'Unity is always effected by means of brutality' (as quoted in Bhabha 1990: 11). Conversations among the informed American public, however, remembering the suppressed 'other' by the American myth gradually evanesce the conscious amnesia of Euro-American origins with hope for the larger public discourse and its immigration angst. The innate superiority of the colonizer reinforced by stereotypes betrays its anxiety as the colonized reflects back the gaze of the colonizer vividly depicted in the following political cartoon (see Fig. 6).⁵⁴

53. The initial debates between Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson over immigration reveal the un/conscious amnesia within America. Jefferson's image of hospitality between Native Americans and Pilgrims reflected a conscious silence of the brutality of early Europeans and doubly served his pro-immigration policy and annexation of new territories. Conversely, Hamilton's own anti-immigration stance reflected an unconscious repression of the nation's immigrant roots, especially the denial of his own 'foreignness' as an exile (Behdad 2000: 143-47).

If a picture is worth a thousand words, then perhaps nothing more remains to be said except that the current angst over immigration simply reflects nothing more than the shared borderlands experience of both Mexicans and Anglos that the latter has forgotten.

Conclusion

Puns, stock characterizations, sacrificial motifs, feminizing strategies, and scatology collectively satirize the Moabites in Judges 3.12-30 as the stupid ethnic group too incompetent for self-rule. As a part of the conquest-settlement ideology of the larger national myth, this story's ethnocentric humour becomes not a means of resistance against oppression but rather gets co-opted in a context of colonization where disputed land-claim boundaries are at stake. Its colonial discourse justifies 'Israel's' claims of divine right to land and political authority over it, sanctions their presumed attitudes of superiority, and legitimates depersonalization in a context of identity construction while suppressing immigrant status via an assumed indigenization.

Sociologically, the consumption of such literature within the colonial nexus of Yehud and Tejas by immigrants enables their projections and reinforces group identity amidst conflict. They 'Moabitize' their neighbors by typecasting them as the incompetent 'other', which, at a more abstract level, is a reflection of 'self'. The nationalistic element of this satire allows a subversive perspective on the matter in that Moab is the object of mockery. It is not Moab who is stupid, but rather 'Israel'. This would certainly square well with the psychological explanation provided. Nonetheless, for the colonizer, ethnic differentiation is of little concern. Whether Moabite or Ammonite, mattered not if you were not part of the in-group. Harold Washington (1994: 232-33) notes,

By referring to the local non-*golah* Judaeans as "peoples of the land(s)", the returning exiles effectively classified their Judaeans

54. The stereotype itself is a form of anxious colonial knowledge providing justification that the colonizer rules the colonized due to innate superiority. Circulated stereotypes through various re-presentations (e.g. racist jokes) about the stupidity and/or laziness of a particular ethnic group by the dominant culture often results in a form of double consciousness, a concept described in the experience of African Americans by W.E.B. DuBois (1903: 7). The anxiety underlying the stereotype, however, occasions the opportunity for resistance by the colonized. Rejecting how the dominant culture sees and defines people of colour becomes in itself a consciousness-raising activity allowing the marginalized to define themselves apart from the negative stereotypes imposed upon them.

rivals, together with the neighboring non-Judean peoples (Ammonites, Moabites, Edomites, residents of Samaria, etc.) as alien to Israel.

Whether Spanish or Mexican really did not matter to 'Israel' in Tejas, anyone else simply was demonized as 'other' by means of guilt by association. Postcolonial observations, however, redirect the textual misdirection of the 'stupid' ethno-typing slur to reveal these immigrants' double consciousness: the land is theirs, yet it is not theirs; they are indigenous, yet they are immigrants; they are colonizers, yet they are colonized; they are the in-group, yet they are the out-group; and they are 'self', yet they are 'other'. The Anglos' own 'borderlands' experience provides more points of commonality with the colonized than they care to remember. So, they 'forget' with the conscious construction of a national myth that conveniently erases the voice of the subaltern (its ethnicity, history, and narrative), regardless of ethnic identity, and its significant role on that national stage. But the gaze of the colonized will not fade that quickly to allow the colonizer to forget.

Uncritical interpretations of this literature re-present the experiences of 'Israel' (whether in the contexts of Yehud or Tejas) conquering and settling land confiscated from Moabite and the natives with no concern to its *Nachleben*, which, over time, has justified one ethnicity's power and privilege over another by fomenting racist attitudes. But when the centre co-opts sacred writ rife with ethnic slurs, interpretation must concern itself with the socio-political effects of that which defines the power and privilege of those at the centre as a blessing from God on the basis of their 'moral righteousness' and 'innate superiority'. Otherwise, prosperity theology and capitalism (especially within an American context) collude to dis-member (a nation) by uncritically branding a disenfranchised ethnic group with a 'stupid' stereotype. Such deeply rooted stereotypes will always stand as a formidable obstacle to progress in improving and repairing economic conditions of Mexicans in the US and Mexico and in making relations between Anglo Americans and Mexican Americans more harmonious unless we confront them and ourselves. Simple monetary reparations will not suffice. Anzaldúa's (2007: 107-08) lengthy suggestion points the way.

We need you to accept the fact that Chicanos are different, to acknowledge your rejection and negation of us. We need you to own the fact that you looked upon us as less than human, that you stole our lands, our personhood, our self-respect. We need you to make public restitution: to say that, to compensate for your own sense of defectiveness, you strive for power over us, you erase our history and our experience because it makes you feel guilty—you'd rather forget your brutish acts. To say you've split yourself from minority groups, that you disown us, that your dual consciousness splits off parts of

yourself, transferring the “negative” parts onto us. (Where there is persecution of minorities, there is shadow projection. Where there is violence and war, there is repression of shadow.) To say that you are afraid of us, that to put distance between us, you wear the mask of contempt. Admit that Mexico is your double, that she exists in the shadow of this country, that we are irrevocably tied to her. Gringo, accept the doppelganger in your psyche. By taking back your collective shadow the intracultural split will heal. And finally, tell us what you need from us.

To engage such concerns and ourselves in such a manner that colonialist ideology obfuscates critically re-members by revealing ‘us’ to be more like ‘them’ as well as—more than we wish to admit—‘other’ and ‘stupid’.

THE 'DECEITFUL OPPORTUNIST' STEREOTYPE: RISK/REWARD
AND UN/SEEN PERIL(S) AT GAM SAAN (GOLD MOUNTAIN)

'THE CHINESE MUST GO' !

'The effect of your late message has been thus far to prejudice the public mind against my people, to enable those who wait the opportunity to hunt them down, and rob them of the rewards of their toil...We would beg to remind you that when your nation was a wilderness, and the nation from which you sprung *barbarous*, we exercised most of the arts and virtues of civilized life...We are not the degraded race you would make us'.

—Norman Asing (1852)

Helen Zia recounts an experience common to most all Asian Americans. It is the awkward experience of responding to certain existential questions from rank strangers—'What are you?' 'Where are you from'? Each query, generally well intentioned, strikes at the heart of identity that precludes the possibility of Asians as American. Confirmation of such an observation becomes apparent when white nativists respond to the same question but yet are unable to conceive of the possibility that they or their people could come from anywhere but the US. Words matter in the re-presentation of ethnic identity where they become a means to ethno-type certain groups. Consider the two following contemporary scenarios (discussed extensively in Wu 2002: 21 and 104-16, respectively).

(1) After the 1998 Winter Olympics figure-skating competition concluded with Tara Lipinsky edging out Michelle Kwan for the gold, the MSNBC website ran the following headline: 'American beats out Kwan'. No doubt, many gave little thought to the headline's implications though Asian Americans were rightfully upset. Why? Kwan was (and still is) an American just like Lipinsky despite the headline (likely due to negligence than overt racism), which, in effect, implied Kwan to be a foreigner. Words matter. But would the same mistake have been made had the order been reversed? Frank Wu explores the implications in what would seem to be an example of citizenship equated with race, an issue that dogged the Chinese since their immigration to the US. Wu makes the salient point that had Kwan won, the victory headline would likely not have read 'American beats out Lipinsky' or 'Asian

beats out white'. Nor would a distinction have been made between the two competitors with the victor described as American if those two competitors were Nancy Kerrigan and Tonya Harding, both white (Wu 2002: 21).

(2) On 24 March 1997 the conservative magazine *National Review* published the cover story 'The Manchurian Candidates' with its cover illustration of President Clinton, First Lady Hillary Clinton, and Vice President Al Gore in yellowface. The illustration depicted the president as a Chinese houseboy with buckteeth, slanted eyes, pigtails, and a straw 'coolie' hat serving coffee. The first lady, also buck-toothed and squinty-eyed, holds a 'Little Red Book' while dressed as a Maoist Red Guard. And the vice president, outfitted as a Buddhist priest, proffers a begging bowl stuffed with money. Based on typical Asian physical stereotypes, the caricature exemplifies 'the race card' that the *National Review* chose to play in response to allegations surrounding the fundraising campaign of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) in 1996 spearheaded by DNC fund-raiser John Huang rather than the much larger issue of illegal campaign contributions of non-Asians (Lee 1999: 1-2). Other representatives of American media joined in the coverage of the incident dubbed as the 'Asian Connection', or alternatively as 'the Chop Suey connection' by the editor of the right-wing *American Spectator*. Throughout the months of investigations into the scandal, deep-seated racist perceptions toward the Chinese (re)surfaced. To explain Mr. Huang's conduct, Senator Sam Brownback jokingly retorted, 'no raise money, no get bonus'. Other government officials remarked '[I]llegal donations are apparently only the tip of the eggroll' (as quoted in Wu 2002: 111).

Aside from the matter that race is still a lingering issue within US culture despite efforts not to parade it shamelessly, these scenarios reveal prevalent attitudes, even if consciously kept tucked away safely below the surface, that inform, and are informed by, stereotypes of Asians. Asians in general and the Chinese in specific have always been regarded, even if only subconsciously, as not belonging to mainstream US society and somehow not quite 'real Americans'. These prejudices carry over from the primary history of the Hebrew Bible where attitudes toward the Ammonites in specific reflect and shape their re-presentation in a manner not unlike that toward their Transjordanian neighbours, namely one of an unremitting enmity coupled with efforts to bring them under Palestinian control. Ethno-typed as deceitful and cunning, the Ammonites along with the immigrant Chinese in the US occupy the colonized borderlands spatially and temporally, both retaining their transnational identities, both as *pai hua* (the driven out), quite literally and figuratively. Yet, what a dominant ethnic group identifies as deceitfulness within the 'other' is always present within 'self' though always perceived harmlessly and hailed laudably as cunning. Potential rewards that life in a new land could bring both Ammonites and Chinese 'push/pull' them

as they ventured forth wide-eyed with optimism risks be damned unaware of the various exclusivist tactics driven by prejudicial stereotypes awaiting them in this new land where a new identity not of their own making would be forced upon them despite their preexistent transnational identities.

A Composite Portrait of the Ammonites

What we know of a group known as Ammonites, their preferred self-designation though kings referred to themselves as 'kings of the Bene-'Ammon (*bny 'mwn*), an identifier paralleling the Hebrew designation *bny 'mwn* ('sons of Ammon'),¹ remains sketchy at best. Nevertheless, our knowledge derives from archaeology, epigraphic material, and the biblical texts (especially the Ammonite myth within the primary history²). Until the publication of *Ancient Ammon* (1999),³ the only major study in English on the Ammonites was George Landes's dissertation *A History of the Ammonites* (1956). Unlike the case with the Edomites and the Moabites, we know much more about the Ammonites and their culture beyond the initial explorations of Nelson Glueck in the 1930s. Since the 1970s, numerous sites within modern day Jordan have been excavated.⁴ And we know for certain that the Ammon region did not lay unoccupied between c. 1900-1300 BCE; instead,

1. Daniel Block (1984: 211) argues that this Hebrew designation for the Ammonite peoples cannot be interpreted in the same manner as *bny ysr'l* ('sons of Israel'). Though seemingly analogous, the prefixed *bn/bny* is an 'integral part of the national name' and not 'an indicator of the common genealogical roots of the Ammonites'. Thus, the proper designation for the country was not Ammon but rather Bene-'Ammon.

2. Those texts comprising the Ammonite myth within the primary history are Gen. 19.38; Num. 21.24; Deut. 2.19-21, 37; 3.11, 16; 23.3; Josh. 12.2; 13.10, 25; Judg. 3.13; 10.6-12.3; 1 Sam. 10.27; 11.1-2, 11; 12.12; 14.47; 2 Sam. 8.12; 10.1-19; 11.1; 12.9, 26, 31; 17.27; 23.37; 1 Kgs 11.1-7, 33; 14.21, 31; 2 Kgs 23.13; 24.2. In some instances, the Ammonite myth overlaps with those of the Moabites and Edomites (e.g. 1 Sam. 14.47; 2 Sam. 8.12; 1 Kgs 11.1) and with the Moabites only (e.g. Judg. 10.6; 1 Kgs 11.33; 2 Kgs 24.2).

3. Piotr Bienkowski (2000: 96-98) raises a serious critique of this book tangential to my own interests. The book weaves the main thread of ethnicity throughout its essays but yet hardly addresses the question. How these groups 'became' Ammonite is unclear.

4. Abu Nuseir, the 'Amman Airport Structure, the 'Amman Citadel, the 'Ammonite' towers of Rujm al-Malfuf (North and South) and Rujm al-Mekheizin, 'Amman tombs, Khirbet al-Hajjar, Khirbet al-Meqablein, Rujm al-Henu, Rujm Selim, Sahab, Tell Deir 'Alla, Tell al-Hamman, Tell Hisban, Tell Iktanu, Tell Jalul, Tell Jawa, Tell al-Mazar, Tell Nimrin, Tell Safut, Tell Siran, Tell el-'Umeiri, Umm ad-Dananir, Baq'ah Valley, and the area of 'Ayn Ghazal, to name a few. For a complete rundown of all archaeological work conducted in Ammon, see Younker 1999a: 1-19.

an ethnic group known as the *bny 'mun* occupied the central Transjordanian plateau from about the mid-second millennium through the mid- to late-first millennium BCE with a known province existing as late as the fourth century BCE. Their country was simply known as Ammon and, at its zenith, their capital was Rabbah-Ammon, or simply Ammon, known today as Amman in present-day Jordan.

Geography

Delimiting the geographical boundaries of Ammon in the ancient Near Eastern world has yielded no consensus of opinion among historians and archaeologists with the exception perhaps being that of the desert to the east as its natural eastern boundary. The majority would also concede the Wadi az-Zarqa (biblical Jabbok river) as its northern boundary. Over the course of its history, especially during the absence of an Israelite state, that border may have extended northward to include such sites as Tell Deir 'Alla and Tell al-Mazar. The Wadi az-Zarqa stretches a total of 62 miles with its northeasterly flow taking a circular route. And here, just as several tributaries branched off the Jabbok, so scholarly opinion divides. Some contend that Ammonite territory lay just east of the north-south stretch of the Jabbok with just a narrow corridor of land between the Jabbok and the desert. Within this area lay the capitol city 'Amman. The land west up to the Jordan River belonged, at least from the biblical perspective, to the Israelites. However, archaeological excavations of numerous sites, including Tell el-'Umeiri, in the Madaba Plains of this region reveal a distinctively Ammonite cultural presence up to the fourth century BCE. Finally, the southern border of Ammon may be the most amorphous with opinion divided between the minimalists and the maximalists. The minimalists, basing their arguments on biblical texts (Isa. 15.4; 16.8-9; Jer. 48.1-2, 34, 45; 49.3), place the southern boundary north of Hisban (biblical Heshbon) because Heshbon lay in Moab. Only Isaiah 16 places Heshbon clearly in Moab while the others allow for its placement in Ammonite territory. The maximalists contend, on the basis of archaeological finds (e.g. pottery, writing style, language on several ostraca, and figurines) from Hisban, that the southern border lay somewhere between Hisban in the north and Madaba in the south (Herr 1992). Larry Herr (1997: 168-70) has since modified his opinion to regard the southern border lying further beyond Madaba south of Jalul to somewhere between Khirbet al-Hari and Khirbet al-Mudayna on the presence of Ammonite pottery and inscriptions in the region.

What is of note in this discussion by western archaeologists and historians about the extent of Ammonite territory is the absence of the Ammonite perspective. Every interpreter and commentator decides the territory of the 'other'

without serious consideration of its perspective beyond the obligatory nod. In Judges 11.13, a text representing the Ammonites as aggressive and hostile (the same characterization appears in their military alliance with the Moabites against the Israelites, Judg. 3.12-13; and in their oppression of the Gadites and Reubenites, 1 Sam. 11.1-2), Jephthah engages the Ammonite king in negotiations over disputed land claims. The king responded, 'When Israel came up out of Egypt, they took away my land from the Arnon to the Jabbok, all the way to the Jordan; now therefore restore it peaceably'. Other texts within the primary history would seem to support the king's claims—northern boundary at Jabbok (Num. 21.24; Deut. 3.16; Josh. 12.2) and the southern boundary at the Wadi al-Mujib (biblical Arnon river) separating Ammon from Moab (Num. 22.36). Taking the Ammonite perspective into account, which archaeology certainly seems to substantiate for the Persian era, Ammonite territory extended from the Wadi az-Zarqa in the north to the Wadi al-Mujib in the south and from the Jordan river in the west to the desert in the east, an area approximately 85 km by about 35 km. With the exception of the biblical place-names of Rabbah, Heshbon, and Jazer, the other Ammonite place-names of Aroer, Minnith, Abel-keramim, and Ai within the biblical texts have yet to be definitively identified with a modern site (MacDonald 1999: 33-39).

In comparison to the Transjordanian cultures of Moab and Edom, Ammon was the most densely settled and intensively cultivated of the three cultures (for a thorough description of the natural environment—territory, climate, resources—of modern Transjordan, see MacDonald 2000: 21-43). The annual long-term rainfall average of 500 mm in Ammon with a minimum of 200 mm in the dry years made this region well suited for intense cultivation and dry farming. An agrarian economy with the cultivation of fruit trees and cereals in the land of Ammon coexisted alongside a pastoralist economy with excellent pasturage in the open spaces between fields and on the eastern steppe for cattle, sheep, and goats (LaBianca and Younker 1998: 403, 407). According to Herr (1997: 148), the area surrounding Rabbath-Ammon was excellent for the cultivation of fruits and vegetables on terraced hill slopes and grain in the valleys with pasturage for flocks on the untilled hills. To the south, the Madaba plains were ideal for large tracts of grain. Moreover, range-tied pastoralism within Ammon persisted with the ascent of land-tied tribalism and a new, supra-tribal polity that eventually came to be known as the Kingdom of Ammon.

History

Political

Several other ethnic groups seem to have coexisted alongside the Ammonites in the Transjordan highlands. First, the Zamzumim, or Rephaim, were

prominent before the strength of the Ammonites eventually grew to a point where they displaced this group (Deut. 2.20-21). Second, Egyptian sources, such as the so-called 'Palestinian List', reveal the presence of the Shasu and Hab/piru peoples in the Transjordan region. As discussed in previous Chapters, the Shasu were a tribal group led by 'chieftains' whose ubiquitous presence in Syria, Moab, Edom, and western Palestine makes it highly unlikely that they were not in Ammon as well. The Egyptian pharaoh Thutmose III, for example, recounts his campaign into Palestine c. 1482 BCE listing numerous sites, 15 of which are believed to be in the Transjordan and 5 of those specifically in Ammon ('Abil || Nahr az-Zaraq; Gittoth; Baq'ah Valley?; 'Ayn Musa || 'Amman?; and Keramim || Jawa?; Younker 1999b: 2000). In fact, the Shasu comprised 36 percent of the 89,600 Palestinian prisoners deported by Thutmose's son Amenophis (Amenhotep II). The Shasu had become such a powerful force in the Transjordan region (including Ammon) that they were able to cut off Egyptian campaigns through western Palestine and Transjordan for a while, thus prompting the campaigns of Ramesses II and his son Merneptah in the twelfth century BCE taking Shasu captives as depicted in the Karnak reliefs.

From the inception of Israelite–Ammonite relations, biblical tradition represents this history in terms of land conflict. The Hebrews received strict orders not to harass or engage the Ammonites since Yhwh had allotted their land territory to them (Deut. 2.18-19). The Hebrew conquest of the Amorites and political control of their land from the Arnon River to the Jabbok River placed them on the western boundaries of Ammon (Num. 21.23-24). Only the strength of the Ammonites in their control of the border held the Hebrews in check, certainly not divine obeisance. Later, Moses gave the Gadites half the land of the Ammonites to Aroer, east from Rabbah (Josh. 13.25). So much for no harassment! It is no small wonder that continued relations between these two groups revolve about the encroachment of one upon the territory of the other.

Through an alliance with the Amalekites, the Ammonites assisted king Eglon of Moab in the conquest of Jericho (Judg. 3.12-13). What role, if any, the Ammonites may have played beyond this military action, however, in the political domination of Israel remains uncertain. Ammonite incursions into assumed Israelite territory east of the Jordan placed them in direct conflict with the Gileadites during the time of Jephthah. After renegotiating terms of political leadership over the Gileadites, Jephthah diplomatically engaged the king of Ammon in an effort to resolve their dispute peacefully. And their dispute had solely to do with land boundaries.

The socio-political system in Ammon gradually evolved such that power came to reside in the office of a 'king', preceding similar developments within Israel. Mounting pressures from the Ammonites to the east partially

precipitated the coalescence of Israelite tribes under a central leadership. Presumably, the Ammonite king in the early Iron Age period was Nahash, the first Ammonite king identified by name within the biblical narratives (1 Sam. 11.1-11), who had oppressed the Gadites and Reubenites by gouging out their right eyes and had assaulted Jabesh-gilead, thus prompting the Israelite demand for a king (1 Sam. 10.27-12.12). From the Israelite perspective, the era of the monarchy saw Israelite success against Ammon, subdued initially by king Saul though any narrative of a battle is conspicuously absent (1 Sam. 14.47). Nahash retained his throne and would later provide sanctuary to David during his flight from Saul.

During the regnancy of David, Israelite–Ammonite relations intensified immensely stemming from the advisors of Hanun, Nahash's son and successor. Hanun provoked David, who already had a treaty with Nahash, to anger when the Ammonites spurned David's condolences at the death of Nahash. Hanun heeded the poor advice of his counselors by embarrassing David's envoys thinking their presence as a clever ruse to conceal Israelite designs on Ammon. In response, David's army besieged Rabbah ('Amman) and he took the crown, an indication of Israelite suzerainty (2 Sam. 10-12). Some question exists about Hanun's fate after David seized the royal crown and placed Ammon under Israelite suzerainty. Whether Hanun was killed for his impudence remains uncertain but he did not retain the throne. What is of interest is that Shobi, another son of Nahash and possibly brother to Hanun, honoured his father's treaty with David by later supplying provisions to David and his company while David was exiled east of the Jordan at Mahanaim during the military coup of his son Absalom (2 Sam. 17.27-29). King David subjugated the Ammonites by forcing them to pay tribute (1 Sam. 8.12). Perspectives on David's treatment of the Ammonites range from him vanquishing them with exceptional cruelty to subjecting them to forced labour with saws and at the brick kilns.⁵ David's treatment of the Ammonites though, concludes Sawyer (1996: 174), may reflect the bitter anti-Ammonite feeling present during the Babylonian exile. He cites as support the occurrences of *ויעפר* ('to put to death by fire'), Ezekiel's polemic (21.31-32), and the Ammonite plot to assassinate Gedaliah (Jer. 40.13; 41.18) as all exilic.

5. Despite David's cold-blooded massacre of Moabites and Ammonites, seventeenth century CE commentators persisted to exonerate David citing the following major crimes of the Ammonites as historical reasons for their fate: (1) their treatment of David's envoys (2 Sam. 10); (2) their alliance with Syria as a threat to Israelite peace (2 Sam. 10.6ff.); (3) the Ammonite killing of Uriah (2 Sam. 11.17); (4) the Ammonite king's threat against the men of Jabesh-gilead (1 Sam. 11.2); (5) their denied access to the assembly of Yhwh because of their obstructive tactics (Deut. 23.3); and (6) the Ammonite religious practices of idolatry and child sacrifice (2 Kgs 23.10; Jer. 32.3-5) (Sawyer 1996: 170-171).

Any Ammonite within the Davidic royal court would naturally seem completely out of order given the nature of Israelite–Ammonite relations during David’s reign. Nevertheless, David made an Ammonite, Zelek, a member of his royal honour guard, the Thirty (2 Sam. 23.37). If we also consider David’s good relations with Shobi and the practice of establishing treaty alliances with other ethnic groups via marriage as customary state policy in the ancient Near East, it is quite conceivable that one of David’s wives may even have been Ammonite. All these factors would certainly account, in part, for David’s approval of Naamah (the daughter of Hanun according to the LXX version of 1 Kgs 12.24a), an Ammonite, as wife for his son Solomon.⁶ Such a royal marriage would further ensure the continuation of the treaty alliance between the Davidic administration and Ammon (1 Kgs 14.21, 31), while presumably keeping Ammon under Israelite suzerainty during Solomon’s reign. More importantly, this royal intermarriage resulted in an ethnically mixed bloodline and Davidic heir to the throne. Rehoboam, the son of Solomon and Naamah, would have been either half Hebrew or possibly one-fourth Hebrew since Solomon himself was born to a foreign mother. The intermarriage also resulted in a religious admixture with Ammonite cultural influences contributing to the cultural pluralism of Israel. Solomon characteristically built high places for his foreign wives, and one of those shrines was dedicated to the Ammonite god Milcom.

Ammon continued to remain under Israelite suzerainty even into the ninth century BCE. And it would remain under Assyrian suzerainty for much of the Assyrian empire’s duration. In the ninth century BCE Ammon would gain brief liberation when King Ba’sa led an Ammonite army in a coalition of resistance against Shalmaneser III at Qarqar in 853 BCE (ANET 279). Ammonite independence would be short-lived though as they would later become vassal to Judah paying tribute to kings Uzziah (2 Chron. 26.8) and his son Jotham (2 Chron. 27.5) throughout the eighth century BCE. The Annals of Tiglath-pileser III mentions the Ammonite king Shanip(u) in 730 BCE in a list of those paying tribute to Assyria after the Syrian and Palestinian campaigns (ANET 282). Perhaps preceding Shanipu as Ammonite kings were his father Zakir and his grandfather Yarah-‘azar on the basis of the Statue Inscription (dated c. ninth-seventh centuries BCE), which reads ‘Yerah’azar, son of Sanib’ (Aufrecht 1989: 106-09) or ‘Yarih’ezer

6. Given the numerous wives of Solomon, several princesses may conceivably have been of Ammonite origin. His marriage to Naamah, however, may be the result more from the strategic and political calculations of David than from Solomon’s initiative. The dates set for Solomon and Rehoboam in the Book of Kings would indicate that David arranged the marriage prior to Solomon’s accession to the throne (Malamat 1999: 36).

son of Zakkur, son of Sanip' (MacDonald 2000: 160-61). Prior to the siege of Jerusalem by Sennacherib in 701 BCE, numerous kings, including the Ammonite king Buduili, paid tribute and homage to Sennacherib on his campaign (ANET 287). Later, the Assyrian king Esarhaddon demanded numerous kings on the other side of the Euphrates to provide building materials and supplies for the construction of his palace at Nineveh. Listed along with Manasseh of Judah was Puduil, king of Beth-Ammon (ANET 291). Buduili and Puduil refer to the same individual (Pado'el), according to Frank Moore Cross (see inset of Herr 1985: 171), which would indicate a reign from before 701 to about 635 BCE. In Ashurbanipal's campaign against Egypt, Syria, and Palestine in the mid-seventh century BCE, the Ammonite king 'Amminadab I (Amminadbi), along with a host of other kings, brought tribute, paid homage, and provided military accompaniment (ANET 294). Ammon experienced tremendous economic growth during this period. Assyrian records further reveal that by the time of king Ashurbanipal (668-27) the Ammonites had become the wealthiest of all the Palestinian kingdoms, a conclusion based on the assumption, admits Younger (1994: 308), that paying the highest tribute indicates a measure of wealth and not disloyalty. The Tell Siran Bottle Inscription (dated to c. 600 BCE) mentions Hissal'el (c. 625 BCE), the son of 'Amminadab I, and 'Amminadab II (c. 600 BCE), the grandson of 'Amminadab I: 'May the produce of 'Amminadab king of the Ammonites, the son of Hassil'il king of the Ammonites, the son of 'Amminadab king of the Ammonites—the vineyard and the garden(s) and the hollow and the cistern—cause rejoicing and gladness for many days (to come) and in years far off' (Aufrecht 1989: 203-11). Unfortunately, since we lack details of events surrounding the reigns of these individuals, the most we can infer is that a monarchic state continued into the sixth century BCE.

In addition to the persistence of the Ammonite kingdom as an independent or semi-independent polity during the late Iron Age, their economic and political power increased due in part to Babylonian intervention in Palestinian affairs.⁷ Their agricultural successes provided a firm economic base. That, in turn, perhaps contributed to the political confidence that motivated the rebellion against Babylon by the Ammonite king Ba'alyish'a. Until identified with the Hebrew name Ba'alis (Jer. 40.14) by Bob Becking, this last known king of Ammon by name in the seal impressions from the excavations at Tell el-'Umeiri remained unknown. One seal impression, identified as the Ba'alis seal, reads 'Belonging to Ba'alis[',

7. Ammonite remains at Hesban in the south, Mazar in the Jordan Valley, and the Baq'a Valley in the north indicate the expansion of Ammonite borders at this time, evidence of increase in political strength (Younger 1994: 313 n. 60).

king of, B[nei Ammo]n' (for more on this seal, see Herr 1985: 174; Younker 1985: 173-80; Becking 1999: 13-17; and Deutsch 1999: 46-49, 66). A second seal impression, dating to 600 BCE, reads 'Belonging to Milkom'ur, the servant of Ba'alyish'a', an indication that Milkom'ur was a prominent government official of king Ba'alis (see Herr 1985: 169-72; 1993: 33-35). Becking's identification of the Ammonite name Ba'alyish'a with Ba'alis helps us to understand certain events in the last days of Judah. Toward the close of the Judean kingdom, a warring band of Ammonites, in addition to other ethnic marauding bands, made incursions into Judah during the reign of King Jehoiakim because, as the narrator of 2 Kings indicates, 'he rebelled against him [King Nebuchadnezzar]' (24.1-2). The animosities of Israelite-Ammonite relations did not end with the demise of Judah. Rather, after Babylon's appointment of Gedaliah as the governor of the Yehud province, Ba'alis, obviously upset by the Babylonian appointment, put out a 'hit' on Gedaliah (Jer. 40.13-41.3). The contract was successful in spite of the forewarnings to Gedaliah about Ba'alis's plan and his hitman Ishmael.⁸ The political intrigue of Ba'alis no doubt elicited the Babylonian's punitive campaign against the Ammonites in 582-81. According to Josephus (*Ant.* 10:9:3-4 §163-73), the Babylonians subjugated the Ammonites and annexed Ammon into the Babylonian empire as a vassal province. A third seal impression that reads 'Shuba, Ammon' has convinced archaeologists that Ammon indeed was a Persian province much as Yehud, and that Shuba was either the governor or treasurer of Persian Ammon, perhaps even an administrative colleague of Milkom'ur (Herr 1992; 1993: 34-35). In addition, the Babylonians established a new capital at Tell el-'Umeiri, a region near Amman (see Lipschits 2004: 37-52). Tell el-'Umeiri became an administrative center with the task of overseeing government-sponsored grape plantations at the farmsteads to produce wine for tribute to Babylonia (Herr 1999: 232; see also Lipschits 2004: 44-45).

The Ammonite kingdom ceased to exist as an independent or semi-independent polity after their annexation into the Babylonian administrative system contra the optimism of Larry Herr and James Sauer (based on the work of the Madaba Plains Project Survey) that the Ammonite kingdom persisted into the Hellenistic period. Despite the cessation of the

8. Becking (1993: 15) suggests this act of political intrigue by Ba'alis as evidence of cooperation between the royal party in Ammon and the anti-Babylonian royal party in Judah to bring the Davidic dynasty back to the throne in Jerusalem. Along these lines, Malamat (1999: 37) speculates about the possible relationship existing between Ishmael, sent by the king of Ammon, and the 'seed of the royal family' (Jer. 41.1). The name-change in the biblical texts from Ba'alyish'a to Ba'alis, argues Becking (1993: 20, 24), has less to do with mutilation purposes on pious grounds and more to do with the Judean interpretation of the pronunciation of the Ammonite name.

Ammonite kingdom, we can nevertheless affirm from the material culture that the Ammonite peoples continued to occupy their land and flourish well into Hellenistic times.

Cultural

The material culture of settlements within Ammon indicates an occupational continuity from the Late Bronze Age to that of the Iron Age with a socially complex organization with coexisting sedentary and nomadic lifestyles occurring at any given time. Certainly the Egyptian campaigns into Ammon did little to encourage sedentarization within Ammon. Instead, nomadization increased perhaps as a form of resistance and as a self-preservation mechanism (LaBianca 1990: 41-42). Tribes could have both households that were more land-tied, which would indicate a more intensified food system, or range-tied, which would indicate an abated food system, with an oscillation between the two dependent on the circumstances. The geographical and climate conditions of Ammon would certainly make it more favourable to reach 'a higher level of settlement density, food system intensity, and supra-tribal organization' in comparison to its Transjordan neighbours (LaBianca and Younker 1998: 406). However, a sedentarization lifestyle would not necessarily exclude pastoralism. What settlements did exist in this era evince a less complex social system in comparison to the settlements of Hazor and Megiddo in western Palestine. And, at least in the Late Bronze Age, the material culture of most settlements indicates a self-sufficient subsistence strategy predicated on pastoralism with minimal intensive agriculture. During the Iron Age, settlements within the highlands of Ammon had grown in size and number in part because of Egyptian concerns in western Palestine where they were losing their grip on Canaan due to its socio-political developments. Even with the ascent of a land-tied tribalism and a new, supra-tribal polity known as the Kingdom of Ammon, tribalism as a basic social network did not disappear in Ammon. Rather, tribalism persisted with the coexistence of two economic systems, that of the land-tied agrarianists and that of the range-tied pastoralists. Even after the kingdom's demise, the socio-economic position of el-'Umeiri in the first half of the sixth century BCE reveals the coexistence of these different economies. This major, urban administrative center made use of underdeveloped agricultural hinterland farms in its immediate region as part of 'a well orchestrated governmental infrastructure primarily for the production of wine' to be exported to Babylon as tribute (Herr 1995).

Ammon's importance to the ancient Near Eastern world economy lay in the notable north-south road of the 'King's Highway' connecting Arabia with the major cultural centers of the Fertile Crescent. Other caravan routes

must have traversed the Jordan Valley connecting 'Amman to Jerusalem and the Samaria region. Various finds at Ammonite sites indicate some trade having taken place with Phoenicia (e.g. a seal in Ammonite script mentions Astarte of Sidon), Egypt (e.g. a New Year Flask in a storage cave in the 'Umeiri region), and, of course, Judah and Assyria (e.g. vessels in the tombs at Mazar) (Herr 1997: 171).

Tomb excavations in the 'Amman region have yielded significant insights into the burial customs of the Ammonites. First, the types of tombs range the gamut including natural caves, artificial caves, shaft tombs, built-up types, pit-graves of mud, stone, and brick (with one or both sides lined), with the pit-grave type being the simplest form of burial. Second, anthropoid coffins, jar burials, and larnax burials attest to the use of different coffin types. Third, there were individual and communal burials. Throughout the Iron Age, caves and shaft tombs were used for communal burials with the former being more customary. Fourth, burial practices include the following: objects left for the disposal of the dead in the afterlife (e.g. masculine equipment such as the bow and arrow, spear, and sword); males buried in extended position, females in crouching position; graves and burials oriented in an east-west position with the head to the east; and female burials assigned to a certain part of the cemetery. Fifth, bodies were usually dressed when buried. And finally, the presence and material type of mortuary gifts in tombs reveals social distinctions maintained in burial practices with the tombs of those of an elite social status containing more expensive and lavish items (Yassine 1999: 137-51).

Writing. The Ammonite language belonged to the 'Canaanite' family of Northwest Semitic thus sharing affinities with that of the neighbouring Moabites and Hebrews (see similarities and differences within Fig. 5 in Chapter 4).⁹ What distinctions existed between these languages appears to be insignificant though one, in particular, seems to have been the pronunciation of sibilants (Hendel 1996).

Two views have dominated the discussion of Ammonite writing and whether they used the current Aramaic script or developed their own 'national' script (see Aufrecht 1999a: 167-68). The predominant view maintains an evolutionary development (see Herr 1997: 149, 171-72). Ammonite scribes borrowed from the Aramaic script early on though the language, or dialect, seemed to be Ammonite. That changed as a distinctive 'national' script developed approximately after the mid-eighth century BCE. The Tell Siran inscription and the seal impression of Ba'alyish'a reflect

9. Compared to the Paleo-Hebrew script, the Ammonite characters, while identical in form, were generally upright and simple. Handwriting analysts might posit this as a reflection of Ammonite society as efficient and no-nonsense (Herr 1993: 30).

Ammonite writing. By the late sixth century BCE, the Ammonite script gave way to the Aramaic script of the Persian period. Nonetheless, Ammonite language persisted occurring in some late Heshbon ostraca using Ammonite language but the Aramaic script. Both the Ammonite language and script completely disappeared after 500 BCE.

Religion. No single known text or artifact provides unambiguous direct evidence of a 'state' religion in Ammon or a temple liturgy. Nonetheless, we can assume that Ammonite religion did not function in a cultural vacuum untouched by the world in which it existed. It would have shared in the general characteristics of other ancient Near Eastern, including Canaanite, religions. Thus, the prospect of Ammon not having a 'state' religion or temple complex, especially at the apex of its prosperity as a kingdom, like all the surrounding cultures of the ancient Near Eastern world is completely inconceivable. Some indication may appear in the 'Amman Citadel Inscription' (c. eighth century BCE):

The words of Milkom: Build for yourself entrances roundabout[
] that all who surround you shall surely die[
] I shall surely destroy. All who enter[
] and amid (its) co[lum]ns (the) just will reside[
] (the) innermost door [I shall surely] extinguish[
] you shall gaze in awe in the midst of the porch[
] and s[] *a dot under the second l* and n[]
] ...peace to you and pe[ace]... (Aufrecht 1989: 154-63)

The interpretative consensus of this inscription regards it as instructions to an Ammonite king from the Ammonite god Milkom to build a structure, perhaps a temple (Herr 1997) or the citadel,¹⁰ accompanied with curses (against those who would act hostilely toward the king) and blessings (for those who frequent the structure). Aufrecht (1999b: 155), however, admits of other possible interpretations. William Shea (1979), for instance, interpreted the inscription as Milkom building something for the king of Ammon, namely the citadel and city of Rabbath-Ammon.

Within the same inscription, André Lemaire noted the phrase *bn 'lm* as reference to an Ammonite 'divine council' on the basis of its presence in Ugaritic literature. Aufrecht (1989: 162-63), however, notes equally possible if not more probable interpretations than that of a 'divine council' with numerous deities subsumed into a pantheon. Nonetheless, the inscriptional evidence certainly does not negate the fact that the Ammonites appeared to have recognized a variety of deities—'Adon, 'Addin, 'Ali, 'Amm, 'An,

10. Herr identified certain installations found at Tell el-Umeiri and Rabbath-Ammon as small shrines or 'cultic corners', an identification that does not necessarily exclude them as evidence of popular religion.

'Anat, 'Ashima, 'Astarte/Ishtar, Ba'al, Bes, Dagon, Gad, Haddad, Horus, 'Il, Milkom, Mot, Nanaya, Nir, Ninurta, Qos, Re, Rimmon, Shamash, Sin, Yhwh, Yam, and Yerah—though the preponderance of names contain the theophoric element 'l.¹¹ This data leads to the logical conclusion that 'Il (or 'El) was the chief deity of the Ammonites, not Milkom as identified by the biblical record (1 Kgs 11.5, 33). Moreover, Daviau and Dion (1994) identified so-called Atef-crowned Ammonite statues as those of an Ammonite deity, namely 'Il. The word 'Il in the Deir 'Alla texts is the proper name of a deity not a common noun. So what should we make of this confusion over names and the identity of the Ammonite chief deity? Susan Ackerman (1992: 132) noted that 'Il and Milkom are certainly not two distinct gods but that Milkom was most likely 'an epithet of El, elevated to the status of proper name' in the same manner as Yahweh in Hebrew culture. We can conclude on this point that, whatever the nature of the 'state' religion in Ammon, the cult was most likely that of 'Il known also by the epithet Milkom.

If we take Shea's interpretation of the Citadel Inscription as indication of what Milkom does, we gain some insight into the Ammonite perspective on their chief national deity Milkom. Milkom acts in the manner of a landscaper or architect creating defences and fortifications. Shea uses the metaphor of a military engineer. Also, the imagery of a warrior god occurs but with a different nuance in contrast to the depiction of Chemosh in the contemporary Mesha Stele. Milkom makes battlement preparations and fights for his people from a defensive posture contra the offensive posture of Chemosh (Shea 1979: 23-24). And numerous seals depict Milkom with the iconographic symbol of a bull with huge horns, perhaps a reflection of Ammonite figurations of Milkom akin to its Canaanite neighbours, namely as virile and powerful.

The material evidence from Ammon does provide us with some insight into Ammonite beliefs about their deities as well as popular religious practices of the Ammonites. The theophoric personal names would seem to indicate the following (Muntingh 1996: 267-82): anthropomorphic perceptions of their deity; the concept of deity approaching humankind; the deity observes or takes humankind into account; the deity has some involvement in birth events; the deity as strong, able to provide protection, support, salvation,

11. In spite of these varied deities, the Ammonite onomasticon lacks a great variety of deities thus prompting Jeffrey Tigay (1987: 171) to question the Ammonites as polytheistic. He goes on to say that 'one might conclude that they were no more pluralistic in religion than were the Israelites'. The presence of Mesopotamian deities in personal names furthermore attests to Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian influences upon Ammonite iconography.

and help; the deity as gracious and compassionate; the deity as transcendent and exalted; and the deity as judge and ruler. Prayers to the deities were commonplace. The Tell Siran Bottle Inscription contains what Aufrecht (1999b: 155) claims 'appears to be a petition from or on behalf of the king to an unnamed deity for successful and long-lasting produce'. Scenes on seals depict human figures at altars with upraised arms. One particular Ammonite seal contains a prayer invoking the blessing of a deity by means of a personal vow (Aufrecht 1999b: 156). But what about the practice of child sacrifice? We know it was widely practiced in the ancient Near East and even in the Transjordan region. King Mesha of Moab sacrificed his own son in an effort to avoid defeat in battle. Jo Ann Hackett (1987: 133-34) notes a connection, tendentious at best, between the name Shaddai and child sacrifice at Deir 'Alla and in Psalm 106 as well as evidence of a sacrificial cult at Deir 'Alla. The closest piece of evidence to child sacrifice in Ammon, however, came from J. B. Hennessy's excavations at the 'Amman airport in the 1960s where he found a Late Bronze Age tophet, an area where child sacrifices took place. Though Hennessy's findings have not gone unchallenged, Ackerman (1992: 120) regards the data as solid. In the end, the routinization of child sacrifice within the ancient Near Eastern world, in the Transjordan region, and within Israel (in spite of certain biblical prohibitions) would seem reason enough to view it as present in Ammon as well.

Art. Apart from the information that the Ba'alīs seal from Tell el-'Umeiri provides us concerning the socio-political context of Ammon in the late seventh to early sixth centuries BCE, it and a number of other seals shed further possible light on the royal iconography of Ammon. The two other distinctively Ammonite seals bear the inscriptions of 'Shoher, the standard bearer' and 'Menahem', respectively. More importantly, however, is their point of commonality with the Ba'alīs seal from Tell el-'Umeiri, namely the presence of a four-winged scarab beetle pushing a solar ball, flanked on both sides by standard-like depictions, each with a lunar crescent above and a single letter above the crescent, in the very center of a tripartite register. A. Douglas Tushingham's (1970: 71-78; 1971: 23-35) studies of Samarian seal impressions with the same iconography of the four-winged beetle led him to conclude this iconography as the royal insignia of the northern kingdom of Israel concurred by Younker (1985: 174-76).¹² Obviously, this conclusion raises the question of some connection between Israelite and

12. Though the motif of the scarab beetle 'pushing balls' in ancient Middle Eastern art originated as an Egyptian concept, Egyptian art only depicts the scarab beetle with six legs extended, never with a sun ball or with extended wings. Egyptian iconography eventually adopted the two-winged beetle motif but never the four-winged (Tushingham 1970: 75).

Ammonite iconography. That Ammon would adopt this iconography does not surprise given Israelite prominence over the Transjordanian kingdoms and Ammon's vassal status to Israel and Judah variously for much of the ninth-sixth centuries BCE. Israelite influence upon Ammon, according to Younker (whose conclusion rests in part on the observations of Tushingham), would naturally be expected. The identical iconographic elements of these seals along with their connection to the Ammonite royal court make it likely 'that the seal motifs represent the royal insignia of the kingdom of Ammon' (Younker 1985: 175). The adoption of this motif by Ammon only underscores the zenith of its political power and prestige by the 7th and sixth centuries BCE. But if these are royal seals, queries Younker (1985: 178), would they not also bear the symbol for the national deity? As yet, the evidence only admits of speculation on this question, but its answer would seem to hinge on two factors: (1) the translation of Milkom'ur (possibly as 'light or flame of Milkom') and (2) the relationship of Milkom to El and the El cult.

The material culture of numerous limestone busts, sculptures, and figurines dating from the eighth-sixth centuries BCE would seem to indicate this period as the apex of Ammonite culture. Accompanying the majority of male figurines are depictions of horses, camels, fish, and the Egyptian household god Bes. Female figurines holding a tambourine are also prominent. Limestone busts of the head of a male wearing a headdress similar to the Egyptian *atef* crown represent the crown worn by Ammonite kings. Free standing, male statues appear to depict noble or royal personages while female sculptures 'are restricted to double-faced heads' (Younker 1994: 307-09).

While the archaeological record undoubtedly reflects little or no break in the material remains east of the Jordan at the time of the Babylonian captivity of Judah, we can safely conclude that they, unlike their Judean neighbours, were apparently not exiled and remained in their homeland where their culture not only continued unscathed but flourished.

Ethnicity

Origins

The origins of the Ammonites remain shrouded in mystery. From the Israelite perspective, Ammonite origins are rooted in incest. Their indigeneity in Canaan originates with the birth of their eponymous ancestor Ben-'Ammi, whose mother, following the plan of her elder sister, got her father Lot drunk, slept with him, and conceived by him (Gen. 19). But such

a re-presentation, as most scholars would admit, reflects more a polemical smear campaign than actual fact.

Historians speculate about Ammonite origins beyond their biblical re-presentation. According to Gottwald (1979: 429, 433), following Mendenhall, the Ammonites, along with other peoples of the Transjordanian population, originated in Canaan only to migrate to the Transjordan because of socio-economic inequalities where, over time, they established new ethnic identities. The hypotheses by Mendenhall and Gottwald of collapsing lowland Canaanite cities and migration of Canaanites into the Transjordan betray biases within biblical scholarship in that these hypotheses hinge on theories about the emergence of Israel in Palestine and assume the nonexistent occupation of the Transjordan region by the biblical ethnic groups. Israeli archaeologist Israel Finkelstein stringently counters the migration hypothesis by suggesting that the Ammonites were already present in Transjordan. In addition, archaeological records indicate the presence of Ammonites within the Transjordan highlands long before any presence of a group known as Israel. Studies of the material culture from Tell el-'Umeiri, for instance, reveal a 'process of continuous development between the Late Bronze and the Iron Age' (Herr 1992).

While we lack any certainties about Ammonite origins or exactly when a particular ethnic group came to know itself as 'Ammonite', we can agree with Younker (1994: 304), on the basis of continuity in settlement patterns in the Transjordan highlands of Ammon, that 'there is no reason not to assume that the Iron Age Ammonites were derived directly from the Late Bronze Age population of central Transjordan' (for a fuller discussion of the nuanced positions on the origin and early history of the Ammonites, see Younker 1994: 297-304). Younker (1994: 206) takes his conclusion further by claiming the ancestors of the Ammonites to be the Late Bronze Age highland pastoralists, the 'Shasu or Hab/piru type peoples'.

Perceptions

Israelite perceptions about Ammonite origins do not diverge significantly from those of their Moabite neighbours as discussed in the previous Chapter. The two are so inextricably connected to one another that Hebrew perceptions tend to depict them as mirror images of one another. Whatever one does, the other does too; whatever one is involved in, the other is naturally involved in as well. Therefore, for the sake of expediency, I will dispense with any similar discussion of Ammonite origins and refer the reader to Chapter 4 instead.

Throughout the Hebrew literary tradition, the Ammonites come across as an aggressive, hostile, group of land-grabbers. But who was not in the

ancient Near Eastern world? The dominant voice redolent in the primary history (Num. 21.24; Deut. 2.19-21, 37; Josh. 12.2; 13.10, 25) limits Ammonite territory to the upper regions of the Jabbok River in the vicinity nearest Rabbath-Ammon. Israelite territory included that of Gilead closest to the Jordan and extended from the Arnon to the Jabbok River. The history of biblical commentary on these texts follows suit in its perceptions thus reinforcing the dominant voice. But another voice eclipsed reveals several points worthy of consideration. First, the territory occupied by King Sihon and the Amorites from the Arnon to the Jabbok initially belonged to Moab though by the sixth century BCE it had come under Ammonite control. Nevertheless, Israel had no reservations about taking political control of land considered Moabite and thumbing their noses at the Moabites with a taunt-song to boot (Num. 21.27-30). Second, the territory just east of the Jordan River extending from the Arnon to the Jabbok given to the tribe of Gad includes acknowledged Ammonite land, and certainly under Ammonite political control in the Persian era. The dominant voice of such texts concretize the land ideology that 'Israel' of Persian Yehud has a divine right to the land east of the Jordan despite acknowledgement of its divine proscription to another ethnic group and the divine prohibition to avoid harassment or military encounters. What the primary history glosses over, the eclipsed voice does not—'Israel' has designs on land not its own, the acquisition of which these texts sanction by means of fierce hostility and violent aggression. The consumption of such texts would have fostered perceptions of superiority on the part of those identifying themselves as 'Israel' when, politically and militarily, they had not the capability, manpower, and/or funding to engage in such an extensive colonization project. Nor would the Persian authorities have permitted such unrest under their regime.

In addition to the re-presentation of the shameful origins of the Ammonites, the Jewish tradition highlights their notable distinction as having withheld sustenance to the Hebrews when they wandered through the desert. This point and that of their participation in the prophet-for-hire scheme serve as the *raison* for their ignominious distinction of denied access into the assembly of Yhwh in perpetuity (Deut. 23.3-6). These actions of the Ammonites foster re-presentations of them in the primary history as plotting, scheming, and deceitful. But were they indeed? When we examine the primary history closely, several points surface to belie the veracity of such a re-presentation. First, Israel never asked Ammon if it could go through its territory; in fact, Israel did not need to since it never recognized Ammonite territory beyond the region of Rabbath-Ammon though slip-pages in the primary history reveal knowledge otherwise. But why would Israel in its literary traditions castigate the Ammonites for not offering hospitality? Simply because Edom and Moab were asked but declined? So if

Moab does, or does not in this instance, Ammon does likewise? Why single out the Ammonites and Moabites for exclusion from the assembly of Yhwh in perpetuity while the Edomites, who presumably acted more lecherously toward Israel, only face a limited exclusion? And was hospitality simply all that Israel was after? Since when is hospitableness equated to an open invitation to an armed group of people with militaristic designs on the hostile takeover of land? And how can a violation of the hospitality code of the ancient Near Eastern world by the Ammonites maintain when Israel never went through Ammonite territory according to their own understanding? Only had Israel gone through Ammonite territory and Ammon refused hospitality could the accusation of their violation of the hospitality code have force. Whether a large group of people or recurring waves of groups advancing through the Transjordanian region, however one understands the Exodus event and Israelite presence in Canaan, perhaps Ammon (and Moab and Edom) knew all too well the potential threat to land and children and to their political, economic, and social stability that such passage through their territory would entail. But that does not necessarily make them inhospitable; they would simply have gone into self-defence mode, as would any other group in the ancient Near Eastern world at that time. That Israel had no qualms about taking territory divinely proscribed for another ethnic group as it did with traditionally Moabite territory occupied by the Amorites and taunting the Moabites by their actions renders the accusation of inhospitableness as specious. What makes most sense is that the literary tradition of territory conquered by Israel, however accurate or misinformed, 'papers over' the socio-political reality of same territory under Ammonite control during the Persian era.

Second, the primary history directly connects Ammonite exclusion from the assembly of Yhwh with their participation in the prophet-for-hire scheme. But another tradition attributes this incident to the collaborative efforts of the Moabites and Midianites (Num. 22.1-14). Nowhere do we find any hint of cooperation by the Ammonites, even if indirectly. In a related incident, a subsequent plague befalls Israel due to their exogamous marriages with Moabites (Num. 25). This concern with exogamous marriages surely reflects the social concerns of the ruling elite in Persian Yehud. It would seem that Ammonite exclusion in the literary tradition could best be explained in terms of guilt-by-association. They bear an association with Moab in morally questionable behaviour and through various military incursions—definitely in alliances against Jericho (Judg. 3), and possibly in alliances during the time of Jephthah (Judg. 10.6-7), Saul's days (1 Sam. 14.47), David's tenure (2 Sam. 8.12), and in Judah's last days (2 Kgs 24.2). When we note the textual overlapping of the Moabite and Ammonite ethnic myths, however, we find very limited collaboration between the

Moabites and Ammonites against Israel. Whatever kinship may have actually existed between the Moabites and Ammonites, to re-present the latter as an ethnic group devoid of any distinctive impulses of its own becomes an act of depersonalization.

All these details naturally beg the question, Why Ammon? Why typecast Ammon as hostile and aggressive and/or as plotting or scheming? As reflected in the postexilic texts of Ezra and Nehemiah, the Yehud elite could care less about maintaining distinctions between all the different ethnic groups of that time, many of whom no doubt lived in Yehud; instead, exogamous marriages and political control dominated their focus. 'Israel' transferred what religious guilt it perceived in itself upon its powerful neighbours who could threaten their control of Yehud. With slurs and denigrating connotations of association that only serve the purpose to dehumanize, they shifted the blame for the downfall of its own people with regard to sex and religion by re-presenting the Ammonites as incestuous bastards whose selfish plotting concerns only the destiny of its own group. Again, why Ammon? Because the province of Ammon had surpassed that of Yehud in material, political, and economic prosperity during the sixth-fifth centuries BCE. Moreover, Tobiah, a prominent Ammonite, had intermarried in the family of the high priest Eliashib and had taken up occupancy in the Temple. The cumulative effect of the Ammonite myth within the primary history has the desired effect, separation...social, political, cultural, economic, and religious. When the reading from Deuteronomy 23.8 had concluded, the assembly of Yhwh immediately expelled Tobiah from the Temple precincts and initiated anti-miscegenation policies (Neh. 13). The rejection of Sanballat, Tobiah, and Geshem from Nehemiah's wall project (Neh. 2.20) echoes that against the 'people of the land' in the Temple project (Ezr. 4.3), thus joining themes of reestablishing the 'house of God' (a metaphor for the *golah* community) to that of (re)building walls: the 'house of God' was *figuratively* built in just that manner—with walls.

Conclusion

From a psychological and sociological perspective, the re-presentation of events surrounding the Ammonites and their concomitant effects would have had a significant impact on relations between the Yehud elite and the Ammonites, especially given a prominent Ammonite (Tobiah) in Yehud who had received certain Temple favours. Moreover, certain cultural affinities between the Yehudites and Ammonites would have contributed to the perceptions of the latter by the former. First, various seal impressions reflect the shared royal motif of the four-winged scarab between Ammon and the kingdoms of Israel and Judah. Second, the Ammonite language

bears a remarkable relation to those of nearby nations, like Israel and Moab. Third, mixed ethnicity in the Judean monarchy (David of Moabite descent; Solomon of an unidentified ethnic descent; and Rehoboam of Ammonite descent) rendered the royal family as anything but pure bluebloods. Ethnic intermarriages among the ruling elite of Yehud prompted the ethnocentric disposition present in the exclusivist policies of the community leaders Ezra and Nehemiah. Fourth, Israelite observations reflected in the primary history clearly regard no distinctions between Ammonite and Moabite ethnicity. Any perceived act of Moabite aggression toward Israel in the national myth naturally assumes Ammonite complicity and vice versa. Altogether, these factors bespeak close, cultural ties between the Ammonites and 'Israel' with the Yehudian elite engaging in the ethnic identity construct of Ben-'Ammi vis-à-vis national myth.

Pai Hua, or The Driven Out

Aside from the typical analyses of the Jephthah cycle within the commentary tradition that focus upon its purpose,¹³ ideological perspectives that analyze this narrative do so with a focus on violence against the feminine, and deservedly so (see the conventional, feminist analyses of this cycle in Phyllis Trible's *Texts of Terror*, J. Cheryl Exum's *Tragedy and Biblical Narrative*, and Athalya Brenner's *A Feminist Companion to Judges*). This analysis will not be one more in the same ideological vein. Nonetheless, the standard interpretative concerns and violence against the feminine together perpetrate an unseen violence. The verbiage of one voice eclipses the cameo comments of another virtually left silent in the narrative process. The voice of 'Israel', symbolized narratively in Jephthah, marginalizes that of the Ammonites with its colonizing discourse of claims of divine right to a land rightfully belonging to the sons of Ammon. Initially, the emphasis upon Ammon and Israel worshipping Ammonite gods foreshadows the irony within this cycle, which comprises an introduction (10.6-16) and four vignettes (10.17-11.11; 11.12-28; 11.29-40; 12.1-7) with diplomatic nego-

13. Various proposals of the story's purpose include the following: reveal Jephthah's integrity because of his willingness to undertake the sacrifice resulting from his vow (Boling 1975: 210); the impropriety of a rashly made vow (Marcus 1986: 54-55); censor tendencies to accommodate religion to political norms (Webb 1987: 74); the refusal of Israel and its leaders to take responsibility for their actions (Klein 1988: 95-96); critique the Deuteronomistic belief that the reasons for punishment and disaster are clear (Römer 1998: 38; similarly, see Polzin 1980: 210); underscores an important theological motif of the Deuteronomist that 'when Israel worships like foreigners, it will act like foreigners' (Janzen 2005: 341); or to make for 'a wonderful, if heart-wrenching story' (Cartledge 1992: 185).

tiations between Jephthah and the sons of Ammon who ultimately become 'pai hua', 'driven out' like the nineteenth-century Chinese Americans.

Risk/Reward

Conflict, or contention, is a major motif within this cycle weaving through each episode. There is contention between Israel and both Ammon and Philistia, conflict between Jephthah and his own family ultimately leading to his inheritance and banishment, contention between Jephthah and his own tribal leaders involving their deliverance from Ammonite subjugation and his future political role, conflict between Jephthah and the Ammonites resulting in their defeat and the sacrifice of his only daughter, and contention between Jephthah and the Israelite tribe Ephraim resolved with the latter's defeat and destruction. With increasing frequency, the Hebrew word עבר ('to cross over', 'to pass through') underscores the conflict with its pervasive connotation of armed conflict. In spite of Hebrew perceptions of the Ammonites as aggressive and hostile, the question must be asked, Who really is the aggressor? Certainly the Hebrew term עבר describes the militaristic actions of the Ammonites engaging Israelites on the other side of the Jordan in armed conflict (10.9). But its preponderance of usage depicts the actions of Jephthah, who crosses through Gilead, Manasseh, and finally to the sons of Ammon as prompted by the spirit of Yhwh (11.29; 11.32; 12.3); the Ephraimites, who cross over to confront Jephthah over his engagement with the sons of Ammon without their support (12.1), and who wish to escape their routing (12.5); and the Israelites, who desire to cross through Edomite and Amorite territory with King Sihon distrustful of Israelite motives (11.17, 19-20), the latter, of course, mediated through the words of Jephthah.

The motif of the spoken word reverberates throughout this cycle with most coming from the lips of Jephthah whose evaluation within scholarship spans the polar opposite descriptions of an 'exemplary Yahwist judge' (Boling 1975: 210) and 'a spiritually flawed character' (Younger 2002: 266). Character is key, especially when a character, driven by political ambitions is so full of words. How much of Jephthah's words can we accept at face value as trustworthy and reliable? Do Jephthah's actions belie his words? Does the narrative force convince us as readers of the Hebrew perceptions of the Ammonites as scheming opportunists or do the distinctive lines between 'us' and 'them' blur? In the end, Susan Niditch's (2008: 123) observation will prove telling: 'They are "the enemy" not because they are so different from Israel, as the writers would have us believe, but because they are regarded as so similar to Israel, sharing many of the same beliefs and aspirations'.

Banished from and disinherited by his home, Jephthah the Gileadite becomes a renegade, an outlaw, a terrorist (note his own self-description as, literally, 'a man of quarreling/contention' in 12.2) who forms around him a group of vagrants (*'nashim reqim*, [lit., 'empty men'] found in Judg. 9.4 to describe Abimelech's henchmen). Just who are Jephthah and his men terrorizing? Citizens of Tob? Gileadite territory? Or perhaps Ammonites? Most likely, Jephthah and his band of brigands terrorized where they could gain the greatest amount of reward irrespective of the risk involved and of tribal/ethnic loyalties. Yet, the Gileadite elders have decided, perhaps on the basis of the reputation of Jephthah's exploits, that he is the right man to command the army and lead it into battle against the Ammonites. He is one of them, but in more ways beyond that of ethnicity. Jephthah's rhetorical question to them, 'Are you not the very ones who rejected me and drove me out of my father's house? Why do you come to me now, when you're in trouble?', indicates his incredulosity commented on by Marcus (1989: 97-98): 'People do not go to those they have rejected for help, nor does the victim of rejection help his rejecters. Nobody in his right mind would come to ask for help in such circumstances...' Jephthah rejects the elders' offer recognizing it for what it is (i.e. an attempt by some unprincipled opportunists to get something 'cheap' than what they would have offered a full Gileadite citizen¹⁴) and, having the upper hand in the negotiations process, tenders the proposal of a reinstatement to his rightful inheritance and position of 'head' or 'chief' over Gilead in addition to army commander. But why would Jephthah accept this offer by those who disinherited him? Could it be that the potential rewards of such an offer—(1) prestige and status among his kinfolk, and (2) revenge against the Ammonites whom he most likely had been terrorizing all along—outweigh the risk (death or further social ignominy)? Could it perhaps be an occasion of 'small-town boy from the wrong side of the tracks makes good'? An attempt perhaps to salvage a dysfunctional background and reverse societal perceptions tagged to an illegitimate, bastard son, rejected and disinherited by his family, and leader of a gang? Such explanations bespeak a character trait of nobility devoid in Jephthah. His appeal to Yhwh, like that of Abimelech, smacks of self-interest. 'The elders of Gilead get the leader they deserve, for, like them, Jephthah is a person who is willing to utilize 'whomever' by whatever

14. On the unscrupulousness of the Gileadite elders, note their comment, 'Whoever will begin the attack on the Ammonites will be the head of all the inhabitants of Gilead' (10.18; emphasis mine). They retract the initial offer of 'head' or 'chief' (*rosh*) in their negotiations with Jephthah willing only to consider him for the position of 'commander' (*qatsin*).

means in order to pursue a private agenda. Both the elders and Jephthah are calculating opportunists using each other' (Younger 2002: 251).

Clearly, Jephthah's negotiation skills reveal a deftness that one would not naturally expect of a terrorist. Those skills are visibly put on display in his 'diplomatic' negotiations with the Ammonite king over disputed land claims. But how much veracity do his claims have? How well do his statements hold up under a 'fact-check'? The gist of the negotiations concerns authority over the land stretching from the Arnon to the Jabbok and west to the Jordan, which, during the Persian era, fell under the control of the province of Ammon. Jephthah's speech, however, intends to demonstrate Israel as the non-aggressor but with entitlement to the same land territory in question on the other side of the Jordan. As Jephthah reiterates the history of land claims, his words undoubtedly reflect the default Hebrew perception in that (1) he associates Moab with Ammon and (2) he claims that Israel skirted the eastern boundaries of Moab. On the first point, when perceptions conflate Moab with Ammon and vice versa, any acknowledgement of Moabite territory is implicitly an acknowledgement of Ammonite territory. To maintain distinctions only when convenient to do so reflects a logical incongruity. On Jephthah's second point, his acknowledgement of Israel's defeat of King Sihon and possession of territory that the primary history identifies as Moabite belies other claims in the primary history concerning Israel's route as well as the mere logistics embodied within such a claim. How could Israel have actually skirted the eastern boundaries of Moab if they had taken possession of ancestral Moabite land west of Moab and yet not encroach also upon admitted Ammonite territory?

Jephthah's disputation, like that of many skilled politicians, appears quite logical, especially when he appeals to the religio-political ideology of the day (11.24). A people must accept the will of its gods, including the land boundaries of nations established by the gods. Just as Israel possesses the lands that Yhwh gives them, so the sons of Ammon must abide by the decision of their god Chemosh.¹⁵ Perhaps not surprisingly thereafter, the negotiations between Jephthah and the Ammonite king abruptly terminate. Jephthah has committed a political foreign policy faux pas by insulting the leader of another nation and torpedoing the negotiations process. Chemosh is not the god of the Ammonites, but rather the god of the Moabites (see attestation in biblical texts, e.g. 1 Kgs 11.5, 7, 33, the Mesha Inscription, and Moabite seals discussed in ch. 4). Here again, Jephthah conflates Ammon

15. Robert O'Connell (1995: 196-99) suggests that the Ammonite king had recently taken over Moabite territory and as a matter of diplomatic protocol deferred to Moabite deities. Such an assumption lacks support in the face of Ammonite inscriptions making no reference anywhere to Chemosh.

with Moab. Should we attribute this faux pas to Jephthah's ignorance? It is completely inconceivable that an individual living in the Transjordanian region so close to the territory of Ammon would not know the chief god of Ammon. Moreover, this text's consumption in the Persian era would reflect and perpetuate a depersonalized attitude toward the Ammonites. This appeal therefore would seem to be inflammatory rhetoric with no regard for ethnic distinctions between Moabites and Ammonites simply intended to provoke a confrontation. After all, Jephthah stands to gain a great deal personally from this encounter reaping the benefits of an expanded base of operations (beyond inconspicuous Tob), land control (with its attendant resources), and sphere of political authority. What astounds, besides the fact that the commentary tradition overlooks this important point fueling the 'diplomatic' negotiations, are the lengths to which some assert the truthfulness of Jephthah's argument such that the Ammonite king can pose no reasonable rebuttal. Younger (2002: 258), for instance, suggests that the effect of Jephthah's speech leaving the Ammonite king speechless only underscores 'that the Ammonite king had his heart set beforehand and really did not care about "truth and accuracy"'.¹⁶ In the same vein, McCann (2002: 80-81) attributes the subsequent armed conflict to the refusal of the Ammonite king to recognize Israel's claims to the land in dispute. Other possibilities exist beyond the colonizing perspective of a narrative that privileges 'Israel' reinforced by the commentary tradition of biblical studies. One question though, Who initiated the negotiation proceedings?

The negotiations between Jephthah and the Ammonite king yield the desired result, namely armed conflict with Jephthah 'crossing over' to the Ammonites after having done so in Gilead and Manasseh (though his presence there may have only been for recruitment purposes).¹⁷ With lucrative prospects at stake, Jephthah seeks to ensure his potential reward with a vow to Yhwh that risks anyone but him. Whether one regards the vow as rash and hasty (Klein 1988: 95; Boling 1975: 215-16) or manipulative (Webb 1987: 64; O'Connell 1995: 180-81) or perhaps both (Younger 2002: 262),

16. In addition to Boling's (1975: 205) estimation of Jephthah's speech reflecting 'a high historicity', Pamela Reis (1997: 282, 294 n. 6) notes 'Jephthah's comprehension of Israel's history...as accurately informed' and his 'conspicuous cognizance of his people's history and traditions', which altogether render his portrayal as 'devout, knowledgeable, and measured of speech' (282). I concur that Jephthah does not desire a negotiated peace with the Ammonites but for reasons other than her conclusion that the speech was 'intended as a morale builder and a recruiting speech for his own people' (280; along the same interpretative lines, see Webb 1987: 62).

17. Jephthah's actions raise the question of whether Jephthah intends to extend his authority beyond Gilead to other Israelite clans, including Ephraim (Willis 1997: 42). His attempt to do so may explain Ephraimite hostility toward him (12.1-7).

Jephthah clearly leaves nothing to chance despite the presence of the spirit of Yhwh upon him. The words of Jephthah's vow ('whoever/whatever') eerily those of the unscrupulous Gileadite leaders and will, in the end, place the life of his daughter, who has no direct involvement in this affair, within the crosshairs. Scholars naturally question, Did he intend a human sacrifice with this vow (on the affirmative, see Webb 19987: 64, 227 n. 51, 52; Klein 1988: 91; on the negative, see Boling 1975: 208-209; and Marcus 1986)?¹⁸ The ambiguous nature of the text allows no definitive answer to the question though the fact that Jephthah never uses the feminine gender with his indeterminate reference 'whoever/whatever' may indicate his expectation to sacrifice someone/thing other than his daughter. To add insult to injury, Jephthah attempts to shift the blame for his vow to his daughter rather than consulting Phinehas the priest or rescuing her through the redemption of the vow (Lev. 27.1-8), a possibility in the cases of vows like this one made without a full reflection upon their possible ramifications. In a tragic irony Jephthah suffers the same fate as that of his daughter, childlessness. His willingness to sacrifice his daughter overturns any stability achieved by victory over the Ammonites. Jephthah becomes another oppressor rather than a deliverer. Jephthah's child sacrifice makes him, in a twist of characterization, the typical Ammonite since Ammonites, not Israelites, engage in such a barbarous practice roundly excoriated within the biblical tradition (see Lev. 18.21; 20.2-5; Isa. 57. 3-13). But the fact that a select, literate cross-section of the population, definitely in the minority, would openly condemn the practice provides evidence to the practice's routinization among the populace throughout much of the history of Israel even after the Josianic reforms (see Exod. 13.1-2; 22.29; 34.19; Mic. 6.6-7; Ezek. 20.26; 2 Kgs

18. Reis's (1997) analysis argues that Jephthah's vow should be understood metaphorically that he never intended to sacrifice a human. For one, that would run counter to his character portrayal of someone knowledgeable of Israelite history and, by assumption, of Israelite law. Instead, his daughter becomes a vowed and redeemed person regarded as a burnt sacrifice and can no longer do productive work.

19. Ackerman addresses this complex historical issue—to whom (El? Molech?), proper candidates (firstborn? any other child?), practice (only in times of crisis? routinized?), and reasons for the practice—as it relates to ancient Israel. She concludes *molek* as a technical term of sacrifice, not the name of a deity, with sacrifices made to the god of child sacrifice, El (1992: 133, 137). Child sacrifice appears to have been routine in Israel with a regular and well-established cult site, the Tophet in the valley of Ben-Hinnom (140-41; see the following biblical passages: 2 Kgs 23.10; 2 Chron. 28.3; 33.6; Jer. 7.31-32; 19.2, 6; 32.35). Early on, the practice may well have been reserved exclusively for the firstborn but came to include any child vowed as the cult evolved over time (137-39).

3.27; 16.3; 21.6; and the thorough discussion on the topic of child sacrifice by Ackerman 1992: 117-43).¹⁹

With the tactlessness reflected in the negotiations with Ammon, Jephthah responds to Ephraimite criticism against him with language like that posed to the Ammonite king (compare the Hebrew of 11.12 with 12.3), though the element of personal effrontery here is more blatant. Jephthah responds that he had summoned Ephraim to a call to arms, endangering his own life when they did not respond. But no such call appears in the narrative thus raising our ears concerning the veracity of Jephthah's words, which seem more concerned with exonerating him from any personal culpability than anything else. Moreover, whose life did Jephthah really take into his own hands? His? Really?!? The veracity of Jephthah's words notwithstanding, conflict between the Ephraimites and Gileadites is inevitable and underscores the obvious internal dissension and regional conflicts within the ranks of 'Israel' alone. Yehudite leaders excoriated its citizens for the diverse ethnic mixture within the community. The Gileadites lived with Ephraimite attitudes of superiority that looked down upon the Gileadites as 'illegitimates' and 'bastards',²⁰ a tag that certainly would have struck a personal chord with the illegitimate, 'son of a prostitute'. In the ensuing shameful rout of the Ephraimites, the Gileadites render the Ephraimites as the true fugitives of Ephraim (*pelite 'ephrayim*, cf. 12.4 and 12.5) on the basis of their speech impediment. Ironically, the ability of the Gileadites to pronounce *shibboleth* with the *shin* (as opposed to the Ephraimite pronunciation of the word with a *samek*) makes them more linguistically similar to the Ammonites (Hendel 1996: 69-75).

How the cycle ends reveals something telling about Jephthah, his character, and his role as judge. Unlike the typical, formulaic ending of the episodic Judges' narratives, the Jephthah cycle lacks any boon to the Hebrew community characteristic of hero myths. No peace comes to the land as a direct result of Jephthah's actions. Rather, like Samson, all of Jephthah's conflicts are personal or, at the very least, borne out of personal motives and gain. His wars with the Ammonites benefit him ultimately, not the Hebrew community. And his conflicts may perhaps shed light on a personal history with the Ammonites filled with ongoing regional animosity and acts of vengeance. The potential reward Jephthah stands to gain incites his opportunism casting a doubt of suspicion upon all his words regarding land claims, boundary lines, a misidentification of a national deity, blame for a vow, and efforts at tribal collaboration that fail to elicit trust.

Contentiousness breeds contentiousness in a cycle of violence, seen and unseen. Illegitimate, rejected, and disinherited, Jephthah seized an oppor-

20. The Transjordanians feared this very exclusion by Israelite perceptions of them on the western side of the Jordan as second-class Israelite citizens (see Jos. 22).

tunity that, in the end, perpetuated a cycle of violence rather than breaking it. The unseen violence of Jephthah's dysfunctional background extends to the seen violence of child sacrifice (his abused daughter becoming the symbol for all those of abusive fathers) and fratricide in a narrative ideologically masking another unseen violence—the depersonalization of the Ammonites. Contra the primary history's ethno-type of the Ammonites, it is 'Israel' (via its narrative symbol Jephthah) who is cunning, opportunistic, child-sacrificing aggressive land-grabbers, all characteristics that the primary history would have us associate *only* with the sons of Ammon. All nations in the ancient Near Eastern world were opportunists seizing upon what time and circumstance might provide for the expansion of their land holdings. That is not the point though. What is important to note is the literary sleight-of-hand that would distract from the effects of an unseen violence perpetrated by a seemingly 'harmless' re-presentation. Instead, the mimicry of the 'other' that would establish a re-presentation of difference ultimately reinforces the menace of mimicry, that notion of total difference but not quite. 'Other' is not completely and entirely 'other' as it reflects and is reflected by 'self'; Ammon as 'Israel', 'Israel' as Ammon.

'California for Americans!'

Throughout the 19th and the early part of the twentieth centuries, US population in the West expanded significantly with Asian immigration comprising five distinct groups: Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Filipinos, and Asian Indian. Almost 1 million people had migrated, with customs officials estimating about 370,000 Chinese in Hawaii and California between the late 1840s and early 1880s; approximately 400,000 Japanese between the 1880s and the first decade of the twentieth century; 7,000 Koreans, 180,000 Filipinos, and 7,000 Asian Indians in the first third of the twentieth century. These figures, of course, do not take into consideration the numbers of immigrants from these ethnic groups in other decades. What these numbers do not ostensibly reveal, however, is a larger global process during this historical period. Europe was expanding searching for land,

21. In the case of the Chinese, this observation may not entirely be accurate. Prior to the nineteenth century, the Chinese had demonstrated a long history of migration with 10,000 Chinese in Thailand and 20,000 in the Philippines by the seventeenth century. Nonetheless, the greatest migration of Chinese occurred in the nineteenth century with an estimated two and a half million migrating to Hawaii (an independent kingdom from 1810-1893, a republic from 1894-1910, and US territory from 1900-1959), Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Southeast Asia, the west Indies, South America, and Africa, in addition to the US, between 1840 and 1900 (Takaki 1998: 31-32).

profits, power, and souls by sending its colonists, capitalists, soldiers, and missionaries. European expansion into Asian regions especially indirectly propelled the steady streams of Asian migrations.²¹ The activities of the British and Americans alike in China and India, by the former, and in Japan, Korea, and the Philippines, by the latter, initiated the influx of immigrants from these countries into California and British Columbia and into Hawaii and the Pacific Coast, respectively (Chan 1991: 3, 23). It is the experience of the Chinese alone that preoccupies the focus of this section as it explores the risk-reward factor in their immigration, their culture, and stereotypic re-presentations driving exclusionary tactics (discussed in the next section) that ultimately only exacerbated the very problem Anglos sought to eradicate.

(Trans)Migrations Westward

Regardless of 'official' activities, trans migratory movements on the ground by Chinese and Ammonites alike were not motivated by wholesale land or territorial acquisitions. Just as potential economic prosperity motivated Jephthah, so the search for a better life including expanded economic opportunities propelled the migrations of Chinese throughout the global world and Ammonites throughout the Transjordanian and Cisjordanian regions in spite of Ammonite and 'Israelite' officials jockeying for political control of land and its potential economic revenue, perhaps control of Yehud by the former and control of Ammon by the latter through colonialist ideology of divine destiny and through encouraged immigration, by both. Unfortunately, the desired reward of economic prosperity that outweighed any risk involved resulted in the contact zones of Gilead for Ammonites and Jews and *Gam Saan* ('Gold Mountain') for Chinese and Euro-Americans.

The potential economic prosperity occasioned by the gold rush of 1849 led to the steady but gradually increasing influx of Chinese into California from 325 to 450 in 1850, 2,716 in 1851, 20,026 in 1852, an average of between 2,000 and 9,000 per year for the next decade, and some 40,000 from 1867-1870 during the construction of the first transcontinental railroad. Californians extrapolated from this perceived local problem of Chinese immigration a national problem since, by 1870, 63,000 Chinese had come to reside within the US. Nonetheless, the Chinese comprised the majority of California's population in the last three decades of the nineteenth century (78, 71, 67, and 51 percent in 1870, 1880, 1890, and 1900, respectively) with 84 and 45 percent in the mining counties alone in 1860 and 1870. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Chinese had made the transition from predominantly a rural population to an urban population, e.g. an

increase from 24 percent of the population in San Francisco and the Bay Area in 1870 to 45 percent by 1900 (Chan 1991: 28; Takaki 1998: 79).

Asian historians have generally described the Asian, and especially the Chinese, immigration into the US in terms of the 'push-pull' effect (for fuller discussion of the theories accounting for the anti-Chinese movement of the late nineteenth century that eventually gave way to the anti-Japanese movement of the early twentieth century, see Okihiro 2001a: 75-99). With Hong Kong newspapers in the 1850s reporting the presence of gold in the streets of the US for the taking, and similar advertisements announcing the presence of jobs in agriculture and on the railroads in 1867, many individuals 'from a different shore' felt the 'pull' to seek new and better opportunities that life in China would never provide. One young man in Canton wrote his brother engaged in the tea trade in Boston: 'Good many Americans speak of California. Oh! Very rich country! I hear good many Americans and Europeans go there. Oh! They find gold very quickly, so I hear' (as quoted in Takaki 1998: 34). A ship-broker pamphlet, for instance, advertised, 'Americans are very rich people. They want the Chinaman to come and make him very welcome. There you will have great pay, large houses, and food and clothing of the finest description...Money is in great plenty and to spare in America' (as quoted in Takaki 1998: 63). Similarly, one Chinese immigrant in the US commented:

In those days, in China, or Hong Kong, you get out of school, means you don't get a job, period. That means life is probably pretty tough for you. It's almost impossible to find a job. So coming to America is one of the better ways perhaps to have a better future. So everybody told you it's good here. They don't tell you the laundrymen, people work eighteen hours a day, they don't tell you this. They only tell you, it's a lot of gold, go and dig (as quoted in Hsu 2000: 53).

Most Chinese, excepting the 'coolies' (contract slaves or 'unfree laborers who had been kidnapped or pressed into service by coercion', Takaki 1998: 36) who were sold to work the guano pits and sugar fields of Peru and Cuba, had a say in their transmigration to the US or Canada, first to find gold, then to build railroads. Chinese migrants to the US came voluntarily contra the popular stereotype of them in the US as 'coolies' (labourers who worked for a pittance to undermine the wages of honest Americans; see Brands 2002: 333). Chinese leaders responded, 'If you mean by "coolies", laborers, many of our countrymen in the mines are coolies, and many again are not. There are among them tradesmen, mechanics, gentry...and schoolmasters, who are reckoned with the gentry, and with us considered a respectable class of people' (as quoted in Brands 2002: 333). The enticement of

having land also contributed to the 'pull' effect. Chinese land by 1870 had become so overpopulated (more than 400 million by 1840) that it could not only sustain the burgeoning population but it had also become uncultivable. Land in the western US, however, was plentiful. The development of plantations, the mining industry, new cities, ports, the railroad industry, and the agricultural sector requiring enormous amounts of cheap labour additionally 'pulled' Chinese from abroad. Clearly, economic reasons drove Chinese migrations to the US in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Hsu 2000: 24, 27-29).

The 'push' effect upon Chinese immigrants was not isolated from the 'pull' effect; rather, they were interrelated. Numerous factors contributed to the 'push' effect, not least of which would have included certain natural phenomena. Between 1851 and 1908, China suffered through 14 serious floods, 7 typhoons, 4 earthquakes, 2 severe droughts, 4 epidemics, and 5 great famines, all of which took a heavy economic toll (Hsu 2000: 25). But the disrupted economies within China and increased poverty directly exacerbated by (if not wholly attributed to) Western intrusions into Chinese affairs 'pushed' Chinese 'pulled' by the allurements of economic prosperity. The Opium Wars of 1839-42 and 1856-60 (sometimes referred to as the Anglo-Chinese War) erupted from Chinese government attempts to reestablish its authority in the face of Western powers 'opening' China to trade (vis-à-vis the opium trade) and Christian proselytization. The British, and later American, government engaged in the export of opium to China in an effort to offset import expenses of tea and silk from China. The Chinese government deplored the opium trade because it made addicts of and wreaked havoc upon Chinese citizens inciting rebellions among the peasants. The Treaty of Nanking ended the first Opium War and guaranteed privileges to Western traders (e.g. increased Chinese ports for foreign commerce, an indemnity of 21 million silver dollars, and the allowance of Christian missionaries in certain locales) that adversely affected the common Chinese whose cottage industries declined and taxes skyrocketed. The loss of the second Opium War by the Chinese only wrung further concessions from the Chinese including the legalization of opium (Chan 1991: 7-8). In an effort to pay the exorbitant indemnities to the West, the Qing Dynasty imposed higher taxes on the peasants. Concurrent with this indirect after-effect of Western intrusion were three inter-ethnic conflicts, violently intense: (1) the Taiping Rebellion (1850-64), which resulted in an estimated 10 million deaths; (2) the Red Turban Rebellion (1854-1864); and (3) the bloody strife between the *Punti* ('Local People') and the *Hakkas* ('Guest People') that took 200,000 lives from 1854-67 (see Hsu 2000: 25-27; Chan 1991: 8). The precariousness of a life marked by violence and turmoil fueling the economic downturn within China 'pushed' many Chinese

from their home country ‘pulled’ by the potential economic upswing within the US.

Chinese immigrants early on sought after the pot of gold at both ends of the rainbow in the Pacific—wealth in America, family and leisure in China. The potential reward from making fast and easy fortunes and then retiring to China to enjoy life with wives and sons far outweighed any risks involved. All faced the harsh obstacle of travel itself, but the dream persisted for many in the face of the harsh realities of thousands sacrificing their youth and health to decades of hard labour only to, in the end, never return to China. As one Chicago laundryman described his own experience,

Oh! I don’t know. When I heard about a chance to go to America, the hardship just didn’t occur to me. All I got excited about was to take the chance—going to America!...Now I am here, I begin to feel America is work, work, work. It is nothing to get excited about (as quoted in Hsu 2000: 53).

Similarly, the 1909 US Commission of Immigration noted, ‘A Chinaman will apparently undergo any hardship or torture, take any risk or pay any sum of money up to \$1,000 to enjoy the forbidden but much coveted privilege of living and working in the United States’ (as quoted in Hsu 2000: 55). One particular hardship endured was the separation from family. Very seldom were immigrants ever able to return to China and reunite with their families.²² The sojourn, albeit temporary in the beginning, was hard as well for the women left behind. The reality of Gold Mountain dreams that motivated the reward of economic mobility in spite of the risk of separation from family resulted in neither material wealth in the US nor the desired life of luxury and family in China.

Both large and small associations helped Chinese immigrants establish and maintain networks of kinship both in the US and in China. The large Gold Mountain firms known as *jinshanzhuang*, which began operations during the 1850s, not only expedited the complicated process of immigrating from overseas (buying tickets, arranging health exams, preparing evidence of identity, and filling out forms at the US consulate), but they also expedited the process of sending letters, money, and information to the villages in rural China from major urban centers in the world, and they facilitated

22. Madeline Hsu (2000: 108) documents the only known case of the longest separation and reunion with Mei Shiming and his family. Mei left China in 1922 at the age of 38 leaving behind a wife and five children. He worked as a laundryman and sent money back home to his family during the 60-year period of separation. Mei survived to the age of 100 and was able to return to China in 1984 and reunite with his 98-year-old wife. But the experience of Mei was the exception rather than the rule for Chinese immigrants.

the commerce of Chinese goods to Chinese immigrants in the US. Such goods included books and magazines, herbal medicines, rice, noodles, pine-apples, ginger, water chestnuts, water lily roots, yuengans, pears, vinegar, peanut oil, flower fish, blackfish, eels, oysters, ducks, fried rice birds, quail, dried oysters, shrimp, cuttlefish, mushrooms, dried bean curd, bamboo shoots, duck liver and kidneys, sweetmeats, and sausages. Many of these goods were a necessity for Chinese merchants and restaurateurs and certainly benefited Chinese export-import firms and shipping companies overseas (Hsu 2000: 34-39; Chan 1991: 29). Smaller firms, like the Ninyang Association, for example, helped Chinese immigrants in the US 'find jobs, mediate[d] conflicts, lent money, paid for immigration lawyers, provided burials for the indigent, and organized fund-raising drives for charities and war relief' (Hsu 2000: 61).

As Chinese began coming to the US in significant numbers in the 1850s, they worked in the mines alongside Mexicans, Native Americans, South Americans, French, and Anglos. The competition amongst these groups in such close contact with one another in the mines only intensified conflict between them. In 1860 over 70 percent of Chinese men over the age of 15 were miners. During the 1860s and 1870s, the Chinese built the Transcontinental Railroad only to find their jobs cut (11,000) and excluded from the celebratory driving of the golden spike on 10 May 1869. The Chinese had also established the foundations of California's agricultural fortunes and transformed the swampy marshland of the Sacramento delta into valuable farmland.²³ In 1870 Chinese constituted one-fourth of the state of California's hired labour. For all their significant contributions to the Californian economy, the Chinese remained the objects of racial violence and social ostracism that contributed to their social and economic mobility. Those not railroad or agricultural labourers became merchants and businessmen engaged in a variety of entrepreneurial activities, including the recreational vice of prostitution, as a matter of necessity. The first Chinese

23. Much like the Native Americans on the eastern seaboard of the US, the Chinese 'taught their overlords how to plant, cultivate, and harvest orchard and garden crops' (as quoted in Takaki 1998: 88). Their contributions to the US agricultural sector extended beyond California (where they specialized in vegetables like potatoes, onions, and asparagus, strawberries, other small fruits, deciduous tree fruits, and nuts), e.g. in Oregon Ah Bing bred the famous Bing cherry, and in Florida Lue Gim Gong developed the frost resistant orange bearing his name.

24. The proprietor Wah Lee hung a sign that read 'Wash'ng and Iron'ng' over his premises at the corner of Dupont (now Grant Avenue) and Washington Streets. There were 890 Chinese laundrymen in California by 1860, almost 3,000 by 1870, and more than 5,000 by 1880 (Chan 1991: 33).

laundryman appeared in San Francisco in 1851,²⁴ and the first mentioned Chinese restaurant, the Canton Restaurant, opened in July 1849 in San Francisco. Between 1870 and 1880, however, Chinese opened up cigar factories and grocery stores; manufactured shoes, slippers, boots, candles, and matches; and became heavily involved in the shrimp and fishing industry (Hsu 2000: 58; Chan 1991: 32-35).

The Chinese took on work scorned by Anglos. They were 'gap-fillers', doing what no one else would do. Their successes especially provoked the ire of the Anglo miners (referred to by Brands [2002: 332] as Americans) who accused the Chinese of stealing jobs and driving down wages. Their exoticism to Anglos, many of who had scarcely encountered a Chinese, made them obvious targets of claims that they were inferior, unassimilable, and dangerous to democracy. Indeed, the Chinese were conspicuous compared to surrounding Anglos: the majority were non-Christians; they spoke little English; their language and script compared to that of the Anglos was bizarre; their dress and tonsure (queues) were easily recognizable; they ate dog and rat; and they used opium (Brands 2002: 330). Initially, whites tolerated the Chinese because they were timid and nonaggressive, but that quickly changed as the bigotry of the Anglo majority in California targeted the Chinese and as jealousy sparked the anti-Chinese movement fueled by political pandering. The rallying cry heard throughout the state of California and resounding throughout the nation became 'California for Americans!', accompanied by the sentiment 'The Chinese Must Go' (Okimoto 2001a: 79-80).²⁵

What may not have been obvious at the time, but has since become so, is that by 'American' was meant 'white'. The 1790 Naturalization Law had restricted citizenship to 'whites' only, and the Chinese were not 'white'. In overturning a conviction in *People v. Hall* (1854), California Supreme Court Chief Justice Hugh C. Murray ruled that Chinese, along with blacks, mulattoes, or Indians, could not testify 'in favor or against a white man... That therefore Chinese and all other people not white are included in the prohibition from being witnesses' (as quoted in Caldwell 1971: 128). Murray would later comment that the word 'white' 'necessarily excludes all other races than Caucasian'. US Supreme Court justice Stephen Field would later comment in a personal correspondence to a friend in 1882: 'You know I belong to the class who repudiate the doctrine that this country was made for people of all races. On the contrary, I think it is for our race—the Caucasian

25. Denis Kearney, a young Irish American who launched the Workingmen's Party, popularized the tag-phrase including it at the end of his speeches. His incendiary speeches fueled the 'merchants' militia' amid the 1880 riots of San Francisco (Pfaelzer 2008: 77-79).

race' (as quoted in Pfaelzer 2008: 39-40, 249, respectively). Justice Field's racist attitudes echo the view of race relations held by Hinton R. Helper of North Carolina, a chief Republican antislavery polemicist: 'No inferior race of men can exist in these United States without becoming subordinate to the will of the Anglo-Americans.... It is so with the Negroes in the South; it is so with the Irish in the North; it is so with the Indians in New England; and it will be so with the Chinese in California' (as quoted in Saxton 1971: 18). Such racial prejudices undergirded the stereotypes of the Chinese setting off a cycle of violence, seen and unseen, by fueling various exclusionary tactics, which, in turn, perpetuated ethno-typing re-presentations.

De-colonizing Gam Saan

Determining cultural and ethnic distinctions between Asians and Anglos in nineteenth-century America certainly did not warrant any cryptic means of identification. Perceptions of the Chinese helping distinguish them from Anglos circulated nationally amidst concerns over the Chinese as cheap labour and as strikebreakers in the Northeast that paralleled mounting labour concerns over the Chinese in the West. But the nineteenth century did not mark the beginning presence, much less residence, of Asians in the Americas. However inconceivable the reality of Asians on the scene at the time of George Washington may be to the American imagination, Asian presence dates back as early as the 1500s well before the era of American independence. Filipino sailors had established a settlement on the Louisiana coast between 1565 and 1815 during the lucrative Spanish galleon trade between Manila and Mexico. A thriving Chinatown bustled in Mexico City in the 1600s resulting in their eventual banishment to the city's outskirts. Chinese sailors found their cargo ship, the *Pallas*, stranded in Baltimore prompting discussion of their plight at the Continental Congress in 1785. In 1790 the Reverend William Bentley of Salem, Massachusetts noted in his diary the presence of a 'tall, well-proportioned, dark complexioned man from Madras', India. A Chinese merchant seaman and Irishwoman gave birth to the first known Asian American New Yorker in 1825. A young Japanese sailor, rescued at sea in 1850, learned English, became a US citizen, adopted the name Joseph Hecco, and worked in the office of a US senator. In 1854 a Chinese man named Yung Wing 'graduated from Yale College and established an educational mission from China to the United States' (Zia 2000: 24). Prior to the statehood of California in 1850, the Chinese resided as citizens of 'lands stolen from indigenous Americans, "inherited" from Spain by Mexico in 1821, governed by "joint occupancy" with Britain,

which had handed over its rights to the United States in 1846, and seized by the United States in the Mexican War in 1848' (Pfaelzer 2008: xx).

Perceptions that galvanized stereotypes of the Chinese did not originate with Chinese immigration into California; rather, they derived directly from American traders, dignitaries, and missionaries who had ventured into China well before the Gold Rush of California and had helped create the Chinese image in the American mind. Traders had been in China since 1785, and only after direct American trade with China, comments Stuart Creighton Miller (1969: 11-14), did the American image of Asians actually take shape. Gary Okihiro (1994: 20) challenges Miller's underestimation of the 'malleability and mobility of racial attitudes'. Europeans never encountered new lands and new people devoid of preconceptions.²⁶ Rather, as Dwight Hoover (1976: 4) points out, 'they brought with them a whole set of ideas concerning both the natural and historical worlds'. Moreover, the re-presentation of Chinese in American popular culture enjoyed a long career well before the substantial numbers of Chinese immigration in the mid-nineteenth century. For example, Peale's Museum in Philadelphia displayed Chinese curiosities with the collections of wrappings and tiny shoes for bound feet as the headline attraction. By 1805, the same museum, renamed the Philadelphia Museum, displayed over 1,000 Chinese items, but its central attraction were the 11 'life group' dioramas of life-size clay figures in Chinese garb representing the hierarchy of Chinese society: 'high- and low-ranking mandarins, literati, ladies of rank, actors, teachers of the main Chinese religions, itinerant craftsmen, a man being carried in his sedan chair, visitors to a wealthy residence, and farmers' (Lee 1999: 29). Western control over the Orient via the power of representation simultaneously disseminated prejudicial attitudes within the Euro-American consciousness and the popular culture's perceptions of the Chinese. Robert Louis Stevenson (as quoted in Okihiro 1994: 25-26) observed, when riding the iron rails in 1879, 'They [Europeans] seemed never to have looked at them [the Chinese], listened to them, or thought of them, but hated them *a priori*'. His own reflections upon the European hatred of the Chinese, however, may reveal something of his own preconditioning of European origins: 'They [the Chinese] walk the earth with us, but it seems they must be of different clay'. In spite of Anglo perceptions of Chinese that would reach a fever pitch from the

26. Okihiro (1994: 7-21) contends that Asians had entered into the European American historical consciousness centuries before the mid-nineteenth century migration to Gam Saan. He traces the European imagination and construction of Asians beginning with the fifth-fourth century BCE writings of Hippocrates and working toward the present considering such figures as Aristotle, the Roman historian Arrian, Egeria (fourth century CE), Adamnan (seventh century CE), Marco Polo (thirteenth century CE), and Christopher Columbus.

mid-nineteenth century amidst economic concerns in Gam Saan, Okiihiro (1994: 28-29) reminds us: 'Asians, it must be remembered, did not come to America; Americans went to Asia. Asians, it must be remembered, did not come to take the wealth of America; Americans went to take the wealth of Asia. Asians, it must be remembered, did not come to conquer and colonize America; Americans went to conquer and colonize Asia'.

American visitors had observed the Chinese to be 'peculiar', having bizarre rituals and tastes, with an alleged propensity for gambling, opium smoking, and eating dogs, cats, and rats. The majority of Americans regarded the 'Chinese as ridiculously clad, superstitious ridden, dishonest, crafty, cruel, and marginal members of the human race who lacked the courage, intelligence, skill, and will to do anything about the oppressive despotism under which they lived or the stagnating social conditions that surrounded them'. One trader claimed the Chinese 'the most vile, the most cowardly, and submissive of slaves', while another contemptuously described the Chinese thusly: 'grossly superstitious...most depraved and vicious; gambling is universal...they use pernicious drugs...are gross gluttons' and are 'a people refined in cruelty bloodthirsty, and inhuman'. Of course, the stress upon Chinese evils (e.g. licentiousness, immorality, filth, infanticide, treatment of women, paganism, idolatry) benefited the proselytizing activities of the Christian missionaries. Social and moral perceptions extended even to Chinese physiognomy with one Boston newspaper in 1840 asserting that China was a land of 'many letters, many lanterns, and few ideas', and its people were 'long eared, elliptical-eyed, flat-nosed, olive colored...singularly deficient in intellectual physiognomy' (Miller 1969: 36, 27-32, 35, 84).

27. Spoehr explores the positive and negative stereotypes of both blacks and Chinese along the lines of racial naturalism and racial nationalism. Concerning negative stereotypes, he concludes that they stressed both biological and cultural inferiority of the blacks whereas they emphasized the cultural inferiority of the Chinese at the expense of the biological. Concerning positive stereotypes, those of the Chinese did not readily translate into negative concepts of biological and cultural inferiority, as it did with the blacks; rather, they derived from the negative stereotypes.

28. Interestingly, the personal context that shaped Helper's vitriolic stance toward Chinese is significant. Hailing from a family of non-slaveholding small farmers, Helper spent years pursuing fortune, first in New York then in the gold fields of California, only to have it elude him. That the Chinese brothers Chang and Eng, the 'Siamese twins' who had toured the US and England with great success, had settled as landowners of substance and slaveholders in the next county of North Carolina from where Helper grew up as a youth, and had received the lion's share of local and national press could not but have had an impact on Helper's perceptions of the Chinese as uncouth and offensive (Lee 1999: 24, 42-43).

Early Anglo encounters with the Chinese often resulted in the subjection of the Chinese to a process described by Dan Caldwell as 'Negroization' (1971: 121-31). Racial qualities assigned to blacks became Chinese traits (cf. Spoehr 1973: 185-204).²⁷ More often than not, the Chinese were categorized racially alongside blacks, likened as slaves (i.e. 'coolies'), enemies to a republican and free-labour society, cheap, heathen, morally corrupt and inferior, savage, vicious, childlike, lustful, and sensual. Stereotypes of the Chinese as filthy and decadent, docile and loyal closely resembled those of blacks. Helper stereotyped Chinese in his book *The Land of Gold* (1855) in much the same manner as he had blacks in previous publications.²⁸ His stereotypes of the Chinese, argued Caldwell (1971: 127), demonstrate evidence of the 'negroization' of the Chinese, assuming a person of any shade of colour to be 'inferior, immoral and probably sub-human'. In comparison to Anglos, both lacked intelligence, a perception based on a smaller brain capacity, thus disqualifying them from participation in a free government. Chinese men, like black men, were perceived as sexual threats to white women. White parents advised their daughters to beware the Chinese man. Sarah Henshaw instructed American mothers in *Scribner's Monthly*: 'No matter how good a Chinaman may be, ladies never leave their children with them, especially little girls' (as quoted in Takaki 2000: 217). In addition, the perception that Chinese men would turn the wives of poor white men onto prostitution spread among white workers. Chinese 'Negroization' reached a high point with *The Wasp* magazine cartoon (see Fig. 7) depicting the Chinese 'as a bloodsucking vampire with slanted eyes, a pigtail, dark skin, and thick lips' (Takaki 2000: 219).

Racially and sociologically, the Chinese could not avoid their identity construction as 'other'. Racially, the new question concerning the Chinese became, Is yellow black or white? The construct of American society defined race relations as bipolar with the Chinese lying somewhere in between...not quite white but not quite black. They could never be white, and California made sure of that with legislative exclusionary tactics like the *People v. Hall* (1854) decision and an anti-miscegenation law (1880), both of which treated Chinese alongside other non-white groups (Takaki 1998: 101-02).

The race card undoubtedly played a pervasively overt role in the 'yellow peril' stereotype that, in turn, fed anxieties about the immigration of Asians including their potential dominance over white America. Some debate exists over who gets the credit for coining the term 'yellow peril'. General consensus attributes the term to Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany in the 1895 lithograph (see Fig. 8), which depicts the European civilized nations allegorized as women in martial garb led by the archangel Michael. Across the valley is the approaching calamity in the form of a Buddha sitting atop a Chinese dragon, which represents the demon of Destruction. Beneath the



Figure 7. 'The Question of the Hour,' (*The Wasp*, 1893). Courtesy of the California History Room, California State Library, Sacramento, California.



Figure 8. 'The Yellow Peril', pen lithograph by Hermann Knackfuss (1895).

original painting, Wilhelm II had inscribed: 'Nations of Europe, defend your holiest possession'. While the gaze of Germany and other European states focused eastward, the gaze of America focused westward. Nonetheless, the expansion of the Chinese beyond the tropical zones to threaten the very heart of the white homeland became a veritable fear, albeit contrived. Even before the US had declared its independence, this anxiety, though unnamed at the time, had manifested itself on American soil. Benjamin Franklin imagined 'increasing the lovely White' at the exclusion of 'all Blacks and Tawnys' from Africa and Asia. His concern that Pennsylvania would 'become a colony of *aliens*, who will shortly be so numerous as to Germanize us instead of [our] Anglifying them' extended beyond the geographic (Southern and Eastern) and religious (Jewish and Catholic) restrictions of certain Europeans (see Takaki 1993: 79; Wu 2002: 93). The notion of the 'yellow peril' helped define the white identity while serving to contain the identity of the 'other', especially in the face of any perceived challenges where it could easily be invoked with exclusionary tactics, e.g. the internment of Japanese American citizens in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor. The idea of the 'yellow peril' was inscribed within colonialist discourse to justify 'the imposition of whites over nonwhites, of civilization/Christianity over barbarism/paganism'. In short, the gaze toward the West at an impending peril posed by hordes of immigrants from China simply reflects that toward the East at the impending peril posed by hordes of exploitative colonizers from Europe and America.

Sociologically, the ideology positing 'the purity and superiority of European peoples and cultures, unsullied by the anti-Christian, uncivilized non-Europeans—the Other' that led to the European colonization of the Third World would not allow the Chinese the full status of 'whiteness', though, on the basis of the 'model minority' stereotype (discussed below), whites sometimes regarded Asians as 'near-whites' or 'whiter than whites' (Okihiro 1994: 37, 62). Nevertheless, the Chinese continued to face white racism in the forms of abuse and physical violence, and educational and occupational barriers.

29. David Hellwig (1979: 25-44) demonstrates that while anti-Chinese prejudice had penetrated even black America, they never accepted discrimination against the Chinese. Frederick Douglass (n.d.), writing in the nineteenth century, defended Chinese immigration on two grounds: (1) the threat to American ideals inherent within the anti-Chinese fervor; and (2) the benefits would offset any burdens. The same strata of society that cried out for the expulsion of blacks had now shifted its focus to the Chinese, a fact not lost on many Afro-American leaders. For example, D. Augustus Straker (1882) declared in a letter to the editor of the *Christian Recorder* that 'the opponents of the Chinese are the opponents of the negro'. Afro-American leaders knew full well that capitalism, not Asian immigration, was responsible for the creation of low wages.

Though looked upon by white planters in the South as the 'new slaves', sub-human, and mere units of production, whites would sometimes use Asians, including Chinese, to 'discipline' African Americans, thus inciting racial tensions and conflicts between the two groups. But, according to Okihiro (1994: 55), 'African Americans steadfastly realized that the enemy was white supremacy and that anti-Asianism was anti-Africanism in another guise'. The Asians' hybrid identity as members of the nonwhite Other and yet an intermediate group between black and whites bespeaks a liberating unity with African Americans in spite of any debilitating antipathy between the two.²⁹ Okihiro (1994: 34) comments,

We are a kindred people, African and Asian Americans. We share a history of migration, interaction and cultural sharing, and commerce and trade. We share a history of European colonization, decolonization, and independence under neocolonization and dependency. We share a history of oppression in the United States, successively serving as slave and cheap labor, as peoples excluded and absorbed, as victims of mob rule and Jim Crow. We share a history of struggle for freedom and the democratization of America, of demands for equality and human dignity, of insistence on making real the promise that all men and women are created equal. We are a kindred people, forged in the fire of white supremacy and struggle, but how can we recall that kinship when our memories have been massaged by white hands...?

Despite the 'Negroization' of the Chinese, they did possess certain qualities that distinguished them from blacks. For example, they were regarded as 'intelligent', not 'ignorant'; 'industrious', not 'lazy'; 'dexterous', not 'bungling'; sometimes 'sullen', but not 'stupid'. Though regarded as more intelligent than blacks, the Chinese lacked in morality. Also, they were 'quiet' and 'peaceful', 'hard-working', 'economical', and 'frugal'. As labourers, the Chinese were perceived to have more ability than blacks in industrial settings. They were quick learners and competent operators of labour-saving machines (Okihiro 1994: 219). There were more positive stereotypes of Chinese than negative, and with no consensus on the negative. In addition to perceptions of the Chinese as superior to blacks physically and mentally, they possessed an 'ability to shift themselves in a free labor market and to keep themselves from falling into servitude' (Spoehr 1973: 196). The Chinese possessed an intellectual discipline and capability of systematic thought, and reaped the benefits of a developed and civilized culture, factors which some regarded as the cause of the root problem of the Chinese, i.e. an inability to assimilate. The popular song 'John Chinaman' (published in the *California Songster* in 1855) in Gam Saan conjoined perceptions of the Chinese as devious and unassimilable.

I thought you'd open wide your ports,
 And let our merchants in,
 To barter for their crapes and teas,
 Their wares of wood and tin.

I thought you'd cut your queue off, John,
 And don a Yankee coat.
 And a collar high you'd raise, John,
 Around your dusky throat.

Imagined that the truth, John,
 You'd speak when under oath,
 But I find you'll lie and steal too—
 Yes, John, you're up to both.

I thought of rats and puppies, John,
 You'd eaten your last fill,
 But on such slimy pot-pies,
 John, I'm told you dinner still.

Oh, John, I've been deceived in you
 And all your thieving clan,
 For our gold is all you're after, John,
 To get it as you can (reprinted in Dwyer and Lingenfelter 1964: 121).

In its constructed image of the Chinese, this narrative representation conveniently overlooks the Chinese' superior degree of industriousness and intellect as well as European intentions in its trades with China and the deeply engrained recalcitrance of Europeans to assimilate. By 1870 these stereotypes of Chinese were indelibly imprinted on the Anglo consciousness such that when Bret Harte's very popular poem 'The Heathen Chinee' was published in the *Overland Monthly* in 1870,³⁰ the poem both reflected the stereotype of Chinese as deceitful but further crystallized and focused anti-Chinese anxieties and paranoia.

Which I wish to remark,
 And my language is plain,
 That for ways that are dark
 And for tricks that are vain,
 The heathen Chinee is peculiar,
 Which the same I would rise to explain.

Ah Sin was his name;

30. Originally published under the title 'Plain Language from Truthful James', the poem was written as a parody of Swinburne's 'Atalanta'. Subsequent reprintings and republications of the poem were entitled *The Heathen Chinee*, accompanied by illustrations reflecting stereotypical perceptions of Chinese.

And I shall not deny,
 In regard to the same,
 What that name might imply;
 But his smile it was pensive and childlike,
 As I frequent remarked to Bill Nye...

Yet the cards they were stocked
 In a way that I grieve,
 And my feelings were shocked
 At the state of Nye's sleeve,
 Which was stuffed full of aces and bowers,
 And the same with intent to deceive.

But the hands that were played
 By that heathen Chinese,
 And the points that he made,
 Were quite frightful to see,—
 Till at last he put down a right bower,
 Which the same Nye had dealt unto me.

Then I looked up at Nye,
 And he gazed upon me;
 And he rose with a sigh,
 And said, "Can this be?
 We are ruined by Chinese cheap labor,"—
 And he went for that heathen Chinese...

With the cards that Ah Sin had been hiding,
 In the game "he did not understand."

In his sleeves, which were long,
 He had twenty-four packs,—
 Which was coming it strong,
 Yet I state but the facts;
 And we found on his nails, which were taper,
 What is frequent in tapers,—that's wax.

The poem describes a card game between Ah Sin and William Nye with the sleeves of both stuffed full of cards. When Nye discovers the deceit of Ah Sin, he attacks him. Yet, the poem's lengthy description of Ah Sin's deceptiveness and slyness focuses the reader's attention upon its negative stereotype of the Chinese all the while deceiving readers by over-

31. Harte continued to write about the Chinese in America, including short stories like 'Wan Lee, the Pagan' and 'See Yup'. Both stories protested anti-Chinese racism in America but, in doing so, perpetuated negative stereotypes of Chinese (e.g. mice-eaters, dark, yellow, superstitious, heathen, subversive to white labour, and having a peculiar smell). He portrayed Chinese as merchants, laundrymen, and labourers, thus reinforcing negative Chinese re-presentations (see Takaki 1998: 106-08; 2000: 225-29).

looking the portrayal of Nye as a cheat, too, and a man of violence. The poem appealed to the racism of American society and to class resentment galvanizing hostility against the Chinese. Ironically, Harte, who regarded himself as sympathetic to the Chinese, unwittingly contributed to the perpetuation of anti-Chinese sentiments in American society despite his intentions to satirize and to condemn its racist values. His success could not counteract the accompanying risk of fanning the flames of anti-Chinese rhetoric and virulent re-presentations as deceitful and aggressive, and would become the occasion of an anxiety to haunt Harte the remainder of his life.³¹

'Say "*Shibboleth*"!'

'What's the password?' 'Give us the code.' Efforts to ferret out 'the enemy', even from within, have always been a part of special military operations. For Jephthah, the basis of such an effort was an ostensible, cultural linguistic marker between Israelite and Gileadite. The Gileadites were but were not Israelites. Certainly, Jephthah's conflict with the Ammonites would have involved similar tactics since Ammonites, Ammonite sympathizers, and Gileadites shared the linguistic marker 'shibboleth'. Linguistics marks a point of concern in the inter-ethnic differentiation between quasi-Yehudites and true Yehudites as children spoke a hybridized language that elicited overt hostilities from deep-seated animosity (including Aramaic among others?; see Neh. 13.24). Social mobility had rendered the lines of cultural distinctions indistinguishable by creating hybrid identities where individuals considering themselves Yehudites (e.g. Ammonites, Moabites) because of their national residence would have also maintained a different ethnic identity. Not so with the Chinese for whom race would not allow space and time to blur would-be cultural and ethnic distinctions though they maintained their transnational identities. Race made efforts to root out the Chinese through covert means of secret codes unnecessary. Hostilities against Asian Americans, and especially Chinese since they were the first to migrate to the US, were overt and anything but subtle. Red herring concerns like labour and depressed wages became the rationale for exclusionary tactics identified by Sucheng Chan (1991: 45-61) as 'economic discrimination, political disenfranchisement, physical violence, immigrant exclusion, [and] social segregation'. This section will consider only those tactics of physical violence, economic discrimination, social segregation, and immigrant exclusion.

Acts of Violence as Exclusion

Violence against the Chinese took on a variety of forms from the wanton murder and maiming of individuals to spontaneous attacks to the destruction (usually by fire) of Chinatowns throughout the nineteenth century. In the 1850s Chinese miners specifically became the first Asian victims of Anglo prejudices. How many Chinese miners were injured and killed remains unknown though a committee of the California State Legislature in 1862 had a list of 88 known Chinese murdered by Euro-Americans. Jean Pfaelzer's book *Driven Out* details numerous instances of violence against the Chinese exposing the shocking lengths of the ethnic cleansing in California and the Pacific Northwest. In the spring of 1852 some 60 white miners, though outnumbered by Chinese miners, assaulted 200 Chinese miners at Mormon Bar on the shores of the American River (in California), and then attacked 400 more downstream along Horseshoe Bar. Riots broke out in the small towns of Horsetown, Middletown, and Oregon Gulch, 'where white miners vowed to behead or crucify the Chinese'. By 1860, only 160 of the 3,000 Chinese miners in 1853 remained to mine the riverbeds and creeks of Shasta County. Thus began the second 'Trail of Tears'. Throughout this decade of violence against Chinese miners, Anglo re-presentations of Chinese men as lacking virility proliferated in this mostly male world. 'Chinese men', observes Pfaelzer (2008: 15, 13), 'became targets of white men's fears of homosexuality or the objects of their desire'.

The first documented example of a spontaneous outbreak against a Chinese community took place in Los Angeles in 1871. On the night of 24 October 1871, 17 Chinese were lynched and two others knifed to death on a narrow street lined with Chinese shops and residences in El Pueblo called Calle de los Negros, or sometimes known at the time as 'Nigger Alley'. The outrage had actually begun two days earlier when two Chinese brokers fought over a runaway prostitute and fired shots at one another. On October 24, Los Angeles police officers heard shots again in El Pueblo. Rumour spread that the Chinese had hoards of hidden gold and were killing whites. Deputized white men from the large crowd shot Chinese fleeing their homes and the lynching spree began. The vigilante mob drug terrified Chinese along the streets, beating and kicking them before lynching them. Some looted houses looking for gold. After newspaper headlines across the country exposed the vigilante nature of California, the Los Angeles city council sought to clean up its image by renaming Negro Alley to Los Angeles Street (see fuller description of the events and details surrounding this event in Pfaelzer 2008: 47-53; 54).

Violence against the Chinese did not abate with the 1880s; rather it became more organized (see detailed examples in individual cases of the litany of hate in Pfaelzer 2008: 252-90). In California alone, documented cases of violence against Chinese took on the form of forced expulsion (from Humboldt County in February 1885; from Redding and Red Bluff in January 1886; from Sheridan, Wheatland, Marysville, San Jose, Gold Run, and Arroyo Grande in February 1886; and from Sonora, San Pablo, Dutch Flat, Lincoln, and Nicolaus in March 1886). Sometimes, that violence took on the form of arson targeting Chinatowns in San Francisco (November 1885); in Placerville (January 1886); in Redding and Chico (February 1886); in Yreka, Sawyer's Bar, and Folsom (March 1886); in Truckee (June 1886); in Red Bluff (August 1886); and in Los Angeles and North San Juan (October 1886). Incidents of murder and expulsion also broke out beyond California at Snake River Canyon in Idaho; Rock Springs, Wyoming; Denver, Colorado; Portland, Oregon; and Squaw Valley, Coal Creek, Black Diamond, Tacoma, Seattle, and Puyallup, Washington. Perhaps the more notable incidents because of the wide-scale publicity received and the intervention of federal troops were the violent episodes at Seattle and Rock Springs (see fig. 9) with both taking place in 1885, though the former did carry over into 1886.



Figure 9. 'The Massacre of the Chinese at Rock Springs'. Courtesy of the Bancroft Library/University of California, Berkeley.

The massacre at Rock Springs erupted from the labour-striking maneuvers of the Union Pacific Railroad, which brought in 150 Chinese men to break up a labour strike in 1875. White miners, realizing their defeat, returned to work at a reduced wage. Over the coming decade, the railroad company only retained 50 of its original 500 miners and added more Chinese. By 1885, however, Chinese and white wages were apparently identical. Nonetheless, the labour union known as the Knights of Labor had been planning for a strike since 1883 and, when the Chinese refused to join the strike in 1885, actualized its mantra, 'The Chinese Must Go!' On September 2, 150 Irish-born miners marched into Chinatown and




Figure 10. 'Here's a Pretty Mess'! Courtesy of the Bancroft Library/University of California, Berkeley.

fired shots into the air and at fleeing Chinese, and torched Chinese quarters—some 39 houses owned by the company and 50 owned by Chinese. That same afternoon, white miners expelled 400 Chinese at various mines. When the dust had settled, at least 28 Chinese were killed and 15 wounded with the riot resulting in US\$150,000 property damage. Newspapers such as *The New York Times* upbraided Rock Springs with at least two editorials. The first editorial stated, ‘the appropriate fate for a community of this kind would be that of Sodom and Gomorrah’, while another assailed the residents of Rock Springs, both those who actively participated in the violence and those who stood by and allowed the mob to continue its violent behaviour (1885a; 1885b; see also the political editorial from *Harper’s Weekly*, fig. 10). The US government paid out US\$147,748 for reparations as an indemnity to China though it remains highly doubtful that any of the Chinese expelled from Rock Springs received any of that money.

Economic Discrimination as Exclusion

Legislation against the Chinese within the State of California overlapped with economic discrimination as a means of expelling the Chinese. The state legislature passed a series of bills targeting the Chinese as a race and depriving them of judicial protection (e.g. those laws denying them legal redress on the basis of citizenship defined constitutionally as ‘white’). Those unable to become citizens of the US faced a US\$50 fee as an immigrant for medical indemnities (1855). The US Supreme Court, which tolerated and promoted California’s roundups and expulsion of Chinese, initiated the Act to Protect Free White Labor Against Competition with Chinese Coolie Labor, and to Discourage the Immigration of the Chinese into the State of California in 1862. The bill required a monthly police ‘capitation’ or head tax in the amount of US\$2.50 from Chinese immigrants. A lower court would rule the act unconstitutional because it trespassed on federal authority over immigration. Nevertheless, that same year California levied a ‘police tax’ of US\$2.50 per month on all Chinese over the age of 18 who did not work in the mines or produce rice, sugar, coffee, or tea. Under the Commutation Tax Act, shipowners had to pay US\$500 for every ‘alien’ aboard. The fee could be commuted, however, if each Chinese passenger paid a US\$5 fee (Chan 1991: 46, 54).

No more piece of legislation did as much to target the Chinese and discriminate against them economically than that of the Foreign Miners’ Tax, initially passed in 1850, repealed in 1851, and reenacted in 1852. Though the tax applied theoretically to all foreigners (non-whites) working in the mines, it was practically enforced against the Chinese alone.

Under this law, each miner had to pay US\$3 per month for the right to mine (US\$4 in 1853, US\$6 in 1855, and a US\$2 increase per year thereafter). Half the revenue went to the county treasury and the rest to the state of California with local collectors receiving a fixed fee. The yield from this tax alone between 1852-1870 stupefies the imagination when realizing that 'one billion dollars' worth of *untaxed* gold was mined in California'. Pfaelzer (2008: 31) notes, 'Chinese miners paid a staggering fifty-eight million dollars to the state, ranging from one-fourth to one half of California's revenue'.

In addition to the tax itself, the system of collecting the tax became even more problematic. Since collectors received a percentage of the tax, many were not above extorting the Chinese miners. Fraudulent and legit collectors preyed upon the Chinese with intimidating threats of deportation and physical assaults. They would visit the same Chinese miners demanding payments beyond the required fee for the same plot of ground. Even after payment, some Chinese experienced expulsion from legitimate claims especially when the Euro-American miners realized that the Chinese had no legal protection. Many of the collectors boasted of their harassment of Chinese miners in their logs. Pfaelzer (2008: 32) quotes one such entry: 'I took all the dust the rascal had'. The Chinese did their best to fight back bribing tax collectors, paying them off directly, refusing to pay, hiding, and fighting. Nonetheless, the abuses, extortion, and violence of and against the Chinese brought about by this tax elicited this response by a reporter from the *Placerville American* in 1857:

There ought to be a protection against his having to pay the onerous foreign miners' tax over three or four times; against sham licenses being given out and taken away from him, and his money extorted; and against being gagged, whipped and robbed whenever a worthless white rowdy chooses to abuse him thus, for pleasure or profit (as quoted in Chan 1991: 46).

The tax became a ticket to expel, often violently, the Chinese and to deter their immigration. But it did not work.

The Chinese in urban areas did not fare much better as urban life could not shelter them from economic discrimination. One case in point is the Sidewalk Ordinance of 1870 passed by the San Francisco Board of Supervisors that banned the Chinese from carrying vegetables and laundry in baskets hanging from shoulder poles. Laundry ordinances stipulated a quarterly fee of US\$2 for laundries using one horse for their delivery wagons, US\$4 for those using two horses, and US\$15 for those who used no horses. Since the Chinese were the only launderers not to use horses and wagons in their deliveries, the spirit of such an ordinance clearly discriminated

against them though its letter ostensibly did not. From 1873-1884, the Board passed 14 separate ordinances in an effort to curb the proliferation of Chinese laundries (Chan 1991: 46, 33).

Social Segregation as Exclusion

The assumptions of 'Western Christian civilization' and 'Eastern barbarism' factored into representations of the Chinese as degenerate on the moral front. They lied, smoked opium, gambled, and engaged in prostitution and the enslavement of women. Overcrowded Chinatowns with their pollution and disease posed a health risk to 'white' Euro-American society. Garbage and sick people filled the streets with a ubiquitous stench that was unbearable. Inadequate cooking facilities posed fire hazards. The Chinese were blamed for the introduction of smallpox and leprosy into California. All men were regarded as gamblers; all women as prostitutes who lured white youth and men and infected them with venereal disease (Okihiro 2001a: 85). While 70-85 percent of Chinese women immigrating to the US from 1860-1870 were indeed prostitutes (and regarded as such by immigration officials), certain factors such as legislative discrimination and anti-immigration policies (discussed below) created a delimitating culture that denied any occupational opportunities for these women beyond that of prostitution, thus creating the very social problem deplored.

The first anti-miscegenation law to pass in California in 1872 was subsequently amended in 1906 to include Mongolians. Such a law limited the possibilities of wives for Chinese men since the only Chinese women to enter the US legally were the wives of merchants, diplomats, and US citizens. Those who did buck the anti-miscegenation laws ran the risk of forfeiting their own US citizenship, if they had it, and that of their wives. The Cable Act of 1922 reinforced the difficulties of Chinese men to find a wife by declaring that any woman with a US citizenship would forfeit her citizenship upon marriage to an alien ineligible for citizenship. Two years later, the Immigration Act would further exacerbate the social discrimination against the Chinese by specifically excluding 'Chinese women, wives, and prostitutes' and denying admittance into the US and citizenship to foreign-born wives of US citizens. Immigration legislation was especially stricter for Chinese women, hence the separation from wives and children because of economic liabilities (Hsu 2000: 91-101).

Chinese prostitutes became the first targets of segregation in the strictest sense of that term. The Court of Sessions in San Francisco had convicted several madames in 1854 and posed the option that the

Chinese brothels move beyond the city limits. Upon the recommendation of a newly appointed board of health in 1866, the Chinese prostitutes did choose to occupy only those buildings and localities approved by the Board of Health. The achievement of confining and isolating Chinese prostitutes carried over to desires to segregate the Chinese population completely. If the California State Legislature had had its way in 1879, its law obligating incorporated towns and cities to remove Chinese would have segregated the Chinese population. Similarly, the attempt to remove San Francisco's Chinatown in 1890 beyond its city limits failed. Deaths from bubonic plague at the turn of the twentieth century occasioned the last official attempt to remove Asians beyond San Francisco's city limits. City officials cordoned off Chinatown and washed every house 'from garret to basement with lime, while gutters and sewers were disinfected with sulfur dioxide and mercury bichloride' (Chan 1991: 57).³² Residential segregation of the Chinese never became legal though the forced 'ghettoization' of Chinese in 'undesirable' neighbourhoods became a reality with tacit residential boundaries enforced by physical threats of violence and housing discrimination (i.e. landlords' refusal to rent certain premises beyond those boundaries). While residential segregation may not have achieved wide-scale success, the social segregation of Chinese along educational lines had more tangible success within the public school system, a battle that the Chinese had to fight nationally beyond their experiences in California (Chan 1991: 57-58).

Immigration Legislation as Exclusion

Perceptions of the Chinese as un-American, unassimilable, and unworthy of participation in a democratic society undergirded attempts to exclude them from American land(s), economy, polity, and society in general. As seen, those exclusionary efforts assumed a variety of forms though the legislative Exclusion Act of 1882 (which remained in effect until 1943) by the US Congress aimed at the Chinese may be the chief icon of such efforts. Nonetheless, efforts to stem the tide of Asian immigrants began as early as 1855 in California with the capitation tax. Two acts passed in 1870 prohibited the importation of 'Mongolian, Chinese, and Japanese

32. A similar outbreak of the plague had occurred in Honolulu, Hawaii's Chinatown. The Board of Health there quarantined 4,500 Chinese in a camp and burned Chinatown to the ground. The population density of San Francisco's Chinatown and the inability to control any fires set ruled out the Honolulu solution as a viable option for San Francisco (Chan 1991: 56-57).

females for criminal or demoralizing purposes' and of 'coolie slavery' (as quoted in Chan 1991: 54). The state laws of California, when challenged in the higher courts, practically had no effect because of their unconstitutionality. The US Supreme Court had declared immigration as a form of international commerce, thus removing the matter from state control. Furthermore, the terms of the 1868 Burlingame Treaty gave rights to citizens of the signatory nations of China and the US to emigrate and change their residency. The US government, however, set plans in motion whereby they could unilaterally limit Chinese immigration. How to...? quite literally became the question of the hour for the US government. Beginning in 1875, the US Congress passed the Page Law forbidding the admittance of Chinese, Japanese, and Mongolian contract labourers, felons, and women for the purpose of prostitution though its effect really extended only to the influx of Chinese women, not men (Peffer 1986). The negotiations of a new treaty with China in 1880 allowed the US government to obtain its desired objective though it promised Chinese immigrants the right to 'go and come of their own free will and accord' (McClain 1994: 348), thus laying the foundation for the enactment of the Exclusion Act of 1882.

The Exclusion Act barred the Chinese from US citizenship by naturalization and required them to carry on their person at all times a certificate of legal entry. In its ban on the immigration of Chinese labourers, the Exclusion Act exempted the following six categories: teachers, students, tourists, certified returning labourers, merchants and their family members, and diplomats and their families. Aside from the ban, this act required the Chinese to wear a photo ID, hence its alternative name the 'Dog Tag Act'. Later, in 1888, the Scott Act would take the legislation of the Exclusion Act one step further by prohibiting the entry, and even return, of Chinese labourers for 20 years (an estimated 20,000 labourers found their reentry rights abrogated; Chan 1991: 55), by forbidding the issuance of new Certificates of Return, and by declaring null and void previously issued certificates of identity (Hsu 2000: 55, 65). When the Exclusion Act of 1882 approached expiration, many white Americans spread the toxic yellow peril myth. This myth popularized notions that the Chinese would swarm the country to form a dictatorship of greedy, dirty, deceitful, fertile yellow men. The House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization declared that after 1892,

there will be no law to prevent the Chinese hordes from invading our country in numbers so vast as soon to outnumber the present population of our flourishing states on the Pacific slope...to make this country their temporary home, where in a few years they can

accumulate enough to live the balance of their days in China in comparative ease (*Report* 1891).

While determining Asian presence required no ostensible extraction procedures, discerning the il/legality of Asians within America by the Bureau of Immigrations did involve a process of interrogation to establish the physical admittance, social rejection, and national in/exclusion of Asians. In effect, the interviews were a more convoluted version of 'Say "Shibboleth"! whereby to exclude, and those that did happen to circumvent the process did so only to find social ostracism and hatred. The interviews were grueling lasting all day for several days. They involved detailed questions posed not only to immigrant applicants but also to their witnesses. Their intention: reveal inconsistencies in the testimonies whereby to discredit witnesses and exclude immigrant applicants. Hsu (2000: 70) provides an example of an interview conducted in 1921.

Q: How many houses are there on your row, the first one?

A: Three. One of them is tumbled down.

Q: Which one is that?

A: The third one of the last one of the row.

Q: Who lives in the second one of your row?

A: Mah Sin Ick.

Q: What does he do?

A: He is dead.

Q: When did he die?

A: He died when I was a small boy.

Q: Did he leave a family?

A: Yes, he left two sons. His wife is dead also.

Q: When did she die?

A: I don't remember. She died long ago.

Q: What are the boys' names?

A: Mah Quock You, Mah Quock Him. I don't know the age of Quock You. Quock Him is over ten.

Q: Is the oldest one married?

A: No.

Q: Who takes care of them in that house?

A: The older brother has gone to Siam. The younger one is now working in Kung Yick village.

Q: Does anybody occupy that house?

A: No, it is empty.

Q: Then your house is the only house occupied on that row?

A: Yes.

Q: Who lives in the first house of the second row?

A: Mah Kong Kee.

Such a process of exclusion created more problems than it actually solved. The bureau recognized the interrogation system's shortcoming, estimating its failure rate at 90 percent. It was not an effective means of distinguishing between real and fraudulent identities, and it only encouraged the proliferation of fraudulent entry.

The Chinese evaded the intent of this exclusionary tactic with the sophisticated 'paper-son' slot system and detailed coaching books. Individuals with the help of network associations could create paper identities for family members wishing to immigrate and backing that created identity up with 'evidence' (see further discussion of the paper-son slot system in Hsu 2000: 74-88). Coaching books included minute details of village life that had to be memorized in preparation for the grueling ordeal of the interrogation process. This complicated process posed problems for legitimate sons who, seeking to immigrate to the US, were denied because they happened to provide wrong answers. Such occurrences were known. Ira Lee (as quoted in Hsu 2000: 71), an interpreter at the Angel Island Immigration Station, commented

I think it could [happen]. I mean, it's quite detailed. On the other hand, you see, what has happened, is that many of the cases where they are really not his real son, where they are paper sons, they are well coached, and so their testimony jibes. Whereas a real case, a legitimate case, where it's not the paper son coming in, they're legitimate, so they haven't gone to the trouble of making up these *hao gong* [coaching papers] you know. And preparing for it. They're the ones that get the wrong answers. Because they think that it's cut and dried.

Such a sophisticated system bears witness to the Chinese ability to organize and to network viewed contrastively by immigration officials as acts of deceit. But the process, itself deceitful, helped to inspire the creation and perpetuation of the stereotype of Chinese as cunning and deceitful. The 'rational' foundation underlying all attempts at excluding the Chinese (i.e. the Chinese were unassimilable) ultimately became self-fulfilling by producing the very thing it assumed—an unassimilable presence due to the risk of exposing their real identities. Moreover, such a system only reinforced the racial biases intrinsic to American identity and just who could be American.

Experiences of detainees at Angel Island from 1910-1940 underscore the injustice of such a system. Pushed from their homeland because of the Japanese invasion of China, they immigrated to Gam Saan in search of a better life that they could not find in their homeland because of the poor economy, poverty, and simple inability to improve upon the financial conditions for their own family only to find themselves detained much to their consternation and dismay. Through the published anthology of poetry scrawled on the walls of the wooden barracks housing the Chinese immigrants off the shores of Gam Saan by Him Mark Lai, Genny Lim, and Judy Yung in *Island*, we encounter the full range of feelings held by these detainees so close to Gam Saan as to see it on the horizon but yet so far. Their responses to their detainment range the gamut from feelings of acceptance (they were following the examples of heroes from Chinese antiquity) to feelings of revenge (e.g. attacks upon America when the fortunes were reversed). But they all seem to be in agreement with the sentiment expressed in poem 22 (Lai, Lim, and Yung 1991: 58).

America has power, but not justice.
In prison, we were victimized as if we were
guilty.
Given no opportunity to explain, it was really
brutal.
I bow my head in reflection but there is
nothing I can do.

It is the Western, Anglo, civilized Euro-American, not the Eastern, barbaric Oriental, who is the barbarian devoid of justice.

Stereotypical perceptions of the Chinese in the Anglo mind had preceded the immigration of the Chinese into American society and dogged them while in American society. The Chinese had to contend with racially motivated attitudes that created an identity of the Chinese in the Euro-American imagination as debased and servile, 'inferior to African Americans morally...and immeasurably lower than American Indians, clannish, dangerous, deceitful, and vicious' though they possessed a transnational identity, citizens of China and residents of the US. Claims of Chinese unassimilability reveal Anglo anxieties over Chinese commingling with Anglos and a well-established practice by Anglos to cling to European culture rather than assimilate. And who could legitimately deny the very same opportunism sought after by the Chinese, whether pushed or pulled, in the US that spurred the immigration of so many Europeans? Despite the numerous exclusionary tactics driven by these stereotypes that often incited acts of violence experienced by the Chinese, they resisted and fought back. They purchased arms; they created strong organizations

to protect their jobs, their families, and their transnational identities; and they often refused to abandon their homes and claims. They turned to the legal system for redress despite the overwhelming barrier of discrimination they faced there. But occasionally they were successful in criminal and civil litigations. Moreover, these acts of legislative, economic, and social discrimination, many of which had an impact upon the other, only reinforced cultural anxieties within Euro-America. The scare of exotic and contagious diseases only exacerbated these anxieties as the anti-Chinese drama played itself out on the larger American stage beyond that of California. Ironically, many of the perceived problems became self-fulfilling in that the exclusionary tactics created and exacerbated the very problems they sought to eradicate. The desired intention by 'strangers from a different shore' did not rid the 'strangers from a different shore'. Undoubtedly, Chinese ways were different than those encountered upon American shores. Nonetheless, Chinese affirmed

...but in the important matters we are good men. We honor our parents; we take care of our children; we are industrious and peaceable; we trade much; we are trusted for small and large sums; we pay our debts, and are honest, and of course must tell the truth;... If the privileges of your laws are open to us, some of us will doubtless acquire your habits, your language, your ideas, your feelings, your morals, your forms, and become citizens of your country—many have already adopted your religion as their own—and we will be good citizens. There are very good China men now in the country, and better will, if allowed, come here after—men of learning, men of wealth, bringing their families with them...Let us stay here—the Americans are doing good to us, and we will do good to them (as quoted in Brands 2002: 333).

Time and circumstances have proven the veracity of this Chinese affirmation and the mendacity of Euro-American contentions propelled by stereotypical re-presentations of the Chinese as deceitful opportunists supposedly incapable of *becoming* Americans.

Contemporary Gam Saan and Chinese Re-presentation

Many Chinese were and did become Americans. The felt presence of Asians, and Chinese in particular, in US society in sheer numbers alone reflects the inadequacy of exclusionary tactics in the nineteenth century as deterrents to immigration. While numbers indicate that legislation such as the 1882 Exclusion Act, the Cable Act of 1922, and the Immigration Act of 1924 did stem the tide of legal immigration, it did not deter immigration. The 2000 Census figures indicate that between 1990 and 2000 the Asian

American population grew to 48 percent nationwide, trailing only Latinos as the fastest growing minority population in the US. Asian Americans number about 10 million, comprising between 3-4 percent of the nation's total population. Within California alone, the Asian American population edged slightly ahead of the Latinos growing by more than one-third to about 3.7 million (Chinese at 2.4 million, Filipinos at 1.9 million, Indians at 1.7 million, Vietnamese at 1.1 million, Koreans at 1 million, and Japanese at 800,000; Wu 2002: 20).

As the numbers of Chinese proliferated, so did the stereotypes. Stereotypes that overtly circulated within nineteenth-century US culture linger into the twentieth-twenty first centuries, though not as overtly, to find expression in subtle forms of social ostracism and/or discrimination and in the popular versions of 'yellow peril' and 'model minority'. Recently, a friend of mine responded to the economic recession of the US (December 2008) and the prospect of other countries, including China, loaning money to the US government. 'Great, all we need is for China to control the country. They've always wanted to take over the US', he said. Popular media portrayals of Asians in general have no doubt contributed to the proliferation and embedment of perceptions of the Chinese. The Media Action Network for Asian Americans (2007) identified some of these limited and unbalanced portrayals in American entertainment media: Asians who cannot be assimilated; Asians as inherently predatory; Asians restricted to clichéd occupations; Asian racial features, names, accents, or mannerisms as inherently comic or sinister; Asian male sexuality as negative or non-existent; unmotivated white-Asian romance; Asian women as 'China dolls' or as 'dragon ladies'; Asians who demonstrate their honour by sacrificing their lives; Asians as the 'model minority'; Asians as explanation for the supernatural or magical; and Asian racial slurs that go unchallenged.

Two prominent archetypes of US popular culture, Fu Manchu and Charlie Chan (see the lengthy treatments of each in Wu 1982: 164-74 and 174-81, respectively), in the first quarter of the twentieth century led the way in reifying re-presentations of Asians in general and Chinese in specific, upon which later movies (e.g. 'Falling Down' and 'Rising Sun') would capitalize. Fu Manchu, created by British author Sax Rohmen in 1913, would become the racial archetype of 'the yellow peril incarnate in one man' who threatened white supremacy. The first Asian leader in Anglo-American lit-

33. Okihiro (1994: 143-45) further discusses these archetypes as engendered figures—Fu Manchu as masculine and Charlie Chan as feminine. Both have their female counterparts: the 'dragon lady' for Fu Manchu; the 'lotus blossom' or 'China doll' for Charlie Chan. On appearances alone, Fu Manchu emblemizes the 'yellow peril' gone amok, whereas Charlie Chan emblemizes the containment of the 'yellow

erature, Fu Manchu possessed global ambitions. His presence was imminent in both British and US Chinatowns with vast minions outside the gates at the periphery. In the novels British agent Sir Denis Nayland Smith engaged the evil genius in a battle of wits, supernatural forces, and science, in which 'the swamping of the White world by Yellow hordes might well be the price of our failure'. The threat of Fu Manchu came from within, created and educated within the European culture, not from without.

If Fu Manchu became the archetype of the 'yellow peril', then Charlie Chan embodied the 'model minority'. A Hawaiian-born detective, Chan exemplified upward mobility, quietude, faithful servitude, and devotion to work. Intelligent, docile, patient, and polite to a fault, Chan was always apologetic for the improprieties of others. But his creator, Earl Derr Biggers in 1925, never lets us forget that Chan is still a foreigner, speaks in broken English, and serves under a white man. In the end, both archetypes are steeped in Orientalism and educated in the West, operate in colonial enclaves from within the white homeland, challenge and threaten white supremacy, and galvanize and attest to European superiority all the while personifying cunning and intellect (Okihiro 1994: 145).³³

Not until January 1966 did the popular press advance the image of Asian Americans as the 'model' minority in US society where it remains to this day despite the image's considerable criticism within the Asian American community as 'racially stereotypic', 'empirically inaccurate', and inapplicable to the changing Asian American population. Following upon William Petersen's praise of Japanese Americans in a *New York Times Magazine* article, a December 1966 story in *U.S. News and World Report* lauded Chinese Americans for their remarkable achievements, Chinatowns as 'bastions of peace and prosperity', and an 'ability to overcome years of racial discrimination'. 'Still being taught in Chinatown is the old idea that people should depend on their own efforts—not a welfare check—in order to reach America's "Promised Land"'. Numerous facts attesting to Chinese 'success' include statistics of educational achievements, 'movement into high status occupations, rising incomes, and low rates of mental illness and crime'. And what factors contributed to Chinese American success but the cultural emphases on hard work,

peril'. Yet the feminine qualities of Fu Manchu (slender, sleek, feline body with long, tapered, and clawed fingers) temper his masculinity enabling containment of the 'yellow peril' while, conversely, the masculinity of Charlie Chan (strength of mind over body, exhibition of control and equanimity under stress, and virility [impregnating his wife 11 times]) exceeds his femininity, thus 'transforming the model minority into the yellow peril' (145 n. 54).

thrift, and morality—the very qualities discerned a century earlier within a culture ostracized because of an incapability to assimilate. The social context in which the press perpetuated this image inscribed it with political and ideological implications. As Osajima (1988: 165-67) points out, 'Asian American success constituted a direct critique of Blacks' at a time of racial upheaval and the Civil Rights Movement. In the end, the 'model minority' stereotype became yet another means to discipline blacks by suggesting that hard work, not militancy or reliance upon welfare programs, was the key to success.

The 'model minority' thesis re-circulated in the 1980s stressing educational achievement and social mobility as indicators of Asian success, and the values of hard work and reverence for learning as integral to such success. Nonetheless, the overt racial discourse in this stereotype's form in the 1960s was significantly tempered to focus on differences between Asian American families and 'American' families. For example, direct attacks on programs like school busing by President Reagan, designed to benefit racial minorities, suggested the subtlety to which 'family' became code to disguise underlying racial concerns. In spite of the emphasis on Asian American success in the 1980s, its discourse linked with anti-Asian sentiments where their presence in academic circles was described in almost alarming tones, recalling the 'yellow hordes' rhetoric of the nineteenth century. The discriminatory backlash in academia (note jokes like MIT meaning 'Made in Taiwan', and UCLA as 'University of Caucasians Living Among Asians') reflected the anti-Asian sentiments amidst a context of concern over the declining US economy and the concomitant Japanese competition (Osajima 1988: 170-71).

As positive as the 'model minority' stereotype may appear on the surface, it obviously has not gone without its problems. Asian American adolescent students have had to deal with every imaginable stereotype of Asians (see Kim and Yeh 2002): socioeconomic ('greedy', 'stingy', 'restaurant owners'); physical ('short', 'slant-eyed'); behavioural ('sly', 'devious', 'quiet', 'obedient'); and educational ('geniuses', 'overachievers', 'nerdy', 'intelligent'). Studies demonstrate that Asian Americans have fared better than Caucasians academically and behaviourally but at the risk of symptoms of depression, withdrawn behaviour, poor self-images, and dissatisfaction with social support (Lorenzo, Frost, and Reinherz 2000). Moreover, studies have also disclosed higher levels of distress particularly among Chinese and Korean students experiencing racial and ethnic discrimination from their peers (Fisher, Wallace, and Fenton 2000). In generalizing Asian Americans as 'success stories' the 'model minority' stereotype never considers the large number of Asian American students and their families who suffer from poverty and illiteracy. Many Asian students, high- and

low-achievers alike, find it difficult to live up to the expectations set by the 'model minority' stereotype (Lee 1996).

Ostensibly unrelated, the popular 'model minority' stereotype, often regarded as benign and ingratiating, compliments the 'yellow peril'. Asian acceptance of European culture and religion, mastery of the English language unencumbered by accents, and adoption of European dress and customs—assimilation, the end-goal of colonization—results in a 'cheap imitation' (mimicry) and 'subversion of the original text (grotesque representations of the Euro-American identity)' that simultaneously flatter and threaten. Rather than potentially deconstructing the Euro-American identity, the 'model minority' representation reifies it. Qualities of the 'model minority' are not un/ambiguous: Asian work ethic as both 'diligent' and 'slavish', 'frugal' and 'cheap', 'upwardly mobile' and 'aggressive'; Asian family values as 'mutual aid' and 'self-serving', 'inclusive' and 'exclusive', 'multicultural enclaves' and 'balkanized ghettos'; Asian religiosity as 'transcendentalist' and 'paganist', 'filial piety' and 'superstitious'; and Asian intermarriage as 'assimilation' and 'mongrelization', 'integration' and 'infiltration'. Ambiguation yields 'models' as 'perils' and 'perils' as 'models' (see Okihiro 1994: 139-42).

Both 'yellow peril' and 'model minority' stereotypes are *constructed* images serving colonial discourse as a means whereby Euro-Americans exerted control and authority over Asians. Yet these stereotypes ultimately transform to mimicry as Chinese exemplify resemblance ('model minority') and menace ('yellow peril'), but menace only in the sense that they reflect back the deep anxiety over the colonizer's own identity within. And the more that writing, and other cultural media, perpetuate the stereotypes, the more they have the opposite effect of the desired intention, namely to undermine an identity touted as honest, peaceful, and humanitarian by exposing it instead as deceitful, aggressive, and barbaric.

Even while they are tyrannical, they still
claim to be humanitarian...
I thoroughly hate the barbarians because they
do not respect justice.
They continually promulgate harsh laws to
show off their prowess.
They oppress the overseas Chinese and also
violate treaties (poems 47-48; Lai, Lim, and Yung 1991: 100).

Despite perceptions that the US has progressed beyond the taint of Angel Island oh so long ago, it has not because the prejudices that spawned Angel Island have not gone away; rather, they have (re)surfaced in places like Abu Ghraib and the Guantanamo detainee camp, Angel Island *redivivus* with only names and ethnicities having changed.

Conclusion

Many Asians today continue to struggle with the acceptance of their identity as American by a society whose historical consciousness has effectually rendered them 'MIH—Missing in History' (Zia 2000: 43), and has bequeathed them an identity constructed from racially prejudiced stereotypes. Despite Chinese prints all over the economic development of Gam Saan in the 1800s, the larger historical tapestry of the US nation has been woven by the significant contributions from Chinese labour and ingenuity. Chinese labour built the West—the California state industries of the railroad, the transformation of delta swampland into arable farmland in Sacramento and in the San Joaquin Valley, vineyards, and manufacturing plants. The Chinese became tools of an exploitative capitalism always paid with low wages and always objects of manipulation in labour relations; they often found themselves the objects of tyrannical laws and acts of violence that singled them out for exclusion. Asians alone experienced the exploitation by American labour brokers who introduced successive waves of Asian workers into American society after the gates had been closed to the Chinese. From Japanese to Indian to Korean to Filipino, each Asian group pursued the dream of becoming American convinced they could succeed where their ethnic predecessors had failed only to find themselves subjected to the same anti-Asian legislation barring them from citizenship and land ownership, and discriminating against them by denying equal access to education and housing. The Chinese became subjects of an internal colonization reinforced by its own mechanisms: they were despised and regarded as 'unassimilable' though their desire for citizenship continually met with denial; racist attitudes driving acts of violence and exclusionary tactics ignored treaties (Burlingame Treaty of 1868) that ensured their dual nationalist status; discriminatory legislation (e.g. the Page Act) excluding Chinese women never solved but only created the very moral problem of prostitution detested; and finally, immigration legislation never deterred but only intensified Chinese presence 'illegally'. As MIH, Asians within the historical consciousness of American society did not improve with the twentieth century. Witness the case of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team of Japanese American GIs, 'probably the most decorated unit in United States military history' with 18,143 individual decorations and among the first to liberate the Nazi concentration camp in Dachau, Germany in 1945

34. Zia (2000: 43) notes that the US military commanders decided that the liberation of Jewish prisoners by Japanese-American soldiers would be bad public relations since some of the soldiers own families were interned in American concentration camps.

(as quoted in Takaki 1998: 402).³⁴ And then there is that ugly black eye on US history with the concentration camps for Japanese American citizens that US history would conveniently prefer to sidestep.

Asian presence in the Americas predates the formation of the US as a nation. Yet, their identity as American and their role in US history inconspicuously suffer the effects of elision principally on the basis of race despite dis/similar experiences with their Euro-American counterparts. They, too, shared in the American dream and the prospects of a better life that that could provide though the immigration numbers indicated a definite preference for whites (compare the quota system of 102 Chinese to 6,000 Polish and 65,000 British per year between 1943 [Chinese exclusion repealed] and 1965 [The Immigration Act]; Zia 2000: 40-41). Ironically, in the current immigration debate only Asian contributions in the high-tech sector of the US economy seem to enable them to escape the furor of public backlash and its preoccupation with lesser skilled immigrants that overlook the high numbers of Asian foreign-born immigrants to the US. Throughout US history, each Asian group has found itself the personification of the feared enemy and became the tool for a form of racialized wedging, itself a means of internal colonization (e.g. Japanese against Filipino labourers, and Korean plantation workers as strike-breakers against the Japanese plantation workers in the Hawaiian sugar-cane plantations; Asian citizens over against Japanese citizens in the aftermath of President Roosevelt's Executive Order 9066 issued 19 February 1942 for the evacuation and internment of Japanese American citizens; and the Chinese as 'enemy' during the Red Scare of the 1950s that transformed 'yellow peril' into 'red menace' in anti-Communist campaigns resembling a witch-hunt in an effort to 'contain' Communism). Asian groups once enemies became allies...allies enemies.

Together, Chinese and Ammonites occupied the borderland of Gam Saan (with all that it symbolizes), the product of constructed images, the re-presentation of liminality. Their status as immigrants without colonizing ambitions issues forth their exclusion as itself a process of colonization. Presence in a land long occupied by both does not translate into an expected guaranty of citizenship, but rather as alien. Ethno-typed as cunning, deceitful opportunists, both represent, in the most figurative sense of that term, the peril from within where their presence fomented prejudicial biases that manifest themselves in exclusionary tactics, oftentimes violent. But why? Is it simply because both groups find themselves competing for access to the same resources? Or is it because the dominant, ethnic group finds, from a positive angle, its own aspirations and dreams for a better life within the desires of the 'other'? Or is it perhaps because the colonizing group circumscribing identity sees, from a negative angle, its own faults and shortcom-

ings that may inhibit it from attaining its dreams reflected back at it by the necessary ethic present within the 'other' to attain those dreams? Perhaps numerous factors contribute with only time and circumstance dictating the nature of the dynamic between colonizer and colonized. Nevertheless, mimicry reveals the resemblance of colonizer/d, 'Israelite'/Ammonite, Euro-American/Chinese in both similarity and difference more so than the presumed dominant identity within the ethnic binarisms would indicate or more so than those ethnic groups who regard themselves as dominant in the cultural interchange would care to acknowledge. 'Israelite'/Ammonite and Euro-American/Chinese experienced immigrant status with a shared history though with the connection to an imagined community as long-time residents of the same land. Each felt the 'push'/'pull' of economic rewards and perceived destinies that only their migrations could actualize irrespective of the risks involved. And contrary to the re-presentations of the 'other', both ethnicities typologically understanding themselves as 'Israel' refused to assimilate to the culture they found themselves in after having migrated. However deceitful, however menacing the 'other' in its re-presentations, the 'other' simply reflects back that projected onto it. Euro-Americans cannot portray the deceit and peril of the Chinese; 'Israel' cannot re-present the Ammonite as deceitful and menacing without simultaneously exposing its own cunning as deceitful opportunism and its own beneficence as peril. The unseen (peril) becomes seen when the re-presentation of the 'other' as deceitful and a peril disavows a voice for that ethnicity beyond their colonization, and tacitly sanctions their effectual ethnic cleansing from historical consciousness.

THE 'VIOLENT/REBELLIOUS' STEREOTYPE:
EXODUS FROM THE 'PROMISED LAND'

'Both read the same Bible'

—*Abraham Lincoln*

'They assign us that place; they don't let us do it for ourselves, nor will they allow us a voice in the decision'

—*Frederick Douglass*

Black hole, black ice, blackball, blacklist, blacken, black mark, Black Friday, black-market—why should the word 'black' connote something negative and/or dangerous? The US has a long, sordid history where the phrase 'race matters' rings truest especially in black–white relations. While some US citizens would like to think that the sordid part of the past is...well...in the past with their optimistic assessment of the US as a post-racial nation, reality reminds that the (racial prejudices of the) past is still present. Recently, Harvard University professor and renowned African American historian Henry Louis Gates Jr. was arrested as a burglary suspect in his own home despite showing proof of identity and residence, thus prompting the White House 'Beer Summit' on 31 July 2009.¹ And James Byrd Jr. was brutally dragged to death on 7 June 1998 on a rural road in East Texas, later precipitating the James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes Act (11 May 2001) legislation. All this in the wake of efforts—e.g. the Fair Housing Act (Title VIII of the Civil

1. Cambridge, Massachusetts police came to Gates' house on the suspicion of two black men, Gates and his driver, breaking into the house (Associated Press 2009). Sgt. James Crowley, the arresting officer, indicated in his report that Lucia Whalen, the woman who made the 911 call, 'observed two black males with backpacks on the porch of Ware street', though Whalen and her attorney have insisted that she never spoke with Crowley at the scene or used the word 'black'. The 911 tapes do, however, reveal that the operator raised the issue of race (as if that should even have mattered with a break-in call) by asking if the suspects were white, black, or Hispanic, to which the caller responded that 'one looked kind of Hispanic' (Drash 2009). In the aftermath Gates has had to change his email address, cell phone number, and consider moving after receiving numerous death threats and accusations of being a 'racist' ('You should die; you're a racist' read one email; Milton and Van Sack 2009).

Rights Act), Anti-Discrimination Act, Equal Employment Opportunity, Affirmative Action, 'Hate Crimes' Act; and numerous PSAs (Public Service Announcements)—by notable celebrities to sensitize US Americans to racial prejudice and stem the tide of a racialized history. While the experience of many African Americans has indeed drastically improved from that of the nineteenth century and much of the twentieth, and while the era of slavery and Jim Crow laws have passed, their damaging effects coupled with stereotyping tendencies (e.g. racial profiling) continue to linger.

And yet, both Euro- and African Americans share the same spiritual heritage and relied on the same sacred texts not too dissimilar to experiences of the Judaeans and Israelites || *golahs* and Samari(t)ans. Within the context of these ethnic groups' interactions, the former ethnicities clearly established a sense of their own superiority over the 'other' with reciprocally reinforcing re-presentations and divine biblical sanction. Conversely, African Americans responded with a hermeneutical riposte; they read (interpreted) the same Scripture but through the prism of their own history, exiled in America though awaiting their exodus liberation. In spite of the insurmountable obstacle of illiteracy in the early nineteenth century,² African American interpretations revealed the antislavery face of the Bible in addition to defining their own religion (a Christianity similar to but different from their oppressors) and their own identity. How must the Israelites || Samari(t)ans, who shared the same spiritual heritage and sacred texts as their colonizer, have done the same? The resistant voice of the oppressed African American community can help articulate the experience of the Israelites || Samari(t)ans, whose story early on was eclipsed by that of their colonizer. Assumptions to the contrary, the story of the 'other', however segregated, remains significant for colonizer/d alike who, as Martin Luther King Jr. (16 April 1963; as quoted in King 1992: 85) noted, 'are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality...whatever affects one directly affects all indirectly'. The (hi)story of Samari(t)ans and African Americans as 'other' indirectly correlates to their identity and re-presentation as 'violent' and 'rebellious'. But were these subaltern ethnicities violent and rebellious as a matter of nature, or so only as a viable option as dictated by time and circumstance? This chapter re-traces the (hi)story of the Samari(t)ans and explores those factors contributable to their identity

2. Despite the rampant illiteracy within the slave community, many slaves did learn the biblical tradition by listening to others read the Bible to them (e.g. Frederick Douglass' mistress often read the Bible to him; 1893: 78-79) or memorizing a few Bible verses from the white preachers or their masters (see fuller discussion of the origin of African American hermeneutics and the Bible's centrality to the community's spiritual formation in Saillant 2000 and Sanders 2000).

as 'rebellious' before finally allowing the similar African American liminal experience to articulate Samari(t)an resistance utilizing the same scriptural traditions as their colonizer.

A Composite Portrait of the Samari(t)ans

Known variously as 'Samaritans', 'Samaritans'³ (English translations of *shomronim*, the biblical name for the province of Samaria), or 'Cutheans' (so Josephus), this particular sect generally eschewed such labels preferring instead 'guardians' (*shomrim*) or 'keepers of the Torah', a designation known to the church father Jerome in the fourth century CE (Crown 1991a: 14). Unlike other subaltern ancient Near Eastern ethnicities occupying centre stage in preceding chapters, the Samaritans perhaps have a stronger ring of familiarity among adherents of Jewish and Christian traditions, e.g. the long-held perception of enmity between Jews and Samaritans and the well-known narrative of Jesus and the Samaritan woman at Jacob's well in John 4. And unlike the Edomites, Moabites, and Ammonites, the Samaritans still exist as a religious and ethnic group (with an approximate population of 670 roughly divided equally between the communities of Nablus (biblical Shechem) and Holon, near Tel Aviv), and have been the focus of more literature (so much so that the specialized field of Samaritanology comprises all fields of study related to the Samaritans). But they have also produced their own literature refusing to remain silent about their own history (*Samaritan Book of Joshua* [SJ], *The New Chronicle* (aka *Chronicle Adler*), *Chronicle II*, and *Kitab al-Tarikh* or *The Annals of Abu'l Fath*), religious identity (*Samaritan Pentateuch* [SP]), or theology (*Memar Marqe*).⁴ Modern scholarship has generated its detailed accounts of Samaritan studies

3. Throughout this Chapter, I will use the ambivalent descriptor 'Samari(t)ans' to connote two, related people groups—(1) Samaritans, an ethnic group whose members resided in/outside the province of Samaria, and (2) Samaritans, a distinct religious group with a definite self-conscious understanding of its identity—except for those instances where I have one specific group in mind. Both 'Samaritans' and 'Samaritans' are not identical though in the Persian and Hellenistic periods their identities would have overlapped in that a Samaritan was most likely Samaritan though a Samaritan might not have been Samaritan. The ambivalent descriptor therefore identifies a proto-Samaritan group, if you will, during a period of identity transition to loosely mark the trace of Samaritan ancestry within 'Samaritans'. That the Samaritans came to identify themselves so self-consciously in contradistinction to other religious groups does not disavow their ethnic and religious ties to the 'Samaritans', or to the Jews I will argue.

4. None of the Samaritan literature in final form predates the Common Era (Books I-II of *Memar Marqe* perhaps date as early as the fourth century CE); thus biblical scholarship tends to look askance at these late sources to reconstruct Samaritan history on the

(e.g. see the comprehensive works of Alan Crown, *The Samaritans* (1989), his edited *A Companion to Samaritan Studies* (1993) and his *A Bibliography of the Samaritans* (2005); Ferdinand Dexinger and Reinhard Pummer's *Die Samaritaner* (1992); and Ingrid Hjelm (2000, 2004) with Samaritan contributions not to be overlooked (e.g. the recently edited work of Ephraim Stern's and Hanan Eshel's *Sefer Hashomronim* (2002); Benyamim Tsedaka's *History of the Samaritans Based on their Own Sources* (English translation forthcoming); a biweekly newspaper *A.B. The Samaritan News*; and two websites—*The Israelite Samaritans* (www.mystae.com/reflections/messiah/samaritans.html) and *The Samaritan Update* (www.the-samaritans.com). Numerous questions surround Samaritan studies: What makes the difference between a Samaritan and a Samaritan? When did the Samaritans begin to understand themselves self-consciously as Samaritans? What markers established their identity as Samaritans distinct from Judaism? When did the schism between Samaritans and Jews begin? The discussion to follow will touch on some though not all of these issues and not in extensive detail keeping the Samari(t)ans, that ambivalent proto-Samaritan group, for its focus; I will leave the reader to consult these issues' focused exploration in other identified sources. And where we find Jewish and Samari(t)an voices to conflict, I feel no methodological compunction to adjudicate between them but will instead critically engage each.

Geography

The province of Samaria covered an area estimated at approximately 2,500 km², rectangular in shape with sides 50 km long and 45 km wide, with a projected population in the eighth century BCE upwards of 60-70,000 persons. Adam Zertal (2003: 384-85) identified the province's boundaries as originating from the old Israelite tribal division of the hill country allotment of Manasseh with the third Solomonic district (1 Kgs 4.10). Given the boundaries of the surrounding provinces of Dor and Megiddo, only that area of the hill country with its northern boundary along the Jezreel Valley, its eastern boundary at the Jordan River, its western boundary along the

basis of their theological bias. To dismiss this literature from consideration because of such 'bias', however, simply privileges the Jewish perspective while overlooking the very same concerns related to the MT, part of the same textual tradition as the SP with its final recension most likely during the Hasmonean period. In effect, such an approach denies the 'Keepers' a voice about their own origins and identity, not to be facilely equated, I would add, with that of the ambivalent Samari(t)ans. For a compendium of Samaritan literature, including, but not limited to, commentaries, midrashes, and halakahs, consult John Bowman's *Samaritan Documents* (1977) and Robert T. Anderson and Terry Giles' *Tradition Kept* (2005).

Coastal Plain, and its southern boundary along the Jericho-Nasbeh-Eqron line fell under the administrative jurisdiction of the governor of Samaria at any time. Most geographers divide the province basically into three regional districts: Central Samaria, W. Samaria, and E. Samaria.

Both districts of W. Samaria and E. Samaria in the province have received little attention in comparison to concentrated activities in Central Samaria. W. Samaria consists of mountain ranges extending from east to west descending toward the Sharon Plain with peaks ranging from 100-500 m above sea level. During the Persian period, this region witnessed a significant increase of settlements and farmhouses, its growth perhaps aided by the development of a system of major and minor roads (Knoppers 2006: 269). E. Samaria likewise consists of various mountain ranges extending S-SW with peaks ranging from as low as 539 m above sea level to several more than 900 m above sea level. It received less rainfall (an average of 200-400 mm per annum), and, as a result, was more arid and less settled. As of yet, archaeology has not uncovered any permanent settlements in this region though surveys have identified an Assyrian administrative complex at Khirbet Umm Qatan on the desert fringes (Zertal 2003: 390). Moreover, E. Samaria may be the habitation for imported foreigners into the Samarian province by the Assyrians, a possibility that hinges on the perspective of Assyrian deportation of Israelites in 722/21 BCE.⁵

At the center of the province lay Nablus (1 mile west of biblical Shechem; Roman Neapolis) within the Nablus Mountains region with the most notable peaks being those of Mt Ebal (940 m above sea level) and Mt Gerizim (881 m above sea level) (Dar 1992: 926). Valleys such as the Dothan Valley and those of Far'ah, Nahal Shekhem, and Bezeq (Zababida) surround the region readily lending this area to agriculture and dense population settlements. The Achaemenid period witnessed an unprecedented number of sites in the northern region over those of Iron Age III. Its recovery may have been aided by 'Assyrian investments, an increase in trade, and the absence of major political upheavals' (Knoppers 2006: 269). Only Samaria and Tell Balâtah (Shechem) have yielded any evidence of settlements in

5. Though Zertal (see table in 2003: 402) acknowledges a 71 percent decline in the number of sites in the eastern valleys from Iron Age II to Iron Age III (722-535 BCE) attributable to the Assyrian mass deportations, he nonetheless identifies certain Iron Age III sites in the triangular area of Shechem, Tell el-Far'ah, and Samaria as settlements of imported foreigners, Cutheans, principally on the basis of wedge-shaped bowls (discussed below) and buildings 'Mesopotamian' in character. By contrast, Nathan Schur (1989: 21-23) limits the importation of foreign settlers to the city of Samaria itself whereas Richard Coggins (1974: 18-20) does not. Coggins and Zertal do concur that the foreign settlers do not seem to have intermixed with the surviving Israelite population, much less to form a syncretistic religion.

the Persian period. Prominent cities within this district include Taanach, Dothan, Tell el-Far'ah (biblical Tirzah), Gezer, and Bethel.

In general, the province of Samaria had a Mediterranean climate with an average annual rainfall from 550-700 mm, dependent on the altitude of the region with dew obviously plentiful in the mountains. Two main historical routes extended the length of Samaria—one through the slopes of the mountains in Central Samaria, the other partly coinciding with the well-known Via Maris—and a dozen roads crossed its width placing the province at the center of significant commercial and trade activity in and through Palestine.

History

Political

Regardless of the voice narrating the origins of Samari(t)an history, the conquest of Samaria in that history becomes pivotal. The Samaritans acknowledge a shared history with biblical Israel; therefore, it will not be necessary to begin a review of their political history before the demise of Samaria. Such investigations will not yield any new insights into a distinctive group known as Samaritan or Samaritan anyway since a distinctive group known as 'Samaritan' will not emerge until much later. Interestingly enough, the Samaritan narrative does distinguish between their forebears and other groups of Israelites within Israelite society.⁶

The demise of the northern kingdom Israel and its capital Samaria culminated a decade-long Assyrian military campaign into Palestine. Before capitulating the details, however, I must add that historians are not all in agreement on the interpretation of these details; they divide into two camps, identified by Gary Knoppers (2004) as the maximalists and the minimalists, whose contentions I will integrate into the conversation momentarily. But first, the details. Documentation from Assyrian and/or Babylonian records concerning the conquest of Samaria is scant (ANET 282-87). But we do know that Tiglath-pileser III (744-727 BCE) led a series of western

6. In addition to the Samaritan Israelites, descendants of Phinehas and the tribe of Joseph, there was the tribe of Judah, those residing in the city of Pir'aton, and those who followed Jeroboam. This historical retrojection within *Chronicle II* no doubt attempts to distance the Samaritans from Jeroboam who erected the two golden calves at Samaria and Dan. Though Jeroboam established a fortress at the city of Samaria, it was Omri who purchased the hill of Samaria and fortified the city. The Samaritans draw a distinction between themselves and those who resided about the hill of Samaria (Anderson and Giles 2005: 243-44, 247).

campaigns into Palestine, the first in 733-32 resulting in the destruction of Damascus, the conquest of Galilee, the destruction of towns in the northern Transjordan and the northern coastal region, and the defeat of the House of Omri to render Israel a vassal state (2 Kgs 15.19, 29; 16.5-9; cf. 1 Chron. 5.6, 25-26). Tiglath-pileser III also enforced a mass deportation: 'all its inhabitants and their possessions I led to Assyria' (ANET 284). He appointed Hoshea as puppet-king of the vassal state in place of Pekah. The next major blow for Israel came almost a decade later when Shalmaneser V (727-22/21 BCE) launched a 2-3 year siege against Samaria (2 Kgs 17.1-5; 18.10). Shalmaneser died in 722/21 BCE leaving the task of Samaria's complete subjugation under Assyrian hegemony to his successor Sargon II (721-705 BCE). Apparently, Samaria and the cities of Hamath, Arpad, Simirra, Damascus, and Hatarikka formed a coalition to revolt against their Assyrian overlords (see also Nimrud Prisms D & E 4.25-41 in COS 295). Sargon moved quickly to recapture these cities boasting in his annals that he had 'besieged and conquered Samaria' and 'led away as booty 27,290 inhabitants of it'. He also claims, '[The town I] re[built] better than (it was) before and [settled] therein people from countries which [I] myself [had con]quered' (ANET 284-85). His policy of bidirectional deportation, however, did not leave the land empty; rather, remaining inhabitants were left to assume their social positions and held responsible for payment of the imposed tribute.

Historians in the maximalist (e.g. Stern 2001 and Mazar 1990) and minimalist (e.g. Coggins 1975 and Shur 1989) camps part company over interpreting the effects of the Assyrian campaigns, specifically the extent of the onslaughts and deportations. Maximalists contend that the Assyrian destructions were so thoroughgoing to be ruinous to Israel's infrastructure claiming that excavations and surveys of late eighth-century destruction layers at certain Israelite sites (e.g. Taanach, Samaria, Shechem, and Bethel) reveal 'total destruction' of the Samarian region (Stern 2001: 7-9, 49-50). Against the claim of total devastation, the minimalists maintain a destruction of limited duration consigned to the major urban centres. The principal weakness to the maximalist case lays in the assumptions it makes 'and how it employs material evidence in support of sweeping, generalized conclusions' (Knoppers 2004: 161). Granted, the aforementioned sites do evince destruction, but they also evince restoration with settlements. In other words, the evidence does not support a complete discontinuity of settlement. Whatever political discontinuity the Assyrians may have imposed upon the city of Samaria, it contains a fundamental material continuity with its walls in use into the Babylonian and Persian eras. Several other factors pose a problem for the radical and total devastation of Samaria as argued by the maximalists. First, the Assyrian and Babylonian records never

assert devastation, only siege and conquest. Second, such a scorched-earth policy would have serious economic repercussions, thus becoming counter-productive. How could tribute be expected from a people whose lands have been laid waste and denuded? And yet, Sargon claims to have received as much tribute from Samaria after its fall as before its fall. The Assyrian record presents a more complex picture of the aftermath of Samaria's conquest than maintained by the maximalists. At best, we can affirm siege and devastation but also resettlement and material continuity.

Concerning the importation of foreign settlers, the maximalists contend that the population exchanges were so massive as to alter 'the ethnic composition of the population' (Stern 2001: 43) and transform the religion of the region by importees bringing their own gods and cultic customs with them (2 Kgs 17.24-41). I will speak more to this issue in the next section when I discuss the religion of the Samari(t)ans. No doubt, the imperial policy of forced population exchanges did serve several purposes: military conscription, de/stabilizing local regions, labour forces, enforcing state control over newly subjugated peoples, psychological control, and integrating far-off regions into the (Assyrian) empire, to name but a few (Oded 1979: 33-68). While the minimalist camp affirms the presence of Assyrian-sponsored colonists, they deny that it had any affect upon the Israelites who continued practicing their traditional religion. Schur (1989: 20) regards the number of 27,280 northern exiles 'an example of literary hyperbole', while Coggins avers that 'the overwhelming majority of the population' remained in the land with only between 3-4 percent of the population actually being exiled (Coggins 1975: 17). Those native Israelites remaining did not mix with the foreign settlers to form a syncretistic religion. Two counterarguments from the minimalists pose difficulties for the argument of extensive importation of foreign settlers. The first counterargument derives from the testimony of the latter prophets. The early sixth-century prophets Jeremiah and Ezekiel refer to northern Israelites but not to strange peoples having displaced the Israelites, not to all Israelites having departed the land, and not to Israelites becoming contaminated by alien blood. Rather, they express sentiments about the potential reunification of north and south. Why express a desire for reunification if the northern tribes ceased to exist? Second, the expectation of paying tribute and taxes makes sense only if a significant amount of the population familiar with the land remained behind to produce the necessary tribute. Third, if Sargon did import vast numbers of foreign immigrants, the material record should confirm this population exchange. Instead, the traditional culture in the hill country persisted with no evidence of sudden displacement by a single foreign culture or a variety of foreign cultures (Knoppers 2004: 168-69), though some pottery types do reflect Assyrian presence (Zertal 2003: 395-99). We can conclude then

that while bidirectional deportations did occur, the numbers of transplants in Israel do not appear to be high nor did they disrupt the continuity of Israelite material culture and presence. A substantial number of Israelites remained within the land after the Assyrian campaigns, a point that best, and less laboriously, accounts for the presence of a Yahwistic Samari(t)an community in the Persian period.⁷

After the demise of Israel, Assyria divided it into provinces (Aram. *pahwah*; Assy. *pihatu*) with that of Samaria encompassing only a fraction of the territory of the northern kingdom. Sargon may have been responsible for the reorganization of the Assyrian administration into provinces to ensure the stability of Assyrian rule in the Palestinian region. Basically, the provinces replaced the former independent states of the Levant with a governor (Assyrian *bel pihati* or *saknu*) appointed as head. The Assyrians typically implanted Assyrian 'islands' within the newly conquered territories and transplanted exiled populations around those islands, actually military forts. B.J. Parker (1997: 77) notes 'that the construction of forts was an integral part of the permanent establishment of Assyrian sovereignty in newly conquered regions'. Archaeological evidence attests to the presence of forts, administrative complexes, and areas settled by exiled populations in addition to Mesopotamian influence on the architecture of these structures 'characterized by an open-court building surrounded by rooms' (Zertal 2003: 406). These military forts and administrative centres served multiple functions: supply or equipment centres, communication centres, control post for the shipment of raw materials and troop movement, and centres for enemy prisoners, among potential others. The province of Samaria became the base for Assyrian and Babylonian rule in Palestine with the city of Samaria as capital.

The *pahwah*-system remained virtually unchanged for the next 400 years. With Nebuchadnezzar II's defeat of the Egyptian army at Carchemish, Assyrian control of the Levantine provinces naturally transferred to the Chaldeans. Mention of the Assyrian provinces of Transjordan and Syria (Hammath, Damascus, and Gilead) in Ezekiel 47.15-18 seem to indicate that the Babylonians left the former provincial system intact. The large-scale damages inflicted upon Palestinians by the Babylonian campaigns seem to have evaded the Samarian region. The Samaritans evidently did not participate in any of the rebellions against the Babylonians since they

7. To account for the continuation of Yahwism in the north, traditional interpretation, based on a reading of 2 Ki 17.24-32, asserted the Samaritans as descendants of the Assyrian-sponsored colonists. The immigrants perpetuated Israelite state religion by mimicking the activities of Jeroboam I in their renewal of the Bethel cultus.

did not suffer any mass deportations. Babylonian rule was brief, and left few remnants of its presence in the province.

Our knowledge of the Samari(t)ans really does not begin until the Persian period when the reforms of Ezra and Nehemiah began to establish boundaries and foster tensions between 'true Israelites' and Samari(t)ans. The epigraphical evidence of Samaritan and Elephantine papyri, coins, and seals reveals the identity of several governors in the Samaritan administration during this time period. The first was Sanballat, mentioned in the book of Nehemiah as part of a triad formed against the *golah* community. Presumably a scion of a prominent Samaritan family of the Israelite remnant and once in charge of the Samaritan garrison, Sanballat was appointed the governor of Samaria prior to Nehemiah's arrival in Yehud in 444 BCE. The names of his sons Delaiah and Shelemaiah occur in the Elephantine papyri with Delaiah acting alongside the governor of Yehud, thus suggesting to some that he was governor of Samaria at the time. A seal impression identifies yet another governor: '[to Is] aiah son of [San]ballat, governor of Samaria' (as quoted in Grabbe 2004: 156). Reconstructions of the possible list of Samaritan governors bear some affinities though with some noticeable differences (see Fig. 11).

Questions surround some of these individuals, either because of the lack of unambiguous data, dating of sources, or because of the assumption among many historians that the Samaritan government remained in the Sanballat family though no evidence exists to verify all names on the list as belonging to the Sanballat family (see the reconstructed list of Cross 1975). Menachem Mor (1989: 9), who follows Cross's reconstruction, exemplifies this line of scholarship when citing the appointment of Andromachus as governor of Coele-Syria, which most likely included Yehud and Samaria thus terminating the long line of 'governors of Samaria...from the Sanballat family during the entire Persian period'.

This line of reconstruction adds the enigmatic figure of Sanballat (III), whose death precedes Andromachus's appointment, to the list. Whether a Sanballat III ever existed remains debatable, a proposal that stems from Josephus (*Ant.* 11.7.2-8.6 §§302-45). According to Josephus, the high priest Jaddua had a brother named Manasseh (Manasses) who married Nikaso, daughter of Sanballat, at the end of the Persian period. The Jerusalem elders gave Manasseh an ultimatum: divorce his wife or desert the priesthood. His father-in-law, however, offered to build him a Temple on Mt Gerizim and make him high priest. Shortly after Manasseh accepted his father-in-law's offer, Sanballat sent soldiers to support Alexander's fight against the Persians in the siege of Tyre whereas Jaddua remained loyal to the Persian emperor Darius III. Sanballat obtained Alexander's permission to build the temple but died shortly thereafter. Clearly, Josephus's story of Manasseh and

Governor	Date	Source
Sanballat I	mid-5th c. BCE	Nehemiah, Ezra 4, Elephantine
Delaiah	End of 5th, beg. of 4th c. BCE	Elephantine, Samaritan coins
Shelemaiah	Beg. of 4th c. BCE	Elephantine, Samaritan coins
Hananiah (1) Sanballat II (2)	mid-4th c. BCE	Wadi ed- Daliyeh Documents, Samaritan coins
Sanballat II (1) Isaiah (2)	second half of 4th c. BCE	Wadi ed- Daliyeh Bulla and Documents, Samaritan coins
Yeshua/Yeshaiah (1) Joshua (2)	second half of 4th c. BCE	Wadi ed- Daliyeh Bulla, Samaritan papyri
Hananiah (2)		

Figure 11. Table of Samaritan Governors Adaptation of Eshel's (1) (2007: 234) and Grabbe's (2) (2004: 156) Reconstruction.

Nikaso appears to 'sample' that found in Neh. 13.28. Several factors seem to belie the historicity of Josephus's version, which, according to Grabbe (2004: 158), 'contains a reflex of Neh. 13.28 but dated a century later'. First, the story assumes the presence of a Sanballat III.⁸ Second, evidence of a Persian-period Samari(t)an temple on Mt Gerizim, even if dated to the late fifth or early fourth century, undermines Josephus's story (by contrast,

8. As support of Josephus, some scholars have pointed to several Samaritan coins with the letters *sn* identified as Sanballat III though the coins may best fit with Sanballat II (Grabbe 2004: 158).

see Purvis (1986: 86) who affirms the veracity of Josephus's account on the basis of archaeological evidence from Balatah and er-Ras). Third, the episode of Alexander visiting the Jerusalem temple and bowing down to the high priest that culminates the section beginning with Manasseh's marriage to Nikaso is nothing more than Jewish legend intended to demur the legitimacy of the Samari(t)an cultus, but it also taints the perceived credibility of Josephus's other details, such as a Sanballat III. Historically accurate or not, the importance of Josephus's account may reflect the lines of demarcation and tensions between Samari(t)ans and Jews at the time constructed and maintained by such stories.

The political struggles that revolved around the Sanballat family and certain elite members of the *golah* class mark the better part of fifth-century Yehud wherein the well-established symbol of the Temple cultus played a significant role. Three episodes exemplify this conflict not merely political in nature,⁹ with the first two entwined (if not identical). Why the son of Jehoiada (episode 1, Neh. 13) || Manasseh (episode 2, Josephus) would have accepted his father-in-law's offer remains a mystery though one could surmise as plausible suggestions the limited opportunities for advancement to high priesthood, a position later occupied by his brother Yehohanan (Yohanan or Joannes) || Jaddua, and the stringent reforms of the ruling elite in Yehud. In fact, many Jews who had married foreign wives and were increasingly disaffected with the stringent religious reforms in Jerusalem deserted to Samaria. This consideration notwithstanding, Sanballat's appointment of his son-in-law Manasseh as high priest established a fitting priest from the lineage of Aaron, turned his own progeny into fit priests, and validated Gerizim as a sacred site.

The third episode occurs with the Elephantine papyri (408 BCE), which further sheds light on the growing religious isolationism of late fifth-century Jerusalem Yehud. The Jewish community of Elephantine wrote a letter 'sent to our lord [Bagohi the governor of Judah] and to Yehohanan the high priest and his companions the priests who are in Jerusalem and to Ostan the brother of Anan and the nobles of the Jews' (as quoted in Grabbe 2004: 235)

9. Division, infighting, and class struggle are reflected in the perceived antagonism between Nehemiah and those local Jews with power like Sanballat, governor of the province of Samaria (Neh. 4), and Tobiah, an influential member of an old, Jewish upper-class family with strong connections in Jerusalem (6.17-19; 13.4-5, 7-8); between Nehemiah and Manasseh, the son of the high priest Jehoiada (Jaddua) and son-in-law to Sanballat; between Nehemiah and the Jerusalem nobility vis-à-vis Sabbath observance (13.15-18) and intermarriage (13.23-27). How much historical accuracy can be ascribed to these events remains speculative, but it nonetheless gives us an extraordinary insight into a community's acceptance of its identity as one of religious, cultural, and social isolation (symbolized by the wall) borne out of conflict.

appealing for the restoration of their temple destroyed by Egyptian priests. In addition to Yehohanan and Bagohi (Bagoses or Bagavahya), high priest and governor of late fifth-century Yehud respectively, the Elephantine Jews also addressed the same letter to Delaiah, son of Sanballat and presumably governor of Samaria, no doubt considering the Samaritans as their brethren. Interestingly, both governors approved the Elephantine Jews' request over against Yehohanan, who regarded the Elephantine temple at Yeb as illegal on the basis of ethnicity (see Anderson and Giles 2002: 24).¹⁰ But why do the Elephantine Jews address this letter to two different provincial officials unless they have the authority to effect change? Do they regard themselves to be under the political, and or religious, auspices of both governors thus needing their approval? Or might these letters reflect an attempt to capitalize on conflict within Yehud and between provinces by playing one against the other? The latter scenario bears a modicum of credibility when we consider the internal religio-political power struggle between the high priest Yehohanan and the Persian governor Bagohi narrated by Josephus (*Ant.* 11.7.1 §§297-301). Bagohi had conspired with Yehoshua/Jesus, the brother of Yehohanan, against him. After a quarrel in the Temple that resulted in the murder of Yehoshua by his brother (c. 400 BCE), Bagohi was denied access to the Temple to which he responded by asserting his power forcibly against Yehohanan and other temple priests and by bringing reprisals against the Yehudim for seven years.

The Hellenistic period noted little improvement of Samari(t)an reputation in the eyes of Alexander after he appointed Andromachus governor. Deprived of political leadership, the Samari(t)an aristocracy resettled the ancient site of Shechem where ongoing antipathy between Jews and Samari(t)ans for two centuries intensified.¹¹ The Samari(t)an aristocracy, those most affected by the appointment of Andromachus, reacted violently to this change by burning Andromachus alive. Afterwards, they fled their centre at Shechem and took refuge in a cave at Wadi Daliyeh. Alexander withdrew from Egypt to inflict retaliation upon the Samari(t)ans whom he banished from the city of Samaria and settled with Macedonian veterans.

10. The joint communiqué of governors Bagohi and Delaiah permitted the Jews of the Elephantine community of Yeb to rebuild their temple but with the following proviso that only cereal offerings, drink offerings and incense be offered. No sheep, goats, or oxen were to be offered as burnt sacrifices (*TAD* A4.9:9 and A4.10:10-11 in Porten et al 1996).

11. Purvis (1986: 89) cites the following as factors: political tensions created by differing power relations with the Ptolemies and the Seleucids; resentment toward the Samaritans' willingness to accept Hellenization; hostilities between the two in their respective diaspora communities in Egypt under Ptolemy VI Philometor (18-45 BCE); and the expansionist policies of the Hasmoneans under John Hyrcanus.

The city would evolve from a military colony to a Hellenistic city. Along the way from Egypt to Samaria, Alexander met the Jewish high priest Jaddua who may have revealed the whereabouts of the Samari(t)ans' caves. Alexander and the Macedonian army suffocated the hidden Samari(t)ans by setting fire to the cave entrances. As a result of the Samari(t)an aristocratic revolt, the Samari(t)ans fell into disfavour with the Greeks while the Jews became the favoured group of Palestine (see Mor 1989: 10-11). The Samari(t)an sect assumed a rather low profile from the late fourth century until the religious persecutions of Antiochus IV in 167 BCE.

Cultural

Some regions of Samaria witnessed a decline demographically at the end of the eighth century BCE due to Assyrian deportations. But the archaeological record nonetheless evinces a material continuity from the late eighth-fourth century with significant population shifts from the eastern to the northern and western regions with intensive settlement patterns especially during the Achaemenid era (Grabbe 2004: 156; see also fuller discussion in Knoppers 2006: 268-73). The southern part, a more mountainous area, did not fare as well, having less than half the number of sites (90) during the Persian period relative to the preceding Iron II period. In the northern region settlement during the Persian period grew densest in the hills of Manasseh (247 sites). The western region experienced a significant increase of settlements and farmhouses aided in part by the development of an artery system of major and minor roads. Even the city of Samaria prospered during the Achaemenid era. Surveys reveal thick settlements in the areas around the city of Samaria (over half of the Persian period sites within a 10-km radius of the capital; Zertal 1990: 14) with varied population estimates for the region. But if the more generous estimates place the population of contemporary Yehud at 30,000 and the number of residents on Mt Manasseh alone roughly at 42,000 (Zertal 1990: 11-12), then the population figure for the province of Samaria obviously had to be much higher. No doubt, Samaria was one of the most important urban areas throughout all Palestine (Stern 2001: 424), if not the largest and most important city of all Palestine (Zertal 2003: 380). No cultural parity existed between Yehud and Samaria; rather, Samaria was larger, better established, considerably more populous, and wealthier than Yehud to the south.

Writing/Language. Samaritan papyri, Samaritan coins, Elephantine papyri, and the Arsames correspondence yield significant insight into the language and scripts of the Samaritan province from the Persian to the Hellenistic period. Numerous inscriptions from Samaria dating to these periods reveal that Samari(t)ans spoke the same language as the Yehudim,

i.e. Aramaic. Aramaic was the official language of correspondence and governance throughout the Persian era, though Hebrew, too, was employed for certain official or religious purposes (both scripts remained in use among Judaeans and Samari(t)ans into the Hellenistic era; see Knoppers 2006: 274). J. Naveh (1998: 91) notes: 'No differentiation whatsoever is discernible in the scripts used in Judah and Samaria in the Persian Period'. One major exception relevant from the fifth-third centuries BCE needs noting: Hebrew predominates on official seals and coins in Yehud with instances of Aramaic coin legends in the minority, whereas Aramaic predominates in Samaria with instances of Hebrew coin legends in the minority, almost a rarity (Knoppers 2006: 274-75). In one example, the Hebrew inscription '[Belonging to Yesha]yahu son of Sanballat, governor of Samaria' appears on a seal of an Aramaic legal document written in the Aramaic script.

Equally revealing about the epigraphic evidence are its proper names that contain a theophoric element, perhaps an insight into Samari(t)an religious culture. Names alone are not reliable indicators of religious affiliation,¹² but the accretion of names and knowledge of Samari(t)an religion (however perceived it did include northern traditions of Yahwism) lend more credence to suppositions, albeit tentative, about the religious culture of Samaria. Papyri and coins include the names 'Delaiah' (*dlyh*), 'Shelemiah' (*slmyh*), 'Hananiah' (*hnnyh*), 'Jeho'anah' (*yhw'nh*), and 'Bodyah' (*bdyh*), all with a Yahwistic theophoric. Another proper name deserving mention found in the numismatic evidence yet parting from the Yahwistic theophoric is 'Jeroboam' (*yrb'm*), attested in the legend of five different fourth-century coins. Its attestation as the most recurring non-Yahwistic proper name bears national connotations since it would seem that 'some residents of Samaria felt an attachment to the traditions of the former Northern Kingdom' (Knoppers 2006: 277). All in all, the preponderance of personal names occurring in bullas, coins, and papyri suggest that the Samari(t)an elite, if not the majority of Samari(t)ans, were Yahwistic.

Religion. Perhaps the 'People of the Book' moniker fits no religious group best than that of the Samaritans. The Samaritan community owes its very existence to the unifying function of the SP, translated early into Greek (*Samareitikon*), Aramaic (*Samaritan Targums* or *SamTg*), and Arabic. As Anderson and Giles (2005: 46) remark, 'the SP is the fountain from which

12. Instances of Babylonian and Persian names appear in Samari(t)an evidence (e.g. 'Sanballat' (*Sin'uballat*)), as well as in literature from Yehud (e.g. 'Shenazzar' (*sen'assar*), 'Sheshbazzar' (*sesbassar*), and 'Zerubbabel' (*zerubbabel*)).

flows the religious identity of the Samaritans'. The SP is central to their identity and to their sacred site Mt Gerizim.¹³

Many forms of the SP exist within the Samaritan community, but none symbolize its vitality and significance than the venerated Abisha scroll (so-named for its author Abisha (Heb. Abishua), the great-grandson of Aaron (1 Chron 6.50 [6.35 MT]) housed in the Nablus synagogue. Questions surround the Abisha scroll's date and the SP, the latter a concern solely with regard to establishing the preeminence of the MT. Samaritans regard the Abisha scroll as the oldest Torah scroll dating back more than 3,000 years,¹⁴ hence its sacrosanct status (few individuals have ever seen the Abisha scroll with most having the Pinhas scroll, named after the Samaritan high priest Pinhas the sixth and dated 1441 CE, fobbed off on them). The scroll's presumed antiquity rests on the following cryptogram within.

I am Abisha, the son of Pinhas, son of Eleazar, son of Aaron the Priest, on them be the favour of the Lord and his glory—I wrote this holy book in the door of the tent of meeting on Mount Gerizim in the thirteenth year of the dominion of the Children of Israel over the land of Canaan to its boundaries round about. I praise the Lord.

Regardless of the scroll's disputed antiquity, dismissing the validity of the SP text tradition on the basis of spurious theological bias simply overlooks the very same bias present in the MT. The SP served, and continues to serve, an invaluable function for the Samaritan community, as had the MT tradition for the Jewish community.

13. The SP is also fundamental to the theology and cultus of the Samaritans sanctioning both beliefs and religious practices. The Samaritan creed succinctly sums up four major foci of Samaritan beliefs. 'We say: My faith is in thee, Yhwh; and in Moses son of Amram, thy servant; and in the Holy Law; and in Mount Gerizim Bethel; and in the Day of Vengeance and Recompense' (Montgomery 1968: 207). In addition to Torah and Gerizim, the creed affirms a rigorous, monotheistic stance (see Macdonald 1964: 59-143), most likely shaped by that of Islam (for close parallels cf. both Montgomery 1968 and Macdonald 1964) though belief in Yhwh harks back as early as the late-eighteenth century, and the intermediary status of Moses to the divine (Anderson and Giles 2005: 34).

14. Though modern scholarship has yet to validate the scroll's antiquity, consensus dates it no earlier than the mid-twelfth century CE. The stated problems adduced for the scroll's date are principally arguments *ex silentio*: (1) the old Samaritan Chronicles make no reference to the scroll; (2) the early church fathers knew of an ancient Samaritan version of the Pentateuch but never mention its writer as someone from the Bible; (3) the SJ, which clearly bears some antiquity, never refers to an ancient Torah scroll though chap. 23 mentions the high priest Eleazar handing Joshua a copy of the Torah and chap. 38 indicates Levites making copies of the Torah; (4) paleographically, the scroll evinces scripts from a variety of hands with the cryptogram itself dating to the twelfth century (see discussion in Crown 1991a: 20-21, 39).

Comparisons of the SP with the MT have commonly revolved around deviations of the former from the latter, numbering some 6,000 (Hjelm 2000: 87), while ignoring their numerous similarities, much closer than the SP to the LXX though widespread publication of the Dead Sea Scrolls (DSS) now reveals its parallels with the SP.¹⁵ A few examples from the MT and SP will suffice to demonstrate affinities between the two text traditions.

MT Exod 20.17 Do not covet your neighbour's house, do not covet your neighbour's wife or his servant.

SP Exod 20.17 Do not covet your neighbour's house, do not covet your neighbour's wife, *his field*, or his servant.

MT Deut 11.30 As you know, they are beyond the Jordan, some distance to the west, in the land of the Canaanites who live in the Arabah, opposite Gilgal, beside the oak of Moriah.

SP Deut 11.30 As you know, they are beyond the Jordan, some distance to the west, in the land of the Canaanites who live in the Arabah, opposite Gilgal, beside the oak of Moriah *opposite Shechem*.

Differences between the SP and the MT were generally attributed to Samaritan scribes. However, a comparison of the SP with the Dead Sea Scrolls (DSS) reveals that these 'changes' were not all at the hands of the Samaritans since readings from both texts share more in common than does the DSS with the MT (cf. the DSS || SP version of Exodus 20 contra the MT). While the DSS text of Exodus 20 shares all the major expansions within the SP, one noticeable difference between the two does exist—4QExod lacks the Samaritan expansion of the tenth commandment with its inclusion of Gerizim. The comparison of these text traditions sheds significant light on Samari(t)an culture from the second-first centuries BCE and their relations with other religious groups. Judith Sanderson (1986: 319-20) comments:

15. Studies of recensions of the SP, its origins, and history abound (Anderson and Giles 2005: 4-17; Purvis 1968; Tov 1989: 397-407). Basically, two prominent theories exist to explain the four known pentateuchal texts—the SP, MT, LXX, and 4QExod (DSS) (for surveys of these theories, see Sanderson 1986: 31-34). The first is a theory of regional or local texts. The second is the 'manuscript tree' theory, and proposes a common text tradition from which all four texts derive though adding their own unique expansions and characteristics. The Old Greek text (OG) split off first, then the SP and 4QExod with their traditions, followed lastly by the MT. Purvis claims an origin for the SP in the Hasmonean period shortly after John Hyrcanus' destruction of Samaria and Shechem though Grabbe (1993: 342) suggests that Purvis' arguments do not preclude a recension two or three centuries after the second century BCE. Currently, several versions of the SP have been made available to Western scholarship though August von Gall's published edition *Der hebräische Pentateuch der Samaritaner* (1916-18) remains the standard.

In one more way their group [i.e., Samaritans] has been shown to be quite at home in the "rich complex of Judaism." They were not the only ones to treat their Scriptures as they did. Or, at very least, even if they were the creators of all of the major expansions, a scroll with all but the Gerizim expansion was accepted and used in a different and very isolationist and hostile group. Even the most tendentious aspect of their Scripture followed a pattern also found at Qumran and, we may suppose, elsewhere as well.

By far, the most noted difference between the SP and MT Pentateuch crucial to Samari(t)an identity is their holy site Mount Gerizim. Even the MT witnesses to the significance of Gerizim, thus buttressing the Samaritan contention that certain passages of the SP (e.g. Deut 11.26-30; 12.2, 4-5; 27.4; Josh. 8.33-34) are oldest. Moses addresses the people on the eve of their entry into Canaan:

See, this day I set before you blessing and curse; blessing, if you obey the commandments of the LORD your God which I enjoin upon you this day; and curse, if you do not obey the commandments of the LORD your God, but turn away from the path which I enjoin upon you this day and follow other gods, whom you have not experienced. When the LORD your God brings into the land which you are about to invade and occupy, you shall pronounce the blessing at Mount Gerizim and the curse at Mount Ebal (11.26-29).

Just in case confusion exists over the proper location for worship, the SP clarifies by adding 'opposite Shechem' immediately after 'Moriah' in Deuteronomy 11.30. Moses identifies the mountain of blessing with Mount Gerizim. Following in Deuteronomy 12 is yet another major distinction between the MT and the SP.

MT Deut 12.5 But you shall seek the place that the LORD your God *will choose* out of all your tribes as his habitation to put his name there.

SP Deut 12.5 But you shall seek the place that the LORD your God *has chosen* out of all your tribes as his habitation to put his name there.

Contextually, the SP version makes most sense as the legitimate location for the proper worship of God since Gerizim, already identified in 11.29-30, had been 'chosen' before the crossing of the Jordan. The SP version legitimizes Gerizim, not Jerusalem, as the proper place to worship YHWH. When the Israelites did enter Canaan, they pronounced the blessings facing Mount Gerizim (Josh. 8.33-34), regarded as holy long before Jerusalem. Altogether, these texts relate a public exposition of the Torah with the building of an

altar in the vicinity of Shechem at Mount Gerizim, thus establishing the prominence of Shechem as a cultic site in early Israelite tradition.¹⁶

There on Gerizim the Samari(t)ans built their temple subsequently destroyed by John Hyrcanus I in 128 BCE (*Ant.* 13.254-58). Many scholars have questioned this early date on the basis of archaeological excavations of Mount Gerizim, Shechem, and Mareshah (Magen (2007: 193) proposing an alternate destruction date c. 110 BCE. But the more pressing question in the discussion of the temple sanctuary at Mount Gerizim is, When did the Samari(t)ans build their temple? Scholarship generally assumed Josephus' reconstruction thus dating the construction of the temple to the late fourth century of the Hellenistic period. Archaeological discoveries at Gerizim, however, corroborate an earlier dating of the first temple phase to the mid-fifth century.¹⁷ The Persian period sanctuary measured 96 × 98 m with numerous discoveries confirming its identity as a Temple to Yhwh. In addition to burned bones of sacrifices (of sheep, goats, cattle, and doves), inscriptions provide the greatest attestation. They include titles of the priests ('Pinhas the priest' and 'their brothers the priests'),

16. Christophe Nihan (2007: 187-223) contends that though the site of Shechem in Deut. 27 and Josh. 24 is not coincidental, the two texts actually deal with two distinct sacred sites with no cross-referencing taking place. 'Shechem' in Josh. 24 forms an artful frame (cf. Gen 12.6-7) in the redaction of the hexateuchal narrative, thus making concessions to Northern Yahwists. The redaction of Deut. 27 offers a compromise, the coexistence of two cultic sites yet affirming a law of centralization. Apart from the redactional suppositions of the formation of a Hexateuch and the Pentateuch by Nihan, his proposal demonstrates several flaws. First, it fails to satisfactorily provide reasons why the redactors of the Torah in Yehud would wish to make concessions to Northern Yahwists. Such a conciliatory attitude belies what we know of religious groups during that era, namely that they engaged in polemics against each other. Second, Nihan's conclusions basically affirm the long-standing position of Western biblical scholarship that assumes the primacy of the Jewish Torah and the cultic site of Jerusalem without consideration of their ideological basis vis-à-vis complex relations with the Samari(t)ans.

17. Archaeological work on the central peak of Mount Gerizim by Magen in 1984 has advanced knowledge of the site beyond the prevailing theory of the Samaritan Temple lying beneath the Roman temple in Tell er-Ras, north of Gerizim. On the basis of such a theory, scholars demurred the notion of a Samaritan Temple claiming the absence of a monarchy and the poor economic condition of Samaria as necessary motivations (e.g. Anderson 1991). But we know much more now. From the uninterrupted excavations on Gerizim up until 2006 by Magen (2007: 157-58), he has categorized the subsequent archaeological discoveries into three groups: (1) the sacred precinct of the Persian period; (2) the sacred precinct of the Hellenistic period (early second century); and (3) the Hellenistic city on Gerizim.

certain formulas ('before the God in this place', 'before (the) God', 'before the LORD', and the 'house of sacrifice') indicative of a temple, and the Tetragrammaton ('the house of the LORD'). Equally fascinating is the find of a small gold bell with a silver clapper from the fringes of the high priest's ephod (Exod. 28.33-35). Ceramic finds reveal a material continuity with no break in settlement patterns from the Assyrian, Babylonian, and Persian periods at Gerizim. Numismatic evidence reveals coins, though minimal, dating to the Persian era from as early as 480 BCE. The paucity of coins relative to later periods may be attributed to Alexander the Great's conquest and destruction of Samaria, an act that terminated coin minting in Samaria. Despite the destruction of Samaria, Mount Gerizim and its temple continued to exist and to flourish as the center (religious, national, economic, and political during the Ptolemaic period) of the Yahwistic Samari(t)ans.

Devotees of Yhwh, the Samari(t)ans continued unabated their religious traditions. They offered sacrifices to Yhwh even after the demise of the northern kingdom (cf. Ezra 4.2; 2 Kgs 17.32-33). Had they completely abandoned Yhwh and their religious traditions, Hezekiah's Passover invitation would have had little resonance with 'the remnant' to the north (2 Chron. 30).¹⁸ Some Samaritans did respond to Hezekiah's invitation, regarding themselves as 'Israel' with a shared ancestry, heritage, and deity, and ventured south to participate in the paschal feast on the second month, itself perhaps a concession to the northern calendar allowing for sufficient travel time. Only a context where the Samari(t)ans continued their religious devotion to Yhwh can enable such literature to have a rhetorical force necessary for advancing an ideology of the primacy and legitimacy of the Jerusalem cultus. To this day, Samaritans continue to observe the Passover sacrifice (as described in Exod. 12) in addition to the High Holy Days of Rosh Hashanah (Festival of the Seventh Month), Yom Kippur (Day of Atonement), Sukkoth (Feast of Tabernacles/Booths), Shavuot (Feast of Weeks), and the Sabbath.

18. While I concur with Knoppers (2005: 321-25) that the DH and the Chronicler diverge on their perspectives of Jewish-Samari(t)an relations in that the latter envisions the prospect of a reunification of north-south whereas the former certainly does not (the fall of Samaria and the myth of the empty land terminates the northern realm), I disagree with his implication that both share different attitudes toward the Samari(t)ans. Rather, the Chronicler shares the same perspective with regard to the supremacy of the Jerusalem cultus (under which the ideal of reunification will occur) and with regard to perceptions of the Samari(t)ans as 'rebellious'.

*Ethnicity**Origins*

Identifying the ethnicity and origins of the Samari(t)ans admits no straightforward conclusions. Numerous proposals abound with thorny questions central to the issue. Samaritans or Samaritans? When did the Samaritans as a self-conscious religious sect first emerge? Are Samaritan origins directly connected to a schism with the Jews? From antiquity to modernity three positions have basically dominated the discussion: (1) the Jewish version that claims Samari(t)ans as ethnically foreign; (2) a mediating Jewish version deriving from Josephus and propagated by modern scholarship that claims Samari(t)ans as ethnic half-breeds; and (3) the Samaritan version that affirms an ethnic Israelite identity. All three positions have their pitfalls, but the historically eclipsed Samari(t)an voice will gain ample hearing with its every word not simply being taken at face value.

The first position, that of the Jewish voice, historically defined Samari(t)an ethnicity as foreign with the name 'Cuthean'. This identification rests principally on the interpretation of 2 Kings 17, interpreted earliest by Josephus as anti-Samaritan polemic. Basically, 2 Kings 17 implies that after the demise of Samaria in the late eighth century, the Assyrians deported Israelites to other regions of the empire (hence an implied empty land myth; 2 Kgs 17.23), but also imported numerous population segments from Babylon, Avva, Hamath, Sepharvaim, and Cuthah to inhabit Samaria (both town and province; 'they took possession of Samaria, *and* settled in its cities', 2 Kgs 17.24). Moreover, these colonists adopted a syncretistic form of worship thus prompting a repatriated Israelite priest to instruct them in Yahwistic worship in order to ward off a lion plague as divine punishment for their syncretism (vv. 26-28). The Josephan designation 'Cuthean' for the Samaritan sect stuck over time as an ethnic slur, emblemizing Jewish ethnic and religious contempt for the Samaritans.

The second position of Samari(t)ans as ethnic half-breeds has enjoyed wider currency, thanks to its dissemination by modern scholarship. This perspective derives as well from Josephus' interpretation of 2 Kgs 17, from the assumption of a Samaritan schism (based on Josephus' conflation of Neh. 13.28), and from an assumed Samaritan Sanballat contemporaneous with Alexander. Presumably, those colonists imported to the Samaritan province intermarried with remnant Israelites, their hybrid offspring known by the pejorative slur 'Cuthean' among Jewish outsiders.¹⁹ As the result of a

19. If only implicitly, 2 Kgs 17 lends itself to this view of ethnically hybrid Samari(t)an origins. Though only one priest from Samaria receives specific mention, plural verb forms occur throughout 2 Kgs 17.27 MT ('Let them go and let them settle

schism between the Samaritan and Jerusalem communities, disenfranchised Jerusalem priests defected (e.g. Manasseh) and Samaritans assumed a quasi-Israelite identity.

Following Josephus, modern research popularized nuances of two schisms (either an emphasis upon one—the Persian or the Greek period; or a conflation of two—in the Persian period [Neh. 13.28] and the temple in the Greek period) with that of the two-episode paradigm advanced by James Montgomery being most influential. Montgomery (1968) located Samaritan origins (the first episode of separation) to the post-exilic era and the final schism to Hyrcanus's activity in the second century BCE. Similarly, Moses Gaster asserted a pre-exilic origin with the schism in the fifth century BCE during the time of Ezra (1925: 32-34), yet still assuming the two-episode paradigm. Not until Richard Coggins's monograph *Samaritans and Jews* did modern research move away from the two-episode paradigm. Coggins argued that the term 'schism' was misleading; instead, Samaritanism, like so many other factions and currents of the time divided over cult, belief and society, developed during the formative era of Judaism in the third century BCE (1974: 163). Subsequent scholarship on the Samaritans have since proposed radical alternatives—e.g. an extremely late date for the Jewish–Samaritan schism (third century CE) by Alan Crown (1991b), or the emergence of three distinct Jewish groups during the Hasmonaean period by Etienne Nodet (1997)—though not entirely free of presumptions about Samaritan origins within Judaism. These proposals that have virtually revived the Josephan view, albeit recast, are subject to the same logical flaws and ethnic prejudice. First, no consensus exists over when a schism actually occurred between Jews and Samaritans; it is simply assumed. While many scholars date the schism later to the Hasmonaean era, after Hyrcanus's attack on the Samaritan temple and community, Crown pushes it further back to the Roman era. Second, scholars who follow Josephus assume as schism what may be nothing more than ongoing episodes of acute tension, religious and/or political, between two communities jockeying for primacy. Third, a strong, underlying anti-Samaritan bias informs both Jewish versions of Samari(t)an origins that assume 'a schism of the Samaritans *from* the Jews' as axiomatic for understanding Samaritan origins (Purvis 1986: 85). Usage of the term 'schism' to describe relations between Jews and Samari(t)ans moreover assumes an orthodox norm to Judaism not in place until the Christian era.

there and let him teach them the custom of the god of the land'). The convergence of repatriated Israelite priest(s) and plural verb forms 'constitute one of the sources, if not the source, for the later tradition that the Samaritans were composed of a mixed population' (Knoppers 2007: 239 n. 42).

The third position, that of the Samaritans, insists on Samaritan ethnic identity as Israelite, descendants of the sons of Joseph (Pummer 1987: 2-3; Hjelm 2000: 76-103). Samaritan historical theology places their origin at the time of the judges, and most specifically with the cultic site of Shechem. Presumably, the priest Eli broke with orthodoxy by establishing the cultic center at Shiloh. Both sites were certainly important to early Israel, Shiloh as the site for the Tent of Presence (Josh. 18.1) and Shechem as the site for the covenant renewal between Israel and Yhwh (Josh. 24.1). Eli's move resulted in the establishment of three factions within Israel: (1) that loyal to Mount Gerizim Bethel and Shechem; (2) that group following Eli at Shiloh; and (3) a faction following after false gods that ushered in the 'Era of Divine Disfavor'. Only the Samaritans, as claimed, have kept the orthodox faith preserving worship at the legitimate cult site of Mount Gerizim Bethel, maintaining the integrity of the Torah, and retaining the ancient traditions of the 'House of Joseph'.

Appearances notwithstanding, both Jewish and Samaritan versions actually share more in common than appears. First, theological and ideological biases motivate the portraiture of the 'other' in both versions. Since we have no extant Samaritan literature antedating the modern era, the Samaritan version suffers from the critique of retrojection. Details that its origin extends back to the pre-monarchic era and is connected to a schism within the Israelite community seem highly dubious. It seems completely inconceivable that had events transpired according to the Samaritan version that Jewish writers of the Hebrew Bible would not have exploited it in their anti-Samari(t)an polemics, especially if the Jews were culpable for the rift. Second, each version of the identity of the 'other' relates to the theological emphasis in each group's literature—the supremacy and legitimacy of the Mount Gerizim Bethel cultus for the Samaritans on the one hand, and the Jerusalem cultus for the Jews on the other hand. Neither group disavows an ethnic relationship to its 'other' as Israelite, but certainly understands its religious identity and superiority much differently. To not demonstrate a commitment to the cultic orthodoxy of each group inherently disqualifies it as Yahwist. Third, the historical dubiety of claims made about the 'other' in each version does not diminish the significance of that version for group identity, clearly understood in relation to its 'other'.

Perceptions

Only two texts comprise the Samari(t)an myth within the DH: 1 Kgs 12-14 (analyzed in the next section) and 2 Kgs 17. Nevertheless, both texts yield significant, if not focused, insight into Jewish perceptions of the Samari(t)ans. Additionally, certain literary devices connect these

narratives: the presence of 'Samaria' (an obvious anachronism interjected within the first narrative to reveal an ideological bias), the motifs of 'the sin of Jeroboam', 'the mauling lions', and the Bethel cult. The text of 2 Kgs 17 and its embedded perception of Samari(t)ans deserve closer analysis beyond its surface layer.

The text lacks, as Knoppers (2007: 238) remarks, 'a univocal perspective on Samari(t)an origins' reflecting instead a more complex situation. Commentaries on 2 Kgs 17 generally assumed vv. 24-34a and vv. 34b-40 to be from the hand of different writers with the latter as a reaction to the viewpoint of the former (for example of a close structural analysis on the division of these verses, see Walsh 2000: 315-23). The former text posits ethnic discontinuity but substantial religious continuity within Samaria, whereas the latter text assumes an ethnic continuity with the post-exilic population of Samaria in that it regards the northerners ethnically as descendants of Jacob, i.e. Israel. For example, the writer mentions the longstanding covenant of Israel with Yhwh in relation to the Samarian residents whose ancestors experienced liberation from Egypt (vv. 34-36). This tolerant perspective of the Samari(t)ans as Israelite echoes that of the Chronicler (see Knoppers 2005: 309-38; Williamson 1977). What is disputed in 2 Kgs 17, however, is its religious perception of the Samari(t)ans as Yahwists, which speaks to an interpretative problem historically, namely how to account for Yahwism continuing centuries beyond the Assyrian period given perceptions of Samari(t)an religion as syncretistic.

Presumably, the continuation of Yahwism in Samaria originated with the Assyrian royal dictate to repatriate an exiled Samarian priest who could teach the colonists how to fear Yhwh and who revived traditional northern Israelite practices (17.24-28). The priest took up residence at one of the major state-sponsored Israelite sanctuaries with a long tradition, namely Bethel. Whether he was a landed Israelite or a deported Israelite mattered very little to a narrator who derides *every* Israelite for never seeking to return to Yhwh. The narrator clearly connects the cult established by the Samarian priest to that established by Jeroboam I with thrice-repeated injunctions of worshipping other gods (vv. 35, 37, 38) in order to emphasize a theological point for a post-exilic audience. That emphasis centres on the Jerusalem cultus and a counter-cultus at Gerizim germane to perceptions of Samari(t)ans as 'rebellious'. The narrative trajectory of the DH depicts Samari(t)an rebelliousness in terms of a cultic movement from south to north though closer analysis affirms a cultic movement in the opposite direction from north to south, the antiquity of religious traditions at Bethel to the north supplanted by the newly innovative religious tradition of Jerusalem to the south. Never does the writer disavow an ethnic tie between post-exilic Samari(t)ans and Israelites; rather, the writer of

vv. 34b-41 mitigates potential perceptions of Samari(t)ans as Yahwists in vv. 24-34a. As Knoppers (2007: 236) observes, 'Not worshipping other deities is vital to keeping Yhwh's commandments. Worshipping Yhwh means not worshipping other gods'. Strictly speaking, an adherence to the Jerusalem cultus ideologically becomes synonymous with worshipping Yhwh and being true 'Israel'. While the post-exilic Samari(t)ans bore an ethnic relation to Israelite ancestors, they also bore a religious connection by clinging to their traditions and worshipping Yhwh, though not exclusively at Jerusalem.

A view through the veil of textual misdirection reveals the magnitude of its success. Textual cues entice scholarly preoccupation with a 'schism', which only fuels the anti-Samari(t)an polemic and its implicit purpose to colour perceptions of Samaritanism (however ancient or modern) as 'rebellious'. Yet, not all the literature of the Hebrew Bible colours perceptions of the Samari(t)ans as has the DH or Ezra-Nehemiah. By contrast, the Chronicler affirms that the Samari(t)ans indeed have a share in Jerusalem (cf. Neh. 2.20). Only the Chronicler, for example, narrates King Hezekiah's attempt to include the Israelite remnant in the Passover celebrations at Jerusalem after Samaria's demise (2 Chron. 30.1, 10-11), and a number of Israelites from the tribes of Ephraim, Manasseh, Issachar, and Zebulun did attend (2 Chron. 30.18). In addition, 'the remnant of Israel' provided donations toward Josiah's temple renovations, a detail missing from the Kings' narrative. The Chronicler's broad-minded perspective, which regards 'Israel' as comprising members from the tribes of Judah and Israel and not simply *golahs*, contrasts starkly with the more narrow, sectarian approach present in Ezra-Nehemiah and the DH (Magen 2007: 186-87). Even the prophet Jeremiah speaks of citizens from Shechem, Shiloh, and Samaria bringing frankincense and a grain offering to the house of Yhwh (Jer. 41.5). Moreover, the tone within the prophetic literature does not resound with animosity between both ethnic groups but rather with a hope of restoration (see Ezek. 37.16-19; for consideration of the prophetic literature on this note, see Anderson and Giles 2002: 18-19). Were the religious state of Samaria so irredeemable after its demise as the DH depicts it, we would have to query the idea of a restoration as an obvious *non sequitur*.

Two points bear mention that scholarly preoccupation with a 'schism' and the ethno-typed identity of Samari(t)ans as 'rebellious' occludes from view. First, it dismisses the positive religious ties binding these two groups. Samari(t)an acknowledgment of the Jerusalem cultus underscores their shared inheritance in Jerusalem with the Jews. In Ezra 4, the Samari(t)an contingent affirms their Yahwistic ties claiming, 'for we worship your God as you do' (4.2). Their claim does not meet with a rebuttal repudiating Samari(t)an religious syncretism under the guise of Yahwism,

but rather with a sectarian appeal to imperial authority sanctioning the Jewish community's *exclusivist* claim to Jerusalem (4.3). Second, preoccupation with a 'schism' and the ethno-typed identity of Samari(t)ans as 'rebellious' misdirects attention from the negative religious ties binding these two groups. Ezekiel allegorizes Samaria and Jerusalem as two sisters, Oholah and Oholibah respectively, and metaphorically associates Israelite infidelity with Yhwh to adultery with a lustful whore with such graphic language and images that would necessarily debar it from a modern motion picture screen (Ezek. 23). Yet Oholibah, Jerusalem, was much worse than Oholah, Samaria, having witnessed her religious infidelity. Rather than learning from her disloyalty, Jerusalem chose instead to best her (23.11). While the literary re-presentation of the Samari(t)ans as 'rebellious' may serve its intended ethno-typing effect, it also reflects the negative image of (Jewish) 'self'—Jews as 'rebellious' and, conversely, Samari(t)ans less so, almost 'faithful' in comparison.

Conclusion

By the late sixth century BCE, Samaria and Yehud struggled for imperial favour as antagonistic relations (sometimes tense) unconfined to any single locus marked interactions between their intelligentsia. Amidst these tense relations, ethnic identities were constructed in the face of a relative Samaritan superiority that had to have a psychological impact on the collective (un)conscious of the *golahs*. On an ethnic front, a new identity in Yehud that excluded its indigenes revived the long-standing antipathy between Judah and Israel with ethnic purity as the boundary marker identifying true 'Israel'. On a political front, Samaria was considerably larger with open hostility between both provincial governors attested (Lemche 1995: 190-91). On an economic front, control over the land intensified friction between the 'people of the land' (a term comprising Samaritan upper class citizens, remaining Judaeans, and/or former debtors and slaves; Smith 1991: 96) and the *golahs* (Grabbe 2004: 287-88).²⁰ Israel, which historically fared better

20. According to Grabbe (2004: 252-54), although friction between returning temple personnel, officially recognized and approved by Persia, and any indigenous priestly groups would have occurred, that did not likely create conflicts in the wider community. Moreover, the conflict between this indigenous religious group of the 'people of the land' and the *golah* does not reflect conflict between Samaritans and Jews, but rather between 'Samaritans' and Jews. Samaritan tradition maligns Ezra for the 'schism' because of (1) the exclusive approach to Judaism favoring the orthodoxy of Jerusalem and (2) the establishment of the Hebrew canon that extended beyond the Torah (Anderson and Giles 2002: 20-24; 2005: 169).

economically,²¹ had more abundant resources (with its agricultural technology, social structure, and culture) and geographic accessibility in stark contrast to Judah's relative lack of natural resources (less fertile farm- and pastureland) and isolation. On a religious front, the Samari(t)ans were devoted to the traditional local deity Yhwh thus making them rivals for religious influence. The pathology of this kin relation, in which Samaria overshadowed and dominated her often politically and economically inferior sibling, aroused 'fierce jealousies on the part of the less-favored sibling' (Grabbe 2004: 263). In the context of such realia, the consumption of the DH would (1) ideologically justify the Temple cultus, (2) provide the elitists' *raison d'être* implying indigenization, (3) provide psychological motivation for their political control (Lemche 1995: 189), (4) establish their typological identity as 'true Israel', and (5) establish the typological identity of Samari(t)ans as 'rebellious' whereby to anathematize them (Davies 1992: 117-18).

The Samari(t)ans lost out in their bid to appropriate the descriptor 'Israel' (to which they had right²²) for their self-identification. But identity is only one commonality linking both Jews and Samari(t)ans in the face of 'obvious' differences that appear to firmly demarcate boundaries between them. Appeals by the Jews about its 'other' through its literary re-presentation could only be made if they shared many things in common with Samari(t)ans. Only because of their 'unity based on shared bloodlines, shared customs, shared traditions, shared prophets, shared beliefs, a shared past, a shared land and a shared social structure' could an appeal to build hope in a shared future be made by the Chronicler (Knoppers 2005: 327). No interrelationship between two ethnic groups of the Persian period strongly exemplifies this notion of shared identity, itself predicated on traits of ambiguity and hybridity, than that of the Jews and Samari(t)ans. Just how Jewish were the Samari(t)ans (a preoccupation of modern scholarship)? And conversely (though a question nobody has yet to broach), just how Samari(t)an were the Jews? Efforts to disambiguate with any clear-cut identity markers, however real or per-

21. In the ninth century Omri expanded the territory of Israel as far south as the Transjordan and increased Israelite revenue through Moabite tribute. Israelite military power enabled Ahab, Omri's son, to contribute 2,000 chariots and 10,000-foot soldiers to the Aramean coalition against Shalmaneser III (ANET 279). Israel reached its apex in the eighth century when King Jehoash conquered Judah (2 Kgs 14.11-14), and when King Jeroboam II expanded Israelite borders north into central Syria and south to the Dead Sea (2 Kgs 14.23-29).

22. The Samaritan *Kitab al-Tarikh* views the Persian context as that when Jews denied Samaritans the name 'Israel', principally because of imperial favour. After hearing arguments from Zerubbabel and Sanballat over the legitimate place of worship, King Darius supported the Jerusalem cultus (Anderson and Giles 2005: 171, 130-31).

ceived by the groups themselves, ultimately falter. And exogamous relations between the two resulting in shared bloodlines only cement the hybridity that is their identity despite initiatives toward ethnic purity— Samari(t)an but not quite Samari(t)an, and Jewish but not quite Jewish.

Violent, Rebellious...Really? Or a Matter of Civil Disobedience?

In the climactic scene of the 2007 inspirational movie *The Great Debaters*, the forensic team from historically black and obscure Wiley College (Marshall, Texas) debates the forensic team from prestigious Harvard University. Wiley College debater James Farmer, Jr, who would become a prominent activist in the US Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s, resolved Henry David Thoreau's concept of civil disobedience as a moral weapon in the fight for justice. Profoundly influenced by a recently witnessed lynching, Farmer argues passionately,

the law did nothing...My opponent says, "Nothing that erodes the rule of law can be moral". But there is no rule of law in the Jim Crow South, not when negroes are denied housing, turned away from schools, hospitals—and not when we are lynched. Saint Augustine said, "An unjust law is no law at all", which means I have a right, even a duty to resist—with violence or civil disobedience. You should pray I choose the latter.

US history is replete with numerous incidences of African American civil disobedience, before and after the 1930s. The response of civil disobedience to liminality best characterizes the experiences of both African Americans and Samari(t)ans, their struggles against oppression...economic, social, and psychological. Despite colonized-colonizer relations, the colonizer actually shares more in common with the subaltern group as 'colonized' than fully appreciated—Euro-Americans with African Americans; Jews with Samari(t)ans. Only political vicissitudes and ideologies over the passage of time reified differences between these groups. I begin this section by reading 1 Kgs 11-14 through the prism of politics, religion, and economics (termed semantic isotopies in Roland Boer's *Jameson and Jeroboam*), first to view the 'rebellion' stereotype alternatively as civil disobedience and, second, to 'historicize' the relations of conflict between Jews and Samari(t)ans vis-à-vis textual consumption during Persian colonization.²³ Finally, I will relate the

23. For Frederic Jameson class conflict between ruler and ruled which relate to the mode of production yield its figurations in the text. Political history is the ground of a text, hence his mantra 'Always historicize!' (1981: 9, 75) Of course this poses some difficulties for our sketchy accessibility to a context virtually inaccessible. The historical context of the majority of biblical texts, if not all, can only be reconstructed partially

African American experience to that of the Samari(t)ans as colonized vis-à-vis the 'rebellious' stereotype. Were they 'rebellious' as a course of nature or as a matter of principle? And are they indeed 'rebellious' if they respond in the manner scripted for them with no other options? In the course of addressing these matters I will also focus on the deeply religious character of the African American community who appropriated the Bible of their colonizer to shape their identity along the stony road of slavery trod.

Lift Every Voice and Sing: 'To Your Tents, O Israel'!

Politics

Frederic Jameson (1981: 38-39) wrote that in pre-capitalist societies groups 'become aware of their political differences and fight them out' through religious discourse, itself giving voice to class struggle in a text '...with its own political and ideological agenda' (Boer 1996: 54). What we in the modern world take for granted as naturally discrete spheres was not the case in the pre-modern world. In the ancient Near East politics, religion, and economics intertwined just as they do in the modern era, if we were just honest about it. Economics and politics often impinge upon religion, religion sometimes informs politics, but economics most often influences politics and politics economics.

Political conflict in 1 Kgs 11-14 first emerges with Ahijah's prophetic announcement to Jeroboam (11.11-13; echoed in 11.31-32, 34-36). His words ostensibly condemn Solomon for religious offences though with only mitigated punishment. His proclamation alludes to conflict at both story and ideological levels along the politics isotopy. Story conflicts with conclusion in 1 Kgs 11-14; the story portrays Jeroboam's reign with the pervasive imagery of religious apostasy contra the conclusion's portrayal of his reign in terms of violent warfare (14.19-20),²⁴ whereas the conclusion portrays Jeroboam's reign in terms of violent warfare contra the story's portrayal of

from the text itself on the basis of figuration. Nevertheless, many efforts with a historical concentration boldly assert the historical base or reliability of the content at every turn (Gray 1977; DeVries 1985), and assign sources and redactional levels to particular historical conjectures on the basis of the most minimal information. But history is not a text; yet its accessibility is only in textualized form, hence the poststructuralist assertion that history is inevitably textualized. Jameson's interpretative scaffolding, which defers the question of history as 'absent cause' to later phases, has elicited criticism as *ahistorical* despite his continual call for historicizing.

24. For Boer (1996: 129-30) the contrast between thematic emphases in the narratorial formula (Jeroboam as the epitome of apostasy) and in the closing formula (noticeable absence of condemnation) indicates formal conflict. According to the closing formula, the initial revolt of Jeroboam presumably persisted in continual warfare with Rehoboam.

Rehoboam *only* as the violent war-monger. Further conflicts maintain, but with the characterization of Rehoboam, Solomon's son and successor. His prolonged violence toward Israel à la Jeroboam (14.30; echoed in 15.6) contrasts with his presumed acquiescence to the prophet Shemaiah's advised moratorium on violence toward Israel (12.24). And finally, the conclusion condemns Rehoboam on religious grounds though the story impugns his political imprudence.

The narrator construes the 'turn of affairs brought about by Yhwh' as prophesied by Ahijah with stereotypical images of violence and rebellion. But why conclude divinely ordained Israelite political autonomy in terms of 'rebellion'? The 1 Kings' narrative clearly underscores the exploitative nature of the Solomonic regime: the triple taxation of Israel *alone* with (1) monthly provisions for the royal court, (2) an annual tribute to a foreign administration, and (3) the dreaded corvée. Through the corvée Solomon retained a work cadre in perpetuity to construct all his grand building projects, including the (Jerusalem) temple and the numerous shrines for his foreign wives' gods. When given the opportunity to reverse such domestic policies and to quell underlying tensions within the kingdom, Rehoboam spurned it instead entrenching policies that only alienated, and for good. So, why project the blame for political conflict deservedly belonging to Rehoboam onto Jeroboam with sleight-of-hand religious discourse?

The answer may lie in a conflicted royal ideology—tension between the conditional and unconditional nature of the kingdom. Yhwh's promise to David of a perpetual dynasty in Jerusalem (cf. 2 Sam. 18.50; Pss. 89.19-37; 110.4; 132) articulates the assumption intrinsic to the unconditional perspective. And this voice predominates in the Hebrew canon despite its juxtaposition to the conditional perspective, thus signaling tension between the two. Compare the following representative examples.

If his children forsake my law
and do not walk according to my ordinances,
if they violate my statutes
and do not keep my commandments,
then I will punish their transgressions with the rod
and their iniquity with scourges;
but I will not remove from him my steadfast love,
or be false to my faithfulness (Ps. 89.30-33).

If your sons keep my covenant
and my decrees that I shall teach them,
their sons also, forever,
shall sit on your throne (Ps. 132.12)

In Psalm 89 the unfaithfulness of a Davidic king results in punishment but not covenant termination (hence unconditional), whereas in Psalm 132 the strong implication is that the unfaithfulness of a Davidic king means covenant termination (hence conditional).²⁵ The dominant voice of the unconditional gains primacy in Ahijah's announcement while the repressed voice of the conditional returns to be associated *only* with Jeroboam and Israel. Therefore, the unfaithfulness of Davidic monarchs, like Solomon, can only result in punishment (and mitigated at that) but not covenant termination, whereas any hint of unfaithfulness by Israelite monarchs will result in punishment (with no mitigation) and certain covenant termination.

Class struggle vis-à-vis the socio-economic question of the corvée as political policy erupts between those who attempt to legitimate the ruling class and those who work to subvert it; in other words, between exploiters and exploited, rulers and ruled (1 Kgs 12).²⁶ Rehoboam's elder advisors' final words ('then they will be your servants forever', 12.7) echo the people's initial request (12.4) by co-opting Israelite voices to legitimate Judean supremacy. But the Israelites respond in an act of civil disobedience to a situation of violent injustice with their own 'national anthem': 'What share do we have in David?/We have no inheritance in the son of Jesse/To your tents, O Israel!/Look now to your own house, O David'; 12.16).

Immediately following this major political crisis, the related Jeroboam-man of God and old prophet-man of God narrative complex exemplify a process of displacement designated as 'national allegory'. Indication of a national allegory indeed happening relies on the following slippage²⁷ of oppositions (modified from Boer 1996: 170-71)—Jeroboam :: Rehoboam (c. 12) → Jeroboam :: man of God (13.1-10) → old prophet :: man of God (13.11-32). These, in turn, yield the following geopolitical opposition—Israel (Jeroboam → old prophet) :: Judah (Rehoboam → man of God). The narrative presentation of God/man of God united against Jeroboam affirms

25. This contradiction points to an uneasy incorporation of the Davidic covenant mythology with that of Zion. The irrelevance of the king's righteousness in his tenure (a central feature of the Davidic covenant) collides with a deep ambiguity concerning the king's righteousness in the Zion mythology (Jobling 1992: 108-109).

26. Boer (1996: 77) remarks that discursive class relations generally assume two forms: (1) 'the ruling class attempts to suppress...cultural and political activity by those under its control' or (2) 'there is a continual appropriation and neutralization of oppositional activity in order both to defuse the explosive potential of that activity and to provide new life to its own stale and uninteresting culture and politics'.

27. The term slippage (a basic Freudian category) relates closely with the notion of repression. The slip shows signs that something is being repressed or hidden from full view, thus indicating the direction one should pursue in uncovering that something (Boer 1996: 175 n. 61).

his intended subordination to Judean religio-political authority, the only legitimate existence for Israel. But the repetitive prohibition (11 times in different forms throughout the chapter) against the man of God from Judah eating, drinking, and traveling (the ideologeme of hospitality, Boer 1996: 171-72), lying at the text's margins, according to Boer, and his open rebellion, I would add, altogether subverts the whole consensus of divine favour for the south and divine disfavour for the north by providing 'fundamental social and economic recognition of the north' despite narrative predilections within a conflicted royal ideology.

Religion

The discourse of the politics isotopy centring on an ideological legitimization of the Davidic House quickly slips into religious discourse that censures Jeroboam and the north as 'rebellious'. Politics and religion converge, but the religion isotopy ostensibly dominates as both ideological tenets of Davidic authority (political) and of cult centralization (religion) coalesce. Nevertheless, this isotopy is not without its narratorial conflicts. It focuses on the (in)disputable 'sin of Jeroboam' to curry reader disapproval of Jeroboam's cultic initiatives (principally the reestablishment of the cultic sanctuaries at Dan and Bethel but note also the installation of the golden calves at those sanctuaries, the ordination of non-levitical priests, and the creation of a rival festival date²⁸) as 'rebellious' vis-à-vis Yhwh's chosen sanctuary in Jerusalem while virtually glossing over the 'rebellion' of Judah. With 'high places, pillars, asherahs, and male temple prostitutes' (1 Kgs 14.22) customary in Judah, Rehoboam and Judah blackened the sacrosanct status of Jerusalem as 'the place [where] Yhwh had chosen to make his name dwell there' (14.21). Yet in spite of Judean 'rebellion', the narrator focuses attention instead upon the 'sin of Jeroboam', a motif carrying much ideological freight by virtue of inclusio, bracketing the central narrative on Jeroboam (12.30; 14.16), and repetition, recurring throughout the Kings' narratives (1 Kgs 13.34; 15.26, 30, 34; 16.2-3, 19, 26, 31; 21.22; 22.52; 2 Kgs 3.3; 9.9; 10.29, 31; 13.2, 6, 11; 14.24; 15.9, 18, 24, 28; 17.21-22; 23.15). Furthermore, the narrator employs the 'sin of Jeroboam' motif as the negative standard against which to evaluate the character of ensuing kings

28. Changing the religious calendar, notes Victor Matthews (2005: 118), may have (1) 'forestall[ed] the people's desire to make their religious pilgrimage to Jerusalem' and (2) 'increase[d] his popularity by adjusting the cultic calendar to better reflect the realities of the agricultural year in the northern kingdom'. Certainly climactic conditions in the north were much different than in the south. And Jeroboam's initiative enabled the northerners to fulfill their cultic obligations while shoring up Israelite economy.

as 'evil'. Not one king from Israel receives a positive appraisal throughout its almost 200-year existence. But why focus on the 'sin of Jeroboam'? And just what was the 'sin of Jeroboam'? To this motif we now turn though yielding observations different than those of traditional scholarship.

Identifying the 'sin of Jeroboam' admits no simple solutions since the narrative itself equivocates on the matter offering one proposal in one instance only to offer a different proposal in the next. At first, the 'sin of Jeroboam' appears to be the installation of the golden calves (as an iconic substitute for the ark of the covenant? as divine pedestals?; though not innovative given the familiarity of calf symbolism and acceptance of cult images by the Israelites, Cross 1973: 73-75) at the newly established sanctuaries of Dan and Bethel, an act facily associated with idolatry (see 1 Kgs 14.9, 15-16) in the later regnancies of Baasha (1 Kgs 15.34) and Ahab (1 Kgs 16.2, 13). But the Kings' narrator does draw a distinction between the two acts of installing the golden calves and idolatry germane to the Israelite kings Jehoram (2 Kgs 3.2-3) and Jehu (2 Kgs 10.18-29). Next, 1 Kgs 11-14 shifts an understanding of the 'sin of Jeroboam' to his appointment of non-levitical priests (1 Kgs 13.33-34). Contrary to popular opinion not all Levites were priests,²⁹ as understood by its religiously prescriptive signification. Priests were civil, administrative officials with political authority, not just religious functionaries. Nor would such an appointment have been inconsistent with royal prerogatives in the ancient Near East in general nor with royal prerogatives in Israel or Judah in specific as assessed within the DH. Rather, kings customarily appointed priests loyal to them and their kingdom (Ahlström 1982: 3-8, 46; cf. the king's list of cabinet officials, 2 Sam. 8.15-18; 20.23-26; 1 Kgs 4.1-6), and not all of levitical heritage. David, who hailed from the tribe of Judah, appointed one of his own sons and Ira the Jairite as priests (2 Sam. 8.18 and 20.26, respectively), and his son Solomon appointed Zabud (1 Kgs 4.5).

29. For example, the Levites served as administrators, as tax collectors (2 Chron. 24.11), and as instructors and enforcers of the law, both civil and religious (2 Chron. 17.7-10). Roland de Vaux (1965: 133) notes that the Levites officiated as a 'police force...who supervised all the affairs of Yhwh and the king on both sides of the Jordan'. David appointed members of Hebronite 'levitical' families as his officials in Transjordan (1 Chron. 26.30-32) most likely to collect taxes, manage royal estates, and administer his authority in such areas. Given the civic/political functions of the Levites, Ahlström (1982: 47-51) remarks that they were not a special clan or priestly family during the monarchic era. First, we rarely find any mention of them as priests in the pre-monarchic period. Second, the word *lwy* (לוי) meant 'client' and Levites were associated with the category *grym* (גרִימ), 'aliens, clients, newcomers' (Deut. 14.27, 29). And third, the Levites bring tithes to the priests, but no mention is made of them being priests or sacrificing (Num. 18.21-24). Therefore, any royal government appointee could have conceivably been a Levite.

In addition, Saul removed the priests at Nob from service (1 Kgs 22.9-19), and Solomon removed Abiathar (1 Kgs 1.5-8; 2.26). Therefore, Jeroboam acted in a manner consistent with his royal predecessors by installing individuals as priests (irrespective of lineage) who would ensure his interests and that of his kingdom. What the narrator construes as a matter of religion, we can, in effect, identify as political. Yet only Jeroboam's indulgence in such a royal prerogative receives the label 'sin'. Is this simply a matter of difference in cultic ideologies? Perhaps, but not so simply put. Or does this religious discourse conceal that which at the narrative borders contributes to the derogation of Jeroboam? I would conclude that identifying the 'sin of Jeroboam' is not a simple matter of either/or but rather a case of both/and. What the narrative never fully reveals it neither never fully conceals. In other words, narrative focus on Jeroboam's actions (neither of which reflects any religious innovation but rather standard religious practice) concerns those essential integrants of sacred space (e.g. sanctuaries, shrines or high places, iconography, priesthood, rituals, and calendar) to bespeak collectively the 'sin of Jeroboam' as metonymic for a cultus rivaling Jerusalem.

Relative to the 'sin of Jeroboam', the religion isotopy of this narrative nuances its national allegory by aligning the Bethel cult with 'Samaria', an obvious anachronism. The literary inseparability of Jeroboam || Israel || Samaria (1 Kgs 13.32; 17.21-28) conjoins Samaria and the 'rebellion' stereotype, in part because Samaria rivals Jerusalem, the place chosen by Yhwh (first mentioned and twice emphasized, 11.36; 14.21), and in part because the stereotype becomes a means of practical control whereby to locate and to reify the 'other'. This tensive relationship paralleling that of Yehud and Samaria, remarks Davies (1992: 88), depicts historical Israel 'as a defecting (and defective) branch of the true "Israel" whose religion is focused on Jerusalem'. If antiquity, however, has any bearing on the issue of cult legitimacy as appealed to by both Jews and Samari(t)ans in the Persian and Hellenistic eras, then it would seem that the nod must go to the Samari(t)ans. Jeroboam does not construct new religious sanctuaries, but rather reestablishes previously existing sanctuaries with a long history in the shared religious traditions of both Israelites and Judaeans, Samari(t)ans and Jews. Jerusalem was the relative latecomer, not Bethel-Gerizim (see discussion by Knoppers 2005: 320), a point borne out by both literary tradition and archaeological evidence. First, the shared Pentateuchal traditions of both ethnic groups provide a stronger case for the antiquity and prestige of Bethel-Gerizim as a place of blessing (see Deut. 11.29 in conjunction with 12.11; 27.11-13). The Torah explicitly mentions Gerizim but not Jerusalem. Second, the archaeological witness attests to the presence of the Gerizim temple well before the Hellenistic era contra the position of Josephus promulgated by Western biblical scholarship (see above discussion and Magen

2007). The re-presentation of the cultic programme of Jeroboam as 'sin', as an act of 'rebellion', marks the point of ambivalence to reflect back literally its Persian double. Reestablishing the sanctuary at Bethel-Gerizim by the Samari(t)ans does not constitute 'rebellion' and, therefore, a schism from Jerusalem, but rather an act of civil disobedience.

Economics

Economics, an influential but erstwhile factor that motivates decisions and actions affecting a society at-large as understood from a modern perspective, never occupies centre stage in the Jeroboam narrative (rarely does it ever, in fact, within the religious world of Hebrew literature). Yet this isotopy is not without its significance for understanding the religio-political context of Jeroboam's programme. Jeroboam had inherited an economically distressed state due to previous administrative policies, a point that gains in clarity only through examining the Solomonic narratives. Observations of a social-scientific and materialist nature descriptively articulate the absent presence of an economic force literarily and historically—literarily, to understand the political and religious infrastructure of Solomon's administration, and historically, to understand the conflict revolving about this text's consumption, if not production, merely 'papered over'. I begin my explorations into this isotopy via two Lévi-Straussian clusters, ideal and real economics, appropriated from Jobling (1991: 61-63). Though these dual clusters further bifurcate into internal and external economic spheres, my analysis will principally focus on the former since it bears direct relevance to social tension within the Solomonic state and subsequent Israelite civil disobedience.

According to Jobling (1991: 61-62), 'real economics works by fair exchange or trade, any acquisition by one party diminishing another's store', while 'ideal economics allows for one party to win without anyone else losing'. Under ideal internal economics, Israel (understood generally for the entire state?) presumably prospered by Solomon's accumulation of wealth, specified pointedly in 1 Kgs 4.20, 25:

Judah and Israel were as numerous as the sand by the sea; they ate and drank and were happy...During Solomon's lifetime Judah and Israel lived in safety, from Dan even to Beer-sheba, all of them under their vines and fig trees.

and generally in 10.21, 27.

All King Solomon's drinking vessels were of gold, and all the vessels of the House of the Forest of Lebanon were of pure gold; none were of silver—it was not considered as anything in the days of Solomon... The king made silver as common in Jerusalem as stones...

The narrator depicts an administrative 'trickle-down' type economic policy; kingdom prosperity naturally translated into a boon for the populace. But did it? Were the Israelites as well off as the narrative implies?

Under real internal economics, Solomon had established a powerful administration geared toward the heavy taxation of Israel, *excluding* Judah, in terms of material provisions for Solomon's royal court (4.1-19) and forced labour (5.13-18). Such developments seem, indeed, to be the case, when considering altogether several additional narrative elements: (1) the annual exportation of material provisions and labour from Israel to a foreign court (an example of real external economics; 5.7-12); (2) the revolt by Jeroboam, once supervisor over the Israelite *corvée* and therefore a high-ranking official in Solomon's administration; (3) the general assembly convention at Shechem with Israelite tribal leaders requesting Solomon's son Rehoboam to reconsider his father's economic policy; and (4) the subsequent 'rebellion' of Israel after Rehoboam's refusal to effect a successful negotiation with the northern tribal leaders. Furthermore, two economic determinants merit attention given their repression. First, Israelite political independence triggered ethnic antipathy along nationalist lines well before Jeroboam's religious initiatives. Such a move dealt the Judean economy a significant blow and became a realistic factor in the perception of Israel as 'rebellious'. Second, religion, itself a principal source of boosting state revenue, had economic ramifications for Judah. Jeroboam would have understood the economic stimulant to Judean economy by Israelite religious pilgrimages to Jerusalem. Judah undoubtedly made use of its sacred stones and *asherahs* (14.23) to accumulate both Israelite and Judean offerings (i.e. taxes). Monarchies in the ancient Near East customarily utilized idols, notes James Kennedy (1987: 141), as a religious device 'to channel power to the priestly/political hierarchies by means of the accumulation and control of material resources'.³⁰ Idolatry, sustained by political policy, siphoned off economic resources from the masses to expand royal revenue. Hence religion, politics, and economics merge in a complex dynamic of reciprocal relations.

And yet, the ostensible criticism of Jeroboam significantly downplays economic factors in the face of narrative tension between ideal and real internal economics that demur Solomonic economic policies (tension of the real within the ideal subverts 1 Kgs 3-10 as Golden Age mythology;

30. As religious devotion to the god(s), devotees would sacrifice the raw materials of their agricultural goods ultimately funneled into the possession of the ruling classes. Religious ceremonies (e.g. the consecration and care of the idol) would mitigate this form of taxation's impact. Nevertheless, the religious dictum of idolatry only enhanced the ruling elite's control over the production and distribution of agricultural goods, perhaps prompting the religious polemic on idolatry within Hebrew literature.

Jobling 1991: 61-63). Ideal economics assumes a theory of 'surplus value', a notion contrary to the social dynamic where *class* exists because some live off the labour product of others, i.e. *exploitation*. The exploiter consumes or exchanges the 'good' produced, thus denying the labourer use or exchange of that 'good', hence *class conflict*. Norman Gottwald (1993: 150) further describes the *pre-capitalist* mode of production.

The surplus was consumed by the exploiter, or exchanged in trade that passed largely over the heads of the laborers who operated mostly by barter, or it was used for public works, only a fraction of which would directly benefit the laborers. While the production process was embedded in the social fabric, the actual appropriation of the surplus was not hidden as it is in capitalism. People knew their surplus was being taken from them and used by others...religion justified this expropriation, but the exploited did not face the ruling class as private individuals nor did they worship as voluntary joiners of religious societies.

Divine right or religious fidelity justified the surplus extraction process, which benefited numerous administrative officials, including priests, serving as state functionaries. So what, in concrete terms, might this extraction process have looked like? Again, I appeal to Gottwald (1993: 164) who descriptively diagrams a model (broad enough, however inaccurate some of its details may be) of the Asiatic mode of production to illumine the complex economic exchanges that may have maintained during the monarchic era. Surplus extraction, a two-fold collaborative effort, in the internal economic sphere assumed the form of taxes/tithes, foreign tribute, land tax-rents, the *corvées*, usury loans, and foreclosure on indebted lands. State extraction through taxes, tributes, and statutory labour pushed peasant farmers well below the subsistence level though maintaining a high level of production, the difference between the two levels resulting in surplus channeled back into the state treasury. Another means of state extraction subcontracted functionaries to provide loans at high interest rates, which, in effect, reduced peasant producers to wage labourers, tenant farmers, and/or debtors either because their surplus production (if agriculturally prosperous) went toward their loans or because their lands (if not agriculturally prosperous) were absorbed into the state's land holdings. Either way, those material goods extracted reverted to the state since the functionaries operated on behalf of the state.

Just as an orderly transition for Rehoboam's accession seems to have been made (we read of no struggle for power, elimination of family members from a previous dynasty or rival claimants from the Davidic house), so established Solomonic economic policies continued unabated. But all was definitely not well, politically or economically, within the monarchic state despite the apparent façade of a Golden Age. Israel did not bask in Solomon's

wealth; rather, they were forced to create it. If any blame should be ascribed for schism between Judah and Israel, it should rest with Rehoboam and his 'evil deeds' as emphasized within the LXX (Matthews 2005: 108). Ultimately, real economics subverted the viability of ideal economics since Solomonic policy that appropriated Israelite surplus value also precipitated Israelite secession *en masse*. Had Solomonic administrative policies stimulated the fair exchange of wealth without loss to any party (ideal economics), Israel would not have 'rebelled' after spurned negotiations for a lighter corvée (real economics). That Israel chose to establish its own identity apart from Judean real economics implies a standing economic policy of exploitation with conflict between labourer (Israel) and exploiter (Judah) as grist for the ideological mill.

So just what relevance might these observations have if 1 Kings 11-14 bears the figurations of conflict along the politics, religion, and economics isotopies precipitating its production or consumption? That Israel's (economic) gain over time had become Judah's (economic) loss could not have been a point lost on the Persian Yehud *golah* intelligentsia.³¹ The relative wealth and prosperity of the northern region, its kinder climate, its greater abundance of natural resources, and the revenue gained from tolls and trade due to its closer proximity to international trade routes would naturally have escalated jealousies and tensions between Jews and Samari(t)ans that resulted in periodic border disputes and competing religious claims as 'God's chosen' (Matthews 2005: 131). And antagonism with displaced Levites certainly would not have ameliorated the situation. Moreover, the literature of Nehemiah (5.1-5, 14-15) cites examples of land-tax and usury as commonplace to extract material resources from the peasants for the ruling classes' benefit. Disregarding the peoples left in the land as 'Israel' removed them from the world of moral concern 'so that their labor c[ould] be exploited without prejudice' (1 Kgs 9.20-22; Jobling 1991: 62).

The elite *golah* class no doubt aligned themselves with colonial Persian interests functioning in a manner as quasi-colonizers, reflected in their elitist attitudes of divine authority over the land, its inhabitants and resources. Refusal to accept this socio-political reality mirrored in the 'attempted'

31. Boer (1996: 175-76) identifies the 'out-of-place' lion in 1 Kings 11-14 'as a figuration or representation of a larger entity, or an absent totality', namely the Babylonian empire, which posed a 'legitimation crisis' for royal ideology. Though Boer concludes the Other for Judah as the Babylonian empire, he does nonetheless hold out the possibility of the Persian empire. While the lion motif may indeed represent colonial presence, it fails to account for the consumption of this (hi)story's ostensibly virulent anti-Israelite polemic requiring a suitable context.

forced subjugation of Jeroboam/Israel is represented rhetorically as 'rebellion'. 'Rebellion' is the term conveniently employed by the colonized (who reap benefits from preexisting power structures) to control public opinion about and to circumscribe the identity of another group (who does not reap benefits from preexisting power structures), i.e. internal colonization. Moreover, *golah* efforts to galvanize an exclusivist cultus in Jerusalem contra Gerizim-Bethel only precipitated conflict within the diverse and hybrid population of Yehud. Rejection of the Temple for (an)'other' cultus is tantamount to 'rebellion'...to Yehudite leadership, to Persia, and to Yhwh. The narrative denigration of Samari(t)ans via metonymy (Jeroboam = Samaria) negatively constructs their identity as defective, idolatrous, 'other', and hence subaltern. Yet ideological analyses along the three isotopies reveal significant points for consideration: (1) concerning politics, a repressed ideology of the colonized affirms both the conditional nature of whatever political authority the *golahs* wielded and the legitimation of the colonized Samari(t)ans; (2) concerning religion, a repressed ideology of the colonized affirms the legitimacy (and antiquity) of the Samari(t)an cultus over against the rival, upstart Jerusalem cultus (its status narratively projected upon Samaria);³² and (3) concerning economics, the repressed ideology of real economics in favor of the ideal returns to reveal what worked to the (dis)advantage of the Samari(t)ans historically, i.e. exploited ethnically as residents within Yehud but prosperous nationally as citizens of the Samarian province. Recognizing these discursive strategies that actuate this (hi)story's colonizing impulses help stem Jewish and Christian readings that have reified difference in Samari(t)an ('rebellious' and thus inferior) and Jewish (chosen and thus superior) identities so as to obscure their sameness, namely a shared religious heritage of Yhwh devotion.

Lift Every Voice and Sing

Your country? How came it yours? Before the Pilgrims landed we
were here. Here we brought our three gifts and mingled them

32. The observance of *Sukkot* by Jerusalem informs the critique of northern religious defectiveness (12.32). Such criterion may reflect anachronistic concerns of post-exilic significance dependent on how to view the Nehemiah narrator's comments that the Israelites had not observed *Sukkot* since 'the days of Jeshua, son of Nun' (Neh. 8.17). Admittedly, this reference to Joshua rests in the tenuous patronymic 'son of Nun' (בְּנֵי נֹחַ) missing in some MSS. Whether the name Jeshua refers to the prominent priest in Ezra-Nehemiah, the namesake of the biblical book, or some unknown figure is not altogether discernible though the latter is most unlikely. The possibility of the first option makes as much sense as the second unless, as Bolin (1996: 7-8) assumes, the person cited as a chronological marker is a contemporary of the writer.

with yours: a gift of story and song—soft, stirring melody in an ill-harmonized and unmelodious land; the gift of sweat and brawn to beat back the wilderness, conquer the soil, and lay the foundations of this vast economic empire two hundred years earlier than your weak hands could have done it; the third, a gift of the spirit. Around us the history of the land has centred for thrice a hundred years...Nor has our gift of the Spirit been merely passive. Actively we have woven ourselves with the very warp and woof of this nation,—we fought their battles, shared their sorrow, mingled our blood with theirs, and generation after generation have pleaded with a headstrong, careless people to despise not Justice, Mercy, and Truth, lest the nation be smitten with a curse. Our song, our toil, our cheer, and warning have been given to this nation in blood-brotherhood. Are these gifts not worth the giving? Is not this work and striving? Would America have been America without her Negro people? (Du Bois 1903: 206-207).

With a pathos to articulate the plight of the Samari(t)ans separated only geo-temporally along the limen, W. E. B. Du Bois' query strikes at the heart of the centuries-long struggle of African Americans in the US—not simply for their voice to be heard in a way that counts, not simply to rail at the inhumane nature of slavery to which they were subjected, but to decry their displacement from national history within mainstream US consciousness and their assigned identity therein as second-class citizens. Mainstream US consciousness had long associated African emergence in the Americas to slavery, with national histories having reified such an image of African identity and roles. Victimized by the Atlantic slave trade, Africa came to be known as 'the dark continent', not 'a mother culture for colonial America' (Pierson 1996: xx) though they played an equally significant role as architects of US culture. Historically, they entered the Americas more than 2,000 years before Columbus (most likely as explorers),³³ next as members of the sixteenth-century Spanish expeditions, and later as enslaved agricultural labourers. In addition to physical labour, African intelligence and practical

33. Pierson (1996: 10-11) cites the following as supporting evidence. First, the presence of gigantic, stone heads and terra cotta sculptures with Negroid-like features along the east coast of modern day Mexico that date from the early Olmec civilization, thus possibly indicating a small, significant African presence. Second, natives of Hispaniola informed Columbus of black people carrying spears tipped with precious metals like those found in the court of Mali having already preceded him. Such information dovetails nicely with the story by Lord Musa of Mali in 1325 about a lost exploration party led by the former monarch of Mali. Third, Cape Verde islanders told Columbus that traders from the coast of Guinea had been there long before him.

know-how (the Africans' 'second gift' to the US) did as much to build the economic infrastructure of colonial America as anything by Euro-Americans. Still, African American presence and identity in the colonial era (not simply limited to the colonizing efforts of the English in the Americas) remains largely ignored. Throughout this era Africans struggled with an identity from without reinforced by a dehumanizing institution and, itself, justified by a racist ideology (expressed in its most virulent form in the nineteenth century). Nonetheless, Africans resisted to shape an identity from within, their efforts informed by the Bible and an ideological struggle for liberty all the while deconstructing the same of white colonial authority.

'Stony the Road We Trod' in the Colonial Era

Africans arrived in the land later known as the US by the early sixteenth century as participants in the Spanish expeditions. Lucas Vázquez de Ayllón arrived on the coast of what is now South Carolina in 1526 with as many as 100 blacks in his expedition party. After his untimely death, a small group of blacks resisted his illegitimate successor's intent to abandon the colony and would eventually stay behind to reside with the Guale Indians. Estevanico, a dark-skinned Moroccan and perhaps most noted of all Africans among the Spanish expeditions, landed in Florida with the Narváez expedition of 1528. He was taken into Indian captivity, entered the Spanish Southwest during the colonial era, and explored the territories of Arizona and New Mexico long before any white man would. In the 1540s Hernando de Soto's expedition depended heavily on Africans, mostly as part of the supply train. Well before the *Mayflower* or before the first blacks arrived in Virginia, many Africans who were Spanish slaves had lived in Saint Augustine since its settlement (1565), and were instrumental in clearing land, planting crops, and building fortifications throughout the Spanish borderlands. In August 1619, 'twenty negurs' (indentured servants) landed in Jamestown, Virginia via the Dutch slave ship *Jesus*. Several years later, the first black immigrants (Antoney, Isabella, and John Pedro) arrived in the colony. According to Virginia's 1624-1625 census, blacks comprised approximately 2 percent of the total population of 1,227 (Bennett 1987: 34-38). The black population would swell by the end of the eighteenth century (the African population in Louisiana alone comprised over half of its nearly 40,000 people according to the 1778 census; Pierson 1996: 37-39, 42-44). Initially the first black settlers enjoyed the same privileges as their white counterparts, voting, testifying in court, and owning land, only to eventually be denied those privileges with the advent of racist theories and biological arrogance justifying

the institution of slavery and, oddly enough, introducing the concept of *whiteness*.³⁴

The majority of Africans who came to the Americas with the French and Spanish expeditions did so as slaves. Although gold provided the initial economic impetus for European expeditions into Africa, slave trade became the principal African export around 1700 and remained a profitable venture until after 1850.³⁵ Spanish and Portuguese traders preferred Africans to Native Americans as a labour force in the Americas; Native American populations were small and inaccessible, and were fatally vulnerable to European diseases due to their weak immunity (Pierson 1996: 52). Even the English would later opt for African slavery over the indentured servitude of poor Anglos from seventeenth-century Britain and Ireland (a contract of indenture basically gave the holder rights over workers' labour and allowed a grant of land and sufficient capital at the end of the contract term, usually 3-7 years). Economics drove preferences: African slavery was cheaper than European labour and maximized the profitability of export crops (Thornton 1992: 144, 148).

Brought to the Americas to work, African slaves made significant economic contributions utilizing their agricultural knowledge and techniques that made their work effective. As in West Africa so with the Carolina rice production, African agriculturalists utilized 'slash-and-burn clearing and gang labor, for preparing the land, heel-and-foot methods of planting the seed, communal task work to tend it, fanner baskets for winnowing the harvest, and mortars and pestles to husk the grain' (Pierson 1996: 111). Africans also parleyed their horticultural knowledge of herbs and barks to experiment with the flora of the new land and consequently developed many useful medicines. Most Africans were farmers, but others specialized in cattle raising and herding, diving, fishing, trades (e.g. metallurgy), and crafts (e.g. weaving) (Bennett 1987: 22-23).

34. From the surviving documents it seems that the first white settlers did not understand themselves as 'white', but rather as Englishmen or Christian. The word 'white' would develop in the latter part of the seventeenth century, the same time as the word 'Negro' in the ideological debasement of blacks (Bennett 1987: 40).

35. European expansion into the Atlantic took place on two fronts, the African and the Atlantic. Only as expeditions along the African coast from 1340-1470 reaped nice dividends (e.g. oils, skins, gold, and slaves in the Senegal region) for individual sponsors fronting the private capital did the Portuguese Crown sponsor an expedition in 1482. With royal patronage of the expeditions came substantial capital and geo-political ambitions. Of the many who patronized the progress of Atlantic explorations, only the Iberians were the first to claim sovereignty over territories and to enforce such claims (Thornton 1992: 27-32, 35).

Traditional scholarship generally contends that the commercial activity between Africa and Europe was unequal with Europe having the upper hand (see Rodney 1981: 95-113; Austen (1987: 81-108) follows the same ideological trajectory). Africans were forced into trade relations ultimately yielding the modern situation of economic dependency and underdevelopment. Forced into a 'colonial' trade, Africans gave up raw materials and human resources in exchange for manufactured goods, while Europeans reaped the long-range profits gained from their commercial activity with Africans. The most profitable of all commercial activities was the slave trade with numbers exported staggering the imagination.³⁶ Millions of slave labourers from West and West Central Africa were imported into the North American colonies.³⁷ Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the numbers of enslaved Africans and American-born blacks increased in the New England colonies with over 12,000 by 1715 (note the total percentage of the population that was black in the New England colonies: Maryland, 31 percent; North Carolina, 27 percent; South Carolina, 61 percent; Virginia, 44 percent; in comparison to Louisiana, 60 percent; see additional figures in the table in Pierson 1996: 57). Certainly impressive, the slave trade numbers only reveal one component of a multi-faceted business enterprise engaged in and equally profited from by Africans.

How did so many Africans become slaves? To be frank, African slaves imported to the US were first slaves in Africa. Having said that, however, we must not confuse African slavery with the chattel slavery of the Western world and the US. When the Europeans engaged the Africans in commercial activity, they did so in a market where slavery was widespread;³⁸ the Europeans simply tapped into a pre-existing market. Slavery was deeply

36. The Portuguese were the first Europeans to export Africans as slaves with figures spiking from 700-1,000 slaves annually after 1448 upwards to 1,200-2,500 by the end of the fifteenth century. According to Thornton, the numbers of slaves exported group into three zones (Western Coast, Gulf of Guinea, and West Central) with exports increasing exponentially. Compare the following slave numbers by region and date: (1) Western Coast—in 1500, 2,000; in 1550, 2,000; in 1600, 2,500; in 1650, 2,500; in 1700, 5,700; (2) Gulf of Guinea—in 1500, 1,000; in 1550, 2,000; in 1600, 2,500; in 1650, 3,300; in 1700, 19,400; and in (3) West Central—in 1500, 2,000; in 1550, 4,000; in 1600, 4,500; in 1650, 8,000; and in 1700, 11,000 (see table in Thornton 1992: 118).

37. Between 1700 and the American Revolution the Chesapeake region imported nearly 100,000 slaves primarily from the Niger Delta and the Bight of Binafra to establish tobacco as a profitable staple export (Pierson 1996: 11, 45, 74, 67-69). And the North American colonies of Louisiana and South Carolina imported Senegambians because of their expertise with those areas' major export crops of rice and indigo.

38. Exporting slaves from Africa had far deeper roots than the Atlantic slave trade market. The trans-Saharan slave trade outlasted the Atlantic trade extending from before 700 CE to almost the beginning of the twentieth century (Wright 1990: 16).

rooted within the legal and institutional structures of African societies (see full discussion in Thornton 1992: 73-91; Eltis 1987: 72-78; and Eltis and Jennings 1988: 936-59). Slaves functioned as the only form of private, revenue-producing property in African law contra that of land in the European legal system. Land in Africa was corporately, not privately, owned. Constant field rotations for crops made individual land ownership practically infeasible. Kin groups redistributed land on the basis of need (Pierson 1996: 17). Slavery provided African entrepreneurs with private, reproducing wealth by virtue of their ownership or control of labour.³⁹ Yet slaves were treated as people. The notable eighteenth-century slave Olaudah Equiano (1789: 14) describes the station of the African slave.

Those prisoners which were not sold or redeemed we kept as slaves: but how different was their condition from that of the slaves in the West Indies! With us they do no more work than other members of the community, even their master; their food, clothing and lodging were nearly the same as theirs...Some of these slaves have even slaves under them as their own property and for their own use.

Many Africans became slaves as a result of imprisonment from wars, legal mandates to settle debts or serve a sentence, or illegal kidnappings by armed thugs. African slave dealers saw no crisis of conscience when selling fellow Africans as slaves since they regarded these prisoners of war or criminals as 'outsiders'. European influence in the slave trade was initially marginal at best despite maneuverings by the Portuguese, French, Swedish, Dutch, English, Danish, and Prussian traders to manage it. That Europeans tapped into a pre-existing market with an increased demand for slaves allowed African entrepreneurs to maximize their private wealth. Slave dealers profited (note for example the profit margin of one healthy adult slave purchased at £14.10 yet sold for £45 in 1760s Virginia; Wright 1990: 36-37), and the wealth of powerful African elites increased proportionately to the decrease of African public wealth in human capital. Add to the mix the concurrent proliferation in arms trade (180,000 muskets per year imported by 1730 and over 500,000 per year by 1800 as African coastal states vied for control of the slave trade) and the slave trade worked to the detriment of African society.⁴⁰ Granted, Africa grew richer materially, but they lost

39. Any African who wished to invest wealth in a reproducing form purchased slaves. Slaves manifested a private and securely reproducing wealth, but also served state officials in revenue production and military service. The political elite used slaves as a means to increase their power.

40. No one African state could control the slave trade market since private merchants conducted the negotiations. European oceangoing vessels enabled them to quickly dominate the new carrying trade of the West Coast, while the African naval power allowed

human capital, grew less self-sufficient and dangerously more dependent on foreign trade in the process (Pierson 1996: 23, 25-28).

For those Africans swept up in the slave trade (Wright 1990: 24-33, details the period of slaveholding prior to shipment), the horrors already experienced only intensified with the deadly Middle Passage. Prior to embarking on the long, deadly voyages, slave trauma reached a new level psychologically when they encountered face-to-face the fleshly embodiment of their perceptions of Europeans. Joseph C. Miller (1988: 389) describes the experience,

All the slaves trembled in terror at meeting the white cannibals of the cities, the first Europeans whom many of the slaves would have seen. They feared the whites' intention of converting Africans' brains into cheese or rending the fat of African bodies into cooking oil, as well as burning their bones into gunpowder.

Slave fears of 'white cannibals' did not lack merit as attested by the inhumane conditions of their grueling ship voyage. Merchants reduced food and water supplies in order to pack the slaves into their ships as tightly as sardines in a can, thus making the voyages uncomfortable, dangerous, and unhealthy (e.g. seasickness, frequent vomiting, widespread diarrhea, urine, feces, typhoid fever, measles, yellow fever, and smallpox). Of the 12 million African slaves that survived the Middle Passage, 1 in 4 died during the first years of American 'seasoning' (Pierson 1996: 29-30; Thornton 1992: 155-60).

African slaves who survived the slave trade (captivity, sale, transfer, shipment, and relocation) brought with them a cultural and religious heritage that helped shape the newly developing culture of the Atlantic world and helped foster an identity of 'double consciousness', both African and American, that would sustain them as a group through the most tumultuous of times. The heterogeneous nature of African culture, perhaps more than anything, enabled these slaves to transmit their culture in a new world contra assumptions by anthropologists (*à la* Mintz and Price 1976) that slave trade conditions prevented the direct transmission of African culture to the Americas. Despite randomization of slaves by slave-owners, separation from family (perhaps their greatest loss), loss of familiar home environment and village, the African slaves were not in a cultural wilderness. They could communicate with each other easily finding members of their own nation on large estates. And they could communicate with Africans of dif-

Africans to control both interior traditional land and river trade, conducting trade on their own terms and collecting customs and other duties. Trade favoured no one, most especially Europeans at the expense of Africans (Thornton 1992: 37-39, 70-71).

ferent nations via a hybridized language perhaps acquired because of shared commercial and cultural interactions, and the religious and aesthetic values that promoted cultural interconnections while in Africa (Thornton 1992: 195-201).⁴¹

These uprooted, yet ethnically diverse, Africans, clung to their cultural traditions to cope with their difficult conditions. These traditions included cosmology, aesthetics,⁴² family life, work, social customs, technical knowledge, language, and religion, to name a few, all markers contributing to their group identity. African acculturation to Euro-American culture was not homogeneous; rather, how much and at what rate Africans did so hinged on a variety of factors: age, class status in Africa, job status, degree of isolation/interaction with fellow Africans, degree of isolation/interaction with whites, proportion of imported slaves either 'seasoned' or directly-born African, and region. For example, assimilation of Euro-American customs occurred rapidly in the New England colonies, urban Charleston, and rural Virginia where blacks interacted fully with whites on a daily basis (Pierson 1996: 58-59), whereas the process was much slower for those blacks in isolated conditions (e.g. plantations) who had greater interaction with fellow blacks and little with whites. Furthermore, three distinct patterns of African American culture evolved among settlements in the Chesapeake, the Carolina and Georgia low country, and the New England colony regions (see thorough treatment in Wright 1990: 87-90). In the Chesapeake region assimilation was so complete in language, formal religion, and family structure as to render the slaves more like Anglos. In the Deep South region African slaves isolated from whites retained African speech patterns, religious practices,

41. The linguistic diversity, one measure of cultural diversity, within Western and Central Africa alone comprised as many as 50 languages. Though linguistic differences might have separated the Upper Guinea, Lower Guinea, and Angolan Coast regions from one another, cultural and philosophic factors linked them together, and economic contact facilitated by coastal waterways and rivers tended to force linguistic accommodations (Thornton 1992: 187-90). Once in the Americas they adopted the English language though developing their syntax around African patterns. By retaining their speech Africans produced a hybridized language to communicate with one another. These slaves' communication seemed unintelligible to their masters who blamed the problem on African stupidity rather than their linguistic limitations. Nevertheless, this hybrid language became a marker of African American ethnic consciousness (Pierson 1996: 87-88).

42. Of the aesthetic markers African music and dance had the most enduring impact in the Americas. A heavy reliance on rhythm required various percussion instruments (e.g. drums of different sizes and shapes, bells, gongs, and rattles). Nocturnal gatherings of slaves in the English colonies employing music and dance disturbed the Virginia settlers who regarded them as a danger to public order and attempted to ban them in 1680 (Thornton 1992: 221-28).

and social customs in contrast to the accommodating tendencies of New England African slaves who consciously incorporated African customs and practices while conforming more to white culture surrounding it than any other African American group. Regardless of the extent to which African slaves clung to traditional customs and/or borrowed from Anglo American and Native American ways, they nonetheless chose to assimilate while always adapting and changing.⁴³ The African slaves were not 'militant cultural nationalists', but rather showed tremendous flexibility in an acculturation process that, over time, produced a hybrid African American culture and identity (Thornton 1996: 206).

Perhaps no cultural marker of ethnic identity best exemplifies the African American tendency to assimilate via adaptation and change than that of religion. Though European missionaries did not convert all Africans to Christianity on African soil, they did nonetheless engage a religious people with whom they shared certain beliefs despite European perceptions of Africans as superstitious. Africans were a deeply religious people; to them, religion was life (on African folk religion and presence in the Euro-American world, see Levine 1977: 209-32; Bennett 1987: 24-25). African religious orientation carried over into the New World where religion came to be 'the heart of African American culture in colonial America' (Wright 1990: 95). Both sixteenth and seventeenth century Africans and Europeans shared a bipartite cosmology with two separate but interconnected worlds, the material world and that which one entered upon death. The Bible, when originally presented to Africans of the Gold Coast, evoked simultaneous respect (after all, the Bible was, as claimed, the 'most compelling revelation of transcendence', the locus of the sacred) and incredulosity (How can revelation be limited to a book and events of which it speaks that took place in the past so far away?; Wimbush 2003: 16-19). European Christianity and the Church reserved primacy for a discontinuous revelation while acknowledging the reality of continuous revelation (albeit ascribing all such forms to the Devil), whereas African Christianity recognized continuous revelations (e.g. those of other-worldly beings such as saints) as valid but not all discontinuous revelations (e.g. the Catholic doctrine of Apostolic Succession) (Thornton 1992: 236-39, 254).

43. Blacks were not unwilling to assimilate. They assimilated with other ethnic groups in multiracial maroon settlements (of slave escapees, whites, and Native Americans) like that of the Great Dismal Swamp located along the Virginia-North Carolina border. In the early Southwest blacks blended into Spanish Creole society or married Native Americans in the Spanish borderlands of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California. But Anglo legislation, ideological justification for African enslavement, and other social measures ostracising African slaves deterred any thoroughgoing African hybridization.

African Christianity did not look like the European or Euro-American version. When Africans converted,⁴⁴ they did not wholly embrace Euro-American Christianity; instead, they integrated African religious practices with Christian beliefs. And though they accepted the 'white folks' book' and America's biblical culture, they did not do so 'in the way white Americans accepted it or in the way the whites preferred that others accept it' (Wimbush 2003: 32). As Allen Callahan (2006: 42) points out, they rejected 'the religion of the Book' though embracing 'the Book of the religion'. In addition, two mutually influencing, theological impulses gave expression to African Christianity's distinctiveness. First, African Christians revitalized a perceived core to the spiritual message of Christianity, namely that the oppressed were God's chosen people. Forget white nationalistic typology that affirmed a recapitulation of Israelite history in North America. '*America was Egypt, escape from American institutions was the Exodus*' (Raboteau 1978: 311-12). Second, they interpreted the Bible in the light of their experiences focusing especially on the exodus narratives and the Hebrew bondage motif (absent from the master's Gospel with sermons in white churches, which emphasized obedience, discipline, work, and the proper relationship between master and slave; Wright 1990: 96; Levine 1977: 207-08) as well as prophetic visions of social justice.⁴⁵ To African Americans the theological message of Christianity had been sullied. Their transformation of Christianity extended even to spirituality (e.g. being filled with the spirit, not knowledge of the Bible, marked a religious initiate) and ecclesiastics (e.g. they infused worship services with joyful emotional responses, including shouting and dancing) in a way that would influence Euro-American Christianity. Pierson (1996: 101) fairly concludes on the African American interface with Christianity, 'While blacks were being converted, they were likewise converting'.

African American interpretation reveals the Bible's significance for a group understanding its experience, forging a destiny, and envisioning a future. That future would include a message of freedom heralded by eighteenth-century harbingers of both black abolitionism and an African

44. African conversions to Christianity met with the barriers of Anglo prejudices, especially in Protestant areas. Some Anglos regarded African slaves as unfit for Christianity; others denied slaves the free time requisite for Christian instruction; others discouraged preaching to slaves because they felt conversion brought freedom; and still others questioned the true conversion of slaves as simply a means to secure freedom or lighter work loads (Jameson 1909: 408-09).

45. The spirituals, sermons and testimonials of the Africans reflect their interpretative appropriation of the Bible. Their engagement with the Bible freed their imagination in ways they could not experience socially. Such transformative acts empowered them 'to negotiate, even overcome, the opposition of the world', itself rooted in the dominant culture's interpretation of the same book (Wimbush 2003: 26-31).

American hermeneutic, individuals such as Jupiter Hammon, Quobna Ottobah Cugoano, John Marrant, and Olaudah Equiano. Hammon, a New York slave, poet and essayist, appealed to his fellow Negroes 'to read the Bible' in his *Address to the Negroes* (1787). Similarly, Cugoano echoed the same sentiment in his *Thoughts and Sentiments on the Evil and Wicked Traffic of Slavery* (1787) exclaiming how 'wonderful is the divine goodness displayed in those invaluable books the Old and New Testaments, that inestimable compilation of books, the Bible. And, O what a treasure to have and one of the greatest advantages to be able to read therein, and a divine blessing to understand'! (as quoted in Saillant 2000: 236-37) Even Equiano found the Bible to be of great comfort in times of duress. 'I prized it much... Whenever I looked in the Bible I saw things new, and many texts were immediately applied to me with great comfort'. By recontextualizing the Bible, exegetes like Hammon could provide a context for slaves to understand their sufferings. They could see within the Bible a reflection of their own experiences as did Equiano who, recollecting circumcision, naming practices, washings and purification rituals, sacrifices and burnt offerings, and reverence for the deity's name in his Ibo youth, concluded the Ibo and Israelites as 'one people [who] had sprung from the other' (1789: 199, 16-20). Even the chiefs, judges, wise men, and elders of African patriarchy and governance were Israelite in origin, he thought. The Bible would also provide an antislavery interpretation of history. Only justice for the enslaved was a point of disagreement, but in the afterlife or in the current life? No other marker bound the shared history and shaped the common identity of African Americans than did the biblical story of the Exodus. It signified their aspiration for freedom, but it also nurtured resistance as they located themselves within the story much differently than did Anglos (the New World not as Canaan but as Egypt, and the slave masters as Pharaohs). Likewise, the Samari(t)ans would have seen themselves differently in their religious tradition co-opting the land promise to the patriarchs as a necessary resistance to their marginalization by the *golahs* (Ezek. 33.24; Ezra 4.2). African American antislavery interpretation cut against the grain by that of the dominant culture 'that God intended Africans to be slaves' (Raboteau 1994: 12). Such bold interpretative moves with the 'white man's book' helped religiously to shape an identity, socially to carve out a semi-independent life from the master's control, and psychologically to channel anger and project aggression without recriminations (Nash 1974: 204-05).

African resistance to dominant religious interpretations about their predestined lot as slaves ran deep within the slave population. Before the ships left the coast of Africa, opposition to enslavement had begun as slaves struck back against their vile treatment in a struggle for freedom. John Newton (1788: 32), a reformed slave trader, recounts one particular episode.

When a hundred and fifty or two hundred stout men, torn from their native land, many of whom never saw the sea, much less a ship, till a short space before they embarked; who have, probably, the same natural prejudice against a white man, as we have against a black; and who often bring with an apprehension they are bought to be eaten: I say, when thus circumstanced, it is not to be expected that they will tamely resign themselves to their situation. It is taken for granted, that they will attempt to gain their liberty if possible.

Slavery bore within it the seeds of rebellion.⁴⁶ Black resistance assumed a variety of forms (see Aptheker 1969: 140-49) with several factors such as the extent of slave acculturation and the kind of work performed by slaves influencing the form it would take. For example, new slaves who lived in isolation with little command of the English language resisted by ruining crops, breaking tools, malingering, or feigning sickness or stupidity, whereas assimilated slaves, such as skilled artisans, were more capable of successful escape from slavery. Sometimes the rebellion became widespread and violent appearing, as Herbert Aptheker (1969: 162-263), who identified periods of widespread slave rebelliousness (between 1710 and 1722, 1730 and 1740, 1765 and 1780, and 1790 and 1802) notes, to come in waves every generation or so 'as though anger accumulated and vented itself and then a period of rest and recuperation was needed before the next upsurge'.⁴⁷ Slave rebellions that grew violent did so according to the script proscribed by the

46. Eighteenth-century law codes prevented the number of blacks meeting in groups, forbade carrying weapons, restricted movements of blacks beyond the farm or plantation past dark, outlawed drums or horns, and required blacks to carry lanterns and passes (South Carolina). Legal statutes permitted such forms of punishment as branding, flogging, burning, hamstringing, execution, and limb amputations where slaves had violated law codes. Georgia regarded resisting interrogation by a white man as a capital offence. Arson, insurrections, or willfully killing or injuring a white person brought the death penalty. Connecticut handed out 40 lashes for angry words that defamed a white person. And the American colonies of the Carolinas, Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey prescribed castration (Great Britain had outlawed this punishment long before the eighteenth century) for offences that could range from habitual escapes to sexual assaults (Pierson 1996: 123-25).

47. The most serious slave rebellion in the colonial era was the Stono rebellion. Beginning at the Stono River, about 20 miles from Charleston, South Carolina on 9 September 1739, a group of 20 newly arrived slaves from Angola under the leadership of Jemmy broke into a store, killed the shopkeepers, and left their severed heads on the front steps. They made their way southward to Georgia having killed 8 whites along the way. By early afternoon they had killed most whites they encountered and burned houses. The group's numbers swelled to 50-60 by midday. A force of mounted planters attacked and dispersed the group with a week having passed before a white militia company caught the largest remnant of the group. Individual rebels were not apprehended until several months later, and one leader remained at large for 3 years. The insurrection had left 30 whites and 44 blacks dead in its aftermath (Wright 1990: 101-02).

institution of slavery. African Americans were not rebellious or violent as a matter of nature but only as a matter of re-presentation.

The slave struggle for liberty and freedom within the colonies paralleled that of the colonial Revolution with Great Britain, echoing Israelite protests against the Solomonic regime, where oppression relegated its victims to the limen. 'Liberty'! cried the Stamp Act protestors parading the streets of Charleston in 1765 only to find their cries met with indifference by white authorities unwilling to grant the same to slaves whose demands they regarded as 'thoughtless imitation'. Pierson (1996: 132, 33) blasts the Founding Fathers as 'traitors to the principles of freedom', having missed 'the greater heroism of those black men and women who were a truer vanguard of liberty'. Black patriots participated in the Stamp Act riots joining the larger resistance movement for independence. But theirs was a struggle for freedom in *their* American Revolution. They exploited contradictions between colonial practice and colonial rhetoric calling not simply for *independence* in America but independence *in* America. These patriots made 'black freedom an inevitable corollary of white freedom' fighting by every peaceful means possible, e.g. mass pressure, holding meetings, circulating petitions, legal contentions, legislative pleas (Bennett 1987: 57-58). Witness the Freedom petition of several Connecticut slaves (1779; as quoted in Pierson 1996: 135).

We have endeavoured rightly to understand what is our Right, and what is our Duty, and can never be convinced that we were made to be Slaves. Altho God almighty may justly lay this, and more upon us, yet we deserve it not, from the hands of Men. We are impatient under the grievous Yoke, but our Reason teaches us that it is not best for us to use violent measures, to cast it off; we are also convinced, that we are unable to extricate ourselves from our abject State; but we think we may with the greatest Propriety look up to your Honours, (who are the fathers of the People) for Relief. And we not only groan under our own burden, but with concern, & Horror, look forward, & contemplate, the miserable Condition of our Children, who are training up, and kept in Preparation, for a like State of Bondage, and Servitude. We beg leave to submit, to your Honours serious Consideration, whether it is consistent with the present Claims, of the united States, to hold so many Thousands, of the Race of Adam, our Common Father, in perpetual Slavery.

In a letter to her husband in 1774, the insightful Abigail Adams wrote, '[Slavery] always appeared a most iniquitous scheme to me—to fight ourselves for what we are daily robbing and plundering from those who have as good a right to freedom as we have' (as quoted in Pierson 1996: 136). That right to freedom and the concomitant ideology of the American Revolution

that asserted the natural rights of all men never came to African Americans with the founding of the new nation. Despite black patriots' participation in the Revolutionary War alongside white patriots for independence, they would find themselves rebuffed and ostracised by the end of the eighteenth century, and would turn inward to form their own social institutions, the most powerful of which may have been the independent black church movement (see discussion of these institutions in Bennett 1987: 79-83). The African American struggle for independence would not materialize for another century. Jefferson's credo 'All men were created equal' obviously did not apply to blacks alienated, deprived, and considered racially, as different, or 'other'.⁴⁸

The relationship of slavery to racial prejudice that collectively proscribed the social status of all African Americans, free and slave, as second-class citizens of the US and denied their natural, unalienable rights as human beings for centuries naturally stimulated queries among historians much like that of the proverbial chicken-and-egg question. Which preceded the other to influence it? Did racial prejudice usher in the institution of slavery? Or did slavery foster racial prejudice? Once firmly entrenched within the social system, however, slavery and racial prejudice reciprocally influenced the other. Winthrop Jordan (1968: 80) offers a mediating position contending that enslaving blacks was an 'unthinking decision'. 'Slavery and

48. Throughout his life Jefferson remained conflicted over slavery. On the one hand, he often spoke of ending slavery—'You know that nobody wishes more ardently to see an abolition not only of the [African slave] trade but of the condition of slavery' (personal correspondence to Brissot de Warville 11 February 1788). Yet on the other hand, he was unwilling to make the necessary sacrifices—'once "my debts" have been cleared off, "I shall try some plan of making their situation happier, determined to content myself with a small portion of their labour"' (personal correspondence to brother-in-law Francis Eppes 30 July 1787; as quoted in Takaki 2000: 42-43). Several reasons for Jefferson's unwillingness to secure their liberty in favour of appropriating their labour present themselves (Wright 1990: 120-22). First, Jefferson was personally a racist. He wrote in his *Notes On Virginia* (1785) from 'scientific observation' of 'blacks' laziness and slowness, their inability to reason, their lack of imagination, and their unsightly appearance compounded by "wooly hair" and an "ungainly" physique'. Second, Jefferson's economic and political status required slaves. Jefferson was heavily involved in the slave trade. His 200 plus slaves built Monticello and made it run. The slave system had made him and other Virginia slave owners quite wealthy, but the basis of that wealth also constituted two-thirds of Jefferson's debt wherein he remained upon death. Third, pro-slavery sentiment permeated the North American mainland. For example, 1,200 people signed petitions to the Virginia General Assembly in 1784-85 opposing a 1782 law that allowed masters to free their slaves. By contrast, Jefferson proposed a movement for the colonization of blacks, ideally to Africa but realistically to Santo Domingo, or Haiti (Takaki 2000: 44-49).

“prejudice” may have been equally cause and effect’. Not everyone concurs with Jordan. After all, the presence of racial prejudice among the colonists evidenced by their attitudes toward Native Americans certainly strengthens the argument for its preeminence. Though never having confronted any Africans, pre-slave trade Europeans harboured images of Africans as dark, sinister, evil, foul, un-Christian, without religion, and barbarous savages (all qualities uncannily the antithesis to white perceptions of themselves). But Europeans already knew something about the ‘barbarous savage’ image with it having been imprinted upon their collective unconscious since ‘us’ was ‘them’ prior to the sixteenth century (e.g. peoples to the north of the Grecians (now Europeans) as barbarians; those outside the Roman Empire as barbarians; Hungarians as ogres and savages in the Middle Ages; the ‘wilde Irish’ and Highland Scots as savages from the twelfth century onward). While European immigration easily facilitated the image’s transference to non-Europeans (Pieterse 1992: 31), it did not exorcise the ‘other’ from within ‘self’. Nonetheless the argument for the preeminence of slavery is strong. We have already touched on a long-term, stable labour force as a principal *raison d’être* for European presence in Africa. Moreover, the availability of large numbers of African slaves to be had quite inexpensively, and the unwillingness to enslave fellow whites regardless of nationality and socio-economic status led colonists to opt for black slavery.

Racial prejudices such as African biological, cultural, and religious inferiority helped justify the enslavement of Africans and rationalize the unfairness of colonial servitude in the white mind. Gary Nash (1974: 172) comments on the African American plight:

Irrevocably caught in the web of perpetual servitude, the slave was allowed no further opportunity to prove the white stereotype wrong. Socially and legally defined as less than a person, kept in a degraded and debased position, virtually without power in their relationships with white society, Afro-Americans became a truly servile, ignoble, degraded people in the eyes of the Europeans.

African Americans struggled for the same unalienable liberty, rights, and privileges denied them but naturally assumed for white, European colonizers. That struggle says less about African American identity, defined as ‘rebellious’ by the colonizer, and more about a horribly flawed system that sanctioned exploitation for economic motives. Amidst these struggles, amidst exploitation, amidst dehumanizing racialism, African Americans developed a religious-centred identity and consciousness undefined by the wider American culture that it would influence with time. Throughout the nineteenth century racial prejudice would unfortunately yield its most inhumane expressions in US history despite US government efforts (namely,

President Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation) to abolish slavery, well intentioned though lacking in foresight.

'Yet with a Steady Beat(ing)' in the Nineteenth Century

Racist thought of the seventeenth-eighteenth centuries only crystallized in the nineteenth century with two stereotypes ('the Negro as brute', the harder image; and 'the Negro as child' aka the 'Sambo' figure, the softer image) predominating in discussions of slavery and emancipation. Proponents of both stereotypes employed science and the Bible to buttress their arguments, and Negroes, too, would rely on the Bible and intellectualism to resist an imposed identity and social status. When it came to defining the identity of Negroes vis-à-vis the surrounding dominant White culture, not all within the African American community, freedmen and slave alike, were in consensus. How much, if any, of the African traditions and practices to retain? How much, if any, of the traditions and practices of neighbouring ethnicities to assimilate? Separate? Accommodate? The diversity of thought among prominent leaders within the African American community during the nineteenth century would foreshadow the same diversity present in the twentieth century.

Antebellum Period

White American perceptions of Negroes as inferior, morally and intellectually, that prohibited their complete assimilation maintained throughout the nineteenth century. Prior to 1800 Thomas Jefferson had cautiously noted the prevailing opinion of black inferiority 'in the faculties of reason and imagination...as a suspicion only'. Yet Jefferson's opinion, however diffident claims Jordan (1968: 455), 'stood as the strongest suggestion of inferiority expressed by any native American'. The racial prejudice that regarded Negroes as innately inferior prohibiting their assimilation influenced discussions of their emancipation that would have tested such perceptions. But emancipation of the Negroes in the early nineteenth century was practically and economically infeasible, a point eclipsed by White anxieties disguised as Negro revenge. Vengeful attitudes among blacks over the years of their mistreatment, it was assumed, raised concerns that emancipation would 'produce convulsions' resulting in, as Jefferson commented, 'the extermination of one or the other race' (Koch and Peden 1944: 256). Emancipation with the intent of colonization, however, did gain momentum with both the establishment of the American Colonization Society (1817) and the hard stereotype of 'the Negro as brute'.

Slave unrest and rebellion became a recurring theme in colonizationist literature with African colonization regarded as the panacea for the free-Negro crisis and the gradual extinction of slavery. Perceptions over the Negro condition within the colonization movement diverged with some affirming Negro inferiority as the root cause of their degraded condition (e.g. Calvin Colton), some affirming their degraded condition as the root cause of their inferiority (e.g. Henry Clay), and some arguing deeply-rooted and ineradicable prejudices as the root cause of the Negro problem, though all were united that the Negro could attain full potential but only through colonization. Once in Africa (specifically Liberia) the Negro could become a new man; but while in the US the Negro would never experience equal participation in a society where anti-Negro sentiment and violence were on the upswing in the 1820s and 1830s. The colonization movement ultimately became a casualty at the end of the 1820s when President Jackson vetoed federal subsidization for it. Nevertheless, the idea would be revisited several times throughout the nineteenth century.

The staunchest critics of the colonizationists in the 1830s were the abolitionists though they, too, shared in the perception of the Negro as brutish and violent. William Lloyd Garrison, the most vocal abolitionist who established the American Anti-Slavery Society (1833), accepted Negro ignorance, licentiousness, revenge, hatred, and murder as problematic. In a sermon on slavery James Freeman (1842; as quoted in Frederickson 1971: 34) remarked:

A worse evil to the slave than the cruelty he sometimes endures, is the moral degradation that results from his condition. Falsehood, theft, licentiousness, are the natural consequence of his situation.... He goes to excess in eating and drinking and animal pleasures; for he has no access to any higher pleasures, and a man cannot be an animal without sinking below an animal,—a brutal man is worse than a brute.

Where abolitionists parted company with colonizationists, however, was over the solution to the Negro condition. Abolitionists rejected outright the colonizationist doctrine of ineradicable prejudice as un-Christian. Racial injustices faced by Negroes that denied them their moral, religious, and intellectual self-development were correctible. To correct the problem, some abolitionists placed the onus on white slaveholders by regarding slaveholding as an individual sin. Yet others placed it on the Negroes by advocating a self-help stance to prove their capability, to strive for their equality, and to demonstrate themselves to be model citizens.

Proslavery propagandists especially utilized the hard image of 'the Negro as beast' after the 1830s appealing to the Santo Domingo (Haiti)

rebellions and the infamous Nat Turner rebellion. The Negro was by nature a savage brute with the institution of slavery providing the Negro his only domestication or civilization, albeit limited. George Sawyer (1858) asserted the 'lust and beastly cruelty' that 'glow(ed) in the negro's bosom', and a writer in *De Bow's Review* (1852) commented, '...the brutish propensities of the negro now unchecked, there remains no road for their full exercise...but in the slaughter of his white master, and through the slaughter, he strides (unless he himself be exterminated) to the full exercise of his *native barbarity and savageness*' (as quoted in Frederickson 1971: 58 and 55, respectively). Slavery and the control of the master, as proslavery propagandists maintained, produced the happy, loyal, affectionate and lovable slave, emblemized by the 'Sambo' stereotype. Or did it? If so, why would the slave rebel? A closer look at three Negro slave rebellions will underscore the propagandists' misguided rationale and slave rebellion and violence as themselves fomented by the institution of slavery. Moreover, the centrality of the Bible for the slave community will shed light on an identity belying white perceptions of the Negro as innately violent.

Gabriel's Conspiracy⁴⁹

Gabriel, a blacksmith and slave of the Prosser plantation in Richmond, Virginia, targeted the summer of 1800 to set his insurrection into motion. One group of conspirators would set a diversion by setting fire to the warehouse district of Rocketts in southeast Richmond, while another group would procure arms stashed at a tavern near Prosser's plantation. Several factors suggested the possibility of the insurrection's success: (1) the population of Richmond and the surrounding areas had a black majority ranging from 50-60 percent; (2) US army troops had demobilized, and the Virginia militia had been disarmed with all arms setting in storage in Richmond; (3) slave patrols had grown lax in their duties; (4) the escalating international situation between the US and France; and (5) the Haitian revolution. But the conspiracy failed being derailed conjointly by nature (a fierce storm rendered a bridge necessary to enter Richmond impassable the evening of 30 August) and militia patrols (dispatched by Governor Monroe after the conspiracy leaked out). Whether the

49. Not much historical data on the conspiracy survives. What details do exist derive from the court proceedings and testimony from conspirators. For comprehensive treatment of the conspiracy set within the Virginian market economy, urban culture, and rapidly changing religious culture, see James Sidbury's *Ploughshares into Swords* (1997).

conspiracy could have been successful remains a matter of speculation, but the slaves' intended appropriation of certain white artifacts reveals a cultural symbolism they desired to transform. Horses, a symbol of status and authority, and swords, also a symbol of authority associated with the Virginia militia and African traditions, symbolized a system within which Negroes were powerless. The conspiracy sought to 'transform symbols of Black oppression into weapons with which slaves could demand freedom and respect' (Sidbury 1997: 69).

The centrality of the Christian religion for these slaves remains indisputable (e.g. the Hungary Baptist Meeting House as the meeting-place for recruitment, the testimony of white Virginians that cited religion as integral to the planned insurrection). The testimony of Ben Woolfolk, one of the conspirators, reveals the slave community's close familiarity with the Bible. At a pivotal meeting in early August to iron out conspiracy details, Gabriel deferred to his brother Martin's authority to decide the date, perhaps, as a contemporary white suggested, because of his 'acquaint[ance] with the Holy Scriptures'. Martin called for action warning that an 'expression in the Bible' states that 'Delays bring Danger'. Woolfolk, however, had his misgivings, 'I told them that I had heard that in the days of old, when the Israelites were in Servitude to King Pharaoh, they were taken from him by the Power of God,—and were carried away by Moses—God had blessed them with an Angel to go with him, But that I could see nothing of that kind in these days'. Woolfolk's appeal to a biblical analogy suggests that the conspirators could not overpower the Whites to reach the Promised Land without divine aid. And that God had sent no angel to lead the conspiracy apparently played on Gabriel's name as a metaphorical rejection of his leadership. Martin responded by invoking God's promise to his chosen people in Leviticus 26.8. 'I read in my Bible where God says, if we will worship him, we should have peace in all our Lands, five of you shall conquer an hundred and a hundred, a thousand of our enemies' (Sidbury 1997: 76-77). Aside from a strong familiarity with the Bible, the conspiracy leadership also shared a strong conviction that the biblical stories spoke directly to their situation, that racial slavery violated biblical precepts, and that enslaved Virginians were God's chosen people. Where they parted company was over strategies that God's chosen people might pursue: 'should man...wait for God to bring justice to the world, or...could they just rely on God to make them victorious against their oppressors if they would only seek to further his cause' (Sidbury 2003: 123)? Clearly, the exchange between Martin and Woolfolk redolent with biblical imagery and texts demonstrates the importance of the Bible in shaping these Virginian slaves' image of themselves.

Denmark Vesey Conspiracy⁵⁰

A religious man, the free black artisan Denmark Vesey grew discontented with white Christian theology as pulpитеers advanced a proslavery brand of Christianity intended no doubt to assuage white slaveholding parishioners and to keep slaves in a state of servitude. White clergymen even 'made a Catechism *different* for the Negroes', a point conceded by whites. As a leader among the lay clergy in the African church, Vesey conducted evening Bible class meetings in his home where his close familiarity with the Bible, especially that of the Old Testament, and interpretative abilities shone forth. His efforts to connect the experiences of Black Charlestonians with a theology of resistance relied on their identification with the saga of the enslaved Israelites and injunctions for Jews to hold true to the covenant in their diaspora (from Tobit 1-2). He would often read to the slaves 'from the Bible *how the children of Israel were delivered out of Egypt from bondage*' (italics Bennett 1987: 127). With the Exodus story for a theological underpinning, Vesey's well devised plot of a mass exodus was set in motion when Charleston authorities burst into the African Church on 7 June 1818 and arrested 140 Negroes, free and slave, and continually harassed the church through 1820. Such a move on 14 July 1822 to the promised land of Haiti would certainly have created an economic vacuum in Charleston similar to Israelite secession from Judah.⁵¹ Vesey shared his detailed plan with his officers, each with their assigned roles. All that the conspiracy's success needed were strict confidence and recruits (estimated as high as 6,600, and only for one of the five officers).

Vesey and his officers were quite literate possessing a cache of literature, the Bible being the most important. His interpretative proficiency to refute white interpretations of Scripture contributed to his authority. Old Testament passages with edicts on slavery captured Vesey's focus. At his Bible class meetings he read 'different Chapters from the Old Testament, but most generally read the whole of 21st Chap. Exodus' and 'spoke and exhorted from the 16th Verse the words "and He that Stealeth a man"'

50. The voluminous written material concerning the Vesey conspiracy starkly contrasts with the paucity of evidence surrounding Gabriel's conspiracy, a testament to the cultural differences between Charleston, South Carolina and Richmond, Virginia. Charleston, more cosmopolitan than the provincial backwater of Richmond, boasted a rich, cultural heritage with literacy rates among its blacks higher than those of Richmond. For a more detailed account of the conspiracy itself and the Charleston, South Carolina context, read Douglas Egerton's *He Shall Go Out Free* (1999).

51. With the South Carolina legislature's passage of 'An Act to Restrain the Emancipation of Slaves' (20 December 1820) forbidding the private manumission of slaves by their masters, Vesey's plan for a mass exodus seemed the only path to freedom for Charleston's African community (Egerton 1999: 131-32).

(as quoted in Sidbury 2003: 126 and Egerton 1999: 114, respectively). Those who steal a man, Vesey emphasized following the retributive sense of justice in Exodus 21, 'shall be put to death'. Africans who remained captive beyond the allotted six years 'were absolutely enjoined' by God's law to 'attempt their emancipation, however shocking and bloody might be the consequences' (as quoted in Egerton 1999: 115). One white Charlestonian summarizing trial testimony especially honed in on the bloody quality of Vesey's theology to criticize his 'misinterpretation' of the Bible.

The designing leaders in the scheme of villainy availed themselves of these occasions to instill sentiments of ferocity by *falsifying the Bible*. All the several penal laws of the Israelites were quoted to mislead them, and the denunciations in the prophecies, which were intended to deter men from evil, were declared to be divine commands that they were meant to execute...they were told that... Joshua levelled the walls of Jericho and regarded neither age or sex; that David vanquished empires and left not one man, woman or infant alive (as quoted in Pearson 1999: 348).

But the stakes were much higher than a clash of hermeneutics. Concerns by contemporary historians who focus on the 'bloody quality' of Vesey's plans and claim he used a radical Christianity to sanction his revolt in effect dismiss Vesey and the viable option of resistance (see Genovese 1974: 593; Egerton (1999: 113) maligns Vesey for using the 'Nemesis-like God of the Old Testament' as a vision 'for a day of vengeance and retribution').

Nat Turner's Rebellion⁵²

Of all the slave rebellions in US history, the infamous Nat Turner revolt (22 August 1831 in Southampton County, Virginia) was the largest. Historians generally identify a meeting near Cabin Pond the preceding Sunday evening (21 August) as the revolt's beginning point, but Nat began it with his infancy. As a child of 3 or 4 he recalled to other children events

52. Our most important source of knowledge for the event and the man derives from Thomas R. Gray's *The Confessions of Nat Turner*. A local lawyer and slave-owner Thomas R. Gray composed the work on the basis of interviews with Turner after his capture as an economic solution to his financial dilemma (e.g. his holdings had decreased from 21 slaves to 1 slave and a farm of 800 acres to 300 acres from 1829 to 1831, and his father had cut him from the will prior to dying). Had the *Confessions* overtly suggested the brutal nature of slavery as the roots of the rebellion rather than bolstering the popular position of Nat Turner as an insane, maniacal, religious fanatic, it would not have had the wide circulation it did, being reprinted in Virginia in 1832 (Greenberg 1996: 8, 10).

that had preceded his birth. Other people, including his parents, who heard about the incident 'were greatly astonished' and claimed that he 'surely would be a prophet, as the Lord had shewn me things that had happened before my birth'. His parents and grandparents believed Nat possessed 'too much sense to be raised...of any service to any one as a slave' and was 'intended for some great purpose' (Greenberg 1996: 44-45), namely the liberation of his people from bondage. Nat was highly intelligent, well educated though with no formal instruction, able to read and write at an early age. Studious, inquisitive, and contemplative in nature, Nat Turner read and reread the Bible, and religion became the supreme influence in his life.

As I was praying one day at my plough, the spirit spoke to me, saying "Seek ye the kingdom of Heaven and all these things shall be added unto you.["] *Question*—what do you mean by the Spirit. *Ans.* The Spirit that spoke to the prophets in former days—and I was greatly astonished, and for two years prayed continually, whenever my duty would permit—and then again I had the same revelation, which fully confirmed me in the impression that I was ordained for some great purpose in the hands of the Almighty (Greenberg 1996: 46).

Nat was also truthful and honest, never uttered an oath, never committed a theft, and never drank alcohol. His character and nature simply did not predispose him to fighting and violence. On 12 May 1828 Turner received a revelation:

I heard a loud noise in the heavens, and the Spirit instantly appeared to me and said the Serpent was loosened, and Christ had laid down the yoke he had borne for the sins of men, and that I should take it on and fight against the Serpent, for the time was fast approaching when the first should be last and the last should be first. *Ques.* Do you not find yourself mistaken now? *Ans.* Was not Christ crucified... (Greenberg 1996: 47-48)

Turner kept 'the great work' for which he was destined to himself until he received a sign from God. That sign came in the form of a solar eclipse on 12 February 1831. Another sign, with the sun a 'greenish blue color', appeared to Turner on Saturday, 13 August, and the meeting of conspirators convened on Sunday, 21 August.

The revolt began and ended about as abruptly as planned. Turner's final words to his followers underscored his intention: 'Remember that ours is not war for robbery nor to satisfy our passions; it is a *struggle for freedom*. Ours must be deeds, not words. Then let us away to the scene of action' (as quoted in Aptheker 2003: 51-52; italics mine). And immediately the revolt began, first at Turner's home farm, the Travis



Figure 12. Nat Turner's Capture.

residence, at approximately 2 am, then quickly moved to every farm in turn enlisting insurgents along the way. Skirmishes with the militia and heavily guarded bridges foiled plans to attack the county seat of Jerusalem. In the approximate 40 hours of the revolt between 55 and 65 whites were killed. Turner eluded capture for more than 2 months until finally apprehended on 30 October. He was tried one week later and executed 11 November 1831.

In the aftermath rumours that the rebellion had spread into neighbouring communities incited panic. Garish accounts of inhuman butcheries (e.g. decapitation; bowels ripped out; ears, hands, noses, and legs cut off) circulated as if the insurgents engaged in an indiscriminate killing spree (conspirators testified of houses being bypassed; no buildings were burnt, no women raped, no acts of torture, and no wholesale looting), or as if they alone monopolized massacres as a form of terror, while whites brutally executed,

including decapitation and mutilation, a minimum of 120 Negroes who never participated in the rebellion.⁵³

Perceptions of the rebellion vary in memory. First, the image of Nat Turner as a crazed savage resonated with white Southerners as well as many Northern abolitionists, no doubt because it presumably confirmed the hard stereotype of Negroes. Though Garrison (1831) disagreed with this perception of Turner, he nonetheless deplored the violence. In the same editorial Garrison warned 'countrymen of the danger of persisting in their unrighteous conduct', his truculent words inviting suspicions of agitation.

Ye patriotic hypocrites! Ye panegyrists of Frenchmen, Greeks, and Poles! Ye fustian declaimers of for liberty! Ye valiant sticklers for equal rights among yourselves! Ye haters of aristocracy! Ye assailants of monarchies! Ye republican nullifiers! Ye treasonable disunionists! Be dumb! Cast no reproach upon the conduct of the slaves, but let your lips and cheeks wear the blisters of condemnation!

Later, William Styron's Pulitzer Prize winning novel *The Confessions of Nat Turner* (1967) popularized Turner as a 'nut' in the modern era.⁵⁴ Second, the image of Nat Turner as 'trickster' hero gained currency among some Virginia slaves (see two such stories in Higginson 1861b; also Levine 1977: 102-35). Finally, the image of Nat Turner as freedom fighter and hero was common among the black community and sympathetic whites (Higginson 1861b; Harding 1983). Vestiges of this image reemerged in later interviews with former slaves as late as the 1930s.

On the surface these rebellions confirm only the Black *image* in the White mind as violent, rebellious, and brutish; they do not demonstrate the Negro by nature as violent, rebellious, and brutish. If anything, evidence from the early 1800s reveals the majority of Negroes clinging tightly to the Christian doctrine of loving one's neighbour, even their master. They would have nothing to do with angry talk about Yhwh's bloody justice. Such black

53. The Nat Turner rebellion reinforced White anxiety and became the ostensible reason for Virginia rejecting any legislation on abolitionism. Yet Thomas Dew, well-respected professor of political law at the College of William and Mary at the time, suggested otherwise in his essay 'Abolition of Negro Slavery' (1832). Dew pointed to the impracticality of any emancipation plan in that it would bring social and economic collapse to Virginia. Slave labour constituted one-third of the state's wealth and gave value to its soil, and the added enormous expense of colonization would take up the remaining two-thirds.

54. Styron's novel elicited a furious critique by a collection of essays in John Henrik Clarke's edited work *William Styron's Nat Turner* (1968). The respondents especially took exception to Styron's embellishment of Turner possessing deeply repressed and conflicted sexual desires for a white woman, the source of which, they claimed, lay with Styron's own racial-sexual fantasy (see Greenberg's discussion, 1996: 28-31).

passivity easily lent itself to the constructed stereotype of the docile Negro, the Sambo figure or Uncle Tom, a softer image to its obverse. Each conspiracy/rebellion bore a religious quality, as their biblically literate figure-heads never regarded the enemy as personal. Turner had spoken of how kindly his current master had treated him. The real enemy was slavery, and the Bible provided the paradigm of resistance to combat its violence. After all, 'the God of the Bible', remarks Callahan (2006: 197), 'is a God who meets violence with violence'. Nat Turner reminded his interviewer prior to his execution that Jesus brought 'not peace but a sword' (Matt. 10.34). Slave rebellion sought the liberation of God's chosen people. In this regard the slaves acted no differently or heinously than did white revolutionaries, who understood themselves as 'Israel' seeking liberation from British tyranny. The only difference between the two—colour. Granted, no rebellion, whatever its purpose, is gentlemanly. And slaves needed no incentive than that found 'in their stripes—in their emaciated bodies—in their ceaseless toil—in their ignorant minds—in every field, in every valley, on every hill-top and mountain, wherever you and your fathers have fought for liberty'. But in every American slave revolt the brutality of oppression, often ignored, far surpassed the brutality of the revolt (Genovese 1979: 105-10). Nobody remembers the wrongs of the oppressor borne in the lacerated bodies of the slaves, especially in a history controlled by the oppressor where such brutalities are conveniently downplayed or lost to memory. Frederick Douglass, the most visible black leader of the abolitionist movement and apostle-militant for black freedom from 1845-1895, referenced customary floggings for the most common offence of 'impudence', under which any act might qualify. 'Impudence...may mean almost anything, or nothing at all, just according to the caprice of the master or overseer, at the moment... This offense may be committed in various ways; in the tone of an answer; in answering at all; in not answering; in the expression of countenance; in the motion of the head; in the gait, manner and bearing of the slave' (Douglass 1855: 180). Violence was already present, well before Gabriel, Vesey, or Turner...and its colour wasn't black. Garrison (1831: 143) understood full well the violent nature of slavery when he railed against a White culture that regarded itself so powerful to be beyond reproach. 'But we have killed and routed them now—we can do it again and again—we are invincible!... We have the power to kill *all*—let us, therefore, continue to apply the whip and forge new letters'! And why could they act so reprehensibly? Because the victims were, after all, blacks, simple brutes pretending to be human, made by God to serve whites. Such an attitude reveals the contempt whites had for blacks. Thomas Higginson (1861a: 94), commander of the first Union Army black regiment, the South Carolina volunteers, elaborates, '... if the Truth were told, it would be that the Anglo-Saxon despises the Negro

because he is *not* an insurgent, for the Anglo-Saxon would certainly be one in his place'. If the Negro does not rebel, he is despised for not emulating the colonizer; if he does, then his mimicry renders him the monster too much like the colonizer. To rebel against a system predicated on violence from within simply reflects back to the colonizer a mirrored image of the 'other' within (it)self.

Re-presentations of African Americans that initially contributed to their enslavement gained reinforcement with the emergence of polygenesis theories advanced by science and religion in the mid-nineteenth century. Genetics, not environment, explained racial inferiority with whites and Negroes having been *created* unequal. Polygenesis theorists co-opted the Bible to defend their position. Louisiana physician and proslavery writer Samuel A. Cartwright argued the Negro as a separately created and inferior being in the Bible. In an 1860 article in *De Bow's Review* Cartwright contended that Negroes were created before Adam and Eve, and were among the living creatures placed under Adam's dominion. Moreover, 'Nachash', the serpent, which could also mean 'to be or to become black', he argued, was a Negro gardener. Later, these pre-Adamite Negroes would intermarry with Cain, a point inferred from the mark placed on Cain and the then widely accepted position on the 'curse of Ham or Canaan'.⁵⁵ African Americans responded vigorously to the new, scientific racism that had co-opted the Bible in its assertions. Of the many responses, Douglass's address 'The Claims of the Negro Ethnologically Considered' in 1854 heralded the cultural and intellectual achievements of Negroes who were responsible for the ancient Egyptian and Ethiopian civilizations (Foner 1999: 287-90). In 1843 abolitionist clergyman James Pennington claimed the curse of Cain as biblical justification for slavery to be 'stupid'. 'How then can Cain have any posterity this side of the deluge? How could we have inherited his mark and curse? The supposition is false and absurd' (as quoted in Callahan 2006: 27). While some voices in the discussion accepted polygenesis theories to account for Negro inferiority, they did not find it as justification for the enslavement or extinction of inferior races. Such actions, wrote Dr. Charles Caldwell in the 1830s, constituted 'an abuse of power' (as quoted in Frederickson 1971: 73). Similarly, Abraham Lincoln ascribed to Negro inferiority.

There is a physical difference between the white and black races
which I believe will for ever forbid the two races living together on

55. Modern interpretations of the curse of Ham or Canaan originated with the early Church of Augustine's era and its identification of the curse with slavery, though not with blacks, an association made by later medieval Talmudic texts. The association would find a place within Christian theology in the sixteenth century and wide acceptance as explanation for *blackness* by the seventeenth century (Pieterse 1992: 44).

terms of social and political equality. And inasmuch as they cannot so live, while they do remain together there must be the position of superior and inferior, and I as much as any other man am in favor of having the superior position assigned to the white race (as quoted in Plous and Williams 1995: 796).

While Lincoln's views factored into his reticence to deal with the slavery issue and emancipate Negroes, he did not regard the doctrine of Negro inferiority as justification for 'the Negro as brute'.

Black abolitionists (e.g. Charles Lenox Remond, Samuel Ringgold Ward, Henry Highland Garnet, Harriet Tubman, and Sojourner Truth) rejected white perceptions of Negro inferiority. They did not all agree on the means whereby abolition should proceed—Remond and Douglass who advocated the Garrisonian tenets of nonviolence in contrast to Ward and Garnet who advocated a militant assertiveness; Sojourner Truth as a 'talking' abolitionist in contrast to Harriet Tubman as a 'walking' abolitionist. Disagreement even arose between Douglass and Garnet prior to 1843 over the Bible's place in the abolitionist movement. Prior to 1843 Garnet was a pacifist like Douglass disavowing armed resistance to slavery: 'I cannot harbor the thought for a moment that [the slave's] deliverance will be brought about by violence' (as quoted in Callahan 2006: 131). His position soon changed with the Supreme Court decision in *Prigg v. Pennsylvania* (1842) to uphold the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793. He resolved that only violence would end slavery and campaigned to provide Bibles to slaves in the South, a matter debated heatedly with Douglass in 1849. Douglass saw the Bible as raw material for proslavery propaganda as master would wield whip and text in service of the other (as they had been doing). He knew that the justice of the Bible was not self-evident. The Bible had participated in the creation of two Christianities claimed Douglass: (1) that of the slaves, described as 'good, pure, and holy...pure, peaceable, and impartial', and (2) that of the master class described thusly, 'They strain at a gnat, and swallow a camel... They attend with Pharisaical strictness to the outward forms of religion, and at the same time neglect the weightier matters of the law, judgment, mercy, and faith' (Douglass 1854: 97-100). Douglas opposed Garnet's campaign and its proposed violence in favour of 'moral suasion'.

That the Negro had 'toiled over the soil of America' for 228 years prompted Douglass to reject outright any proposals for African colonization to Liberia, even from well-meaning individuals within the African American community. 'We live here—have lived here—have a right to live here, and mean to live here' ('Colonization', 26 January 1849; as quoted in Foner 1999: 126). Douglass relentlessly contended for African American rights and liberties as US citizens by denouncing slavery despite anti-abolitionist critiques that such confrontational tactics impeded the favourable impression and

success desired. Perhaps Douglass' most biting denunciations came in his speech 'The Meaning of July Fourth for the Negro'.

What, to the American slave, is your 4th of July? I answer; a day that reveals to him, more than all other days in the year, the gross injustice and cruelty to which he is the constant victim. To him, your celebration is a sham; your boasted liberty, an unholy license; your national greatness, swelling vanity; your sounds of rejoicing are empty and heartless; your denunciation of tyrants, brass fronted impudence; your shouts of liberty and equality, hollow mockery; your prayers and hymns, your sermons and thanksgivings, with all your religious parade and solemnity, are to him, mere bombast, fraud, deception, impiety, and hypocrisy—a thin veil to cover up crimes which would disgrace a nation of savages (5 July 1852; as quoted in Foner 1999: 196-97).

Appeals to Negro inferiority that denied citizenship (initially), liberty, and suffrage were 'an old dodge' that sought an apology for the enslavement and oppression of a people within their character. The blood-marked system of slavery *made* Negroes brutes, argued Douglass (Foner 1999: 196), by robbing them of their liberty, working them without wages, beating them with sticks, loading them with irons, hunting them with dogs, selling them at auctions, sundering their families, and starving them into submission. What did elicit optimism for Douglass and moved him to exclaim 'God be praised'! was the beginning of the Civil War.

Civil War Period

Nineteenth-century Romanticism during this period revived 'the Negro as child' image. The Sambo figure became central in the accommodation process functioning as the antidote to the rebellious slave image. Happy, lazy, passive, carefree, affectionate, docile, kindly, loyal, patient, cooperative, the antithetical Sambo type claimed that the Negro demonstrated the nature of an overgrown child. Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner, an advocate of Northern emancipation, told a Faneuil Hall audience in 1862 'the African is not cruel, vindictive, or harsh, but gentle, forgiving, and kind' (as quoted in Frederickson 1971: 109). If any race actually resembled the 'brute' stereotype, claimed the militant abolitionist Theodore Parker, it was the Anglo-Saxon race:

[they] had in them the ethnologic idiosyncrasy of the Anglo-Saxon—his restless disposition to invade and conquer other lands; his haughty contempt of humbler tribes which leads him to subvert, enslave, kill, and exterminate...We have exterminated the Indians...We have taken a feeble tribe of men and made them slaves (as quoted in Frederickson 1971: 100, 120).

Harriet Beecher Stowe's popular novel *Uncle Tom's Cabin* (1852) reflected the classic expression of romantic racialism. Its main character Uncle Tom, a docile black and Christian, is intended to generate sympathy because he does not rebel. In addition to the Uncle Tom type, Stowe forged the standard for the two would-be popular types of the 'pickaninny' and 'mammy' figures with characters Topsy and Aunt Chloe, respectively.

The publication of *Uncle Tom's Cabin* would eventually give rise to different tropes of Stowe's original 'tom' type in its more than 150-year existence.⁵⁶ The image of an elderly, gray-haired, gap-toothed man often associated with Uncle Tom, even by modern students who may never have read Stowe's novel, sharply contrasts with that originally presented by Stowe. She depicted Tom as a healthy, robust family man, wise, venerable, and kind, who worked long days in the field (most likely a rejoinder to the lazy slave stereotype of proslavery Southerners), and was a stalwart, devout Christian with an unflinching loyalty to his white master but who also demonstrated loyalty to his fellow slaves, even willing to sacrifice his life for them. Stowe depicted the day-to-day existence of Southern slaves as she did in an effort to convince her readers to abhor slavery. In contrast, antebellum theatrical versions (e.g. the popular production by George Aiken and George Howard in the 1850s) of the novel troped the 'tom' image by re-presenting Uncle Tom as passive, docile, and servile willing to 'sell out' blacks in order to placate whites (Turner 1994: 69-79).

Throughout the nineteenth century, several black types emerged to buttress the contented slave image represented in the Sambo figure, though for much different purposes. Joel Chandler Harris's folk tales drew from the trickster genre of African and West Indian Anansi stories and would popularize the 'Uncle Remus' type. They idealized plantation society and slavery by depicting Uncle Remus as the ideal 'plantation Negro' who has nothing but fond memories of slavery. Out of the same ideological vein came another type that traded on the centrality of entertainment within plantation society to buttress the contented slave image. Slaves were often expected to perform if for no other reason than to reduce friction. Slaves would often perform on days off with whites taking an active interest that would eventually express itself in a form of mockery called minstrelsy. A white imitation of a black imitation of a contented slave, the Minstrel tradition emerged in the first half of the nineteenth century as a form of proslavery ideology. 'Daddy' Rice, a gifted performer from Kentucky, would perform the popular 'Jim Crow' jig and, later, a Jim Crow version of Uncle Tom as a part of white backlash

56. The Uncle Tom trope has enjoyed widespread appeal across ethnic groups in the US where it has elicited the connotation of a 'sellout'. For Native Americans, the label is 'Uncle Tomahawk'; for Latino/as, 'Uncle Tomas'; and for Asians, 'Uncle Tong' (Turner 1994: 75).

against abolitionism while easing white anxiety over the problem of slavery. Mocking blacks through minstrelsy served to undermine black emancipation and any process of their assimilation. Black entertainers responded by engaging in a reverse minstrelsy that mocked whites and their rigid body language with a plantation dance called the Cake Walk (Pieterse 1992: 154, 132-33).

The mammy figure never emerged prior to the Civil War era principally because fewer than 25 percent of the white Southern population owned slaves. Of those that did, most owned less than 10 slaves, the majority of whom were consigned to field labour. Moreover, black women did not run white households until after Emancipation. Nonetheless, Stowe's Aunt Chloe would establish the fictive tradition spawning the mammy type. Depicted as round and plump, black, with a shiny complexion, good-humoured, able cook and housekeeper, turban on head, and fiercely loyal to the master/mistress, the proto-mammy Aunt Chloe always put the needs of her white charges ahead of those of her own children. This trait in particular defined the white-identified mammy as a desexualized type. The Civil War era found this fictionalized re-presentation (Aunt Chloe/mammy) of black women much more palatable than the reality (e.g. Sojourner Truth). After all, Sojourner Truth, a stalwart campaigner for abolition and women's rights during the 1850s, disturbed and unsettled audiences with an uncompromising loyalty to her *own* children and a vision of black women shaping their own destiny. In contrast to Aunt Chloe, Truth was a fully black-identified individual whose demands, if accommodated, meant a substantial social upheaval where blacks could pursue their own destinies irrespective of the needs of the white community, obviously a more radical stance than that of a 'humane structure' where blacks could continue to serve whites (Turner 1994: 42-49).

Unfortunately for the black image in the white mind and the African struggle for freedom, the conclusion to *Uncle Tom's Cabin* revived old sentiments of colonization in the face of growing American 'ethnologic' self-image, itself increasingly being cast in the mould of the dominant, and assumed superior, Caucasian race. As example, note John C. Calhoun's 4 January 1848 Senate speech declaring that the US had never 'incorporated into the Union any but the Caucasian race...Ours is a government of the white man' (as quoted in Frederickson 1971: 136).⁵⁷ Stowe's equally

57. The full-white nationalist position radically maintained the elimination of the Negro population whether through colonization, migration, or extermination (through 'natural' processes, of course). Attitudes that Providence had reserved the US for its exclusive habitation by the white race lay at the root of emancipation and colonization during the Civil War era. A Republican dominated House Committee concluded in its official report (1862) 'that the whole country should be held and occupied by these races [Anglo-Saxon, Celt, or Scandinavian] alone' (Frederickson 1971: 138-45).

famous brother, Reverend Henry Ward Beecher, endorsed colonization, 'I am for Colonization for the sake of the continent of Africa'. While these neo-colonist sentiments did depart from the prior colonizationist agenda by demanding white Americans discharge their paternal obligations to educate and to Christianize Negroes before colonization, they did nonetheless ironically imply 'that American nationality could never really include the blacks' and unwittingly reinforced white attitudes of Negro unassimilability (Frederickson 1971: 117).

If the government of the US was that of the white man, then so was the Civil War. Early on the Lincoln administration dismissed black volunteers with the understanding that the war was a 'white man's war' (Bennett 1987: 191). Lincoln policy sought to emancipate Negroes, but closer examination of his speeches reveals a less than praiseworthy proposal for doing so. When Lincoln met with a group of prominent Negroes at the White House on 14 August 1862, he acknowledged the problem that both races suffered: 'Your race suffer greatly, many of them, by living among us while ours suffer from your presence...it affords a reason why we should be separated' (as quoted in Van Doren Stern 1940: 715-23). Lincoln's solution? A black exodus...colonization.⁵⁸ His veiled beneficent plan of colonization benefiting both races betrays his own 'American prejudice and Negro hatred' underlying efforts to eradicate the US of both slaves and blacks. His insensitivity to suggest black people as the cause of racism and the war met with a swift and furious response from Douglass using the analogies of a horse thief and a highwayman. 'No, Mr. President, it is not the innocent horse that makes the horse thief, not the traveler's purse that makes the highway robber, and it is not the presence of the Negro that causes this foul and unnatural war, but the cruel and brutal cupidity of those who wish to possess horses, money and Negroes by means of theft, robbery, and rebellion' (1862; as quoted in Foner 1999: 511-12). The idea of government-sponsored colonization dissipated with Negro conscription, a point over which Douglass also took umbrage. It represented just the third time in the history of the US government that Negroes were considered citizens: first when 11 out of 13 states gave the Negro the right to vote just after the Constitution's formation, and second when fighting alongside General Jackson's forces in the War of 1812. Only when in trouble did it seem the US nation accepted the Negroes as citizens (Douglass 1865: 184). When conscripted, black soldiers

58. The Lincoln administration had attempted to conjoin colonization with emancipation. Lincoln negotiated for a tract of land with Panama initially, then with the Haitian government to accept an American Negro colony, sought congressional funding, and even pushed for Constitutional amendments that would support colonization, all to no avail (Frederickson 1971: 149-50).

faithfully and submissively discharged their duties, contributions that, argued Orestes Brownson (1864), entitled them to regard the US as their country. Yet the black image in the white mind did not change, and blacks still had to remain in their place—understood to be in the South and on their side of the racial line as established by God and science.

Postbellum Period

Attitudes toward Negroes did not change with Reconstruction in the US South as the 'white burden' queried, 'What shall we do with the Negro?', as if the Negro needed something doing with. Douglass (1865: 185) responded, 'Do nothing with us! Your doing with us has already played the mischief with us. Do nothing with us!' Sincere solicitude for the welfare of the slaves simply masked proslavery objections to Emancipation. Concerns ranged the gamut: Negroes can't take care of themselves; Negroes would not work; Negroes would become a burden to the State; Negroes would cheapen labour; Negroes would become vagrants; Negroes would seek revenge against their former masters ad infinitum. '...mind your business, and let them mind theirs...let them alone...When you, our white fellow-countrymen, have attempted to do anything for us, it has generally been to deprive us of some right, power or privilege which you yourself would die before you would submit to have taken from you'. If anything needs doing with the Negro, if whites genuinely had Negro welfare in mind, and if whites selflessly wanted to act benevolently toward the Negro, Douglass (1862; as quoted in Foner 1999: 471-72) argued, then 'deal justly with him'. Accommodationists struck out to do what was best for blacks, though such efforts quickly became a guise for what practically ended up as doing what was best for whites.

The image of 'the Negro as brute' persisted despite Reconstruction programs to include the Negro in the American body politic. Northern approval of Negro suffrage in the South had less to do with belief in the Negro intellectual potential for citizenship and more to do with restructuring the South under Northern Republican hegemony. Only 6 Northern states actually allowed Negroes to vote after the Reconstruction Act's passage. Furthermore, enfranchising blacks with the Fifteenth Amendment became a Northern ploy to secure the black vote in case of close elections (Frederickson 1971: 183-86). Appeals to the biblical polygenesis theory, which buttressed admonitions against miscegenation, relied on the hard image of the Negro. No offence was greater than that against race, country and God than for a white man to give his daughter in marriage to a Negro, a beast. Even politicians played on racial fears as evidenced by President Andrew Johnson's 1866 veto speeches to Congress. '...it must

be acknowledged that in the progress of nations negroes have shown less capacity for self-government than any other race of people. No independent government of any form has ever been successful in their hands. On the contrary whenever they have been left to their own devices they have shown an instant tendency to relapse into barbarism' (as quoted in Stamp 1965: 87).

Simultaneously, the literature of the 1870s and 1880s, while praising Negroes' wartime loyalty, promulgated accommodationist attitudes of the New South paternalism with the support of black leadership. Accused of being Negrophiles, accommodationists of the Progressive era took up the Negro cause while glorifying 'the old time darky' of slavery. Black leaders such as Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. Du Bois in the 1890s aligned themselves with an accommodationist racism (though the latter disagreed with the former's agenda as laid out in his 'Atlanta Compromise') only because they felt blacks could benefit from the assistance of white South benefactors (Du Bois 1903: 176-77). Not surprisingly, accommodationists emphasized the soft image of the Negro as docile child, a position that came under fire from those embracing the hard image. Soft image advocates responded claiming that Negro sex crimes against white women were rare and exceptional, overpublicized, and peculiarly uncommon among blacks. Despite their mistreatment, they managed to demonstrate the Christian virtue of 'turning the other cheek' (Riley 1910: 119, 127). Accommodationists embraced the paternalist ideal by envisioning a future for blacks, which, however benevolent and useful, ultimately had limited influence in a profoundly anti-intellectual society.

No black leader did as much to champion accommodationism than Booker T. Washington. He especially possessed what Southern liberals desired in a Negro leader with whom they could cooperate. So close were both sides in their racial philosophy that white Southern accommodationists could pass as white Washingtonians. That Washington did not threaten the racial status quo made him appealing to white America. Washington laid out his programme in his 'Atlanta Compromise' address (18 September 1895) calling on blacks to temporarily accept racial subordination and segregation. More importantly, he espoused a gradual program for black progress designed to bring about racial peace and transform white perceptions of the Negro character and capacity. Transformation of the Negro character and condition would eventually usher in their full equality. Rather than bringing the anticipated discipline to the black character and industrial skills to the Negroes, Washington's programme instead provided preindustrial skills of 'comparatively little value in the emerging economy' (Frederickson 1971: 216). Unlike many preceding African American leaders, Washington enjoyed cult-like status acquiring some 10 million followers and notoriety in

a nation of 70 million as his influence extended across political and colour lines. However influential, Washington could not avoid his reputation as a compromiser between the South, the North, and the Negro. Historian Wilson J. Moses (1993: 62) goes even further with his stinging appraisal that Washington, 'cunning and slippery, played upon the Uncle Tom stereotype' to secure his position as white America's favourite black son.

W. E. B. Du Bois (1903: 38-51), a prominent African American historian and more outspoken of Washington's critics, acknowledged the wide currency and ascendancy that his contemporary's theories had gained by the turn of the twentieth century in addition to his remarkable ability to retain the respect of everyone while negotiating so many diverse and conflicting positions. Du Bois applauded and even advised support for Washington, up to a point. And that point became the difference-maker setting Washington apart from his predecessors as a recognized spokesman for the Negro community. Though previous leaders maintained the ideal of ultimate freedom and assimilation, their main efforts centred on the 'assertion of the manhood rights of the Negro'. Du Bois regarded Washington's programme as a departure from this emphasis because it 'practically accepts the alleged inferiority of the Negro races' by momentarily asking black people to give up political power, insistence on civil rights, and the higher education of Negro youth while reaping disenfranchisement, legal ordinances of Negro civil inferiority, and decreased funding for higher education institutions that train Negroes. Washington's doctrine asked the Negro to give up way too much for what was asked in return. His 'propaganda' left the impression of certain dangerous half-truths that occlude their supplementary truths. First, the Negro condition justified Southern attitudes toward the Negro; and yet slavery and race-prejudice were just as potent, sufficient causes for the Negro condition. Second, the wrong education of the Negro primarily accounted for the Negro's failure to rise more quickly; and yet industrial and common-school training lagged simply because higher institutions of learning trained so few black teachers. Third, the Negro's future rise depended principally on his own efforts; and yet those efforts would certainly flounder if not encouraged by 'the richer and wiser environing group'. On this last point Du Bois especially took exception because Washington placed the burden of the Negro problem squarely on the Negro while excusing critical, pessimistic white spectators from any responsibility. Du Bois insisted that Negroes continue to strive for those unalienable, God-endowed rights enjoyed by all men though by civil and peaceful means. But it was Washington's programme outlined succinctly in his Atlanta Compromise speech that received endorsement from the standing ovation and rousing applause of a large white audience.

However genial accommodationist racism and its image of the Negro as docile, the hard image of 'the Negro as brute', violent and savage, had taken

on sexual overtones by the end of the century to predominate in the general population of the South. Anti-Negro literature of the late 1880s and after 1890 simply fanned the flames of white anxiety over the 'black peril' in the South. After the Emancipation Proclamation (1863) the *Cincinnati Enquirer* ran the following commentary: 'Slavery is dead, the negro is not, there is the misfortune. For the sake of all parties, would that he were' (as quoted in Pieterse 1992: 61). Newspaper editorials revived old thoughts of colonization. Blacks became easy scapegoats for social ills (e.g. economic shortfall with the declining Southern agriculture), and white anxiety over the 'black peril' manifested itself in the heinous practice of lynching, which reached a high point in the 1890s as the 'inadequate' racial control to curb the 'dangerous' tendencies of blacks (over 2,500 blacks between 1884 and 1900 with 9 out of 10 every other day between 1889 and 1900; Pieterse 1992: 176-77). The popular hard image invoked the horror and brutality of alleged black crimes, principally rape of white women, in order to justify the brutality of white retaliation. No literature of the era best exemplifies the sexual overtones of the beast image than Charles Carroll's *The Negro A Beast* (1900). George T. Winston (1901: 108-09) provides this vivid description prior to a lynching.

...when a knock is heard at the door, [the Southern woman] shudders with nameless horror. The black brute is lurking in the dark, a monstrous beast, crazed with lust. His ferocity is almost demoniacal. A mad bull or a tiger could scarcely be more brutal. A whole community is frenzied with horror, with the blind and furious rage for vengeance.

Thomas Dixon, Jr's novels *The Leopard's Spots* (1902) and *The Klansman* (1905), the basis for D. W. Griffith's film *Birth of a Nation* (1915), further propagated this nuanced myth of the black beast. The image projected of the black violent brute inciting horror is a creation, necessary to justify the brutality against blacks at the turn of the twentieth century in the US. But the brutality of white retaliation took a perverse turn in that the black men lynched were often castrated, suggesting a close link between the violence of whites and their repressed sexual drives. Large numbers of mulatto children bore testimony to the 'sins' of white men who had violated anti-miscegenation laws,⁵⁹ tried to cover up their intercourse with blacks by referring to

59. Legal restrictions such as anti-miscegenation laws intended to regulate interracial relations, principally of white women and black men. White males benefited sexually because the Black Code or *code noir* did not taboo black women, twice disadvantaged in the social hierarchy in terms of race and gender. Race and sexuality, emblemized in the myth of the black rapist, found a psychic outlet to Southern political and economic insecurities (e.g. depression of the 1890s, loss of Civil War, vulnerability of the Southern plantation).

mulattoes as 'Negroes', and then 'transferred their own lusts and their anxieties of black male retaliation to their fear of black men as sexual threats to white women' (Takaki 2000: 59). Noted actor James Earl Jones (as quoted in Pieterse 1992: 176-77) adds, 'When a white feels so personally involved with a Negro that he takes the time to cut off his penis and torture him, then it has to be something sexual, the result of repressed sex... Everywhere in the world men kill each other, but nowhere do they cut off penises and lynch each other'. But the Negro was no stranger to castration; the lynchings of the 1880s and 1890s made physically real the economic, social, legal, and political castrations endured for quite some time. No doubt the stereotype of the black man as a hypersexual, threatening brute conjured by racist extremists indeed reflected their own genuine fears and hatred, but may have also projected their own unacknowledged guilt feelings. The images of the Negro maintained the social boundary while suppressing blacks from the arena of competition—the Sambo figure as a device of mimicry socially stigmatizing and mocking; the Negro beast as a device of humiliation psychologically desexualizing and emasculating.

In the face of slavery, numerous lynchings, dehumanizing stereotypic representations, overt racism, Jim Crow laws, and many other obstacles to enjoying full rights and privileges of US citizenship, Negroes found ways that allowed them to resist while affirming Black pride. The same Bible justifying slavery divinely sanctioned the slave rebellions and informed the African American experience and identity. With no common land or common ancestry, the bases for collective identity in modern ethnicity, African Americans collectively resisted an identity based on melanin for a common history with Hebrew enslavement typologically as their own and Hebrew liberation for the Promised Land as their telos.

Canaan land is the land for me,
And let God's saints come in.
There was a wicked man,
He kept them children in Egypt land (Slave spiritual cited in
Raboteau 1994: 1).

Canaan was not the hope of reaching heaven; instead, Douglass pointed out, 'We meant to reach the *North*, and the North was our Canaan' (1893; cited in Raboteau 1994: 14). The Exodus for some African Americans from American Canaan, or Egypt, took various forms—transatlantic (e.g. Martin Delany's joint venture in the Liberian Exodus Joint Stock Company in 1878) or transcontinental (e.g. the mass migration of blacks from Louisiana to Kansas led by Benjamin 'Pap' Singleton in 1879 and to Oklahoma)—but was never commemorated as a historical event. Nonetheless, James Weldon Johnson (1899) captured African American hope for the future in the face

of oppression with the song 'Lift Every Voice and Sing' (popularly known as 'The Negro National Anthem' and adopted as such by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, or NAACP, in 1919) that perhaps articulates Samari(t)an resistance beyond the only voice ('To Your Tents'!) given them.

Lift every voice and sing
 Till earth and heaven ring,
 Ring with the harmonies of Liberty;
 Let our rejoicing rise
 High as the listening skies,
 Let it resound loud as the rolling sea.
 Sing a song full of the faith that the dark past has taught us,
 Sing a song full of the hope that the present has brought us,
 Facing the rising sun of our new day begun
 Let us march on till victory is won.
 Stony the road we trod,
 Bitter the chastening rod,
 Felt in the days when hope unborn had died;
 Yet with a steady beat,
 Have not our weary feet
 Come to the place for which our fathers sighed?
 We have come over a way that with tears have been watered,
 We have come, treading our path through the blood of the
 slaughtered,
 Out from the gloomy past,
 Till now we stand at last
 Where the white gleam of our bright star is cast.
 God of our weary years
 God of our silent tears,
 Thou who has brought us thus far on the way;
 Thou who has by thy might
 Led us into the light,
 Keep us forever in the path, we pray.
 Lest our feet stray from the places, Our God, where we met Thee;
 Lest, our hearts drunk with the wine of the world, we forget thee;
 Shadowed beneath Thy hand,
 May we forever stand.
 True to our God,
 True to our native land.

'God of our Weary Years' and the Modern Era

While the twentieth century marked an era of improved black–white relations in the US, it also signaled challenges still remaining. Little did W.E.B. Du Bois know how prophetic his claim would be at the beginning of the

twentieth century that 'the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line'. Every social niche in a supposed 'post-racial' US culture from entertainment to education to advertising to news media faced (and still face, to some degree) the colour challenge. Within the film industry alone prominent black actors/actresses broke through the colour line only to confront traditional African American re-presentations.⁶⁰ Twentieth-century film media cleverly depicted African Americans in numerous changing guises, e.g. plantation jesters (1920s), servants (1930s), entertainers (1940s), troubled problem people (1950s), and angry militants (1960s), though never moving away from the predominant representations of the 'tom', 'mammy', and 'brute black buck'.⁶¹ As we explore the glaring inequities of the colour challenge in what follows, we will pay particular attention to the African American response.

Edwin Porter's 12-minute silent, black and white, motion picture of *Uncle Tom's Cabin* (1903) visually debuted the 'tom', originally in black-face. Whether harassed, flogged, enslaved, or insulted, 'toms' always kept the faith never turning against their *massas* and endearing white audiences to them. Not until 1914 did an African American actor, 72-year old Sam Lucas, portray Uncle Tom. Nonetheless, the docile depiction fixed the 'tom' label for any black, on screen and off, approximating Uncle Tom's bowing and scraping demeanor. The black actor Bill 'Bojangles' Robinson (1930s) would vivify the 'tom' type. His on-screen success with Shirley Temple, America's sweetheart, captured American hearts in a relationship described by Bogle (2001: 47) as 'the perfect interracial love match'. The reconstructed 'tom', as represented most vividly with blackface, reinforced white

60. Of note are Cab Calloway, Harry Belafonte, Ethel Waters, Pearl Bailey, Diahann Carroll, Eartha Kitt, Mahalia Jackson, and Ella Fitzgerald of the 1950s; Ossie Davis, Brock Peters, Jim Brown, Cicely Tyson, and Richard Pryor of the 1960s and 1970s; Fred Williamson, Ruby Dee, Billy Dee Williams, Richard Roundtree, O. J. Simpson, Ken Norton, Pam Grier of the 1970s; Louis Gossett Jr., Carl Weathers, Danny Glover, Eddie Murphy, Whoopi Goldberg, Denzel Washington, Spike Lee, and Morgan Freeman of the 1980s; and Whitney Houston, Angela Bassett, John Singleton, Wesley Snipes, Samuel L. Jackson, Ice-T, Ice Cube, Queen Latifah, Mario Van Peebles, Laurence Fishburne, Cuba Gooding, Jr. of the 1990s.

61. Donald Bogle (2001) also identifies the 'coon' and 'mulatto' types as prominent during this era. The 'coon' type formed a triumvirate with the 'pickaninny' (nameless black children with eyes popping out and hair on end; e.g. *Our Gang* characters Stymie and Buckwheat), 'Rastus' (the unreliable, lazy, watermelon-eating character; e.g. Stepin Fetchit and Rochester), and 'Uncle Remus' (similar to the tom though naïve and given to comic philosophizing) sub-types. The 'mulatto' type, usually a fair-skinned woman, typified the truly liminal identity, not quite black and not quite white, experiencing no sense of belonging (e.g. Dorothy Dandridge).

control by insinuating that black problems would easily be solved through submission to their masters. On and off stage America seemed willing only to embrace blacks who placed white interests ahead of their own with anti-black violence erupting against those failing to conform to the stereotype. Yet throughout the twentieth century, African Americans shifted toward self-empowerment by, among many acts, defying the white reconstructed Uncle Tom image. African American actor Charles Gilpin quit the cast for the 1927 Hollywood production version of *Uncle Tom's Cabin* because the white director refused to modify some of the offensive aspects of the stock Uncle Tom character. The more that African Americans sought to distance themselves from 'tom', however, the more tenaciously the image clung around. Nevertheless, African American playwright Robert Alexander produced the politically inflammatory *I Ain't Yo' Uncle: The New Jack Revisionist 'Uncle Tom's Cabin'* (1991), and presents Tom as defiant, witty, and determined, especially to articulate his own representation and to sentence Stowe to listen to the version as told by the story's characters. 'I said we're doing this play! Wid new dialogue...and scenes YOU left out! Scenes that show me in a new light...So tonight—let me lift my voice and sing, 'til the earth and heavens ring' (as quoted in Turner 1994: 86). More importantly, Alexander's version draws a continuum between slavery and contemporary economic, social, and cultural problems plaguing African Americans. That his version lacked in public appeal in comparison to the 1987 politically correct, Showtime version only underscores the latter's status and commodification as 'emblematic of race relations as a whole in the United States' (Turner 1994: 87).

The 'mammy', from the well-known children's series *The Bobbsey Twins* (1904), was a 'plump, good-natured Negro woman' who would fiercely defend the sanctity of the white household, even against other blacks (Pieterse 1992: 152). Hattie McDaniel of the 1930s perfected the role winning an Academy Award. US companies adopted the mammy type to create the offshoot Aunt Jemima. The success manufacturers had with integrating the Aunt Jemima symbol into US culture had a profound impact on both the image that blacks had of themselves and that whites had of blacks (see Kern-Foxworth's (1994: 61-113) detailed treatment of the Aunt Jemima image, its promotion in advertising campaigns, and its metamorphosis throughout the twentieth century). Aunt Jemima functioned as an icon of generalized servitude in nostalgic re-presentations of blacks as domestic servants who tended to white children in the slavery plantation days. Advertisers capitalized on the image's public appeal by plastering the image on numerous products (e.g. cookie jars, black rag dolls, creamer and sugar dish sets, spoon rests, butter dishes) that circulated well into the twentieth century, and still found in any curio or antique shop. The US public opted for

a re-presentation of black women, whereas Ida B. Wells, the early Aunt Jemima's contemporary, was eventually forgotten in the US historical consciousness perhaps because of her anti-lynching, desegregation in the federal workplace, and racial equity campaigns that threatened the status quo (Turner 1994: 49-50). Similar icons of servitude continue to circulate in US public life with the Cream of Wheat chef (originally 1893, present form from 1925), named Rastus, and Uncle Ben's rice (originally 1946 when Frank Brown, a Chicago *maitre d'*, posed for the portrait). Television shows like *Julia* (1968) and *Gimme a Break* (1981) acknowledged new vocational opportunities for African American women though still tethered to the mammy type because of their roles serving white needs—Julia as a registered nurse, clad in uniform, and nurturing white children; and Nell as a former cabaret singer turned housekeeper whose life revolved around a white family.

The 'brutal black buck' type had its most forceful impact upon the American public with D. W. Griffith's *The Birth of a Nation* (1915). Griffith presented all Negro types so powerfully as to touch off a firestorm of controversy denouncing the movie as the most slanderous anti-Negro movie ever and Griffith as racist (e.g. NAACP picketing the premiere, civil rights' and religious organizations' protests, and newspaper editorials). This type conjoins the black brute and the black buck, the former *only* being more physically violent, an outlet for sexual repression. The bucks were the big, baaddd niggers, oversexed, violent with a lust for white women, intentionally represented to arouse white hatred. The film industry would later revisit the 'buck' type in the 1970s with Melvin Van Peebles' *Sweet Sweetback's Baadasssss Song*, *Shaft*, *Super Fly*, and *Melinda*, all of which reinforced the stereotypic re-presentation of blacks as oversexed (Bogle 2001: 234-42). Such sexually overt re-presentations of the black man easily led to the 'blaxploitation film' that played on the black audience's need for heroic figures with an unrealistic image of the all-powerful brutal black man (e.g. jock-turned-movie stars Jim Brown and Fred Williamson in the 1960s and 1970s).⁶² Black athletes naturally revived the 'brutal black buck' type with none embodying both images better than boxer Jack Johnson. Johnson became the first black

62. These movies simply reflect their times—the violence of Vietnam, the sense of betrayal with the Watergate scandal, the rage and despair over a racially corrupt system. Prior to the 1970s the Hollywood industry remained mired in its 'brotherly-love everything's-going-to-be-dandy escapist movies' while the mass of US culture had sped past with certain social developments. Martin Luther King, Jr's philosophy of nonviolence was virtually dead by 1966; Malcolm X had been assassinated; Stokely Carmichael had arrived; Watts, Detroit, Harlem, south Philadelphia, Cleveland, and Washington, D.C., had exploded with riots; and the President's National Advisory Commission of 1968 (aka Kerner Commission) reported that America was 'moving toward two societies, one black, one white, separate, and unequal' (as quoted in Bogle 2001: 219).

heavyweight-boxing champion (1908-15) by defeating Gene Tunney that set off race riots throughout the major urban areas of the US. His disregard for the *code noir* and numerous affairs with and marriages to white women further elicited white rage. Achievements of early black sports figures like the Brown Bomber Joe Louis (1930s and 1940s), Jackie Robinson, who broke through the colour barrier of Major League Baseball in 1947, and the feats of Jesse Owens at the 1936 Olympics in Munich, Germany challenged theories of white supremacy and the myth of racial inferiority. Unfortunately, the successes of the 'black athlete' and stereotypes associated with it would limit the arena of success for blacks within US society.

Advertisers perpetuated these re-presentations of African Americans, especially capitalizing on the appeal of sports personalities and the 1980s success of Michael Jackson's *Thriller* album and Bill Cosby's television sitcom 'The Cosby Show' (Kern-Foxworth 1994: 52). For the longest time, however, African American presence in advertising was marked by their absence via stereotypical re-presentations.⁶³ Advertising agencies never considered the African American market in their campaign strategies until 1962 when some agencies began integrating blacks into their staffs as a means of bridging the communication gap between advertising and African American communities. But they did not appear in ads until after 1968, and even then only out of guilt following the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. A concurrent concern was the black image in the American mind (e.g. the negative stereotypes on television that hinder social and occupational progress of blacks, that teach self-hate, and that reinforce the myth of white superiority). The Civil Rights Movement's focus 'to attain equality in housing, education, employment, voting, and the use of public facilities' extended even to pejorative images of blacks in advertising. Civil rights 'organizations threatened, boycotted, and excommunicated companies for their insensitivity toward blacks' (Kern-Foxworth 1994: 126). In addition, the Ad Watch Committee of the Black Media Association would send out both complimentary and critical letters to advertisers in its effort to fight stereotypes. Critical letters were sent out on the basis of criteria such as blacks portrayed as using slang; black women as single parent moms; as living in low-income housing; as criminals, unemployed, and/or welfare freeloaders; as replicating the following stereotypes: the overbearing black woman, the savage African, the happy slave, the vicious criminal, the sexual

63. Advertisements in white-oriented mass-circulation magazines (e.g. *Time*, *Sports Illustrated*, *Woman's Day*, *Newsweek*, *Vogue*, and *Esquire*) from 1959, 1969, and 1979 reveal blacks as either absent altogether from mainstream advertising or portrayed in stereotypical roles. Only mounting pressures from various civil rights organizations prompted reconsideration of these subtle re-presentations of blacks (Kern-Foxworth 1994: 134).

superman, the natural-born athlete, the chicken and watermelon eaters, and intellectually inferior to whites (Gist 1992: 3). By the 1980s advertisers included blacks through 'integrated advertising' though by projecting a distorted world or by 'pigeon-holing' blacks into advertising only certain products. Advertisements moved away from depictions of blacks in low-skill labour occupations to more professional occupations while continuing to perpetuate re-presentations of blacks as sports figures (27 percent compared to under 5 percent for whites in *Gentleman's Quarterly*; 68 percent compared to 15 percent for whites in *Sports Illustrated*, both from July 1988-July 1991; Kern-Foxworth 1994: 140-41). Of those African Americans (a visible minority) appearing within the majority of major mainstream US magazines, they were either portrayed in stereotypical roles or had their visual impact 'whitened' (being pictured with or obscured behind whites). Such images have an indelible impression on African American self-perceptions and on Euro-American perceptions of blacks (Sturgis 1993: 23).

The news media has done much to perpetuate misinformation and re-presentations about African Americans despite their higher visibility. Research of news media, types of stories covered, and representations of ethnic groups reveal the liminal place of blacks in a white-dominated media where, for example, only Michael Jordan and Oprah Winfrey graced *Time* and *Newsweek* covers (8 January 1996-6 September 1999), which visually illustrate the normal, prototypical American. The impressions left from such images reveal the subtle modern racism distinct from the now politically incorrect traditional racism. Responses from a telephone survey of white Indianapolis residents with follow-up face-to-face interviews by Robert Entman and Andrew Rojecki (2000: 24-25) exemplify modern racism. Of the responses, 76.8 percent strongly agreed/agreed with the statement that since Irish, Italians, Jews, and many other minorities overcame prejudice to work their way up, Blacks should do the same without benefit of special favours; 77.8 percent felt most Blacks on welfare programs could get a job if they really tried; and 58.2 percent believed that Blacks could succeed as well as Whites if they only tried harder. Such responses reflect latent stereotypic perceptions of Blacks as lazy within a culture that since the 1950s has moved positively toward greater tolerance *in principle* but not *in practice*. Entman and Rojecki concluded that white racial thinking fell between the attitudes of ambivalence and animosity.⁶⁴

64. White racial thinking at the animosity level remains oblivious to the subtle yet systemic advantages conferred by the legacy of White privileges—e.g. government-subsidized mortgages and highways for all-White suburbs, tax-exempt and subsidized private and public universities throughout the South (the highest concentration of black population), and government sanctioning of all-White unions blocking occupational mobility for blacks (Entman and Rojecki 2000: 19-21).

News media images of blacks at the local and national levels perpetuate negative re-presentations by entrenching black stereotypes within the public consciousness. Two basic scripts emerge from the samplings of typical, local news stories: (1) 'crime is violent', and (2) 'criminals are nonwhite' (Gilliam et al 1996: 8). In a sampling of Chicago local newscasts from 1 December 1989-10 May 1990, Robert Entman (1992) focused on 321 of 429 stories about crime, further subdivided into violent and non-violent categories, where the race of the accused was made known. Of the accused given a name *in toto*, 72 percent were white compared to 28 percent black; of the accused for a violent crime given a name, 67 percent were white compared to 43 percent black; of the accused shown in motion, 66 percent were white compared to 52 percent black; and of the accused being physically held, 18 percent were white compared to 38 percent black. Statistics from one 1993-1994 sampling virtually remained unchanged (Entman and Rojecki 2000: 83). What do these samplings conclude, and what is their cumulative effect at the symbolic level? First, Blacks accused of committing a violent crime are more likely to be denied an identity, which suggests the lack of individuation whereby to homogenize significant differences among individual members of an out-group. Second, Blacks accused of committing a violent crime were less likely to be shown in motion, which symbolizes them as being non-human. Third, Blacks accused of committing a violent crime are more likely to be shown being physically held, which symbolizes them as dangerous.⁶⁵ By heightening White tendencies to link social threats of violence and danger to Blacks, local news media re-presentations (perhaps motivated by ratings, sensationalism, and politics, and not necessarily in that order) froze the culturally liminal status of African Americans rather than counterbalancing such stigmatizing images with portrayals of blacks as law-abiding, contributing citizens of society, or as Rothbart and John (1993: 43-44) note, 'we give too much weight to those individuals who confirm the stereotype and not enough weight to those who disconfirm the stereotype'.

Analysis of samplings from 3 10-day periods of the ABC, CBS, and NBC nightly news programs in January, February, and March 1990, and

65. White racial beliefs directly contributed to more punitive crime policy views. During the anti-drug media blitz of the 1980s that spawned stiffer penalties for drug crimes, the unconscious focus on race was apparent. Punishments involving crack cocaine (consumed mostly by blacks) were more severe in comparison to those involving powder cocaine (consumed mostly by whites), despite the chemical equivalence of both drugs. Blacks constituted approximately 40 percent of all persons arrested for drug offences. Media shifted its focus away from white, suburban drug users to violent, black, inner city drug users (Reeves and Campbell 1994).

from full verbatim transcripts of the ABC nightly news from January–June 1990 and July–December 1991 yielded not-so-surprising data. First, of the stories involving blacks, 46.4 percent, nearly half, fell into the crime and victim categories suggesting 'blacks as threats to or non-contributing victims of American society' (Entman 1994: 511-12). Second, blacks accused of violent or drug crimes comprised 77 percent of network stories (17 of 22) in comparison to 42 percent for whites (19 of 45).⁶⁶ Third, Blacks were virtually non-existent in human-interest stories, politics, and government policies. Even where news stories featured prominent black leaders such as Colin Powell (7 percent), Marion Barry (23), Jesse Jackson (14), and Clarence Thomas (89), they did so reflecting the reality of few blacks in top government leadership positions (Colin Powell and Louis Sullivan), or, of those present, accused of some crime (sexual harassment by Clarence Thomas, and drug charges against Marion Barry), or as extremely controversial (Jesse Jackson). Videotape samples of 4 randomly chosen weeks of evening news from ABC, CBS, and NBC in 1997 yielded little difference in the disparity of re-presentations distorting reality (Entman and Rojecki 2000: 64-67). Whites dominated 75.5 percent of all news stories with black voices noticeably non-existent in areas of technical expertise (e.g. science and economics) or common experiences of Americans (e.g. disasters, foreign affairs, death/rituals). Their voices did appear quite prominently, however, in sports/entertainment, discrimination, and crime stories, all stories contributing heavily to black stereotypes. For example, blacks appeared 3 to 4 times more often than whites in crime stories. Such frequent and overt connections of blacks to crime and victimization in news stories constructs and reifies African American identity in terms of rebellion and violence. Note the news coverage of the 1992 Los Angeles riots, a racially integrated disturbance with Latinos and quite a few Anglos constituting the majority of arrests contra media re-presentation of African American identity as violent and rebellious.

The inextricable association of African Americans with violence has roots extending into the 1960s and beyond. Many discussions of Negro activities in the 1960 riots cautioned against conforming to the stereotype (see Abrahams 1970: 229-49). Blacks intended protest, not revolt, with the riots, though their opportunity to attain self-respect and an identity beyond that assigned them by the dominant in-group manifested itself in

66. Nobody denies the higher than average rate of unlawful activities among poor, black males in comparison to whites (US Department of Justice 1998, Table 4.10). However, these stories represent only a portion of black reality in that these same males experience higher rates of discrimination, unemployment, inadequate education, and single-parent upbringing, to name but a few (Entman 1994: 512).

patterns determined in large by their conversion of white stereotypes. They transformed white stereotypes to develop mechanisms of resistance to use against the dominant majority. What form that resistance should assume was never a foregone conclusion within the African American community though leaders on both sides of the debate relied on biblical imagery. In 1959 Robert F. Williams, president of the Monroe, North Carolina chapter of the NAACP advocated armed resistance to racist terror in the 1950s and 1960s (the precursor to black militancy in the 1960s and 1970s) in his debate with popular civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr. Williams's insistence on the right to defend oneself against racial violence resonated with many African Americans. His experience of the post-Cuban Revolution on a 1960 visit left him awestruck. As Callahan notes (2006: 202), 'For Robert Williams, Jesus was the image of the revolutionary and the revolutionary was the image of Jesus'. Reliance on biblical imagery also informed King's resistance within the Civil Rights Movement that sought the 'Promised Land' of full citizenship for Blacks within 'the Egypt of segregation'. Freedom—from police brutality, from housing discrimination, from voting inequities, from educational and religious segregation, from debilitating poverty, from unfair wage practices—constituted but a portion of the full rights and privileges as first-class citizens of the US that King dreamt for African Americans. His 'I Have a Dream' speech (28 August 1963; in King 1992: 102-06) regaled in Isaianic imagery to co-opt the lion-lamb predator-prey motif in a messianic banquet scene with sons of former slave owners and sons of former slaves sitting down together at 'the table of brotherhood'. In effect, King's dream partly sought a reunification of two disparate Christianities within the US—one Black and prey, the other White and predator. Several examples from King's 'Letter from a Birmingham Jail' (16 April 1963; in King 1992: 86, 88) illustrate the point: (1) Rev. Shuttlesworth and leaders of the Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights broke a negotiated promise that Birmingham, Alabama storeowners would remove humiliating racial signs; and (2) Ready answers elude the 5-year old's question marked with agonizing pathos, 'Why do white people treat colored people so mean?' On the eve of his assassination, King bequeathed a legacy and challenge not unlike that of Moses to the Israelites. 'We've got some difficult days ahead. But it doesn't matter with me now. Because I've been to the mountaintop. And I don't mind... I just want to do God's will. And He's allowed me to go up to the mountain. And I've looked over. And I've seen the promised land' (3 April 1968; in King 1992: 203).

For King, justice that would carry in its train freedom would neither come about easily nor certainly through the influence of Jesus' claim to bring a sword. Unlike Williams, King (1958: 27) advocated

a nonviolent direct action stance. 'I have not come to bring this old negative peace with its deadening passivity. I have come to lash out against such a peace...I have come to bring a positive peace which is the presence of justice, love, yea, even the Kingdom of God'. King was acutely aware that violence as a tool for advancement appealed to many Negroes but demurred such a position because 'violence never solves problems' but 'only creates new and more complicated ones', such as 'bitterness in the survivors and brutality in the destroyers'. The 'direct action' component to his nonviolent stance offered a means of resistance and assumed a variety of forms, e.g. mass boycotts, sit-down protests and strikes, sit-ins, mass marches, and prayer pilgrimages or vigils. These acts of resistance had a resolute purpose: never to humiliate or to defeat the white man, but to bring about redemption and reconciliation. King also cited the additional purpose 'to win his (white man) friendship and understanding', an echo of the Euro-American approach with Native Americans in previous centuries (1960; as quoted in King 1992: 68). The nonviolent direct action approach sought 'to awaken a sense of shame within the oppressor' who would 'be forced to stand before the world and his God splattered with the blood and reeking with the stench of his Negro brother' (1958, 1957; as quoted in King 1992: 31 and 27, respectively). However treated though, King cautioned, the Negro must not 'drink[ing] from the cup of bitterness and hatred' to respond in retaliatory violence. The manner of Negro resistance to unjust laws characterized the nature of its civil disobedience contra the uncivil disobedience of segregationists. King explains, 'In the face of laws they consider unjust, the racists seek to defy, evade and circumvent the law, and they are unwilling to accept the penalty. The end result of their defiance is anarchy and disrespect for the law'. The civil disobedience of King's nonviolent direct action program had a direct bearing on African American identity and the freedom to shape that. What had distinguished the African American community from surrounding ethnic groups in their relation to the dominant in-group was that many blacks had accommodated to Euro-American culture and white stereotypes of themselves. King (1956; as quoted in King 1992: 5) remarked that 'many Negroes lost faith in themselves and came to believe that perhaps they really were what they had been told they were—something less than men'. Other ethnic groups could cling to those traits emphasizing their cultural distinctness when threatened whereas Negroes could not, hence a concerted effort among many to reconnect with African historical and cultural roots and connect with the quest to forge an African American identity by the Black Consciousness Movement. The civil disobedience of African Americans, claimed King, provided a

new sense of self-respect and dignity to replace the former self-pity and self-deprec(i)ation.

Despite the accomplishments wrought by the civil disobedience of the Civil Rights Movement, the colour line still remains a challenge within the education sphere as it relates to income (see Fig. 13 below). In 1990 the median income for black families was \$16,627 in comparison to \$22,401 for white families, an increase from the 1975 mean income \$6,190 in comparison to \$8,815. Over that period of time black family income barely changed at all. By 2000 the black family income had increased to \$26,204 in comparison to \$37,346 for white families, and to \$33,333 in comparison to \$45,542 for white families by 2007. Though black incomes increased, they did so always remaining behind white income. In fact, the only ethnic group to out-earn whites were Asians (only then above the \$30,000 income mark). Educational attainment also factors into this inequity of income. As the income of blacks increased with a college education, so did that of whites. Compare the 2007 mean income of \$47,153 for 16 percent blacks with a college degree to that of \$59,644 for 31 percent whites. At the higher end of the educational attainment spectrum, 6 percent of blacks with an advanced degree earned \$64,247 in comparison to \$82,900 earned by 11 percent of whites. The disparity even reaches to the lower end of the educational attainment stratum when comparing those not high school graduates, e.g. \$17,439 for blacks in comparison to \$23,015 for whites. Thus, the myth of not having an education obviously does not account for the glaring inequity of income between whites and blacks. Small wonder that many young blacks lose hope within a system that denies them an equitable distribution of privileges naturally granted to a class who cannot (or will not) see the race-based nature of such a system. Marked by indifference, inaction, and slow decay, the silent, insidious violence of institutions proves more deadly than the violence against King (Kennedy 1968).

Educational Attainment & General Income																
	Total Earnings (Mean)		Education - Not HS Graduate		Education - HS Graduate				Education - Bachelor's Degree				Education - Advanced Degree			
	Whites	Blacks	Whites	Blacks	Whites	Blacks	Whites	Blacks	Whites	Blacks	Whites	Blacks	Whites	Blacks		
			Income	Income	Pct.	Income	Pct.	Income	Pct.	Income	Pct.	Income	Pct.	Income	Pct.	
2007	45,542	33,333	23,015	17,439	89	35,647	80	27,096	31	59,644	16	47,153	11	82,900	6	64,247
2000	37,346	26,204	19,147	15,201	84	27,122	72	21,789	26	51,351	14	41,513	10	72,356	5	52,373
1990	22,401	16,627	12,773	11,184		18,257		14,794		39,780		26,448		41,908		32,962
1975	8,815	6,190	6,438	4,989		8,005		6,281		16,079		9,473		16,920		12,333

Figure 13. Table of Educational Attainment and General Income Adapted from Hacker (1992: 93-106, 134-46) and US Census Bureau (2003, 2008).

Conclusion

Throughout many decades of discontent, African Americans sought to eradicate a system that entrenched the dehumanizing institution of slavery (with its stalwart defenders appealing to God, the Bible, and science) and identity construct ('slave') reinforced by numerous re-presentations. On 29 July 2008 the US House of Representatives officially apologized to African Americans for the institution of slavery and racial segregation through its successor Jim Crow, and committed to rectifying their lingering consequences (e.g. 'loss of human dignity and liberty, the frustration of careers and professional lives, and the long-term loss of income and opportunity'; US House of Representatives 2008). And why did so many defend slavery against the face of human(e) reason? For the same reason that Samari(t)ans || Israelites were devalued and dehumanized—economics. When anticipating the economic boon potentially deprived by the loss of its free labour force, the colonizer quickly galvanized its position of control and authority within a cultural system that circumscribed identity and roles therein. And religion became a powerful force co-opted in this process. Against the Samari(t)ans || Israelites, religion enforced a system of subservience to a certain class who would reap every benefit imaginable to Samari(t)an disadvantage. Forced labour, redistribution of northern capital, suppressed linguistic markers, and miscegenist tendencies disenfranchised Samari(t)ans in a religio-cultural system re-presenting them as 'rebellious' or 'violent'. Re-presentations identifying the uncanny, not *quite like us* Samari(t)ans as rebellious, however, occlude their true Yahwistic identity. Only in their refusal to accept the *golahs'* ethnic cleansing tactics to assert an identity on their own terms do the Samari(t)ans || Israelites appear as 'rebellious'.

Similarly, African American identity and roles were proscribed within a cultural system that denied them the opportunity to define their own identity in addition to basic rights and privileges as citizens. Religion enforced a system of subservience to a particular race even well after the oppressive presence of slavery had transmuted into the equally oppressive Jim Crow laws denying them access to equal housing, education, and employment opportunities, to name but a few. The force of such practices marginalized African American presence from the centre of a cultural system where Euro-Americans benefited from the authority over and control of goods, capital, and resources. Re-presentations of African Americans with 'Uncle Tom' and 'brute beast' images entrenched public opinions in a reciprocal manner. But rather than imitate the white, most African Americans resisted the 'Uncle Tom' and 'brute beast' identities assigned them through the civil disobedience stance of nonviolent direct action (see King 1992: 25).

Many African Americans resisted to forge their own identity because they believed in the *real* America, not unlike those Samari(t)ans who regarded themselves as the *true* 'Israel' who had settled the land and, like African Americans, had "'manured it" with blood. The land was theirs, the country was theirs' (Bennett 1987: 181). Unfortunately for some African Americans who sought a sense of identity, they did so never apart from the language of the dominant class always expressed in negative terms and, therefore, simply emulated the character trait proscribed for them—violent and rebellious. Nevertheless, even in such instances, it must be remembered that such expressions should not be decontextualized for they say absolutely nothing about the character disposition of an ethnic group but rather a socio-cultural system that scripted both identity and behaviour of African Americans as colonized, always mirroring the reflection of the colonizer who cannot (or will not) see. For example, Samari(t)an resistance and their religiously 'rebellious' nature reflected back that of the Judean golahs throughout their history. And African American 'violent' resistance mirrored the violence of Euro-Americans in the American Revolution and the slavery era. Ralph Ellison's (1952) *Invisible Man* character emblemizes the larger cultural resistance of African Americans (and perhaps Samari(t)ans) to stereotypes of themselves to construct an identity based on their own terms, and not as 'other'.

I am an invisible man. No, I am not a spook like those who haunted Edgar Allan Poe, nor am I one of your Hollywood ectoplasms. I am a man of substance, of flesh and bone, fiber and liquids—and I might even be said to possess a mind...When they approach me they see only my surroundings, themselves, or figments of their imagination—indeed, everything and anything except me.

EPILOGUE

West meets East. Or so has been part of the ideological focus for this book. Euro-Americans who typologically identified themselves as 'Israel' to assert their hegemony over other ethnic groups had more in common with their typological counterparts beyond simply an Exodus/Promised Land ideology. For instance, their migration, their idea of the west for their expansion, the allotment of lands once in the west (the 1785 Act of Congress divided and sold lands west of the Appalachian mountains), and the superior attitude from the west unites them with Joshua and the Israelites. The perspective of the West has always regarded itself as authoritative, the sole possessor of Truth. But why so since, as Okihiro (2001b: 27) observes, 'geographies are neither predetermined nor fixed'. Decolonizing the West and a history of 'Israel' that has relegated the presence of one ethnic group to the margins of obscurity (Samaritans) and others to nonexistence (Moabites, Edomites, Ammonites) questions such a privileged status. Re-presentation via stereotypes facilitated the colonization process whereby 'Israel' could assert its control of and authority over the 'other'. Analysis of this form of re-presentation that constructed differences reveals more commonalities than differences between 'Israel' and its 'other'—Edomites/Native Americans as civilized with 'Israel' as savage; Moabites/Latin Americans as intelligent with 'Israel' as stupid; Ammonites/Asian Americans as shrewd with 'Israel' as the deceitful opportunist; and Samari(t)ans/African Americans as religious devotees with 'Israel' as rebellious and violent. Border identities that intended to distinguish and isolate insider from outsider are not real, but only imaginary.

Within US history alone, examples abound of constructed differences in the colonization of the 'other', those *not quite white*, and their subsequent isolation to the cultural periphery. Perhaps nothing best emblemizes the national sentiments of Anglo superiority/non-Anglo inferiority in the nineteenth century than the contrast between White City and the Midway Plaisance exhibitions at the 1893 World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago, the hub of the Midwest. A microcosm of West meets East, White City clearly was the centre piece of the fair in full view of the public contra the Midway Plaisance tucked away and behind with only a gravel

walkway connecting the two attractions. In fact, the Exposition's *Official Guide* stated that the Midway Plaisance was not even part of the fair. A souvenir book further stated, 'The Plaisance is a side show pure and simple' (as quoted in Okiihiro 2001b: 31). White City, a utopian fantasy, openly displayed the progress and civilization of the modern West with replicas of its crowning achievements (e.g. the Statue of Liberty, the US Capitol building, and the latest technological developments in water, sewage, sanitation, and transportation), whereas the Plaisance, a 'paradise of Babel', exemplified the regress and barbarism of the ancient world (East) with its dirtiness and decadence (e.g. oriental villages; crowded, narrow streets; Orientals in need of soap and water; and the eroticism of Asian women dancers). In addition, the (dis)placement of ethnic groups exhibited at the fair was quite telling linking both White City and the Midway Plaisance in a manner more intimately than the average fairgoer may have perceived. For at one end of the exhibit were the Anglos and at the exact opposite end were African and Native Americans with various ethnic representatives in between. The layout of ethnicities and their cultures re-presented signified a racial evolution spectrum of sorts, if you will—the apex of civilization at one end followed by successive stages along the spectrum down to the 'savage races' at the exact opposite end. Yet for all the social Darwinist pretenses of this microcosm of the nineteenth century US, the connection between White City and the Midway Plaisance revealed the presence and contributions of the 'other' in 'self' that would not remain hidden as well as the presence of 'self' within 'other' made visible through re-presentation highlighting the fact that 'a white man's country America never was and never would be' (Okiihiro 2001b: 32-41).

19 January 2009...the date symbolically emphasizes Okiihiro's point. The eve of the inauguration of the 44th President of the US, Barack Hussein Obama, the first African American president, Martin Luther King Jr. holiday could not have had more significance. King's prophetic words 'I've Been to the Mountaintop...I may not make it to the Promised Land with you, but we will get there together' (1968) rang true in a symbolic way on 20 January 2009. As I watched coverage of the date's inauguration ceremonies, typological imageries and allusions to biblical characters and events (influenced no doubt by my work on this book) flashed through my mind. Martin Luther King Jr., a Moses figure, saw the Promised Land only to never enter or to enjoy its fruits leaving that benefit for successive generations. Reflecting on the day's events that night, I recalled a comment I had overheard: 'This is a big deal for blacks. I didn't realize how important this was for them'. And I thought, 'No, we really don't'. But then how could 'we'? Having never been denigrated and marginalized on the basis of skin colour; having never experienced the brutish realities of depersonalizing and dehu-

manizing institutions like slavery and Jim Crow as a race; having never been denied citizenship privileges while placated by rhetorical affirmations that 'we are all created equal'; 'we' could never fully appreciate the emotional gravity elicited deep within by such a momentous occasion. The symbolism of this event, not simply the event itself, points to a long-existent reality in the US never quite acknowledged within the mainstream. 'We' have always been multi-ethnic and multi-racial.

The rich tapestry of the US story and identity has always been woven with the cultural heritages and traditions of the 'other'. Hopefully now US society, with an already visibly multi-ethnic Congress, has reached its cultural watershed moment to move beyond the identity of a *real* American with whiteness to embrace its multi-ethnic, multi-racial identity. To echo the eloquent words of Rev. Joseph Lowery's (2009) inauguration benediction, perhaps 'we' have reached the point 'when black will not be asked to get in back, when brown can stick around...when yellow will be mellow...when the red man can get ahead, man; and when white will embrace what is right' in ways that 'Israel' did not for Ammonite, Moabite, Edomite, Samari(t)an, or Canaanite.

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